Northern Mozambique at a Crossroads

Scenarios for Violence in the Resource-rich Cabo Delgado Province

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Judd Devermont

AUTHOR
Emilia Columbo

A Report of the CSIS AFRICA PROGRAM

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Executive Summary

The government of Mozambique has a rapidly shrinking window within which to implement a more comprehensive and effective strategy to weaken the Ahlu Sunna wa Jama (ASWJ) insurgents in Cabo Delgado and prevent the group from becoming an entrenched, long-term security problem. This report projects that the security situation in Cabo Delgado will most likely deteriorate during the next 18 months if the ASWJ insurgency continues to recruit new fighters and maintains a high frequency of attacks, as they have done since October 2017. Another key destabilizing factor is a government response that prioritizes military action over community development programs as its primary line of effort against the group. The government’s heavy-handed counterinsurgency approach risks further alienating the local population, driving them to lend active and passive aid to the militants.

While the complete pacification of the group is unlikely during the next 18 months, a concerted whole-of-government approach would help undercut the group’s momentum. This includes outreach to the local community, programs, and policies designed to address specific grievances, and the use of targeted military operations. Maputo’s partners in the international community and private sector also have an important role to play. They can leverage their political influence and financial resources to press the Mozambican government to shift its current approach toward one that addresses the underlying grievances driving the insurgency. In doing so, Maputo and its partners have a better opportunity to not only undercut the present violence but potentially prevent future armed groups from emerging.

Scope Note

This paper lays out potential scenarios for the trajectory of violence in Cabo Delgado during the next 18 months based on two primary drivers: insurgency capacity and government strategies to address the violence. This paper does not seek to predict likely outcomes of the conflict. Rather, it provides a framework to analyze the situation’s progression and identifies indicators that would point to the emergence of any of the four scenarios discussed in this paper. This paper is informed by the proceedings of a CSIS conference that took place in June 2019, “Understanding Extremism in Northern Mozambique,” a structured brainstorming exercise and scenarios generation, and consultations with Mozambique experts in academia, the private sector, and U.S. government.
**Information Gaps**

We chose to use scenarios as our analytic methodology for this paper because a paucity of publicly available information about both the militants’ objectives and the government’s strategy make any analysis of the situation in Cabo Delgado highly speculative. ASWJ has not publicized its ideology or goals and has never confirmed its links to local, regional, and international extremist networks. We characterize the group as an insurgency because it has displayed behavior consistent with an organization seeking to control a population and its resources through the use of irregular military force. The difficulties in conducting research in both Cabo Delgado and southern Tanzania limit available information about the group’s recruitment practices, funding sources, target set, and relationship with civilians. The government similarly has kept its security priorities, plans, and strategies to counter the group secret.

**Wild Cards**

Wild cards—inherently unpredictable events such as an unexpected death or disaster—can abruptly shift the trajectory of insurgencies throughout the world. For example, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) quickly collapsed as an insurgency after the death of its founder, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002. We have identified a number of wild cards that we assess would invalidate our key assumptions and significantly alter the trajectory of violence in Cabo Delgado:

- Emergence of a charismatic leader capable of providing the extremists with a unifying ideology and a more cohesive, centralized structure;
- Eruption of pockets of violence in other parts of the country at a level that requires the government to reduce its military or police presence in Cabo Delgado; and
- The winner of the presidential election makes a sudden, unannounced change in the government’s approach to Cabo Delgado.
1 | Conflict at a Crossroads

On October 5, 2017, a group of armed men attacked three police stations in Moçimboa da Praia, starting nearly two years of violence and insecurity that still show no sign of ending. Between the first October incident and August 27, 2019, extremists conducted 173 attacks—79 percent of which were committed against civilians—resulting in over 350 deaths, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED).1 There is no consensus on the name or construct of the group committing the violence, but for the purposes of this paper, we will refer to the group as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ), which is one of the several names that observers and local communities have ascribed to the militants.2

The militants have not published an official ideology or specific grievances but are probably looking to create a new social order that would afford them greater economic and political power. A government indictment from July 2019 against alleged militants in Mozambican custody claims the group wants to create an independent nation that covers northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania. Locals also report hearing that the group wants to impose Sharia law in the area and that recruited individuals shun family and friends who disagree with their religious views and activities.3

- Mozambican experts in academia and local press note the insurgency is most likely rooted in the historically unequal distribution of political and economic power among the predominant ethnic groups in the province. ASWJ is most likely comprised predominately of Mwani youth, a group that is historically Muslim and whose livelihood and identity are rooted in coastal resources and culture. At the same time, the Makonde, President Nyusi’s ethnic group, have over time seized control of most of the business opportunities in the province, steadily marginalizing the Mwani and setting the stage for conflict.4
- The current generation of youth are frustrated with the lack of economic opportunities and religious marginalization within their community. Declining economic

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2. Locals also call this group al Shabaah, or “the youth,” because they are young people from the community. Other reports indicate the group is known locally as “Swahili Sunna,” an apparent reference to the region’s past connection with Swahili communities in East Africa.
opportunities, combined with a growing alienation from traditional social structures, provide the organization with fertile ground for recruitment. Mozambican observers, as of June 2019, argued that the group ultimately wants to provide their members with economic opportunities because the youth believe that foreign investment in Cabo Delgado has failed to produce ample job opportunities.\(^5\) Government crackdowns on artisanal gem mining, relocation of some Mwani fisherman away from their traditional homes, and the growing presence of foreigners drawn to the area by potential job opportunities have introduced increased economic stressors on the local population.\(^6\)

- Although most evidence suggests ASWJ is driven by local grievances, African media outlets have reported that individuals from outside the region contribute to its ranks. Among those arrested by Mozambican authorities in connection with the insurgency are Tanzanians, Congolese, Ugandans, Gambians, and Burundians.\(^7,8\)

Since October 2017, the group’s tactics and operations have been fairly unsophisticated, and most attacks have been conducted in predominately Mwani territory. Members of the Mozambican security forces, however, are reportedly complicit in providing ASWJ with more advanced weapons and training.

- When ASWJ’s attack locations are overlaid with a base map depicting the percentage of Makua language speakers—which is the only one of the three languages available in survey data—most of the attacks (93 percent) have been conducted in areas with a low-density of Makua speakers. Moreover, ASWJ appears to have switched its tactics in 2019, refocusing on its operations on the coast and road networks and retreating from previous efforts to expand its footprint into Cabo Delgado’s interior.\(^9\) (See map on page 5)

- Attack survivors report the militants rely on rudimentary and easily accessible weapons, such as machetes, but press reports from June and July 2019 suggest the group continues to acquire weapons from attacks against Mozambican security forces. The group reportedly first used an improvised explosive device in March 2019 in an attack against the Mozambican military, suggesting an evolution in tactics.\(^10\) Local media reports from 2018 also claim disgruntled former Mozambican police have provided some training to its fighters.

At the same time, the government has relied heavily on repression—such as arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate violence, and the closure of mosques—to counter the group, measures that have likely further alienated a society already at the margins, even as some government officials have traveled to the region to inaugurate various economic initiatives.

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## Timeline of Key Security Events in Northern Mozambique

### 2010—2011
*Anarko and Eni discover gas reserves.*

### 2012—2015
*ASWJ emerges as a religious organization.*

### 2013
*Conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO resumes.*

### 2015
*ASWJ forms a military cell as tensions with local civil and Muslim leaders grow.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2017</strong></td>
<td><strong>MAY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2017</strong></td>
<td><strong>DECEMBER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2018</strong></td>
<td><strong>MAY 27, 2018</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2018</strong></td>
<td><strong>MARCH 26, 2018</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>JUNE 4, 2019</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>JUNE 26, 2019</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>APRIL 2019</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>MAY 31, 2019</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• African press reports suggest as many as 400 people have been arrested since October 2017. According to a UNDP study from 2017, 71 percent of interviewed former extremist group members said they joined these groups in response to violent or repressive government actions against them or those close to them.\(^\text{11}\)

• The government has issued contradictory explanations to the public about the causes of violence in Cabo Delgado, refused to communicate its plans to manage the conflict, and treated reporters looking for answers harshly. This has almost certainly heightened anxiety among the civilian population and increased distrust in the government, a situation that will favor the militants.\(^\text{12}\) Mozambican officials have publicly blamed violence in Cabo Delgado on bandits, fake entrepreneurs tricking youth into violence, and artisanal miners.\(^\text{13,14}\)

• Maputo has entered into security agreements with Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, India, Russia, Tanzania, and Uganda with an eye to enhancing joint operations, training, and weapons acquisitions but with an attendant risk of learning equally counterproductive advice from countries that have a mixed to poor human rights records. Furthermore, none of these agreements seem to include support for population-centric programs to enhance governance and development.

• Despite an increase in security force presence in areas where ASWJ operates, locals report these forces regularly arrive well after militants have concluded their attack and left the scene. To the extent security forces have launched unilateral operations against the group, these efforts have not reduced the pace and scope of attacks. Mozambican security forces in October launched attacks against the militants with Russian assistance, reportedly disbursing fighters deeper into the countryside, but we have not seen information to indicate the long-term impact of these operations on the insurgents.\(^\text{15}\) Mozambican security forces are not trained in counter-extremist operations and lack the discipline, equipment, and intelligence information to effectively counter ASWJ alone.
ASWJ Attack Locations since 2017

Ethnic Distribution
- Makua
- Makonde
- Mwani

ASWJ Attacks
- 2019
- 2018
- 2017

Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration Blocks

Source: ACLED and Ethnologue
ISLAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

ASWJ’s beliefs and activities represent a dramatic shift from Islam’s historical presence in Mozambique, introducing a new dynamic within the country’s centuries-old and complex Muslim community. Islam in Mozambique can trace its origins back to the eighth century when the coastal communities of northern Mozambique constituted part of the Swahili and Indian Ocean trading and cultural networks. At that time, Muslims in northern Mozambique practiced a form of Islam common in Swahili-speaking East Africa, which incorporated elements of African culture and West Indian Ocean influences and came to be known as “Swahili Islam.” Portugal’s expanding presence in Mozambique eventually led to the decline of Swahili Islam in the central and southern parts of the country, but Islam remained relatively strong to the north because of its link with local chiefs and elites. In the late-1800s and early-1900s, two sheikhs arrived from Comoros to introduce two new Sufi orders to northern Mozambique, which became very powerful during the twentieth century. In the 1960s and 1970s, Wahhabism came to the area. While Muslims represent a minority nationally—about 18 percent of the population according to the 2017 national census—in Cabo Delgado, they account for 58 percent of the population.

Even as Portugal imposed stricter rules governing citizenship and rights within its colonial possessions, Muslim communities in northern Mozambique largely avoided these regulations and, in some cases, grew in size. When the FRELIMO government came to power in 1975, it quickly restricted religious activity as counter to its revolutionary ideals, but by 1981, the government began to fear that Muslim opposition to FRELIMO was spreading and could entice Muslim countries to intervene in the RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict in retaliation. To that end, FRELIMO consulted imams in Maputo to create the Islamic Council of Mozambique to serve as the official interlocutor between Mozambique’s Muslim community and Muslim communities and governments abroad. In 1983, the Islamic Congress stood up to represent the other Islamic groups excluded from the council, fueling a political rivalry between the two organizations seeking favor from the sitting government.

18. Ibid.
In June 2019, the CSIS Africa Program assembled a group of experts on Mozambique from the private sector, academia, and U.S. government to brainstorm the most likely scenarios for how violence in Cabo Delgado may evolve over the next 18 months. While myriad factors feed into the trajectory of violence, participants agreed that two factors are the most important drivers to the conflict: **insurgency capacity** and **government strategy**. Using these two drivers, participants developed four potential scenarios contingent on whether insurgent capacity increased or decreased and whether the government employed a more effective or less effective counter-extremist strategy.

Scenario One: Militants and a hostile government drive away civilians.

This scenario is largely an extension of the present situation on the ground, driven in equal parts by the militants’ expanding warfighting capability and the government’s unwavering commitment to using the military and police to eliminate the ASWJ threat. In this scenario, the militants increase recruitment, acquire more resources, and avoid most of the missteps that incipient insurgencies make. ASWJ sticks with what is working in terms of recruitment, leveraging social and familial networks to fill their ranks and bringing in new members with promises of small-business loans.\(^{19}\) ASWJ also capitalizes on growing discontent with government excesses to entice new members. Some civilians, fearful of the group’s growing strength, provide them with supplies, medical care, and intelligence on security force movements. What the militants are not given, they can easily take through slowly expanding areas of operation and using more aggressive attacks on transportation hubs and towns. We assume in this scenario that ASWJ’s reported ties to criminal organizations are accurate. We also assume that the militants have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and are benefiting materially from that relationship. The militants start accumulating enough resources to acquire more weapons and pay their fighters more than they would earn otherwise. As the security situation continues to decline and civilians flee the area in growing numbers, ASWJ leaders have an easier time holding territory that has been cleared of resistance and begin issuing edicts governing civilian behavior.

\(^{19}\) Habibe, Forquilha, and Pereira, “Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique.”
MILITARY FORCES SNAPSHOT

**Title:** Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM)

**Services:** Army, Navy, Air Force

**Total Military Personnel:** 11,200 (estimated)

**Budget:** $86 million; less than 1 percent of GDP (2016)

**Key Partners:** Portugal, United Kingdom, France

The present-day FADM arose from the Rome Peace Accords of 1992, which ended the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO and established new criteria for the military. The Rome Accords dictate that the FADM should number about 30,000 members, but only 11,000 FRELIMO and RENAMO fighters volunteered to join. In 1997, parliament enacted a conscription law, but eligible conscripts tend to avoid service, and those that do follow through with their commitment typically leave when their time is up. The military is characterized by low pay and benefits, a high proportion of unserviceable equipment, and inadequate training, resulting in low morale. Despite the creation of a military academy in 2005 and an institute for higher defense studies in 2011, most soldiers lack sufficient training and education. Upon completion of basic training, soldiers are most often deployed on humanitarian or infrastructure improvement missions and rarely receive further training. These issues point to a larger, strategic problem: successive governments have struggled to define the military’s priorities and plan a long-term budget to fund acquisitions and provide appropriate training to the armed forces, leading to a weakening of command and control and accountability.

Driving this scenario from the government side is a focus on heavy-handed military and police tactics to combat the growing insurgency. Maputo is increasingly concerned about the threat the militants pose to foreign investment projects and decides the best course of action is to continue increasing military pressure on the group. The government remains wary of negotiations and of increasing existing projects to help relevant communities, in part because it judges that community building and infrastructure improvement programs would only help the militants. The government deploys more soldiers and police to the area—despite competing security priorities in other parts of the country surrounding national elections—

25. Ibid.
because we assume in this scenario that safeguarding foreign investment is its highest security priority. The security forces continue to follow loose rules of engagement and expect that they will not be held accountable for human rights violations, resulting in a surge of arbitrary detentions, harassment, and extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and their supporters. Mozambican security forces increase joint operations with their Tanzanian counterparts, also known for a heavy-handed approach to extremists, while Maputo pursues additional security agreements with countries willing to sell more advanced military technology to assist government forces in eliminating the insurgent threat.

THE ISLAMIC STATE IN MOZAMBIQUE
We cannot validate the Islamic State’s claims that it has established a presence in Cabo Delgado. ASWJ has never officially announced its existence nor publicly stated its endgame; however, based on its area of operations and reports from locals, we judge the group emerged in response to economic and social grievances rather than a desire to become part of a larger movement. ASWJ has not commented on claims that the Islamic State was behind three attacks in Cabo Delgado in June and July 2019. We have seen limited change in the group’s operational capability, strategy, or target set since June to suggest Islamic State exerts control or direct influence over the group. ASWJ continues to operate primarily along the coast—where the Mwani are most populous—and along major roads. More importantly, ASWJ’s total lack of international outreach and messaging, including any acknowledgment of the Islamic State’s claims, is indicative of a group that, for now, has no interest in courting foreign support and is most likely messaging at a very local level to the audience it seeks to serve and threaten.

However, we cannot discount the possibility that the two organizations may eventually develop an allegiance. Given ASWJ leadership’s reported ties to East African extremists and the group’s loose structure, the Islamic State or one of its East African affiliates could eventually co-opt a breakaway cell or the group as a whole. Conversely, ASWJ’s leadership could leverage its contacts within the extremist community abroad to pursue a closer relationship to the larger Islamic State organization if such ties could provide the organization the means of achieving its localized goals through better training, access to more effective military equipment, or financial resources. We expect that a closer relationship between the two organizations would be preceded by an official announcement from ASWJ, as has been the practice with Islamic State affiliates in West Africa. Indicators that the relationship between the two organizations is developing would include: the introduction of international propaganda videos and press releases from ASWJ highlighting its activities in Cabo Delgado; public statements from ASWJ promoting Islamic State successes in Africa; and a shift in tactics that more closely resembles those that Islamic State affiliates use.

The implications of this scenario would include growing frustration among the Mwani—who face the brunt of ASWJ violence. The Mwani would face an untenable situation whereby they cannot rely on government forces to keep them safe nor assume that ASWJ will treat them fairly, given the group’s reputation for extreme violence. These civilians, many of whom are living hand-to-mouth, would flee in growing numbers as they lose the ability to farm their land or make a profit from fishing, the primary livelihoods of Cabo Delgado’s coastal population. The absence of these resources creates food insecurity in pockets of the province where violence is worst, while the arrival en masse of starving, traumatized people creates economic and social pressures in neighboring areas of Mozambique and Tanzania. Media coverage of this looming humanitarian crisis would be difficult, as both Mozambique and Tanzania are hostile to researchers and journalists, but word starts leaking out, drawing negative international attention on the area.

Furthermore, the grievances that have fueled the violence would remain unresolved in a scenario where the government ignored population-centric policies to undercut the insurgency in favor of military operations, contributing to creating a long-term, intractable security problem. When an insurgency survives its incipient stage, research suggests that the conflict between government and insurgents will last an average of 10 years. If the counterinsurgency strategy fails to undermine support for the insurgents, the conflict could last even longer. In fact, grievances against the state would almost certainly grow more pronounced, as security force abuses reinforce negative perceptions of what is probably seen as a Makonde-led government. Indeed, in July 2019, a video began circulating via social media showing an alleged Mozambican military unit torturing a civilian who failed to answer a question to their satisfaction about his presence in the area. Civilian harassment and torture have become commonplace in Cabo Delgado, heightening fear and tension there. Government abuses would likely be the primary driver behind ASWJ’s growing capacity, as more people join forces with the group either out of fear or to avenge wrongs dealt to them at government hands.

Indicators that we are moving closer toward this scenario would include:

- Increased refugee flows out of Cabo Delgado’s littoral region;
- Increased reports of excessive violence from both sides;
- Increased harassment of journalists and clergy who are trying to report on government activities in the province;
- More frequent reports of Mozambican military hardware acquisitions and agreements with foreign countries;
- Reported arrests of ASWJ members in connection with criminal activities, such as timber and gem smuggling; and
- Reports of more complex and frequent ASWJ attacks.

**Scenario Two: The government celebrates a false victory.**

In this scenario, ASWJ starts losing battlefield initiative and its ability to project power, but the government nonetheless ramps up its enemy-centric approach to Cabo Delgado. There is a convergence of intense security force operations and classic insurgent blunders, a dynamic that resembles in part the final phase of Sri Lankan operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).\(^{30}\) Most insurgencies take about three years to establish themselves, suggesting that ASWJ is probably still in its incipient stage and more vulnerable to missteps. In this scenario, ASWJ falls into a series of traps that undermine its momentum, such as attempting to expand into areas where it lacks local support and undertaking operations that leave it overexposed. The group never manages to articulate a coherent ideology to broaden its appeal and starts to lose adherents who are disillusioned with the group’s failure to make good on recruitment promises. The lack of a charismatic leader leaves the group vulnerable to internal divisions, and splinter groups start to form. Local community leaders establish civilian militias to counter ASWJ and rid the area of these fighters, a phenomenon similar to what occurred in western Colombia in the 1980s and in northeastern Nigeria in the 2000s.

Even as militant operations slow down and produce fewer casualties, the government does not let up military operations. Maputo’s priority continues to be to protect foreign investment, so the government approves “extraordinary measures” to ensure the group is truly routed and unable to stir up trouble again. The security services start to take even bolder risks and take the fight to ASWJ instead of just responding belatedly to the group’s most recent attack. This harsher strategy reflects the government’s confidence that its total military strategy is working in Cabo Delgado, combined with its concern that the group could return to arms, as RENAMO did in 2013. Even if Maputo’s various security agreements have not completely come into force, the government is in a position to unleash specialized, foreign-backed units to capitalize on some of ASWJ’s mistakes. It is almost certain that reports of arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings will increase in this scenario because military planners would seek to arrest or kill every ASWJ member or perceived collaborator. With the aftermath of national elections to manage, the government does not expend sufficient resources in addressing the grievances that gave rise to the militants, arguing that the conflict is effectively over and that resources would be better spent on other pressing issues. The government eventually declares victory in the province.

In this scenario, the government’s “victory” is ultimately a hollow one. A RAND study of 71 insurgencies since World War II shows that of the 33 cases where governments pursued a repressive strategy, 23 ultimately lost to the insurgents.\(^{31}\) The immediate outcome would be that private-sector stakeholders enjoy some peace to get their investment projects off the ground, while regional and national governments use the end of active hostilities to focus on other pressing security and economic issues.

However, the issues that gave rise to the conflict would remain unresolved, and the number of people seething over government abuses would eventually outnumber those

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30. Paul et al., Paths to Victory.
31. Ibid.
who are relieved to see the fighting come to an end. The list of grievances and distrust of central government will have grown as a result of what the population views as a total disregard for the rule of law. Once the government moves on to the next domestic or foreign issue, Cabo Delgado is once again left to benign neglect, and the risk of a return of violence will increase. With no reintegration programs in place, the region will have a new pool of young people with fighting experience and few alternative prospects, increasing the risk of recruitment into regional radical groups and potentially the regrouping of a stronger, smarter ASWJ. This dynamic partly resembles the resurgence of the Shining Path in Peru. After Peruvian authorities arrested the Shining Path’s charismatic founder in 1992, the group essentially collapsed, and its fighters retreated to their homes inside Peru. But a decade later, they resurfaced—albeit at a much smaller scale—because Lima never addressed the social and economic conditions that led to the group’s initial creation.32

Indicators that we are moving closer toward this scenario would include:

- A steady decline in attacks against government and civilian targets;
- Reports of multiple successful military operations against insurgents;
- Increasing reports of arrests and extrajudicial killings; and
- A government announcement that ASWJ has been defeated.

Scenario Three: Maputo’s ill-timed strategic shift empowers the insurgency.

In this scenario, we assume the militants have successfully avoided making any significant strategic errors and have used the government’s past abuses as an effective messaging tool to expand the group’s base, allowing it to grow in size and increase operational tempo. The militants have effectively disrupted governance in the littoral region and resumed probing attacks beyond their coastal safe haven. As the militants’ influence in the region grows, we see the local population resigning itself to ASWJ’s control. Many join ASWJ as fighters or collaborators, and fewer families send their children to state-run schools or visit public medical facilities, in keeping with the militants’ radical views. ASWJ’s success also attracts more attention from Islamic State affiliates in East and Central Africa, who doggedly pursue greater collaboration with the group.

Government security officials and provincial leaders observe the group gaining strength, despite two years of government repression, prompting Maputo to recalibrate its approach to pacify Cabo Delgado by moderating its use of violence and pursuing talks with the militants. Since the first attack against the police station in October 2017, the government had been primarily using military means to weaken the militants but with little impact on the group’s capabilities. In an effort to change the course, Maputo identifies an interlocutor from ASWJ to begin talks and leverages assistance from foreign donors to pursue more community development and citizen security programs, such as creating a community police force to build trust with the locals and start chipping away at the militants’ influence. However, Maputo’s community-building efforts are too little, too

### ASWJ’s Strengths and Weaknesses as an Insurgency

This table presents a list of factors influencing the success of insurgencies, a description of each factor, and how well ASWJ activity corresponds to each factor. For an incipient insurgency to transition into an established insurgent group, it must grow its size and resources to meet the demands of its overarching goals. Factors in an insurgency’s ability to establish itself include the creation of a broadly appealing group identity; the ability to compete with resource rivals; the creation of a safe haven; the employment of strategic violence; and effective recruitment and logistics. Outside the insurgency’s control, but still important to its success or failure, are the state’s strategy toward the group’s use of violence and the potential for external support to aid the group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>FACTOR DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>ASWJ STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Identity</td>
<td>The group uses propaganda to create a group identity that undermines other potential group identities, such as national or religious ones, through the use of propaganda. The broader an identity the group can create, the more supporters it can recruit.</td>
<td>ASWJ is closely identified with Islam and the Mwani ethnic group because its activities are highly concentrated in an area where this group is dominant. We have not seen information to suggest the group has developed and disseminate a message that would incorporate other marginalized groups in the province or beyond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcompete Rivals</td>
<td>A successful group will push aside any other group or organization that may draw on the same pool of resources.</td>
<td>No available information suggests that ASWJ is competing with a rival armed group for dominance in the Cabo Delgado.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Haven</td>
<td>A strategic move to a remote area can provide respite from military, police, and intelligence operations.</td>
<td>ASWJ currently uses the Mwani coast as a safe haven. There is potential for the group to also take advantage of the border with Tanzania and corruption within the security services to make a safe haven in southern Tanzania. Access to boats can provide an easy escape to islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Violence</td>
<td>Violence is used to undermine popular confidence in government and to scare moderates into providing support to insurgents.</td>
<td>A lack of accessibility to the region hinders outside observers from measuring the effect of strategic violence on the civilian population; however, given the province’s long history of marginalization, confidence in the state was probably already low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Actions</td>
<td>States that rely heavily on repression to manage the conflict tend to fare worse and inadvertently create more grievances, potentially legitimizing the insurgents.</td>
<td>Press reports indicate the government is favoring repression, to include mass arrests and censorship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>Foreign actors provide insurgents assistance without restrictions, potentially enhancing the group’s political or military operations.</td>
<td>The Islamic State periodically claims a presence in Cabo Delgado. There have been no reports of state support to ASWJ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruits</td>
<td>The group is able to leverage the broader relevant identity it created to recruit outside its original base, thus growing sufficiently to wage a full-blown insurgency.</td>
<td>Analysis of ASWJ operational areas suggests the group is probably composed predominately of Mwani, potentially hindering the group’s ability to grow unless it can appeal to other communities in Cabo Delgado and beyond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>The insurgents develop sources of supplies not easily obtained from civilians, such as military materiel.</td>
<td>Mozambican press has reported multiple instances of ASWJ fighters stealing military and police weapons and possibly uniforms. A recent Mozambican press report suggests the insurgents may have tapped into the black market.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
late. The militants assess the government is negotiating from a position of weakness and exploit the opportunity to rest, train, and reevaluate its strategy going forward, dragging talks on for an extended period of time without any intention of reaching a conclusion.

One implication of this scenario would include the government losing credibility in its management of violence in Cabo Delgado, not unlike what the Pastrana government in Colombia experienced when it created a demilitarized zone within which to launch ultimately doomed talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1998. In this scenario, ASWJ is ascendant, has few incentives to engage in sincere negotiations, and could use its influence to undermine government community programs aimed at dissuading militant supporters.

Indicators that we are moving closer toward this scenario would include:

▪ Reports of a partial withdrawal of troops from Cabo Delgado;
▪ Reports of sustained ASWJ activity beyond its littoral areas of operations;
▪ Rumors of deal-making between government officials and ASWJ leaders; and
▪ Targeted assassinations of local leaders.

Scenario Four: Mindful government approach brings improved stability.

This is a scenario-driven by a waning insurgency and a thoughtful government—in many ways, the ideal scenario for long-term peace and stability. ASWJ commits some serious strategic errors. The militants become overconfident from shaming the Mozambican military with successful operations against state and civilian targets and attempt a coordinated attack on multiple targets or a large-scale operation outside their Mwani-dominated safe haven, resulting in high casualties within the organization and leaving them vulnerable to military responses. This expression of insurgent hubris happened in Greece in 1948 and for the Kurds in 1977, setting the stage for these groups’ weakening and eventual defeat.33

The other key driver of this scenario is a government that has finally accepted that military might alone will never remove the security threat in Cabo Delgado and that a more holistic and well-considered strategy is required. In this scenario, the government adopts a raft of initiatives and reforms to apply a whole-of-government approach to the problems afflicting the area. Focusing on the underlying causes, Maputo, in partnership with NGOs, works with local community leaders to hear their grievances and find a way forward. The government ensures this effort is well-resourced, hiring local staff and implementing special projects. This spurs locals, including religious leaders, to buy into the central government’s plans. There are renewed discussions with private-sector representatives to discuss ways foreign investment projects can best support this population-centric strategy.

In addition to pursuing civilian-focused programs, Maputo develops a more precise military strategy to create a security environment that would allow for the gradual

33. Ibid.
implementation of these policies. Mozambican military and intelligence officials work closely with their Tanzanian partners to better secure the border and push within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for better systems to share traveler data to reduce the risk of foreign fighters entering Mozambique and bolstering the militants.\textsuperscript{34} Maputo might decide to work with foreign advisers—from Europe, the United States, or even Colombia—to help train special units within the national police to conduct limited patrols in rural areas, winning locals’ trust and gaining access to actionable intelligence on ASWJ movements. The military internalizes special training on human rights to minimize violence against noncombatants, and the government prosecutes anyone in violation of these rules of engagement. The government puts in place specific policies for managing detained militants and implements a demobilization and rehabilitation program for those willing to lay down their arms.

This scenario provides the best chance at long-term stability in Cabo Delgado. A RAND study of insurgencies indicates that a balance between eliminating both insurgents and the causes of insurgency through both military actions and government reforms have a better chance of ending insurgency than those that focused exclusively on repression.\textsuperscript{35} In this scenario, the government’s focus on local issues and the inclusion of community leaders create a dramatic reduction in violence. The government’s decision to implement reintegration programs in the community would undermine ASWJ’s claims to moral authority and begin mending some of the long-standing issues between the province and the central government. While some ASWJ fighters continue to operate, the group is reduced to a manageable police problem and no longer threatens the state or investors.

\textit{Indicators that we are moving closer toward this scenario would include:}

- The government announcing a whole-of-government strategy;
- More precise military operations against legitimate hostile targets;
- Reports of decreased extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests;
- Reports of decreased civilian displacement;
- Reports of increased ASWJ defections; and
- A sharp decline in militant attacks.


\textsuperscript{35} Paul et al., Paths to Victory.
### Scenario 1

**Characteristics**

- a. ASWJ capitalizes on growing discontent to recruit new members
- b. ASWJ strengthens ties to criminal groups and ISIS
- c. The government deploys more troops, committing human rights abuses

**Select Indicators**

- Increased reports of excessive violence from both sides
- Increased harassment of journalists trying to report on government activities
- Reported arrests of ASWJ members in connection with criminal activities
- Reports of more complex and frequent ASWJ attacks

**Implication**

A combination of unresolved grievances and harsh military tactics creates a long-term, intractable security problem.

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### Scenario 2

**Characteristics**

- a. ASWJ is unable to broaden its appeal, experiencing a loss of supporters
- b. The government increases its military campaign, seeking to destroy the insurgency
- c. The government fails to address grievances that gave rise to the militants

**Select Indicators**

- A steady decline in attacks against government and civilian targets;
- Reports of successful military operations against insurgents
- Increasing reports of arrests and extrajudicial killings
- Government announces that ASWJ has been defeated

**Implication**

The government’s robust military response and insurgency’s missteps contribute to an initial lull in fighting, but it sets the stage for an eventual resumption of conflict.
Characteristics

a. ASWJ attracts more recruits and forges partnerships with other extremists
b. The government struggles to win militarily, calling for talks with the militants
c. The militants use negotiations to rest, train, and tighten their grip over communities

Select Indicators

• Reports of sustained ASWJ activity beyond its littoral areas of operations
• Reported sightings or arrests of growing numbers of foreigners in Cabo Delgado
• Rumors of deal-making between government officials and ASWJ leaders

Implication

ASWJ's superior position enabled them to undermine the government and expand their area of operations.

Characteristics

a. ASWJ overextends itself militarily, undercutting its local support
b. The government works with local communities, increasing employment opportunities
c. The government develops a more precise military campaign, removing ASWJ leadership

Select Indicators

• The government announcing a whole-of-government strategy
• More precise military operations against legitimate hostile targets
• Reports of increased ASWJ defections
• A sharp decline in militant attacks

Implication

A balance between eliminating insurgents and addressing root causes of the insurgency provides best chance for long-term stability.
3 | Policy Options

Maputo, its international partners, and the private sector are still within the window during which an insurgency can be repelled before it becomes an entrenched, long-term problem, but this opportunity is quickly dissipating. Maputo must recognize ASWJ as a real threat to the government’s authority in Cabo Delgado and develop appropriate policies in conjunction with regional neighbors, international governments, and foreign investors to deal with the group accordingly; the government cannot dismiss them as bandits. ASWJ is still at a point in its evolution where it must strike a delicate balance between showing strength and avoiding government hits. This creates conditions where the group can easily make missteps, especially in the absence of a charismatic leader who communicates clear goals.

**Government of Mozambique**

Rolling back the militants is primarily Maputo’s responsibility. Doing so will require an approach that incorporates proportionate military action and holistic programs that address the fundamental economic and social issues that drove these youth to take up arms. These programs will likely take time to produce concrete results, and some issues may never be fully resolved. However, a good faith effort to improve the quality of life for Cabo Delgado’s residents—particularly its youth—will be an essential first step in improving trust between the government and local communities. This trust will provide tactical advantages to the government, such as intelligence on militant movements, members, and activities, as well as strategic gains. The British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya from 1952-1955 featured increased efforts to improve the quality of life of civilians, including initiatives to accelerate self-government and increase access to economic opportunities, community halls, and medical assistance—programs that helped increase civilian support to the counterinsurgents.

**Increase accountability of policy implementers in the field.** Mozambican forces at best have failed to provide security for its citizens and at worst have perpetrated human rights abuses. The country’s forward-deployed military and police units require human rights training and must be held accountable for their actions. Mozambican experts at CSIS’s conference in June 2019 noted that while Maputo’s official position is to arrest and prosecute suspected

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37. Paul et al., Paths to Victory.
militants, security services are reluctant to take prisoners because they contend that
arrested individuals will eventually be released and join the militants again. Security services
need training on how to handle combatants, civilian collaborators, and innocent bystanders
and should understand that they will be punished for failing to uphold these strictures.
For example, in 1950, the Filipino military’s new commander in chief instituted a series of
reforms to reduce abuses against civilians that improved morale within the military and
increased internal support. These reforms included firing several high-ranking officers,
increasing pay for the enlisted to reduce looting, and setting up a direct telegraph line to the
defense ministry office for villagers to use. In Colombia in 2008, the government quickly
arrested officers and soldiers implicated in a spate of extrajudicial killings that occurred
between 2002 and 2008, sending a strong message throughout the military and police
structure that human rights violations would not be tolerated.

A similar effort in Mozambique to identify and prosecute human rights violators would not
only show the military how seriously the government takes human rights, but it would
likely restore faith among some civilians that the government is committed to protecting
them, not just foreign investors. The Mozambican government includes a National Human
Rights Commission that has as part of its mandate the investigation of human rights
abuses in the military, and soldiers receive some instruction in human rights awareness;
however, restrictions on the commission’s ability to investigate abuses reduce the incentive
to abide by human rights laws, while low morale often diminishes soldiers’ compliance.

Create an informant program. Both the British in Malaya and the Filipino government
fighting the Huk rebellion at home launched programs to pay civilians for information
about insurgent activities, a move that resulted in a high-volume of leads. Since
ASWJ is primarily a local group, a similar program that rewards actionable intelligence
would provide the military with the information needed to launch more precise
counterinsurgency operations.

Establish reconciliation and reintegration programs. Maputo will need to develop a
localized program to help militants lay down arms and reintegrate into their communities.
In Rwanda, for example, to expedite justice for participants in the genocide, authorities set
up traditional dispute settling courts, or gacaca, around the country to allow perpetrators
and victims to face each other in a public forum. Given the close ties between militants
and the local communities, a Mozambican equivalent of traditional grassroots justice may
allow the militants to more quickly make reparations to the communities and reintegrate
than if they were prosecuted through the criminal court system.

Implement economic development programs. Experts and observers frequently cite
economic hardship among Cabo Delgado’s youth, particularly among those Mwani who are

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38. Ibid.
39. Joe Parkin Daniels, “Colombian army killed thousands more civilians than reported, study claims,” The
ualties-higher-thought-study.
40. Francisco Manetto, “Los ‘falso positivos,’ un capítulo oscuro de la historia de colombia,” El País, June 4, 2019,
issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library2/Country-Profiles/Mozambique-Background-Note#Management.
42. Paul et al., Paths to Victory.
experiencing reduced access to fishing, as an important driver for the insurgent movement. Some Mozambican experts argue that youth expectations for employment increased with announced foreign investment, creating even higher expectations for economic gains. Providing Cabo Delgado’s youth with gainful employment—in farming and fishing, as well as in the construction and service sectors—will be essential to pulling them away from ASWJ and preventing other youth from joining the group. We have not seen information to indicate how much ASWJ fighters are paid or how much recruiters promise to pay them, but the prospect of some income is a likely inducement for recruitment.

**Promote religious understanding and education.** An academic study from May 2019 suggests religious intervention is effective in moderating violent tendencies and attitudes. In countries where segments of the population have already been radicalized, such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, programs focusing on the militants’ religious re-education, psychological support, and reintegration into peaceful communities to replace the militarized communities of the Islamist groups have been useful in combating radicalism.

**Enlist women’s help.** Islam in northern Mozambique, with its roots in both local African tradition and Swahili Islam, has traditionally been matrilineal, providing women with roles of leadership and prominence within the society. Some press reports indicate that a significant number of young women are counted within the ASWJ’s ranks. Programs that leverage this tradition and empower women and girls would serve as a counterweight to some of the group’s messaging as well. Respected elder women within the community could serve as powerful voices to challenge the “new” ideas ASWJ adherents have brought to the region.

**The Region**

Creating a durable peace in Cabo Delgado rests on Maputo and the Mozambican people’s shoulders, but Mozambique’s regional partners will play an important role in creating conditions conducive to keeping both parties focused on a peaceful endgame. Some of Maputo’s neighbors, including Kenya and Tanzania, have questionable histories of human rights abuses in pursuing extremists in their own countries, so Maputo will need to pursue some of these relationships with care to avoid exacerbating the situation at home. Joint operations that result in violence against civilians could turn the militants against neighboring authorities. It could also push ASWJ further along the path of partnering with like-minded groups in neighboring countries, increasing the costs of regional collaboration.

**Enhance intelligence sharing.** Increasing communication between Mozambican security and intelligence services and their counterparts in the DRC, Kenya, South Africa, and Tanzania could help slow the flow of foreign fighters coming into Cabo Delgado. To the extent ASWJ benefits from illicit trade in natural resources, greater cross-border collaboration could help curb some of this activity, undercutting the financial resources ASWJ’s growth might require. Mozambique and other precious gem-producing countries and corporations could develop a system based on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to ensure these goods at least are not funding the insurgency.

**Improve border security.** Cabo Delgado’s geography largely favors the insurgents, who can melt into the dense forest or escape by boat. Close collaboration with Tanzania to at least reduce access to safe havens abroad will be an important factor in putting pressure on the insurgents. Academic studies on insurgencies indicate safe havens, particularly abroad, can be a lifeblood for a group on the ropes or developing its insurgency. Enhancing maritime monitoring of the area, paired with joint operations and patrols along the border, would help increase pressure on the militants. Maputo could leverage the experiences of countries in the Horn of Africa to develop best practices for monitoring its own seas. These operations would be especially effective if supported with actionable intelligence that prevents Mozambican security forces from targeting civilians. Publicizing successful operations would also help Maputo demonstrate to Mozambicans throughout the country that it is being careful and proactive in managing the ASWJ threat.

**The United States and International Partners**

Like Mozambique’s regional partners, the United States and international partners can play a supportive role, encouraging Mozambique to pursue the difficult and costly programs that will produce long-term stability in the region.

**Develop strategic partnerships with organizations and governments.** The Mozambican government should take advantage of the bilateral partnerships it has pursued in recent months to obtain assistance with human rights, counterextremism, and counterterrorism training for units deployed to Cabo Delgado. These same partners could also provide valuable advice in developing programs to promote education and community development. For example, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres during a bilateral meeting with President Nyusi in July offered UN counterterrorism support, including programs to educate at-risk youth to prevent them from joining extremist groups. In July 2019, the defense minister of India also promised his Mozambican counterpart anti-terror and counter-radicalization support.  

**Develop effective public messaging.** International and Mozambican media have been highly critical of the Mozambican government’s public messages regarding events in Cabo Delgado, citing contradictory statements about the cause and perpetrators of violence. Maputo’s trusted partners need to help the government develop a coherent and transparent message to allay fears and restore confidence that the government understands the problem and is taking effective measures to manage and prevent its spread. Partners could offer to embed a public relations specialist to assist the government in developing a coherent media campaign highlighting its efforts to help Cabo Delgado and its successes against the insurgents.

**The Private Sector**

The private sector, particularly foreign investors, have an opportunity to not only support Mozambican government efforts to address the quality of life for Cabo Delgado’s residents but to enhance their own image locally. Mozambican experts note that some Cabo Delgado residents complain that foreign investment, especially near the gem fields and

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LNG facilities, has deprived them of their livelihood, forced them from their ancestral lands, and denied them proper compensation for these losses. These experts judge that resentment over a loss of livelihood, which is perceived to disproportionately affect lower-income people, was a significant factor in driving the youth to violence. The perception that jobs related to foreign investment are going to outsiders, such as Zimbabweans, is further exacerbating the feelings of injustice.46,47

Create transparent hiring processes. Foreign investors can help chip away at ethnic, religious, and social divisions through the training and hiring of locals and by ensuring that its employment strategy considers the diversity of Cabo Delgado’s communities. Transparency in the hiring process could help reduce accusations of favoritism of one group or another while providing classes to job seekers to increase their competitiveness could help level the playing field. Providing youth with jobs that would enable them to achieve the cultural milestones of marrying and starting a new home would help undercut a major grievance within the militants’ primary pool of potential recruits.

Empower women by funding microenterprises. These microenterprises should serve the community and develop extractive industries. Some reports indicate a strong presence of women among the militants, and experts note women in Cabo Delgado have historically had important roles in the community. Empowering this segment of the population through microenterprise funding would be important in diminishing the pool of potential recruits for the militant group but also in engaging this critical demographic in the region.

Build community structures. As many as 9,000 farmers have fled Mocímboa da Praia alone since 2017.48 Providing Cabo Delgado’s residents—particularly in areas where people have been relocated—with the infrastructure to build communities, such as soccer fields and community centers, would help Maputo further realize community reconciliation programs and potentially reduce the risk of displaced youth joining the ASWJ. Building institutions, such as hospitals and schools, is also important to improving state relations with the community. Foreign investors enjoy a certain amount of leverage over the Mozambican government because of the importance these investments have for the national economy and are therefore in a prime position to hold Maputo accountable for implementing community development programs.

46. Bonate, “Islamic Insurgency in Cabo Delgado.”
About the Project Director and Author

**Judd Devermont** is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he served as the national intelligence officer for Africa from 2015 to 2018. In this position, he led the U.S. intelligence community’s analytic efforts on sub-Saharan African issues and served as the DNI’s personal representative at interagency policy meetings. From 2013 to 2015, he was the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior political analyst on sub-Saharan Africa. Mr. Devermont also served as the National Security Council director for Somalia, Nigeria, the Sahel, and the African Union from 2011 to 2013. In this role, he contributed to the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, signed by President Obama in 2012, and managed the process that resulted in U.S. recognition of the Somali government for the first time since 1991. Mr. Devermont spent two years abroad working at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria from 2008 to 2010.

Mr. Devermont is a lecturer at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs where he co-teaches a class on U.S. intelligence analysis on sub-Saharan Africa. He is also a senior adviser at Kupanda Capital, a pan-African investment platform, and at Fraym, a data analytics firm. Mr. Devermont is a frequent commentator in print, on radio, and on television, and he has testified before Congress. He has published articles in a range of journals, such as Foreign Affairs and African Affairs, as well as newspapers and magazines like Bloomberg, the Hill, Lawfare, and Mail & Guardian in South Africa. In addition, Mr. Devermont hosts Into Africa, a biweekly podcast series on African politics and policy. The views expressed in publications authored by Mr. Devermont do not represent those of the U.S. government. Mr. Devermont has lived in South Africa and Cote d’Ivoire, and he has traveled widely across the continent. He has a master’s degree in African studies from Yale University and bachelor’s degree in history from the University of California, Los Angeles.

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