Asianism and Universalism

The Evolution of Norms and Power in Modern Asia

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Nicholas Szechenyi

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Asianism and Universalism of Democratic Norms

In this publication, we use the terms “Asianism” and “universalism of democratic norms” as follows:

Asianism: The belief or premise that the Asian countries share Asian cultural and political values, a premise that is sometimes used to support political and/or economic solidarity between Asian states and is sometimes but not always linked with principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention between states in internal affairs, and a lack of commitment to universal democratic norms.

Universalism of democratic norms: The belief or premise that democracy and democratic norms such as universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and human rights are universal values; that democracy is the foundation of good governance; and that adoption of democratic norms will lead over the long term to greater national, regional and global stability and prosperity.
Introduction

Michael J. Green

The definition of rules, values and norms has become increasingly important in the contest for supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese leaders have challenged the universalism of democratic norms, championed the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and pronounced the exceptionalism of Asian political cultures, while providing diplomatic and economic assistance to regimes that defy democratic norms. In 2018 Xi Jinping went from defense to offense, promising to export China’s form of socialist authoritarianism for a new era. At the same time, Japan, Korea, Indonesia and India have each amplified the importance of democracy in their own domestic identities and definitions of regional integration. In late 2017, the resurrection of the U.S.–Japan–India–Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue appeared to align maritime democracies in the face of Chinese ambitions for regional dominance.

On the face of it, the universalism of democratic norms seems poised in opposition to Asianism, or Asian regional exceptionalism, which is often coupled with non-intervention in internal affairs. Yet the currents of normative discourse and identity in Asia are not actually binary. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found in surveys of strategic elites in the region in 2009 and 2014 that China was indeed an outlier in its lack of support for basing regional integration on norms such as good governance, free and fair elections, rule of law and women’s empowerment. However, what might be considered the “democratic camp”—both developed and developing democracies—was itself divided on the importance of respecting the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Norm identification occurs at many levels in Asia: at the geopolitical level, the state level and the local level. Sometimes the focus is effective governance, sometimes justness,

1. The author is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and director of Asian Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
and sometimes legitimization and branding vis-à-vis rivals at home or abroad. At all levels, however, normative discourse is an increasingly important dimension of international relations of the region.

In 2017, with a grant from the government of Japan, CSIS convened a group of scholars to examine the interplay of democratic norms and political identity in Asia. The specific countries examined were Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and the United States. The two major questions the group addressed were:

1. How is the interplay between Asianism, or regional exceptionalism, and the universalism of democratic norms shaping state identity, discourse, and behavior in the major Asian democracies?

2. Is there a prospect for developing a common understanding of rules and norms as the foundation for a more stable regional order?

In her essay on Japan, Maiko Ichihara documents the rising prominence of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Japanese foreign policy over the last several years. She notes that a shared commitment to democracy is one strategic pillar that successive Japanese governments have used to reinforce alliance relations with the United States and closer strategic alignment with Australia and India. This normative glue has proven critical in Japan’s external balancing behavior in the face of China’s growing power and ambitions in the region. However, Ichihara notes that Japan sets aside these same democratic norms when competing with China for influence in authoritarian states like Cambodia. She also cautions that Japan’s foreign aid remains weak in support of civil society and civil liberties compared with other advanced donor nations, despite steady increases in Japanese spending in these categories since 2010. Finally, she questions whether India’s identification with democratic norms is as strong as the Japanese government claims. Still, the rising importance of democratic norms to Japan’s foreign policy identity and the Japanese public’s own priorities is a striking feature of contemporary Asian international relations.

Eunjung Lim’s chapter on Korea captures the dynamic evolution of democratic identity in three stages: the initial democratization of the 1980s, the response to the Asian financial crisis, and the most recent impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. As a result of these growing pains, demands for political accountability are a central element of Korea’s modern identity and Lim predicts that Korean foreign policy will increasingly reflect the principles of justice, transparency and rule of law. She rightly notes that pride in civic institutions has surpassed ethnic nationalism in Korean discourse, and Korea has also increased its foreign aid spending on governance and democracy over the past decade.

Yet at the same time, Korea has been somewhat passive on human rights and democracy challenges in developing Asia, focusing instead on commercial interests and diplomacy with North Korea. Korea has also taken a more cautious stance on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and other efforts to frame common democratic norms in the Asia-Pacific because of sensitivities about China, which Seoul also sees as critical for trade and solving the North Korea challenge. Korea has enormous credibility with developing Asia on the question of democratization but has not fully found its voice as an advocate for democracy in a regional context.
Shubha Kamala Prasad and Irfan Nooruddin note in their essay that India's strong democratic identity was based on a desire to make the international system more democratic and allow developing countries to pursue their own goals, first in the non-alignment movement, and subsequently in global institutions such as the Group of 77, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the United Nations (UN). They submit that India's pursuit of global leadership has lacked a clear strategy or exportable ideology—either Asianism or democracy—particularly in the politically diverse milieu in which India has immersed its foreign policy identity. To the extent the current government led by Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has created an ideational role for India, it is focused on transforming the Indian identity from a predominantly secularist outlook to one focused on Hinduism as the center of Indian society and culture. They point out that within this gradual transformation in Indian politics, Hinduism and democracy are compatible concepts for the BJP at both the strategic and normative levels. The BJP's commitment to democracy and Hinduism aligns with Japan's definition of shared democratic norms among maritime democracies around China's littoral, but only imperfectly, since the BJP's focus on sanskar (one who embraces modernity while upholding traditional Hindu values) is not universal. Still, the exploration by Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Abe of a common ideational basis for their countries' budding strategic ties is likely to continue as China asserts its own ideology for the region.

Former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa draws on his academic and policy experience to argue that Indonesia's democratic transformation supports the notion that in the realm of foreign policy, the promotion of democratic principles and state sovereignty, or non-interference in internal affairs, are not irreconcilable. As foreign minister of Indonesia, Natalegawa focused on the “democratization” of foreign policy both internally, in terms of engaging civil society and other stakeholders to create a sense of participation in and greater ownership of foreign policy, and externally by placing Indonesia on the right side of the global debate on the protection and promotion of democratic principles. As chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2003, Indonesia actively promoted democratic principles and human rights and called for the creation of a political-security community pillar to complement ASEAN's traditional focus on economic cooperation. By sharing some of its own internal challenges, Indonesia tried to encourage discussion of political developments within member states and how they might affect the region. While some civil society groups within Indonesia argued that the country should focus on promoting democracy at home first, Natalegawa contends that internal and regional democratization had to go hand-in-hand to succeed. Engaging and embracing a diversity of regime types in dialogues on democracy was critical to this approach, although perhaps limiting its impact. Indonesia's own twenty-year transition to democracy and the country's size within ASEAN once raised the prospects for the gradual democratic transformation of surrounding states through the powerful Indonesian example, but as Natalegawa concedes, the region has seen more democratic setbacks than successes in the past few years.

Dan Twining's final essay covers the oldest advocate of democratization in the Asia-Pacific. He acknowledges that the United States has been an imperfect and inconsistent advocate for universal democratic values but offers several reasons to believe that U.S. support for such values in Asia will intensify, despite the apparent disinterest of President Donald J. Trump. These reasons include the fact that a majority of Asians now live in democratic
systems, the performance legitimacy of Asian democracies, the pressure on democracies to cooperate in the face of Chinese competition, and the relative geopolitical strength of Asian democracies compared with those in Europe. Yet Twining also warns that the margin for error in U.S. support for democratic norms in Asia is narrowing and argues that universality driven from Washington will not succeed. The key will be to embrace greater diversity of approaches and harness the identification of major powers in Asia like Japan, India, Indonesia and Korea with democratic norms.

Will that work? The essays in this short volume demonstrate how contested the definition of democratic norms is across and especially within the major democratic states of the Asia-Pacific region. In India the battle is occurring between Hindu and secular identities; in Korea Moon Jae-in’s championing of accountability is a proxy battle for legitimacy against conservatives; in Japan Abe’s promotion of democratic norms is dismissed by the left-leaning Asahi Shimbun and others as cover for a turn to the right; in Indonesia the democratic vision of Marty Natalegawa and former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has dissipated under his successor. The United States is itself enmeshed in the most divisive debate over democratic norms since at least the Vietnam War. The contest for legitimacy and power in Asia is being complicated by contests for legitimacy and power within each of the major democracies that should be upholding a free and open regional order.

Yet broader trends suggest that it is far too soon to write off the prospects for greater democratic consolidation.

First, China’s efforts to export a Chinese ideology will likely spur greater strategic cooperation among the major democracies in defense of the open order each supports, despite their diversity in approaches to promoting democracy.

Second, material and ideational competition are beginning to blend. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and associated Maritime Silk Road have alarmed India and to lesser extents Japan and Australia because Beijing has deployed debt financing arrangements that have locked countries like Sri Lanka and Laos into long-term dependence on China—and given China strategically significant facilities for future military use. Some of these arrangements were struck in non-transparent settings with non-democratic and unaccountable governments. While Japan and others will offer high quality infrastructure alternatives, the region’s major democracies will be incentivized to support transparency and accountability in recipient states to help them avoid coercive and usurious arrangements in future.

Third, in the 150-year old game of nationalism and self-determination that has shaped regional order since Japan’s modernization in the Meiji period, the United States is once again on the right side of history (having occasionally slipped to the wrong side, as we did at times in Vietnam). The internal democratization of Asian states’ foreign policy, noted by both Lim and Natalegawa, means that populations will increasingly take a dim view of coercive or usurious actions by China. Democracy will still have to perform to be accepted, but it offers the best tools to ensure national resilience and independence. Leaders in authoritarian states may be attracted to some of China’s toolkit, but increasingly empowered civil societies will not be.
Fourth, despite the promotion of Xi Jinping thought—introduced at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China—and growing hi-tech repression of civil society within China, the Chinese people are hardly monolithic or content. The turn in official Chinese discourse to a more authoritarian direction with the 19th National Congress is not necessarily an expression of party leaders’ confidence in their ability to navigate the socio-economic challenges around the corner. The external examples of successful democracies can shape debates within Chinese society.

Fifth, despite setbacks in democratic norms and a closing of civil society space in parts of developing Asia, there is nevertheless growing confidence in countries like India, Korea, Indonesia and Japan in their own democracies. These powerful major and middle powers will continue to demonstrate that Asian culture and democratic norms are winning combinations. The surprise 2018 electoral defeat of the United Malay National Organization government of Prime Minister Najib Razak demonstrates that the ballot box still has considerable power to shape national trajectories in Asia.

Sixth, the U.S. retreat on democracy is more likely cyclical than linear, as Dan Twining suggests in his essay. The U.S. Congress, civil society groups, state and local governments, and increasingly empowered diaspora communities from Asia are all giving voice to concerns about democratic norms and human rights within the Asia-Pacific region.

These trends are simultaneously reasons for encouragement and indications of how complex views of norms in Asia are and how challenging it will be to operationalize cooperation in support of governance and democracy in the region. The only future more complicated, though, would be to cede the region to illiberal forces that would threaten the interests of all the states studied in this project.
The Role of Democracy Promotion in Japanese Foreign Policy

Maiko Ichihara

Democracy in Japanese Foreign Policy

Never has the term democracy appeared so frequently in Japanese foreign policy statements like today. The Japanese government repeatedly mentions democracy—along with the rule of law and human rights—as a universal value that has guided and will continue to guide Japan’s external behavior. Ever since 2006, when Foreign Minister Taro Aso of the first Shinzo Abe cabinet launched the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept, consecutive Japanese administrations, whether of the Liberal Democratic Party or of the Democratic Party of Japan, have emphasized democracy and explained Japanese foreign policy in relation to it.\(^5\)

This tendency has been especially striking in consecutive Abe administrations since December 2012. In his 2013 policy speech to the Diet, Prime Minister Abe stated, “Fundamental to our diplomacy will be for us to develop a strategic diplomacy based on the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law.”\(^6\) This determination was reflected in every document on foreign policy, from diplomatic bluebooks to the National Security Strategy, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) white papers, and the Development Cooperation Charter.

In policy recommendations, academics have also increasingly mentioned democracy as a core value for Japanese foreign policy. The concluding report of the Advisory Panel on Conceptions for the 21st Century, convened by the government in February–June 2015, made policy recommendations emphasizing democracy and stated, “Japan will be required to be willing to lead the establishment of liberal rules and the creation of regional systems by consensus in Asia.”\(^7\) A 2011 policy paper published by the PHP Institute also

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\(^7\) The Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st
highlighted the importance of “partnership with those developed countries in the region that share liberal political values with Japan such as South Korea, Australia, Canada, India, and Indonesia.”

**Democracy Promotion in Japan’s Values-Based Diplomacy**

By placing democracy as a core guiding value, Japan accomplishes two functions in its foreign policy. First, democracy is used as a value that connects Japan with its security partners and strengthens their relationships with other democracies, such as Australia and India, in addition to the United States. Democracy has been used as a term to express the bond among these countries to show that they constitute a security community.

Along these lines, in 2012 Prime Minister Abe proposed the creation of Asia’s “democratic security diamond” and “envisage[d] a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.” While this proposal was received dispassionately, mainly due to Australia’s reservations given the country’s strong economic ties with China, the Japanese government re-proposed creating a quadrilateral security dialogue framework among the four countries in 2017, along the lines of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” that Japan launched the same year. In these new security cooperation frameworks, democracy is used as a banner to ensure the bond among the countries that share the same democratic norms.

Second, Japan’s values-based diplomacy exhibits its resolve to support democracy abroad. In his 2006 “Arc of Freedom of Prosperity” speech, Foreign Minister Aso said, “Japan will serve as an ‘escort runner’ to support these countries that have just started into this truly never-ending marathon” of democratization. Created in 2013, the National Security Strategy, the first formal guidelines for Japan’s foreign and security policies in the history of modern Japan, states: “As an advanced, liberal and democratic nation, based on the principle of human security, Japan will actively utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.” The five principles Abe declared at the time of his visit to Jakarta in January 2013 also state that Japan would play a role in consolidating and expanding universal values such as liberal democracy and basic human rights.

Japan’s increased emphasis on promoting democracy seems out of step with the arrival of the U.S. president Donald Trump, who is disinterested in international democracy.
promotion. Not only does President Trump intend to reduce U.S. efforts to promote democracy and largely cut the budget for it, his attacks against free media and praise of authoritarian political leaders also provide justification for non-democratic rulings.\(^4\)

Observers such as Andrew Nathan and Michael Pillsbury have argued that China presents a non-democratic model that has led to an authoritarian resurgence. Now that the president of the country regarded as the champion of democracy projects an authoritarian image, international society requires political leaders to take up the mantle of supporting the liberal international order.\(^5\) Indeed, President Trump’s impact is so serious because, in the words of Samuel Huntington, “the pervasiveness of democratic norms rest[s] in large part on the commitment to those norms of the most powerful country in the world.”\(^6\)

Thus, scholars such as John Ikenberry began to expect Prime Minister Abe along with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, as the two major political leaders in the liberal developed world, to play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order.\(^7\)

Reflecting the Japanese government’s increased emphasis on promoting democracy, Japan increased foreign aid provision for state institutions, elections, and civil society in developing countries, considered the main target sectors of democracy assistance.\(^8\) If we take the data of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on foreign aid for government and civil society as a proxy for democracy assistance, Japan’s aid has expanded from $130 million in 2003 to $353 million in 2011 and has remained high since then. Two target subsectors within this category stand out in terms of the expansion of aid amount: (1) public sector policy and administrative management and (2) legal and judicial development. Together, Japan’s foreign aid for these two subsectors makes up between 80 percent and 99 percent of its total aid to government and civil society for the last decade and a half.\(^9\)

While there is no consensus as to what democracy is, Robert Dahl argues that democracy requires both contestation (i.e., free and fair elections) and participation (i.e., universal suffrage). And Dahl claims that there are eight requirements for democracies: “1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) right of political leaders to compete for support; 6) alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.”\(^10\) Thus, if a country intends to promote democracy, it is crucially important to support civil society and civil liberties, in addition to elections and state institutions. In the case of Japan, however, while foreign


\(^{16}\) Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 47.

\(^{17}\) John G. Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 3 (May/June 2017), 2–9.


aid provided for civil society and civil liberties has increased in the second decade of the twentieth century, it remains miniscule compared to aid for state institutions. It shows that Japan’s foreign aid, while ostensibly promoting democracy, remains weak in the support of critical functions underlying the spread of democracy abroad.

Although democratic countries generally use diplomatic pressure as a tool to promote democracy, Japan’s diplomatic pressure remains somewhat muted. For example, while the Japanese government expressed its deep regret about the Thai coup in May 2014 and urged Thailand to return to democratic rule, it stopped making such statements only months after that, and steered to build friendly relations with the Thai junta. It also affirmed Cambodia’s general election in July 2013 immediately after the election, although there were allegations of widespread election fraud.

Interestingly, there seems to be a discrepancy between Japan and other international actors in their understanding of democracy promotion. For example, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Japan agreed in 2017 to provide extensive support for Kyrgyzstan, which ousted authoritarian presidents in 2005 and 2010. Although Japan’s support consisted of grants for state population registry, disaster risk governance, and school programs, none of which are related to democracy promotion, Mr. Yoshihiro Yamamura, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Kyrgyz Republic, stated: “I am sure that the grants provided will contribute to the further development of the country’s democracy.” None of the other stakeholders considered the projects to be related to democracy promotion, while the Japanese government seems to regard support for socioeconomic infrastructure as support for fundamentals of democratization.

How Deeply Embedded are Democratic Norms in Japan?

Does the increased emphasis on democracy in Japan’s foreign policy indicate that democratic norms have been embedded in Japanese society and are reflected in foreign policy?

One of the most accepted definitions of the concept of norms, by Peter Katzenstein, states that norms are “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.” Combined with Dahl’s conception of democracy, democratic norms can be defined as collective expectations that maintain contestation and participation—or the eight elements of “1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) right of political leaders to compete for support; 6) alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and 8)

institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference”—as the basic elements of a regime and as constituting the proper behavior of actors within a country.

Given this definition, Japan’s immediate endorsement of the Cambodian general election in 2013 does not seem to be driven by democratic norms. The endorsement was made although the suspicion of election fraud was yet to be dispelled, and thus, there remained the possibility that contestation of the election was violated.

In 2014, at the 7th Bali Democracy Forum, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kazuyuki Nakane stated: “Japan has supported the consolidation of democracy in Cambodia through legal assistance.” However, Cambodia is yet to meet Dahl’s definition of democracy and remains as an example of competitive authoritarianism with weak check-and-balance mechanisms, massive election fraud, and limited civil liberties. Japan’s assertion that Cambodia has consolidated democracy seems to indicate that the Japanese government’s understanding of democracy might be limited to electoral or procedural democracy, whether it includes liberal substance or not.

Although contestation requires civil liberties, the Japanese government has never commented on President Trump’s attacks against the media and his weak support for human rights of minorities and immigrants. Strong belief in democratic norms is likely to lead actors to criticize actions that violate democratic norms; the lack of such actions seems to show that it is not normative factors that drive Japan to emphasize democracy in its foreign policy.

The use of democratic norms to evaluate Japanese foreign policy is split among the Japanese media. Japan’s liberal newspaper Asahi Shimbun criticizes Abe’s diplomacy by stressing that it does not actually promote democracy and human rights. On the other hand, conservative newspapers such as Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun praise Abe’s strategic diplomacy. Yomiuri Shimbun emphasizes that Japan should conduct strategic diplomacy to protect the maritime order as China expands its influence through such initiatives as the Belt and Road and the String of Pearls, without any mention of using ODA to promote democracy. In praising Abe’s values-based diplomacy, Sankei Shimbun calls on “those countries that share values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights protection, and the rule of law” to “strengthen their relations both in terms of security and economy in order to counter autocratic state’s hegemonism.” While emphasizing the importance of strategic alignment among democratic countries, Sankei Shimbun does not question Japan’s weak support for democracy abroad. Democracy is not necessarily commonly accepted

28. The term competitive authoritarianism is from Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
as a guiding norm for foreign policy even among Japanese media; at least some of the media view democracy more as an umbrella term useful for strategic diplomacy.

Among the Japanese public, an overwhelming number of respondents answered that democracy is important in the World Value Survey of 2005–2009 and 2010–2014. However, more people rated democracy as “somewhat important” than “absolutely important” (on a scale of 1 to 10, a score between 6 and 9 indicated “somewhat important,” with 1 being “not at all important” and 10 being “absolutely important”). Indeed, democracy was “somewhat important” to almost 52 percent of Japanese respondents in 2005–2009 and 41 percent in 2010–2014; it was “absolutely important” to almost 37 percent in 2005–2009 and 36 percent in 2010–2014. This seems to show that while the Japanese believe in the importance of democracy, the preference for democracy may be considered in relative, not absolute, terms.

Democratic Norms in Asia?

Although Japan’s democracy promotion remains somewhat weak in substance, does its use of democracy to strengthen security relations among Asian countries indicate that democratic norms have been accepted widely in Asia?

Japan has been strengthening relations with India under the banner of democracy, but the Indian media seems to be somewhat indifferent to the role of democracy in bilateral or international relations. For example, as major Indian media reported that the Japanese foreign minister planned to propose a quadrilateral security dialogue—between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—to the United States during President Trump’s visit to Japan in 2017, the Indian media made almost no mention about the role of democracy in quadrilateral relations.

India itself has been promoting democracy abroad recently. India’s Election Commission is active in supporting elections abroad; the country conducts capacity building of government officials in neighboring countries for good and democratic governance; and India is one of the major founding members of the United Nations Democracy Fund. However, normative support for promoting democracy seems to be split within India. Prime Minister Mahomohan Singh stated in 2005 that “Liberal democracy is the natural order of political organization in the world,” to indicate India’s commitment to promoting democracy. However, Sidharth Mallavarapu argues that India’s democracy promotion is motivated by strategic interest in improving its international reputation and its relations with the United States. Niranjan Sahoo notes that the Indian government’s...

muted response to the Rohingya refugee crisis, where the Indian government portrayed the Rohingya refugees as “illegal migrants,” indicates the Indian government’s strategic calculation as it focuses on the fight against terrorism, maintaining warm relations with Myanmar as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, and political competition with China, instead of norms such as democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{37} David Allen even argues that India remains suspicious of “external democracy promotion and ‘intervention’ in the affairs of others.”\textsuperscript{38}

Indeed, democracy has not confined India’s diplomatic behavior. In addition to strengthening its relations with democracies such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, India held a trilateral meeting with China and Russia in 2016 and became an official member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2017. While India–China relations have cooled somewhat after the standoff in Doklam in June–August 2017, India–Russia relations remain friendly stemming from ties with the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. India seems to be taking an omnidirectional diplomatic approach that reflects its longstanding commitment to non-alignment.

When it comes to South Korea, there has been no ideational alignment with Japan yet. Despite the commonalities of human rights concerns regarding the North Korean abduction issue and both governments’ emphasis on democratic values, lingering distrust since the early 2010s, in addition to the importance of South Korea’s relations with China and relatively weak interest in democracy promotion in South Korea, seem to be inhibiting Japan–South Korea collaboration. For example, when the South Korean presidential Blue House declined to participate in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative in 2017, the reason was not only because the initiative was considered to be a counterweight to China but also because it was led by Japan.\textsuperscript{39} And in Japan, the foreign ministry’s diplomatic bluebook stopped mentioning democratic values as a commonality with South Korea in 2015, and the description of Japan’s relations with South Korea has been weak in tone ever since.\textsuperscript{40}

However, South Korean society as a whole has shown support for democratic norms in recent years. One clear example is the candlelight movement in 2016–2017. In the anti-corruption demonstrations against President Park Geun-hye, South Korean citizens showed not only their preference for greater transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption, but also strong civic activism. In her remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on September 25, 2017, South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha seems to have hinted at the country’s intention to highlight this civic movement in Korea’s public diplomacy. If implemented, it might alleviate one of the inhibiting factors for Japan–South Korea cooperation on democracy promotion.


\textsuperscript{38} David Allen, “The EU and India: Strategic Partners but Not a Strategic Partnership” in The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, ed. Thomas Christensen et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 574.


Conclusion: Strategic, Rather than Normative, Motivations

There are apparent strategic calculations behind Japan’s increased underscoring of democracy in its foreign policy. There seem to be two reasons why the Abe administration has been emphasizing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. One is to help maintain the status quo amid China’s rise with its support for international rule of law. China’s ever more assertive stance on maritime security issues is a special concern for Japan. Commitment to democracy and the rule of law is a way to justify the maintenance of the maritime status quo in Asia and to help stabilize it.\(^{41}\)

Then why does Japan mention democracy as well as the rule of law if Japan’s concern is to maintain the maritime status quo? This question leads to the second reason for emphasizing security—Japan seems to be utilizing the term “democracy” to emphasize commonalities with other democratic countries as a means of encouraging defense cooperation with democratic security partners. In other words, the country intends to nurture “we-feeling” among democracies to foster the sense of natural bond to facilitate a security community. Above all, the main driver for Japan is to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States.\(^{42}\)

Ole Holsti argues that, even in the United States, there has never been strong normative support for democracy promotion as a part of U.S. diplomacy either during the Cold War or after.\(^{43}\) Despite championing democratic principles as a pillar of its foreign policy, Japan’s recent democracy promotion initiatives appear to be motivated by strategic rather than normative incentives.

\(^{41}\) Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance.
\(^{42}\) Ichihara, Japan’s International Democracy Assistance.
South Korea’s Democracy 3.0 and Implications for Its Foreign Relations

Eunjung Lim

In over 30 years since the 1987 June Democratic Uprising—which replaced Chun Doo-hwan’s military regime with the current, directly democratic Sixth Republic system—South Korean “politics of the vortex” remain in some ways fundamentally unchanged, as illustrated by the political turmoil that ended in President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017. However, South Korean democracy and the priorities of the Korean electorate have changed over the years. How has this young democracy has evolved? What makes South Korean democracy unique? What might these recent changes mean for South Korea’s foreign policy and relations with the United States and China?

South Korean Democracy 1.0 and 2.0

I would characterize the first decade of conservative leadership after the democratization of South Korea in 1987 as Democracy 1.0. After the massive 1987 uprising that called for amending the constitution and directly electing the president, the electorate voted into power Roh Tae-woo, a leader in the previous military junta who had already been selected by then-president Chun Doo-hwan as his successor. In 1992, Kim Young-sam, respected as a young, brave dissident against Park Chung-hee’s Yushin regime of the 1970s, was elected the first civilian president since democratization—but only after building a coalition with two conservative leaders of the military junta (then-president Roh Tae-woo and Kim Jong-pil) and running on the ticket of the giant conservative party, the Democratic Justice Party (Minju Jeong-ui-dang). During this period, the Korean electorate showed their strong preference for sociopolitical stability while aiming for the expansion of political freedom restrained under the authoritarian leadership.

The “critical juncture” that marked the end of Democracy 1.0 was an external shock that crippled the country’s economy: the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The period from Kim Dae-jung to Park Geun-hye (1997–2016), nearly two decades, can be thought

44. The author is an assistant professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University.
of as South Korea’s Democracy 2.0. Throughout this period, the economy was the overarching theme of Korean presidential elections and politics, regardless of the presidents’ party affiliations.

In 1997, the Asian financial crisis severely damaged the Korean economy and shifted South Korea’s attention from political freedom to economic reform, at a time when neoliberalism was a dominant trend in the global economy. The election of Kim Dae-jung as fifteenth president in December 1997—with South Korea in the throes of socioeconomic pain from the financial crisis—was a peaceful transition from the conservative, state-directed model of economic development to a liberal and progressive model, a victory that rode on the back of the Korean electorate’s expectations of Kim Dae-jung’s strong leadership for economic recovery.

In July 1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis blew the Korean economy, the country’s foreign exchange reserves dropped sharply from $22.3 billion to $7.3 billion, and South Korea asked for a $55 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 1997. Two months later, Kim Dae-jung was inaugurated, and then-foreign exchange reserves recorded only $18.5 billion. Requests for economic adjustments from the IMF were tough, and accordingly, Kim Dae-jung’s economic reforms could not be insulated from the IMF’s prescriptions and IMF-led global neoliberalism, which resulted in some serious paradoxes between his ideological background and his economic policies. Kim Dae-jung, as Park Jung-hee’s lifetime rival and a respectful dissident against the Korean military junta’s statism, had been supported by liberal groups who led democratization. In theory, he was expected to protect labor rights and public economy. After his inauguration, he made some significant efforts to improve labor–management relations and strengthen corporatism by establishing the Korea Tripartite Commission (of labor, management, and government); but at the same time, his administration implemented neoliberal labor market reforms such as introducing layoffs and the dispatch of irregular workers. The unemployment rate increased to 7 percent in 1998, which was almost three times higher compared to before the crisis. Resistance from labor grew, and new socioeconomic challenges such as disintegration of the traditional family emerged and the South Korean economy was gradually restored.

Economic concerns dominated subsequent presidencies. President Roh Moo-hyun’s extraordinary unpopularity in 2007, the last year of his term, stemmed in large part from his real estate tax policy, which triggered a furious backlash from the Korean middle class. Lee Myung-bak’s landslide victory in the 2007 election reflected in part the Korean electorate’s deep disappointment with Roh Moo-hyun’s economic policies. Lee’s

49. Tae-hyun Kim and Su-beom In, “Evaluations on the Kim Dae-jung administration’s labor policies and remaining issues,” in Congressman Park In-sang’s Policy Materials (2001).
52. Lee earned 48.7% of the votes at the 2007 presidential election while Chung Dong-young, the candidate of then-ruling party, only earned 26.1% (voter turnout was 63%).
presidential campaign slogan, the so-called “747 Plans,” was ardently supported by Korean voters who expected further economic growth regardless of the plan’s low feasibility.

The massive protests against U.S. beef imports in 2008, during the first year of the Lee Myung-bak administration, illustrate how Korean society perceived the free trade agreement with the United States and reacted to its neoliberal demand to open Korea’s traditionally protected markets such as agriculture and dairy farming. This cannot be simplified as anti-Americanism but rather reflects a multidimensional phenomenon including the fear or rejection of neoliberalism that pushed for a fully open market economy. Adverse reactions to neoliberal reforms formed a new ground for the 2012 presidential election. In 2012, Park Geun-hye’s major slogan for her presidential campaign was “economic democratization”: it contradicted her party’s ideological identity, but her Saenuri Party pragmatically transformed its policy agenda for political gain by playing on economic concerns, and she was elected as the country’s eighteenth president.

In sum, South Korean society struggled with its economic and political transformation in the era of globalization, as U.S. patronage—both political and economic—waned. The nation’s greatest challenge during Democracy 2.0 was figuring out how to readjust its economic performance to the global trend of neoliberalism. Consequently, the Korean electorate kept voting for leaders who stressed the country’s economic development and/or reforms, regardless of the candidates’ political identities, ideological backgrounds, personal scandals related to corruption, and professional skills.

**The Sewol Ferry Disaster, Impeachment, and Democracy 3.0**

The Asian financial crisis, followed by the bailout and prescriptions for the country’s economic reforms provided by the IMF, changed the Korean socio-economic landscape. Neoliberal reforms such as restructuring and deregulation in the labor market shook the sociocultural bases of Korean society. Nonetheless, other key features of Korean economic development remained unchanged, such as the back-scratching alliance between state elites and business elites (or chaebol), and the government’s guidance of industrial development. Both the Korean elites and the Korean electorate bear some responsibility for having been continuously willing to compromise other values such as transparency and the rule of law in favor of economic growth over almost two decades of Democracy 2.0. Koreans call the series of post-financial crisis reforms “the IMF Incident,” which sounds like Koreans blaming an international institution. The economic adjustment was tremendously painful; however, the Korean electorate missed an eye-opening opportunity to review their own responsibilities for the decisions they made. Had the electorate focused as much on governance as the economy, that period could have become the era of developmental democracy after the era of what has been called developmental dictatorship.

The Sewol Ferry disaster of April 16, 2014, precipitated the end of Democracy 2.0. That disaster, in which 304 people out of 476 passengers and crew lost their lives, awakened

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53. Lee, who used to be widely recognized as a former CEO of Hyundai Construction and became popular as the 32nd Seoul mayor, pledged “7 percent economic growth, increase in GDP per capita up to $40,000, and to make South Korea the 7th largest economy in the world.”


Korean society and helped crystallize the distinction between modern Korean ideals and the moral hazards of the older generation: the 18-year-old ferry was illegally modified to maximize profits and the captain, Lee Joon-seok, who was supposed to guide the escape of passengers, fled the vessel and was later convicted of negligence, and a number of young high school students lost their lives. This tragedy might have marked the very first time Korean society engaged in introspection, rather than rejection or opposition to impacts from external shocks such as globalization. As a result, Korean society finally stepped across the threshold of self-examination and became more focused on governance and the state of South Korean democracy.

When President Park Guen-hye's influence-peddling scandal erupted in late October 2016, the momentum for self-purification accelerated. In terms of corruption, Park might not have been exceptional compared to her predecessors who were able to finish their five year-terms, but her understanding of the political system of South Korea, a liberal democracy, was out of step with that of average Korean people who recognized themselves as democratic citizens. Every Saturday after October 29, 2016, the public held candlelight protests demanding the removal of Park Geun-hye from office, and her impeachment was finally upheld by the Constitutional Court on March 10, 2017.

**Whither Democracy and its Role in South Korean Foreign Relations?**

I would contend that South Korea's Democracy 3.0 has just begun. Over a short period of time during his 2017 presidential campaign, Moon Jae-in consistently gained significant support from the Korean electorate with his major pledge to clean up South Korea's “deep-rooted evil.” After assuming office he pursued major reforms, including an investigation of Lee Myung-bak's “four-rivers” development project and the phase-out of coal and nuclear power, and his approval rating in the first month after his inauguration was considered historically high. It is not certain when Korean society's infatuation with Moon will end, but it is clear that there is a strong public desire for fundamental reforms including the restoration of democratic values such as justice, transparency, and the rule of law.

In turn, South Korea's foreign relations will be significantly influenced by how Koreans view counterpart countries based on these democratic values. Though the favorability rating of the United States has dropped worldwide since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, South Korea remains one of the strongest supporters of the United States: 75 percent of Korean respondents assessed the United States positively in a 2017 Pew survey, 9 percent lower than in the last year of the Obama Administration. Also, 69 percent of

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younger respondents (age 18–29) appreciated U.S. ideas and customs, and 78 percent of Korean respondents expressed support for U.S.-style democracy, higher than any other country including Japan (63 percent).61 On the other hand, more South Koreans expect that China’s influence in Asia will be greater than the United States 10 years from now, and that it will eventually replace the United States as the world’s leading superpower.62

Meanwhile, recent controversies surrounding the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) reflect how South Koreans perceive their partner countries and how liberal and democratic values are interconnected with this discourse. Koreans’ approval rating of the THAAD deployment has been fluctuating; in June 2017, 55 percent were supportive and 37 percent opposed.63 South Korean favorability towards China reached its lowest point in March 2017 when China’s economic retaliation against South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD escalated.64 Also, it is noteworthy that 60.7 percent of respondents who approved of THAAD and 72.4 percent of respondents who disapproved of THAAD responded that the National Assembly should ratify deployment.65 Whether or not they approve of the deployment, the respondents seem to emphasize the procedural legitimacy of such an important decision. Kang Kyung-wha, the foreign minister of the Moon Jae-in administration, also noted that it is necessary to conduct an environmental impact assessment, to obtain democratic and procedural legitimacy, and to strengthen public support for the deployment while highlighting that the South Korean government “has no intention to basically reverse the commitments made in the spirit of the ROK [Republic of Korea]–U.S. alliance.”66 The series of THAAD-related debates revealed how Korean society sees the ROK–U.S. alliance, Chinese unilateralism, and the procedural legitimacy of important decision-making processes.

What does this mean for foreign relations between South Korea and others? Historically, South Korea has preferred multilateral and liberal approaches to deal with regional issues. For instance, under Kim Dae-jung, South Korea regularized the trilateral summit with China and Japan in 1999 and the three countries have had eleven trilateral summits from 1999 to 2011, when ASEAN Plus Three Summit meetings were held. Since 2008, the trilateral summit has been held separately from the ASEAN Plus Three Summit meetings, and six trilateral summits were held before the end of 2015. The latest trilateral summit was in Tokyo on May 9, 2018, after a two-and-a-half-year interval.

Given Kim Dae-Jung’s efforts at regional diplomacy, which sought to include support for democratic norms in South Korean foreign policy, many Koreans have been frustrated by the Japanese government’s decision to delete the phrase “a neighboring country that

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shares basic values such as freedom, democracy and human rights” from the section on South Korea in its diplomatic bluebook. Since 2016, Japan has described South Korea simply as “the most important neighboring country that shares our strategic interests” in accordance with the need for military cooperation to counter against North Korea and China.  

However, few Koreans would agree with the demotion of South Korea in Japan’s diplomatic bluebook, as South Korea’s democratic confidence has been rising.

South Korea’s diplomatic agenda is not entirely consistent, however. South Korea’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending has increased substantially ($2.2 billion as of 2017) and almost one third of its total ODA goes to Asia, but South Korea is not proactive enough in discussing conditions related to liberal values such as democracy and human rights in recipient countries. South Korean liberals, although they achieved their political power by defying dictators, have tended to be more tolerant or even silent on North Korea’s human rights issues. This might seem paradoxical to other countries and even to Korea’s younger generation.

The Chosun Daily, one of the most conservative and largest newspapers in South Korea, recently conducted a public poll together with Seoul National University which found that more than 90 percent of respondents (1,000 in total) in their 20s and 30s answered that they do not think North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons. This kind of deep-rooted doubt toward North Korea among South Korea’s younger generation is related to their democratic identity and mistrust of authoritarian regimes.

In sum, one can conclude that South Koreans will increasingly prioritize democratic values as an important part of their national identity over ethnicity-oriented nationalism, Asian regionalism, or even strategic calculations when working on foreign relations. It is very likely that South Koreans would see countries that share democratic values as much more important and trustworthy partners for future cooperation.

“I am New India”: Balancing Economic Liberalism with Social Conservatism

Shubha Kamala Prasad & Irfan Nooruddin

Introduction

In March 2017, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu right-wing party, won the state legislature elections in Uttar Pradesh, the largest Indian state, with an overwhelming majority of 312 out of 403 seats—a dramatic change from the previous election in 2012 when the BJP secured only 47 seats. When, in its aftermath, the office of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh went to Yogi Adityanath, he became the most recent and powerful offspring of religion and politics in India. The BJP’s selection of Adityanath is significant for two reasons: first, it openly marks the appointment of a Hindu religious figure, a mahant or chief priest of a Hindu temple, as one of the most powerful political actors in Indian politics; second, it is the visible triumph of Hindu right-wing identity politics over Nehruvian Indian secularism. As India celebrates over seventy years of independent statehood, how will the BJP’s consolidation of power across the country translate into a new identity for India that will alter its foreign policy and strategy?

In contrast to the other essays in this volume, we claim that the concept of Asianism, which operates at the strategic and normative level for East Asian countries, does not resonate in the Indian context. Instead, we focus on the core tension of India’s evolving identity and its relationship with democratic values. In India the battle occurring today is...
an internal one between conflicting ideas of India centered on either secular or Hindutva identities. Led by Narendra Modi, the current BJP government is firmly rooted in Hindutva politics and looks to strengthen India’s Hindu identity. Thus, understanding India in the twenty-first century means grappling with the shift from more secular policies to the proliferation of Hindutva policies and its impact on democratic values.

In this essay, we argue that in the realm of foreign policy, both continuity and change mark the BJP government’s track record since 2014. The BJP’s exclusive vision of India is an attempt at balancing the modern and the moral. On the one hand, the BJP has, in national and state elections, sought to adopt an anti-corruption platform that embraces modern technology for better governance. On the other hand, the party has also taken a strong stance against cow slaughter and has pushed for the creation of a uniform civil code that will supersede personal religious laws (aimed mostly against the largest religious minority group in India, Muslims). The BJP relies on a narrative of progress and modernity consistent with previous administrations, harking back to Jawaharlal Nehru’s modernist project of socialist development for a newly independent Indian state. However, the BJP resoundingly rejects the idea of a secular India. It strongly affirms the existence of an undivided Hindu rashtra or state—akhand bharat, or literally “undivided India.” In 2014, for the first time in the history of Indian politics, the BJP won a majority of the seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s Parliament. With an overwhelming majority to implement its mandate, the full intent and likely impact of the party’s Hindutva philosophy can finally be gauged.

**Continuous Modernity**

At the stroke of the midnight hour, when India awoke to life and freedom on August 15, 1947, it also explicitly entered an era of modernity. Jawaharlal Nehru—India’s first prime minister—had envisioned India developing into an independent nation rooted in a modernist project that included centralized economic planning, big dams, and the promotion of science and technology. For instance, government support for nuclear research began right after independence in 1948 with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. In the Nehruvian ideal, India would emerge as a successful, self-reliant nation with a scientific temperament and assume its rightful place as a global power. These aspirations have not changed in their essentials across successive governments. The current Modi-led BJP regime is no different, highlighting science and technology as it promotes mobile apps for better governance. In the ever-expanding list of apps introduced since 2014, the Narendra Modi app provides the “latest information, instant updates & helps you contribute towards various tasks,” while the GARV Grameen Vidyutikaran app has a real-time dashboard that tracks rural electrification across India. The emphasis on apps serves the dual purpose of appearing modern and in sync with

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75. Hindutva (or Hindu nationalism) is an ideology that perceives India as the homeland of Hindus and equates Indian identity with being Hindu. In one of the first articulations of Hindutva’s philosophy, V.D. Savarkar (1923) wrote that India is the pitrabhumi (fatherland) and punyabhumi (holy land) for Hindus, which is why only Hindus can be true Indian patriots, while the primary loyalties of Indian Muslims or Christians lie with their holy lands in the Middle East. For the purpose of this essay, we use the term Hindutva to identify the ideology that equates Indian identity with a Hindu identity and not a secular identity.

76. For more on the overlap between the Congress and BJP’s foreign policy agenda on India’s autonomy and recognition in the international system, see Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland, “Institutions and Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy.” *India Review* 11, no. 2 (2012): 76-94.
Indian youth, and also providing the government another platform to communicate with the electorate.\textsuperscript{77}

In foreign policy, the modernity narrative initially translated into a projection of India’s strength and rightful place as the leader of the developing world. The Non-Aligned Movement, with its emphasis on neutrality and independence of non-great powers to decide for themselves, captures this sentiment best. India, one of the movement’s founding members, sought to ensure that developing countries, many of which had gone through anti-colonial struggles and recently achieved independence, were not forced to pick sides between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. Independence was a hard-won prize—having dispatched Western colonizers at long last, independent states were not eager to hand sovereignty over to another master. Nehru’s India saw itself as a defender of those countries that did not have the power to stand up for themselves, allowing newly independent states to forge their own paths of progress and economic development without external pressure.

Consistent with its self-image of a modern state with the power to lead the developing world, India has sought to play this role in multiple forums over many years. For instance, the Group of 77, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty talks, the Doha round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and climate change negotiations are just some examples of India’s leadership role that involved resisting the pressure exerted by developed states in defense of the interests of its developing world comrades. Through these fora, India has hoped to signal that powerful developed countries cannot coerce it into doing what it wishes not to do. The BJP government is no different in its approach when it comes to this aspect of foreign policy. The expectation that a Hindu right-wing government more sympathetic to free trade policies would ease the deadlock at WTO’s Doha round of trade negotiations was not met. In 2015, the Modi government toed the previous Congress governments’ line and the Minister of Commerce and Industry asserted that India “negotiated ‘hard’ to ensure that the WTO continues to place the interests of developing countries and LDCs [Least Developed Countries] at the center of its agenda.”\textsuperscript{78}

However, India’s ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement was one of the first major compromises made by any Indian government on climate change, since the treaty does not include the historical responsibility of developed nations to counter global warming more effectively—a point India has long emphasized. Furthermore, while India managed to include “equity and common but differentiated responsibilities,” the cornerstone of India’s climate policy for the last couple of decades, this principle does not feature in the operational section of the text. This treaty might be a unique case, though, with India not wanting to be perceived as a roadblock and seeking to project its global leadership responsibilities on a matter of grave concern to developing countries since they are most likely to be adversely affected by climate change.

On the theme of global leadership, our assessment is that India desires a “seat at the table,” but does not have a clear action plan for what it would do with this position of

India has been campaigning hard for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council since the early 1990s; this effort has spanned three Congress-led and two BJP-led governments. The Indian government, along with leading Indian strategists, advocates for a multipolar world in order to expand the number of world powers, but without an explicit strategy for India’s role in this multipolar world. Furthermore, in a bid to be taken seriously beyond the ongoing conflicts in South Asia, both the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government and the present BJP government have sought to “de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan in the eyes of the world in a deliberate policy of seeking to engage with the world beyond India’s concerns with Pakistan. The enthusiastic response in Delhi to President Donald Trump’s apparent recognition of India’s strategic importance for the United States in South Asia reflects India’s insecurities about whether it could in fact step beyond its dysfunctional relationship with its neighbor to the west.

All Indian governments since 1947 have shared the narrative of a modern Indian nation developing at a rapid rate and rising in prominence in international affairs. The Modi-led BJP government is no exception, which explains the absence of an extreme hardline nationalist foreign policy that many were expecting. The BJP’s election manifestos placed development as a key agenda at the central and state levels. Modi’s demonetization scheme to combat corruption with modern tools—like the Bharat Interface for Money app to facilitate cashless transactions—is emblematic of the continuous strain of modernity running through this government. However, despite this commonly held faith in the positive outcomes of modernity, the current government has deviated from previous ones in its understanding of India’s cultural identity.

**Changing Identity**

During the final years of colonial rule, the heart of the tension about South Asia’s future was the role of religion in politics. The Indian National Congress wanted an undivided, secular India and the Muslim League advocated the creation of a Muslim-majority country, Pakistan. The partitioning of South Asia into India and Pakistan led to the creation of two secular states, the former with a Hindu majority and the latter with a Muslim majority. Pakistan soon lost its secular credentials and its 1973 constitution explicitly established it as an Islamic republic. India has held on to its secular identity thus far. However, is this changing with Modi’s government and if so, how does this impact policy?

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80. For instance, there has been no real deliberation on how to mitigate conflict in a multipolar world given that it is probably the least stable international system. *NAM 2.0* (2012) was a brave attempt by leading scholars and policy makers at outlining a strategy for the Indian government but has seen no real follow through on the government’s part.


The BJP envisions an India in which the glory of Hinduism is restored to its rightful place and the Hindu rashtra becomes synonymous with the idea of India. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), widely regarded as the BJP’s parent organization, states that its goal is to “attain the ‘Param Vaibhav’ (the principle of glory) of the Hindu Rashtra [nation]” since “the Hindu culture is the life-breath of Hindusthan [sic].”

Founded in 1925, the RSS refers to itself as the cultural, and not the political, arm of Hindu nationalism. The BJP is a political party with a Hindu nationalist agenda that derives its goals from the RSS. The BJP’s 2014 election manifesto states that “India shall remain a natural home for persecuted Hindus and they shall be welcome to seek refuge here,” a promise that led to a crucial policy change with ramifications for South Asia. In 2016, for the first time in Indian history, religion became a basis for citizenship. The BJP introduced legislation that amended India’s Citizenship Act (1955) to bestow citizenship on “illegal” migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan who are Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians—but not Muslims. In 2017, the BJP government announced its intention to deport over 40,000 Rohingya Muslim refugees from Myanmar, threatening to send them back to almost certain persecution and even death, although, as of this writing, it has yet to do so. Thus, BJP’s anti-Muslim propaganda has been realized in significant legislation that is shaping India’s identity.

A Hindu identity has also become synonymous with a strong heteronormative masculine identity. Narendra Modi has come to embody such an identity as the prime minister of the country. In the lead-up to the 2014 elections, Modi boasted about his 56-inch chest. His slightly fantastical chest measurement has stuck in BJP’s political discourse since as an “idiom of political machismo.”

Modi does not shy away from his larger-than-life depictions in the media and political campaigns. In a parliamentary democracy, he has become the face of every BJP election. The National Election Study’s 2014 post-poll data reveal that a substantial section of the Indian public (39 percent) does not have a decisive opinion on which political leader is best suited for national security issues. However, Narendra Modi topped the poll at almost 28 percent, with Rahul Gandhi coming a distant second at almost 10 percent. Clearly, Modi’s masculinized foreign policy posture has gained some portion of the public’s trust that he will effectively represent India internationally. In terms of foreign policy, he is perceived as one of the few leaders who has taken a strong stance against Pakistani transgressions against India, especially in Kashmir. The Modi government’s intransigence on negotiating...
with Pakistan over Kashmir has effectively isolated Pakistan in South Asia. This is evident in the breakdown of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in 2016, after Modi refused to attend and the Indian government’s diplomatic maneuvering ensured that other South Asian countries withdrew from participating as well. His aggressive diplomacy is also evident in his numerous foreign travels to build personal bilateral relationships with many countries in order to benefit India both economically and politically on the global stage. The success of the Modi-Trump summit in June 2017 is a case in point. While both leaders were looking to promote their respective domestic industries, the meeting did not focus on this point of potential friction. Instead, their joint statement emphasized deepening strategic and economic ties between the two countries. Trump also portrayed the United States and India as victims of terrorism and in a speech on his Afghanistan policy at Fort Meyer in August 2017, explicitly criticized Pakistan, an old U.S. ally, for harboring safe havens for terrorists. Unsurprisingly, Modi’s supporters see this as vindication of Modi’s brand of personal diplomacy.

So far, India’s concerns with its identity have been principally domestic. The tension between secularism and Hindutva politics lies at the heart of domestic politics and, as India has started reconsidering how it projects its identity internationally, it may extend to affect India’s identity in the global arena. Modi’s government has tried to emphasize some of India’s more Hindu aspects. For example, Modi introduced the idea of an “International Day of Yoga” in 2014 to the UN General Assembly, which subsequently designated June 21 as such a day. In an international capitalist system in which India is one of the main beneficiaries as a rapidly developing country, India is capitalizing on its gains by projecting its Hindu identity. India is re-branding itself by drawing on its Hindu heritage while meeting the demands of a global market for a popular Indian export, yoga.

As mentioned earlier, the 2017 BJP victory in Uttar Pradesh is yet another victory for Hindutva politics over secular politics in India. With the selection of a Hindu priest as the chief minister of the largest Indian state, the BJP is sending a clear signal both domestically and internationally about its priorities and vision for the future of India. Based on the evidence thus far, we believe that Indian politics as a whole are gradually shifting in response to the BJP’s agenda to reshape Indian identity into a Hindutva identity.

A Hindu Democracy

In its preamble, the Indian constitution clearly states that India is a democratic republic. While India’s democratic credentials have been put to the test, for example during the Emergency (1975–77) when civil liberties were suspended under the Indira Gandhi-led Congress government, India has remained a robust democracy since 1947. Given that we are witnessing a gradual transformation in Indian politics, the important question is whether the rise and consolidation of Hindutva politics impact India’s democratic values.

We assert that for the BJP, Hinduism and democracy are mutually compatible concepts at both the strategic and normative levels. 

On the strategic level, regardless of the party that controls the government, India has always taken great pride in being the world’s largest democracy. The creation of the Indian International Institute of Democracy and Election Management within the Election Commission of India, which aims to advise other developing democracies in electoral best practices, is a remarkable statement of India’s confidence in this domain. Both Congress and BJP governments have highlighted India’s democratic character as strategically important in strengthening India’s bilateral relationship with the United States. The world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy are “natural allies.” The BJP government is continuing a time-tested policy of pitting a democratic India against a nondemocratic China in the eyes of Europe and the United States. The United States’ pivot to Asia has helped reinforce this policy. The increased frequency of military exercises between the United States and India, especially after 9/11, reflects this emphasis on democratic partnership.

India’s strategic emphasis on democracy is not restricted merely to bilateral relations. The addition of Japan to the joint naval exercise Malabar between the United States and India from 2015 onwards signals the expansion of democratic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. India’s engagement with Japan has strengthened under the BJP government. The India–Japan Investment Promotion Partnership (2014) and the 2016 civil nuclear deal between the countries are seen as instances of both the expansion of good relations between the two countries and the positive personal relationship between Modi and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe.

In the normative realm, far from considering Hindu majoritarianism and democracy incompatible, the BJP perceives them as synonymous. For instance, in their joint statement in 2017, Prime Ministers Modi and Abe endorsed Samvad II, a global Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on peace and security, in order to “enhance the positive influence of traditions of non-violence, tolerance and democracy in Asia.” The BJP has consistently blamed secularism for unfairly putting the rights of minorities ahead of those who are in the majority and through its rule, seeks to redress the apparent victimhood of the Hindu majority. This perspective is entirely in line with the understanding that in a democracy, the majority’s will should be enacted. The BJP would ideally like India to be a Hindu democracy that caters to the preferences of the religious majority, even at the cost of impinging on the rights of other religious minorities. The government’s ban on beef and cattle slaughter in general in 2017 is emblematic of this vision. Despite potential warnings that its divisive tactics at home will tarnish India’s reputation internationally, the BJP has

seen no reason to change course. However, while minorities may face the brunt of new Hindutva policies, democracy in India is here to stay, since the BJP has no quarrel with the principles of democracy and no real incentive to change the status quo.

**Conclusion: The Rise of the Modern Sanskari**

“To build a Modern India: the best foundation is our own Culture” – opening pledge of the BJP’s Election Manifesto (2014)

The Modi-led Hindu right-wing BJP government that came to power in 2014 has plodded along the same path created by its predecessors in some respects while markedly deviating in others. Like previous governments, the BJP relies on a narrative of modernity that promotes linear development and progress. What is new is the assertion of a masculinized Hindu culture as symbolic of India, which is eroding India’s secular identity. Signposts that mark India’s journey from secularism to Hindutva politics include the amendment of India’s citizenship act to exclude “illegal” Muslim migrants from becoming citizens and the normalization of religious figures as political leaders. Although this gradual transformation adversely affects minorities in India, potentially indicating a dip in the strength of India’s democratic values, the BJP government believes that Hindutva politics and democracy go hand-in-hand. The BJP used its electoral victory in India’s largest state as a symbol of its legitimate popular appeal. Furthermore, the BJP is no longer a party restricted to the Hindi-speaking regions of India. The party has succeeded in coming to power either as a majority or as a part of a coalition in states as diverse as Assam in the east and Maharashtra in the west. In this moment of BJP’s electoral triumph, we are witnessing a change in India’s identity, but not its core democratic credentials. A BJP-led India still seeks to enhance its relations with other Asian democracies, particularly to highlight their democratic ethos as a contrast to China’s autocratic model. The Indian government understands the strategic value of upholding its democratic tradition as it aspires to rally support from Asian countries for its great power aspirations. Additionally, the majoritarian aspects of democracy fall in line with the BJP government’s agenda for furthering Hindu nationalism. For instance, in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on Asian security in 2018, Modi underscored that India would engage with the Indo-Pacific region in a democratically inclusive manner, ideals he claimed were rooted in the Hindu Vedanta philosophy of oneness in diversity.

How should one reconcile the Modi government’s modernist agenda for development with its social and cultural agenda for a more religious identity for India? On the one hand, being modern and keeping pace with the rest of the world is seen as essential to India’s progress. On the other hand, India’s ancient Hindu heritage is interwoven with its identity as a state. For the Modi government these two underlying themes in its world view are not irreconcilable and in fact, have led to the rise of the modern *sanskari*, or cultured person, from *sanskar* or culture. The modern *sanskari* is one who believes in scientific progress for


India but at the same time upholds traditional Hindu values, which may counter scientific rationale. The term symbolizes economic modernism coupled with a revanchist social understanding. It is simultaneously a celebration of India’s profitable tech savviness and a rejection of Nehruvian socialist secular thought. The modern *sanskari* is the type of Indian the BJP government relies on for support and desires to create. The modern *sanskari* is the foundation of a New India.
The Role of Democracy Promotion in Indonesian Foreign Policy

R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa

Among the most enduring challenges in conducting foreign policy is the promotion of synergy between domestic and external priorities. The contemporary world is replete with issues that defy national solutions alone and demand instead cooperative partnership among nations—promoting food and energy security, protecting the environment, mitigating natural disaster, promoting global health, and overcoming transitional crimes.

Such a list would include protecting and promoting democratic principles, human rights and good governance. These particular issues come with the challenge of addressing the all-too-familiar suggestion that protecting and promoting these principles in a country’s foreign policy risks a clash with the sacrosanct principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of states.

Indonesia’s recent foreign policy has promoted the narrative that these principles are not in fact irreconcilable. At a personal level, over some three decades of work in Indonesian foreign policy-making—with the last five years as Foreign Minister during Indonesia’s post-1998 democratic transformation—this has been a never-ending task.

The significance of Indonesia’s democratic transformation since 1998 has not been fully acknowledged. In sharp contrast to the recent Arab Spring, the 20-year democratic reform process in Indonesia—transforming it into the third largest democracy in the world—was not accompanied by regional and extra-regional geopolitical tensions and conflicts. Quite the reverse: coming not long after the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, Indonesia’s democratic reform process arguably helped unleash nearly a two decade long positive dynamic in Southeast Asia in favor of greater respect for democratic principles and human rights.

This has not been by accident. Rather, it has been the outcome of the conscious and deliberate decision to place the protection and promotion of democratic principles as central tenets in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

97. The author was foreign minister of Indonesia (2009–2014), permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations (2007–2009), ambassador of Indonesia to the Court of St. James’s and to Ireland (2005–2007), and currently, inter alia, member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation.
As Foreign Minister, I spoke of the “democratization” of Indonesia’s foreign policy. To some extent this refers to the internal foreign policy decision-making process to promote greater beyond-government participation and sense of ownership in foreign policy-making and implementation. The engagement of civil society and other stakeholders has been essential to ensure that there are no significant gaps in expectations and understanding between these foreign policy constituencies and the government.

Significantly, however, it also refers to policy outcome: namely, to place Indonesia, through its foreign policy, on the right side of the global debate on the protection and promotion of democratic principles. It refers to the aim to ensure that Indonesia’s foreign policy reflects the democratic changes which have occurred in the country. And not least of all, it refers to Indonesia’s sustained belief that the protection and promotion of democratic principles can go hand-in-hand with respect for the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states that shall always remain key tenets.

Indonesia projected this outlook primarily at the regional level, specifically through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As Indonesia began its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003, when I served as the country’s Director-General for ASEAN Cooperation, it took the seminal decision to actively promote respect for democratic principles and human rights within ASEAN. This was a significant departure for an organization that has long considered such issues to be the exclusive domain and preserve of its member states. More specifically, Indonesia introduced the notion of “political development gaps” within ASEAN that can best be addressed through an ASEAN Political-Security Community pillar. Indonesia made the case that it was not sufficient for ASEAN to pursue an ASEAN Economic Community goal, but rather that a true community must also embrace political-security goals as well. Through the 2003 Bali Concord II, the resultant three-pillar ASEAN Community ushered in a process hitherto unimaginable within ASEAN: the development of ASEAN institutional capacities and frameworks on the protection and promotion of democratic principles, human rights and good governance. The 2007 ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, and the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration were some of the most obvious manifestations of this transformed outlook.

Above all, however, Indonesia has been acutely aware that the protection and promotion of democratic principles and human rights within ASEAN cannot be secured simply by the promulgation of formal documents and agreements. Rather, it has required deliberate and purposeful promotion of ASEAN state practice and customs in consonance with such objectives. In particular, by injecting the notion that as an ASEAN “family” of nations, it was perfectly acceptable and understandable for ASEAN member states to demonstrate interest and concern about internal developments in their respective countries, especially if they have the potential to adversely affect the region as a whole.

Thus, from 2002 onwards, Indonesia began the practice of informing fellow ASEAN member states—principally at ASEAN’s more informal meeting settings—of some of the difficult internal challenges it was then facing, including developments in the Indonesian

province of Aceh, as well as the horizontal inter-communal incidents it was then experiencing in some of the other provinces. Apart from promoting greater understanding and support from fellow ASEAN countries for Indonesia's efforts to consolidate democratic change in the country, this sharing of information aimed to alter the dynamics within ASEAN on how it collectively views internal developments within its member states and to create a positive “demonstrative effect” and peer encouragement for other ASEAN member states to follow suit. As such briefings by Indonesia were neither called nor asked for, on many occasions there were no responses from other ASEAN member states, apart from a rather uncomfortable deafening silence. Indonesia persevered, however, as it was on a deliberate dynamics-changing mission, and as it had ample confidence in the democratic response it was making to its various internal challenges. Eventually, though not to the same extent and degree, the Philippines and Thailand began a similar sharing of information practice.

Most significantly, Myanmar, having just launched its so-called seven-step roadmap in 2003, also initiated the practice of informing ASEAN member states of internal developments in its country. With hindsight, this made possible increasingly robust and candid deliberations within ASEAN about Myanmar’s democratization efforts—urging Myanmar to deliver in concrete manner on its promises of reform—while maintaining an outward demonstration of collective ASEAN unity, a quality now arguably missing in ASEAN's response to the unfolding developments in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. No doubt, ASEAN's past collective response to Myanmar's initial democratization process—a deft combination of strong internal encouragement and external support—contributed significantly in promoting reform in Myanmar without the attendant geopolitical repercussions that have been the unfortunate hallmark of the Arab Spring.

Indonesia's efforts to promote democratic principles within ASEAN—initially and predictably questioned by the large majority of ASEAN member states—also encountered reservations from a rather unexpected quarter within the country itself, namely some segments of its robust civil society. In the early years of the reform process, they commonly ridiculed and questioned Indonesia's foreign policy emphasis on promoting and protecting democratic principles and human rights, when the country itself was beset by its own difficult human rights conditions as it sought to consolidate the recently-won democratic reforms. The argument was made that Indonesia should first concentrate on its own internal issues before turning to the region. For Indonesia's foreign policymakers at the time, however, the reverse was the case: precisely because of the then-fragile state of Indonesia's democratic reform process, it needed to ensure that a conducive atmosphere existed in the region as a whole for the promotion and protection of democratic principles and human rights. Indonesia's democratic reform process cannot take place in isolation or, worse still, in complete opposite to the region's developments. Foreign policymakers believed that as Indonesia democratizes, so must ASEAN. It was this outlook that motivated Indonesia's push for an ASEAN Political-Security Community.

Importantly, however, Indonesia has been careful to emphasize that ultimately there is not a “one size fits all” approach to promoting democracy. Indonesia has consistently been of the view that to be sustained and to be truly meaningful, democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, however well intentioned. Instead, that it must be “home grown”—
with a sense of common ownership and participation by the peoples of the countries concerned. At the same time, Indonesian policymakers believed that there is scope for peer encouragement and support for the valuable lessons learned and experience on democratization to be shared by among countries.

Indeed, beyond ASEAN, this perspective motivated Indonesia to launch the Bali Democracy Forum, now one of the premier intergovernmental forums in the Asia-Pacific on democracy, to provide a platform for the exchanges of views among countries in different stages of democratization. Likewise, it motivated Indonesia to engage with the Community of Democracies forum; to take an active part in the United Nations Human Rights Council, as well as within the UN as a whole; and to regularly include cooperation and dialogue on human rights in its bilateral cooperation.

In 2018, twenty years after the democratic reform process began in Indonesia in 1998, notwithstanding the initial promise shown within ASEAN, the democratic architecture in the region appears once again tenuous and fragile. Signs abound in Southeast Asia of democracies in retreat, of authoritarian tendencies and challenges to hard-won civil liberties cloaked in populist politics, of there being once again the false suggestion that the promotion and protection of democratic principles and human rights—anchored in the spirit and principles of positive partnership and mutual respect—are somehow incompatible with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

Experience demonstrates that positive regional dynamics in favor of democratic principles require constant and indeed persistent investment of efforts, democratic leadership, and diplomatic heft. In the past, through its foreign policy, Indonesia provided such leadership. Indeed, having brought the subject of promotion and protection of democratic principles to ASEAN, Indonesia cannot now be found wanting.
Asianism, Universal Values, and U.S. Perspectives on Ideational Cooperation in Asia

Daniel Twining

Asianism—in the sense of regional exceptionalism that bolsters a political or economic solidarity that excludes non-Asian powers—has historically been viewed as a threat to U.S. interests in Asia. At the turn of the last century, the universalism of the Open Door Note—which proposed to keep trade with China open to all countries—was designed to prevent colonial powers in both Europe and Japan from carving a collapsing Chinese empire into exclusive spheres of influence. Imperial Japan’s proposed “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” would have given that country unified control over the resources of Northeast and Southeast Asia and locked the United States out of what became, after Japan’s defeat in 1945, the world’s most commercially dynamic set of emerging markets. After 1949, Mao’s China sought to export its revolution into Northeast Asia, specifically Korea and Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, in ways that constituted a direct challenge to U.S. interests. In the early 1990s, post-Cold War U.S. leaders spoke out strongly against the establishment of an “Asian Monetary Fund” that could diminish U.S. economic and financial leadership in the region. In the early 2000s, U.S. officials warned against Asian regional groupings that were not pan-Pacific in orientation, including the original East Asia Summit membership before it was broadened to include U.S. allies like Australia. In the past several years, successive U.S. presidents have warned China against establishing an exclusive Asian sphere: President Obama justified the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a strategic initiative to preclude a form of economic Asianism, while Trump administration cabinet secretary visits to the region have underlined the point that the United States is a Pacific power and will not cede regional initiative to Asian nations seeking to carve out exclusive spheres.

Although the United States spent over a century opposing Asianism—recently summed up as “Asia for the Asians” by Xi Jinping—Washington was an imperfect advocate for universal values in Asia. President Theodore Roosevelt sought to promote Japan as a friendly balancer to Russian power, with a nod not to liberal norms but to realpolitik. President

99. Daniel Twining is president of the International Republican Institute.
Wilson inspired Chinese democrats with his Fourteen Points and their grounding in the principle of self-determination and anti-imperialism, only to concede Imperial Germany’s control of Shandong to Japan at Versailles in 1919. Washington turned a blind eye to Japanese imperialism in Manchuria in the 1930s and was pulled into the Pacific War only after a direct attack on U.S. soil by Imperial Japan. During the Cold War, the United States fought to preserve the integrity of both South Korea and South Vietnam—not to uphold democracy but to prevent the spread of revolutionary communism. U.S. alliances with South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and the quasi-alliance with Taiwan were all made with what were then authoritarian governments. President Nixon’s opening to China occurred while the Cultural Revolution was still underway, with its unprecedented persecution and zealotry, and had little to do with encouraging liberalism in what was still a totalitarian state. The United States did support democratic transitions in key countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and more recently in Timor Leste and Myanmar. And U.S. core alliances in Asia, with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as its more recently emergent strategic partnership with India, are all grounded in shared values as well as shared interests.

Today, there are several compelling reasons to believe that U.S. support for universal values in Asia will intensify, building on the United States’ mixed record over the previous century. The first is that most Asian peoples now live in democratic systems. This includes what will be, in less than a decade, Asia’s most populous country, India, as well as its neighboring South Asian states, which together form a bloc approaching 2 billion people. It includes the main U.S. allies of Japan, Australia, and South Korea. It includes the pivotal Southeast Asian state of Indonesia, home to a quarter of a billion people and the country whose fortunes will determine the success of its region more broadly. It includes transitional states like Myanmar, a cockpit of geopolitical rivalries that could be recast by a liberalized political system. Add Malaysia, Mongolia, Taiwan, and several other states to the list of democracies, and it is China, with its strong form of authoritarianism that has become more rather than less repressive over the past decade, that looks like Asia’s political outlier, not its trendsetter.

The second reason is the performance legitimacy of Asian democracies. Not more than a few decades ago, many commentators argued that East Asian cultural traits of hard work, Confucianism, and deference to authority underlay the East Asian miracle. When the East Asian miracle spread to Southeast Asian countries, it was argued that their minority Chinese communities embodied these cultural traits which were the driving force behind their success. As both East and Southeast Asian countries democratized, these old arguments about Asian values fell away, though some still apply them to China’s success with authoritarian modernization. However, countries like South Korea and Taiwan are now high-income economies, and those like Indonesia continue to grow fast under democratic leadership, suggesting that democracy can legitimize and broaden the base of economic growth—while redistributing income inequality through inclusive institutions rather than allowing such inequalities to intensify, as in the case of China today, which lacks mechanisms of democratic accountability. Democratic India is now growing faster than China and is likely to do so for several decades to come. China’s structural slowdown as India takes off suggests that the old argument about Asian values—that only strongmen can propel economic modernization—is as antiquated as some of the old men who still make it.
The third reason to expect U.S. support for democratic cooperation in Asia to intensify is that it facilitates strategic cooperation against China. China's primary competitors in Asia are Japan and India, Asia's biggest democracies, and the United States is their top military partner. With the exception of Thailand, U.S. treaty allies in Asia are all democracies, as is its unofficial military ally Taiwan. The most significant non-democracy in the informal coalition that opposes Chinese hegemony in Asia is Vietnam—and for all the progress in military-to-military cooperation between Washington and Hanoi over the previous decade, it is a fact that Vietnam's Leninist political system and persecution of human rights advocates will constrain security cooperation with the United States. It is even imaginable that Vietnam's leaders will take a decision to open their country to greater pluralism and political contestation, as did the then-authoritarian leaders in Myanmar, with an eye on creating a strategic opening for closer relations with outside powers like the United States in order to balance Chinese power.

More broadly, a democratic counter-coalition to Chinese suzerainty over Asia is united not just around a shared sense of threat but also around a set of political beliefs. The United States will hopefully continue to lead this coalition, but even in the event of a U.S. withdrawal to an over-the-horizon posture in Asia, it is possible to imagine it coalescing and including other emerging democratic regional powers such as Indonesia.

A fourth reason to expect the United States to overcome the particularism of Asia policy during the Cold War with a more universalistic approach is the weakness of Europe, home to Washington's traditional democratic allies in global affairs for over a century. Europe's declining ballast in geopolitics results from several factors, including the fraying of the European Union, particularly the departure of America's closest European ally Britain; the material weakness of European states whose power once governed the planet but who now comprise an ever-less-weighty proportion of global GDP and defense spending; the return of Russian revanchism, which requires NATO to assume a defensive posture to protect the European core rather than an expeditionary one along the lines of the “global NATO” envisioned only a decade ago; and the rise of populism within core European countries, including Britain, France, and Germany, which erodes leader commitments to internationalism and undercuts European states’ ability to generate and project national power.

As European democracies suffer a broad retreat from global leadership due to changes in relative power internationally and political dysfunction at home, Asian democracies look like increasingly attractive partners for the United States in both regional and global affairs. Democratic institutions in nations like Japan and India have produced strong leaders with broad mandates who are using them to do big things in both domestic and international affairs. Other important democratic leaders, like Jokowi in Indonesia, are less focused on foreign policy but are committed to generating the domestic growth and revitalization that could make their nations bigger players on the international stage. The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia was framed with reference to shaping the balance of power in Asia and hedging against China’s rise by sustaining U.S. military and economic partnerships there. But the longer-term U.S. rebalance to Asia could equally be framed with reference to the fact that major democratic powers are amenable to working with the United States to shape an ideational balance, not just a material one, to shore up a regional order that is resilient to an authoritarian China’s hegemony—expressed in
terms not only of China’s power capabilities but of Beijing’s vision of a Sino-centric order governed by norms of deference and restraint to the Middle Kingdom.

Democratic cooperation in Asia—whether trans-Pacific or intra-Asian—need not be premised on any kind of missionary zealotry to provide universal norms. Rather, it can be functionally understood as a source of regional order that deters conflict, promotes peaceful resolution of disputes, and preserves the independence of smaller powers to chart their own course in foreign affairs. Countries that allow pluralism at home are more willing to tolerate it as an organizing principle of international relations. Countries that are bound by laws and institutions in domestic affairs are more likely to defer to laws and institutions in the international context. One of the greatest regional sources of anxiety about the projection of Chinese power is that it is not bound at home by legal and normative constraints. If China’s authoritarian rulers employ their unchallenged power to crush dissent and enforce their monopoly of control at home, why would a China that is stronger than any other Asian power feel constrained from using its singular power and central geographic position to crush dissent and enforce Chinese suzerainty through all means, including military power, abroad?

An obvious danger to the future of values-based cooperation in Asia lies in the uncertainty over the future of U.S. policy in the region under the Trump administration. To the extent that the president of the United States walks back from a historic U.S. commitment to sustaining a liberal world order founded in laws, norms, and institutions in favor of a more nationalistic, machtpolitik, and transactional approach to major-power relations, that would undercut both the U.S. position in Asia and the durability of an Asian regional system that is not Sino-centric or Hobbesian in nature. Should the United States, the world’s oldest democracy, itself become increasingly fractured and ungovernable due to partisan gridlock in Washington and unprecedented polarization among the body politic, that would undercut the cause of democracy writ large and put wind in the sails of Chinese pundits who argue that a strong hand is a better source of both political stability and economic accomplishment.

Even as questions arise about U.S. military and diplomatic leadership in Asia in recent months, the U.S. retreat from global economic leadership poses a hard test for Asian regional order. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, supported by both former Republican president George W. Bush and former Democratic president Barack Obama as well as by Republican majorities in Congress, was designed as a vehicle to project U.S. economic power and market-based norms into Asia, precisely to prevent the development of any kind of more exclusive Chinese co-prosperity sphere. The Trump administration may well fill the vacuum left in the wake of Trans-Pacific Partnership with a set of bilateral economic deals, including with friendly democracies such as Japan, India, and Taiwan. But should Washington cede economic leadership across the Pacific, it would fundamentally set back the cause of values-based cooperation, in part because the norms of free-market exchange and protection of intellectual property rights are the economic corollaries of the universal political values of open, competitive politics and the rule of law.

In mid-2018, the Trump administration rolled out what it termed an “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to orient the United States’ national security engagement in maritime Asia—including building democratic India centrally into U.S. regional security partnerships.
As then-secretary of defense Jim Mattis put it in a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Washington's goal is “a free and open Indo-Pacific” founded in “a commitment to common values” in which “sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded, the promise of freedom [is] fulfilled and prosperity prevails for all.”

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2018, Vice President Mike Pence announced a new Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative “to promote civil society, the rule of law, and transparent and accountable government across the region.” This strategy rollout came in the context of the U.S. government's attempts to rebalance trade with China, including confronting it directly over trade distortions caused by state subsidies, protectionism, and forms of authoritarian economic control within China. Despite the vicissitudes of the Trump administration, the United States appears to be doubling down on its historic commitment to a free and open Asia, controlled by no single regional power, in which economic and political pluralism can flourish.


About the Editor

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