Is Asia Reconnecting?
Essays on Asia’s Infrastructure Contest

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CSIS CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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ISBN: 978-1-4422-8031-1 (pb); 978-1-4422-8032-8 (eBook)
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Preface

"Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played," the late Dr. Zbigniew Brezinski wrote two decades ago. His words ring true again as a massive infrastructure competition unfolds across the Eurasian supercontinent. If the roads, railways, and other connections that are emerging today shift flows of goods, people, and ideas, the long-term implications could be profound.

CSIS launched the Reconnecting Asia Project to make sense of these developments. Our website, ReconnectingAsia.CSIS.org, has a growing database of over 2,100 projects and an interactive map that tracks what is happening on the ground. In our Big Questions series, leading experts respond to wide-ranging questions. This report includes highlights from the first six questions posed in the series.

The Big Questions series begins with the biggest question of all: Is Asia reconnecting? Until the rise of Europe’s colonial powers in the sixteenth century, many of the world’s most important trading routes ran overland. Today, emerging overland routes aim to shift trade away from the sea, where 90 percent of international trade currently travels. As our experts point out in Chapter 1, many obstacles—economic, political, and strategic—stand in the way of this potentially epochal shift.

With a frenzy of investment and construction in recent years, Asia has in some respects become the world’s infrastructure laboratory. Reflecting this trend, China overtook the United States as the global leader in built assets in 2015, while three of the top four per-capita leaders were also in the region (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan). In Chapter 2, experts consider what the rest of the world could learn from Asia about how—and how not—to make infrastructure investments.

Just as the compass and the domesticated camel facilitated greater mobility in ancient times, emerging technologies could impact Asia’s economic landscape. In Chapter 3, experts examine how automation could impact existing modes of transportation, whether shipping terminals on the water or driverless cars on land. They also considered an entirely new form of transportation: the Hyperloop concept popularized by Elon Musk.
Greater connectivity can also create unintended consequences. The ancient Silk Road, for example, carried not just commerce, but also disease. In Chapter 4, experts consider how greater connectivity could impact the movement of illicit drugs, wildlife trafficking, and infections. New roads, railways, and ports are not the primary drivers of these challenges, but could exacerbate them if policy is not updated to reflect an increasingly integrated region.

New connections are emerging in the Arctic as well. During the past year, Arctic sea ice has dropped to record lows. In August, a Russian tanker became the first ship to complete the Northern Sea Route, traveling from Norway to South Korea and shaving days off the dominant route through the Suez Canal. In Chapter 5, experts consider how the Arctic's transformation might impact economic opportunities and what factors will drive or delay the region's future development.

Economics has been our primary lens, but we have begun to consider strategic implications as well. History is filled with infrastructure projects that have advanced national security and foreign policy objectives. The same road network that Darius the Great used to rule the Persian empire was used by Alexander the Great to conquer it. In Chapter 6, experts consider how ports and railways transformed Japan, India, and Russia, and what lessons those cases hold for today.

Eurasia’s infrastructure game is still heating up, and it could take decades before these questions are fully answered. Eurasia remains the chessboard for global primacy, but the nature of that game has not remained static. Military power still matters, but economics has taken center stage. Infrastructure has become a more important tool for accumulating power as well as exercising it. As the world’s economic center of gravity continues moving east, the stakes of this game are likely to rise even higher.
Acknowledgments

This report was a truly collaborative effort. Thanks are due first and foremost to the scholars who participated in our Big Questions series. They tackled complex questions while speaking to a broader audience and meeting our unreasonable word limits. Their hard work left us with a good problem: there were too many responses to include in this first volume. Thankfully, readers can find the rest of the series at the Reconnecting Asia website (https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/). Matthew Goodman provided the intellectual guidance behind the questions, Maesea McCalpin kept the series on track, and the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy provided generous support.
Overland Connections

A SILK ROAD FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?

Thomas Fingar

Xi Jinping’s 2013 call for China and the states of Central Asia to build a modern-day Silk Road to facilitate the movement of goods and people between Europe and Asia is a good idea that has been blown out of proportion by a variety of Chinese and non-Chinese commentators. Viewed from any perspective, the existing regional infrastructure is woefully inadequate and an obstacle to greater prosperity, economic integration, and political change. Many of the proposed projects will be delayed or never built, but those that are built will transform the region.

Geopolitical Considerations

Geography and geopolitics explain, in part, the current pattern of roads, railroads, pipelines, and other regional infrastructure. They also help explain why countries seek to change the current situation. By the time railroads and internal combustion engines began to transform other inland regions, Central Asia had been incorporated into the Russian empire and its Soviet successor. For political and economic reasons, infrastructure projects were designed to strengthen dependence on Moscow and impede options for interaction with Asia and Europe. The now independent countries of Central Asia are eager to complement existing routes in order to reduce dependence on Russia, expand economic opportunities, and establish links to China, South Asia, and Europe that will counterbalance Russia’s current advantages. China, in particular, wants to use infrastructure development to increase Beijing’s influence and to constrain that of Russia and India, among others.

Economic Considerations

Infrastructure is a public good that is usually constructed by governments because only governments have the broad interests and access to funding required to undertake the construction of roads, bridges, power grids, and the like. The need is great, but given the distances involved, the
demographics of Central Asian states, and the alternatives available, governments in the region would find it difficult to obtain funding or amortize more than a limited number of projects on their own. Many proposed projects might never be economically viable, so if they are to be built, they must promise economic and/or geopolitical benefits to external actors. In the case of Central Asia, the key external actor is China, which seems willing to commit substantial funds in order to gain access to hydrocarbons, metals, minerals, and markets; to expand economic opportunities for people living in its frontier regions; and to increase its political profile and influence in a region Beijing considers important for security and stability reasons.

Beijing’s reasons for promoting infrastructure development in 2013 through the Belt and Road Initiative include, in addition to those noted above, the desire to use external projects to sop up some of China’s excess capacity to produce cement, steel, and construction equipment and maintain employment in these industries and the construction sector, and to make better use of foreign exchange reserves that it does not want to repatriate for fear of fueling inflation. When Xi made his initial proposal, it was widely assumed that China would “pay” for the projects through some combination of grants and concessionary loans in exchange for access and, possibly, recipient country endorsement of Beijing’s position on certain international issues. Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), substantial drawdown of China’s foreign exchange holdings, and the prospect of difficulty obtaining repayment from African countries that over-borrowed from China when commodity prices were high now make it appear that China will use the cover of multilateral lending to reduce the risk of default. That would constrain the number of projects undertaken.

Developmental Considerations

Infrastructure can be enormously beneficial, but only if projects are well chosen and well executed. Prestige and make-work projects may add little to long-term growth or deeper integration into production or supply chains, but well-conceived projects can jumpstart local economies, facilitate economies of scale, and enhance prosperity and quality of life. Economic viability is one consideration, but so too are environmental impact and opportunity costs. Given systemic problems such as corruption and capacity limitations, one cannot assume that all projects undertaken in the region will be optimized for long-term and spin-off benefits. “Good” projects will create synergies and generate benefits that enhance prosperity, regional integration, and overall capacity. “Bad” projects will have the opposite effects.

What to Expect

What actually happens over the next decade or more is likely to be considerably less extensive or consequential than predicted by over-enthusiastic boosters and those who forecast benefits to China at the expense of the United States and the West more broadly. Local impacts—within and among the countries of Central Asia—are likely to be more significant than the impact on countries at the eastern and western ends of the new Silk Road. Most commercial traffic and most people moving between Europe and Asia will continue to move by sea and air respectively, but regional and subregional integration and prosperity could increase substantially. Prosperity and other dimensions of modernization will change societies (e.g., they will become better educated, better
informed, more urbanized, and more demanding) and this will transform the political landscape. The future Eurasia will look more like an upgraded version of the present than a restoration of the past.

WHITHER EURASIAN INTEGRATION?

Johannes F. Linn

With the fall of the Bamboo Curtain in Asia and the Iron Curtain in Europe, the progressive economic integration of the Greater Eurasian supercontinent became possible and by now it has become seemingly inevitable, especially after China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Major infrastructure investments\(^1\) are under implementation or on the drawing board, supported by China, India, Russia, the EU, and international financial organizations. They are designed to provide East-West and North-South connectivity across Greater Eurasia for energy, transportation, and telecommunications, thereby accelerating the integration of the huge Greater Eurasian geographic and economic space. In the past, infrastructure investments have spurred economic integration in Western Europe, North America, the Soviet Union, and most recently in China. Indeed, Greater Eurasian economic integration can be seen as the last frontier of the economic globalization process that has characterized the seven decades since the end of World War II.

However, in considering the prospects of Eurasian economic integration seven obstacles and risks need to be considered, which may impede the process, even though they will likely not derail it altogether.

First, investments in roads, pipelines, and other “hard” infrastructure projects are generally relatively easy to plan and carry out, as long as there are financial resources and the readiness of countries to cooperate across borders for cross-border networks. But two key challenges arise, beginning with the need for systematic planning and implementation of network-wide improvements. Long-distance communication is only as good as the weakest link along the way. This requires the integration of national and regional plans, which is generally extremely weak or altogether absent. Furthermore, operating and maintaining a vast network of new infrastructure creates huge challenges for national governments. The public finances needed to pay for the debts created by these investments and to sustain the infrastructure often cannot be mobilized in today’s constrained national budgets. The institutional capacity to efficiently run and maintain the physical investments is missing in many Eurasian countries, especially the poorer ones.

Second, even more problematic is the provision of the “soft” aspects of efficient connectivity. For transportation, this includes the development of intermodal connectivity, including efficient customs, health, and other procedures for border clearances, and an absence of corrupt traffic police and other transit impediments behind the border. For trade, this means low tariff and nontariff barriers, and effective logistical services. For interconnected power systems, it means

cooperation among power regulators and dispatchers. For all major infrastructure investments, it means that the economic, environmental, and social impacts on local communities are fully considered, with detrimental impacts minimized as far as possible and positive development impacts along the infrastructure corridors maximized. None of these soft aspects of infrastructure provision are currently well supplied in many parts of the Eurasian continental space.

Third, the allocation of scarce cross-border natural resources, especially water and in some cases energy, is a common irritant to neighborly relations in some parts of Eurasia. Some Eurasian neighbors have shown that long-standing conflicts over cross-border resources can be amicably settled, as in the case of European riparians of the Rhine and Danube Rivers, and as between India and Pakistan for the Indus River. However, other regions of Eurasia have a long way to go, especially Central Asia and Southeast Asia, including China. The scope for misallocation of natural resources and for conflict over them is therefore significant.

Fourth, in some regions of Eurasia conflicts and security are a major constraint to greater integration, especially in the belt of conflict that stretches from the Middle East through parts of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, to the Indian subcontinent, and now even to the East China Sea. Whether it is closed borders as between Armenia and Turkey and between India and Pakistan, or civil war disrupting transportation routes as in Afghanistan, or international terrorist attacks on major transportation hubs as recently at Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, conflicts and insecurity cause disruptions to and raise the costs of transportation, communications, trade, and investment. In the future, cyber-crime may also disrupt electronic communication links across Eurasia, as can also happen anywhere in the world.

Fifth, on a wider scale, geopolitical competition among major powers inside and outside the region may interfere with the progress of Eurasian integration. The sanctions against Iran, albeit now lifted, have been a significant impediment to Iran’s integration into Eurasia. The Western sanctions against Russia have reversed the trend toward greater economic links between Russia and Europe. The big question for the future of Eurasian economic integration is whether the relations among major Eurasian powers in the twenty-first century will be more like the peaceful and cooperative relations European countries were able to forge in the post–World War II era, or whether Eurasia will face a future of major-power conflicts as was typical for Europe until the mid-twentieth century. The apparent breakdown of the post–World War II political order in Europe over Ukraine and the escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas are a reminder that Eurasian integration faces many geopolitical challenges.

Sixth, there are some additional risks that can cause significant, continent-wide disruptions in Eurasia, including epidemics such as the bird flu, illicit drug trade, cross-border criminality, and demographic pressures such as refugees and illegal migration. Climate change may reinforce some of these risks, due to increased pressures on water, land, and other limited natural resources.

Finally, successful supercontinental economic integration requires the development of some minimal institutional structures to help plan and finance investments, harmonize regulations, and mediate tensions and conflicts. Currently such institutional infrastructure in Eurasia is almost entirely absent. The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) brings together the heads of 53 states of the region for biannual summits, but misses some important countries and it is more form than
substance. Subregional institutions are either limited in membership, weak, or—in the case of the EU—subject to significant centrifugal pressures. Ultimately, it is not clear that the governments of the Eurasian countries will have the will to surrender parts of their sovereignty to supranational regional institutions, or that their populations are willing to support greater integration, as skepticism about the benefits of globalization are dramatically on the rise in many countries.

Three institutional innovations might help mitigate the obstacles and risks. The first is upgrading ASEM along the lines suggested by Michael Emerson. Second, a Eurasian steering group of major Eurasian powers, similar to the Group of Twenty (G20) at the global level, could be established. One compromise for membership might be a combination of permanent membership for major powers and rotating or constituency-based membership for smaller countries. Third, a coalition of key multilateral development banks could provide a platform for the systematic planning, financing, implementation, and institution building of Eurasian regional infrastructure. Some of these organizations already cooperate under subregional umbrellas and on specific infrastructure projects.

Given all the potential obstacles and risks, is Eurasian economic integration a mirage? Definitely not so. Economic integration is happening and will continue, as the supercontinent catches up with globalization elsewhere in the world. But it will likely proceed fitfully and remain partial, wracked by tensions and even open conflicts. Above all, institutional support will be needed for effective cooperation across the many borders of Eurasia.

MARCO POLO AND THE MONGOL HORDES

Christopher Miller

The leaders seeking to rebuild connections across Eurasia’s vast landmass might not like to be compared to the great Mongol warlord and empire builder Genghis Khan. The harder edges of Mongol rule—whole cities razed, bones and skulls scattered over vast territories—are the exact opposite of the hopeful images that China, in particular, hopes that its trade initiatives will inspire. But to understand today’s efforts to reconnect Eurasia, the Great Khan provides useful lessons.

The Mongol empire, which lasted from the early thirteenth century to the mid-fourteenth century, stretched from Khiva to Hangzhou, Krakow to Karakorum. The Mongols were not the first people to trade over the Silk Road, but no one did more to facilitate exchanges across the vast Eurasian landmass. Travel times decreased, and overlapping customs tariffs were eliminated. The Mongols established a postal system, and built the roads that Marco Polo traveled. If the Belt and Road Initiative works a fraction as well as did the Mongols’ trading bloc, Beijing will consider it a great success.

Yet not all Eurasian exchanges were positive. Silk and spices traversed Eurasia, but so too did viruses and bacteria. The spread of the Black Death, which killed even more people than did Mongol armies, was likely facilitated by the Mongols’ success in rejuvenating Silk Road exchanges.

Other effects of Mongol rule were unexpected, such as the rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which long collected taxes on cross-continental trade and remitted the proceeds to its Mongol overlords. When Mongol rule finally dissipated, the Grand Duchy began to build an empire in many of the lands Genghis Khan formerly controlled.

The success of the overland Silk Road trade routes, however, fueled their own demise. Great wealth flowed to the powers that dominated Eurasian trade—first the Mongols, later others—inspiring jealousy and resistance. Portuguese and Spanish adventurers took to the Atlantic in the fifteenth century, seeking a water route around Eurasia. When Columbus landed in the Caribbean in 1492, he hoped he had arrived at an Indian spice port, thus breaking the monopoly on Eurasian trade.

The greatest power shift of the last millennium—the rise of seaborne empires centered on Europe’s Atlantic coast—was driven, therefore, by competition for Eurasian trade. After the Spanish or Portuguese explorers, seaborne transit was cheaper and, for a long time, faster than travel by land. For several centuries, technological innovation in sailing outpaced that of land-based transport, pushing more Eurasian trade away from Silk Road caravans into the hulls of the growing fleets, soon steam-powered, that plied intercontinental trade routes.

The rise of railroads might have changed this. Russia’s czars, who in the centuries after casting off Mongol rule united the territory from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, realized the strategic implications of a transcontinental railroad. In 1916, Russia finally finished a line through the Siberian tundra, the first railway to connect the Atlantic and Pacific via Eurasia. But the Russian empire fell the following year. The Soviet Union, which inherited the czarist railway infrastructure, was too insular and too inefficient to turn the Trans-Siberian Railway into a challenger for seaborne or, increasingly, airborne trade.

Now it is China’s turn. Like its predecessors, China’s efforts at unifying Eurasia are driven by several factors: a desire to boost trade, a need to find new markets for firms struggling with overcapacity at home, and a desire to set the rules of the new Silk Road. Will China be more successful than its predecessors?

The fate of Genghis Khan and the Russian czars provide some lessons. One is that unifying Eurasia’s economies is only in part a technological challenge. The Trans-Siberian Railway did less to boost Eurasian trade than might have been expected due to politics and poor management. Beijing is betting, at least for now, that soft power coupled with inexpensive loans can reduce trade barriers despite Eurasia’s thorny politics. The Mongols exercised soft power too, supporting literacy, trade, and some religious freedom. But the Khans also paraded their enemies’ severed heads on the highways that crisscrossed their empire, a reminder of the hard power that undergirded their rule.

Economics dictates that transcontinental commerce is likely to increase. Efforts to cut shipping time and transaction costs on Eurasian trade routes, whether proposed by China, Russia, or anyone else, are only to be encouraged. Yet history suggests that the struggle for control of the lucrative trade between Europe and Asia is unlikely to be left solely to businesses, nor will it be determined solely by commercial factors. Eurasian trade routes have always been a matter for high politics and for grand geopolitical designs. Marco Polo may have benefited from the Mongols’ efficient roads, but it was the cavalry of the Mongol hordes that cleared his route to China.
The World’s Infrastructure Laboratory

CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE BOOM THREATENS ITS ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

Atif Ansar and Bent Flyvbjerg

A typical Chinese infrastructure investment suffers a double whammy of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls so large that it destroys economic value. There is an even more detrimental boomerang effect of infrastructure overinvestment. Unproductive projects carry unintended pernicious macroeconomic consequences: sovereign debt overhang, unprecedented monetary expansion, and economic fragility.

Low-quality infrastructure investments pose significant risk to the Chinese economy. Unless China shifts to fewer and higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely to spread to the international economy.

We reached these conclusions based on an analysis of 95 large Chinese road and rail transport projects and 806 transport projects built in rich democracies, the largest dataset of its kind. Our China study is part of a larger ongoing investigation1 of large-scale projects around the world at the University of Oxford’s Said Business School. We were thus able to report valid international comparisons between China and many of the rich democracies in the Americas, Europe, and Asia Pacific for the first time.

The salient findings are fivefold. First, China is now the world’s biggest spender on fixed assets in absolute terms. The scale and speed of China’s investment boom are staggering. China spent $4.6 trillion in 2014, accounting for 24.8 percent of worldwide total investments and more than double the entire gross domestic product (GDP) of India. By way of comparison, China’s total domestic

investment was merely 2.1 percent of the world total in 1982. Undoubtedly, China has been in the grips of the biggest investment boom in history for over 15 years.

Second, in line with global trends, in China actual infrastructure construction costs are on average 30.6 percent higher than estimated costs, in real terms, measured from the final business case. The evidence is overwhelming that costs are systematically biased toward underestimation.

Third, in terms of absolute construction time schedule overrun, China performs better than rich democracies. In democracies, politicians seem to have an incentive to over-promise and then under-deliver. China has built infrastructure at impressive speed in the past but, it appears, by trading off due consideration for quality, safety, social equity, and the environment.

Fourth, with respect to traffic performance, demand in China represents two extremes. A majority of the routes witness paltry traffic volumes but a few routes are highly congested. Too little and too much traffic of this magnitude both indicate significant misallocation of resources.

Fifth, 55 percent of the projects were economically unviable at the outset of their operational lives. Another 17 percent of the projects generated a lower-than-forecasted benefit-to-cost ratio. Any future risks, such as greater-than-expected operation and maintenance costs, can impair the future economic viability of these projects. Only 28 percent could be considered genuinely economically productive.

The pattern of cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in China’s infrastructure investments is linked with China’s growing debt problem. Cost overruns have equaled approximately one-third of China’s $28.2 trillion debt pile. China’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at over 280 percent, exceeding that of many advanced economies, such as the United States, and all developing economies for which data are available. Because many corporations and financial institutions in China are state owned, our revised calculation of China’s implicit government debt as a proportion of GDP suggests that China’s is the second-most indebted government in the world after Japan’s. Extraordinary monetary expansion has accompanied China’s piling debts: China’s money supply, broadly defined, grew by $12.9 trillion in 2007–2013, greater than the rest of the world combined. The result is increased financial and economic fragility.

The infrastructure policy implications of our research are three-fold. First, China’s high-octane investment program in infrastructure is not a viable strategy for other developing countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, or Brazil. Instead, China’s is a model to avoid. It is a myth that China grew thanks largely to heavy infrastructure investment. It grew due to bold economic liberalization and institutional reforms, and this growth is now threatened by overinvestment in low-grade infrastructure. The lesson for other markets is that policymakers should place their attention on software and orgware issues (deep institutional reforms) and exercise far greater caution in diverting scarce resources to large-scale physical infrastructure projects.

Second, less is more when it comes to infrastructure investments. Infrastructure supports economic development if the investments are productive. This big “if” is all too often ignored in policy debates, leading to the predicament in which China now finds itself. Our findings suggest that had China focused on about a third of its most productive investments it would have reaped lasting economic benefits without the debt overhang it is currently suffering.
Finally, incurring huge piles of debt to fund infrastructure is a destabilizing strategy. New-Keynesian arguments that see public debt in a benign light are misguided at the level of debt we see in China. Negative macroeconomic impacts include volatile movements in interest, exchange, and inflation rates; unpredictable movements in asset prices, such as house prices and listed public equities; adverse growth outcomes; rising unemployment from deleveraging; and lack of capital to finance productive investments. Several of these negative consequences were already materializing in China in 2016.

**ASIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE CULTURES**

Georg Inderst

Since the 1980s, infrastructure investment has been trending down in the Western developed world to a level of about 2.5 percent of GDP while rising to 5.5 percent in emerging markets. East Asia is often seen as leading in building infrastructure. But the picture is rather mixed across the continent. Japan and China have the highest capital expenditure in infrastructure at 5 percent and over 8 percent of GDP respectively, while South Asia (4 percent) and Southeast Asia (2–3 percent) are well below the required levels of 6–7 percent of GDP.

**Dominance of State Funding and Finance**

Is there an “Asian model”? It is worth taking a closer look before jumping to conclusions. Asia is, of course, not a homogeneous continent, but there are some interesting features in relation to infrastructure investment and finance:

- Asia’s infrastructure is mainly driven by the state. The ratio of public to private finance is 2:1 to 3:1 or higher, compared to a ratio of roughly 1:2 in Europe and North America.
- The private sector still plays a subdued role in Asian infrastructure, often supported by substantial government subsidies and guarantees. Both privatizations and public-private partnerships (PPPs) are below the global average.
- Private participation in infrastructure investment is still only 0.1–0.2 percent of GDP in most of Asia, and much lower than the global emerging markets average of 0.6–0.8 percent.

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Asia’s project finance is very dependent on bank loans, especially from state-owned banks and development institutions. Nontraditional and foreign lenders are frequently deterred by low credit standards and excessively inexpensive funds from public banks.

Scope for More Private Market Development

There is scope for more securitization in this field, even in countries with relatively advanced capital markets such as Korea, Taiwan, or Thailand that provide, for example, stocks and corporate bonds of utility companies. The use of project bonds or U.S.-style revenue bonds is still tiny overall, although interest is rising in some places.

Faced with budgetary and banking problems, many Asian governments are now trying to find new sources of infrastructure finance, especially from institutional investors. However, the local scene is rather concentrated, with a predominance of public or semipublic institutions.

The Asian private pension systems are very small. Very sizeable public pension reserve and social security plans in the region have total assets of about $2.5 trillion. Asia also has a significant share (40 percent) of global sovereign wealth funds, and there is massive capital with other public institutions, including central banks.

Conservative Investment Policies and Regulation

Most Asian investors traditionally run very conservative investment policies with a high allocation to domestic government bonds and deposits. Investor regulation tends to keep insurers and pension funds away from riskier and less liquid assets such as infrastructure debt and equity. Some change is under way. For example, the world’s largest pension scheme, Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, started to move into infrastructure in 2015. But higher commitments to real assets do not necessarily mean more finance for Asian infrastructure. Singaporean and Chinese Sovereign Wealth Funds, for example, have been very active in European real estate and infrastructure markets in recent years, and so has the Korean National Pensions Service.

What about international investors? Asia’s attractiveness has so far been subpar. There are widespread restrictions on foreign direct investment in infrastructure sectors, not only in China but also in most Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian countries. Other factors that make life difficult for potential foreign investors include cryptic regulations and land laws, bureaucracy, and judicial processes.

An "East Asian Model"?

In a nutshell, there are certain commonalities across Asia but is there an “Asian model”? If any, it would apply to East Asia’s massive public expenditure programs from abundant state budgets on the back of strong export revenues. This also drives the construction, engineering, and related industries to the extent they can be exported worldwide. It is also remarkable that, at the same time, China has managed to become the largest producer of renewable energies with many highly competitive companies. But not many countries are in such a position.

Nor should other countries follow such models, at least not fully, despite the visible successes. Japan ended up with expensive overcapacities and a massive debt burden. Even China is changing its reliance on heavy state spending at all levels and on easy credit from domestic public banks and local government financing vehicles.

What other lessons can we glean from Asia? Most of them are not dissimilar to other regions.

Diversity of Infrastructure Cultures

Different approaches work in different places. Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, for example, are following a more open model with capital markets that attract private and international investors. India has seen substantial domestic private activity in project finance and private equity funds. Malaysia has developed the world’s biggest market for sukuk (Arab financial certificates), including Islamic infrastructure bonds. Other countries are following these footsteps. More generally, people’s views on ownership and funding of infrastructure vary considerably across the globe. Many emerging countries find it easier to divest in telecommunications than in transportation. Water, sewage, and even electricity are often considered free goods. Western societies, too, disagree on issues such as road pricing, privatization of water or railways, nuclear energy projects, climate change policies, or strategic infrastructure assets.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs), in particular, take plenty of time and trust to develop. They also tend to be cyclical, even in developed markets such as the United Kingdom. PPPs were booming in Indian energy when bank loans were easily available, but volumes have fallen back.

Investor Governance and Regulation

Private finance of infrastructure requires weighty long-term savings institutions with good governance and adequate investment policies. They can help rebalance the wide maturity mismatch between short-term bank deposits and long-term project financing. A few things can be learned from the Pacific examples of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada about institutional investor involvement. Long-term investing requires continuity and predictability of the legal and institutional environment. Co-investment of domestic and international institutions is often a good idea in order to combine local knowledge with external discipline.

Policy Stability, Consistency, and Implementation

Infrastructure investment is inherently political. There is certainly merit in having dedicated infrastructure plans and institutions, as many Asian countries have set up. However, even with the best intentions at the top, they can be frustratingly slow, as Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, have experienced.

When the state is trying to facilitate private involvement, it is typically standing in its own way. Infrastructure investment is hindered by policy reversals, regulatory changes, poor implementation, and inconsistencies across government departments. The classic case in infrastructure finance is that fiscal incentives are counteracted by restrictive sectoral and financial regulations. Politicians favor flashy new projects. More investment should go into maintenance, efficiency improvements, and renewal of existing infrastructure, especially in more developed places. Commonly, the long-term funding of mega-projects is opaque, and the social and ecological cost-benefit analysis is inadequate or ignored.

Conclusion

So, what can be learned from Asia? There is probably more to learn about political determination than about infrastructure finance or setting the framework for private investment. Political leadership and consensus building are most needed for cross-border projects such as intercontinental railways or large distribution networks for energy, water, and communications.

With the Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013, the fast establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the construction of ports and railways in Africa and elsewhere, and by pushing green energy, China is demonstrating what has been lost in the West in recent times.

LESSONS FROM CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE BOOM

Genia Kostka

Among Asian countries, China has invested the most in large infrastructure projects. There is much to praise about China’s infrastructure investment path, such as a remarkable scale and speed of infrastructure delivery. These achievements can be partly attributed to devising effective incentives for local government officials to invest in infrastructure; local officials received binding economic growth targets in their annual performance evaluations, triggering impressive infrastructure investments. One takeaway from the Chinese experience is that compared to the central government, local governments can be more effective in planning and delivering local infrastructure. For instance, in my research of 136 large infrastructure projects in China constructed between 1983 and 2015, I found that projects’ cost and time overruns were lower when provincial or municipal governments were in charge rather than the national government. One lesson for other countries might be to consider whether it is feasible to delegate infrastructure planning and delivery to subnational governments.
Yet, there are also numerous mistakes China has made over the past decades that should be avoided by other countries. First, many of the investments in China have not been put to productive use. "Image projects" were often planned to further the career of government officials and resulted in unproductive investments, such as oversized government buildings, massive public squares, or large, empty "ghost towns." Many of the approved infrastructure projects did not undergo transparent bidding contests. Even if a bidding process was conducted, the cheapest offers often won at the cost of quality. This is a problem faced by many countries and is known as the problem of the "survival of the unfittest." As a result, in China today one can find much poorly built infrastructure, commonly referred to as Tofu buildings or Tofu projects.

Second, almost all of China's local infrastructure projects were debt-financed. Local governments across China set up local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to get around a formal ban on municipal bond issues, leading to reckless lending from state-owned banks to finance local infrastructure projects. LGFVs opened the door for soft budget constraints for local governments as they helped local governments to raise extra-budgetary finance outside authorization of the central government. Many of these investment approvals did not follow strict scrutinization and local LGFVs repeatedly faced financial troubles and did not repay their loans. By 2015, China had seen an exponential rise of local debt and local governments accumulated an infrastructure debt of more than $1 trillion. One lesson here is that the use of local government financing vehicles can result in substantial infrastructure investments, but such financial platforms and accumulating debt levels need to be carefully monitored.

Finally, like many other countries in the world, China was also not very effective in planning and delivering infrastructure within budget and time frame. Drawing again on the database of 136 large infrastructure cases, findings show that cost overruns in rail projects were on average 35 percent, in hydro 32 percent, and in road 29 percent. This suggests that China is doing slightly better than the world in hydro, but the same or worse in rail and road infrastructure investments. Many of these cost overruns resulted from deficiencies in the governance arrangements. Typical examples here include inappropriate or complex governance set-ups and rent-seeking behavior by individuals or firms. These cost overruns could have furthermore been partly avoided if comprehensive front-end planning was adopted. That could include using sector-based benchmarking such as Reference Class Forecasting, a method of predicting the future costs and time budgets of a project by comparing it to actual outcomes of similar projects in the past. Supervisory bodies also need to be in place, staffed with experts in infrastructure project management.

In sum, the China example shows that it will be important for other countries to invest not only in high-quality infrastructure, but to also dedicate sufficient thought in how best to plan and deliver these projects to stay within cost and time budgets. Three factors seem to be of particular importance. First, countries should promote transparency throughout a project’s life cycle, including providing comprehensive information during the planning phase or competitive bidding processes. Second, sufficient thought should go into creating appropriate financing tools that do not bring financial instabilities. And finally, tight supervision and regular monitoring through supervisory boards is associated with better outcome.
Emerging Technology

DISRUPTION ON THE DOCKS

Mary R. Brooks

In 1991, Geoffrey Moore¹ wrote, in his famous marketing bestseller *Crossing the Chasm*, that the key to successful technology adoption by the marketplace was the marketing plan that recognized the benefits sought by early adopters (techies or geeks) were significantly different than those required by early majority purchasers (who would seek proven technologies without glitches). The differences in target market and product benefits created not merely a gap but a chasm that could doom many technologies to failure. Products that crossed the chasm would reshape the competitive landscape and the technology would become profitable and widely distributed. In Moore’s third edition (2014), the examples have changed but the concept of disruptive technology adoption has not.

The popular press speculates as to which technologies will be disruptive in changing the competitive landscape, and which will not. Is container terminal automation a disruptive enough technology to change the competitive landscape of global trade?

Automation in container terminals is not exactly new technology, but rather has evolved as capital equipment replacements have been made. Full automation tends to come only with completely new terminal developments.

The world’s first automated container terminal was developed in Rotterdam in the early 1990s. With the opening of the Delta/Sea-Land Terminal in 1993, Europe Container Terminals created the first modern automated container terminal. Automated guided vehicles (AGVs) transport boxes between the berth and container stacks and automated stacking cranes add or remove the boxes from the stacks. This fascinating and bold vision saw AGVs move boxes in a slow dance. As automation improved, new technologies made the process much faster.

By 2016, the new container terminal in Middle Harbor, Long Beach, boasted “no more humans” on the working terminal and truck turns of five minutes. The benefits were those initially envisioned by the early adopters (greater efficiencies resulting in lower costs and greater unit productivity), and many more. For truckers moving boxes to and from the terminal, safety was improved. Upon arrival at the automated terminal, the driver positions the truck, gets out of the cab, and walks to the adjacent protected driver area; the automated equipment does not unload the truck until the driver is sensed: to be in the safe zone. Instead of longshoremen on the terminal, operators are housed in comfortable, ergonomic workspaces with joysticks, and surrounded by computer screens. The port industry now has a different kind of worker doing a different kind of work as a result of choosing the technologies of full automation.

In addition to a focus on safety, the Long Beach facility design also paid much more attention to the type of equipment in use. In particular, the goal of zero emissions was a key factor in selling the technology to local community interests. Battery-driven container-handling equipment is quieter, addresses noise pollution concerns, and is generally more acceptable to a local community, which is capable of preventing new terminal development. Given the current number of new terminals globally, it can be argued that automated container terminals have crossed the chasm.

However, existing terminal capacity is over-built in many parts of the world. In North America, trade growth is slow; consumer purchases of imported products have been dampened by a migration to a greater sharing economy, and a larger share for services in the economy. The fastest growing container trade in the world is intra-Asian trade. It is here that the business case for automated terminal investment is strongest. In North America, investments in automation will be focused more on environmental factors like air pollution, noise pollution, and worker safety in addition to the reduction in labor uncertainty.

The decision about which port or terminal to use is more often driven by issues like route risk and diversification, labor strife, and competing offerings by shipping lines. Shipping line network configuration, own terminal investments, existing alliance partner investments, and availability of the cranes to service ever-larger ships are also critical factors. Much of recent investment in automated equipment at older terminals was just taking advantage of innovations when crane investment was made to achieve the greater reach required by wider ships.

Therefore, the reality is that changes to the economic geography of trade are less about terminal investment and more about responding to opportunities arising from the relocation of global manufacturing and distribution centers. It would be a mistake to assume that reducing the cost of moving a bottle of wine from Australia to New York by one cent, equivalent to a 10 percent improvement in transportation cost, would make a difference in the number of bottles of wine consumed and whether that wine is Californian or Australian. Reducing costs through terminal automation might trigger a review by a user of the port or terminal, but it is unlikely to be the primary factor in the competitive landscape.

Wherever the location, international trade requires long-game infrastructure investments with local impacts requiring social license for continued development. Both ports and shipping are industries currently recovering from an unprofitable operating environment, and automated equipment is not a small capital investment to finance. Therefore, while the chasm may have been
crossed, the growth trajectory for adoption in the early majority phase will be a long one; investments must have both clear business and social cases for the investors. The secondary nature of shipping as a driver of economic investment means that the terminal industry will respond to the new economic geography rather than lead the charge.

**DRIVERLESS IN EURASIA**

Melba Kurman

In 2007, two British motorists in a specially equipped Aston Martin undertook a record-breaking, 10,000-mile-long journey from Tokyo to London (a distance roughly equal to driving from Anchorage, Alaska, to Mexico City and back). Over the course of several weeks, they passed through Japan, South Korea, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, Germany, and France, where they took the Channel Tunnel to the United Kingdom. Several years after this ambitious undertaking, it is intriguing to ponder whether an autonomous vehicle, if programmed and "trained" appropriately, could successfully complete this same journey. Thanks to dramatic advances in artificial intelligence, the vehicle's software would likely be able to handle the driving. However, I suspect the vehicle would be brought to a standstill by a decades-old problem that thwarts even the best human drivers: negotiating the border checkpoints to cross from one Eurasian country to the next.

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to reshape the continent of Asia’s economic geography, but they face infrastructure challenges unique to the region. First, briefly consider their potential benefits. Autonomous vehicles could reduce the annual global death toll from car accidents, a tragically high figure of an estimated 1.25 million lives each year.2 Cities would be safer and cleaner. Projects are already afoot in Korea,3 China,4 Singapore,5 and Japan6 to build driverless cars and taxis that can use data and algorithms to efficiently guide themselves through troublesome (and polluting) traffic bottlenecks.

Given how rapidly the technology is maturing, autonomous vehicles have the potential to transform long-distance road transportation. On rural stretches of roadway, autonomous freight trucks could drive in tightly spaced platoons, reducing their wind resistance and therefore their fuel consumption. Because no human driver will be needed, merchants could adapt the size and shape of their autonomous delivery vehicles to the loads they need to ship, thereby saving on fuel costs. For example, a company that sells long steel beams would ship its wares on a heavy-duty

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Center for Strategic and International Studies
autonomous truck, while an organic farmer would send fresh foodstuffs to nearby markets using a platoon of small, lightweight refrigerated vehicles.

Finally, while still exploring the bright side, compared to other forms of land transportation, autonomous vehicles require less upfront investment in infrastructure. Building a mile of highway costs significantly less than building a mile of rail; specialized rail systems such as high-speed rail are even more expensive. Autonomous vehicles are not impacted by variances in national standards, such as differences in the width of railroad tracks. Finally, autonomous vehicles are essentially mobile robots with machine vision so (if specially equipped) they can drive over rough terrain; on highways they require very little supporting infrastructure technology to find their way (except, perhaps, the presence of crisp, painted-on lane markers so they can “see” the edges of the road).

Although Eurasian cities and nations could reap tremendous benefits from autonomous vehicles, one critical barrier remains: road border checkpoints. Should an autonomous passenger bus or freight truck attempt to conduct business across national borders, it would be quickly brought to a halt by the invisible walls that encircle each individual Asian and Middle Eastern nation. Until the region’s international highway system is equipped with an infrastructure that provides rapid and secure border crossings, individual nations will not reap the full economic benefits of autonomous vehicles.

Many Eurasian countries boast modern economies that are built on global tourism and a foundation of vast, elaborate global supply chains that casually sprawl across the borders of several different nations. Yet their international roadways are parsed by strong national boundaries. An analysis of the wait times experienced by freight trucks at the borders of eight Eurasian countries showed that time spent waiting in queues for border control and inspections accounted for 30 percent of total trip time. For reasons both economic and political, the vast stretches of roads and highways that criss-cross the continent of Asia remain parochial, subject to the rules and cultural climates of the individual nations through which they run.

Roads were not always so difficult to traverse. In ancient times, Asian and Middle Eastern traders used overland routes—the famed Silk Road—to transport their wares to distant markets. However, in the twentieth century, as maritime navigation improved and the airline industry matured, the vast majority of Eurasian merchants began to utilize ships and airplanes to transport goods. At the time, not only were most of the continent’s highways in poor condition, these other modes of international transportation were already adequately set up to meet the demands of a global marketplace, enjoying robust international standards bodies, and the protection of trade agreements and well-defined intergovernmental organizations. As a result, today the vast majority of Asian-made goods and products destined for international markets are shipped by boat or plane; once the shipped containers reach the destination port, freight trucks are used to carry the cargo to its nearby destination.

Meanwhile, in North America and Europe after the end of World War II, governments made major investments in highway infrastructure and “soft infrastructure,” which includes the trade

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agreements and legal frameworks to enable the rapid flow of people and goods across state and national borders. More critically, these legal frameworks were put into effect. In contrast, although the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) database contains more than 400 bilateral interstate road transport agreements between nations on the Asian continent, for many reasons most of them have not been implemented. Efforts are under way to change this situation. In 2013, China proposed to lead a Belt and Road Initiative, a rapidly expanding multitrillion dollar economic and diplomatic program to finance and build up the road and sea transportation infrastructure in several different nations. However, standardizing the road transportation infrastructure across the economically and culturally diverse nations that comprise Eurasia will be a formidable undertaking that will take years to gain real traction.

Autonomous vehicles will have an immediate and positive impact on the quality of life in Eurasian cities, and will help businesses create new business models. Yet to fully realize the benefits that the application of autonomous vehicles could lend to international commerce, Eurasian nations will need robust checkpoint customs departments and road-specific international trade agreements. Because terrorism plagues many of the nations in the region, another critical piece of soft infrastructure will be the development of a standardized automated infrastructure that can track potentially dangerous vehicles. Perhaps the emergence of autonomous vehicles will motivate the individual governments of Asian and Middle Eastern nations to invest in their region’s border infrastructure so pan-Asian highways will someday be as easy and safe to traverse as the highways that stretch across Europe or North America.

HYPERLOOP ON THE SILK ROAD

Bruce Upbin

The northeastern Chinese city of Hunchun is like many of the country’s smaller boomtowns, continually fed by an influx of rural jobseekers looking for factory work. China is building a new $6 billion passenger high-speed rail line to connect Hunchun with the provincial capital of Jilin to the east. That said, Hunchun is a bit off the beaten path, tucked into a nook between the borders with Russia and North Korea. Geography has enabled Hunchun to become the largest logistics terminal in the region, preparing textiles, electronics, grain, and automobiles for export.

Hunchun could become an even more influential export hub if it had better access to the Pacific. Currently, it is cut off from the coast by rugged mountains and Russia’s Primorsky Krai region to the west and south. In winter months, roads are often impassable.

China would like to see Hunchun connect to the sea and Russian economic planners have long had their eyes on developing better, faster links between China’s interior and Russia’s deep-water, ice-free ports along the coast south of Vladivostok. Demand for the export of goods from Hunchun’s logistics center is projected to surpass 40 million tons per year by 2030. There happen to be a couple of optimal places to build a port. One of them is the seaside town of Zarubino, which had long been a fishing village until the Russian government began taking steps to develop a cargo export operation there several years ago. With a little vision, investment, and long-term planning, Zarubino has the potential to become an important stop on the global cargo circuit. All it needs is a direct, high-capacity link back to Hunchun and its surrounding region.

That is where the Hyperloop enters the picture. Hyperloop is a new mode of passenger and freight transportation that uses a custom electric motor to accelerate and decelerate a levitated pod through a low-pressure tube. It is autonomous, energy-efficient, and safe. Because the vehicle is fully enclosed inside a steel tube, the system is immune to weather hazards and pilot error and runs continuously. Pods will glide silently at airline speeds for miles with no turbulence and very little energy use along the way. The idea of high-speed travel in vacuum tubes has been around for decades, but this particular concept was popularized by Elon Musk in a research paper in August 2013. Hyperloop One is the only company currently building a full-scale system and will be testing its prototype in 2017.

Hyperloop One began working with Russia’s transport ministry in 2016 to explore the feasibility of a commuter link in the Moscow area as well as a cargo route in Russia’s Far East. In December 2016, Hyperloop One and Russian investment firm Caspian Venture Capital (an investor in Hyperloop One) presented a preliminary feasibility study for the use of a Hyperloop One system to move cargo containers between Hunchun’s logistics center and the planned Zarubino port. The study, carried out by Russian transport institute MosgortransNIIproekt (МосгортрансНИИпроект; MGTNIIIP), confirmed that the system would generate a sizable operating profit at a throughput of six containers per minute, 20 hours a day, 365 days of the year.

The planned route calls for twin Hyperloop tubes on columns threading through 65 kilometers of terrain between Hunchun and Zarubino. The route is short enough to be an affordable first investment and long enough to take advantage of the energy efficiency of Hyperloop cruising speeds. The project, as proposed, would be built in two stages commencing in 2020 and 2023 with a total estimated capital cost of $1.5–2.3 billion.10 By the time both stages are completed and operational, the Zarubino Hyperloop will be capable of carrying 1.3 million TEUs per year, just shy of the current volume at the ports of Houston, Genoa, or Fuzhou. (A TEU, or 20-foot equivalent unit, is a standard unit of measure in the container cargo business.) The system, when fully operational, would generate an estimated $250 million in operating income per year with $77 million in annual operating costs.

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Hyperloop is often touted for its potential to reach speeds of 1,000 kilometers per hour (km/h), but speed is not the primary benefit in cargo applications. Shippers want availability, or system uptime, which is one of Hyperloop’s advantages over rail or roads. Being an autonomous system enclosed in a tube eliminates a lot of safety hazards such as grade crossings, but also takes weather and operator error out of the equation. The cargo will still be moving rapidly; average speeds attainable on the proposed line would be 540 km/h. Shippers also get flexibility. A Hyperloop can send a container when it is received instead of waiting for a mile-long train to be loaded with hundreds of other containers. Its magnetic noncontact traction allows it to climb grades three times steeper than the 5 percent for traditional freight rail, which will come in handy in the mountainous region between Zarubino and Hunchun.

If the project gets the green light from Russian and Chinese authorities, it will take two or three years to prepare the detailed feasibility study and to work with regulators to update the operating framework before construction begins in earnest. Project codeveloper Caspian Venture Capital is the venture arm of Summa Group, a diversified industrial firm based in Moscow with interests in logistics, oil pipelines, and port infrastructure. Its chairman, Ziyavudin Magomedov, has made it a goal to bring Hyperloop to Russia and envisions a day when cargo can zip overland at supersonic speeds from China to Europe across the vast Russian interior. It is a wildly ambitious idea with world-changing potential, reducing the time it takes cargo to get from the East to the West from weeks to hours.

A millennium ago, the rise of the Silk Road opened Central Asia and the Far East to global trade. One hundred years ago, Russia opened its own frontier by completing the epic Trans-Siberian Railway. A Hunchun-Zarubino Hyperloop would propel Russia to the forefront of transport innovation and could be the first step toward the twenty-first-century Silk Road.
Unintended Flows

DIAGNOSING CENTRAL ASIA’S DRUG PROBLEM

Sebastien Peyrouse

Central Asia is becoming an increasingly open trading area. China launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, with plans for massive investment and substantial development of the transport infrastructure in the region. Moreover, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been integrated, along with Russia, Armenia, and Belarus, into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a free trade zone without border controls; Tajikistan also may soon join the EEU.

Greater connectivity and the development of free trade zones, despite their promise of economic benefit, have sometimes been criticized as opening the door to an increase in illicit trafficking, and particularly of drugs. This concern has been considered in the context of many economic zones (including the American continent and the European Union), and now is being looked at as a possible concern for Central Asia as well. The concern is heightened as this region neighbors Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium and heroin producer, and is, therefore, an ideal transit route for illicit drugs to China, Russia, and Europe, now among the world’s biggest illicit drug markets. The opening of internal borders in the Eurasian space, and the current and future development of transport infrastructure, certainly will open up new opportunities for traffickers. Once they cross the Kazakh or Kyrgyz border, they can carry their shipment to the gates of Europe without being subjected to any serious control.

However, studies carried out in several regions of the world, including the American continent, show that “greater openness to trade does not have a consistently significant effect on the prohibition capabilities of states in drug transit countries.”1 Central Asia will likely not be an exception. Illicit drug trafficking in Central Asia did not wait for the opening of a common economic space or for the development of road or railway infrastructure. Rather, since the breakup of the

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Soviet Union, there has been a tremendous increase in both trafficking and drug use throughout the region. The main causes of the development of drug trafficking are to be found elsewhere.

First, trafficking has been facilitated by the ineffectiveness of border controls. The length of the external borders of Central Asia (1,300 miles with Afghanistan, and more than 4,000 miles with Russia), the geographic difficulties of controlling them, including due to their mountainous nature (particularly between Afghanistan and Tajikistan), and the lack of training and equipping of border guards—despite international assistance—have made the border porous. However, the EEU could serve to focus border management efforts on external borders, in particular with Afghanistan, through cooperation among its members, and thereby organize more effective border control efforts, which hitherto have been dispersed over too large a space.

Second, illicit drug trafficking in Central Asia has, to a large extent, been fueled by the corruption and complicity of security forces. Research in the region shows that some law enforcement officials actually oversee trafficking rings, turn over drugs seized during arrests to traffickers, and sometimes provide protection to dealers. This has become almost public knowledge in Tajikistan, where dealers operate in plain view of the authorities. Tajikistan’s highest state structures, as well as the presidential family, are themselves suspected of being among the main beneficiaries of this trafficking. Consequently, efforts to secure or close borders have not had a significant impact, as some state structures have not shown the necessary political will to fight drug trafficking.

Finally, the current economic and social crisis in some Central Asian states appears to be stimulating drug trafficking. A growing number of individuals—men, women, and children—have been willing to transport drugs, either for themselves or for organized networks, in order to meet their basic needs. Poverty also contributes to corruption among underpaid civil servants in societies where corruption is socially criticized but “accepted” as a channel of redistribution and survival. This may be why the allegedly tight border controls of highly policed states, such as Turkmenistan, have never been able to significantly reduce drug trafficking.

Whatever the extent of border controls, and with or without the new development of transport infrastructure, it is likely that illicit drug trafficking will continue to grow in the region, spurred by poverty and bureaucratic corruption. It is to be hoped, however, that the development of more open trade policies with and among Central Asian states will contribute to economic development in a region long slowed down by the isolationist policies of some of its governments (in particular Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), as well as to increased employment and reduced social problems.

The real challenge for fighting the illicit drug trade in Central Asia, therefore, stems less from the supposed risks associated with opening borders or developing transport infrastructure, than from dealing with poverty and corruption. What will be crucial is the political will of the governments in

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Central Asia to tackle corruption and institute real reforms, as well as the capacity of international assistance—especially from China’s BRI program and the EEU—to deliver to Central Asia real socioeconomic benefits, and thereby reduce drug trafficking in the long term.

ASIA’S INFECTIOUS FLOWS

Mary E. Wilson

Asia’s infrastructure push will involve building roads, railways, and ports across a vast expanse of land that spans many different ecosystems, among them tropical and subtropical areas and biodiversity hot spots. The region includes sleek modern cities, huge urban slums, and relatively isolated and often unstudied rural areas. These will be joined in a network that will allow the physical movement of humans—and everything that accompanies them. Many benefits are likely to follow, but there are other possible consequences.

Consider first the building of roads, railways, and ports. Building roads can disrupt ecosystems, fragment landscapes, displace wildlife, and reduce biodiversity. Intruding on new environments and changing land use can be associated with exposure to previously unrecognized pathogens that can infect humans.1 Some are found in wildlife and can spill over into the human population, sometimes with dire consequences. Although HIV, for example, emerged from nonhuman primates in Africa, it spread throughout Asia (and the world), carried by travelers. Fragmentation and degradation of natural habitats are associated with increased infections acquired from animals.2

Asia’s remarkable biodiversity, a great asset, could also pose challenges. At lower latitudes, there is greater species richness, which includes pathogens that cause infections in humans.3 By spanning rivers, mountains, deserts, and other inhospitable barriers, roads and railroads can also eliminate natural barriers to the movement of pathogens or animals that carry them.

Recent history underscores the stakes. In recent decades, the Nipah virus, avian influenza viruses, and the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus have all originated in Asia. It is notable that all originated from animals, with bats playing a prominent role in two of the three. The dengue situation has worsened with all four dengue serotypes circulating in many areas. A new strain of vibrio (bacteria) that causes cholera emerged in Asia—and subsequently spread widely. A form of malaria, caused by Plasmodium knowlesi, a parasite found in nonhuman primates, has also increased in the region, especially in Malaysia.

Resistant bacteria could also arise. Growing populations of humans and food animals expand the interface between humans and animals—wild and domestic. Markets, where live chickens and other food animals are sold, are a rich source of new strains and combinations of influenza viruses.

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Antibiotic-resistant genes, many able to spread horizontally among bacteria, have been documented in abundance in estuaries along China’s coastline, and bacteria that are resistant to most or all commonly used antibiotics are widely distributed throughout China and India. Intensive use of antibiotics for growth promotion in food animals in China has contributed to the selection of resistant bacteria. Humans can acquire, carry, and spread these antibiotic-resistant genes, which may be found in bacteria that live in the gut.

Roads and railroads provide mobility to hosts and mosquito vectors. Humans and animals can carry infections (with or without symptoms) that can be introduced into a new area. Infections that are spread from person to person, such as tuberculosis, influenza, and measles, can be carried anywhere and introduced into new populations. Mosquito vectors have been dispersed globally through travel and trade. After the Asian tiger mosquito, *Aedes albopictus*, was introduced into the United States from Asia in used tires, it initially spread along major roadways. HIV/AIDS moved along truck routes. Plant pathogens, including ones that threaten food crops and hence food security, will be able to move more easily in food, vehicles, and with other materials.

Populations and places can be described by their receptivity or vulnerability either to the introduction of new pathogens or to the reintroduction of old ones. Tropical and subtropical areas that are infested with *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes are vulnerable to the introduction of many viruses that they are competent to transmit, including dengue, chikungunya, yellow fever, and Zika viruses. The likelihood of introduction is higher when a high volume of travelers is arriving from an area with active transmission. The risk of local and sustained spread will depend in part on the housing (screens and air conditioning), the strength of mosquito control activities, and ecoclimatic conditions.

The new network will connect populations with widely different economic statuses. Diagnostic capacity and surveillance activities in many poor and rural areas may be limited, which means little may be known about locally endemic infections in many of the areas. Undetected pathogens could move out of isolated niches when transport is possible.

But there are also health advantages to increased connectedness. New infrastructure could allow better access to the remaining populations in Asia with malaria, especially in Myanmar. There is urgency in the effort to eliminate malaria before parasite resistance to drugs and mosquito resistance to the insecticides used to treat bednets disable the current key control tools. Of course, those with infection may also become more mobile, transporting infection to other areas. Even after malaria elimination, many areas will remain susceptible to reintroduction by infected persons visiting the area, assuming competent mosquito vectors continue to infest the area.

A number of steps can be taken to reduce these risks. Good diagnostics and surveillance will be essential to identify and promptly treat any new cases. In fact, increased connectedness should be


accompanied by better surveillance of mosquito vectors and infections in humans, animals, and plants.

Responses should be tailored to specific threats and locales. It is useful to consider the concept of the receptivity of a place and population to specific microbial threats. Receptivity will depend on the specific agent and its means of transmission. Infections that can spread directly from person to person, such as influenza and sexually transmitted infections, including HIV, can be carried by mobile populations and introduced anywhere.

Local conditions matter greatly. Local spread may be affected by the living conditions and density of the population, ecoclimatic conditions (temperature and humidity), demographics of the population, behavior, host factors such as nutrition, immunosuppression, and previous infections or immunizations. Measles and diphtheria, for example, cannot be introduced into a population that is completely immunized. Infections that require a specific vector, such as a mosquito, cannot be introduced into an area where the specific vector is absent.

One must consider the dynamics of known infectious diseases that are present in the area and acknowledge the likelihood that currently unknown or unrecognized infections are likely to emerge as new areas are explored and populations are linked by roads. New connections are just conduits for flows. To make the most of them, we must not only seize the positive opportunities they present but also reduce the health risks they could carry.

THE ROAD TO EXTINCTION

Peter Zahler and Louisa Denier

By 2050, Asia’s urban population will reach more than three billion people, which will require a significant increase in transportation and infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank estimates that in order to meet infrastructure development needs, the region would have to spend $8 trillion between 2012 and 2020,10 with a big part of it on roads, railways, and other linear infrastructure. Huge projects are already under way, from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Trans-Asian Railway.11

Long seen as a driver for improving economic conditions around the world, linear infrastructure also poses risks, particularly to the environment. This is especially true in Central Asia, where hot dry summers and cold snowy winters mean many animals must make extensive movements annually to find food and avoid inclement weather. Roads, railroads and other transportation

corridors can act as significant barriers\textsuperscript{12} to the movement and survival of these highly mobile animals. The same roads and railways that are opening up areas previously off the grid to commerce and economic growth are also facilitating access to pristine and wildlife-rich areas. Consequently, the development of new roads can provide more opportunities\textsuperscript{13} for wildlife poaching.\textsuperscript{14}

The stunning growth in wildlife poaching and trade has happened so quickly that it is still not widely recognized. Illegal trade in wildlife is now the fourth most lucrative transnational crime after drugs, counterfeit goods, and human trafficking.\textsuperscript{15} Southeast Asia, one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots, generates $8–10 billion in illicit revenues per year, in part due to easy links to markets such as China, Indonesia, and India.

Wildlife traffickers rely heavily on logistics and modern infrastructure, taking advantage of new roads, ports, and airports to cross borders more quickly and easily.\textsuperscript{16} Similar to (and often linked with) other transnational organized crimes, the networks involved in wildlife crime span multiple countries over several continents, and criminals have developed elaborate ways of smuggling goods through major international airports, ports, and border crossings. High amounts of wildlife, dead or alive, are hidden in passengers’ suitcases and clothing or mixed in with legal shipments.

Large seizures happen frequently. In March 2017, for example, 21 horns from South African white rhinos, worth an estimated $5 million, were seized by authorities at Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok, Thailand. The horns had been smuggled from South Africa and transported to Thailand on a flight from Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{17} In a single month, there were seizures of 14 tons of pangolin scales across different locations in Africa and China, an amount equivalent to roughly 20,000 pangolins.\textsuperscript{18} If poaching continues, the world will lose many species including iconic wildlife such as tigers, elephants, and rhinos—many of which have seen population declines of 50 to 90 percent or more in the last century.

\begin{itemize}
This rising threat to the world’s natural capital requires action. At the policy level, countries must be encouraged to improve legislation aimed at ensuring that transportation infrastructure projects are planned in ways that do not significantly negatively impact wildlife. A recent study by the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) showed that few countries in the Central Asian region have any infrastructure laws or regulations that even mention wildlife. Even fewer have legislation that addresses the need to have infrastructure avoid significant negative impacts on wildlife or other aspects of the environment.\textsuperscript{19} International donor and lending institutions, all of whom have strong internal requirements related to biodiversity protection, should play an important role in pressing governments to improve their existing legislation and responsibly adhere to their existing requirements.

A number of steps can help address illegal cross-border movements. First, there needs to be improved collaboration and information exchange between agencies domestically. Second, similar steps are needed between law enforcement agencies such as customs in different countries. While mutual agreements between certain local customs agencies in countries such as Vietnam and China exist,\textsuperscript{20} more efforts are needed to strengthen collaboration and intercept criminals. Third, capacity must be built for the better management of border, port, and airport infrastructure.\textsuperscript{21} Inspection capacity at ports is telling. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated that while maritime shipping contributes 90 percent of all trade globally, less than 2 percent of the 500-plus million containers are inspected.\textsuperscript{22}

The transport sector itself has an important role to play in helping to identify key routes and smuggling hotspots. In 2015, Prince William’s United for Wildlife initiative set up a transport task force,\textsuperscript{23} bringing together representatives from a range of airlines, shipping companies, and a few non-governmental organizations to identify the main routes exploited by traffickers and take measures to ensure wildlife is no longer part of their operations. The members of the task force signed the Buckingham Palace Declaration in March 2016. The declaration focuses, among other things, on securing information-sharing systems for the transport industry to receive credible information about high-risk routes and methods of transportation.\textsuperscript{24} These efforts could be expanded to include additional participants from the private sector.

Ultimately, the stakes extend well beyond the environment. Wildlife trafficking is a huge business and is driving species to extinction and accelerating the loss of biodiversity.\textsuperscript{25} It can also significantly impact local economies by reducing ecotourism opportunities and contributing to the

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{19}] CMS, \textit{Guidelines for Addressing the Impact of Linear Infrastructure on Large Migratory Mammals}, 38–40.
  \item[\textsuperscript{21}] UNODC, \textit{Protecting Peace and Prosperity in Southeast Asia}, 46.
  \item[\textsuperscript{25}] UNODC, \textit{World Wildlife Crime Report}.
spread of viruses and diseases. Wildlife trafficking also threatens security by providing funding to criminal and militant networks. New transportation infrastructure developments need to be funded, designed, and established with the understanding that additional resources must be directed toward minimizing direct impacts on biodiversity and building stronger enforcement capacity to control the growing illegal traffic in wildlife. For all these reasons, we cannot afford to wait.


Arctic Opportunities

ARCTIC MARITIME CONNECTIONS

Lawson W. Brigham

The twenty-first-century maritime Arctic is experiencing extraordinary change. Profound climate change and the connection of Arctic natural resources to world markets are shaping new opportunities for the global shipping enterprise in this once remote region. The Arctic Ocean’s sea ice cover, responding to regional and global warming, has been dramatically changing in ice extent, thickness, and character during more than four decades. In turn, these physical changes in sea ice provide for greater marine access and potentially longer seasons of navigation throughout the Arctic Ocean.

Yet these changes should not be exaggerated. In fact, the Arctic Ocean will remain fully or partially ice-covered for up to seven to eight months each year in the decades ahead. The Arctic Ocean will never be ice-free year-round but may be entirely ice-free for periods of time in future summers. The presence of sea ice and the likelihood that Arctic marine routes will be open only seasonally limits the potential for year-round, trans-Arctic navigation. Icebreaker escorts of ice-class commercial ships can extend the Arctic navigation season in some areas, such as along Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), but full trans-Arctic routes will remain limited except perhaps during the summer months. These routes are not economically attractive to the largest, global container shippers with time-sensitive cargoes. There will likely be niche seasonal markets, but such ocean-to-ocean Arctic voyages will not become direct competitors to the main global marine trade routes through the Suez and Panama canals. Russian experts have suggested that the NSR could become a seasonal supplement to the southern Suez Canal marine route. But a majority of future traffic will surely be “destinational,” meaning that ships will carry cargo out of the Arctic to global markets.

If not sea ice retreat, then what is the primary driver of future Arctic marine operations and shipping? The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), an influential study released by the Arctic Council in April 2009, developed a set of scenarios, or plausible futures, to identify the key
uncertainties and factors influencing the future of Arctic navigation. The complexity and range of potentially important factors include global oil prices, climate change severity, new Arctic resource discoveries, legal and governance stability, conflicts with indigenous marine users, the seasonality of marine operations, new global actors in the Arctic (such as China, Korea, and Japan), new international agreements on Arctic marine safety and environmental protection, and others. The AMSA provides strong evidence that future Arctic marine operations and shipping are driven principally by Arctic natural resource developments that are, not surprisingly, highly coupled to global commodities prices and markets. The majority of future Arctic commercial ships will likely be bulk carriers, oil tankers, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers. With cargoes of oil, gas, hard minerals, fish, and plausibly fresh water, most of these voyages will be destination.

Russia’s NSR is the most visible symbol of a marine transportation system driven by Arctic natural resource developments. Defined in Russian federal law from Kara Gate in the west to the Bering Strait, the NSR is a national waterway, a marine transportation corridor in the Russian Arctic along the top of Eurasia, and an integral component of Russia’s northern economic strategy. Not only does the NSR facilitate the movement of natural resources out of the Arctic to global markets, but it also provides marine access to all regions of the Russian Arctic for effective sovereign presence, law enforcement, security, and supply to coastal communities.

The large and well-known Russian icebreaker fleet, made up of nuclear and nonnuclear icebreakers, maintains this coastal Arctic marine access and thus extends the navigation season along the route. The fleet also is available to escort convoys of commercial ships. Since 1979, year-round navigation on the western NSR has been maintained to Dudinka, a port on the Yenisey River that services the industrial complex at Norilsk, the world’s largest producer of nickel and palladium. Today, independently operated ice-class container carriers, which do not use convoy icebreakers, move nickel plates westward to Russian and European markets on a year-round basis. During the summer navigation season, these container ships sail east to Asian ports in the Pacific.

The most significant development in the Russian North today is the construction of an LNG plant and port (named Sabetta) on the western shore of the Ob Bay on the Yamal Peninsula. This new complex will be supplied with gas from fields on the Yamal Peninsula and liquified gas will be carried by ship out of the Russian Arctic to world markets. An initial fleet of fifteen icebreaking LNG carriers (both Russian and foreign-flag), all being built in Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering yard, will operate out of Sabetta. Capable of carrying 170,000 cubic meters of liquefied gas, these large ships will sail westbound and year-round on voyages to northwest Russian and European ports. During the summer months, these ships will sail into the Pacific and to Asian markets. The length of the navigation season for eastbound voyages has yet to be determined and will depend on the availability of Russian icebreakers. The first ship of this class, the Christophe de Margerie, has been undergoing ice trials in the Russian Arctic.

The geoeconomic context for Arctic shipping and the NSR is quite clear for the next few decades. The NSR is a national Arctic waterway that facilitates the movement of Russian Arctic natural resources to trade partners and markets throughout Eurasia. However, the NSR is not likely to compete with rail across the continent, or with more southern routes developed by China linking Indian Ocean and Mediterranean ports, as a future maritime corridor to Europe for exports. Future
increases in global commodities prices will plausibly lead to greater exploration of the Arctic’s, and specifically Russia’s, natural resources. Many of these future resources will surely be carried by sea out of the Arctic to distant markets. Profound changes are happening in the Arctic Ocean, especially the increases in marine access from sea ice retreat, but these changes do not foretell a retooling of global maritime trade routes as many speculate.

ECONOMICALLY CONNECTING THE ARCTIC

Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino

Welcome to the world’s newest blue-water ocean: the Arctic Ocean. You are forgiven if you think the Arctic is a mostly frozen and forbidding place covered in darkness for most of the year. It still is. But this ocean is rapidly changing: since 1979 Arctic sea ice maximum extent has dropped by an average of 2.8 percent per decade; in the summertime, the ice cap declined at 13.5 percent per decade; and the Greenland Ice Sheet lost an estimated 9,103 gigatons or over 9 trillion tons of ice since 1900 and between 25 to 35 gigatons annually. On land, the near-surface permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere is projected to decline by 20 percent relative to today’s area by 2040, and it could be reduced by as much as two-thirds by 2080 under a scenario of high greenhouse-gas emissions. We may be at the dawn of a new Arctic Age.

If so, this dawn has been characterized by hype, hysteria, and hyperbole. Newspaper headlines have declared the Arctic to be the next energy frontier. At $100 per one barrel of oil, companies were interested and enthusiastic about Arctic energy exploration; with energy prices below $50 per barrel, interest cooled. The predicted international race for resources is currently a saunter. Sluggish commodity prices and global economic demand have chilled the most ambitious Arctic economic development plans. For example, the Chinese mining firm, General Nice, had announced plans to develop a $2 billion iron ore mine in Greenland, but low commodity prices have placed this investment on hold. And Russian president Vladimir Putin’s 2011 declaration that the Northern Sea Route (NSR) will become a rival shipping route to the Suez Canal is another example of hype distorting the reality of Arctic development. In 2016, approximately 18,000 vessels traversed the Suez Canal, only 19 vessels navigated the NSR.

This Arctic Age is also distinctive in that it is no longer exclusively driven by Arctic nations such as the five coastal states—Russia, Norway, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), and the United States—but by nations that consider themselves to be near-Arctic states, such as China. In 1996, the five coastal states plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, which have territory above the Arctic Circle, founded the Arctic Council as the premier intergovernmental body to oversee environmental protection and sustainable development activity in the Arctic. In 2008, the five coastal states reaffirmed, through the Ilulissat Declaration, that the international law of the sea and their sovereign rights as coastal states were sufficient to govern the Arctic. Yet by 2013, addressing Arctic issues was no longer restricted to this exclusive regional club, as the Arctic Council welcomed a number of new permanent observing nations and organizations, dominated by countries from the Indo-Pacific region, including China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India.

For the past 20 years, the Arctic has been the purview of scientific research and environmental stewardship, but as reduced ice presence and rising ocean temperatures become the norm, this Arctic Age may be increasingly characterized by slow but advancing commercial opportunities. No longer exclusively national in character and with increased realism of its developmental prospects, there is growing evidence of the early formations of an Arctic Belt and Road economic construct that mirrors the southern Eurasia land and maritime route counterpart (Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013) but with a unique addition of a circle.

**An Arctic Belt**

The contours of an Arctic infrastructure belt take some imagination, but there is a network of ports and rail projects that extend primarily across the Russian Arctic. There are at least 17 ports along the Northern Sea Route that serve as major shipping hubs during the summer months and export outlets for Russian oil to various global markets. President Putin has expressed his desire to better connect these ports not just as hubs for shipment operations of liquified natural gas (LNG) but also as universal ports where different types of goods can be rerouted from the Trans-Siberian Railway or Baikal-Amur Mainline. The focal point of an Arctic Belt is the Port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula. Traffic through the port has increased as the nearby Yamal LNG plant continues to be constructed. A total of 120 ships with goods docked in 2016, more than twice the number in 2015. They delivered a total of 505,000 tons of goods valued at $5.2 billion. Designs to increase connectivity between the port and major transport routes are under way. In 2016, the governor of the Russian Yamal-Nenets region signed a deal with Russian Railways to construct the 707-kilometer-long Northern Latitudinal Passage that will connect Russia’s Ural and West Siberian region with the Northern Sea Route. The project is expected to start in 2018. Although this

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infrastructure stopped at the Cold War Soviet borders, there are new efforts to develop a rail link between Finland and Norway that would connect Roveniemi, Finland, to Kirkenes, Norway. Former Finnish prime minister Paavo Lipponen described this project in 2015 as the last “missing link” in the EU South-North traffic network.\(^{10}\)

**An Arctic Maritime Road**

The Arctic Maritime Road is a bit easier to imagine. Increasingly ice-free waters also offer opportunities to increase destination and transshipping across the Arctic region, primarily the shipment of energy (liquified natural gas and oil) and mineral resources (uranium, gold, iron ore, zinc, and rare earth metals). Once considered dangerous and noncommercial, there are three possible Arctic maritime “roads”: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Northwest Passage (NWP), and the transpolar route (TPR). These routes could be potential economical alternatives to some of the world’s most popular maritime passages in the future, but with important caveats that shipping will likely remain limited to summer months and is largely for resupply of Arctic communities. Harsh weather conditions, a lack of infrastructure, and limited satellite coverage will continue to restrict future Arctic shipping.

**The Arctic Circle**

The Arctic Circle is both a latitudinal designation and its own distinctive regional feature, specifically focusing on the Central Arctic Ocean, which consists of the international waters beyond the five coastal states’ exclusive economic zones around the North Pole, the so-called Donut Hole. The circle contains a road component (the transpolar route) and a governance component (under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), which focuses on fisheries and extending sovereign claims. Governance in the Central Arctic has focused on the potential for marine species to expand northward as key elements of the food chain migrate to warming waters, which is likely to result in countries seeking to exploit these new fisheries to satisfy a rise in demand for protein. Wary of these developments, the five Arctic coastal states negotiated and signed a moratorium on fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean in 2016 until better scientific knowledge is available and a regulatory system is in place to ensure sustainability. Four other nations (Iceland, Japan, Korea, and China) as well as the European Union are taking part in negotiations to expand this agreement.

For the past several years, Chinese authorities have been the most vocal regarding the rights of all countries to explore the region. However, as Arctic coastal states Russia and Denmark, and potentially also Canada, submit scientific claims to extend their outer continental shelves to the North Pole, there could be restrictions placed on international access to certain areas of the Donut Hole. It is unclear whether this circle will remain open or will increasingly become closed.

Russia has historically viewed the economic development of the Arctic as a national imperative. This imperative has been revitalized and resourced under President Vladimir Putin’s ambitious leadership despite national economic challenges. And, although a relative newcomer to the Arctic

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region, China has also emerged as a very active and engaged economic, diplomatic, and scientific
actor in the Arctic. It is possible that Russia and China—as demonstrated by their joint investment
in the Yamal Peninsula—could drive development to connect Asia and Europe through a northern
Arctic Belt, Road, and Circle. If their efforts are successful, we will know that the Arctic Age is
upon us.

CHINA’S EXAGGERATED ARCTIC INTERESTS

Arild Moe

The world’s awareness of petroleum resources in the Arctic soared in 2008 after an assessment
from the United States Geological Survey\(^1\) indicated that 12.3 percent of global undiscovered oil
resources and 32 percent of gas resources could be found there. The analysis was widely misinter-
preted to reflect offshore reserves and created the perception of a huge untapped potential that
was becoming more accessible because of the ice melt. It resonated strongly in China, which
worried about soaring energy needs and overdependence on the Middle East.

A common misperception in China was that much of the Arctic’s resources were up for grabs.
Literature and media coverage supported the myth that untapped energy resources were in mar-
time areas outside national jurisdiction. In fact, those resources overwhelmingly are located within
national jurisdictions. This means that engagement in Arctic energy development essentially
becomes a bilateral issue. It cannot be separated from the overall bilateral relationship with the
resource owners, notably Russia, which has the largest Arctic continental shelf, by far.

Not long after China set its sights on the Arctic’s energy resources, major developments in the oil
and gas markets created a new supply situation. The “unconventional revolution,” mostly associ-
ated with shale oil and shale gas, mainly took place in the United States but had repercussions for
world markets. It made the world’s largest oil importer almost self-sufficient and opened the
possibility of the United States exporting liquified natural gas (LNG). Moreover, supplies previously
destined for the United States became available for other buyers. In sum, the supply situation for
China did not look as constrained as it had only a few years earlier.

For China, a breakthrough in gas supplies came through the construction of a pipeline from
Turkmenistan with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year in 2012, involving supplies
also from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.\(^1\) It was followed by a pipeline from Myanmar, completed in
2013, with a capacity of 12 BCM and a deal with Russia in 2014 for supplies of 38 BCM via a new
pipeline from Eastern Siberia. With three major pipeline gas supply routes in addition to a more
diversified group of LNG suppliers, the need for Arctic gas seemed less pressing.

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1. USGS, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic,” accessed
-gas-assessed-arctic.

Oil is a different story. After China became a net oil importer in 1993, Chinese state oil companies were encouraged to acquire production assets abroad. In addition, China embarked explicitly and implicitly on a hedging strategy to enhance its energy security. Whereas the Chinese policy was successful in establishing new energy links, it did not manage to reduce the dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East. In fact, the share of China’s oil imports from that region increased from 39 percent in 2006 to 51 percent in 2015.¹³ These supply dynamics suggest greater Chinese interest in Arctic oil resources than in gas resources.

But actual Arctic offshore oil-related investments and projects have been quite modest.¹⁴ In 2013, Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, agreed to cooperate with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to study three structures in the Barents Sea. Since then, nothing has happened. China National Offshore Oil Corporation has a big stake in a still commercially uncertain project on Iceland’s continental shelf,¹⁵ but there has been no serious Chinese interest in licensing rounds on Norway’s Arctic continental shelf. An important reason is that Chinese companies have become more familiar with technological, cost, and operational challenges in the Arctic. They are in no position to replace Western majors as partners for Russian companies. Another reason is that companies are reevaluating their Arctic prospects after the fall in oil prices.

The major exception is Chinese involvement in the Yamal LNG project. The project, which involves the development of gas fields on the eastern side of the Yamal peninsula in West Siberia and construction of an LNG factory and port, was initiated by the Russian gas company Novatek and the French company Total. In 2014, CNPC bought a 20 percent stake in the $27 billion project, and the Chinese Silk Road Fund obtained a 9.9 percent stake in 2015. A contract of $12 billion for project financing was signed with two Chinese state banks in 2016. Chinese shipping companies are involved in international joint ventures set up to own and operate the large icebreaking LNG carriers custom built for the project. Lastly, CNPC has contracted annual deliveries of 3 million tons of LNG, out of a total production of 16.5 million tons.¹⁶ Through the Yamal LNG project, therefore, China is deeply involved in Arctic energy.

Why has China jumped into this project, while limiting its energy engagement elsewhere in the Arctic? To explain this apparent contradiction, it is necessary to understand the particularities of Yamal LNG. When CNPC entered the project, it was already far advanced: the resource base was extensively explored and infrastructure construction was under way. Solid partners with technical competence, particularly Total, brought credibility to the project. Russia also played an important role, providing subsidized infrastructure and preferential tax conditions to make the project

commercially attractive. Taking these factors into account, the risk level must have been perceived as very low, especially compared to Arctic offshore oil projects.

There is no doubt that China wants to be a player in the Arctic and gain competence for such a role. Chinese technology and service companies can be expected to play an increasing role, even if Chinese oil companies will not be in the driver’s seat. The Chinese stepwise approach is to learn from others, without taking undue risks or incurring unnecessary costs. China may initially have approached the region with unrealistic energy expectations, but its currently cautious approach could give way to greater confidence over the long term.
Strategic Infrastructure

JAPAN’S PORTS AND POWER

Catherine L. Phipps

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Japan’s ports had long been key to the country’s transportation infrastructure, serving domestic coastal shipping networks and limited East Asian and Dutch trade. In the East Asian state system, trade and diplomacy were combined rather than separate functions of foreign interactions, and designated ports, like Nagasaki, were equipped to handle both. By the 1850s, however, Japan’s port system changed dramatically with the forced opening of select seaports to international trade. Paradoxically, both the earlier maritime restrictions and their gradual undoing through the opening of international trade ports aimed to ensure Japan’s national security and state sovereignty.

The tipping point in foreign policy came in 1853–1854 when, after half a century of minor attempts by the British, Russians, and others, an American expedition, led by Commodore Matthew Perry, used gunboat diplomacy to force Japan’s Tokugawa shogunate to accept limited trade and diplomatic relations with the threat of military confrontation. In this famous incident, the Americans compelled the Japanese to change two centuries of austere policies that were largely designed to restrict foreign, especially Western, contact. Initiated in the 1630s, the so-called closed country edicts cut off what proved to be an emerging global trade to protect the fledgling Tokugawa regime from unwanted influences, especially Western Christians—and their Japanese trading partners and converts—who were seen as subversive to the new order.

The short-term objective of Perry’s expedition was to secure maritime access to Japan, including fair treatment of distressed sailors and the provision of necessities like water and coal. These demands came at a time when an increasing number of foreign vessels were plying East Asian waters as shipping and navigation technologies improved worldwide. The longer-term goal was to establish diplomatic relations and direct trade. Japan signed “unequal” commercial treaties, also known as the Ansei Treaties, in 1858 with the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, the Netherlands, and France. These opened five treaty ports to foreign commerce, giving the Western powers privileges such as fixed tariffs, extraterritoriality, and most favored nation status, none of which were reciprocated.

Some domestic factions, especially those located at the country’s margins, saw the promise of opening to trade and the risks of not doing so. Engaging the foreigners and purchasing vessels and firearms gave them an edge over the central government, strengthening them to overthrow the Tokugawa with the rallying cry of sonnō jōi, “Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians.” Under the modernizing Meiji government, the new domestic agenda supported foreign policy and national security imperatives in conceding to Western demands, beginning what would be an economically fraught process of engaging in global trade, and funding and establishing the infrastructure and services (such as jetties, lighthouses, customs offices, and connecting railroads) that provided shippers and merchants with the technologies they needed to conduct trade.

Moreover, Japanese business and political leaders strategically targeted particular industries and products, including silk, cotton, tea, wheat, and rice, for export. Coal was one of these key commodities and the development of Japan’s coal industry met more than one need. Beyond its sale for domestic use in fueling the country’s modern industries, coal immediately began fulfilling foreign demand in the treaty ports. In addition to generating revenues for the growing network of foreign steamships operating in the region, entrepreneurs established coaling stations and created a vigorous export trade, supplying key Asian hubs in the British empire, especially Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

In some cases, ports like Moji, at the tip of northern Kyushu, became so-called Special Trading Ports, which opened in the 1880s and 1890s to handle limited trade under full Japanese jurisdiction. The designation of these ports allowed foreign vessels to enter a greater number of harbors to load and unload cargo, including coal for export or ships’ use. Moji was also retooled to serve military needs during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, handling the nation’s strategic interests in addition to commercial ones. Other Special Trading Ports, like Naha in the Ryukyus and

Muroran in Hokkaido, were opened to curb illegal trade and expand state oversight in these remote sites.

In the closing decades of the century, as government officials worked to revise the unequal treaties through a combination of legal, institutional, and social change at home and diplomacy abroad (revisions were enacted in 18999), the Japanese enhanced and expanded their own system of ports, linking them directly to a broad web of shipping lines and international seaports throughout East Asia and around the world. Doing so helped the country emerge from semi-colonial status to become an economically and militarily strong state that reordered traditional East Asian relations and launched its own empire. Ports were essential to this island country’s efforts to regain national sovereignty, develop economically, and compete in an imperialistic world order.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan’s seaports were transformed from sites that primarily handled domestic coastal shipping to deep-water harbors with the equipment necessary to accommodate commercial steamships and state-of-the-art warships. If anything, the transition in Japan’s port system tells us something about the degree to which a country’s transportation infrastructure is plugged into other national and supranational networks in such a way as to impact not just domestic economic interests but also advance national security and foreign policy objectives.

**HOW BRITAIN’S COLONIAL RAILWAYS TRANSFORMED INDIA**

Christian Wolmar

Nowhere other than India is the railway so indelibly connected with the image of the nation. Just as there is no single country on earth that has such a broad cultural, ethnic, and racial mix as India, there is also no railway system that has played and, crucially, continues to play such a fundamental role.

There are endless paradoxes about the Indian railways. They were the greatest gift left by the colonial power, and yet they were not built to serve the needs of local people. The fact that they did so, and continue to do so, was almost incidental. The British companies that laid down the tracks had not envisaged that people would pour en masse onto the iron road to take advantage of the immeasurably improved experience of traveling across the vast subcontinent offered by train services. Even though for the best part of the first 100 years of the railway age, they were owned and controlled by companies based 5,000 miles away in the United Kingdom, they immediately assumed an Indian identity, which only became stronger over time. A neat illustration of that is the fact that Indian Railways adopted a rather bowdlerized version of the famous London Underground roundel on its station signs.

The Indians took to the railways, not just physically, but emotionally. Railways and India are a good fit, an enduring one because not only are the Indians still building new lines, but virtually none have ever been closed. The railways delivered much for India. Just as with the United States of America, they bound the country together. They allowed fast travel between one end of the country and the other and cemented relationships between the various provinces. They enabled goods to be carried around the country far more cheaply than ever before. They allowed the development of markets in foodstuffs and other agricultural produce that increased their availability and, eventually, did make famines less likely. They created an infrastructure that in India was unprecedented in its sophistication and extent. They gave the opportunity of secure jobs to millions of Indians and enabled many of them to acquire new skills. They helped the development of the trade union movement. They laid the foundations of the large Indian middle class. They brought sophisticated technology to the subcontinent.

And so much more. They were transformative in so many ways, creating the India we know today. As Theroux summarizes,

> The railway was the bloodstream of the Raj, and it affected nearly everyone. 
> It linked the centers of population; and the cities, which until then had been identified with their temples and forts, became identified with their railway stations. Howrah with Calcutta, Victoria with Bombay, Egmore and Madras Central with Madras."

He goes on to suggest, with some justification, that India only functions thanks to its railways. That is not to say that the railways were always welcomed by Indians. Indeed, they were the subject of huge controversy because they were seen as the principal instrument of colonization. The British, with their small army, could not have kept hold of a turbulent country for so long without the ability of the railways to move troops around quickly. After a slow start in 1853, the construction of the railway network envisaged by Lord Dalhousie was sped up rapidly after the 1857 Rebellion. The railways were an instrument of control. The stations became fortresses, the white and, later, the Eurasian, staff became an auxiliary army, and the tracks became lines of communication in the event of conflict. The 1857 Rebellion, coming as it did at a crucial stage in railway development, had an enormous impact on the railways’ eventual shape and the attitude of the British colonial rulers to their Indian subordinates. This was a nakedly military project, but not solely one. There were immeasurable economic benefits, too, and though the very design of the railways was as conduits to and from the ports to help British imports and exports, inevitably the Indian economy received a stimulus through their construction.

There was another source of mounting antagonism: the treatment of third-class passengers who were virtually all Indian. While the Europeans traveled in world-class luxury in first class, the masses were crammed into world-class squalor. There was even a long battle for them to have toilets on trains and conditions remained squalid well into the twentieth century. This proved to be a great source of dissent and encouraged nationalistic sentiment. The invention that did most to keep the Indians in check proved to be double-edged, stimulating the nationalistic forces that

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eventually triumphed. Gandhi made great use of the railways but also criticized the conditions that third-class travelers—of which he deliberately was one, despite his relative wealth—endured.

At times it seemed that the authorities set out willfully to ensure that the railways antagonized the local population. In the mid-1880s, various lines were built supposedly to relieve famine, though they were a remarkably inefficient way of doing so. The Bengal-Nagpur line, for example, was built with funds from the Rothschild family but the British government decided that their guaranteed profits should be paid by an extra tax on the local peasantry. Consequently, the profits accrued by the richest family on earth were being provided from a group that was certainly among the poorest. You could not make it up.

Quite apart from the antagonism created by their construction and operation, the railways could have done so much more for India had they not been first and foremost a colonial project. There was a fantastic missed opportunity with ramifications that stretched far beyond transport considerations. If the British had nurtured the skills of their Indian workers and used the economic clout of the railways to stimulate the Indian economy, and if the companies had treated their third-class passengers as customers rather than as chattels, much of the anger toward the colonial power might have been allayed. That is not to say independence would not have happened, as clearly decolonization was an irresistible historic force, but the horrors of Britain’s rapid departure might have been avoided.

The failure was, above all, economic. In an analysis of the impact of railways, John Hurd,11 an economist who has written extensively on India, concludes that India only enjoyed limited economic development under the Raj precisely because the railways were not allowed to be the catalyst for growth that they proved to be in so many other countries. While the railways undoubtedly enabled the cheaper flow of goods, stimulated increased agricultural output, and created many jobs in modern industry and mining, “these changes did not affect the basic structure of the economy. Not until Independence when economic development became a conscious and pursued policy did the railways begin to realize their potential for assisting in the transformation of the Indian economy.”

The failure was cultural, too. Imagine if the British had allowed far greater mingling of the races on the railways; if they had consciously helped to develop a managerial class of Indians able to share the burden of running the railways with them; if they had, essentially, seen Indians as partners rather than subordinates. Who knows, there might still be a group of Europeans working on India’s railways today.

**THE STRUGGLE BEHIND THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY**

Tom Zoellner

Other than the Apollo 11 mission to the moon, it would be hard to envision a national transportation project that was less about daily efficiencies and more about psychological conquest than the Kremlin’s effort to build a railroad across Siberia.

The guiding principle of the Trans-Siberian Railway was not about the routine moving of people from place to place, but sticking a pair of iron rods into bleak territory that had strategic importance in defining Russia’s role in the Far East. The road was more geopolitical than economic, and it took a wildly profligate financing scheme to pull it off.

At the beginning of the 1890s, Czar Alexander III worried about pressure from Germany in the west as well as the possible expansion of Chinese influence into Siberia, which was then a barely populated gulag region mastered only by tigers and bandits. He decided the best way to reaffirm Russia’s dominance in the East and even into Manchuria, as well as strengthen its internal economy through natural resources, would not be through posting isolated army divisions in the frozen wilderness but by creating a mechanical link between St. Petersburg and the far provinces, which were rich in iron, fur, and lumber.

The Russian minister of finance, Sergei Witte, was not worried about long-term currency inflation. He told the czar that the best way to build up the national treasury was to spend “lavishly” on public works and let the corresponding revenue make up the difference—a strange reverse-echo of the famous Laffer Curve of U.S. Republican faith which says that tax cuts pay for themselves through increased payments.

“European know-how and capital will find for itself an extensive new field of employment for the exploration and development of the natural riches of the Eastern nations,” Witte wrote. It was an audacious gamble whose only real major-scale comparable—the building of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railways across the American West—had too many of its own idiosyncrasies to serve as a useful model.

Construction began in 1891 with an increase in taxes and the money supply to pay for wages and equipment, and Witte put the ruble on the gold standard six years later. He also opened the economy to unprecedented levels of foreign investment particularly from France, Britain, and the United States.

With the help of forced prison labor and the diversion of a third of Russian iron reserves, the railroad pushed steadily east into terra incognita, even as crews started westward from Vladivostok in hopes of meeting on the taiga within a decade. The construction camps were beset with malaria, cholera, and starvation. The ties and some bridges were made of immature green wood that buckled and created maintenance headaches all along the 5,772-mile route—about a fourth of the circumference of the earth—that would not be tied together until 1901.

The railway’s strategic value, or at least its potential, would be made apparent by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, in which troops were sent closer to the combat zone more rapidly than by ship or by crossing the tundra on foot and sled. But the single track that had been completed suffered traffic jams and cut off the flow of Siberian wheat back to European Russia.

Even in peacetime, goods sat on the docks at Vladivostok for months at a time, awaiting a break in the snarled logistics window. The railway would function smoothly in the twentieth century only after an infusion of American cash and construction expertise, as well as the peace that came after 12.

the Russian civil war. Up to five million settlers were eventually persuaded to give up the meager comforts of the west and make the journey out to the frontier to become farmers of the permafrost on free land given by the government, and outpost cities like Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk developed into manufacturing hubs in the era of the USSR.

As for the aggressive and visionary Witte, he got sidelined by the court of Nicholas II and left government fearing—correctly—the imminent collapse of the monarchy in the face of growing revolutionary sentiment. The Trans-Siberian Railway proved that heavy borrowing and crash building can pay dividends. They just might not be enjoyed by the current regime.
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