Building a Big Tent for Agricultural Transformation in Ethiopia

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CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

A Report of the CSIS GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY PROJECT
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1 | Introduction

There are different stories to tell about social and economic change in Ethiopia. One story emphasizes recent progress. Since its first poverty reduction strategy in 2002, the country’s economic performance has been remarkably strong—largely driven by public investments in infrastructure—and has placed Ethiopia among the world's fastest-growing economies. Economic growth surpassed population growth and exceeded the 7 percent rate targeted to achieve Millennium Development Goal 1 of halving poverty by 2015. The country successfully halved poverty, a remarkable feat: between 2000 and 2016, the share of Ethiopians living in poverty fell from nearly half to less than one in four.¹

The forward-looking story is daunting, however, with challenges posed by remaining poverty, population pressure, and recurrent rainfall shortages. Despite the rapid decline in poverty, more than a fifth of the country’s population is still impoverished. Meanwhile, the country’s expanding population is placing greater pressure on its finite natural resource base. The greatest pressure falls on rural areas, where poverty is concentrated, natural resources such as land are increasingly scarce, and recurrent drought continues to undermine agricultural livelihoods.²

At the turn of the twentieth century, drought-affected areas and resulting food crises were essentially limited to the northern provinces of Tigray and Wello. Over subsequent decades, food crises have expanded to the eastern, southern pastoral, and central areas; to the Rift Valley; and to the country’s western regions, where rainfall shortages are becoming the norm. Between 1975 and 1993, drought was recorded 17 times in Sidamo, 16 times in Bale and Gondar, 15 times in Shewa and Wello, 14 times in Gamo Gofa and Hararghe, 12 times in Arsi and Tigray, and 11 times in Gojjam, Illubabor and Wollega provinces. From 1994 to 2007, many locations reported drought nearly every year. Between 2008 and 2018, the total number of woredas (districts) deemed priorities reached

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568, out of a total of some 800. A typical weather anomaly—drought—has become a regular source of major national food crises. As a result, overseas development assistance swelled to $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2015/2016.³

This reading of the Ethiopian context makes one thing clear. Economic growth, in and of itself, is insufficient. It must be accompanied by economic transformations that equip Ethiopia’s smallholder farmers with the ability to grow and diversify their livelihoods. For this to occur, the agriculture sector itself must transform.

Recent research has empirically reaffirmed the advantages of investing in farmers: growth in the agriculture sector is two to three times more effective at reducing poverty than growth generated in other sectors.⁴ Agricultural transformation is part and parcel of the larger economic process of structural transformation, which, as economist Peter Timmer notes, “has been the main pathway out of poverty for all societies.”⁵

**Economic growth must be accompanied by economic transformations that equip Ethiopia’s smallholder farmers with the ability to grow and diversify their livelihoods.**

To better understand agricultural transformation efforts in Ethiopia, this study focuses specifically on the Ethiopian government’s Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), established in 2010 to catalyze transformation in the country’s farming sector (see the box “CSIS Research Questions”). As a qualitative case study, the report draws principally on interviews and focus group discussions—approximately 70 individuals between December 2018 and February 2019—held by the Global Food Security Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Individuals interviewed represented about fifteen organizations: multi-lateral agencies, non-governmental organizations, for-profit development contractors, parastatal entities, and the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).⁶ In addition, the research team spent several days conducting focus group discussions with approximately 25 ATA staff members, including the CEO and the senior management team, at ATA headquarters in Addis Ababa and in ATA field office in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR).

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³. UNDP Ethiopia, *Ethiopia’s Progress.*
⁶. In 2018, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource merged with the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries to form the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Resources (MoALR). Throughout the report, MoALR is referred to as MOA.
Building on scholarly and policy research on agricultural transformation, our report aims to help clarify and advance our current understanding of the conditions, challenges, and practical dynamics underlying efforts of agricultural transformation. This report does not seek to evaluate the ATA, but rather to look to new directions for its future. We hope our findings and recommendations are constructive to those engaged in the difficult work of agricultural transformation, both in Ethiopia and beyond.

In the remainder of this chapter, we present an overview of our findings and recommendations and a brief primer on agricultural transformation. Chapter 2 summarizes the scope of ATA's present-day work, organizational structure, and governance dynamics. Chapter 3 presents three key themes that emerged from our research with the ATA. Finally, Chapter 4 develops a set of recommendations for agricultural transformation stakeholders.

Three major conclusions emerged from our research. First, the ATA has evolved into a role that more prominently features practical implementation work; its emergent challenge is to ensure that these efforts remain grounded in, and justified by, a rigorous theory of change. Second, the ATA must enrich and expand its working relationships—including those with the Ministry of Agriculture—in order to advance transformation. Finally, although the question of replicability is premature, donor countries like the United States can advance their aims for country-led development efforts by supporting the ATA's emergence as a thought and practice leader.

Building on this message are eight recommendations—five for the ATA, and three for donors such as the U.S. government:

**For the Agricultural Transformation Agency**

1. **Build a bigger tent.**

Now that the ATA has established itself and demonstrated its ability—time and again—to deliver innovative products aimed at transformation, its brand must evolve from innovator to collaborative leader, by building myriad new alliances, formal and informal, to transform agriculture in Ethiopia. They must build a bigger tent for agricultural transformation, welcoming in diverse contributors, big and small.

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2. **Double down on innovation and scrutinize the pivot to implementation.**

Delivering innovative insights, products and technologies seems to be the ATA’s core competency and comparative advantage. As the ATA strategizes its future directions regarding innovation-focused projects versus implementation-focused projects, a rigorous theory of change must guide the ATA’s decisionmaking.

3. **Diversify the Agricultural Transformation Council (ATC) and expand regional input mechanisms.**

The ATA’s governing board, the ATC, is traditional in its composition. Traditional leadership is unlikely to yield transformational outcomes. Diversifying the ATC and expanding the number of other input mechanisms could enrich the innovation, quality, and relevance of ATA’s work.

4. **Co-create Transformation Agenda deliverables with the Ministry of Agriculture that tackle challenges within the ministry itself.**

Agricultural transformation will not be realized in Ethiopia unless the MOA is itself transformed. The ATA must re-conceptualize the MOA not only as a partner in transformation, but as a site of it. The ATA could work with the MOA to identify Transformation Agenda Deliverables that address challenges within the MOA itself—challenges that the MOA prioritizes and that the ATA can address.

5. **Widen the two-way street between ATA and the Ministry of Agriculture.**

Historical experience suggests there can be no agricultural transformation without a transformed MOA. To help promote transformation, the ATA could establish stronger in-house opportunities for MOA career civil servants to participate in ATA projects. Giving MOA personnel an opportunity to see the ATA from the inside could enrich the sense of mutuality and shared purpose between the two institutions.

For the U.S. Government and Other Country Donors

6. **Help the ATA establish a Center for Excellence to advance the goal of country-led development.**

Replicating successful agricultural transformations depends on more than white papers on best practices. Less experienced policymakers and practitioners of transformation need deep mentorships with those who are experienced in it. They also need the opportunity to learn from peers in other countries. Investing in relationships among mentors, mentees, and peers from across the global South is an excellent way for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to advance its aim to promote country-led development approaches. Countries where USAID works on agriculture and food security—such as Mali, Bangladesh, and Guatemala—could learn from successes in other such countries, like Ethiopia, thus multiplying USAID’s return on investment.

7. **Embrace some agnosticism over how recipients deliver outcomes.**

USAID Administrator Mark Green has consistently emphasized that the purpose of foreign assistance is ending its need to exist. The U.S. Global Food Security Strategy also
frequently underscores a commitment to promote country-led development efforts. One thing that stands in the way of these laudable ideals is the institution’s intense procedural scrutiny over how development objectives are achieved. But what if USAID were to agree upon development objectives with government agencies like the ATA, and then assume a degree of agnosticism about the ATA’s specific methods? This could give the ATA scope for genuinely radical leadership, of a kind less feasible under traditional funding mechanisms.

8. Challenge Ethiopian leadership to further open commercial space for small and medium-sized agro-enterprises owned by Africans.

The U.S. government could utilize its diplomatic resources to have richer, bolder conversations with Prime Minister Abiy and his cabinet about the private sector’s role in Ethiopia’s economy. Private sector promotion has both technical and political components; the latter would benefit from greater attention.

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### A VERY SHORT PRIMER ON AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Agricultural transformation takes different forms, depending on the context, but some general features are shared across countries: increasing incomes for farmers, rising output per hectare of land, rising output per worker, expanding commercial agricultural enterprises along the value chain, and greater adoption of machinery and improved inputs. Figure 1 presents a simplified sequence of agricultural transformation: initially, agricultural productivity improves as farmers shift to higher-value crops, gain better access to markets, achieve economies of scale, and capitalize on technical innovations such as planting modern seed varieties, utilizing customized agronomic advice, and mitigating post-harvest loss with cold storage. Improved agricultural productivity subsequently results in higher farmer incomes, and thus more spending on—and demand for—goods and services that are off-farm. To meet this demand, new economic enterprises arise and pull agricultural labor out of fields and into new jobs and opportunities. Such migratory patterns tend to be rural-to-urban and over time lead to the expansion of industrial sectors and the attenuation of the agriculture sector.

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9. USAID’s focus on the technical element of private sector promotion is noteworthy. See, for example, the USAID program *Partnering for Innovation*, which invests in start-up agribusinesses in countries where Feed the Future works. https://www.partneringforinnovation.org/.
Agricultural transformation efforts depend upon political commitment, organizational arrangements, and technical areas of focus. **Political commitment** refers to sustained buy-in from a country’s top leadership, without which true change can be difficult to achieve. **Organizational arrangements** concern the institutional architecture through which transformation is pursued; not all countries have a dedicated ATA, and this defines the possibilities of transformation. Finally, **technical areas of focus** are the nuts and bolts of transformation: input markets, land reform, agricultural financing, and enhancements to the enabling environment.\(^\text{12}\)

Government-led efforts for agricultural transformation are modeled after the experiences of Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and other Asian countries. Consider South Korea: between 1977 and 1991, the importance of the country’s agriculture as source of both GDP and employment declined precipitously, a transformation that was driven by agricultural development policies that fostered, among other things, specialization, commercialization, and capital-intensification.\(^\text{13}\) By comparison, countries like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States took much longer—between 40 and 70 years—to see the same proportional declines.

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2 | A Brief History and Overview of the ATA

In the decade leading up to the ATA’s establishment in 2010, the government of Ethiopia initiated a series of strategic national plans for development, growth, and poverty reduction. The 2002–2005 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) enshrined a commitment to agriculture development led industrialization (ADLI), a “long-term strategy to achieve faster growth and economic development.”\(^{14}\) Envisioned in this paradigm was “progress in terms of commercialization, with more intensive farming, increasing proportion of marketable output and correspondingly decreasing ratio of production for own consumption. . . . It will mean greater market interaction on the part of the farmer.”\(^{15}\)

The 2005–2010 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) carried the existing strategy forward but embedded it within—and so more explicitly tied it to—a broader industrial development strategy. This involved strengthening “inter-sectoral linkages (between agriculture and industry) on the domestic front and . . . exploiting the . . . opportunities [for] regional and global economic integration.”\(^{16}\)

Unsatisfied with the effects of these initiatives on food insecurity and poverty, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi engaged in a series of conversations with Bill and Melinda Gates in 2009 about Ethiopia’s agriculture sector. Meles eventually asked for the support of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) “in identifying an innovative way to catalyze not only the growth but [also] the transformation of” this sector. BMGF subsequently conducted a series of eight diagnostic studies in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and McKinsey & Company, a management consulting firm. Two key challenges emerged from the research. First, significant agricultural development efforts in Ethiopia had historically taken narrow

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15. Ibid.
sectoral approaches, failing to address root causes of low agricultural productivity. Second, actors in the agricultural sector lacked implementation capacity to achieve change at scale.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, beyond growth and development, the sector would require something more fundamental: transformation.

Thus, in 2010, Regulation 198/2010 established the ATA, “an autonomous federal organ having its own legal personality.” Its two founding objectives were to: 1) identify systemic constraints to agricultural development; and 2) ensure effective agricultural development activity by helping establish strong linkages among institutions.\textsuperscript{18}

Governing the ATA was the Agricultural Transformation Council (ATC), chaired by the prime minister, with the minister of agriculture serving as the deputy chair, the ATA’s CEO serving as secretary, and various other ministers and regional government officials serving as members.\textsuperscript{19}

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of ATA’s political incubation by a head of state.\textsuperscript{20} Both a blessing and a curse, the “powerful grandfather” effect (to use the words of one interviewee) would prove to be a source of clout, and thus contempt, for the agency. Equally noteworthy are those absent from the original architecture of the ATC: members of the donor community, civil society, the private sector, or, for that matter, any representation from political outsiders. One could question the logic of expecting transformational outcomes from representatives of the status quo.\textsuperscript{21} We will return to these two issues later.

Today, the ATA employs 459 people, with the majority (79 percent) in its headquarters in Addis Ababa and the remaining 21 percent spread across four regional offices—SNNP, Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara. Approximately half the staff are technically or programmatically oriented; the other half play operational roles. The senior management

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} “Origins & History,” Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency, http://www.ata.gov.et/about-ata/ori-
  gin-history-2/.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} The language and concepts of transformation would likewise be reflected in the plans succeeding the Plan for Ac-
  ii-201516-201920. The ATA drew inspiration from the success of similar institutions in Taiwan, South Korea, and Malaysia in the latter half of the twentieth century. “Overview of the ATA and the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I & II,” Ethiopian Agriculture Transformation Agency, October 2016, https://www.canr.msu.edu/fs/outreach/presentations/Presentation_on_Ethiopia_ATA-for_Ma-
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, \textit{Regulation No. 198/2010, Agricultural Transformation Council and Agency Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation March 1, 2011}, https://chilot.me/wp-content/up-
  \item \textsuperscript{20} The founding of the ATA under the visionary leadership of Prime Minister Meles was itself proof of this con-
  ment-africas-agricultural-transformation. As an IFPRI study puts it, the diagnostic studies were effective principi-
  ally because of the relationship enjoyed by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation with the prime minister. Mitch
  fer/collection/p15738coll2/id/127769.
\end{itemize}
A team of 10 comprises CEO Khalid Bomba, the senior directors leading the agency’s functional departments, and the regional directors leading their respective offices.\textsuperscript{22,23,24}

Ten strategic objectives guide the work of the ATA at present. These objectives fall into three categories: strategic goals, organizational effectiveness, and enhancing impacts (Figure 2).

As most objectives have between two to five key performance indicators, objective 4 (the design, execution, and institutionalization of catalytic and impactful projects) stands out noticeably, with 15 key performance indicators.

\textbf{Figure 2: ATA’s Strategic Objectives}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE</th>
<th># OF KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Goals Mandated by Regulation</td>
<td>Generate high-impact studies and analytical outputs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide robust implementation support to partners</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectively integrate partners and projects</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Design, execute, and institutionalize catalytic and high impact projects</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Effectiveness and Efficiency</td>
<td>Build strong relationships with partners and effectively communicate with stakeholders</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectively recruit, manage and retain talented human resources</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieve excellence in internal operations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assure compliance with government policies and procedures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Impact</td>
<td>Mainstream gender equality, youth employment, climate change adaptation and mitigation, and nutrition</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure continuous learning and improvement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source: Agricultural Transformation Agency of Ethiopia}

\textsuperscript{22} The functional departments include: Production and Productivity, Agribusiness and Markets, Operations, the CEO’s Office, and Implementation Support.

\textsuperscript{23} The regional directors were added to the senior management team only recently, in October 2018. According to internal documents, this decision reflects the ATA’s “focus on enhancing implementation effectiveness in the regions by bringing regional voice directly into strategic decision-making of the organization.”

\textsuperscript{24} No women serve on the ATA’s senior management team. However, the agency is making concerted efforts to mainstream gender equity into their programming. These efforts include targeting women farmers for on-farm demonstrations, making mechanical technologies accessible and applicable to women farmers, and preparing communication materials that are sensitive to women’s unique needs and constraints. See Zemzem Muhammed’s presentation, “Gender Mainstreaming at ATA: Current and Future Directions,” https://www.slideshare.net/ILRI/gwg-oct2013-ata. And at the national level, opportunities for women to serve in leadership positions are expanding. For instance, in October 2018, Prime Minister Abiy appointed women to half of his administration’s ministerial posts.
The ATA’s strategic objectives aim to advance four fundamental pillars of the MOA’s “Transformation Agenda”: 1) increased crop and livestock production and productivity; 2) commercialization of smallholder agriculture and market development; 3) environmentally sustainable and inclusive growth; and 4) enhanced implementation capacity. The MOA introduced the Transformation Agenda in 2013, during the country’s first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I), a medium-term country-level strategy to reduce poverty between 2010 and 2015. Under GTP I, the Transformation Agenda included 84 priority interventions or deliverables; under the current plan, GTP II (2015–2020), there are 49 deliverables. Various state ministers and agency heads “own” each deliverable, with ATA staff seconded to these leaders as delivery units to provide embedded technical and implementation support.

Some 30 program areas—rooted in the strategic objectives and designed to address the Transformation Agenda’s pillars and deliverables—structure ATA projects (see Annex 2). Program areas include mechanization, fertilizer supply and distribution, irrigation and drainage, domestic and export market development, and rural land use.

Facilitated by the political clout it enjoys, the ATA’s rapid insinuation of itself in its first years into pre-eminent national strategies (GTP I and GTP II) was shrewd on several levels. It provided the young agency with further legitimacy. The ATA was no longer simply a pet project of former Prime Minister Meles, but an integral part of the country’s vision for its future. Similarly, it provided insurance against unforeseen political events. When Meles passed away in 2012, the ATA already belonged to something greater—GTP I, which had only just begun. Unlike the obscure legal backwaters in which the ATA was born (i.e., Regulation 198/2010), GTP I was a much higher-profile context for the young organization’s growing activities.

**ATA’s rapid insinuation of itself in its first years into pre-eminent national strategies was shrewd on several levels ATA was no longer simply a pet project of former Prime Minister Meles, but an integral part of the country’s vision for its future.**

The ATA’s work has historical precedents; in fact, many of its areas of emphasis have existed for over 60 years. In 1969, a Stanford Research Institute report, The Development of Agriculture and Agro-Industry in Ethiopia, recommended developing and improving “institutional arrangements that would support agricultural development,” expanding agricultural industries, and increasing mechanization and improving agricultural technology. Even in 1969, the study found several such activities already underway: research on agricultural machinery, an initiative to diffuse better agricultural practices, testing on commercial fertilizers, the development of land in the Awash Valley for irrigation, an expansion of the Ethiopian Grain Corporation’s program on grain storage and

marketing, and others. Many of these projects, which map closely onto those of the ATA, were underwritten at least in part by USAID.

What is arguably new for Ethiopia is the ATA’s institutional form, and its powerful mandate to innovate, which was endowed by Meles’s administration. Indeed, among many individuals with whom we spoke, the ATA has become a by-word for creativity and innovation. In recent years, the agency has expanded its work to include boots-on-the-ground implementation efforts. This gradual broadening of the agency’s scope of work, which we discuss in the following section, is hardly unusual for a new institution, but it offers lessons for those trying to understand how transformation works. And some lessons, we will suggest, are cautionary.
Three general themes emerged from our research. The first theme discusses the broadly-held view of the need for a dedicated agency to focus on agricultural transformation. Indirectly, this speaks to the question of ATA's replicability, and the role donors such as the United States might play in it. The second theme analyzes respondents' perceptions of ATA's organizational evolution since its establishment. The third theme discusses the relationship between ATA and the Ministry of Agriculture.

The ATA as a Vital Institutional Idea

Virtually all interviewed organizations and individuals shared and endorsed the ATA's vision. The resounding, even passionate, expectation is that the ATA can and should catalyze change, find solutions, facilitate innovation, and generally serve as a platform for agricultural transformation. Expectations of the agency are great. Specifically, the ATA is seen as an excellent mobilizer of national and international partners, both for the immediate goal of agricultural transformation and for the longer-term goal of helping Ethiopia become a low middle-income country free of hunger and poverty. Many research participants also emphasized the strategic importance of the ATA's focus on identifying Ethiopian agriculture's systemic bottlenecks. In this context, we understand “systemic bottlenecks” as constraining social, political, economic and/or ecological conditions that pervade and transcend the Ethiopian agriculture sector—for example, land tenure issues, public institutional capability and accountability, policy regimes, and political patronage. Many see the ATA's analytical prowess as a core competency, and believe the ATA should continue to study and map these bottlenecks and innovate solutions for them.

The Ethiopian Soil Information System (EthioSIS) is a good example of the analytic rigor the ATA brings to bear on its country's agriculture sector. EthioSIS is a digital soil fertility map that currently covers 748 of the country's 800 woredas, or districts. Drawing on over one hundred thousand soil samples and remotely-sensed satellite imagery, the maps enable the agency to develop custom soil-based fertilizer recommendations.

for localities within Amhara, Harare, SNNPR, Tigray, and Oromia, with the remaining regions expected to be completed this year. These recommendations will be further refined by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research to identify crop-specific fertilizer needs within a given locality.

The resounding, even passionate, expectation is that the ATA can and should catalyze change, find solutions, facilitate innovation, and generally serve as a platform for agricultural transformation.

Since healthier soils are a prerequisite for healthier plants, and soil needs vary across agro-ecological zones, fertilizer maps could be one major component of effectively closing the gaps between potential and actual yields in Ethiopian agriculture. Better yields, in turn, can help strengthen food security. In other words: effectively identify soil fertilizer needs, and you've taken a critical step towards improving food security for smallholder farmers.

As one person put it, the importance of the “ATA’s focus on soil mapping and its potential impact on identifying fertilizer needs cannot be overstated.”

That sense of the urgency and importance of the ATA’s innovative work exists among virtually everyone with whom we spoke: they consistently validated the concept of a special government agency dedicated expressly to systematically transforming agriculture.

The source of the ATA’s innovative capacity is, of course, its people. The ATA describes their staffing model as a hybrid of “local content experts, local analytical staff, international content experts, and management consultants.” This seems like a good idea: blend local knowledge and talent with the problem-solving capabilities of a consultant, and your work products are rigorous, contextualized, and practical.

Where human resources are concerned, the ATA has also put in place a “transition model to long-term local staff, to ensure a sustainable high-performing public sector agency.” To retain talent, they are also investing significantly in a program for young, talented analysts to enroll in a subsidized graduate degree program at local and international universities while working for the ATA. And then, most importantly, there is the compensation: ATA employees earn far more than MOA civil servants—between two and five times as much.

In discussing the ATA, participants did not directly address the question of the ATA’s replicability. Indicatively, this is because its work, although promising, is also ongoing. The question must be deferred. At the same time, the substantial amount of enthusiasm for the ATA’s innovative capacity points to something obvious: there is a great need for it.

30. Ibid.
The ATA's Evolution Towards Implementation

The ATA was never meant to focus solely on analytic innovation. The image of the agency as strictly a think tank or research institute is inaccurate. The government of Ethiopia's Regulation 198/2010, which established the agency, mentions a form of the word “implementation” at least six times: the ATA shall “follow up on implementation of solutions,” shall “provide support for implementation,” and shall “facilitate implementation.” This codifies a certain belief about agricultural transformation—it won’t happen by innovation alone—but the language is vague. What, exactly, does it mean to follow up on, or support, implementation?

The answer is embodied in the evolution of the ATA’s functional roles. The ATA’s most significant implementation work is its anchor initiatives: the agricultural commercialization clusters (ACCs). These clusters—essentially agricultural value chains—are meant to integrate the interventions and program areas prioritized by the MOA’s four-pillared Transformation Agenda. The ATA leads the selection of commodities through a rigorous research process on the basis of their potential value. Wheat, maize, and malt barley are among the most highly-prioritized crops. According to the ATA, the ACC approach “is modeled on successes from countries around the world that deployed geographically-focused strategies to transform their agriculture sectors and drive rural industrialization.”

The scope of the ACCs is impressive. In 2018, the ACCs in Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and SNNPR led to a total 2.07 million hectares of agricultural production, 17 percent of the country’s total cultivated land area (12.46 million hectares). In Tigray, approximately 51 percent of land is devoted to ACC production. And in Amhara and Tigray alone, the ACCs engaged some 1.3 million farmers in producing commodities.

Although the ATA has a warrant to do the practical work that goes into the ACCs, these efforts have opened a Pandora’s box of criticism. Many questioned if implementation should not be left to other organizations. In the words of one interviewee, the ATA’s movement into the clustering work is an “abdication” of its original mandate: a “burrowing” away from efforts to systemically reform policy into the nitty-gritty work of agricultural development. Others question the ATA’s apparent lack of an exit strategy for the ACCs: will it eventually transfer ownership of the clusters to the MOA, or will the clusters will eventually be sustained by their constituent members? The answer is less important than the question, because the question—at least the one implied—is

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32. Many study participants, including some at the ATA, seemed to conflate agricultural commercialization and economic growth with human well-being. As many have noted, however, there is a difference between growth and development. Between 1999 and 2008, for instance, only 5 percent of global GDP growth went to the poorest 60 percent of humanity. Jason Hickell, “The True Extent of Global Poverty and Hunger: Questioning the Good News Narrative of the Millennium Development Goals,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 5 (February 5, 2016): 749–767, https://www.academia.edu/21593862/The_True_Extent_of_Global_Poverty_and_Hunger_Questioning_the_Good_News_Narrative_of_the_Millennium_Development_Goals.
rhetorical: why is a special institution like the ATA doing business-as-usual agricultural development work?

The objections are not because the ACC work itself is perceived as low-quality. On the contrary, one prominent specialist in value chains even told us they had adopted the ACC methodology for the crops with which his organization works. And a regional governmental officer emphasized the ATA’s unique skill in organizing actors within the clusters, for example by identifying potential input providers, buyers, financiers, and cooperatives.

For better or for worse, the focus on implementation is increasing. A 2016 revision to the agency’s mandate explicitly introduces a broader set of themes the agency is to address—agricultural production, agricultural productivity, marketing, environmental sustainability, inclusion, food security, institutional capacity-building. At the same time, a number of references to more specific issues are eliminated—input supply and distribution, agricultural technologies, agricultural cooperatives, and agricultural extension. The ATA may well continue work in these discrete areas, but they are no longer confined to them (see Annex 3).

In summary, the ATA’s initial focus was on analytical innovations. Over time, the agency expanded its work into implementation. If this is understood as an evolution, it may be unfair to critique the ATA for “changing its focus,” as some suggested. The mandate to innovate was there from the beginning. Moreover, many start-up organizations evolve. Evolutions have generative potential, with the ability to manifest institutional identity, capability, and resolve.

Potentially fairer could be critiques over whether the ATA’s current foci—evolved or not—are sufficient for transformation. Such critiques appeared consistently in our interviews and tended to rest on a broader concern for whether ATA’s work on agriculture sufficiently engaged with that of other another entity—the MOA.

**The ATA and the Ministry of Agriculture**

Where the MOA is concerned, the first thing to note is a bit of recent news. Its minister is in the process of assuming the chairmanship of the ATC. It was not always this way. From the beginning, ATA has been “accountable” to the MOA, to use the charter regulation’s language, but the ATC was chaired by the prime minister, not the minister of agriculture. With the ascent of Abiy Ahmed to Ethiopia’s premiership last year, however, that has changed. Abiy—more so than former Prime Minister Meles, the original ATC chair—is intent on devolving power within his administration. Thus, the ATC’s chairmanship is in the process of being transferred from the prime minister to the minister of agriculture.

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34. Mark Leibovich, on the other hand, notes the political utility of using a metaphor of evolution. “[I]n the modern, politicized version, the word is more of a defensive crouch. It might, in its best form, suggest improvement — but it also suggests a kind of helplessness, or an abdication of responsibility, someone being swept along. The world is changing, and I am changing, too; I have no choice.” Mark Leibovich, “You and I Change our Minds. Politicians Evolve.” *New York Times Magazine*, March 10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/magazine/you-and-i-change-our-minds-politicians-evolve.html.

The change in leadership throws into relief an awkward reality noted earlier: ATA employees tend to get paid much more than MOA employees, although both agencies are staffed by civil servants focused on improving the country’s agriculture sector. The differential is arguably justified in cases where ATA hires people with exceptional qualifications and motivation.\(^{36}\) The money for these salaries does not come from a special federal government pot, but rather from grants made by donors from outside the country. National governments like the United States, the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark are among the ATA’s biggest public donors, as well as other institutions like the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.\(^{37}\)

Still, the optics aren’t great. And it isn’t just optics. By far the largest former employer of ATA employees is the MOA. For the ATA, is this strategic (hiring talented civil servants with insider knowledge of the sector) or problematic (inducing brain drain within the country’s pre-eminent agricultural institution)? Like a Russian doll, that question is nested inside increasingly larger ones. How does the ATA actually work with the MOA? Has their relationship changed over time? And what is the MOA’s role in agricultural transformation?

Since ATA is preparing to directly report to the minister of agriculture in his incumbent capacity as ATC chairman, and since the forty-nine Transformation Agenda Deliverables were designed to be owned by departments within MOA, the Ministry’s role in transformation is definitionally that of leader. Even the agenda for the ATC is set jointly with MOA and ATA.

A few observations set this leadership role in context. First, there is confusion among some as to the respective responsibilities of the MOA and the ATC/ATA, even among seasoned professionals who work on Ethiopian agriculture. As one senior NGO representative put it, “For what purpose should I go to the ATA, and for what purpose should I go to the MOA?” Second, ATA delivery units—staff who are seconded to the MOA to support its efforts to implement Transformation Agenda deliverables—seem to have, at best, a tepid reputation among rank and file MOA officers (and other MOA-affiliated institutions). The consensus is that delivery units act as if they “know best,” creating frustration among career civil servants within the MOA. Some ATA staff who work with the delivery units do not seem cognizant of this dynamic, although when approached about this issue, ATA senior leadership stressed two points. First, ATA leadership is “very cognizant of the potential negative perspective which rank-and-file MOA staff might have on the delivery units, and has been seeking regular feedback on (these) perceptions in order to course-correct in real-time.” Second, the ATA is making efforts to measure its own performance in this area, and these efforts present a different picture. In 2018, the agency conducted an anonymous survey among twelve senior members of the MOA, asking them to assess the quality of the delivery units’ work.

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36. Every two years, the ATA surveys salaries of comparable delivery organizations in Ethiopia (international NGOs, local NGOs, and private sector entities working in agriculture). The results inform adjustments to ATA’s salary structure.
37. The ATA is not the only government entity that pays more. For instance, the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, the Ministry of Customs and Revenue, and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research also have unique salary scales. Some individuals embedded within the government of Ethiopia received a portion of their salary from NGOs, and their compensation can thus be higher than that of their colleagues. This fairly new development has taken some of the pressure off of the ATA, according to our interviews.
Ten respondents indicated the overall delivery unit support of Transformation Agenda deliverables was either very good or good.\textsuperscript{38}

The ATA’s working relationships with regional bureaus of agriculture are more robust. The agency focuses its capacity-building and partnership engagements on these offices, which are more closely involved in practical implementation than the Ministry of Agriculture. In fact, the ATA’s own organizational structure mirrors this perception of respective functions of the MOA and its regional bureaus. One ATA respondent suggested the agency’s headquarters in Addis Ababa functions as a think tank whereas ATA regional offices act as implementers.

In these regional offices, ATA is principally involved in the organization of the Agricultural Commercialization Clusters. The form of this varies by commodity and region, but generally includes the identification of input providers, connecting with potential buyers, helping extension agents with demonstration plots, and assisting cooperatives in the establishment of seed multiplication. These activities frequently involve collaborations with Bureau employees, of a kind and degree the research team did not observe at the Ministry level.

Several comments conclude the discussion presented in this chapter. First, our research—guided by the questions provided in Chapter 1—elicited a range of largely-convergent views on ATA’s goals (Theme 1), organizational evolution (Theme 2), and relationships within the Ministry of Agriculture (Theme 3), respectively. Second, the question of the replicability of ATA’s model (and the role the U.S. government might play in it) did not arise organically, unlike the other themes presented here, as many feel ATA’s work is still ongoing, so not yet replicable, \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{39} That said, the enthusiasm for aspects of ATA’s work implies a strongly felt need for an institution that focuses on identifying, and innovating around, systemic bottlenecks in the agriculture sector. Finally, a significant cross-section of respondents’ perspectives not presented in this chapter could be characterized as prescriptive. That is, many participants hold strong feelings about the future direction of the ATA—and about agricultural transformation in Ethiopia, \textit{writ broadly}. This topic, and the various views on it represented in the data, is the subject of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{38} Self-assessment has considerable methodological limitations; the ATA’s survey findings are presented to further illustrate the complicated relationship between the ATA and MOA, but also to illustrate active ways the ATA is engaged in its potential challenges.

\textsuperscript{39} The timeline presented for ATA’s organizational lifespan on the agency’s website projects a sunset date of 2030. This seems ambitious.
4 | Conclusions and Recommendations

There are plenty of reasons to suggest agricultural development in Ethiopia has made good progress in recent decades. Between 2000 and 2016, for example, the annual change of agricultural value added to the economy in Ethiopia was 6.2 percent, higher than any country in sub-Saharan Africa. However, as this report has suggested, significant work lies ahead and may call for different strategies. To use the words of one author, what got Ethiopia here may not get it there. This chapter presents eight recommendations—five for ATA, and three for donors like the U.S. government—aimed to jump-start a new phase for Ethiopian agricultural transformation.

For the Agricultural Transformation Agency

1. Build a bigger tent.

The ATA began its journey in 2010 with the burden of proving its own institutional concept. As a result, many came to see ATA as a boutique innovator. Such is the logic of disruption: move rapidly and shake things up. If you want to go fast, go alone, says the old proverb. But if you want to go far, go together.

Now that the ATA has established itself and demonstrated its ability—time and again—to deliver innovative products aimed at transformation, its brand must evolve from innovator to collaborative leader. The ATA must now expand its mandate of transformation to include and draw on the strengths of others, by building myriad new alliances, formal and informal, to help transform agriculture in Ethiopia. The ATA must build a bigger tent, welcoming in contributors big and small, progressive and conservative, religious and secular, grassroots and multinational. This is harder, slower work—but already there is evidence it is happening. In recent months, for example, the ATA has entered into partnerships with Save the Children, the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, and TechnoServe. These alliances cannot be built ad hoc, however. They will require a careful strategy for how the ATA defines, builds, refines, and closes out relationships with partners.

The ATA can expand its efforts to foster alliances by continuing to give credit where it is due. Public recognition of the contributions from other institutions to accelerate transformation efforts—such as basic agricultural research that gets transformed into a series of policy recommendations—could be operationalized as a key performance indicator. Institutions who provide upstream resources could, for example, be acknowledged in ATA reports and presentations. For example, one institution with whom
we spoke said seeing their logo on an ATA report would have been more than sufficient for their group to feel recognized. In earlier years, such attribution may have threatened the ATA’s ability to demonstrate its unique value; today, attribution is simply proof of its ability to engage collaboration and build a big tent. In fact, the ATA has already made significant efforts in this area over the past five years. As there will always be those who, disgruntled, feel they deserve more credit, a more robust partnership strategy will help ATA discern which perceptions to heed and which to ignore.

If you are good builder, others will want to learn from you. Moreover, teaching is an excellent mechanism for solidifying one’s own understanding of a topic as well as sharing knowledge and building relationships and credibility. The ATA could establish a Center for Excellence in Agricultural Transformation at their headquarters, so countries in the Horn of Africa and around the world can learn from its experiences. The ATA could establish a partnership between its Center for Excellence, the Ministry of Technology and Innovation, and EthioTelecom to establish an online certificate program in Agricultural Transformation, offering courses such as “Open Source Innovations for Transformation” and “Identifying System Bottlenecks.” These courses could be an additional source of revenue and credibility for the agency.

2. **Double down on innovation—and scrutinize the pivot to implementation.**

The ATA is in the vanguard of analytic sophistication for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our research indicated profound approval of ATA’s work to deliver innovative insights, products, and technologies for transformation. Ability to innovate seems to be both its core competency and comparative advantage. As such, the agency may consider doubling down on its work pipelines that center on innovation. One way to do this is to expand and refine a publications strategy to broaden the ATA’s audience. For example, a book-length investigative treatment of the ATA’s experience—by an internationally recognized journalist, written in collaboration with its CEO—could have the potential to reach mainstream venues worldwide.

Another way to double down on innovation could be to strategically clarify the ATA’s rules of engagement with new initiatives. For example, if a major NGO in Ethiopia wants to help farmers learn about climate-smart agriculture, and ATA is approached for a partnership to this end, the agency could prioritize analytical roles for itself (e.g., assessing farmer demand for climate-smart agriculture) rather than implementation roles (e.g., managing demonstration plots of drought-tolerant crops).

The ATA must continue to discern the difference between what must be done to achieve agricultural transformation, and what it is itself capable of doing. For example, if the ATA believes it must continue to implement agricultural commercialization clusters, it could be helpful to design a timebound, benchmarked exit strategy to ensure the clusters eventually become self-sustaining. This would help safeguard ATA’s unique innovative capacities.

A call to double down on one aspect of transformation (innovation) and scrutinize another (implementation) is a round-about reminder that a rigorous theory of change must guide ATA’s decision-making.
3. **Diversify the ATC and expand regional input mechanisms.**

As with all boards, the ATC defines and limits the possibilities of the institution it governs. Its composition is traditional, with the minister of agriculture now serving as its chair, the ATA’s CEO serving as the secretary, and other federal and regional leaders—all political insiders—filling the balance of its seats. Traditional leadership is unlikely to yield transformational outcomes. The list of crucial stakeholders not represented on the ATC is much longer: smallholder farmers, women, Ethiopian agribusiness owners, donors, members of the NGO and donor communities, scholars. The absence of such voices represents a huge missed opportunity for the ATA to substantively benefit from a diverse leadership.

**The ATA must continue to discern the difference between what must be done to achieve agricultural transformation, and what it is itself capable of doing.**

Additionally, the ATA could diversify the mechanisms—beyond the ATC—for important stakeholders like smallholders to participate in the ATA’s work and also hold it accountable. For example, regional smallholder steering committees could meet quarterly at the ATA’s field offices, providing a bottom-up means for the ATA to ground-truth the scope and quality of their work at the regional level.40

4. **Co-create Transformation Agenda deliverables with the Ministry of Agriculture that tackle challenges within the ministry itself.**

Agricultural transformation will not be realized in Ethiopia unless the Ministry of Agriculture is itself transformed. The ATA must re-conceptualize the Ministry of Agriculture not only as a partner in transformation, but as a site of it. The ATA could work with the MOA to identify a small variety of Transformation Agenda deliverables that address challenges within the MOA itself—challenges that the MOA itself feels and prioritizes and that the ATA can address. This process of identifying problems itself builds capability among those who must address the challenges.41

For example, the ATA could lead the design of a new MOA website. Potentially, this would produce three shared benefits. First, it could give the MOA and ATA a structured opportunity to think strategically together about various aspects of Ethiopian agriculture: what the MOA does, what its resources are, how it communicates with the public, how its data are organized, and which policies (federal, continental, international, multilateral) shape its mission. Second, it could allow the ATA to deliver a high-profile public good to the ministry in which it is embedded, thereby demonstrating both complementary functionality and shared purpose. Third, a modern website could embody and illustrate for an international audience—including key stakeholders, like

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40. The selection procedures of members for these committees would need to be transparent, seeing as such bodies, especially in Ethiopia, are susceptible to both political capture and the over-representation of men. Also, because the practical influence of such committees on decision-making can often be tokenistic, the ATA could consider sharing decision-making responsibilities with them.
global food companies and major commodity brokers—the competitiveness and promise of Ethiopian agriculture.

5. **Widen the two-way street between ATA and the Ministry of Agriculture.**

The ATA could establish stronger in-house opportunities for MOA career civil servants to participate in ATA projects. Historical experience suggests there can be no agricultural transformation without a transformed Ministry of Agriculture. Giving MOA personnel an opportunity to see the ATA from the inside may not be a panacea, but—symbolically, at least—it could enrich the sense of mutuality and shared purpose between the two institutions.

**For the U.S. Government and Other Country Donors**

6. **Help the ATA establish a Center for Excellence to advance the goal of country-led development.**

Although it may be premature to fully address the question of ATA’s replicability, the question is important. Replicability must begin with learning. But learning from successful agricultural transformations depends on far more than white papers filled with best practices. Less experienced policymakers and practitioners of transformation need deep mentorships with those who are experienced in it. They also need the opportunity to learn from peers in other countries. Investing in relationships among mentors, mentees, and peers from countries throughout the global South is an excellent way for USAID to advance its aim to promote country-led development approaches. Countries where USAID works on agriculture and food security—such as Mali, Bangladesh, and Guatemala—could learn a lot from other such countries, like Ethiopia, thus multiplying USAID’s return on investment.

Illustratively, a Center for Excellence in Agricultural Transformation could administer the online certificate program mentioned earlier; host short, intensive residencies for visiting civil servants and longer-term fellowships for visiting scholars; and plan an annual conference. The Center could be staffed by a hybrid of ATA employees and specialists seconded from USAID and other research institutions such as IFPRI. The Center could become the continental and global facility for learning about agricultural transformation in situ.

7. **Embrace some agnosticism over how recipients deliver outcomes.**

USAID Administrator Mark Green has consistently emphasized that the purpose of foreign assistance is ending its need to exist. The U.S. Global Food Security Strategy also frequently underscores its commitment to promote country-led development efforts.\(^{42}\) One thing that stands in the way of these laudable ideals is the institution’s intense procedural scrutiny over how development objectives are achieved (mostly in the interest

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ATA must re-conceptualize the Ministry of Agriculture not only as a partner in transformation, but as a site of it.
of accountability and transparency, to be fair). But what if USAID were to agree upon
development objectives with government agencies like the ATA, and then assume a degree
of agnosticism about the ATA’s specific methods? Such performance-based mechanisms
could give the ATA scope for genuinely radical leadership of a kind perhaps less feasible
under traditional funding mechanisms.

Clearly, relaxing accountability measures intensifies the potential for manipulation, even
fraud. But because development is a complex social process with emergent qualities, it
requires the flexibility to adapt, refine, improvise, and abandon particular approaches.
Funding incentives tend to dictate otherwise: recipients are prone to monitor and evaluate
their projects in a way that demonstrates success, regardless of whether meaningful
change has occurred. A better approach—one USAID has begun to explore—may be to co-
create development objectives with qualified recipients, and then provide those parties
with the latitude to adapt their approach as needed.\(^43\)

8. Challenge Ethiopian leadership to further open commercial space for small- and medium-
sized agro-enterprises owned by Africans.

The Ethiopian government’s extensive investment in agriculture in recent decades has
resulted in impressive sectoral growth. However, that investment has also crowded out
private sector involvement along the agricultural value chain. Consider, for example, the
World Bank’s Enabling the Business of Agriculture Index, which measures 62 countries’

enabling environments for agribusiness in five areas (seed, fertilizer, machinery, finance,
and markets). The index puts Ethiopia in the bottom third for seed, fertilizer, and markets,
and in the middle third for machinery and finance.

Where private enterprise is concerned, there is also a perception problem. African
capitalists are often stereotyped as corrupt, politically-entrenched rent-seekers. This,
in the view of some scholars, has led to “a negative and naïve view of the interrelation
between public power and private interests, a view that pre-empts or precludes the
possibility of building positive coalitions between the state and business community.”\(^44\)
That possibility, however, is consonant with USAID’s new Private Sector Engagement
Policy, which emphasizes “working with host-country governments…(to) help create a
stronger enabling environment that fosters transparent, inclusive economic growth.” This
includes “policy and regulatory reform that encourages fair and open competition (and)
institutional reforms.”

The U.S. government could utilize its diplomatic resources to have richer, bolder
conversations with Prime Minister Abiy and his cabinet about the private sector’s
role in Ethiopia’s economy. Private sector promotion has both technical and political
components; the latter would benefit from greater attention.\(^45\)

\(^43\). Grant Power, Matthew Maury, and Susan Mary, “Operationalising bottom-up learning in international NGOs:
\(^44\). Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about developmental states in Africa,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25,
\(^45\). USAID’s focus on the technical element of private sector promotion is noteworthy. See, for example, the
Agency’s program Partnering for Innovation, which invests in start-up agribusinesses in countries where Feed
the Future works. See https://www.partneringforinnovation.org/.
The concept of inclusive growth tacitly acknowledges that business-as-usual capitalism rewards the few, rather than the many. Prioritizing the advancement of small and medium-sized African-owned businesses—especially those led by women—is one way to correct for this. Inclusive growth is another critical dimension of building the big tent of transformation. The good news is Prime Minister Abiy has already demonstrated a commitment to gender equality—last October, he gave half of his ministerial positions to women. Such commitment is a significant opportunity, which the U.S. government can continue to leverage in advocating for inclusive economic development in Ethiopian agriculture.

The U.S. government could utilize its diplomatic resources to have richer, bolder conversations with Prime Minister Abiy and his cabinet about the private sector’s role in Ethiopia’s economy.

In conclusion, the recommendations in this chapter have pointed to a simple idea: in Ethiopia, as elsewhere, agricultural transformation is everyone’s business. That is easy to say, and hard to do. But the ATA has earned the right and built the capability to set up the big tent. They must, because they can.
Annex 1 | Methodology

A. **Sampling Strategy**: The sampling strategy for the study can be described as both purposive (i.e., respondents were identified as having, or having had, working relationships with the ATA) and convenient (respondents were able and willing to meet with our research team). For the purpose of triangulation, focus groups with ATA staff members had different compositions. For example, some were held with programmatic teams (i.e., both senior and junior staff working on the same vertical line of business); others were held with those holding the same level of seniority (i.e., the Senior Management Team).

B. **Organizations Represented in Sample**: Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, Ethiopian Agricultural Businesses Corporation, International Food Policy Research Institute, World Bank, USAID/Ethiopia, USAID/Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (Washington, D.C.), ACDI-VOCA, Catholic Relief Services, Fintrac, Tony Blair Institute, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Rockefeller Foundation, McKinsey & Company. (Note: A number of study participants not represented in this list are presently un-affiliated with an institution.)

C. **Protection of Human Subjects**: The research team obtained informed consent from each respondent. The terms of consent are available upon request.

D. **Data Collection**: The interviews and focus groups were principally conducted in person, with a small number conducted by telephone.

E. **Data Analysis**: Qualitative data were recorded with handwritten notes, transcribed, analyzed, and coded for themes using qualitative data analysis software.

F. **Rigor**: The research team was led by Christian Man and Getachew Diriba, both of whom hold advanced degrees in social scientific disciplines. At the request of the research team, a voluntary panel of experts, including representatives of the ATA, reviewed this report for accuracy, coherence, and quality, providing non-binding input.

G. **Full Disclosure**: The CSIS Global Food Security Project receives funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which also provides support to the ATA. As with all of our work, this research project is intellectually independent. CSIS retains all editorial and substantive privileges. The ATA's feedback for this report was considered only insofar as it improved the report's clarity and accuracy.

H. **Errata**: Any factual errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
## Annex 2 | Current List of ATA Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8028 Farmer Hotline (Interactive Voice Response/SMS) Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Investment Mapping Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Commercialization Cluster Project</td>
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<td>Agriculture Trade and Investment Promotion Project</td>
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<td>Cooperatives Storage Pilot Project</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Investment Commission Support Project</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Agribusiness Acceleration Platform Project</td>
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<td>Input Voucher Sales System Project</td>
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<td>National Market Information System Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives (RuSACCOs) Capacity Building Project</td>
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<td>Farmer Production Clusters Project</td>
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<td>Agricultural One Stop Shop Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agro-Meteorology Project</td>
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<td>Apiculture Value Chain Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Training at Farmer Training Centers (FTCs) Project</td>
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<td>Climate Smart Innovation at FTCs Project</td>
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<td>Commercial Farm Service Centers Project</td>
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<td>Cooperative Based Seed Production Project</td>
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<td>Direct Seed Marketing Project</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Soil Information System Project</td>
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<td>Innovation Validation Project</td>
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<td>Integrated Shallow Groundwater Irrigation Development Project</td>
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<td>Mechanization Service Center Pilot Project</td>
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<td>Teff Improvement Project</td>
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<td>Teff Row Planter Project</td>
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Annex 3 | 2016 Amendments to ATA’s 2010 Charter Regulation

This chart compares provisions in ATA’s charter Regulation 198/2010 with amendments to it enacted under Regulation 380/2016. The analysis illustrates how the amendments effectively broaden the scope of work for the ATA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUB-ARTICLE IN CHARTER REGULATION (2010)</th>
<th>SUB-ARTICLE IN AMENDED REGULATION (2016)</th>
<th>CHANGES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify, through study, the basic systemic constraints of input supply and distribution; recommend and follow up implementation of solutions thereof</td>
<td>Identify, through study, the basic systemic bottlenecks of agricultural production and productivity of crop and livestock; recommend and follow up implementation of same</td>
<td>From a focus on input supply and distribution to broader themes of agricultural production, productivity, marketing, and output—with a new emphasis on systemic bottlenecks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct studies on input supply system to ensure fundamental improvement in the rapid multiplication and timely supply of proven technologies to farmers in the required quantity and quality; and provide support for implementation of same</td>
<td>Identify, through study, the basic systemic bottlenecks of agri-business and agricultural marketing to increase [marketing] and value addition of agricultural products for domestic and export markets; recommend and follow up implementation of same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish effective technology scanning system and facilitate importation, adaptation, verification and multiplication of proven agricultural technologies</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Removed sub-article on agricultural technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Identify, through study, the basic systemic bottlenecks to ensure environmental sustainability, inclusiveness and food security of agricultural production; recommend and follow up implementation of same</td>
<td>New sub-article on environmental sustainability, inclusion, and food security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct studies to ensure that the agricultural extension system is restructured and provided with capable manpower so that it could support the agricultural transformation; and facilitate implementation of same</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Removed sub-article on agricultural extension</td>
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<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>Identify, through study, the basic systemic bottlenecks of developing enhanced institutional capacity for implementation and monitoring of agricultural interventions; recommend and follow up implementation of same</td>
<td>New sub-article on institutional capacity-building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify the soil fertility constraints that cause yield reduction, design the remedies for the constraints, and support implementation of same</td>
<td>Develop a prioritized list of deliverables that can catalyze agricultural transformation for focused implementation</td>
<td>Removed sub-articles on soil fertility and Ethiopia Commodity Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study constraints and means on how modern agricultural marketing system can be established through bringing all actors from primary market up to the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange, and support in implementing recommended solutions</td>
<td>Manage and lead projects of specific deliverables within the agricultural transformation agenda as requested by the Council</td>
<td>New, broader themes on identifying catalytic deliverables and Council-prescribed initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devise means on how to enhance the role of cooperatives in agricultural marketing so that they play pivotal role in input and output marketing, and provide support in the implementation of same</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Removed sub-article on agricultural cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create strong linkages among agricultural and related institutions and projects in order to ensure the effectiveness of agricultural development activities</td>
<td>Create strong linkages among agricultural and related institutions and projects in specific geographies in order to ensure the effectiveness of agricultural development activities</td>
<td>New language on geographic specification of linkage-building efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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About the Authors

Getachew Diriba was born and raised in rural Ethiopia. He graduated from Haramaya College of Agriculture, attended a post-graduate program at the University of Dortmund, Germany, and obtained a doctoral degree in agricultural economics from the School of Development Studies of the University of East Anglia, the United Kingdom. He worked as extension program officer and project manager of the Kobo Alamata Agricultural Development Project in Northeastern Ethiopia; program manager for CARE Ethiopia; regional adviser for Southern and Eastern Africa for CARE International. He also worked for the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) in Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping for the Southern, the Great Lakes, and the Central Africa Regions; as head of program in the Republic of the Sudan, regional program adviser for the Middle East and Central Europe, director of the Partnerships and Capacity Development Service at Headquarters, country director and representative in the Republic of Liberia, and country director and representative in the People’s Republic of China, in which he established the China Centre of Excellence for the WFP. He retired from the WFP in early 2017.

Christian Man is a research fellow with the CSIS Global Food Security Project. Prior to joining CSIS, Christian worked as a consultant for Catholic Relief Services, helping with the design, implementation, and analysis of Seed System Security Assessments in Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Zimbabwe. Prior to his work in international development, Christian was a community development practitioner in Memphis, Tennessee, where he helped organize an urban agriculture program, a food policy council, and a local foods distributor. He received a PhD in rural sociology and international agriculture and development from Penn State, where his research focused on smallholder agricultural development in Ethiopia.