PART SEVEN: CHINESE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OTHER ASIAN POWERS
Chinese Strategic Developments and Other Asian Powers

The U.S. naturally focuses on the prospects for Chinese cooperation, competition, and conflict with the U.S. As has already been discussed in dealing with China’s “belt and road” policies, however, China has growing strategic interests – and areas of tension and potential conflict – with many other states in Asia. As the following map shows, China shares a border with Russia – one of the two existing nuclear superpowers, and with Japan, Central Asia, Pakistan and India, and a range of South East Asia states.

While the bulk of its exports now travel by sea – and are likely to continue to do so – it is also seeking to develop high capacity rail routes to Europe, and pipeline networks through Iran and Central Asia to secure its energy supplies. Once again, Chinese grand strategy cannot separate its economic and military dimensions. It does, however, face several key military and economic challenges:

• Creating a stable strategic partnership with a Russia whose superpower status is now largely a function of its nuclear forces, and ability to threaten European states on its borders.

• Expanding its economic role in Central Asia while dealing with the challenge of Uighur minority interest in China and Islamic extremism, and the need to avoid tension with Russia as China’s influence increases in relative terms.

• Dealing with the tensions and potential conflicts between the two Koreas – seeking to both preserve North Korea as a friendly buffer state and secure its growing economic links to South Korea and Japan – as well as competing Chinese and Japanese claims as to islands, EEZs and air traffic zones.

• Dealing with long-standing tensions with India over their common border and the natural rivalry between Asia’s two largest powers, and in part by seeking to build strategic partnerships with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

• Seeking to expand its strategic influence and economic role in Southeast Asian states, some of which are strategic partners of the United States.

• Seeking to limit Australian military ties to the United States, and secure Australian trade and exports of key commodities.

As has been touched upon in the earlier economic data, China also has a broad internal interest in developing central and western China to both strengthen its economic and military power and reduce or eliminate serious poverty in China. The Chinese leadership has made it clear that such efforts have a high priority and are a critical element in ensuring China’s future development and internal stability.
China’s Land Borders in Asia
Comparative Asian Military Spending
China Leads Asian Military Spending

China’s claims regarding military spending, and the problems in estimating Chinese military spending and comparing it with other states, have already been discussed in other sections. They and apply as much to comparisons of Chinese spending with other Asian powers as they do to comparisons with the United States and Russia. It should also be noted that the comparisons shown include very different mixes of Asian states.

The range of estimates in the charts in this section make it clear, however, that China has sharply outspent other Asian powers since at least 2008, and that its rate of spending has continued to rise more quickly than that of neighboring states in recent years.

What is less apparent from summary metrics – but becomes very clear from a separate detailed comparison of the changes in Chinese forces with those in other Asian states – is that China has spent its military budgets with a far better focus and levels of effectiveness than most of its neighbors. This is particularly true of India, its only potential rival in size. China not only has invested better in modernization – and creating a domestic military industrial base, it has done a far better job of trading force size for force quality.

In broad terms, it is also clear from looking at IHS Janes and IISS reporting on the force developments in Asian states that only China, Japan, Taiwan, and the Koreas have made been able to steady efforts to expand and modernize their force levels. Some other states are funding particular aspects of their forces, but not on a balanced basis that would support joint warfare in their particular area of operations.
China versus Asia: IISS in 2016

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2017, p. 21
SIPRI Top Five Asian Military Budgets: 2017

China $228
South Korea $39.2
India $63.9
Japan $45.4
Australia $27.5

IISS/SIPRI Guesstimate of Comparative Asian Military Budgets: 2017

China versus Asia: IISS vs. SIPRI ($150 vs. $228 billion) in 2017

**IISS**

China officially earmarked RMB 1.02 trillion (US $150 billion in 2017 for defense, although this number is considered to exclude Key expenses such as research and development and arms imports.

This is a nominal increase of 7.1%. Compared to RMB955 ($U.S. 144 bn) in 2016.

The next highest were India (US $52.5bn and Japan US$46bn.)

South Korea spent $35.7 billion.

North Korean could not be estimated.

**SIPRI**

China leads continued spending increase in Asia and Oceania.

Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania rose for the 29th successive year.

China, the second largest spender globally, increased its military spending by 5.6 percent to $228 billion in 2017.

China’s spending as a share of world military expenditure has risen from 5.8 percent in 2008 to 13 percent in 2017.

India spent $63.9 billion on its military in 2017, an increase of 5.5 percent compared with 2016, South Korea’s spending, at $39.2 billion, rose by 1.7 percent between 2016 and 2017.

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2017, p. 21, and SIPRI Defense Expenditure Database
IISI — Top Asian Military Powers in 2018

Military spending in Asia and Oceania was $507 billion in 2018 and accounted for 28 percent of global military spending. Five of the top 15 global spenders in 2018 are in this region: China (rank 2), India (rank 4), Japan (rank 9), South Korea (rank 10) and Australia (rank 13). It is the only region in which annual growth has been continuous since 1988, and the 46 percent increase between 2009 and 2018 was by far the largest of any region.

The increase was due primarily to the rise in Chinese spending, which in 2018 accounted for 49 percent of total spending in the region, compared with 31 percent in 2009. Between 2017 and 2018, military spending increased in Central and South Asia (4.2 percent) and in East Asia (4.1 percent), while spending decreased in South East Asia (–0.8 percent) and Oceania (–2.9 percent).

There were substantial increases in all four subregions between 2009 and 2018, ranging from 20 percent in Oceania to 54 percent in East Asia. Military expenditure fell between 2009 and 2018 in only 8 of the 27 countries in Asia and Oceania, with data available for 2018. India’s military spending rose in 2018 for the fifth consecutive year, and was 3.1 percent higher than in 2017. At $66.5 billion, India’s spending was 29 percent higher than in 2009. Despite this rise, India’s military burden in 2018 was at one of its lowest levels since the early 1960s: 2.4 percent of GDP compared with 2.9 percent in 2009. Increases in Indian military expenditure are largely motivated by tensions and rivalry with Pakistan and China. Pakistan’s military spending in 2018 was $11.4 billion, making it the 20th-largest spender globally. Pakistan’s military spending has increased every year since 2009. It rose by 73 percent between 2009 and 2018 and by 11 percent between 2017 and 2018. Pakistan’s military burden in 2018 was 4.0 percent of GDP—the highest level since 2004. Military spending by Japan was $46.6 billion in 2018, almost unchanged from 2017 (down by 0.1 percent).

Japan’s military spending as a share of GDP in 2018 was 0.9 percent. In South Korea the upward trend in military spending since 2000 continued. In 2018 its military expenditure reached $43.1 billion, an increase of 5.1 percent compared with 2017 and of 28 percent compared with 2009. Australian military spending was $26.7 billion in 2018. It grew by 21 percent between 2009 and 2018 but fell by 3.1 percent between 2017 and 2018. Australia’s military expenditure, including major arms procurement, has risen over the past decade in response to a perceived increase in threats to its security.

Some of the smaller spenders in Asia and Oceania, such as Malaysia and Afghanistan, have made notable decreases over the past few years. Despite ongoing tensions with its neighbors over rights in the South China Sea and its strong economic growth in recent years, Malaysia’s military spending fell in 2018 (–8.2 percent) for the third consecutive year. The decreases are part of an effort to reduce the country’s budget deficit and debts. By 2017 Afghanistan’s military expenditure had dropped by 26 percent compared with 2009 but in 2018 spending increased by 6.7 percent to $198 million. Afghanistan’s military burden of 1.0 percent of GDP in 2018 is perhaps surprisingly low considering the high intensity of the conflict between the Afghan Government and the Taliban insurgency. However, most of the financial cost of the war in Afghanistan has been shouldered by the USA.

China and Southeast Asia
China and Southeast Asia

The Chinese 2019 Defense White Paper again presents only the positive side of China’s relations with its neighbors. As for U.S. official view of this aspect of Chinese strategy, there are two striking anomalies in the OSD and DIA coverage of U.S. competition with China. One – addressed later in this analysis – is the lack of any discussion of the size and nature of China’s holding of nuclear weapons. The second is the broader competition for economic and military influence, and strategic advantage – in the broad range of Southeast Asia states. The previous focus on the South China Sea touches on these issues but does not address the broader competition affecting arc of states from the Philippines to Bangladesh, and particularly the states near China’s borders – a competition that extend into the Pacific on an axis extending as far as Australia.

In the past, the U.S. emphasized strategic partnership with a number of these states – notably Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Australia – along worth growing ties to Vietnam. It also create the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a way of expanding its economic ties and influence. These efforts to create military strategic partnerships still continue but have had notably less priority in U.S. assessments of China.

For all of the occasional talk of arms races affecting in China in Southeast Asia, it is clear from both the previous military spending data and the detailed unclassified force data in open sources like the IISS and IHS Janes, that only Singapore and Australia are seeking to fully modernize their forces. Many have low standards of training and readiness, and large elements of their heavy equipment and aircraft are not operational. While a number of Southeast Asian and Pacific states have enough military forces to be important strategic partners to the U.S – notably Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam – no such state can seriously compete with China in expanding and modernizing its forces and all would need U.S. support in any serious military confrontation.

As for economics, the U.S. abandonment of the TPP effectively made this effort at regional cooperation a gift to China, while U.S. burdensharing efforts and trade policies/wars have further undermined U.S. economic competitiveness.

The data on Chinese trade – and other indications of the full size of Chinese investment – indicate that China already benefits from its trading relations with most SE Asian states although these are a comparatively small aspects of Chinese economic activity. China has made mistakes of its own – particularly in the form of poorly planned, managed, and cost controlled projects in Southeast Asian states — like its port project in Sri Lanka and its damn and power projects in Cambodia and Myanmar — that have indicated that China may be serving its own interests at a high cost to that of its neighbors. It also has sometimes confronted its neighbors over fishing, EEZ, and other claims and rights that have needlessly raised tensions between China and other states.

Nevertheless, China can easily afford to offer better terms and control over its project efforts, and its trade, investment, and development – rather than the military and claims issues in the region – that may well give China a lasting advantage over time if the U.S. continues its current emphasis on trade battles and burdensharing.
The China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) play positive roles in enhancing trust among regional countries through military exchanges and cooperation.

...With a commitment to building a community with a shared future in its neighborhood, China endeavors to deepen military partnership with its neighbors. The PLA keeps close contacts with the military leaderships of the neighboring countries. Given more than 40 reciprocal military visits at and above service commander level every year, high-level military exchanges have covered almost all of China’s neighbors and contributed to growing strategic mutual trust. China has set up defense and security consultations as well as working meeting mechanisms with 17 neighboring countries to keep exchange channels open.

In recent years, China has regularly held serial joint exercises and training on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and tactical skills with its neighboring countries, and carried out extensive exchanges and practical cooperation on border and coastal defense, academic institutions, think tanks, education, training, medical science, medical service, and equipment and technology. In addition, defense cooperation with ASEAN countries is moving forward. The military relationships between China and its neighboring countries are generally stable.

...Theater Commands (TCs), and border troops...strengthen security management along the border with Myanmar, so as to secure stability and public safety in the border areas...They have cleared mines from 58 square kilometers of land, closed 25 square kilometers of landmine area, and disposed of 170,000 explosive devices such as landmines along the borders with Vietnam and Myanmar.

China actively supports the institutional development of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), advocates common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia, and plays an important role in building an Asian security cooperation architecture.

In the principles of openness, inclusiveness and pragmatic cooperation, China actively participates in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms including the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue, Jakarta International Defense Dialogue and Western Pacific Naval Symposium, regularly holds China-ASEAN defense ministers’ informal meetings, and proposes and constructively promotes initiatives to strengthen regional defense cooperation. The China-ASEAN Maritime Exercise-2018, the first between Chinese and ASEAN militaries, was held in October 2018 and demonstrated the confidence and determination of the countries in maintaining regional peace and stability.

...Upholding amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in its neighborhood diplomacy, China is committed to building an amicable relationship and partnership with its neighbors, and peaceful resolution of disputes over territory and maritime demarcation through negotiation and consultation. China has settled its border issues with 12 of its 14 land neighbors and signed treaties on good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with 8 countries on its periphery.

China holds it a priority to manage differences and enhance mutual trust in maintaining the stability of its neighborhood. China has proposed a China-ASEAN defense ministers’ hotline and established direct defense telephone links with Vietnam and the ROK. It has kept contact through telephone or fax, and conducted border meetings and joint patrols, with the militaries of the countries on its land borders on regular or irregular basis. Since 2014, five high-level border meetings between China and Vietnam have been held.

Regional Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Year of inception</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The forum has a membership of 27 countries and is the official multilateral platform for security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Since 2015, China has hosted important meetings and events including the ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting, the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue, the ARF Heads of Defense Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting, and the ARF Security Policy Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing Xianglan Forum</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>This annual forum is co-hosted by the China Association for Military Science and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies. The Xianglan Forum was upgraded to a track-1.5 platform of international security and defense dialogue in 2014. It was renamed the Beijing Xianglan Forum in 2018. The forum advocates the principles of equality, openness, inclusiveness and mutual learning. In Oct. 2018, the 8th Beijing Xianglan Forum was held with the participation of over 500 representatives from 67 countries and 7 international organizations. The forum expected strong positive energy into regional and international security cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangri-La Dialogue</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>The forum has a membership of 27 countries and is the official platform for security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Since 2015, China has hosted important meetings and events including the ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting, the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue, the ARF Heads of Defense Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meeting, and the ARF Security Policy Conference. The dialogue is hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank based in London, and co-hosted by the Ministry of Defense of Singapore. It is held in early June every year in the Shangri-La Hotel in Singapore. At the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, the Chinese delegation, on the topic of “Strategic Implications of Military Capability Development in the Asia-Pacific”, explained the important proposition of President Xi Jinping on building a new model of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind, and actively promoted a joint effort with relevant countries to maintain regional security and stability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Exercises Since 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States/Organizations</th>
<th>CodeName</th>
<th>Location and Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>China-Vietnam Joint Naval Patrols in the South China Sea</td>
<td>Held in the South China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia, Thailand</td>
<td>Peace and Friendship Joint Military Exercise</td>
<td>Held in Malaysia in Oct. 2018 by militaries of China, Malaysia and Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>Maritime Exercise-2018</td>
<td>Held in Shenzhen and the maritime and air space to the east in Oct. 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Selected Southeast Asian and Oceanic Asian Military forces in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Laos</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense spending USD</strong></td>
<td>26.56</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>4.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Active Military</strong></td>
<td>57,050</td>
<td>157,050</td>
<td>124,300</td>
<td>395,500</td>
<td>25,500</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>142,350</td>
<td>72,500</td>
<td>360,850</td>
<td>482,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actives</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>126,150</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>300,400</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>412,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAFVs</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,380+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery-SP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery-Towed</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery-MRL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>710+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actives</td>
<td>13,660</td>
<td>16,200</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>23,750</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Combat-Missile</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Major Surface Combat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol-Missile</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol-Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Amphibious</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active marines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20,000 (600)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(27,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actives</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>30,100</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>17,600</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Fighters</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce/Intell/EW</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRW</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Patrol/ASW</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinese Trade and Southeast Asia in Perspective: 2017

Share of All Chinese Exports and Imports in 2017

China, Russia, and the North
China and Russia have formed a steadily improving strategic partnership, and one very different from the days in which Soviet pressure on China’s border helped lead China to join with the U.S. in containing the Soviet Union. The two nations now cooperate in training, and China’s 2019 Defense White Paper shows it has stepped up in its military exercises with Russia. Russia provides China with advanced military technology through its arms sales, and both countries cooperate with the former Asian republics of the Soviet Union as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Council.

The relative power of each state has shifted radically, however, since the break up of the Soviet Union. Russia is now a “superpower” only in the nuclear sense, although it presents a major potential conventional threat to the NATO states near its border and remains a center of advanced military technology. Russia now has a relatively limited “petro-economy” that cannot compete with China in economic size. Russia lags far behind China in both economic growth and military spending. While estimates differ, the previous sections have shown that Chinese annual military spending is now at least three to four times that of Russia.

The charts and tables in this section reflect China’s growing emphasis on this strategic partnership. It also reflects the fact that Russia no longer deploys force to secure its borders with China, and that Mongolia is not a scene of confrontation as well. The maps shown in various parts of this analysis show that Russia still maintains major military forces in the Far East and Pacific, but US official estimates of both Russian and Chinese deployments indicate that they are focused on other military forces and threats. Later sections of this analysis show, however, that several key issues remain unresolved:

- It is still unclear whether China will attempt to compete with the U.S. – and indirectly with the Russian – nuclear force size and modernization.
- China and Russia do seem to compete at some levels for influence in the former Asian Republics. At the same time, Russian development in the Far East does not compete with Chinese commercial interests, and has therefore opened up parts of Russia to rising Chinese commercial influence.
- Mongolia’s future alignments are unclear.
- It still seems unlikely that either power would come to the direct support of the other in the event of a conflict in Europe, Asia, or some other location.
- China has an interest in the artic, but it is unclear how this will affect its relations with Russia.

Developing all-round military-to-military relations. China’s armed forces will further their exchanges and cooperation with the Russian military within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia, and foster a comprehensive, diverse and sustainable framework to promote military relations in more fields and at more levels.

China’s armed forces will continue to foster a new model of military relationship with the US armed forces that conforms to the new model of major-country relations between the two countries, strengthen defense dialogues, exchanges and cooperation, and improve the CBM mechanism for the notification of major military activities as well as the rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters, so as to strengthen mutual trust, prevent risks and manage crises.

….China’s armed forces will work to further defense and security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and continue to participate in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Jakarta International defense Dialogue (JIDD) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). The Chinese military will continue to host multilateral events like the Xiangshan Forum, striving to establish a new framework for security and cooperation conducive to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

China and Russia: Chinese 2017 White Paper

China and Russia are each other's biggest neighbor, and strategic partner of cooperation and priority in diplomacy. Over the years, China-Russia relations have gained healthy, stable and fast development, and made new achievements through joint efforts. In 2001 the two countries signed the Good-Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which established the idea of a lasting friendship in legal form.

In 2011 the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination based on equality, mutual trust, mutual support, common prosperity and lasting friendship. In 2014 the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination entered a new stage.

This partnership has presented a more positive momentum of development at a high level. President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have met frequently. During the latter's visit to China in June 2016 the two sides signed three joint statements: the Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability, and Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Information Cyberspace Development.

In September that year the two heads of state met for the third time, during the G20 Hangzhou Summit, and agreed to increase their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests, energetically promote the idea of a lasting friendship established in the Good-Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, actively promote their development strategies and their efforts to promote the Belt and Road Initiative and Eurasian Economic Union, hold a Year of Media Exchange, and maintain close coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs, so as to inject strong vigor into bilateral relations.

China and Russia have maintained good cooperation in Asia-Pacific affairs. The two sides continue to strengthen their cooperation within regional multilateral frameworks, safeguard the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and universally recognized norms governing international relations, uphold the achievements of World War II and international justice, advance the process of a political solution to regional hotspot issues, and contribute more positive energy to regional peace, stability, development and prosperity.

China-Russia military relations have made further progress. In 2015 the two militaries jointly commemorated the 70th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War, and sent high-ranking officers and teams to each other's commemoration activities and military parades. The two militaries successfully held joint maritime drills twice in a year for the first time.

China participated in all events of the international military skill competition hosted by Russia, and the first Chinese Military Culture Week was held in Russia. In 2016 the two militaries maintained positive interaction. The First Joint Computer-Enabled Anti-Missile Defense Exercise was held. China participated in the international military games in Russia and Kazakhstan. In September China and Russia conducted the Maritime Joint Exercise 2016. The two militaries have also maintained close coordination within the defense and security cooperation framework of the SCO.

China and Russia: China’s 2019 Defense White Paper

The military relationship between China and Russia continues to develop at a high level, enriching the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era and playing a significant role in maintaining global strategic stability. The Chinese and Russian militaries have continued the sound development of exchange mechanisms at all levels, expanded cooperation in high-level exchanges, military training, equipment, technology and counter-terrorism, and realized positive interaction and coordination on international and multilateral occasions. Since 2012, Chinese and Russian militaries have held 7 rounds of strategic consultations. From August to September 2018, at the invitation of the Russian side, the PLA participated in Russia’s Vostok strategic exercise for the first time.

...Russia is strengthening its nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for strategic containment, and striving to safeguard its strategic security space and interests.

...Russia is advancing its New Look military reform.

...China’s armed forces have established mechanisms for exchanges with neighboring countries at three levels: national defense ministry, Theater Commands (TCs), and border troops. They conduct regular friendly mutual visits, working meetings, joint patrols and joint exercises targeting transnational crime with their foreign counterparts. They work together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan to implement the border disarmament treaty.

In June 2001, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan co-founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO has now grown into a new type of comprehensive regional cooperation organization covering the largest area and population in the world. The Shanghai Spirit featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit of common development has come into being.

...Great Wall Counter-Terrorism International Forum. 2016: The inaugural session of the forum was held in Beijing in Nov. 2016 with the theme of “counter-terrorism in urban areas”. Representatives from 25 countries including Russia, France, Egypt and Brazil participated. The second forum was held in Beijing in May 2018 with the theme of “counter-terrorism in mountainous areas”. Representatives from 27 countries including France, Nigeria, Chile and Pakistan participated.

... (Joint Sea Exercises) Held in the Yellow Sea waters near Qingdao in Apr. 2012; in Peter the Great Gulf in Jul. 2013; in the north maritime and air space of the East China Sea to the east of Yangtze River Estuary in May 2014; in the east of the maritime and air space of the Mediterranean in May 2015; in Peter the Great Gulf, off the coast of Vladivostok, and the maritime and air space of Sea of Japan in Aug. 2015; in Zhanjiang and the east of the maritime and air space of Zhanjiang in Sep. 2016; in the Baltic, St. Petersburg and southeast Baltic Sea in Jul. 2017; in Vladivostok and the designated area between Peter the Great Gulf and the south Okhotsk Sea in Sep. 2017.

...Aerospace Security Computer-Enabled Anti-Missile Command-and-Staff Exercises: Held in Russia in May 2016, and in China in Dec. 2017

China has partnered with other authoritarian states, such as Russia, to mitigate U.S. pressure tactics. China and Russia share a preference for a multipolar world order and frequently jointly oppose U.S.-sponsored measures at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

In the wake of Western sanctions against Russia, China has increased investment in Russia’s economy. The Chinese Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe visited Moscow in April 2018 “to let the Americans know about close ties between the armed forces of China and Russia.”

…New or upgraded crude oil pipelines from Russia to China and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate China’s interest in increasing overland supply. In early 2018, China doubled the capacity of its pipeline to Russia from 300,000 to 600,000 barrels per day.
Russian Military Forces in the Far East In 2018

**Eastern Military District**
HQ located at Khabarovsk

**Army**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**COMMAND**
4 army HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**
1 (Severynaya) 91 bde

**MANOEUVRE**

- Armoured
  - 1 bde
- MR bde
  - 6 MR bde
- Mechanised
  - 4 MR bde
  - 1 MCA kb

**SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE**
- 4 SRBM/LGCM bde with Jadran-M/K

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- arty bde
  - 3 arty bde
- NBC bde
  - 1 NBC bde
- NBC reg

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**
- 4 log bde

**AIR DEFENCE**
- 4 AD bde

**Reserves**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
  - 8 MR bde

---

**Pacific Fleet**

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**SUBMARINES**
- 3 STRATEGIC 5 SSBN
- 2 TACTICAL 18 5 SSGN (of which 2 in refit); 5 SSN (of which 4 in refit); 8 SSK
- 1 CGIM; 6 DGGIM (of which 2 in refit); 1 FGIM

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**
- 24 4 FSGM, 8 FSM, 9 PCTG, 3 FBM

**MINE WARFARE**
- 2 MNSO, 6 MSC

**AMPHIBIOUS**
- 9 LST, 3 LCM, 2 LCU

**Naval Aviation**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
- 1 sqn with MiG-31BM Flanker

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with Il-38 Nebo M/K
- 2 sqn with Tu-142M/MK Mriya

**TRANSPORT**
- 2 sqn with An-26BC Calk

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- FTR 12 MiG-31BM Flanker
- ASW 23: 11 Tu-142M/MK Mriya, 12 Il-38 Nebo
- EW • ELINT 1 B-22 Conv B
- TPT: 2 An-26C Calk, 1 An-26C Calk, 1 Tu-134

**Helicopters**
- ASW 2 Sukhoi Super Hélicoptère
- TPT: Medium Ka-27 Helix, Mi-8 Hip

**Naval Infantry**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
  - 2 naval inf bde

**Air Defence**
- 1 SAM reg

**Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- 2 AShM bde

---

**Military Air Force**

**11th Air Force & Air Defence Army**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**
- 1 regt with MiG-29UB Fulcrum, Su-27SM Flanker, Su-30MKK Flanker, Su-30MKI Flanker
- 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker, Su-35SM
- 1 regt with Su-22 Fitter, Su-30SM

**GROUND ATTACK**
- 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer, Su-34 Fullback
- 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker

**ISR**
- 1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E

**TRANSPORT**
- 2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-26 Car/C-130 Guppy/Tu-134 Crushy/Tu-144 Concorde

**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-26 Halo
- 1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-26 Halo
- 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind MI-8 Hip

**AIR DEFENCE**
- 2 sqn with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly), 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-17 Grizzly), S-300V (SA-12 Gadwall/Giant), S-400 (SA-20 Grumble)
- 2 sqn with SA-10/SA-10B Grumble
- 2 sqn with 8-100 (SA-21 Growler), 9K66 Pinchos-S1

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- FTR 20 MiG-31BM Flanker
- ATK 100: 30 Su-25K Fencer, 10 Su-25TM Fencer, 72 Su-25SM/25SM Flogger
- ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer E
- TPT 24: 22 An-12 Cub/An-26 Car/C-130 Guppy

**HELICOPTERS**
- ATK 14: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B, 12 Mi-24P Hind
- TPT 60: Heavy Mi-26 Halo, Medium Mi-8 Hip

**AIR DEFENCE • SAM**
- Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble), S-300V (SA-12 Gadwall/Giant), S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
- Short-range 9Q89 Pinchos-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

**Airborne Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Air Maneuver
- 2 air adv bde

---

China’s Northern Theater Forces Are Oriented Toward Korea and Its Western Theater Forces Towards Central Asia.

### Recent Russian Exercises with China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (Duration)</th>
<th>Exercise Name or Type (Location)</th>
<th>Other Participants (Number)</th>
<th>Type of Exercise</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017 (6 days)</td>
<td>Aerospace Security-2017 (Beijing, China)</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
<td>In a continuation of growing missile defense cooperation in recent years, the two countries held their second computer-simulated tabletop exercise designed to “practice cooperation of [both sides] to repel missile threats from third countries.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2018 (6 days)</td>
<td>Peace Mission-2018 (Chebarkul, Russia)</td>
<td>Multiple; Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members (China sent 700 troops from the Western Theater Command, including an armored tank battle group, an Air Force battle group, and a special operations unit)</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>In the ninth SCO exercise since they commenced in 2006, the SCO member militaries conducted a joint, live-fire drill surrounding and defeating a terrorist camp involving air and ground forces. India and Pakistan notably participated in their first exercise since becoming full SCO members in 2017.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** From late July to mid-August, the PLA participated in the International Army Games-2018, a Russia-led annual military competition that has been held since 2015. For the second year in a row, China hosted some of the events (four of 18 events). The competition serves as a venue for the PLA to train with the Russian Armed Forces and other militaries, and helps build mutual trust. Participants for the exercises in China include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. China Military Online, “Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on April 26,” April 27, 2018. Source: Various.

China and the Artic

China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status on the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 2018, China published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and self-declared China to be a “Near-Arctic State.” The strategy identifies China’s interests as access to natural resources, securing Arctic SLOCs, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to its implementation.

China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates one Ukrainian-built icebreaking research vessel, the Xuelong, which in 2017 completed its 8th Arctic expedition and became the first Chinese official vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage. In 2016, China commissioned the first of a new series of “ice-capable” patrol boats. In late September 2018, the Xuelong completed its 9th Arctic expedition. In September, China also launched its second icebreaking research vessel, the domestically built Xuelong 2. The Xuelong 2 will be able to break ice 1.5 meters thick, compared to the original Xuelong’s maximum of 1.2 meters. Furthermore, the Xuelong 2 is the first polar research vessel that can break ice while moving forwards or backwards.

Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China’s expanding capabilities and interest in the region. The government of Denmark has publicly expressed concern about China’s interest in Greenland, which has included proposals to establish a research station in Greenland, establish a satellite ground station, renovate airports, and expand mining. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks. In September 2018, a Russian expert at the Russian International Affairs Council stated the Russian Federation was strongly opposed to foreign icebreakers operating on the Northern Sea Route, including U.S. and Chinese icebreakers. Outside potential friction over the Northern Sea Route, the Arctic region is an area of opportunity for Sino-Russian commercial cooperation, in addition to energy development and infrastructure projects such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project.

China and Central Asia
China and Central Asia

As the maps that follow show, China shares borders with several Central Asian states, and its expanding economy and need for oil, gas, and minerals gives China a natural economic interests in the kind of “belt and road” initiatives described earlier. Russia still maintains considerable political and military interests in these states, but China’s development has made it a growing economic force, and one that may open up major new rail and pipeline routes to the region and to Europe.

There are no major territorial or border disputes involving China, and so far the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has allowed Russia and China to cooperate in dealing with the region. Russia may have its reservations about the growth of China’s economic role and influence, but it seems to have accepted China’s growing role.

The main security issue in Central Asia affecting China’s strategy is the Uighur issue and China’s concern that movements could pose an Islamic extremism threat or support Uighur extremist groups in China.
Chinese 2019 Defense White Paper: Central Asia

China has signed border cooperation agreements with 9 neighboring countries and set up border meeting mechanisms with 12 countries. China’s armed forces have established mechanisms for exchanges with neighboring countries at three levels: national defense ministry, Theater Commands (TCs), and border troops. They conduct regular friendly mutual visits, working meetings, joint patrols and joint exercises targeting transnational crime with their foreign counterparts. They work together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan to implement the border disarmament treaty...They enhance control along the border with Afghanistan to guard against the infiltration of terrorists.

...Since 2012, the PAP has deployed large numbers of troops annually in security duties, counter-terrorism, emergency response, and maritime rights protection and law enforcement. It has completed around 10,000 security assignments during major events such as the G20 Summit, the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, the BRICS Leaders Meeting, and the SCO Qingdao Summit, and participated in the response to 671 hostage situations, incidents of severe violence, and terrorist attacks. Since 2014, the PAP has assisted the government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in taking out 1,588 violent terrorist gangs and capturing 12,995 terrorists.

...Under the PLAA, there are 5 TC army commands, the Xinjiang military command, and the Tibet military command

...China has set up defense and security consultations as well as working meeting mechanisms with 17 neighboring countries to keep exchange channels open. In recent years, China has regularly held joint exercises and training on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and tactical skills with its neighboring countries, and carried out extensive exchanges and practical cooperation on border and coastal defense, academic institutions, think tanks, education, training, medical science, medical service, and equipment and technology...The military relationships between China and its neighboring countries are generally stable.

...China is active in international and regional counter-terrorism cooperation. It has strengthened such cooperation within the framework of the SCO. China hosts and participates in joint counter-terrorism exercises, cracks down on illegal trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives, cooperates with SCO members to identify and cut off channels for terrorist infiltration, and promotes international counter-terrorism intelligence exchange and information sharing. It hosts the Great Wall International Forum on Counter-Terrorism, and actively participates in multilateral counter-terrorism mechanisms such as the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum. Bilateral counter-terrorism consultations have been held with certain countries. China initiated the establishment of the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), a counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination mechanism by the militaries of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The QCCM has convened two military leaders’ meetings and conducted counter-terrorism exchange and cooperation, actively safeguarding regional security.

...QCCM among the Military Forces of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan, 2016. The QCCM was built to provide coordination and mutual support in situation evaluation, evidence verification, intelligence sharing, capacity building, and training. China has always emphasized that the mechanism is not targeted against any other country or international organization and is ready to join all parties in expanding cooperation, increasing counter terrorism capacity, and safeguarding regional peace and stability. To date, two military leaders’ meetings have been held

In June 2001, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan co-founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO has now grown into a new type of comprehensive regional cooperation organization covering the largest area and population in the world. The Shanghai Spirit featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit of common development has come into being. With its commitment to building an SCO community with a shared future and developing a new model of international relations, the organization has made a new contribution to regional peace and development. In June 2017, the SCO expanded for the first time and admitted India and Pakistan as member states. In April 2018, China hosted the first SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting since the organization expanded its membership. The member states continue to strengthen defense and security exchanges and cooperation, including Peace Mission exercises, and Fanfare for Peace military tattoos, to further promote good-neighborliness and strategic mutual trust, increase military cultural exchanges, and enhance unity and friendship.

…Established in 2001 on the basis of the Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) mechanism, the SCO aims to enhance mutual trust, good-neighborliness and friendship among the member states, encourages the member states to effectively cooperate in such fields as politics, economy, culture and education. The organization is committed to maintaining and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability and building a new international political and economic order that is democratic, fair and equitable. The member states have signed important documents including the Treaty on Long-term Good-neighborly Relations, Friendships and Cooperation among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States. From 9th to 10th Jun. 2018 in Qingdao, President Xi Jinping presided over the first Council of Heads of State of the SCO with an expanded membership, and stressed that member states will continue to uphold the Shanghai Spirit, make joint efforts to build an SCO community with a shared future, and promote a new model of international relations.

…The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is forging a constructive partnership of non-alliance and non-confrontation that targets no third party, expanding security and defense cooperation and creating a new model for regional security cooperation.
China and Central Asian Borders
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

Founded in Shanghai in 2001, the SCO is comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996. After its inclusion in 2001, the members renamed the group as Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Source: Xinhua
China’s Forces in Central Asia


Since 2015 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has maintained sound and steady development. Progress has been made in political, security, economic and cultural cooperation, leading to the firmer international standing and greater influence of the SCO.

President Xi Jinping attended the 15th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the SCO member states on July 9-10, 2015 in Ufa, Russia, where they signed the Ufa Declaration of the Heads of State of SCO Member States and the SCO Member States Agreement on Border defense Cooperation, and approved important documents including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Development Strategy until 2025 and the SCO Member States 2016-2018 Cooperation Program on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.

Premier Li Keqiang chaired the 14th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO member states held in China on December 14-15, 2015. The leaders at the meeting laid out plans for cooperation in various fields for the next stage, issued the Statement of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of SCO Member States on Regional Economic Cooperation, adopted the resolution on Preparation for Creating the SCO Development Bank and the SCO Development Foundation (Specialized Account), and witnessed the signing of the Program of Interaction Between the Customs Agencies of the SCO member states for 2016-2021 and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the SCO and the Secretariat of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

On June 23-24, 2016 the 16th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of State of the SCO member states was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. President Xi Jinping attended the meeting.

The heads of the member states signed the Tashkent Declaration on the 15th Anniversary of the SCO, approved the Action Plan for 2016-2020 on Implementation of the SCO Development Strategy Towards 2025, and adopted the Memorandums of the Obligations on the Entry of the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the SCO.

Since 2015 meetings of heads of various departments including security council secretaries, foreign ministers, defense ministers, economic and trade ministers, culture ministers and heads of emergency response agencies have been held.

These meetings deepened and expanded cooperation in various fields, and increased the SCO's international influence. China has promoted and participated in SCO cooperation across the board. China's bilateral relations with other SCO member states, observer states and dialogue partners have continued to grow.
At present, the counterterrorism situation in the Asia-Pacific region is undergoing complex and profound changes. The region faces severe security and stability challenges posed by violent and extremist ideologies spreading at an ever-faster pace, more active terrorist and extremist forces, rising threats from cyber terrorism, and frequent violent terrorist activities, in particular the infiltration of international terrorist organizations and the inflow of foreign terrorist fighters.

Terrorism is a common scourge of the international community and humanity as a whole. The Chinese government opposes terrorism in all forms and calls on the international community to cooperate in fighting terrorism on the basis of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. China believes that dialogue among different civilizations should be enhanced and a holistic approach taken to eliminate the breeding grounds of terrorism by addressing both its symptoms and root causes by political, economic and diplomatic means. At the same time, there should be no double standard in fighting terrorism, which should not be associated with any particular country, ethnicity or religion.

China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability. Separatist forces for “East Turkistan independence” and “Tibet independence” have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities by “East Turkistan independence” forces.

Besides, anti-China forces have never given up their attempt to instigate a “color revolution” in this country.
China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan
South Asia is generally stable while conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time. Political reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan is making progress in the face of difficulties...Japan and India are rebalancing and optimizing the structure of their military forces.

...Theater Commands (TCs), and border troops. They conduct regular friendly mutual visits, working meetings, joint patrols and joint exercises targeting transnational crime with their foreign counterparts. They strive to promote stability and security along the border with India, and take effective measures to create favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the Donglang (Doklam) standoff. They enhance control along the border with Afghanistan to guard against the infiltration of terrorists.

...In June 2017, the SCO expanded for the first time and admitted India and Pakistan as member states...To implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of China and India, the two militaries have exchanged high-level visits and pushed for a hotline for border defense cooperation and mechanisms for border management and border defense exchanges.

...China has signed border cooperation agreements with 9 neighboring countries and set up border meeting mechanisms with 12 countries. China’s armed forces ...enhance control along the border with Afghanistan to guard against the infiltration of terrorists.

...China has set up defense and security consultations as well as working meeting mechanisms with 17 neighboring countries to keep exchange channels open. In recent years, China has regularly held serial joint exercises and training on counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, search and rescue, and tactical skills with its neighboring countries, and carried out extensive exchanges and practical cooperation on border and coastal defense, academic institutions, think tanks, education, training, medical science, medical service, and equipment and technology...The military relationships between China and its neighboring countries are generally stable.

...China is active in international and regional counter-terrorism cooperation...China initiated the establishment of the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), a counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination mechanism by the militaries of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The QCCM has convened two military leaders’ meetings and conducted counter-terrorism exchange and cooperation, actively safeguarding regional security.

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...Pakistan: Friendship Joint Anti-Terrorism Training; Held in Ningxia, China in Dec. 2015; at National Counter Terrorism Center Pabbi, Pakistan in Oct. 2016; Eagle/Shaheen Joint Training, A total of 6 training sessions held in China and Pakistan from 2013 to 2018.


China and India are to some extent natural rivals as the two largest powers in Asia. They also have had border disputes whose origins date back to poorly demarcated borders and claims in the 1840s, and which led to a short border war in 1962 over two areas—Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in mountainous areas of limited commercial and strategic importance. Both sides have made several attempts to resolve these issues, but these so far have failed. They both deploy military forces to cover their current areas of occupation and incidents and new disputes have repeatedly occurred.

These disputes have helped lead China to turn to Pakistan as an economic partner and make it a focus for Chinese arms sales—as well as economic loans and investment—making Pakistan an important part of China’s “belt and road” initiative. India, in turn, reached out to the Soviet Union and Russia for arms, and more recently to the U.S. as a potential ally and counterweight to China. Their competition has also had some impact on Chinese and Indian Ocean rivalries in the Indian Ocean as China emerges as more of a blue water navy, deploys forces for the UN anti-piracy campaign in Somalia, and establishes a base in Djibouti in the Red Sea.

It is unclear, however, that China has any major interests that would lead it into a meaningful conflict with India, or that India would risk engaging in a serious conflict with China. No one can ignore the fact both sides remain deployed against the other in the dispute areas, and there is a risk that a more serious conflict could occur, but it is unlikely that China would seek such a conflict, support Pakistan in some future war with India, or seek any form of control over Afghanistan—although it does have mining and trading interests in the country and concerns over the potential threat of support to extremist groups in or near China.

The Chinese Western Theater Command and India - I

WESTERN THEATER COMMAND

The Western Theater Command (WTC) is geographically the largest theater command within China and is likely responsible for responding to conflict with India and managing terrorism in western China. Located within the WTC are two group armies, three Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations.

Counterterrorism is a key issue within the WTC, which includes the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions where China is focused on perceived threats of separatism and terrorism. China's campaign is characterized as combating terror and separatist forces before they enter China, particularly from Afghanistan, while employing an internal “re-education” campaign for any individuals suspected of having sympathies for anti-government elements.

CHINA-INDIA BORDER

Tensions between China and India persist along the western and eastern sections of their disputed border. Chinese and Indian patrols regularly encounter one another along the disputed border, and both sides often accuse one another of border incursions. Despite a summer 2018 low-level standoff in Demchok, China and India have thus far prevented these disagreements from escalating to a level similar to the 73-day border standoff at the Doklam Plateau. Chinese and Indian forces engage in regular border meetings to discuss disputes and are generally able to resolve misunderstandings to prevent the escalation of minor confrontations. However, an enduring settlement of the 2017 border dispute remains elusive.

• Chinese and Indian military and civilian leaders continue discussions on the development of mechanisms to defuse tensions, at both the immediate border areas as well as the national level, through military exchanges and a proposed direct crisis hotline.
• In April 2018, President Xi and Prime Minister Modi held an informal meeting and expressed support for a resolution on the border.

In November 2018, India and China resumed their annual defense dialogue, which was followed by a special representative meeting on the border co-chaired by Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi.

The Chinese Western Theater Command and India - II

China and Indian Border Issues

Source: The Economist
China-India Border Region

(name redacted), China-India Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean Region: Issues for Congress, CRS R45194, April 20, 2018, p. 19
# China-India Military Balance – 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1,395,100</td>
<td>2,183,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic forces</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>58,350</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal surface combatants</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1b</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval combat aircraft</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
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<td>803</td>
<td>2,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear warheads</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$2,515 billion (2017 est.)</td>
<td>$12,284 billion (2017 est.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>6.7% (2017 est.)</td>
<td>6.9% (2017 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:**
- China has one operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. Its second carrier is expected to undergo sea trials in 2018. China reportedly began construction of a third carrier in 2017. India’s Vikramaditya aircraft carrier is currently in service. Its second carrier, the Vikrant, is in late development stages. A third Indian aircraft carrier the Vagir, is reportedly in mid-design stage. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “Will China's New Aircraft Carrier Start Sea Trials This Week?” The Diplomat, April 23, 2018, and Abraham Ait, “US and French Fighters Contend for a Place Aboard India’s New Aircraft Carrier,” The Diplomat, February 24, 2018.
- Includes four SSBN nuclear-armed submarines.
- Between 2007 and 2016 China’s military spending increased 118%; India’s defense spending increased by 54% over the same period. “A New Military Order?” Times of India, February 14, 2018. China’s 2018 military budget of $175 billion represents a 6.1% increase from 2017. “China Boosts Military Spending 8%,” CNN, March 5, 2018.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map and information generated by (name redacted) and Calvin DeSouza using data from the Council on Foreign Relations (2017); the Economist (2017); the Department of State (2015); Esri (2016); and Delorme (2016), correspondence with Department of State (2017).
China and Afghan Border Issues
China & Afghanistan: Chinese 2017 White Paper

China supports peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, and hopes to see an Afghanistan that is united, stable, prosperous and at peace with its neighboring countries.

Since 2015 China has increased assistance to Afghanistan in support of that government's capacity building. In the wake of a 7.8-magnitude earthquake in northern Afghanistan in October 2015 China provided assistance for disaster-relief efforts.

China believes that only an inclusive reconciliation process that is "Afghan-led and Afghan-owned" can provide the ultimate solution to the Afghanistan issue. China will continue to play a constructive role in advancing the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

Source: Ministry of Foreign affairs, China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, January 2017, 
China and Japan
China and Japan

As is the case with Korea, China’s relations with Japan cannot be separated from the history of Japanese conquest and military occupation. Memories are long and the history of Chinese and Japanese relations is one that played a major role in China’s dark years. Key benchmarks include:

• The Sino-Japanese War: 1884-1895
• Manchurian Incident/Japanese Invasion: 1931
• Full Japanese Invasion (Marco Polo Bridge/Peking/Nanking massacre): 1937-1945
• U.S. use of Japan as a base in the Korean war: 1950-1953

The most visible sign of such tensions lies in the Chinese claims in the Northwest Pacific shown in the maps and charts in this section – and the rising level of Chinese naval and air activity near Japan and the Senkaku islands.

At the same time, however, China may be more concerned in strategic terms with the U.S.-Japanese strategic partnership, with U.S. basing and port facilities in Japan, with potential increases in Japan’s military capabilities, with Japan’s improving coverage of missile attacks and missile defenses, and with Japan’s role in providing support to the U.S. in the event of another Korean War.
The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the US has severely undermined the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries. In an attempt to circumvent the post-war mechanism, Japan has adjusted its military and security policies and increased input accordingly, thus becoming more outward-looking in its military endeavors. Australia continues to strengthen its military alliance with the US and its military engagement in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a bigger role in security affairs.

...Japan and India are rebalancing and optimizing the structure of their military forces.

...In May 2018, the defense authorities of China and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on maritime and air liaison and put it into practice in June.
**OSD on China’s Tensions with Japan - 2019**

Key Takeaways

- China continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.
- In May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism systems program.

China claims sovereignty over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which are also claimed by Taiwan.

The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. China uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the islands.

During 2018, China maintained a presence in the Senkaku Islands with typically four China Coast Guard ships in the territorial waters (within 12 nm) around the islands. In January 2018, a PLAN Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) sailed underwater in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. Separately, the PLAN frequently advances into the Pacific Ocean by passing between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako Islands. The PLAN East Sea Fleet regularly conducts military exercises in the Sea of Japan to prepare for potential conflicts. However, during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan in May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism, designed to avoid accidental encounters.

DIA’s Similar Assessment of China’s Role in the East China Sea: 2019

Key Takeaways

• China continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.

• In May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism.

China claims sovereignty over the Japan administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which are also claimed by Taiwan. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

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However, during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan in May 2018, China and Japan signed the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism, designed to avoid accidental encounters.

In the area surrounding Japan, there is a concentration of nations with large-scale military capabilities, and a regional cooperation framework on security has not yet to be fully institutionalized, leading to the existence of uncertainty and insecurity, including the persistence of territorial disputes and unification issues.

Meanwhile, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called "gray-zone" situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests.

There has also been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to reinforce and enhance their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are characterized by:

1. North Korea's military development such as nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development represents an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat.
2. The unilateral escalation of China's military activities poses a growing security concern for the region including Japan and international community.
3. Japan's tendency to increase its military activities, including in areas surrounding Japan, and this trend needs to be paid due attention.
4. Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.
The Strategic Position of the Senkaku Islands

Japanese Estimate of Chinese Naval Activity Near Japan in 2017

Examples of naval vessels confirmed near Japan (photos: Maritime Self-Defense Force)

Aircraft carrier Liaoning

Luyang II-class destroyer

Jiangkai II-class frigate

Frequent advancements to the Pacific Ocean passing between Okinawa and Miyake Island

First confirmed in 2016
Advancement to the Pacific Ocean by aircraft carrier Liaoning

Intermittent intrusions into Japanese territorial waters by Chinese government vessels

Activities by Chinese naval vessels in East China Sea

“Confrontation exercises,” the Chinese Ministry of National Defense for the first time announced the conduct of this in 2016.

Japanese Estimate of Chinese Air Activity Near Japan in 2017

Japanese Estimate of Chinese Naval Activity Near Japan in 2018

Chinese Government Vessels Near the Senkaku Islands: 2008-3/2019

Source: JCG, “The Numbers of Chinese Government and Other Vessels That Entered Japan’s Contiguous Zone or Intruded into Territorial Sea Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,” chart, March 31, 2019; and Lyle L. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffery W. Hornug, Stephanie Pezaed, Anika Binnendijk, Marta Kepe, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone, Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War, Rand, June 2019, p. 95.
U.S. Forces in Japan

US Pacific Command • 38,950
US Army 2,900; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM bn
US Navy 11,700; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka

FORCES BY ROLE
3 FGA sqn at Atsugi with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet;
1 FGA sqn at Atsugi with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 1 EW sqn at Atsugi with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 AEW&C sqn at Atsugi with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60R; 1 tpt hel sqn with 12 MH-60S

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDG/HM; 7 DDG (2 non-op); 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD

USMC 13,600

FORCES BY ROLE
1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph adlt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18C Hornets; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18D Hornets; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey

USAF 11,450

FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB with (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle); 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-35A Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B/C Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130H Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 Spec Ops gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130H Combat Talon; 1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk

US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar at Kyogamisaki

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2018, p.60.
Japanese Estimate of Regional Military Balance: 2017

DW

Estimate of Northern Asia Balance 2017

(Varying estimates for key powers. No credible estimates of North Korea)

China, the Koreas, Russia and the U.S.
China and the Koreas

Like Taiwan, the Koreas remain a critical area where both China and the United States must continue to plan for the risk of actual war, but where both share a common interest in avoiding and deterring such a conflict, and in limiting any clash and crisis before it can escalate. This issue has become steadily more complex as North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) has developed nuclear weapons and missile capabilities that can attack Japan and the United States.

China has supported the U.S. in developing international sanctions that are intended to make the DPRK give up its nuclear program while supporting formal efforts to end the Korean war, bring the DPRK and South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) together, and shift the DPRK to a model of economic development close to that of China and one that can produce a far wealthier and more stable country.

China has also attempted to block the deployment of U.S. anti-missile radars and forces on the ground that they can help limit China’s ability to use its strategic nuclear forces to deter the U.S. – although the technical arguments China raises in support of this position seem to be deeply flawed.

It is far from clear how this situation is evolving. It has recently lurched back and forth between U.S. confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear programs and claims that the issues can be resolved in ways that would trade the DPRK nuclear and long-range missile programs for an easing of UN sanctions and economic aid. Russia – which also shares a border with the DPRK — has taken a mixed stand, though largely in support of China.

Neither China nor the U.S. has issued a detailed official discussion of the role that China might play in a future Korean War, but it is clear that China has major forces near the border and might well act if the DPRK was threatened with the kind of defeat that might eliminate the DPRK as buffer state friendly to China.

The maps and force tables in this section illustrate these aspects of the total military balance, but it is almost impossible to guess how an actual war that brought China into the conflict might evolve, the level of escalation that could result, or the risks in terms of a U.S. and Chinese conflict.
China & Korean Nuclear Issue: Chinese 2017 White Paper

China's position on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is consistent and clear-cut. China is committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its peace and stability, and settlement of the issue through dialogue and consultation.

Over the years, China has made tremendous efforts to facilitate the process of denuclearization of the peninsula, safeguard the overall peace and stability there, and realize an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In January and September this year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted two nuclear tests and launched missiles of various types, violating UN Security Council resolutions and running counter to the wishes of the international community.

China has made clear its opposition to such actions and supported the relevant Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK's further pursuit of nuclear weapons.

China will continue to work with the international community and strive for denuclearization and long-term peace and stability of the peninsula and of Northeast Asia as a whole. At the same time, other parties concerned should not give up the efforts to resume talks or their responsibilities to safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula.

The anti-ballistic missile issue concerns global strategic stability and mutual trust among major countries. China always holds the view that the anti-ballistic missile issue should be treated with discretion. Forming Cold War style military alliances and building global and regional anti-ballistic missile systems will be detrimental to strategic stability and mutual trust, as well as to the development of an inclusive global and regional security framework. Countries should respect other countries’ security concerns while pursuing their own security interests, and follow the principle of maintaining global strategic stability without compromising the security of any country so as to jointly create a peaceful and stable international security environment featuring equality, mutual trust and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Despite clear opposition from relevant countries including China, the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK) announced the decision to start and accelerate the deployment of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system in the ROK. Such an act would seriously damage the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of China and other countries in the region, and run counter to the efforts for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China firmly opposes the US and ROK deployment of the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system in the ROK, and strongly urges the US and the ROK to stop this process.

The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the US has severely undermined the regional strategic balance and the strategic security interests of regional countries. In an attempt to circumvent the post-war mechanism, Japan has adjusted its military and security policies and increased input accordingly, thus becoming more outward-looking in its military endeavors. Australia continues to strengthen its military alliance with the US and its military engagement in the Asia-Pacific, seeking a bigger role in security affairs.

...Regional hotspots and disputes are yet to be resolved. Despite positive progress, the Korean Peninsula still faces uncertainty.

...China has played a constructive role in the political settlement of regional hotspots such as the Korean Peninsula issue...

South Korean jets fired nearly 400 warning shots and 20 flares on Tuesday near a Russian surveillance plane that Korea and Japan said flew near disputed islands in the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea, that the two countries claim. The alleged incursion happened over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands, which are occupied by South Korea but also claimed by Japan.

South Korea's military said that in total three Russian and two Chinese military aircraft entered the Korea Air Defence Identification Zone (KADIZ) on Tuesday morning. One of those planes - an A-50 Russian surveillance plane - also violated its territorial airspace twice, it said, before leaving. South Korea said its jets fired flares and machine-gun warning shots when the Russian plane intruded. It also deployed F-15 and F-16 planes to intercept it. Russian and Chinese bombers and reconnaissance planes have occasionally entered the zone in recent years, but this is the first incident of its kind between Russia and South Korea.

...This first "joint air patrol" involving Russian and Chinese long-range aircraft in the Asia Pacific region, sends a powerful signal of the developing military relationship between Moscow and Beijing. This still falls short of a formal alliance but their joint exercises are larger and more sophisticated.

In 2013, South Korea has announced it is expanding its air defence zone, which will now partially overlap with a similar zone announced by China. The two zones now both included a rock claimed by both countries and controlled by South Korea. The defence ministry said it would co-ordinate with "related countries".

China announced a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) last month, in a move that raised regional tensions.

Both countries' zones will cover the airspace above a rock called Ieodo by South Korea and Suyan by China, which is claimed by both countries. It is part of the Dokdo (Solitary islands) in Korea, Takeshima (Bamboo islands) in Japan. Claimed by Japan and South Korea, but occupied by South Korea since 1954. The islands consist of two main islands and about 30 smaller rocks. A South Korean coastguard detachment has been stationed there since 1954.

As well as Ieodo rock, South Korea's Defence Ministry said the new military air defence zone would cover the airspace above Marado and Hongdo islands controlled by Seoul in waters south of the peninsula. The new parameters were a direct challenge to China's own air defence zone, which covers part of the same area.

China Korea Border
China-Russia-Korea Border

“Golden Triangle”
Russian City of Khasan on Tumen River, a border that flows 17 km into the Sea of Japan
North Korea: Nearby Chinese Forces and Possible Chinese Buffer Zones

Source: Adapted from James Griffiths and Serenite Wang, “Is China Reinforcing Its Border with North Korea?” CNN, July 26, 2017; Jamestown Foundation.

North Korea: Nuclear Facilities

NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND

Key Takeaway

> The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border security.

The area of responsibility of the Northern Theater Command (NTC) covers the majority of its Mongolian and Russian border areas, North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern periphery, as well as counterterrorism operations. Located within the NTC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, one Rocket Force base, and PAP units that conduct internal security operations.

RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA

Key Takeaways

> China’s relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period during 2017.

> The PLA continues to conduct military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.

China’s relationship with North Korea has taken a positive turn from a strained period after China increased implementation of UNSC resolutions in 2017. China has largely enforced the UNSC resolution sanctions against North Korea. Xi had three meetings with Kim Jong Un in 2018, along with numerous lower-level official exchanges in both North Korea and China. China’s objectives for the Korean Peninsula include stability, denuclearization, and the absence of U.S. forces near China’s border. China’s focus on maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula includes preventing North Korea’s collapse and preventing a military conflict on the Peninsula. China continues to advocate for a dual-track approach towards North Korea that embraces both dialogue and pressure, and has claimed credit for the suspension of U.S.-South Korean military exercises in exchange for the suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile activity.

China has long been concerned about stability along its border with North Korea. The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula including air, land, sea, and chemical defense training events. Should a crisis or conflict occur on the Peninsula, China’s leaders could order the NTC to engage in a range of operations. These could include securing the China-North Korea border to prevent the flow of refugees or a military intervention into North Korea. China could also cite the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance it signed with North Korea in July 1961 as a justification to cross the border into North Korea.

China’s Northern Theater Forces in 2019

U.S. Forces in South Korea

US Pacific Command • 28,500
US Army 19,200

FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located at Tongduchon; 1 armd bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
M1 Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; M109; M270 MLRS; AH-64 Apache; OH-58D Kiowa Warrior; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; MIM-104 Patriot/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set

US Navy 250
USAF 8,800

FORCES BY ROLE
1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S

USMC 250

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2018, p.60.
South Korean Estimate of Regional Military Balance: 2016 - I

- **Russia**
  - Defense Budget: USD 51.6Bn
  - 798,000
  - 1,011 Fighters
  - 1 Aircraft Carrier
  - 62 Submarines
  - Nuclear capability enhancement, development of stealth fighters and new missiles, strengthening of Arctic Ocean and space capabilities

- **China**
  - Defense Budget: USD 145.8Bn
  - 2,333,000
  - 1,588 Fighters
  - 1 Aircraft Carrier
  - 65 Submarines
  - Reinforcement of military power projection capabilities and strategic determent capabilities

- **Japan**
  - Defense Budget: USD 41Bn
  - 247,000
  - 348 Fighters
  - 6 Aegis Ships
  - 18 Submarines
  - Introduction of additional F-35s, new early warning aircraft, Global Hawk, Aegis ships and submarines

- **U.S.**
  - Defense Budget: USD 597.5Bn
  - 1,381,000
  - 2,047 Fighters
  - 10 Aircraft Carrier
  - 71 Submarines
  - Pursue deployment of 60% of its naval and air forces in Asia Pacific, strengthening of missile defense system within the region


Adapted from South Korea, Defense White Paper, 2016, p. 15.
South Korean Estimate of Regional Military Balance: 2016 - II

### Number of Troops

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<tr>
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<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<td>1,381,250</td>
<td>798,000</td>
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<td>1,600,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>148,000</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
<td>319,950</td>
<td>145,000</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<td>Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Rocket Forces</td>
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### Army

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<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions/Brigades</td>
<td>10/46</td>
<td>4/89</td>
<td>23/128</td>
<td>9/6</td>
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<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>Infantry combat vehicles</td>
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<tr>
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<td>650(light tanks)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Helicopters</td>
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<td>Aircraft</td>
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Adapted from South Korea, *Defense White Paper, 2016*, p. 264.
### South Korean Estimate of Regional Military Balance: 2016 - III

#### Navy

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
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<th>Japan</th>
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<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic nuclear submarines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and coastal combatants</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine sweepers</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Amphibious vessels</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landing craft</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auxiliary ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>2 brigs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel transport APC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>385</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-tank missiles</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV/ISR</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>486</td>
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#### Marine Corps

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<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
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<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance vehicles</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amphibious assault APC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel transport APC</td>
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<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cannons</td>
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<td>385</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-tank missiles</td>
<td>95</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV/ISR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>-</td>
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#### Air Force

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic bombers</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance aircraft</td>
<td>199</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command and control aircraft</td>
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<td>Fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW aircraft</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>


Adapted from South Korea, Defense White Paper, 2016, p. 265.
China and Taiwan
China and Taiwan

The South China Sea may be the area which gets the most public attention to U.S. and Chinese military competition and the risk of conflict, but Taiwan has remained a key area for such planning in spite of the U.S. opening to China, and receives the most attention to the risk of actual conflict.

This does not mean that it is the area of highest risk. Both the U.S. and China see how dangerous any major conflict or even major military clash or incident can be in this region, and have strong reasons to show restraint and avoid any risk of a major war. At the same time, there are few areas where China has taken so clear a strategic position, and the complex mix of Chinese and Taiwanese politics, Chinese military exercises and force shifts, Taiwanese military modernization and the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and U.S. willingness to send combat ships through the Taiwan Straits all combine to present some risk of a crisis or conflict.

These charts and tables that follow present a much clearer U.S. and Taiwanese view of the military situation than of the Chinese view. China has made it definitively clear that it regards Taiwan as Chinese territory, has pushed hard for changes in Taiwan’s internal politics that could bring it back into some form of union with China, has attempted to block U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, and has used trade to gain economic leverage. It has not, however, made public the level of open source data on the military balance and development in the region provided by Taiwan and the United States.

The U.S. never agreed to halt arms sales and informal military relations with Taiwan when it established diplomatic relations with China in 1979 – largely as part of a joint U.S.-Chinese effort to counter pressure from the Soviet Union, even though it did break form diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It has provided major arms transfers ever since as part of the Taiwan Relations Act that was passed shortly after the U.S. established relations with China, and which requires that the United States provide Taiwan with defensive weapons to deter an attack from China.

The United States broadened this support in 1982 by issuing a Six Assurances document which stated that the U.S. would not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.

It is unclear how the changes in U.S. strategy since 2017, and how the focus on military and economic competition with China, will affect this situation. China has, however, hardened its position relative to Taiwan as a result of shifts in Taiwanese internal politics that have produced a government less willing to be flexible in dealing with China, the U.S. has been more willing to host senior Chinese officials, and the U.S. has agreed to major new arms sales to Taiwan.

Taiwan requested 66 F-16V fighter jets from the US in February 2019, and bought $500 million worth of arms and services including F-16 parts and training. In July 2019, the Department of Defense notified Congress of a request for the sale of some $2 billion more arms, including 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, as well as Hercules armored vehicles and heavy equipment transporters and $220 million in Stinger antiaircraft missiles. This notification came shortly before Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, was due to visit the United States.
Chinese 2017 White Paper on Taiwan

The Taiwan issue bears on China’s reunification and long-term development, and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross-Taiwan Straits relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but the root cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.

Resolutely Safeguarding China’s Sovereignty, Security and Development Interests. This is the fundamental goal of China’s national defense in the new era. China’s national defense aims...

- to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”;
- to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” and the creation of “East Turkistan”;

...To solve the Taiwan question and achieve complete reunification of the country is in the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation and essential to realizing national rejuvenation. China adheres to the principles of “peaceful reunification”, and “one country, two systems”, promotes peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and advances peaceful reunification of the country. Meanwhile, China resolutely opposes any attempts or actions to split the country and any foreign interference to this end. China must be and will be reunited. China has the firm resolve and the ability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the secession of any part of its territory by anyone, any organization or any political party by any means at any time. We make no promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. This is by no means targeted at our compatriots in Taiwan, but at the interference of external forces and the very small number of “Taiwan independence” separatists and their activities. The PLA will resolutely defeat anyone attempting to separate Taiwan from China and safeguard national unity at all costs.

...The fight against separatists is becoming more acute. The Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), stubbornly stick to “Taiwan independence” and refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle. They have gone further down the path of separatism by stepping up efforts to sever the connection with the mainland in favor of gradual independence, pushing for de jure independence, intensifying hostility and confrontation, and borrowing the strength of foreign influence. The “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and their actions remain the gravest immediate threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the biggest barrier hindering the peaceful reunification of the country. External separatist forces for “Tibet independence” and the creation of “East Turkistan” launch frequent actions, posing threats to China’s national security and social stability.

...China’s armed forces conduct air defense, reconnaissance and early warning, monitor China’s territorial air and peripheral air space, carry out alert patrols and combat takeoff, and effectively respond to emergencies and threats to maintain order and security in the air. Aiming at safeguarding national unity, China’s armed forces strengthen military preparedness with emphasis on the sea. By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces.

...China resolutely opposes the wrong practices and provocative activities of the US side regarding arms sales to Taiwan, sanctions on the CMC Equipment Development Department and its leadership, illegal entry into China’s territorial waters and maritime and air spaces near relevant islands and reefs, and wide-range and frequent close-in reconnaissance.

China continues to implement reforms associated with the establishment of its five theater commands, each of which is responsible for developing command strategies and joint operational plans and capabilities relevant for specific threats, as well as responding to crises and safeguarding territorial sovereignty and stability. Taiwan persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic direction,” one of the geographic areas the leadership identifies as having strategic importance. Other strategic directions include the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and China’s borders with India and North Korea.

China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both persuasion and coercion to hinder the development of political attitudes in Taiwan favoring independence. Taiwan lost three additional diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.

- Relations between China and Taiwan remained cool through 2018.
- Bowing to Chinese pressure, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing.
- The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations.

...Relations between China and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2018. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in the 19th Party Congress work report. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for talks with China without using the “1992 Consensus” as a precondition for negotiations.

In May 2016, China suspended consultations between its Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council that had begun in 2014. China continues to thwart Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and INTERPOL. China has also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, convincing the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 2018. Despite the stalled government-to-government consultations, the CCP continues to engage with the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, and China continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

Relations between China and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2018. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. Since November 2016, China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in the 19th Party Congress work report. President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances. In 2018, Taiwan has continued to expand its indigenous defense systems program.

OSD on China’s Strategy for Taiwan and Military Capabilities in
the Taiwan Strait - 2019

Although China advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which China has historically warned it would use force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time. China has an array of options for a campaign, ranging from an air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands. PLA services and support forces continue to improve training and acquire new capabilities for a Taiwan contingency, but there is no indication China is significantly expanding its landing ship force necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.

China appears prepared to defer the use of force as long as it believes that unification over the long term remains possible and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. China argues that the credible threat of force is essential to maintain the conditions for political progress and to prevent Taiwan from making moves toward de jure independence. China has refused for decades to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, despite simultaneously professing its desire for peaceful unification under the principle of “one country, two systems.”

The circumstances under which the mainland has historically warned that it would use force have evolved over time in response to the island’s declarations of its political status, changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s view of Taiwan’s relations with other countries. These circumstances have included:

- Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
- Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;
- Internal unrest on Taiwan;
- Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
- Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification;
- Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; and
- Foreign forces stationed on Taiwan.

Article 8 of China’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that China may use “non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces...cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The ambiguity of these “redlines” preserves China’s flexibility.

DoD on China’s Readiness to Attack Taiwan in 2017

Preparation for a Taiwan conflict with the possibility of U.S. intervention continues to play a prominent role in China’s military modernization program.

PLA Army. The PLAA is increasingly armed and trained in ways that prepare it for a Taiwan invasion scenario. The PLAA often conducts training, including amphibious landing training, under realistic conditions, including in difficult weather and at night. Improved networks provide real-time data transmissions within and between units, enabling better C2 during operations. Additionally, the PLAA’s ongoing fielding of advanced air defense equipment is significantly enhancing the self-defense of key C2 elements and other critical assets believed to have potential use against Taiwan. As the number of these new systems grows in the PLAA, the force’s ability to defend cross-Strait amphibious lodgments will increase.

PLA Navy. The PLAN is improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent, and introducing new platforms positioned to strike Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict. The additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority within the first island chain as well as to deter and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

PLA Air Force. The PLAAF has maintained a force posture that provides it with a variety of capabilities for a Taiwan contingency. First, it has stationed a large number of advanced aircraft within an unrefueled range of Taiwan, providing it with a significant capability to conduct air-superiority and ground-attack operations against Taiwan. Second, a number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense of China’s mainland against counterattack. Third, China’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA operations in a contingency.

PLA Rocket Force. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks and precision strikes against high-value targets such as Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, radar sites, and others in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight.

Strategic Support Force. PLA writings emphasize the importance of the space and cyberspace domains in joint operations, suggesting that the SSF, reportedly responsible for these areas, would be active in a Taiwan contingency; however, information about the force’s posture for such a conflict is scarce.

One of the overarching goals of the structural reforms to reshape the PLA was to construct a military capable of conducting complex joint operations, including those that would be involved in a Taiwan contingency. PLA reforms are aimed at clarifying command authorities, improving joint integration, and facilitating the transition from peace to war. The abolition of military regions in favor of military theaters – in this case, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) – has also likely streamlined and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct yearlong planning and preparation for joint military operations across the Taiwan Strait. PLA combat units are likely experiencing decreased readiness and proficiency to conduct large-scale joint operations as they reorganize units, integrate new capabilities, and adjust to new command structures.

A significant addition to the overall structure of the PLA is the establishment of the SSF and the JLSF. During a Taiwan contingency, the JLSF, in conjunction with subordinate joint logistics support centers, would coordinate joint logistics and the delivery of materiel as well as oversee various civil-military support systems to sustain the campaign. The creation of the SSF likely improves the PLA’s ability to execute and coordinate IO (particularly cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace) in a Taiwan contingency. It may also improve the PLA’s ability to manage and provide space-based reconnaissance to the CMC and the ETC, improving PLA command staffs’ situational awareness of Taiwan’s military units and facilities. The PLA is likely still exploring how to reform its joint command processes to integrate IO and ISR capabilities more fully at the theater-level, but structural reforms have removed the biggest barriers to integrating these strategic capabilities at the theater-level.

Structural reforms within the military and paramilitary forces also have implications on resources and operational capabilities available to the PLA for a future Taiwan contingency.

- In 2018, the PLAAF Airborne Corps conducted training exercises involving long-range raid and airborne operations based on actual warplans. The airborne corps underwent major changes in 2017, reorganizing its previous units into airborne infantry brigades, a special operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade. Since 2017, ongoing PLA Army reforms have reduced the number of group armies from 18 to 13, retired or downsized army divisions into combined arms brigades, and reorganized the Army’s two amphibious mechanized infantry divisions into amphibious brigades.

- The PLANMC in 2018 continued to expand from two to six brigades, but the newly created units lack required equipment and operational training.

...The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Japan and Taiwan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2018, the ETC focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing almost 20 exercises and drills consisting of long-distance sea training, aerial combat, and live-fire training. Located within the ETC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base.

- In May 2018, the ETC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) organized a closely coordinated PLAAF exercise between the Eastern Theater and Southern Theater Commands. In addition, the PLAAF flew fighter aircraft and long-range cruise missile capable bombers around Taiwan. The PLAAF also employed a KJ-2000 early warning aircraft for command, control, and escort to support Su-35 fighters and J-11 fighter flights to the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel.

- In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations. In October 2018, a PLAN flotilla conducted a series of drills, including anti-submarine warfare training by employing destroyers and frigates in formations simulating encirclement of underwater targets. They further completed more than ten training objectives in auxiliary gun firing, visit-board-search-and-seizure drills, and nuclear and chemical defense drills.

OSD on China’s Military Options in Taiwan in 2019

China has a range of options based on the PLA’s increasing capabilities in multiple domains. China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue, under China’s terms. China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign. Failing that, China would attempt to delay intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination.

Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which China would employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. According to these writings, large-scale missile strikes and possibly seizures of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade in an attempt to achieve a rapid Taiwan surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. China’s air and maritime blockade operations will also likely be complemented by concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace.

Limited Force or Coercive Options. China could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of IO to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special operations forces could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or leadership targets.

Air and Missile Campaign. China could use missile attacks and precision air strikes against air defense systems, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the Taiwan people’s resolve.

Invasion of Taiwan. Publicly available Chinese writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air, and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s western coastline, and launch attacks to seize and occupy key targets or the entire island.

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention.

These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability and political resolve while achieving tangible territorial gain and simultaneously showing some measure of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate international opposition.

OSD on Taiwan’s Defensive Capabilities in 2019

Taiwan has historically enjoyed military advantages in the context of a cross-Strait conflict, such as technological superiority and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense, but China’s multi-decade military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of these advantages. Although Taiwan is taking important steps to compensate for the growing disparities—building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and noncommissioned officer corps—these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s declining defensive advantages. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense 2017 National Defense Report reflects adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing greater emphasis on protecting its littorals and near-shore coastal areas. The modified strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy.

Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 active duty billets. Active duty forces are supported by reservists and defense volunteers. The Ministry of National Defense has stated that its goal is to fill 90 percent of the billets (or about 169,000) by 2020. Taiwan’s military modernization program envisions a continued decrease in Taiwan’s active duty force to approximately 175,000 personnel as part of a transition to an all-volunteer force. This transition has slowed due to severe difficulties recruiting enough volunteers. The cost savings from manpower reductions provides some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. The unanticipated magnitude of transition costs has led Taiwan to divert funds from foreign and indigenous defense acquisition programs, as well as near-term training and readiness. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness challenges.

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In addition, Taiwan’s military spending remains at approximately two percent of its gross domestic product. In October 2018, the MND said it would increase the island’s defense budget by 5.6 percent to NT $346 billion ($11.3 billion). Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow, and for 2018, is roughly 14.5 times that of Taiwan, with much of it focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force. Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is working to develop new concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. The United States maintains a “one-China” policy that is based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Joint Communiqués. The United States opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo. The United States continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace acceptable to both sides.

Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. In September 2018, the United States announced the sale of $330 million in military equipment, comprised mostly of spare parts for various military aircraft including F-16, C-130, F-5, Indigenous Defense Fighter, all other aircraft systems and subsystems, and other related elements of logistics and program support. Since 2010, the United States has announced more than $15 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.

The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) likely executes operational control over national defense matters related to Japan and Taiwan, including contingencies in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands. In 2018, the ETC focused on a series of training and exercises to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing almost 20 exercises and drills consisting of long-distance sea training, aerial combat, and live-fire training. Located within the ETC are three group armies, a naval fleet, two marine brigades, two Air Force bases, and one missile base.

In May 2018, the ETC Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) organized a closely coordinated PLAAF exercise between the Eastern Theater and Southern Theater Commands. In addition, the PLAAF flew fighter aircraft and long-range cruise missile capable bombers around Taiwan. The PLAAF also employed a KJ-2000 early warning aircraft for command, control, and escort to support Su-35 fighters and J-11 fighter flights to the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel. In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations.

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- In the East China Sea, the ETC conducted combat drills throughout the year focused on naval operations. In October 2018, a Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances. In 2018, Taiwan has continued to expand its indigenous defense systems program.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

- Relations between China and Taiwan remained cool through 2018.
- Bowing to Chinese pressure, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador switched diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing.
- The PLA continued Taiwan Strait contingency preparations.

Relations between China and Taiwan remained at an impasse through 2018. Since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan's president, China halted formal communication with Taiwan and has repeatedly stressed that Taiwan must accept the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement.

Since November 2016, China's leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to “one China,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in the 19th Party Congress work report. Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has continually pledged to maintain the status quo in cross-Strait relations and called for talks with China without using the “1992 Consensus” as a precondition for negotiations.

In May 2016, China suspended consultations between its Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council that had begun in 2014. China continues to thwart Taiwan’s efforts to participate in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and INTERPOL. China has also maintained its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, convincing the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador to switch diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 2018. Despite the stalled government-to-government consultations, the CCP continues to engage with the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, and China continues to hold lower-level cross-Strait exchanges such as the municipal Shanghai-Taipei Twin City Forum.

The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence. The PLA also is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai Administration, China has increased military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLAAF and naval exercises in the East China Sea.

Taiwan’s national defense report released in 2017 cited concerns that increased PLA military activity near Taiwan poses an “enormous threat to security in the Taiwan Strait,” and that Taiwan requires a “multiple deterrence strategy,” including an emphasis on developing asymmetric warfare to counter PLA advances. In 2018, Taiwan has continued to expand its indigenous defense systems program.

China’s Eastern Theater Command Military Forces in 2019

### China-Taiwan Military Balance in 2019 - I

#### Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Ground Force Personnel</strong></td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
<td>408,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Armies</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Arms Brigades</strong></td>
<td>78 (includes 5 with amphibious role)</td>
<td>30 (includes 5 with amphibious role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanized Infantry Brigades</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motorized Infantry Brigades</strong></td>
<td>Transitioning to Combined Arms Brigades</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armor Brigades</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Assault/Army Aviation Brigades</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery Brigades</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Airborne Brigades</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Brigades</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery Pieces</strong></td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This chart focuses on PLA combat units and applies observed widespread changes in the new group armies to all group army units. Methodology applied to the new group army constant as the PLA Army transitions to brigades is one of each specialty brigade (army aviation/arm assault and artillery) and six combined arms brigades. Some units are likely in the early stages of development and not fully operational. The “Taiwan Strait Area” includes select national-level assets and units in the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theater Command. We are unable to estimate the number of tanks and field artillery located in these two theaters at this time.

#### Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft Carriers</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyers</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frigates</strong></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corvettes</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tank Landing Ships/Ammunition Transport Dock</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Landing Ships</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diesel Attack Submarines</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Attack Submarines</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic Missile Submarines</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coastal Patrol (Missile)</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coast Guard Ships</strong></td>
<td>248</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission critical assets to support other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ CGGs and PPHM ships to support military operations. The table reflects operational units and does not include units under construction, outfitting, or conducting sea trials.

**Notes:**

Due to ongoing restructuring of combat units as part of PLA reforms, the characterization and numbers of units and systems are approximate as units are in the process of establishing, downsizing, reorganizing, or disbanding. The data in this year’s report also consequently applies a new methodology that may result in significantly different numbers than shown in previous reports, but does not necessarily reflect a sudden change in capability.

1 Of the 1,020,000 personnel in the PLA ground forces, it is estimated that 915,000 are in combat units, with 360,000 in the Taiwan Strait Area.

## China-Taiwan Military Balance in 2019 - II

### Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Eastern and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighters</strong></td>
<td>1,500 (2,600*)</td>
<td>600 (750*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers/Attack</strong></td>
<td>450</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport</strong></td>
<td>450</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Mission Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This chart displays estimated totals of operational military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN Aviation. However, the PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario.

*The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers.

### China’s Rocket Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Launchers</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Estimated Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>&gt;5,500km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80-160</td>
<td>3,000-5,500km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150-450</td>
<td>1,000-3,000km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>750-1500</td>
<td>300-1,000km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>270-540</td>
<td>&gt;1,500km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taiwan Estimate of Chinese Military Forces – 2017

Japanese Estimate of Chinese vs. Taiwan Land Forces in 2017

Taiwan’s Increasing Trade with China: 2002-2017

Source: Taiwan’s Bureau of Foreign Trade, Trade Statistics. http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F.

The PLA continues to make modest gains in amphibious warfare by developing additional capabilities to conduct amphibious landings and seize and defend small islands. The PLA has 12 units organized and equipped to conduct amphibious operations.

During the last five years, the PLAA and the PLANMC have fielded new equipment designed specifically for amphibious operations such as the ZBD-05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle and the PLZ-07B amphibious self-propelled howitzer.

The PLA has also made efforts to improve its ability to insert forces by air, restructuring the Airborne Corps and establishing Army Air assault units, which would which would be charged with aerial insertion and seizing key terrain. Both PLAA and PLANMC units equipped for amphibious operations conduct regular company- to battalion-level amphibious training exercises, and the PLA continues to integrate aerial insertion training into larger exercises, including dropping airborne forces from the Y-20 heavy-lift aircraft for the first time. However, the PLA rarely conducts amphibious exercises involving echelons above a battalion, though both PLAA and PLANMC units have emphasized the development of combined arms battalion formations since 2012.

In 2018, the PLANMC writ large made minimal gains in its proficiency to conduct amphibious operations. Only its original two brigades continued to demonstrate the capacity to conduct this mission set. Although the scale and tempo of PLANMC training increased in an effort to indoctrinate the new brigades, they have not received their full complement of required equipment and are not fully mission capable. Consequently, the scope of training was rudimentary, and the new brigades remain unequipped to perform amphibious assault operations.
DIA on Chinese Amphibious Capabilities in 2019 - I

China’s amphibious ship force has slowly grown since a modernization program began in the early 2000s. Since 2005, China has built six large Yuzhao (Type 071) class amphibious transport docks, signaling China’s development of an expeditionary warfare and over-the-horizon amphibious assault capability as well as inherent HADR and counterpiracy capabilities. The Yuzhao can carry up to four of the new Yuyi air-cushion utility landing craft (similar to the U.S. landing craft air cushion, LCAC) as well as four or more helicopters, armored vehicles, and troops on long-distance deployments. Additional Yuzhao construction is expected in the near term, as is a follow-on amphibious assault ship (landing helicopter assault, LHA, which Chinese sources term the "Type 075") that not only is larger but incorporates a full flight deck for helicopters. Production on the LHA is expected to begin soon, if it has not already begun.

An expanded set of missions farther into the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, such as counterpiracy deployments, HADR missions, survey voyages, and goodwill visits, has increased demands on and broadened the experience of the PLAN’s fleet of oceangoing replenishment and service vessels. The PLAN recently launched two new Fuyi class fast combat support ships, intended to support aircraft carrier battle groups, as well as the smaller Fuchi class replenishment oilers, which support surface action groups and long-distance deployments. These ships constantly rotate in support of China’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployments and regularly accompany surface operating beyond the first island chain. At present, China has at least 10 fleet replenishment ships operational, with more under construction.

In addition, China has added a variety of oceangoing auxiliary ships in recent years, including submarine rescue ships, hospital ships, salvage and rescue ships, survey ships, intelligence collection ships, and various large transport ships.

The PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) is the PLAN’s land combat arm. Its primary mission is to conduct offensive and defensive amphibious assault in the South China Sea, including the Paracel Island and Spratly Island chains, and potentially the Senkaku Islands. The PLANMC is tasked with seizing and consolidating beachheads, destroying an opposing force at the beachhead and adjacent areas, organizing landing areas, and supporting landings by the PLAA. Other missions include conducting amphibious raids; seizing and occupying enemy naval bases, seaports, and islands; building beachhead protective zones; and covering the PLAA as it advances inland from the coast.

Roles and Missions. The PLANMC’s mission appears to be evolving beyond amphibious operations and toward a more expeditionary mission beyond China’s borders. This is in line with the PLA’s evolving strategy as outlined in China’s Military Strategy. For the PLAN, the New Historic Missions mean an increased focus on “diversified missions” or noncombat missions. Many of the tasks assigned to the armed forces in the white paper are ideally suited to the PLANMC, including ensuring Chinese sovereignty claims, safeguarding China’s security and interests “in new domains,” safeguarding the security of China’s interests overseas, and performing such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interest protection, and guard duty. The PLANMC already is designated a rapid-reaction force for the PLA and has deployed on numerous international missions, including floods and earthquakes. The PLANMC is the natural land-based force of choice for HADR efforts overseas. In 2017, the PLA also chose to deploy PLANMC troops to the PLA’s first overseas base, in Djibouti, reflecting the Marine Corps’ growing role in China’s military.

Elements of the PLANMC are consistently deployed as part of the PLAN’s counterpiracy task groups operating in the Gulf of Aden. The size of the embarked force is no less than a battalion. They are highly trained in the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for a counterpiracy mission, including VBSS, hostage rescue, and small-boat assault. VBSS tactics include fast-roping or rappelling from PLAN helicopters.

Units. The PLANMC is subordinate to the PLAN and consists of seven brigades. Marine brigades are located in each of the North, East, and South Sea Fleets’ areas of responsibility. Recent PLA reforms included the establishment of a PLANMC headquarters, probably to oversee the administrative man, train, and equip functions of the growing Marine Corps, and also included the appointment of the PLANMC’s first commander. Each brigade has a headquarters element, an armored regiment, at least two infantry battalions, a howitzer battalion, a missile battalion, a communications and guard battalion, an engineer and chemical defense battalion, a maintenance battalion, and an amphibious reconnaissance battalion (special operations). Estimates of the PLANMC’s troop strength differ widely and have been reported as high 35,000, but the actual number is probably between 28,000 and 35,000, evenly divided among the 7 brigades.
DIA on Chinese Amphibious Capabilities in 2019 - II

The PLAN provides the PLANMC with both maritime and air (helicopter) transport, a force enabler for PLANMC amphibious warfare operations. The PLANMC does not have an organic air assault element and probably would rely on PLAN ground-attack fixed-wing aircraft or PLAA helicopters in a close air support role. The PLANMC also has a limited logistics capability.

**Equipment.** The PLANMC is a fully amphibious force capable of conducting amphibious assault operations using combined-arms tactics and multiple avenues of approach. It is the most capable amphibious force of any South China Sea claimant. The PLANMC can simultaneously seize multiple islands in the Spratlys. It also is capable of rapidly reinforcing China’s outposts in the Paracels. The PLANMC still faces challenges and limitations in close air support/air assault and logistics sustainment for large-scale amphibious operations. The PLANMC is incapable of defeating near-peer or peer countries such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia in amphibious or ground warfare.

The PLANMC’s primary fighting vehicles are based on a single chassis and include the ZBD-05 AIFV and the ZLT-05 amphibious assault gun. Noncombatant amphibious variants of the ZBD chassis include an armored recovery vehicle and an armored ambulance. Additional combat equipment includes man-portable air defense systems, antipersonnel mortars, antitank rocket launchers, and flamethrowers. The PLANMC is also equipped with amphibious combat engineering equipment for obstacle removal, beach improvement, and construction of defenses once ashore.

Japanese Estimate of Chinese vs. Taiwan Air Modernization

Figure I-2-3-8
Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan

(Number of Aircraft)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20)</th>
<th>Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage2000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "The Military Balance" (of respective years)

Growth of Chinese Land Attack Missile Capability

In 1996 China had less than 100 that could reach Taiwan. Now China has highly accurate systems that can reach beyond Guam.

Shifting Balance of SAM, SSM, and Cruise Missile Capability in the Taiwan Straits: 2017 vs. 2019