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Sources, Analytic Cautions, and Challenges
Introduction
Terrorism has become one of the dominating national security threats of the 21st century. It is also one of the most complex — mixing the actions of states, extremists, and other non-state actors in a wide range of threats and types of conflicts. Terrorists range from individuals carrying out scattered terrorist acts, to international terrorist networks of non-state actors, to state terrorism including the use of conventional forces and poison gas to terrorize portions of a civil population. Terrorism has also become a key aspect of civil war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare, as well as ideological, ethnic, and religious warfare.

There is no easy way to categorize the resulting patterns of violence, to measure their rise, or to set national security priorities. For more than a decade, the U.S. has focused on the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has dealt increasingly with the expansion of the threat into North Africa, other parts of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of the world. Key warfighting threats like the Islamic State and its affiliates, and the Taliban and Haqqani Network, are only a comparatively small part of the rising threat in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.

It is clear from the current trends in other regions that the threat of religious extremism may soon expand rapidly into the rest of Asia, and there are many other causes of terrorism in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the United States. Terrorism is often heavily driven by ideology, but it also is often a reaction to major shifts in population, ethnic and sectarian tensions, failed and corrupt governance, and the failure to broadly develop a given economy and offer employment and a future. No area is immune to the threat, and internal instability can drive terrorism anywhere in the world.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared this report to provide a graphic overview of these trends from 1970 to the end of 2016. Each section first traces the patterns since 1970, and then focuses on the period from 2011-2016 — the years since the sudden rise of massive political instability and extremism in the MENA region. Finally, it covers global, regional, and key national trends and compares different estimates and sources for 2015 and 2016.
The report draws primarily on reporting in the START database, but uses other reporting from sources like EU/Europol, IHS Jane's, and the IEP to illustrate different estimates, different perspectives, and the uncertainties in the data.

**The Contents of the Report**

The report shows key trends largely in graphic and metric form. It does not attempt to provide the supporting narrative that is critical to fully understanding these trends, nor to list all the many qualifications made by the sources used regarding the limits of their models and data. These are areas where the reader must consult the original sources directly — along with a wide range of narrative material and other sources — to fully understand the trends that are displayed.

Even so, the report is necessarily complex. The report does show that there is value in looking at global trends, but makes it clear that many key trends are largely regional, and must be examined on a regional basis. It also provides key country-by-country breaks out to show that the driving factors shaping the nature of terrorism in any given case are usually national. International networks certainly play a key role, as do factors like religion and culture, but the forms terrorism take normally differ sharply even between neighboring countries.

The report also must be detailed to highlight the differences and uncertainties in much of the data. There often are sharp differences in the most basic summary data, even between two highly respected sources like START and IHS Jane's. These differences do not reflect failures in the analytic efforts of the sources shown. They reflect differences that are inevitable in their need to rely on open source material, the lack of any clear definition of terrorism, the problems in measuring and displaying uncertainty, and the need to guess and extrapolate where key data are missing.
Key Uncertainties and Problems in the Data

One key conclusion that should be drawn from this analysis is just how difficult it is to rely on given set of data. Another is that analyses which ignore the gross levels of uncertainty and the conflicts in the information provided in the different sets of open source data now available, are likely to have little legitimacy and be more misleading than useful.

The final section of the report highlights these problems in more detail, but the key problems involved include:

• No agreed definition of terrorism, or how to define or measure any key metric.

• Reliance on media sources or unstated sources, cancelation of NCTC and all official U.S. public reporting on trends and data with only the EU and Europol providing detailed and credible official estimates.

• Radical differences in level of reporting by region, and a lack of credible data in Central and East Asia.

• No reporting on state terrorism, and ignoring large scale killing of civilians in countries like Syria.

• Failure to report ranges in many key areas of large-scale uncertainty – particularly in terms of how terrorist incidents are defined and counted, and data on targets, perpetrators, and casualties.

• Failure to clearly distinguish between insurgency and terrorism — a key problem in every state where there is some form of active civil conflict.

• Labeling of asymmetric threats and enemies as "terrorist" for political purposes, regardless of the real character of the fighting or actions involved and methods of attack.
• Failure to distinguish ethnicity, sect, tribe, and other key data driving the patterns of terrorism.

• Constant changes in method of analysis and reporting, and unclear historical comparability of data shown.

• Lack of clear handling of hate crimes in collecting terrorism data.

• Focus on ideology and religion rather than the full range of causes of terrorism.

Different definitions and listing of perpetrators, and very different counts and characterization of perpetrator actions – compounded by the lack of clear definitions of terrorist versus insurgent actions. Lack of clear methods for reporting attacks and incidents where perpetrators cannot be identified.

Serious limitations to the search and graphing functions of given databases – e.g. inability to search for perpetrators in each country or region, or get totals or a range for casualties.

The reader should also be aware that the START database and the statistical annex to the State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* do provide a full range of caveats about the definitions used and the uncertainties in the data, and that the START data offer three levels of confidence. These caveats are not reported in detail here to limit the length of this report and the START data presented only show the high START estimate of terrorism and perpetrator threats.
This section of the report draws largely on the START database. The START database forms the core of the data used in the entire report because it is the database presented in the statistical annex to the annual U.S. State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism*. It is as close to an official data based on terrorism as is now available from the U.S. government.

This section presents three sets of statistics that display the global trends from 1970-2016, from the beginning of the upheavals in the Arab world in 2011 through the end of 2016, and finally during 2016.

There is no way to determine the uncertainty in these estimates, or how truly comparable the data are. As becomes clear from the more detailed regional and national data later in the report, however, the inputs differ strikingly in many cases from other sources of such data, and the figures and trends shown must reflect a high degree of uncertainty.

As one example, the START database estimates that there were 13,488 terrorist incidents in 2016. Another key database, developed by IHS Jane’s, reports 24,202 attacks for the same year. Such differences exist in the data developed by virtually every independent source, including official sources in the United States. A review of past reports by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also indicates that they both used different sources and definitions from each other, and would have continued to produce different results if their reports were updated using the same methods and sources used in 2010 and 2005.

As for the data presented, the figures and graphs for 1970-2016 do reflect several broad trends that are undoubtedly real and accurate. They show a major shift from a more broadly distributed pattern of global terrorism to one driven by Islamic extremism and internal instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with a sharp rise beginning in the
mid-2000s and becoming a key threat in these regions after 2011. They also show, however, that some regions show only a limited increase or reflect a decline in incidents relative to the past. And, that the level of violence has not risen in some regions, and has declined in several.

The data for 1970-2016 also show that there has been very limited use of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but that the use of chemical weapons has grown over time in some regions. START and other sources do not attempt to track a key new aspect of terrorism: cyberattacks, and no trend data are available for any period.

The data for 2011-2016 explain the sudden rise of the terrorist threat in more detail in ways that track with other sources and again must be broadly accurate. They show that levels of terrorist incidents began to stabilize in 2013/2014, but this leveling must be kept in perspective. The level of civil conflict, insurgency, and civil war continued to rise sharply. Terrorism had become major conflict in several key states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and the Sudan. The nature of terrorism also shifted, with more and more bombings, and high explosive attacks on civilians.

The data for 2016 show that terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly dominated global terrorism — again, trends that virtually all sources agree upon. The data for 2016 also shows the cumulative rise in suicide and vehicle attacks by country and perpetrator, how many attacks focused on private citizens, and how much the patterns of terrorism focused on ten key countries — all with significant Islamic populations.

At the same time, the data again illustrate the major differences in estimates by source. START reports 13,488 incidents and IHS Jane's reports 24,202 attacks, a figure some 80% higher. Equally striking differences exist in START and IHS Jane's analyses of key perpetrators.

It is critical to note that virtually all of these incidents/attacks were caused by Islamist extremist groups attacking fellow Muslims and seeking to overthrow moderate regimes. The struggle did spill
over into the U.S., European, and other countries with relatively tiny Moslem populations — but the number of incidents and casualties were very small by comparison, and the vast majority of casualties came from a small minority of extremist Muslims killing and injuring large numbers of other far more moderate Muslims.

The U.S. and its European allies naturally focus on their own security, and the threat of terrorism is all too real. At the same time, it has often been exaggerated in recent politics and media to a point where this exaggeration of the risk feeds the very process that terrorism focuses upon, and means that policymakers, the media, and the public lose perspective as to its relative importance.

As later charts and data show, the START database only reports 175 incidents of all kinds in the U.S. between 2001 and 2016, and 1,356 incidents in all of Western Europe, versus 60,230 incidents in heavily Islamic regions and 27,580 in the largely Islamic MENA region. The supporting chronologies in the original source material make it clear that most had nothing to do with Islamic extremism, although such movements did cause a majority of the fatalities.
1970-2016
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016

170,350 incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016

Source: START Data Base,

Years: (between 1970 and 2016)
All incidents regardless of doubt.

Region: (North America; Central America & Caribbean; South America; East Asia; Southeast Asia; South Asia; Central Asia; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; Middle East & North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Australasia & Oceania)

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016
(170,350 Incidents)

- Middle East, North Af... (46511)
- South America (18762)
- Sub-Saharan Africa (15491)
- Central Asia (554)
- South Asia (41497)
- Eastern Europe (5031)
- Australasia, Oceania (264)
- Central America, Cari... (10340)
- East Asia (794)
- North America (3346)
- Southeast Asia (11453)
- Western Europe (16307)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 1970-2016
(170,350 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Global Rise in High Casualty (Killed and Injured) and Fatality Incidents: 1970-2016

- **740 Incidents**
  - with 101+ Casualties

- **1,499 Incidents**
  - with 51-100 Casualties

- **501 Incidents**
  - with 51-100 Fatalities

- **178 Incidents**
  - with 101+ Fatalities

- **14,300 Incidents**
  - with 11-50 Casualties

- **6,807 Incidents**
  - with 11-50 Fatalities

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=f&casualties_max=50

124,984 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

122,913 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&weapon=6&weapon=5&weapon=8&attack=2&attack=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

MENA: 42,003 incidents

East and Southeast Asia, Oceania: 11,444 incidents

Central and South Asia: 37,694 incidents

North America and Europe: 18,182 incidents

Central & South America: 25,853 incidents

Sub Saharan Africa: 12,970 incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=7&region=6&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&weapon=1&weapon=2&weapon=4&weapon=3&attack=2&attack=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Limited Rises in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Incidents: 1970-2016 (92 Incidents Total)

NOTE: START does not count cyberterrorist incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=7&region=6&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&weapon=1&weapon=2&weapon=3&weapon=4&attack=2&attack=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Regional Rise in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Incidents: 1970-2016

MENA: 42 incidents of all types

East and Southeast Asia, Oceania: 11 incidents of all types

Central and South Asia: 22 incidents of all types

North America and Europe: 11 incidents of all types

Central and South America: 5 incidents of all types

Sub Saharan Africa: 6 incidents of all types

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=7&region=6&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&weapon=1&weapon=2&weapon=4&weapon=3&attack=2&attack=3&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Key Country Rise in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Incidents: 1970-2016

Iraq 31 incidents and Syria 8 incidents vs. 42 in all of MENA

Afghanistan 31 incidents, India 1 and Pakistan 4

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=7&region=6&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&weapon=1&weapon=2&weapon=4&weapon=3&attack=2&attack=3&dtp2=all&success=y&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
2011-2016
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

70,767 incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Number of Terrorist Attacks by Region Worldwide 2011-2016 (70,767 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016
(70,767 Incidents)

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Target Type Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Weapons Type Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Casualties Per Incident Worldwide 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8
Terrorist Attacks in Heavily Islamic Regions: 2011-2016

60,320 Incidents

- 85% of world total
- 7% caused by some element of ISIS

Source: START database,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Terrorism in the MENA Region: 2010-2016

27,580 Incidents

- Grow 2-3 times in 5 years if do not include insurgency:
- 46% of total for Islamic regions
- 4,343 or only 15.7% are attributed to ISIS/ISIL/Daesh

Source: START Data Base,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=10&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
2016
The total number of terrorist attacks in 2016 decreased by 9% and total deaths due to terrorist attacks decreased by 13%, compared to 2015. This was largely due to fewer attacks and deaths in Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen. Twenty-six percent of all deaths in 2016 were perpetrator deaths, up from 24% in 2015.

In several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey, terrorist attacks and total deaths increased in 2016.

Although terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries in 2016, they were heavily concentrated geographically. Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 75% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and Pakistan).

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was responsible for more attacks and deaths than any other perpetrator group in 2016. In particular, ISIS carried out 20% more terrorist attacks in Iraq, and caused 69% more total deaths in Iraq, compared to 2015. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS and perpetrator groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS carried out attacks in more than 20 different countries. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of the ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

The number of attacks in which victims were kidnapped or taken hostage continued to decline in 2016; however, the number of kidnapping victims and hostages continued to increase. Like in 2015, this was primarily due to a small number of attacks involving exceptionally large numbers of victims.

In 2016, a total of 11,072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 25,600 total deaths and more than 33,800 people injured. These casualty figures include more than 6,700 perpetrator deaths and 1,600 perpetrator injuries. In addition, more than 15,500 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.
• In past years (2012, 2013, and 2014), total attacks and casualties worldwide generally peaked in May or June, coinciding with the onset of spring “fighting season” in Afghanistan. In 2015, considerable decreases elsewhere obscured the influence of increasing terrorist attacks in Afghanistan on global statistics. However, in 2016 the peak in May was largely a result of a sharp increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq (309 attacks). Unlike previous years, the number of attacks in Afghanistan showed little indication of seasonal influence, instead decreasing fairly steadily throughout the year.

• Of the 25,621 people killed in terrorist attacks in 2016, 6,755 (26%) were perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Perpetrators killed themselves intentionally in suicide attacks, unintentionally while attempting to carry out attacks, or were killed by security forces or victims responding to attacks. This is a 6% decrease in the number of perpetrator deaths, compared to 2015.

• Terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries in 2016; however, they were heavily concentrated geographically. Fifty-five percent of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 75% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, and Pakistan).

• Several countries that have routinely experienced large numbers of terrorist attacks in recent years observed considerable decreases in total attacks in 2016, compared to 2015. These included Pakistan (-27%), Afghanistan (-22%), Nigeria (-21%), and Yemen (-21%), and to a lesser extent Syria (-6%) and the Philippines (-2%).

• In contrast, Iraq, which has experienced more terrorist attacks than any other country each year since 2013, saw a 23% increase in total attacks in 2016. Other top-ranked countries that experienced increases in total attacks in 2016 included Somalia (+49%), Turkey (+17%), and India (+16%).

• Overall, global patterns produced a net decrease of 9% in terrorist attacks worldwide between 2015 and 2016.

• Several countries that were not among those with the most attacks nonetheless saw considerable increases in 2016. These included Saudi Arabia (+129%, from 48 attacks in 2015 to 110 attacks in 2016).
• In Bangladesh, terrorist violence increased 296% between 2014 and 2015, coinciding specifically with the anniversary of disputed 2014 elections. Data for 2016 indicated that this was an isolated pattern, as Bangladesh saw a sharp decrease (-82%, from 461 attacks in 2015 to 85 attacks in 2016).

• The total number of people injured due to terrorist attacks worldwide declined 10% in 2016. However, this global statistic obscures a great deal of regional variation. For example, Yemen (-69%), Nigeria (-67%), and Afghanistan (-19%) saw large decreases in the number of people injured in 2016.

• By contrast, in Turkey (+176%), Somalia (+104%), Pakistan (+29%), India (+27%), and Iraq (+12%) there were large increases in the total number of people injured due to terrorist attacks in 2016.

• While worldwide attacks, the total number of deaths, and the total number of people injured decreased in 2016, the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks worldwide increased 26%.

• In 2016, there were three countries in which more than 1,000 people were kidnapped or taken hostage: Iraq (8,586; +114%); Afghanistan (1,673; +48%), and Syria (1,406; -5%).

• The sharp increase in Iraq – where the already high number of people kidnapped or taken hostage more than doubled in 2016 – was entirely the result of two particular events. In June 2016, Kata’ib Hizballah claimed responsibility for abducting 1,500 displaced civilians in Al-Anbar governorate. In August 2016, 3,000 displaced civilians were abducted in Kirkuk governorate in an attack attributed to ISIS. These two attacks involved more hostages than any other event in the Statistical Annex dataset. They are followed by the January 2013 attack during which 850 hostages were held by Al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade in Algeria, and a third 2016 attack in December in Aleppo, Syria, in which Hizballah held 800 hostages.

• Several of the countries that experienced the most terrorism saw decreases in the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in 2016. These included Turkey (-87%), Nigeria (-69%), India (-63%), and Yemen (-62%).
Attacks in 2016
13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attacks by Region in 2016
13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=40
Attacks by Region in 2016
13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attacks by Region in 2016
13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Deaths*</th>
<th></th>
<th>Deaths per Attack*</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total Injured*</th>
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<th>Injured per Attack*</th>
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<th>Total Kidnapped/Hostages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2965</td>
<td>2417</td>
<td>9764</td>
<td>6973</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>13314</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>1716</td>
<td>4561</td>
<td>5312</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>5054</td>
<td>6250</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>4940</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>2786</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>2088</td>
<td>2767</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>9.16</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2599</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>6.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldwide</strong></td>
<td>11072</td>
<td>12121</td>
<td>25621</td>
<td>29424</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>33814</td>
<td>37419</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes perpetrators

In 2016, a total of 11,072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 25,600 total deaths and more than 33,800 people injured. These casualty figures include more than 6,700 perpetrator deaths and 1,600 perpetrator injuries. In addition, more than 15,500 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.

Attack Types in 2016

13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0&attack=2,1,3,7,4,5,6,8,9
# Key Metrics for Suicide and Vehicle Bombings

Five countries that experienced the most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 – 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Percent of Global Total</th>
<th>Percent Vehicle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five perpetrator groups responsible for most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 - 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Percent of Global Total</th>
<th>Percent Total Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Targets of terrorist attacks worldwide, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Number of Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Citizens &amp; Property</td>
<td>4734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (General)</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/Non-State Militia</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Figures/Institutions</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Institution</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; Media</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (Diplomatic)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Political Party</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports &amp; Airlines</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food or Water Supply</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abortion Related</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Target Type in 2016

13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Weapons Type in 2016

13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=31&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Casualties Per Incident in 2016

13,488 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Casualties Per Incident in 2016
13,488 Incidents

NOTE: Killed and injured exceed total, reasons are not clear.
Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016

Note: START database reports 13,488 incidents for 2016

- Attacks: 24,202
- Wounded: 39,480
- Fatalities: 27,697
IHS Jane’s 2015 Global Trends

Note: START database reports 14,852 incidents for 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>36,839</td>
<td>39,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>29,384</td>
<td>27,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>18,895</td>
<td>24,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Countries with Highest Death Rate in 2015

2015 saw Niger and Cameroon among the ten countries with the most deaths from terrorism for the first time.

- Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria accounted for 72% of all terrorist deaths.
- Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan had at least a 30% decline over 2014.
- Afghanistan rose 18% from 4,507 to 5,312.
- ISIS, Boko Haram, and Taliban accounted for 55% of deaths in 2015.
- ISIS killed 6,141 in 2015, or an average of 6.7 deaths per attack, 62% of deaths in Iraq even with 37% unknown.
- Boko Haram killed 5,478, some 75% in Nigeria. Average of 11 per attack.
- Taliban killed 4,502, 18% above 2014, and average of 4 deaths per attack.

Key Perpetrators
Far too much U.S. attention now focuses on ISIS, and primarily on the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. There is no question that ISIS and Al Qaida are major threats, although ISIS lost much of the territory in its so-called "caliphate" in Iraq and Syria, and Al Qaida's direct impact was relatively limited aside from its branch in Yemen. But there are many other terrorist organizations. For example, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab also carried out extremely violent attacks with high levels of casualties, and the data show that ISIS is only a limited part of the overall threat and source of terrorist activity. Any lasting success against terrorism requires a strategy that deals with the full range of perpetrators and causes, not one organization.

At the same time, the START database provides a key caveat as to how little is known about the perpetrator in many cases:

*Information about perpetrators was reported in source materials for 52% of terrorist attacks in 2016.* A total of 334 groups and organizations were identified as perpetrators of terrorist attacks, compared to 288 in 2015. This includes approximately 100 groups and organizations that had not previously been identified as perpetrators in the Global Terrorism Database.

This caveat reflects a key problem in analyzing the patterns of terrorism that goes far beyond the usual problem of agreeing on definitions, and extends to virtually every other aspect of open source reporting on terrorism. The data presented throughout this report reflect serious uncertainties in estimates of numbers of attacks, targets, methods of attack, and casualties.

The START data that do reflect identified perpetrators show that in 2016, 19% of the incidents were carried out by ISIS and 13% by the Taliban, and that these perpetrators vastly dominated the estimated number of deaths and injuries. This may reflect the fact that ISIS and Taliban attacks are much better documented, but may also reflect the fact that some terrorist groups are far more violent than others. This report consistently shows that the number of attacks often does not correlate to the reported level of violence and civilian casualties.
The START and IHS Jane's data differ sharply in key estimates and show how difficult it can be to establish databases that offer suitable comparability and confidence. START counts 1,133 incidents for ISIS in 2016, and IHS Jane's counts 4,236, a number close to four times higher. Similarly, START counts 848 incidents for ISIS in 2016, and IHS Jane's counts 533, a number nearly 40% lower. Four of the top five perpetrators in the IHS Jane's list are not on the START list of the top five perpetrators.

One key trend affecting ISIS is that START finds that,

...the geographic reach of attacks by ISIS and its affiliates continued to grow in 2016. The number of attacks attributed to ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

It should be noted, however, that the key focus of this growth in ISIS occurred largely in Muslim countries, or with large Muslim populations. Like Al Qaida, all of ISIS's major affiliates are movements seeking to achieve power over fellow Muslims, only conduct sporadic operations against the West, and are not driven by some form of "clash of civilizations."
### Five perpetrator groups with the most attacks worldwide, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>9114</td>
<td>6178</td>
<td>7671</td>
<td>6608</td>
<td>8379</td>
<td>4805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>3615</td>
<td>4535</td>
<td>3572</td>
<td>4758</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists/Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houthi Extremists</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes perpetrators
** Excludes attacks attributed to branches of ISIS or ISIS-inspired individuals

Source: START Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017, p. 15
## IHS Jane's Top 10 Perpetrators in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Attack Numbers</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State</td>
<td>4,236</td>
<td>Attacks increased 28% over 2015. 84% were in Syria and Iraq versus 92% in 2015, reflecting expansion of affiliates and &quot;lone wolf&quot; attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk Peoples Republic</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>Pro-Russian Separatist Group in Ukraine. Six-fold increase in attacks over 2015. Centered in Donetsk and Luhansk. 124 fatalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk Peoples Republic</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>Pro-Russian Separatist Group in Ukraine. More than twice the level of attacks in 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabat Fatah al Sham (Al Nusra)</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>Operates in Syria. Changed names after split (?) with Al Qaida in July 2016. 20% increase in attacks over 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Allah</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>Houthi group in Yemen. Almost double attacks over 2015. 20% of attacks in Saudi. Used anti-ship missiles in Bab el Mandab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiwatt Suriyya al-Dimogratiyyya (QSD)</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>The Syrian Democratic Forces are a U.S. backed coalition led by the Kurdish Yekineyen Parastina Gel which has separately carried out 110 attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>Taliban attacks rose by 15 in 2016. It has failed to take provincial capitals, but steadily expanded its influence in other areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahideen</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>Operates in Somalia. A 64% increase in attacks in 2016. Many mass casualty attacks using vehicles in populated areas like Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPHM)</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>5% increase in attacks in 2016 (14% overall increase in India). Largely focused on attacks on security forces,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016,
Information about perpetrators was reported in source materials for 52% of terrorist attacks in 2016. A total of 334 groups and organizations were identified as perpetrators of terrorist attacks, compared to 288 in 2015. This includes approximately 100 groups and organizations that had not previously been identified as perpetrators in the Global Terrorism Database.

In 35% of the attacks for which there was information about perpetrator groups, an organization explicitly claimed responsibility. For the remaining attacks, source documents attributed responsibility to a particular group or groups based on reports from authorities or observers.

Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported in 2016, 19% were carried out by ISIS. (Note: Attacks attributed to ISIS in the Statistical Annex dataset exclude those attributed to specific declared branches of ISIS such as those operating in Egypt, Libya, and West Africa. They also do not include attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals who might have been inspired by ISIS.) Additionally, 13% of attacks in 2016 were carried out by the Taliban.

ISIS (+17%) and al-Shabaab (+47%) carried out more terrorist attacks in 2016 than they did in 2015, However, while al-Shabaab’s lethality decreased (11% fewer total deaths in 2016), the total number of deaths caused by ISIS increased 48% and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by ISIS increased 75% in 2016, compared to 2015.

Terrorist violence by Maoist extremists in India remained fairly consistent between 2015 and 2016 with respect to the number of attacks, the number of deaths, and the number of people injured. However the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by Maoist extremists in India decreased 76%.

In contrast, the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the Taliban in 2016 decreased 23% compared to 2015, and the total number of deaths caused by the Taliban’s terrorist attacks decreased 20%. Likewise, the number of attacks carried out by Houthi extremists decreased 9%, and there was a dramatic decrease in the casualties caused by terrorist attacks attributed to Houthi extremists: total deaths declined 62%, total injuries declined 67%, and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage declined 65% between 2015 and 2016.

Note, however, that terrorist attacks by Houthi extremists increased in Saudi Arabia in 2016. There were 56 attacks carried out by Houthi extremists in Saudi Arabia, compared to nine in 2015. The majority of these attacks (80%) involve explosive projectiles (e.g., rockets, mortars) fired at civilian and military targets.

While ISIS was responsible for 19% fewer terrorist attacks in Syria (122 in 2016 compared to 150 in 2015), the number of attacks carried out by ISIS in Iraq increased by 20% (932 in 2016 compared to 775 in 2015). The lethality of these attacks increased 69% (7,338 total deaths in 2016, compared to 4,341 in 2015).

Furthermore, the geographic reach of attacks by ISIS and its affiliates continued to grow in 2016. The number of attacks attributed to ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
Perpetrators of Suicide and Vehicle Bombings

Five perpetrator groups responsible for most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 - 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Suicide Bombings</th>
<th>Vehicle Bombings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>Percent of Global Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>1,184</td>
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<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Erin Miller and Michael Distler, *Mass Casualty Explosives Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan*, START Background Report, University of Maryland, June 2017, and
Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.

Battle-Related Deaths by Terrorist Group

ISIL and the Taliban account for the majority of battle related deaths.

Source: UCDP Battle Related Deaths, IEP calculations
Increases and Decreases in Deaths by Country: 2014-2015

Iraq and Nigeria had the largest reductions in deaths from terrorism from 2014 to 2015, with both countries recording more than 2,500 fewer deaths last year.

Three countries had an increase of more than 800 deaths: Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.

Niger had the largest increase in deaths from terrorism last year, due to increased activity by Boko Haram.

Terrorism in North America and the U.S.
This section provides summary data on terrorism in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The START data reflect only minor terrorist activity in Canada and Mexico, and relatively low levels of terrorist activity in the U.S. after a major peak in terrorism in the U.S. in the 1970s – driven largely by the Vietnam War, racial tensions, and right wing extremist activity. After that period, terrorism created a minor actuarial risk until 2001 with a sudden peak caused by the 9/11 attacks.

It shows that terrorism has remained a minor cause of actuarial risk to life, and damage to facilities and the economy, in all three countries since 2001, and the number of incidents was far higher in the U.S. in the 1970s. At the same time, recent acts of terrorism have had great political impact in the U.S. and has been driven in part by Islamic extremism – although almost always by native born or immigrant U.S. citizens and not by non-citizens or the direct action of terrorist organizations.

Once again, recent estimates of the levels of incidents/attacks differ. The IHS Jane’s data show much higher levels of current terrorist activity. START shows 63 incidents in North America in 2015 and IHS Jane’s reports 678 attacks. START shows 72 incidents in 2015 and IHS Jane’s reports 428 attacks.

There is less difference over the recent causes of terrorism. A range of sources show that right wing and Jihadist movements have been the main source of attacks and casualties in recent years. Jihadist casualties dominate if one includes the “9/11” attacks in 2001, but right wing attacks dominate from 2002 onwards. Contrary to some fears, a range of sources show that native born Americans, and immigrants who have become full citizens – not outside visitors or refugees – have made up virtually all of the attackers since 2011.

The NCTC and FBI no longer provide annual public reports on terrorism in the United States. Unlike the annual reports issued by the EU and Europol, there are no data on the religious, racial, and ethnic nature of perpetrators and targets, whether or not they are citizens or native born, the number of arrests, the number of convictions, and the number of attacks prevented.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) ceased to provide a detailed analysis of total homeland defense spending in 2017, and the last special analytic annex to the budget covering such spending was issues with the President’s FY2016 budget request and does not reflect Congressional action on the FY2016 budget.

The FBI does, however, provide an excellent annual report on Hate Crimes. Some European countries class these as terrorist attacks, and there is little practical distinction between terrorism and violent hate crimes. The latest FBI report on hate crimes in the U.S. covers hate crimes in 2015, and shows that:

- There were 5,818 single-bias incidents involving 7,121 victims. Of those victims, 59.2 percent were targeted because of a race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 19.7 percent because of a religious bias; 17.7 percent because of a sexual orientation bias; 1.7 percent because of a gender identity bias; 1.2 percent because of a disability bias; and 0.4 percent because of a gender bias.

- There were an additional 32 multiple-bias incidents that involved another 52 victims.

- Of the 4,482 hate crime offenses classified as crimes against persons, intimidation accounted for 41.3 percent of those offenses, while 37.8 percent involved simple assault, and 19.7 percent involved aggravated assault.

- There were 2,338 hate crime offenses classified as crimes against property, and the majority of those (72.6 percent) were acts of destruction/damage/vandalism.

- During 2015, most reported hate crime incidents (31.5 percent) happened in or near residences or homes.

- Of the 5,493 known offenders, 48.4 percent were white, 24.3 percent were black or African-American, and race was unknown for 16.2 percent of the offenders. The rest were of various other races.

The FBI analysis also reports that:

- 59.2 percent of the 7,123 victims were targeted because of the offenders’ bias against race/ethnicity/ancestry.

- 19.7 percent were victimized because of bias against religion.
• 18 persons were murdered and 13 were raped. (Concerning rape, data for 12 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program’s revised definition; 1 rape was submitted under the legacy definition).

• 41.3 percent of the victims were intimidated.

• 37.8 percent were victims of simple assault.

• 19.7 percent were victims of aggravated assault.

• 0.4 percent (30 individuals) were victims of gender bias.

Here it is important to point out that the START database on terrorism reported a total of 38 incidents of

In contrast, criminal acts of racism still present a major challenge in U.S. society. They make up more than 59 percent of all "single bias" hate crimes—over 3,440 incidents, and single bias crimes are the most clearly identifiable of the 5,850 criminal incidents and 6,885 related offenses that were motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or gender identity. These totals only involve reported incidents, and reporting on hate crimes is far less comprehensive than terrorist attacks—all of which get massive media attention.

Religion was the second greatest cause of hate crimes — 59.2 percent were targeted because of a race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 19.7 percent because of a religious bias; and 17.7 percent because of a sexual orientation bias. These three causes alone led to the targeting of 96.6 percent of "single bias" hate crimes.

The worst terrorist attacks did have more serious human consequences in terms of fatalities than hate crimes. They killed a total of 44 persons in 2015 and injured 52 others—a total of 96 victims inside the United States. START also estimates that 16 of the 52 incidents had some form of religious motive.

Hate caused far more injuries, however, than terrorism. The FBI reports that 4,482 victims of hate crimes were victims of crimes against persons in 2015. The FBI summarizes these victims, and the crimes committed against them, as follows:
• 18 persons were murdered and 13 were raped. (Concerning rape, data for 12 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program’s revised definition; 1 rape was submitted under the legacy definition).

• 41.3 percent of the victims were intimidated.

• 37.8 percent were victims of simple assault.

• 19.7 percent were victims of aggravated assault.

• 0.4 percent (20) were victims of other types of offenses, which are collected only in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

If one compares the total victims from terrorism to the number of victims from hate crimes, 96 victims — including 44 murders — have to be compared to 7,121 victims of hate crimes, and 2,608 of these victims suffered from physical crimes against persons ranging from simple assault to murder. A total of 883 of this total suffered from aggravated assault, and there were 18 murders and 13 rapes.
North America
North America - Attacks

2011-2016: 251 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Incidents in Canada, Mexico, and United States: 1970-2016

2011-2016
251 Incidents

1970-2016
3,346 Incidents

North America - 2016
72 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
## IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – United States, Canada, Mexico, Dominican Republic

### United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
Islamic State

### Canada

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**

### Mexico

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**

### Dominican Republic

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**

---

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
United States
United States - Attacks

1970-2016: 2,758 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
United States – Attacks 2011-2016

175 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
United States – Casualties: 2011-2016
175 Incidents

Total Casualties

Deaths

175 Incidents

Fatalities Per Incident

Injured Per Incident

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
United States – Attack Type: 2011-2016
175 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
United States – Weapons Type: 2011-2016
175 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,

1,635 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

2,593 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=217&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3
United States – Target Type: 2011-2016
175 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
U.S.: Causes of Terrorist Attacks: Jihadist vs. Non Jihadist, Foreign or Domestic

Terrorism Related Cases: 2001-2016

Citizenship Status at Time of Charge or Death

- Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.

85% Citizens and Permanent Residents
15% Non-residents and Unknown

Jihadist vs. Non-Jihadist Sources of Terrorism in the U.S. Through 2016, Less 9/11: New America Foundation - II

Of the thirteen lethal jihadist terrorists in the United States since 9/11:

- three are African-Americans
- three are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan
- one was born in Kuwait to Palestinian-Jordanian parents
- one is a White convert born in Texas.
- two came from Russia as children
- one emigrated from Egypt and conducted his attack a decade after coming to the United States
- and one each had families that originally came from Kuwait and Afghanistan

In the fifteen years after 9/11, jihadists have killed 95 people inside the United States.
Where America’s Terrorists Come From: January 2017

• Nationals of the seven countries singled out by Trump have killed zero people in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and 2015...Zero.

• Six Iranians, six Sudanese, two Somalis, two Iraqis, and one Yemeni have been convicted of attempting or executing terrorist attacks on U.S. soil during that time period... which presumably Trump cares most about, rather than other terrorism-related offenses, like supporting a foreign terrorist group or trying to join a jihadist organization overseas.) Zero Libyans and zero Syrians have been convicted of doing the same.

• Over the last four decades, 20 out of 3.25 million refugees welcomed to the United States have been convicted of attempting or committing terrorism on U.S. soil, and only three Americans have been killed in attacks committed by refugees—all by Cuban refugees in the 1970s...Zero Americans have been killed by Syrian refugees in a terrorist attack in the United States.

• The 9/11 attacks were carried out by 19 men—from Saudi Arabia (15), the United Arab Emirates (2), Egypt (1), and Lebanon (1).

• “[E]very jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal resident,” New America reports. During that time period, more than 80 percent of individuals who were charged with or died engaging in jihadist terrorism or related activities inside the United States have been U.S. citizens or permanent residents (the tally also includes Americans accused of engaging in such activity abroad). Many have been second-generation immigrants...

• The 9/11 attackers entered the United States using various types of visas. But between then and 2015, “among attackers claiming or appearing to be motivated by extremist Islam, only one would have needed a visa to enter the United States at the time of the attack,”

Impact of Foreign Born Domestic Terrorists: CATO, September 2016

- 74 percent of all foreign-born terrorists did not murder anyone.
- Foreigners, whether as immigrants or those in the country temporarily, are disproportionately responsible for killing people in terrorist attacks.
- 88 percent of all Americans killed on U.S. soil in terrorist attacks were killed by foreign-born terrorists.
- From 1975 to the end of 2015, 3,024 people were murdered in terrorist attacks. Of the 154 foreign-born terrorists, only forty are responsible for all of those murders while the other 114 failed to kill anyone or their plots were foiled by law enforcement and they were subsequently convicted of terrorism charges.
- About 98.6 percent of the victims, 2,983, were murdered on 9/11. The high death toll and dramatic nature of that attack naturally dominates our thinking on terrorism. But 9/11 also sticks in our mind because it was a one of a kind. September 11 was about ten times as deadly as the next deadliest confirmed attack...The other attacks on U.S. soil are all much smaller.
- A total of twenty-four of the forty-one victims killed in other terrorist attacks were murdered after 9/11 while seventeen were murdered in the years before the attacks.
- During the time period studied in Cato’s report, more than 1.13 billion foreigners entered the United States legally or illegally. Thus, 7.4 million foreigners entered the United States for every single terrorist—including those who were unsuccessful in carrying out their attacks. Over twenty-eight million foreigners entered for each successful terrorist who actually managed to kill somebody in a domestic terrorist attack.
- The chance of being murdered in a terrorist attack committed by a foreigner on U.S. soil is one in 3.6 million a year.
- The annual chance of being killed in a terrorist attack committed by refugees is one in 3.6 billion. Eighteen of the nineteen hijackers on 9/11 entered the United States on tourist (B) visas. They account for 93.7 percent of all deaths by foreign-born terrorism. However, almost 658 million tourists entered on B visas during the time period.

Terrorism versus Hate Crimes: FBI 2016 Report - I

The is little practical distinction between terrorism and violent hate crimes. The latest FBI report on hate crimes in the U.S. covers hate crimes in 2015, and shows that:

- There were 5,818 single-bias incidents involving 7,121 victims. Of those victims, 59.2 percent were targeted because of a race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 19.7 percent because of a religious bias; 17.7 percent because of a sexual orientation bias; 1.7 percent because of a gender identity bias; 1.2 percent because of a disability bias; and 0.4 percent because of a gender bias.
- There were an additional 32 multiple-bias incidents that involved another 52 victims.
- Of the 4,482 hate crime offenses classified as crimes against persons, intimidation accounted for 41.3 percent of those offenses, while 37.8 percent involved simple assault, and 19.7 percent involved aggravated assault.
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- During 2015, most reported hate crime incidents (31.5 percent) happened in or near residences or homes.
- Of the 5,493 known offenders, 48.4 percent were white, 24.3 percent were black or African-American, and race was unknown for 16.2 percent of the offenders. The rest were of various other races.

The FBI analysis also reports that:

- 59.2 percent of the 7,123 victims were targeted because of the offenders’ bias against race/ethnicity/ancestry.
- 19.7 percent were victimized because of bias against religion.
- 17.7 percent were targeted because of bias against sexual orientation.
- 1.7 percent were victims of gender-identity bias.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) ceased to provide a detailed analysis of total homeland defense spending in 2017, and the last special analytic annex to the budget covering such spending was issues with the President’s FY2016 budget request and does not reflect Congressional action on the FY2016 budget.

The FBI does, however, provide an excellent report on hate crimes in the U.S., which some other sources group or partially include in their totals for terrorism. The most recent such FBI report covers hate crimes in 2015. If its data are compared to those in the START data base on terrorism, they shows that the START database on terrorism reported a total of 38 incidents of terrorism in the U.S. in 2015. START reported that 16 of these 38 attacks had some connection to religion, but did not specify the faith involved.

In contrast, criminal acts of racism still present a major challenge in U.S. society. They make up more than 59 percent of all "single bias" hate crimes—over 3,440 incidents, and single bias crimes are the most clearly identifiable of the 5,850 criminal incidents and 6,885 related offenses that were motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or gender identity. These totals only involve reported incidents, and reporting on hate crimes is far less comprehensive than terrorist attacks—all of which get massive media attention.

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The worst terrorist attacks did have more serious human consequences in terms of fatalities than hate crimes. They killed a total of 44 persons in 2015 and injured 52 others—a total of 96 victims inside the United States. START also estimates that 16 of the 52 incidents had some form of religious motive.

Hate caused far more injuries, however, than terrorism. The FBI reports that 4,482 victims of hate crimes were victims of crimes against persons in 2015. The FBI summarizes these victims, and the crimes committed against them, as follows:

- 18 persons were murdered and 11 were raped. (Concerning rape, data for 12 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program's revised definition, 1 rape was submitted under the legacy definition).
- 41.9 percent of the victims were white.

37.8 percent were victims of simple assault.
● 19.7 percent were victims of aggravated assault.
● 0.4 percent (20) were victims of other types of offenses, which are collected only in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

If one compares the total victims from terrorism to the number of victims from hate crimes, 96 victims — including 44 murders — have to be compared to 7,121 victims of hate crimes, and 2,608 of these victims suffered from physical crimes against persons ranging from simple assault to murder. A total of 883 of this total suffered from aggravated assault, and there were 18 murders and 13 rapes.

Two decades of casualties reveal the extreme ideologies that threaten American lives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deaths and Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>3,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right wing</td>
<td>981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Issue</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Unknown</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A handful of high-profile incidents dominate the casualty figures.

Violent extremists in America are mostly U.S. citizens.

- U.S.-born citizen
- Naturalized citizen
- Legal resident
- Unknown father
- Refugee
- Illegal resident
- Temporary visa

Terrorist incidents are actually in decline, but beware the next 9/11.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, nearly twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment fanatics and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims:

- 48 have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim, including the recent mass killing in Charleston, S.C., compared with 26 by self-proclaimed jihadists.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, nearly twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment fanatics and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims:

- 48 have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim, including the recent mass killing in Charleston, S.C., compared with 26 by self-proclaimed jihadists, according to a count by New America, a Washington research center.

In the last five years, the odds of an American being killed in a terrorist attack have been about 1 in 20 million (that's including both domestic attacks and overseas attacks).
U.S.: Actuarial and Perceived Risk of Terrorist Attack vs. Domestic Cost of Counterterrorism
Panic vs. Policy: Comparative Actuarial Risk Posed by Terrorism in the U.S.

During 2005-2015, jihadists killed 94 people in the U.S. and 301,797 were shot dead (3,211:1)

Dave Mosher and Skye Gould,
“How likely are foreign terrorists to kill Americans? The odds may surprise you,” Business Insider, Jan. 31, 2017, 9:36 PM
Keeping Terrorism in Perspective: 42,773 Suicides vs. 18 killed and 6 Injured from Terrorism in 2014

The time-adjusted actuarial risk indicates Americans are more than 467 times more likely to kill themselves than be killed by terrorists.

In 2014, 42,773 Americans killed themselves according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Half did so with guns. That’s not only more than the number of Americans who were killed in mass shootings, it’s more than the number of people who were killed with guns in homicides and accidents combined.

The belief that overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism is held by 47% of the public, but an equal number says relying on that strategy too much creates hatred that leads to more terrorism. The partisan gap on this question is wide: 70% of Republicans say military force is the best approach, while 65% of Democrats take the opposite view. The gap is even bigger between conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.

Source: Key findings on how Americans view the U.S. role in the world, May 5, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/05/key-findings-on-how-americans-view-the-u-s-role-in-the-world/
The Annual Federal Cost of Domestic Counter Terrorism in the United States: $36 Billion and Counting
(OMB Estimate for Federal costs only less DoD, in FY2017 Budget Request)

Table 22-2. PREVENT AND DISRUPT TERRORIST ATTACKS
(Budget Authority in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>FY2015 Actual</th>
<th>FY2015 Supplemental</th>
<th>FY2016 Enacted</th>
<th>FY2017 Request</th>
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<td>191.0</td>
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<td>28,191.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total, Prevent and Disrupt Terrorist Attacks</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,387.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,639.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,590.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total, Homeland Security Budget Authority | 71,759.8 | 1,088.1 | 71,679.3 | 70,468.3 |
| Less Department of Defense             | -12,363.0 | -181.8  | -13,708.3 | -13,541.9 |
| **Non-Defense Homeland Security BA**   | 59,396.8 | 906.3   | 57,971.1 | 56,926.5 |
| Less Discretionary Fee-Funded Homeland Security Programs | -7,764.5 | -9.8 | -8,605.2 | -5,209.1 |
| Less Mandatory Homeland Security Programs | -8,067.4 | 0.0 | -4,152.8 | -1,325.2 |
| **Net Non-Defense Discretionary Homeland Security BA** | **43,544.9** | **896.5** | **45,213.1** | **50,392.1** |

* Funding decreases in the Department of Commerce from FY 2015 to FY 2017 reflect the non-recurring of authority to build a nationwide interoperable public safety broadband network for first responders and related programs.

** DOD homeland security funding for all years prior to 2017 reflects a revised calculation methodology (see Data Collection Methodology and Adjustments, including the Department of Defense).

Terrorism in Europe
This section provides summary data on the trends in Western and Eastern Europe. It includes the START and IHS Jane’s data presented in other parts of the report, but also includes data from the one useful current official source on terrorism in the world that presents declassified official data. This is the annual report on terrorism which is issued by Europol and the EU.

If one looks at the START data on the total for Western and Eastern Europe, which includes Russia, the impact of terrorism peaks in the 1970s. It rises again in 1991, driven by terrorist attacks in the Balkans, Palestinian violence, and terrorism in the FSU and Russia. It then peaks for a third time in 2014-2015, driven by both violent Islamist extremism and terrorist activity in the Ukraine.

START reporting on the patterns in Western Europe shows a rise in incidents after 2010, driven largely by violent Islamist extremism and the influence and actions of ISIS, that reached new peaks in 2015-2016. Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK were key targets of such attacks. Turkey was a key center of terrorist attacks because of political unrest and Kurdish separatism in the late 1970s, late 1980s to mid-1990s, and then again from mid-2015 onwards.

Once again, the report shows that the IHS Jane's data provide a very different set of estimates. It should be stressed that this would be the same with any of the estimates based on the creation of a separate data base and set of sources. The use of open source material also imposes major additional limits on what any analytic effort can do.

The Europol/EU data provide key insights into the correlation between terrorism and counterterrorist activity lacking in other regions of the world. It also clearly distinguishes between Islamist extremist violence and other forms of terrorism:

- In 2016 a total of 142 failed, foiled, and completed attacks were reported by eight Member States. More than half (76) of them were by the UK2. France reported 23 attacks, Italy 17, Spain 10, Greece 6, Germany 5, Belgium 4, and Netherlands 1.
• Of the 142 attacks, less than half (47) were completed. Member States reported that 142 victims died because of terrorist attacks and 379 people were injured.

• Nearly all reported fatalities and most of the casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks. The total number of 142 attacks is a continuation of a downward trend that started in 2014 when there were 226 attacks, followed by 211 in 2015.

• The largest number of attacks in which the terrorist affiliation could be identified were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been on the rise since 2014; they reached a total of 27 in 2016, of which most (16) were reported by Italy.

• The number of jihadist terrorist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016, of which 6 were linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS). However, a precise ranking amongst and within terrorist affiliations across the EU cannot be established because the UK does not provide disaggregated data on attacks.

• Explosives were used in 40% of the attacks, with similar numbers to 2015.

• The use of firearms dropped considerably from 57 in 2015 to 6 in 2016.

• Apart from jihadist, ethno-nationalist and left-wing extremist attacks, an increasing stream of violent assaults by right-wing extremist individuals and groups was noted across Europe, in particular over the past two years, targeting asylum seekers and ethnic minorities in general.

• These assaults however do not generally qualify as terrorism and are therefore not included in the numbers of terrorist attacks being reported by Member States, with only one exception in 2016, reported by the Netherlands.

• Most arrests were related to jihadist terrorism, for which the numbers rose for the third consecutive year: 395 in 2014, 687 in 2015 and 718 in 2016.

• Numbers of arrests for left-wing and separatist terrorist offences dropped to half of what they were in 2015 (from 67 and 168 in 2015 to 31 and 84 in 2016 respectively).

• Numbers of arrests for rightwing terrorism remained low at 12 in 2016, compared to 11 in 2015.
• France is the only Member State in which the overall numbers of arrests continue to increase: from 238 in 2014, to 424 in 2015, and to 456 in 2016.

• Almost one-third of arrestees (291) were 25 years old or younger. Only one in ten arrestees (9%) in 2016 was older than 40 years.

• Arrests for terrorist activities (preparing, financing, assisting, attempting, or executing attacks) decreased from 209 in 2015 to 169 in 2016.

• Arrests for travelling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes also decreased: from 141 in 2015 to 77 in 2016. This was similar to the decrease in numbers of arrests of people returning from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq: from 41 in 2015 to 22 in 2016.

The Europol/EU report also provides a detailed summary analysis of the patterns in Islamist attacks lacking in the public reporting by all other countries and regions:

...The threat of jihadist terrorism is not perceived equally amongst Member States, of which the majority have not been confronted with jihadist terrorist activities at all in 2016, nor in one of the preceding years. These countries might be used for transiting of foreign terrorist fighters, (potential) jihadists or returnees, or unintentionally providing for a safe haven for them. These and other factors, however, including perceived insults to Islam, may influence potential risks. Switzerland for instance, not being an EU Member State and not being part of a coalition against IS, is aware of its vulnerability to jihadist terrorism by association with other Western countries and its international profile.

...As military pressure on IS increased and measures to prevent potential recruits from reaching IS-controlled territory became more effective, IS adapted its recruitment tactics. It now declared that perpetrating a terrorist attack in the West was even preferable to travelling to join IS.

The increased efforts to incite IS sympathizers in the West to perpetrate attacks were reflected in practical guidance for lone actor attacks provided in IS publications. The IS multi-language magazine Rumiyah18 contained a series of articles under the title “Just Terror Tactics”, which suggested terrorist attacks using knives, vehicles or arson, and gave tips on how to maximize the numbers of victims and impact. Perpetrators were admonished to leave some kind of evidence stating the motivation of the attack and allegiance to IS, such as a note attached to the victim’s body or a last will.
In 2016 IS preferred to claim lone actor attacks through its A’maq News Agency...The increased efforts by IS to directly recruit vulnerable people via social media and incite them to perpetrate terrorist acts in their country of residence, seem to not be limited to male targets.

...In 2012, already before the emergence of IS, al-Qaeda had redesigned its strategy to ensure its survival under the changed political circumstances following the Arab rebellions: al-Qaeda would merge with the population to the extent possible; cooperate with other Muslim groups based on common interests; and administer territories that fell under its control in a way so as not to alienate the population. The aim was to create safe havens from which al-Qaeda could plan and execute attacks on Western targets. The intransigent behavior of IS toward local populations made the implementation of this new strategy even more pressing for al-Qaeda in an effort to mark the difference to its opponent.

The data on Russia and the Ukraine show exceptionally sharp peaks and valleys in the number of incidents and attacks and their consequences. They highlight yet another area where there is no reporting on state terrorism, although Russia has clearly supported such movements in the Ukraine. There also is no clear separation of terrorism from insurgent activity, although the data on weapon type clearly reflect the impact of warfighting.

Once again, striking differences exist between the START and IHS Jane’s counts – differences illustrated in the examples in the tables for Russia and the Ukraine.
Western and Eastern Europe

Western and Eastern Europe: 2011-2016
(START Database Includes FSU Countries in Eastern Europe)
3,673 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Incidents in Western and East Europe: 1970-2016

2011-2016
3,673 Incidents

1970-2016
21,338 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Western Europe
Incidents in Western Europe: 1970-2016

2011-2016
1,356 Incidents

1970-2016
16,307 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Highly Violent Incidents in Western Europe: 1970-2016

9,854 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

15,130 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=8&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3
Western Europe: 2011-2016

1,356 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
ISIS/ISIL Attacks in Western Europe: 2011-2016

13 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Western Europe – Attack Type: 2011-2016

1,356 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Western Europe – Target Type Type: 2011-2016

1,356 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Western Europe – Weapon Type Type: 2011-2016

1,356 Incidents
Western Europe – Casualties: 2011-2016

1,356 Incidents

Fatalities Per Incident

Injuries Per Incident

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Western Europe – Casualties: 2011-2016

Fatalities Per Incident

Injured Per Incident

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Western Europe by Key Target Country: 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
West Europe Incidents by Key Target Country: 2011-2016

Belgium – 9 Incidents
France – 161 Incidents
Germany – 130 Incidents
UK – 559 Incidents

Source: START Database,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
# IHS Jane’s Estimate by European Country: 2015-2016

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Source: IHS Jane’s, 2016 Global Attack Index, Interactive Infographic 3, accessed June 22, 2017 (https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox)
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – United States, Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom

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Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
## IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Turkey, Ireland, Italy, Spain

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Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Turkey Incidents: 1970-2016

1970-2016 – 4,106 Incidents

2011-2016 – 1,337 Incidents

Source: START Data Base, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
EU and Europol
In 2016 a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks were reported by eight Member States. More than half (76) of them were by the UK. France reported 23 attacks, Italy 17, Spain 10, Greece 6, Germany 5, Belgium 4 and Netherlands 1.

Of the 142 attacks, less than half (47) were completed. Member States reported that 142 victims died as a result of terrorist attacks and 379 people were injured.

Nearly all reported fatalities and most of the casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks. The total number of 142 attacks is a continuation of a downward trend that started in 2014 when there were 226 attacks, followed by 211 in 2015.

The largest number of attacks in which the terrorist affiliation could be identified were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been on the rise since 2014; they reached a total of 27 in 2016, of which most (16) were reported by Italy.

The number of jihadist terrorist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016, of which 6 were linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS). However, a precise ranking amongst and within terrorist affiliations across the EU cannot be established because the UK does not provide disaggregated data on attacks.

Explosives were used in 40% of the attacks, with similar numbers to 2015.

The use of firearms dropped considerably from 57 in 2015 to 6 in 2016.

Apart from jihadist, ethno-nationalist and left-wing extremist attacks, an increasing stream of violent assaults by right-wing extremist individuals and groups was noted across Europe, in particular over the past two years, targeting asylum seekers and ethnic minorities in general.

These assaults however do not generally qualify as terrorism and are therefore not included in the numbers of terrorist attacks being reported by Member States, with only one exception in 2016, reported by the Netherlands.

The number of arrests for terrorist offences in 2016 (1002) is lower than that of 2015 (1077).

Most arrests were related to jihadist terrorism, for which the numbers rose for the third consecutive year: 395 in 2014, 687 in 2015 and 718 in 2016.

Numbers of arrests for left-wing and separatist terrorist offences dropped to half of what they were in 2015 (from 67 and 168 in 2015 to 31 and 84 in 2016 respectively).

Numbers of arrests for rightwing terrorism remained low at 12 in 2016 compared to 11 in 2015.

France is the only Member State in which the overall numbers of arrests continue to increase: from 238 in 2014, to 424 in 2015 and to 456 in 2016.

Almost one-third of arrestees (291) were 25 years old or younger. Only one in ten arrestees (9%) in 2016 was older than 40 years.

Arrests for terrorist activities (preparing, financing, assisting, attempting or executing attacks) decreased from 209 in 2015 to 169 in 2016.

Arrests for travelling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes also decreased: from 141 in 2015 to 77 in 2016. This was similar to the decrease in numbers of arrests of people returning from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq: from 41 in 2015 to 22 in 2016.
Total Attacks and Arrests by Europol Member Country in 2014-2016

Declining Attacks and Rising Arrests in 2014-2016

Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects 2014 to 2016.

In 2016, 142 terrorist attacks occurred in eight Member States.

The United Kingdom reported more than half of the total number of attacks (76). The total number of terrorist attacks dropped by 33% in 2016 (142) compared to 2015 (211). 379 casualties and 142 fatalities were reported as a result of terrorist attacks.

For the majority of the attacks the affiliation was separatism (99).
Italy, Greece and Spain together reported 27 terrorist attacks by left-wing and anarchist groups. Despite the continued decrease of the total number of attacks, the number of attacks by anarchist and left-wing groups, increased by more than 100% (from 13 in 2015 to 27 attacks in 2016).

The countries reporting terrorist attacks linked to separatist terrorism are the UK (76), France (18) and Spain (5).

The 13 attacks classified as religiously-inspired terrorism were reported by France (5), Belgium (4) and Germany (4).

This category is the one causing the most casualties (374 out of 379) and 135 out of 142 fatalities.

The Netherlands reported one right-wing terrorist attack.

No attack related to single-issue terrorism was reported in 2016.

Attacks in which firearms were used dropped from 57 in 2015 to 6 in 2016.
### Jihadist vs. Total Arrests by Affiliation by EU Country: 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Jihadist</th>
<th>Left-wing</th>
<th>Right-wing</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Single issue</th>
<th>Not specified</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>149</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>718</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Map of Jihadist Arrests by EU Country: 2016

Trend in Jihadist Arrests: 2012-2016

Broad Patterns in Jihadist Attacks in 2016 - I

- In 2016, 135 people were killed in jihadist terrorist attacks in the EU.
- In total 13 terrorist attacks were reported: France 5, Belgium 4 and Germany 4. Out of these 13 attacks, 10 were completed.
- A total of 718 people were arrested on suspicion of jihadist terrorism related offences.
- Numbers of arrests increased in particular in France: from 188 in 2014 and 377 in 2015 to 429 in 2016. There was also an increase in the Netherlands to 36 in 2016 compared to 20 in 2015. In the other Member States the numbers of arrests stayed at approximately the same level, or showed a (slight) decrease.
- Women have increasingly assumed more operational roles in jihadist terrorism activities, as have minors and young adults, as demonstrated in recent (primarily) failed and foiled attacks in Member States.
- One in four (26%) of the arrestees in 2016 were women, a significant increase compared to 2015 (18%).
- Attack planning against the West continues in Syria and Iraq. Groups including IS and al-Qaeda are believed to have both the intent and capabilities to mount complex, mass casualty attacks.
- IS is training operatives in Syria/Iraq to carry out terrorist acts in the West and has no shortage of volunteers to be part of teams to be sent abroad for this purpose.
- Al-Qaeda, despite decreased operational capabilities of its core organization, has maintained its ambition to carry out large-scale operations against Western targets.
- The terrorist threat in the EU in 2016 emanated from remotely directed individuals operating alone or in small groups, and those that may have been inspired by terrorist propaganda, but not directed. The former are receiving direction and personal instruction from, and are possibly being facilitated by, a terrorist organization.
- The latter are individual attackers, possibly but not necessarily being helped by family and/ or friends as accomplices. They are inspired by jihadist propaganda and messaging, but not necessarily receiving personal direction or instruction from any group.

Broad Patterns in Jihadist Attacks in 2016 - II

- Apart from completed attacks there were a number of failed and foiled terrorist attacks and arrests on suspicion of terrorist activities. Two plots that could have had a significant impact in terms of loss of life if they had not been stopped in time ... One was thwarted in France, the other in Germany.

- In 2016 EU citizens were killed in IS attacks outside the EU. On 12 January, 10 German tourists were killed in a suicide bomb attack in Istanbul (Turkey). This was one of seven fatal attacks in Turkey attributed to IS in 2016. On 1 July, nine Italian citizens were amongst the victims who lost their lives in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in an attack on a bakery located in an area near embassies, for which IS claimed responsibility (this was later disputed by Bangladesh’s minister of home affairs, who stated that the perpetrators belonged to Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen).

- The high numbers of failed, foiled and completed jihadist attacks in 2016, and the equally high numbers of arrests of terrorism suspects, indicate a continued threat towards countries of the EU, and those Member States of the EU that are part of a coalition against IS in Syria/Iraq in particular.

- Therefore the threat of jihadist terrorism is not perceived equally amongst Member States, of which the majority have not been confronted with jihadist terrorist activities at all in 2016, nor in one of the preceding years. These countries might be used for transiting of foreign terrorist fighters, (potential) jihadists or returnees, or unintentionally providing for a safe haven for them. These and other factors, however, including perceived insults to Islam, may influence potential risks. Switzerland for instance, not being an EU Member State and not being part of a coalition against IS, is aware of its vulnerability to jihadist terrorism by association with other Western countries and its international profile.

- Since the IS announcement in June 2014 that it had re-established the caliphate, the group claimed that all Muslims were under the religious obligation to join it. It was alleged that, by doing so, they would re-enact the historical migration (Hijrah) of Prophet Muhammad to Medina in 622 AD to evade persecution in Mecca. The group declared that refusal to join it was proof of apostasy from Islam. In 2015 IS insisted that the only excuse for Muslims for not joining the group in the territories under its control was to perpetrate a terrorist attack in their places of residence.

As military pressure on IS increased and measures to prevent potential recruits from reaching IS-controlled territory became more effective, IS adapted its recruitment tactics. It now declared that perpetrating a terrorist attack in the West was even preferable to travelling to join IS.

... The increased efforts to incite IS sympathizers in the West to perpetrate attacks were reflected in practical guidance for lone actor attacks provided in IS publications. The IS multi-language magazine *Rumiyah*18 contained a series of articles under the title “Just Terror Tactics”, which suggested terrorist attacks using knives, vehicles or arson, and gave tips on how to maximize the numbers of victims and impact. Perpetrators were admonished to leave some kind of evidence stating the motivation of the attack and allegiance to IS, such as a note attached to the victim’s body or a last will.

In 2016 IS preferred to claim lone actor attacks through its *A’maq News Agency*... The increased efforts by IS to directly recruit vulnerable people via social media and incite them to perpetrate terrorist acts in their country of residence, seem to not be limited to male targets.

Media reporting suggests that women were also targeted, as in the 26 February knife attack in Hanover by a 15-year-old girl.

... In 2012, already before the emergence of IS, al-Qaeda had redesigned its strategy to ensure its survival under the changed political circumstances following the Arab rebellions: al-Qaeda would merge with the population to the extent possible; cooperate with other Muslim groups based on common interests; and administer territories that fell under its control in a way so as not to alienate the population. The aim was to create safe havens from which al-Qaeda could plan and execute attacks on Western targets. The intransigent behavior of IS toward local populations made the implementation of this new strategy even more pressing for al-Qaeda in an effort to mark the difference to its opponent.

... In 2016, al-Qaeda spent great efforts to refute the legitimacy of IS’s claim to leadership of all Muslims.
Broad Patterns in Jihadist Attacks in 2016 - IV

• ... In most of its material published in Arabic language, al-Qaeda tends to downplay its international aspirations. By contrast, al-Qaeda communication targeting audiences in the West contains views and calls for action very similar to those of IS. This is likely to be an attempt to benefit from the gradual decline of IS communication with the aim of again gaining ascendancy in the global jihadist movement. Interestingly, in doing so al-Qaeda copied successful propaganda formats developed by IS.

• Terrorist and armed criminal groups continue to consider citizens of the EU and other western countries as high value targets for kidnapping. This is because ransom money is a significant source of revenue for some groups; the extensive media attention attracted by western hostages can be exploited for propaganda and political pressure; and hostages can be used in prisoner swaps. It is assessed that militant groups do not select individuals of specific nationalities but target their victims opportunistically. The total number of abducted EU citizens is difficult to estimate due to the fact that not all the kidnapping incidents are reported for reasons related to the security of the hostages.

Russia and the Ukraine
Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine: 1970-2016

3821 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Russia and Ukraine: 2011-2016
Russia 606 and Ukraine 1,611 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Russia and Ukraine – Weapons Type: 2011-2016
Russia 606 and Ukraine 1,611 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,

3,032 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

3,509 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=167,214&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3
Russia : 2011-2016
Russia 606 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Russia Fatalities: 2000-2016
Russia 606 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Ukraine, Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td><strong>2016</strong></td>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>4,449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>772</td>
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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
- Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic
- Islamic State

**START estimates 637 incidents in 2015 and 60 in 2016**

**START estimates 21 incidents in 2015 and in 54 2016**

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
As is shown at the start of the report, the MENA area and South Asia are currently the center of global terrorist activity, with Sub Saharan Africa next. They are also the centers of U.S. counterinsurgency warfighting and counterterrorist activity.

These patterns are clearly reflected in both the START and IHS Jane’s reporting on the broader patterns in the region as well as in the detailed sections on developments in the fighting in Iraq and Syria and in Afghanistan that follow.

A glitch in the START database prevented the updating of comparative perpetrator data to include 2016, but the rise of ISIS is still all too clear in the graphs and charts shown in the report. So are the escalating levels of violence, and the spread of violence to include Yemen and Libya. The data on both type of attack and weapons use show a major rise in the use of explosives – often large vehicle-borne bombs and suicide attacks.

The trend data on Algeria show the impact of its successful war against terrorism and serve as clear example that such wars can be won. The data on Libya, in contrast, provide another warning of how revolutions can turn into endemic violence. They also reflect the problems in dealing with countries and forces where there is no clear way to separate terrorist activity from insurgency – a problem shaping the data in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen as well.

The bulk of the data that follow cover subregions where the U.S. is not involved in conflict: The Arab-Israeli states and the Arab Gulf states other than Iraq. Once again, a detailed review of the source material showed that the START and IHS Jane’s data are very different. Discussions with national experts also indicate that official national estimates of various aspects of terrorism usually differed strikingly from both START and IHS Jane’s data.
Incidents in MENA Region: 1970-2015

1970-2015

46,511 Incidents: 27% of World Total

2011-2016

27,580 Incidents: 39% of World Total

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
ISIL, Al Qaida, Al Nusra Incidents in MENA Region: 2010-2015

Total of 4,495 between 2010 and end 2015, includes: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusra Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM))

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Incidents in the MENA Region: 2011-2016

Source: START, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=weapon&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=10&weapon=1,2,6,7,5,8,9,4,12,3,11,13,10
Target Types in the MENA Region: 2011-2016

Source: START, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=weapon&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=10&weapon=1,2,6,7,5,8,9,4,12,3,11,13,10
Weapons Type in MENA Region: 2011-2016

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=weapon&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=10&weapon=1,2,6,7,5,8,9,4,12,3,11,13,10
Shift to Bombings and Explosives: 2011-2016

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=weapon&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=10&weapon=1,2,6,7,5,8,9,4,12,3,11,13,10
Total of 1,350 between 2010 and end 2015; Includes: Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
**ISIL, Al Qaida, Al Nusra Attacks by Country: 2010-2015**

*Source: START, [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31)*

**Perpetrators:** (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusra Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)); All incidents regardless of doubt.

**Syria:** 533 Incidents

**Yemen:** 893 Incidents

**Iraq:** 2,896 Incidents

**Saudi Arabia:** 10 Incidents
ISIL, Al Qaida, Al Nusra Attacks by Country: 2010-2015

Syria: 533 Incidents

Yemen: 893 Incidents

Iraq: 2,896 Incidents

Saudi Arabia: 10 Incidents

Perpetrators: (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusra Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)); All incidents regardless of doubt.

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31

Libya: 2,037 Incidents

Tunisia: 85 Incidents

Algeria: 116 Incidents

Morocco: 2 Incidents

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Algeria’s War Against Extremists: 1970-2016

Algeria: 2,729 Incidents

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Libya’s Rising Violence: 2011-2016

2,037 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Libya

START reports 417 incidents in 2015 and 543 in 2016

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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Libya as of 2015


Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Arab-Israeli Attacks by Country: 2011-2016

Israel: 554 Incidents

Egypt: 1,676 Incidents

Jordan: 19 Incidents

Syria: 1,800 Incidents

Source: START database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=164&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
# IHS Jane's 2016 Global Attack Index – Israel, Gaza & West Bank, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Gaza and West Bank</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- **Israel:** Islamic State
- **Gaza and West Bank:** Suicide Attacks
- **Egypt:** Islamic State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- **Jordan:** Islamic State
- **Lebanon:** Islamic State, Jabhat Fath al-Sham

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Egypt

START reports 582 incidents in 2015 and 365 in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>334</td>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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</table>

### Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Egypt as of 2015

GTI Rank: 9
GTI Score: 7.328

- Dead: 662
- Injured: 835
- Property Damage: 129
- Incidents: 493

Attacks by Target:
- Police
- Unknown
- Private citizens and property
- Government
- Other

Total Deaths Since 2000:
- 1,223

Deaths by Group:
- Sinai Province of the Islamic State
- Unknown
- Revolutionary Punishment Movement
- Muslim Brotherhood
- Other

Worst Attack:
The Sinai Province of the Islamic State set an explosion on a passenger flight which crashed in North Sinai killing all 224 people.

Gulf Attacks by Country: 2011-2016

Iran: 57 Incidents

Yemen: 2,794 Incidents

Iraq: 15,620 Incidents

Saudi Arabia: 255 Incidents

Source: START database,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=164&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Gulf Attacks by Country: 2011-2016

- Bahrain: 142 Incidents
- UAE: 3 Incidents
- Kuwait: 4 Incidents
- Qatar: 1 Incident

Source: START database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=164&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Arab Gulf (GCC) Attacks by Key Target Country: 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Attacks</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Militant Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Military Injured</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suicide Attacks</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:** Islamic State, Ansar Allah

*Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016*
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Yemen

START reports 658 incidents in 2015 and 521 in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Attacks</strong></td>
<td>551</td>
<td>970</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Militant Fatalities</strong></td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>1,512</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Military Injured</strong></td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suicide Attacks</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Ansar Allah

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016

3,032 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

122,913 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

IEP Estimate of Yemen as of 2015

All Elements Labeled as Al Qaida Causing Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

1,505 Incidents
• 2.1% of World Total
• 2.5% of Largely Islamic Region Total

Source: START database. All incidents regardless of doubt. Includes Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qaqa Brigade.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
All incidents regardless of doubt.
ISIS and Al Qaida
This section of the report covers the joint impact of ISIS and Al Qaida, the impact of the war on the ISIS "caliphate" in Iraq and Syria, and the impact of ISIS's affiliates. It groups these data into three sets:

- Data on both Al Qaida and ISIS
- Data on ISIS
- Data on ISIS’s affiliates

The START data on ISIS show its rise as a key source of terrorism, but do not reflect its broader impact on warfighting, insurgency, and the large numbers of injured and killed that result from its actions. Once again, there is no clear separation of terrorist and insurgent activity.

They show that Al Qaida Central has been much less active by comparison. Al Qaida and all of its affiliates carried out only 1,505 attacks in 2016, but its affiliates like Al Nusra and Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula are a different story.

At the same time, it is clear from the data in these sections that defeating ISIS in its caliphate in Iraq and Syria will not begin to put an end to the terrorist threat. ISIS proper carried out 4,343 attacks during its rise in 2011-2016. This was only 6.1% of the world total and 7.2% of the MENA total, although these attacks accounted for a much higher percentage of the total deaths. In 2016, ISIS carried out 1,495 attacks out of 13,488 incidents, or 11% of the total, but these seem to include large numbers of attacks related to the fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Syria presents another key problem and weakness in the current data on terrorism: The failure to assess state and state-driven terrorism. The Assad regime’s use of state terrorism in the form of chemical weapons and bombing civilians with weapons like barrel bombs, as well as the abuses of civilians and first responders by its security forces, make the Assad regime the leading single sponsor of state terrorism, but these actions are not addressed in any major database on terrorism.
Equally important, the data and maps in this section show that the ISIS “caliphate” was far more than a terrorist organization and that its primary role was seeking to create a nation under its control through counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare. There is no clear way to separate its role in terrorism from its broader political and military role – particularly because ISIS fought with forces from Arab rebel groups in Syria, Iran, Iraq, Hezbollah, Russia, Turkey, and the U.S.-led coalition. Like the Taliban, ISIS used terrorism as a key tactic, but there is no way to clearly quantify its use of terrorism in Iraq and Syria as distinguished from its overall role in warfighting and insurgency, and the latter role presented the far more serious threat.

Two other key aspects of ISIS emerge in these data. The first is the potential role of "foreign fighters" in future conflicts and terrorism. ISIS in Iraq and Syria created a large body of local and foreign extremists that may become involved in either terrorism in other countries or future insurgencies. Most are far better trained in insurgent warfare than terrorism, but some could easily adapt to support terrorist groups or cells in other countries. The numbers involved are highly uncertain, as is the future number of those who survive and escape some form of capture or internment.

The second is the strength of ISIS’s affiliates, many of which only established ties to ISIS because of its major initial victories in Iraq and Syria. Most of the major affiliates will remain as terrorist and/or insurgent groups after the defeat of the ISIS “caliphate” – just as the overseas branches of Al Qaida survived its defeat in Afghanistan. Once again, the data involved are uncertain, but it is still clear that talking about “defeating” ISIS by fighting in Iraq and Syria ignores the reality of a far greater terrorist, insurgent, and extremist threat.

Finally, the future of Al Qaida Central is a key issue. Groups like Al Nusra may or may not survive in Syria, and may or may not pay close attention to Al Qaida in the future. The same applies to Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. The end result could be the joint splintering of both ISIS and Al Qaida or a shift towards some new broad based structure, but none of the current trends in data provide a strong indication of Al Qaida's future.
Al Qaida vs. IISS
All Al Qaida and Islamic State Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016

5,887 Incidents
- 9.8% of largely Islamic regions
- 8.3% of world

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))
IEP Estimate of ISIS vs. Al Qa’ida: 2000-2015

In 2015 there were 28 countries that had ISIL affiliations, whereas 12 countries had al-Qa’ida affiliates.

In three years ISIL and affiliated groups have killed nearly 30,000 from terrorism. That is a similar number to what al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups have killed over the last eight years.

AQIM and ISIS/ISIL Deaths: 2010-2014

ISIL is a much more deadly terrorist group than any of its precursor groups. Precursors to ISIL are the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).

- al-Baghdadi becomes leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq
- al-Baghdadi calls for 100 attacks in retaliation for the death of Usama bin Ladin
- ISIL formed and moves into Syria
- Invaded Raqqa
- al-Qa’ida severs ties
- Yazidis flee to the mountains
- Returned to Iraq, invaded Mosul


ISIS’s attacks are growing faster than attacks by other terrorist organizations. From 2013–2014 the number of attacks by ISIS increased 233 percent from 373 to 1,241.

*al-Qaeda in Iraq in considered to be ISIS’s predecessor

Source: Meghan Keneally, JAN DIEHM,  ABC News, Sobering Chart Shows ISIS Is the Terror Group With Most Mass Killings Since 2000
ISIS Central
(Primarily Iraq and Syria)
START Assessment of ISIS: 2016

- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was responsible for more attacks and deaths than any other perpetrator group in 2016. In particular, ISIS carried out 20% more terrorist attacks in Iraq, and caused 69% more total deaths in Iraq, compared to 2015. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS and perpetrator groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS carried out attacks in more than 20 different countries. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of the ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.

- Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported in 2016, 19% were carried out by ISIS. (Note: Attacks attributed to ISIS in the Statistical Annex dataset exclude those attributed to specific declared branches of ISIS such as those operating in Egypt, Libya, and West Africa. They also do not include attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals who might have been inspired by ISIS.) Additionally, 13% of attacks in 2016 were carried out by the Taliban.

- ISIS (+17%) and al-Shabaab (+47%) carried out more terrorist attacks in 2016 than they did in 2015. However, while al-Shabaab’s lethality decreased (11% fewer total deaths in 2016), the total number of deaths caused by ISIS increased 48% and the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage by ISIS increased 75% in 2016, compared to 2015.

- While ISIS was responsible for 19% fewer terrorist attacks in Syria (122 in 2016 compared to 150 in 2015), the number of attacks carried out by ISIS in Iraq increased by 20% (932 in 2016 compared to 775 in 2015). The lethality of these attacks increased 69% (7,338 total deaths in 2016, compared to 4,341 in 2015).

- Furthermore, the geographic reach of attacks by ISIS and its affiliates continued to grow in 2016. The number of attacks attributed to ISIS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. In addition to Boko Haram in West Africa, the most active of these ISIS affiliates were located in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
For more than a decade, the organization now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or simply the Islamic State, has carried out deadly terrorist attacks. Beginning as a small network led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the first terrorist attack attributed to this group was the assassination of American diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan in October 2002. Since then, the group initially known as Tawhid and Jihad (Jama'at al-Tawhid w'al-Jihad (the Party of Monotheism and Jihad)) has undergone a complex evolution, including name changes, leadership changes, and shifts in allegiance to other Salafi-jihadist organizations, most notably al-Qaida. In addition, the reach of ISIL’s violence surpasses its own membership, to include attacks carried out by other groups and individuals who have pledged allegiance to ISIL regardless of whether or not formal ties exist.

This complexity makes it difficult to comprehensively and systematically place into context the violence of one of the most active and deadly terrorist organizations in recent history. For the purpose of this report, we have classified the terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into four ISIL-related perpetrator categories:

• ISIL Predecessor: attacks by organizations that were part of the ISIL lineage prior to adoption of the ISIL name in 2013
• ISIL: attacks by operatives of the “core” of the organization, based in and primarily active in Iraq and Syria
• ISIL Affiliate: attacks by organizations that have declared allegiance to ISIL1
• ISIL-Inspired: attacks by individuals who have indicated that they were motivated by allegiance to ISIL
• ISIL-Related: any of the above

This report presents data that illustrate the dynamics of ISIL-related terrorism over time and place, from 2002 to 2015. In particular, we investigate trends in the number of attacks and deaths caused by ISIL-related terrorism over time, the geographic spread of ISIL-related terrorism, and patterns of tactics, targets, and lethality of ISIL-related terrorism.
ISIL/ISIS/Daesh (Islamic State) Terrorist Attacks 2011-2016

4,343 Incidents

- 6.1% of World Total
- 7.2% of MENA Total

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: Perpetrators: (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) Rises to 4347 if include Islamic State of Iraq
IHS Jane’s: ISIS in 2016

Scope: Transnational
Orientation: Sunni Islamic
Objective: Revolutionary

A total of 4,236 attacks were claimed by, or attributed to, the Islamic State in open sources in 2016, underlining the group’s status as the most prolific non-state armed group worldwide. Despite ongoing heavy territorial pressure on the group in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the recorded number of attacks increased by 28% from 2015, highlighting the extent of the group’s resistance and ongoing capabilities, as well as its transition to insurgent operations in recaptured areas and punitive operations. While Iraq and Syria accounted for 84% of Islamic State attacks worldwide, this was down from 92% in 2015, underlining the expanding presence of its affiliates, in addition to proliferating lone actors operating in the West.

Countries in which the group is active:
- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Belgium
- Cameroon
- Chad
- Egypt
- France
- Germany
- India
- Indonesia
- Iraq
- Israel
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Malaysia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Philippines
- Russian Federation
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Syria
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- United States
- Yemen

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
ISIS “Provinces”

ISIS Attacks vs. Deaths: 2002-2015

Source: Erin Miller, Sheehan Kane, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth: Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002--2015; START, August 2016
In comparison to global patterns during the same time period, the weapons used by ISIL in terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 were disproportionately explosives rather than firearms and incendiaries.

Specifically, the vast majority (80%) of weapons used in ISIL’s attacks were explosives, compared to 58 percent of weapons used worldwide. An additional 16 percent of weapons used by ISIL were firearms, compared to 33 percent globally, and 2 percent involved “melee” weapons (usually sharp or blunt objects).

Only 1 percent of the weapons used in ISIL’s attacks were incendiaries, much lower than the usage of incendiary weapons in 6 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide.

Chemicals, vehicles as weapons, and sabotage equipment comprised less than 1 percent of the weapons used in attacks by ISIL between 2013 and 2015. Note, however, that recent reports indicate that ISIL’s use of chemical weapons became more common in 2016.9
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.

Note: Our judgment as to which group has dominant influence over a particular city is based on a body of unclassified sources that we deem reliable.

DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of March 2015
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.

Iraq and Syria: ISIL's Areas of Influence, August 2014 Through April 2016

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL’s) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq and northern Syria have been pushed back since August 2014. Compared to its peak of territorial influence in Iraq and Syria in August 2014, ISIL probably can no longer operate openly in approximately 30 to 35 percent of populated areas, although the group is able to conduct attacks in many areas where it has ceded control. During April 2016, Iraqi forces captured territory from ISIL in Hit and west of Makhmur. In Syria, ISIL lost territory to Syrian regime-backed forces in central Homs Province and opposition forces in Dar'a Province. The map depicts ISIL’s net territorial losses, which translate into approximately 25,000 to 26,000 square kilometers, or about 45 percent of the territory it had dominated in Iraq as of August 2014. ISIL also has lost a net of 9,000 to 9,200 square kilometers, or about 20 percent of the territory it had dominated in Syria as of August 2014. ISIL probably has a presence and freedom of movement in much of the unpopulated areas depicted on the map, but we cannot determine if it is the dominant actor. Our estimates are subject to change because of the dynamic nature of the conflict.


ISIS Loss of Control in Iraq and Syria 2015-2017


Source: IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor as of July 10

THE WASHINGTON POST 196
Uncertain Estimates of Foreign Volunteers
U.S. experts privately make it clear that there are no credible estimates, and that public reporting tends to be the highest figure provided by given countries or from given report, analytic guesstimate, or source.

The term has little practical value since temporary visitors to training and indoctrination facilities, or visitors to the West and non-conflict areas from given terrorist groups, may possess at least as much of a threat, and many so-called foreign fighters become casualties or receive no practical training in terrorism.

Trained cadres, or volunteers/fighters that survive with both motivation and specialized skills almost certainly do pose a major threat but are only a small part of the real-world total which has little to do in any respect with published estimates.

There also is no clear effort to reach a consensus within the U.S. intelligence community, as is shown in the first slide in this section.
CSIS TNT Estimate of Uncertainty in the Increasing Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013-2016

ODNI = Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ICSR = International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Violence

Source: Maria Galperin Donnelly with Thomas M. Sanderson and Zack Fellman, Foreign Fighters in History, CSIS, Transnational Threats, 2017
Rough Estimate of Total ISIS Fighters in Syria and Iraq: As of 8/2016

In Iraq and Syria
- 200,000 (Kurdish claims)
- 70,000 Russian military estimate
- 100,000 (Jihadist claim)
- 20,000–31,000 (CIA estimate in 2014)
- 20,000–25,000 (CIA estimate in 2016)

Outside Iraq and Syria
- 1,000–2,000 (In Egypt)
- 5,000–10,000 (In Libya)
- 30 (In Algeria)
- 4,200+ (In Jordan)
- 3,000 (In Turkey)
- 3000+ (In Afghanistan)
- ~1,000 (in Yemen) 1,000–
- 4,000 (In Europe) 7,000–
- 10,000 (In West Africa)

Estimated total:
52,600–258,000

FTFs continue to reach ISIL-controlled territory, although it remains impossible to accurately assess their number, origins, affiliations, or identities. These FTFs continue to travel undetected through the relatively small portion of the Turkey-Syria border still controlled by ISIL (about 98 km). Ongoing diplomatic efforts seek to work with Turkey to increase security of that border, and the U.S.-led coalition is active on a variety of fronts to prevent, detect, and deter such individuals from joining ISIL. Along with interagency colleagues this quarter, DoS has signed two agreements to share information on known or suspected terrorists. DoS also worked with DHS this quarter to improve visa screening by implementing enhanced questionnaires on persons applying for visa-free travel through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program. The additional questions are intended to help U.S. security agencies in screening potential FTFs who may seek to exploit the Visa Waiver Program.

FTF Origins and Force Strength

As reported in Lead IG’s September 2015 OIR report, the House Committee on Homeland Security estimated that approximately 25,000 FTFs had traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, as of last September (about 5,000 of them Tunisian nationals). A somewhat more recent report, published in December by the New York-based consultancy The Soufan Group draws on data compiled by the UN and other sources to place the number of FTFs slightly higher, at between 27,000 and 31,000. The Soufan Group noted that the profile of the approximately 150 U.S. citizens who have successfully traveled to Iraq and Syria is diverse, with no predominant geographical region or ethnicity.

The Soufan Group also concluded the following:

- FTFs from Russia and Central Asia have increased an estimated 300% since June 2014.
- Regionally, Saudi Arabia (2,500), Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000) are estimated to have produced the most FTFs.
- Personal-recruitment pitches made by ISIL members or sympathizers are often just as compelling as social-media appeals, especially in extremist hotbeds, such as the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and Arab-immigrant enclaves in France and Belgium. The French government estimated that, as of October, 1,700 FTFs had traveled from France to fight for ISIL.
- The western Balkans are increasingly serving as a transit hub for FTFs seeking to join ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In November, the New America Foundation released a report on 474 FTFs from 25 Western countries (defined as select countries in Europe and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand). Of the 474 FTFs included in the study, 83 were U.S. citizens.

Uncertain Foreign Fighter Numbers: 2014 to 2015 - I

FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA FROM ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION COUNTRIES, 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as Turkey. Tunisia has the greatest number of departing foreign fighters of any country in the world.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.
Uncertain Foreign Fighter Numbers: 2014 to 2015 - II

Among countries where Muslims are not in the majority, Russia and Western Europe have the highest numbers of fighters known to have travelled to Iraq and Syria.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.

NOTES: Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country, to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.

Source: IEP, ICSR
*ICSR High-end estimate for the UK as of December 2014.
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013 to 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from the Middle East and North Africa. Western countries include Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.

The total number of foreign fighters believed to have joined armed groups in Iraq and Syria more than doubled from December 2013 to October 2015. Figures are cumulative totals. Numbers are estimates only based on IEP calculations from a variety of sources.

December 2013 to August 2014

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html

TOTAL: 21,632
The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits.

Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups.

The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.


Source: ICSR

*Upper estimates used
BBC Estimate of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: No As of Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq</th>
<th>Per million population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included.
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

The US Central Intelligence Agency believes IS may have up to 31,000 fighters in the region, many of whom are foreign recruits.

Figures from the London-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and the New York-based Soufan Group show an estimated 20,000 fighters from almost 80 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with extremist groups.

The figures suggest that while about a quarter of the foreign fighters are from the West, the majority are from nearby Arab countries, such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Morocco.
IISS Affiliates
Between October 2002 and April 2013, ISIL predecessors (primarily known as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)) carried out attacks almost exclusively in Iraq (95%). An additional 5 percent of attacks carried out by the perpetrator organizations that would become ISIL took place in Syria beginning in December 2011.

Initially sources attributed responsibility for the attacks in Syria to AQI, and in 2012 al-Nusra Front began claiming responsibility for attacks in Syria. In addition, four attacks were carried out in Jordan—one in 2002 (by Tawhid and Jihad) and three in 2005 (by AQI). Two men reportedly linked to AQI carried out an attack in the United Kingdom in 2007.

In April 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced the expansion of ISI to include al-Nusra Front in Syria.3 Although al-Nusra Front’s leadership ultimately rejected this alliance, and al-Qaida leadership subsequently disowned ISI

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js=k.gmail.main.en.sXIEpUnPe0.0/m=m_i/t/am=nhGDGD-3_uDcS0DgK70kQrz3n--fSo7drnH_8DROlV4P_N_h_A_8FetIUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOuWLXcEmxR9Kqg0GbqX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
START Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2011-2016 - I

6,505 Incidents for Affiliates vs. 4,343 for Islamic State “Central,” but casualties per incident vary sharply by affiliate.

Numbers: (between 2011 and 2016).
All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State; Al-Shabaab; Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin; Algeria Province of the Islamic State; Ansar Al-Khilafa (Philippines); Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia); Bahrain Province of the Islamic State; Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM); Barqa Province of the Islamic State; Boko Haram; Caucasus Province of the Islamic State; Fezzan Province of the Islamic State; Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State; Hijaz Province of the Islamic State; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Islamic State in Bangladesh; Jamaah Ansharut Daulah; Jund al-Khilafa; Jund al-Khilafah (Tunisia); Jundallah (Iran); Jundallah (Pakistan); Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State; Lahij Province of the Islamic State; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT); Najd Province of the Islamic State; Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade; Sanaa Province of the Islamic State; Shabwah Province of the Islamic State; Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade; Sinai Province of the Islamic State; Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Tehrik-e-Khilafat; Tripoli Province of the Islamic State)
START Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2011-2016 - II

**Target Type**

- Government (Diplomatic) (52)
- Media (52,9)
- Military NGO (39)
- Transportation (29)
- Unknown (151)
- Airports and Aircraft (29)
- Telecommunication (29)
- Private Citizens (17)
- NGOs (12)
- Religious Figures (1)
- Utilities (47)

**Attack type**

- Unarmed Assault (3)
- Hostage Taking (Kidnapping) (701)
- Assassination (38)
- Bombing/Explosion (3516)
- Facility Infrastructure (85)
- Hijacking (99)

Source: START Data Base, Advanced Search, 25.8.2017
START Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2011-2016 - III

Target Type

Casualties - Killed and Injured Per Incident

Source: START Data Base, Advanced Search, 25.8.2017,
ISIS Role in Worldwide Attacks: 2002-2015
Attack Patterns of ISIL-Related and Non-ISIL-Related Terrorist Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>% Lethal</th>
<th>Total Deaths per Attack</th>
<th>% Suicide</th>
<th>% Hostages/Kidnapping</th>
<th>% Coordinated Attacks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Related</td>
<td>4943</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL Predecessors</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL</td>
<td>2858</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Affiliated</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIL-Inspired</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-ISIL-Related</td>
<td>78345</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83288</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Erin Miller, Sheehan Kane, William Kammerer, and Brian Wingenroth: *Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002--2015*; START, August 2016
As new and established organizations began making declarations of allegiance to ISIL, the network expanded dramatically. In 2014, 11 ISIL-affiliated perpetrator groups carried out terrorist attacks in eight different countries, and in 2015 a total of 27 ISIL-affiliated groups carried out attacks in 20 different countries. The 10 most active ISIL affiliates are listed in the table below, along with information about their attack patterns. Note that for organizations that existed prior to pledging allegiance to ISIL, such as Boko Haram, the table includes only those attacks that they carried out as ISIL affiliates. Thus, the time periods included for each group are not directly comparable.

The ISIL affiliates responsible for the most terrorist attacks and deaths are certainly those that were the most well-established organizations prior to indicating their allegiance to ISIL, and/or had declared allegiance to ISIL the earliest. These include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) in Egypt, and BIFM in the Philippines. ISIL’s presence in Libya was precipitated by Libyan fighters returning from Iraq and Syria—militants who had organized as the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which splintered from Ansar al-Sharia.10

Terrorist attacks by both ISIL and ISIL affiliates were characterized by a high proportion of perpetrator deaths—24 percent and 23 percent of total deaths, respectively—compared to attacks that were not linked to ISIL, in which 17 percent of all deaths were perpetrator deaths. The affiliates whose attacks resulted in the highest proportion of perpetrators among those killed were the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan and Pakistan (47% of those killed in attacks were perpetrators), BIFM (35%), the Sinai Province (27%), and Boko Haram (24%). More than one-fifth (22%) of the Boko Haram and Sinai Province assailants who were killed died in suicide attacks. Attacks in which especially large numbers of perpetrators were killed typically involved numerous assailants attacking a security target, or security forces responding to a major attack targeting civilians.

A key distinction of the attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, all of which occurred in 2014 and 2015, is that they took place in locations where terrorist attacks were relatively rare compared to where ISIL and ISIL affiliates were typically active. Eight of the ISIL-inspired attacks took place in the United States, six in France, four in Australia, two in Denmark, two in Canada; the Gaza Strip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines each experienced one ISIL-inspired attack.

### ISIS Affiliates – 2014-2015

| Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State | Jund al-Khilafah (Tunisia) |
| Algeria Province of the Islamic State | Jundallah |
| Ansar Al-Khilafa (Philippines) | Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State |
| Bahrain Province of the Islamic State | Lahij Province of the Islamic State |
| Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) | Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) |
| Barqa Province of the Islamic State | Najd Province of the Islamic State |
| Boko Haram | Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade |
| Caucasus Province of the Islamic State | Sanaa Province of the Islamic State |
| Fezzan Province of the Islamic State | Shabwah Province of the Islamic State |
| Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State | Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade |
| Hijaz Province of the Islamic State | Sinai Province of the Islamic State |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem |
| Islamic State in Bangladesh | Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques |
| Jamaah Ansharut Daulah | Tehrik-e-Khilafat |
| Jund al-Khilafah (Algeria) | Tripoli Province of the Islamic State |

Source: START, *Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report*, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js=k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEIpUnPzO.O/m=m_i/t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDCs0DgK70kQrz3n~fSo7drnH__8DROIv4P_N_h_A_8FetiUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdPOUaWILxEmxR9Kqg0GbqX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.

An interactive version of this map is available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/interactive/ISILmap.html

Between 2013 and 2015, there were 32 occasions on which ISIL carried out more than 10 attacks in a single day, all in Iraq.

Furthermore, the number of cases in which ISIL attacks resulted in more than 100 deaths increased from six to 16 between 2013 and 2015. These attacks targeted private citizens (6 attacks), military (5), police (3), business (1), and government (1) targets.

The deadliest attacks attributed to ISIL took place in Iraq in June 2014, when assailants abducted more than 1,600 Iraqi Air Force recruits at Camp Speicher in Tikrit and ultimately killed most, if not all of them. In a separate attack earlier that month, ISIL operatives killed more than 600 Shia prisoners at Badush prison in Nineveh.
Deaths from ISIS-Related Terrorist Attacks, Worldwide, 2002-2015*

While approximately half (51%) of attacks carried out by perpetrators not linked to ISIL were lethal, three-quarters (75%) of ISIL-related attacks were deadly. The highest proportion of lethal attacks were those carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals, whose attacks resulted in at least one death 85 percent of the time. Note, however, that despite this relatively high prevalence of deadly attacks, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL-inspired individuals between 2002 and 2015 was 1.9 deaths per attack. This is much more similar to the lethality of attacks by perpetrators not linked to ISIL (2.1 deaths per attack). In contrast, the average number of deaths per attack carried out by ISIL predecessor groups was 8.6, the average number of deaths caused by attacks carried out by ISIL “core” was 7.5, and attacks by ISIL affiliated groups caused 5.8 deaths per attack, on average.

Source: Global Terrorism Database

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXDIEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i/t/ma=nghGPMGDG-3_uDcSo0gK70kQrz3n--fSo7drnH--8DPOlv4P_N_h_A_8FetiUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdpOUnALxWlXcEmxR9Kqg0GbqX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
The most frequent targets of ISIL attacks between April 2013 and the end of 2015 were private citizens and property (39%). Perhaps most notably, attacks primarily targeting private citizens resulted in more than 6,100 people held hostage or kidnapped. Available sources indicate that approximately 1,200 of these victims were subsequently released. The remaining victims were either killed or their status is unknown.

Along with private citizens and property, military targets (21%) and police targets (14%) comprise nearly three-quarters of all attacks carried out by ISIL.

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i/t/am=nhGP GDG-3_uDs0Gk70kQrz3n--fSo7drnH-_8DR0lV4N_h_A_8FetiUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOJWlXcEmxR9Kqg0GbqzX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
Preferred ISIS Attack Methods: 2000-2014 - II

https://www.google.com/search?q=Graphs+of+ISIS+Attacks&tbm=isch&imgil=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%253A%253BZyT03MFSKM7aM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fosintjournal.wordpre
ss.com%25252F2014%25252F08%25252F0%25252F21%25252Ffan-analysis-of-isis-quarterly-reports-kill-and
conquer%25252F%25252Fsource=iu&pf=m&fir=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%25253A%25252CZyT03MFSKM7aM%25252C__&usg=__OJ0sBYgGF0w5QcG2TGiHMUOTwLE%3D&biw=1243&bih=972&ved=0ahUKEwjdw7DxiOzNAhVLGD4K%7DxiOzNAhVLGD4KhdoIBTcQyjI&ei=RemDV7CRDMuwe-AHak2Z54Awy#imgrc=bJ_2yql3oLmSmM%3A
ISIS Terrorist Attacks: January – June 2014

The first attack carried out by an individual reportedly inspired by ISIL, though not directly linked to the organization, took place in April 2014 in the United States. In Seattle, an assailant shot and killed a civilian and later claimed he had done so in response to U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two months later, the same assailant carried out similar attacks in Seattle and West Orange, New Jersey before being apprehended, tried, and convicted. A total of 26 attacks, marked in yellow on the map above, were carried out in 2014 and 2015 by individuals inspired by ISIL. These attacks killed 50 people, including 13 perpetrators, and took place primarily in the United States (8 attacks), France (6), Australia (4), Denmark (2), and Canada (2).

Source: START, Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015, Background Report, https://mail.google.com/_/scs/mail-static/_/js/k=gmail.main.en.sXDiEpUnPe0.O/m=m_i/t/am=nhGPDGD-3_uDcSOdGk70kQrz3n--5So7drnH--8DROIv4P_N_h_A_8FetIUC/rt=h/d=1/rs=AHGWq9CdJPOUaWLXcEmxR9Kqg0GbqX_ow, and https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1566f42d2a1e0a99.
From May 2013 through the end of the year, ISIL carried out an average of 46 attacks per month. In 2014, the frequency of attacks more than doubled to 106 attacks per month, and in 2015, ISIL carried out 102 terrorist attacks per month. Like attacks by its predecessors, ISIL’s terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2015 (shown in red on the map) were heavily concentrated in Iraq (86%) and Syria (12%). ISIL was also responsible for terrorist attacks in neighboring countries such as Lebanon (1%) and Turkey (1%), as well as in Bahrain, Belgium, Egypt, France, Israel, Jordan, Libya, and Somalia, each of which comprised less than 1 percent of ISIL’s terrorist attacks.

In mid-2014, increasing numbers of attacks were carried out by new and existing organizations that pledged allegiance to ISIL, described here as ISIL affiliates. Among the first of these organizations to declare allegiance to ISIL was the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), active in the Philippines. In August 2014, BIFM spokesperson Abu Misry Mama stated “We have an alliance with the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Later that year, the Barqa Province of the Islamic State and the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State emerged in Libya, while Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt pledged allegiance to ISIL and became the Sinai Province of the Islamic State.

Terrorist activity of ISIL affiliates increased dramatically in March 2015 when the extremely violent Nigerian organization Boko Haram, announced “allegiance to the caliph.” Following this development, Boko Haram’s terrorist activity was a significant driver of the overall trend of violence carried out by ISIL affiliated groups. In 2015, each of these ISIL-affiliated groups—Boko Haram, Sinai Province, Tripoli Province, Barqa Province, and BIFM—ranked among the 20 most active perpetrator organizations worldwide in terms of number of attacks.
ISIS Global Fatalities: 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
ISIS MENA and South Asia Fatalities: 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Terrorism and U.S. Wars: Syria and Iraq
This section shows the broader data affecting the role of terrorism in the MENA region and key conflict areas in the region, the relative impact on the Afghan and Iraq Wars and on the U.S.-led coalition’s role in fighting a counterinsurgency campaign against ISIS, and, START and other estimates of how this fighting impacted the overall patterns of terrorism in the region, Iraq, and Syria. It also shows how the fighting with ISIS has interacted with other key ethnic and sectarian tensions and conflict, and the different national patterns of insurgency and terrorism that emerged in Syria and Iraq.

It has already been made clear that the levels of terrorism in Iraq and Syria did not dominate “terrorism,” even in the MENA region, and that other centers of terrorism play a key role. While the data are once again uncertain, it seems likely that they are correct in showing that “terrorism” played a greater role in the insurgency in Iraq and Syria than in Afghanistan – although both combined from all perpetrators were only about half the level of terrorism worldwide.

It is also important to keep the data shown in this section in perspective. A military victory in Iraq and Syria will achieve important results in terms of regional stability and serving U.S. national security interests, but, by itself, will only have a marginal impact on the overall threat of terrorism. Even a total defeat of the ISIS "caliphate" will still leave many ISIS fighters to join other movements or ISIS affiliates outside Iraq and Syria.

In the case of Iraq, the START and IHS Jane’s data again show just how different estimates from leading sources can be. If one focuses on the START data, its summary reporting in the 2016 analytic annex indicates that:

- Perpetrator deaths in Iraq increased 79% between 2015 and 2016, comprising 25% of total deaths in Iraq, and accounting for more than one-third of the increase in total deaths in Iraq between 2015 and 2016.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) remained the primary perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2016. For 66% of attacks in Iraq, source materials did not attribute responsibility to a particular perpetrator organization; however, ISIS was identified as the perpetrator in 94% of the remaining attacks for which a perpetrator organization was named.
• The total number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Iraq increased 40% in 2016, due in large part to an increase in highly lethal attacks.

• In 2016, terrorism in Iraq continued to be marked by extremely deadly coordinated attacks. On 78 occasions during the year, there were more than 10 attacks on a single day within a particular country. Of these, more than two-thirds (71%) took place in Iraq.

• Extensive campaigns of non-lethal violence also took place in Iraq in 2016. For example, the leader of the Dawr District Council reported to the media that ISIS detonated explosives at more than 100 houses in the district over the course of a week in September. No casualties were reported, but dozens of families were forced to relocate.

• More than 2,400 attacks – the vast majority of all attacks in Iraq (86%) in 2016 – were classified as bombings/explosions. An additional 6% were armed assaults, 4% were kidnappings, 2% were facility attacks, and 2% were assassinations. Overall, 9% of all attacks were suicide attacks. These trends are generally very consistent with patterns of tactics in 2015, with the exception of declining numbers of assassinations (48 in 2016 compared to 73 in 2015), and increasing numbers of facility attacks (50 in 2016 compared to eight in 2015).

Once again, START's estimates differ from those of IHS Jane's (and indeed all major independent sources of data on terrorism differ in detail). START does estimate some 3,356 incidents took place in Iraq in 2016 which is close to IHS Jane's estimate of 3,350 attacks. However, START estimate some 2,744 incidents took place in Iraq in 2016, and IHS Jane's estimates 3,350 attacks.

The differences are far greater for Syria. START estimates some 490 incidents took place in Iraq in 2016, and IHS Jane's estimates 5,496 attacks. START estimates some 472 incidents took place in Iraq in 2016. IHS Jane's estimates 7,997 attacks. Jane’s does say it includes insurgent as well as terrorist attacks and violent protests, but it is unclear how one counts insurgency “attacks,” and differences like this did not emerge in the data from Iraq.
All Incidents in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

51,321 Incidents

Years: (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Incidents From Major Groups U.S. is Fighting in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Shabaab; Badr Brigades; Haqqani Network; Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))

12,159 Incidents

Source: START, Years: (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Total of 9,482 between 2010 and end 2015; Includes Haqqani Network; Huthi Extremists; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Nusra Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31
Key Trends in Terrorism: Worldwide and In Iraq and Afghanistan

Total fatalities in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide, 2000 – 2016

Source: Erin Miller and Michael Distler, Mass Casualty Explosives Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, START Background Report, University of Maryland, June 2017.
Types of targets of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 - 2016

START Estimate of Attacks In/or near U.S. Combat in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
START Estimate of ISIS & Affiliate Attacks in Key U.S. Combat Areas 2015
ISIS Loss of Control in Iraq and Syria 2015-2017

Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: July 17, 2017

ISW
Estimate of Zones of Control in Iraq: 6.17

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map/15cb15d4cccd637c, accessed 8.24.17
Iraq and Syria Sunni Dominated Areas: 2017

The Broader Kurdish Issue: 2017

Comparative Patterns of Terrorist Incidents in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: 2011-2016

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Highly Violent Incidents in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: 1970-2016

24,656 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

27,523 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=167,214&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3
START Country Profile Data 2016 - Iraq

By a wide margin, the highest numbers of total attacks, deaths, and people injured took place in Iraq. In 2016 there were more than twice as many terrorist attacks in Iraq as the next highest-ranked country, Afghanistan.

- The average lethality of attacks in Iraq was 3.4 deaths per attack, 42% higher than the global average (2.4 deaths per attack).
- Perpetrator deaths in Iraq increased 79% between 2015 and 2016, comprising 25% of total deaths in Iraq, and accounting for more than one-third of the increase in total deaths in Iraq between 2015 and 2016.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) remained the primary perpetrator of terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2016. For 66% of attacks in Iraq, source materials did not attribute responsibility to a particular perpetrator organization; however, ISIS was identified as the perpetrator in 94% of the remaining attacks for which a perpetrator organization was named. An additional 5% of attacks were carried out by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq. The number of attacks ISIS carried out in Iraq increased from 775 in 2015 to 932 in 2016 (+23%).
- The total number of deaths due to terrorist attacks in Iraq increased 40% in 2016, due in large part to an increase in highly lethal attacks. Twelve of the 20 deadliest individual attacks in 2016 took place in Iraq, compared to two in 2015 and four in 2014. Each of these attacks resulted in more than 80 total deaths. The deadliest attack in Iraq in 2016 took place in July when an ISIS suicide attacker detonated explosives at a shopping center in the Karada neighborhood of Baghdad, killing at least 380 and wounding 200 others.
- In 2016, terrorism in Iraq continued to be marked by extremely deadly coordinated attacks. On 78 occasions during the year, there were more than 10 attacks on a single day within a particular country. Of these, more than two-thirds (71%) took place in Iraq. Likewise, there were 85 occasions in 2016 when more than 50 people were killed in terrorist attacks on one day in a particular country. More than half (55%) of these highly lethal days occurred in Iraq and involved up to 57 attacks on a single day.
- Extensive campaigns of non-lethal violence also took place in Iraq in 2016. For example, the leader of the Dawr District Council reported to the media that ISIS detonated explosives at more than 100 houses in the district over the course of a week in September. No casualties were reported, but dozens of families were forced to relocate.
START Country Profile Data 2016 – Iraq - II

• More than 2,400 attacks – the vast majority of all attacks in Iraq (86%) in 2016 – were classified as bombings/explosions. An additional 6% were armed assaults, 4% were kidnappings, 2% were facility attacks, and 2% were assassinations. Overall, 9% of all attacks were suicide attacks. These trends are generally very consistent with patterns of tactics in 2015, with the exception of declining numbers of assassinations (48 in 2016 compared to 73 in 2015), and increasing numbers of facility attacks (50 in 2016 compared to eight in 2015).

• The percentage of attacks involving people kidnapped or taken hostage in Iraq (5%) remained stable in 2016. Like in 2015 and 2014, the prevalence of attacks involving people kidnapped or taken hostage in Iraq was half that of the global percentage (10%) in 2016.

• However, following sharp increases in the total number of people kidnapped or held hostage in Iraq in 2013, 2014, and 2015, this number more than doubled in 2016, to include more than 8,500 people. Once again, this increase was largely due to a relatively small number of attacks that involved extremely high numbers of victims. Specifically, in 2014, there was one attack involving more than 200 people kidnapped or taken hostage, in 2015 there were two such attacks, and in 2016 there were six, including one attack in which 1,500 people were abducted, and one attack in which 3,000 people were abducted.

• In 2016 the most common types of targets in Iraq were private citizens and property (55%), businesses (15%), and police (7%). While the number of attacks overall in Iraq increased in 2016, the number of attacks against the following types of targets decreased, compared to 2015: police (-22%), non-diplomatic government (-13%), military (-51%), transportation (-34%), and educational institutions (-32%).

• The geographic distribution of terrorist attacks in Iraq shifted somewhat in 2016. Fewer attacks took place in Baghdad governorate (33%, compared to 41% in 2015). In contrast, more attacks took place in al Anbar governorate (22%, compared to 16% in 2015) and Nineveh governorate (9%, compared to 4% in 2015).
Iraq 2011-2016
15,620 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Iraq

START estimates 2,744 incidents for 2015 and 3,356 incidents for 2016

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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Iraq as of 2015

Iraq: Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013

Attacks That Could Be Attributed to ISIS

2004: 51 attacks
2005: 58 attacks
2006: 5 attacks
2007: 56 attacks
2008: 62 attacks
2009: 76 attacks
2010: 66 attacks
2011: 34 attacks
2012: 603 attacks
2013: 419 attacks

2004-05 The group emerges as "Al Qaeda in Iraq" following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Its goal is to provoke a civil war.

2006-07 The group's February 2006 bombing of one of Iraq's most revered Shiite shrines ignites sectarian violence across the country. After merging with several other Sunni insurgent groups, it changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.

2008-10 I.S.I. claims responsibility for more than 200 attacks, many in densely populated areas around Baghdad.

2011-12 The group is relatively quiet for most of 2011, but re-emerges after American troops withdraw from Iraq.

2013 Seeing new opportunities for growth, I.S.I. enters Syria's civil war and changes its name to reflect a new aim of establishing an Islamic religious state spanning Iraq and Syria. Its success in Syria bleeds over the border to Iraq.

Iraq:

Post Mosul
Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions: 2017

Syria 2011-2016
1,800 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
ISIS in Syria, July 10, 2017

Syria

Zones of Control: July 2017

Source:
Washington Post
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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Jabhat Fath al Sham, Qiwaat Suriyya al Dimogratyiyya (QSD)

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Syria as of 2015

Terrorism and U.S. Wars: Afghanistan, Pakistan
Like Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan is a counterinsurgency war zone, not a center of terrorism. The Taliban was a government that the U.S. helped drive out of Afghanistan. It then based itself in Pakistan, and became a major insurgency from 2008 onwards. It is not, like Al Qaida or ISIS, a terrorist movement focused on spreading a regional or global ideology in addition to seeking direct political power.

Even more than is the case with the ISIS “caliphate,” treating an insurgency as terrorism may have propaganda value, but mislabels the Taliban and the nature of the fighting. The Taliban and its direct supporters form what is very close to a classic insurgent movement that seeks to infiltrate, establish influence, and take control by military means. Terrorism is a Taliban tactic (as well as one of many other insurgent groups), but there is no meaningful way to distinguish between its actions as an insurgent force or to even find reliable data to use according to any given definition.

This section does show START and IHS Jane’s efforts to estimate the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, but these caveats about the actual nature of the violence in Afghanistan must be kept carefully in mind. In broad terms, calling an insurgency that is directed almost solely towards gaining power a “terrorist” group makes no real sense, and now there are real terrorist threats in Afghanistan like ISIS

The START analytic annex for 2016 reports that:

- The total number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan decreased 22% between 2015 and 2016, while the total number of deaths decreased 14%. At the same time, perpetrator deaths declined 7%, and the percentage of total fatalities in Afghanistan that were perpetrator deaths remained especially high – 51%, compared to 26% worldwide.

- Attacks carried out by the Taliban in 2016 killed more than 3,500 people (including nearly 2,000 perpetrators) and wounded more than 3,500 additional people. The Khorasan branch of ISIS remained active in Afghanistan in 2016, carrying out 6% of attacks in which a perpetrator group was identified.

- Three of the 20 deadliest individual attacks in 2016 took place in Afghanistan – in Kunduz, Helmand, and Ghazni provinces. The Taliban claimed responsibility for all three attacks.
Attacks against police targets, especially personnel, checkpoints, and police buildings, comprised 35% of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in 2016. This represents a decrease from 2015, when 45% of all attacks in Afghanistan targeted police. However, police targets were still twice as prevalent in Afghanistan as worldwide (17%). Private citizens and property were targeted in one-third (33%) of the attacks in Afghanistan in 2016 (increased from 24% in 2015), followed by non-diplomatic government targets, which comprised 12% of attacks in 2016.

Pakistan is both a state sponsor of terrorism against Afghanistan and India, and suffers from serious internal threats. Its military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) branch have sponsored terrorist attacks and the Taliban in Afghanistan and a range of terrorist groups that have attacked India – some over its control of Kashmir. The START and IHS Jane’s data do not reflect state terrorism, and the show only terrorism on targets within Pakistan.

START summarized the situation in Pakistan in 2016 as follows:

In 2016, the total number of terrorist attacks reported in Pakistan decreased 27%, and the total number of deaths decreased 12%; however, the total number of people injured increased 29% in comparison to 2015. The number of perpetrators killed in attacks in Pakistan in 2016 decreased 25% between 2015 and 2016.Perpetrator deaths comprised 9% of all deaths in Pakistan in 2016, compared to 26% worldwide.

Two-thirds of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016 targeted the police (29%), private citizens and property (27%), and non-diplomatic government entities (11%). Although attacks on educational institutions, religious figures and institutions, and transportation targets each comprised 4-5% of all terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016, these types of targets were approximately twice as prevalent in Pakistan, compared to worldwide.

Again, estimates from different sources differ sharply in many respects. For example, START estimates some 1,927 incidents took place in Afghanistan in 2015; IHS Jane's estimates 1,185. START estimates some 1,615 incidents took place in Afghanistan in 2016; IHS Jane's estimates 1,004.
Incidents in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan: 1970-2016
(35,918 Incidents)

Highly Violent Incidents in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan: 1970-2016

27,266 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

32,337 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&region=8&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3
The total number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan decreased 22% between 2015 and 2016, while the total number of deaths decreased 14%. At the same time, perpetrator deaths declined 7%, and the percentage of total fatalities in Afghanistan that were perpetrator deaths remained especially high – 51%, compared to 26% worldwide.

Like Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Somalia, Afghanistan also experienced a large increase (47%) in the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in 2016.

Information about perpetrator groups was reported for two-thirds of all attacks in Afghanistan in 2016 (67%). Nearly all of these (94%) were attributed to the Taliban.

Attacks carried out by the Taliban in 2016 killed more than 3,500 people (including nearly 2,000 perpetrators) and wounded more than 3,500 additional people. The Khorasan branch of ISIS remained active in Afghanistan in 2016, carrying out 6% of attacks in which a perpetrator group was identified.

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In Afghanistan 7% of all terrorist attacks were suicide attacks in 2016. The number of suicide attacks declined from 137 in 2015 to 99 in 2016. With this latest decline, the prevalence of suicide attacks in Afghanistan is relatively consistent with the global average (6% in 2016).

Terrorist attacks continued to occur throughout Afghanistan in 2016, taking place in 33 of the country’s 34 provinces (with the exception of Panjsher province). The provinces that experienced the most attacks in 2016 were Helmand (8%), Nangarhar (8%), Kabul (7%), Kandahar (7%), and Faryab (6%).
Incidents in Afghanistan: 2000-2015
(9,566 Incidents)

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Afghanistan Attacks by Major Perpetrator: 2003-2016
6,617 Incidents (Does Not Include ISIS)

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Attack Type in Afghanistan: 2000-2015

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Afghanistan: Major Attacks: May 2016-Mid August 2017

Number of people killed in major attacks

APRIL '16  JULY  OCT.  JAN. '17  APRIL  JULY

Kabul

ISIS militants attack a protest. 80 killed
ISIS militants attack a Shi'ite mosque. 27 killed
Unknown militants attack near the German embassy. 150 killed

Other cities

ASADABAD
Taliban militants attack near the provincial government compound. 14 killed

MAZAR-I-SHARIF
Taliban militants attack army headquarters. 140 killed

The New York Times | Source: Institute for the Study of War

The July 30, 2017 quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) states that,

- From March 1 through May 31, 2017, the UN recorded 6,252 security incidents, a 21% increase from last quarter.
- From January 1, 2017, through May 8, 2017, there were 2,531 ANDSF service members killed in action and an additional 4,238 wounded in action.
- SIGAR is concerned that U.S. officials, whether at State, USAID, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, or elsewhere, cannot oversee the billions of dollars the United States is dedicating to Afghan reconstruction if, for the most part, they cannot leave the U.S. embassy compound. Hunkering down behind blast walls damages not only the U.S. civilian mission but also handicaps the U.S. military mission.
- In the long run, such extreme risk aversion and avoidance may even contribute to greater insecurity, since it limits U.S. diplomatic reach to the very Afghans necessary to foster stability, rule of law, and economic growth, while sending an unintended but dangerous message to friend and foe alike that the terrorists should be feared and may actually be winning.
- As of May 15, 2017, the struggle between the Afghan government and insurgents remains a stalemate, with the number of districts and the portion of the population under Afghan government and insurgent control unchanged since last quarter's February 15 assessment.
- USFOR-A reported 12,073 MOD personnel had been identified as "unaccounted for" in the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) as of May 11, 2017, some of whom could be ghosts.
- In the first six months of FY 1396 (which began December 22, 2016), Afghanistan's domestic revenues declined nearly 25% year-on-year and covered about 40% of total government expenditures.
- The estimated value of opiates produced in Afghanistan increased to $3.02 billion in 2016 from $1.56 billion in 2015. The value of opiates is worth more than two-thirds of the country's entire illicit agricultural sector.
According to SIGAR analysis, the United States has obligated an estimated $714 billion for all spending-including war fighting and reconstruction-in Afghanistan over more than 15 years.

The SIGAR report notes that the official estimate is that insurgent gains are still limited:

- According to USFOR-A, as of May 15, 2017, the struggle between the Afghan government and insurgents remains a stalemate, with the number of districts and the portion of the population under Afghan government and insurgent control unchanged since last quarter’s February 15 assessment. USFOR-A reported that approximately 59.7% of the country’s 407 districts are under Afghan government control or influence as of May 15, 2017, the same as last quarter, but a six-point decline from the same period last year.

- As of May 2017, there were 45 districts (in 15 provinces) under insurgent control (11 districts) or influence (34 districts). Therefore, 11.1% of the country’s total districts are still under insurgent control or influence, more than a two percentage-point increase from the same period in 2016. USFOR-A attributes the loss of government control or influence over territory to the ANDSF’s strategic approach to security prioritization, which involves identifying the most important areas that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat, and placing less emphasis on less vital areas...

- The number of contested districts (119) remains the same and represents 29.2% of all districts. It was not clear whether these districts are at risk or if, neither the insurgency nor the Afghan government exercises any significant control over these areas, as USFOR-A previously described.

- ...of the 407 districts of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 243 districts were under government control (97 districts) or influence (146 districts). USFOR-A reports again this quarter that there are three million Afghans living under insurgent control or influence...of, the 32.6 million people living in Afghanistan, USFOR-A determined that the majority, 21.4 million (65.6%), live in areas controlled or influenced by the government, while another 8.2 million people (25.2%) live in areas that are contested...
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The real world situation may, however, have been even more urgent than the SIGAR report indicates. There seems to be a strong element of the public relations exaggerations and lies that were all too common in the Vietnam follies in the official reporting of Taliban and insurgent gains. As a result, the need for immediate White House decisions and action may be even greater than the earlier data imply.

An article by Bill Roggio -- one of the most respected analysts of war -- in the August 1, 2017 edition of the *Long War Journal* notes that,

The battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban “remains a stalemate” and the number of districts under Taliban control or influence is “unchanged” since the last assessment by the US military was made more than five months ago. The Afghan government continue to cede “less vital areas” in order to “prevent defeat.”

That assessment, provided by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in its most recent quarterly report to United States Congress, is likely the best possible scenario provided by the US military. SIGAR’s evaluation is based on data provided by US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Resolute Support, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

The only problem is both USFOR-A and Resolute Support have significantly underestimated and understated the Taliban’s control of districts in the past...According to the report, the Taliban continues to control 11 districts and influences 34 of Afghanistan’s 407 districts (11 percent), while the Afghan government controls 97 districts and influences 146 (60 percent). Twenty-nine percent of Afghanistan’s districts remain contested.

According to SIGAR, Kunduz province has the largest percentage of districts under Taliban control or influence (five of seven). Uruzgan (four of six Taliban controlled or influenced) and Helmand (nine of 14) round out the top three.

USFOR-A's assessment of Helmand, for example, demonstrates that the US military is painting the rosier picture possible when it comes to determining the extent of Taliban control. USFOR-A claims that only nine of 14 districts are Taliban controlled or influenced, however the situation is far more dire than that. The Taliban now controls six of the province’s 14 districts (Baghran, Dishu, Khanashin, Now Zad, Musa Qala, and Sangin) and contests another seven, including the provincial capital (Lashkar Gah, Nahr-i-Sarraj, Nawa, Kajaki, Nad Ali, Marjah, and Garmsir), according to data compiled by *FDD’s Long War Journal*...In other words, 13 of Helmand’s 14 districts are at the very least contested – much more than the assessment of nine by USFOR-A.
Al Qaeda has taken advantage of the security situation in Helmand and is known to operate in southern Helmand. Fighters from al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent have reportedly trained at camps located in Helmand’s Dishu and Khanashin districts as recently as 2014. The town of Baramacha in Dishu is a known hub of jihadist activity. The camps are believed to be operational to this day. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, Al Qaeda operates in southern Helmand province.]

Another key indicator that USFOR-A’s data is skewed to present a more positive picture of the security situation is the identification of a problem area in southern Afghanistan. This region was previously described by FDD’s Long War Journal as a belt of bases in the south that stretches across the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Ghazni which are used to attack nearby provincial capitals and districts. According to SIGAR:

The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeastern Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for one-third of the 45 districts currently under insurgent control or influence.

While USFOR-A does not provide data on Taliban control or influence on a province by province basis, it did identify the Taliban threat in two provinces: Helmand and Uruzgan. According to USFOR-A, there are 13 districts controlled or influence in Helmand and Uruzgan combined. If one-third of the 45 districts (15) controlled or influenced by the Taliban reside in the region, then this means only two districts in Zabul and Kandahar are Taliban controlled or influenced. The data clearly shows otherwise.

The Taliban clearly controls three districts in northern Kandahar (Miya Nishin, Khakrez, and Ghorak) and two more in Zabul (Khak-e-Afghan and Arghandab). Several others, including Arghastan, Khakrez, Maruf, Maiwand, and Shah Wali Kot in Kandahar, are contested.

Like in Helmand, al Qaeda has taken advantage of the security situation in Kandahar province to established bases. Up until Oct. 2015, al Qaeda ran two large training camps in Shorabak district. US forces killed more than 150 al Qaeda fighters while raiding the camps.

The official estimates also make no attempt to indicate where the Central Government has control versus a range of power brokers, warlords, and narcotraffickers, and seem to assume that control of even limited areas in a District capital implies control of the district unless there is actual fighting.
UN OHCA Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 9/2015

More than half of the districts in Afghanistan are rated by the United Nations as having either a substantial, high or extreme level of risk.
ISW Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 11.23.16-3.15.17

Source: ISW. https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map+/151a7e717269d3cb
Long War Journal: Estimates of Afghan Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts: March 1, 2017

Taliban Claims of Its Percent of Control

### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Afghanistan

**NOTE:** START reports 1,927 incidents in 2015 and 1,615 in 2016

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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State, Taliban**

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IHS Jane’s: Taliban in 2016

Scope: Domestic
Orientation: Sunni
Objective: Revolutionary

In Afghanistan, a total of 533 attacks were claimed by, or attributed to, the Taliban in open sources in 2016. This made the Taliban the eighth most active group recorded worldwide, notably down from fourth in 2015. Nonetheless, Taliban attacks rose 6% despite violence falling by 15% in Afghanistan overall, highlighting the continued significant threat posed by the group. Notably the group failed to seize control of any provincial capitals across the year, but continued to undermine government control in key areas of the country, both urban and rural. The overall threat posed by the group in the coming year will likely be mitigated somewhat by the Taliban’s internal divisions and competition from the Islamic State’s local affiliate.

Countries in which the group is active:
– Afghanistan
DNI Assessments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2017

Afghanistan

The overall situation in Afghanistan will very likely continue to deteriorate, even if international support is sustained. Endemic state weaknesses, the government’s political fragility, deficiencies of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Taliban persistence, and regional interference will remain key impediments to improvement. Kabul’s political dysfunction and ineffectiveness will almost certainly be the greatest vulnerability to stability in 2017. ANSF performance will probably worsen due to a combination of Taliban operations, ANSF combat casualties, desertions, poor logistics support, and weak leadership. The ANSF will almost certainly remain heavily dependent on foreign military and financial support to sustain themselves and preclude their collapse. Although the Taliban was unsuccessful in seizing a provincial capital in 2016, it effectively navigated its second leadership transition in two years following the death of its former chief, Mansur, and is likely to make gains in 2017. The fighting will also continue to threaten US personnel, allies, and partners, particularly in Kabul and urban population centers. ISIS’s Khorasan branch (ISIS-K)—which constitutes ISIS’s most significant presence in South Asia—will probably remain a low-level developing threat to Afghan stability as well as to US and Western interests in the region in 2017.

Pakistan

Pakistani-based terrorist groups will present a sustained threat to US interests in the region and continue to plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan. The threat to the United States and the West from Pakistani-based terrorist groups will be persistent but diffuse. Plotting against the US homeland will be conducted on a more opportunistic basis or driven by individual members within these groups... Pakistan will probably be able to manage its internal security. Anti-Pakistan groups will probably focus more on soft targets. The groups we judge will pose the greatest threat to Pakistan’s internal security include Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat ul-Ahrar, al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent, ISIS-K, Laskhar-e Jhangvi, and Lashkar-e Jhangvi al-Alami. The emerging China Pakistan Economic Corridor will probably offer militants and terrorists additional targets. Pakistan’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Early deployment during a crisis of smaller, more mobile nuclear weapons would increase the amount of time that systems would be outside the relative security of a storage site, increasing the risk that a coordinated attack by non-state actors might succeed in capturing a complete nuclear weapon.
Afghanistan and the Taliban

In South Asia, over the past year Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) responded to Taliban pressure on population centers, while sustaining operations against al-Qa’ida and ISIS-Khorasan, which helped to restrict ISIS-Khorasan’s territory. Despite some improvements to command and control and integration of air capabilities, the ANDSF remains beset by persistent shortfalls in combined arms and intelligence integration, as well as overall force generation and sustainment.

In 2017, we believe the ANDSF will incrementally improve its capabilities to challenge the Taliban, but military operations will not be decisive. We expect the Taliban to further consolidate control mostly in rural terrain and continue to pressure provincial capitals in Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kunduz Provinces.

At the tactical level, we judge the Taliban will keep trying to overrun vulnerable ANDSF positions and population centers and will conduct intermittent high-profile attacks in key cities to degrade confidence in Afghan government-provided security.

We believe the ANDSF will need to increasingly focus on long-range planning to improve endemic institutional deficiencies in leadership, force generation, and sustainment in order to defeat the Taliban.

Coalition train, advise, and assist efforts in 2017 will be critical to improving the ANDSF’s ability to forestall Taliban advances beyond rural areas and in improving ministerial planning and development.

Pakistan

In 2017, Islamabad is likely to slowly shift from traditional counterinsurgency operations along Pakistan’s western border to more counterterrorism and paramilitary operations throughout the country, which have had some success in reducing violence from militant, sectarian, terrorist, and separatist groups. Anti-Pakistan groups probably will respond to this sustained pressure by focusing their efforts against soft targets. Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile continues to grow. We are concerned that this growth, as well as an evolving doctrine and inherent security issues associated with Pakistan’s developing tactical nuclear weapons, presents an enduring risk. Islamabad is taking steps to improve its nuclear security and is aware of the extremist threat to its program.
IEP Estimate of Afghanistan as of 2015

**AFGHANISTAN**

**GTI RANK** 2
**GTI SCORE** 9.444

**ATTACKS BY TARGET**
- Police
- Private citizens and property
- Government
- Unknown
- Other

**DEATHS BY GROUP**
- Taliban
- Unknown
- Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State
- Haqqani Network
- Other

**TOTAL DEATHS SINCE 2000**
- 22,730

**WORST ATTACK**
The Taliban raided Kunduz, storming the prison. There were 240 deaths.

In 2016, the total number of terrorist attacks reported in Pakistan decreased 27%, and the total number of deaths decreased 12%; however, the total number of people injured increased 29% in comparison to 2015. The number of perpetrators killed in attacks in Pakistan in 2016 decreased 25% between 2015 and 2016. Perpetrator deaths comprised 9% of all deaths in Pakistan in 2016, compared to 26% worldwide.

For 70% of all attacks in Pakistan, source materials did not identify a perpetrator group. Of the remaining attacks, 30% were carried out by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the most active and deadly perpetrator group in Pakistan in 2016. The number of terrorist attacks carried out by TTP continued to decline, to 67 in 2016, down from 136 in 2013. However, following sharp declines in previous years, the lethality of attacks carried out by TTP increased in 2016 to 283 total deaths, up from 240 in 2015.

In addition, the Khorasan branch of ISIS – which first claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Pakistan in December 2014 – carried out 13% of attacks in Pakistan in 2016. ISIS operatives increased their activity in Pakistan in 2016, carrying out 29 attacks (+93% compared to 2015) that killed a total of 154 people (+191%) and wounded 271 others (+613%).

Lashkar i Jhangvi was responsible for 9% of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016. These included an attack in October in which three assailants armed with explosives and firearms held 300 police cadets hostage in an overnight standoff at a training facility in Quetta. In addition to the assailants, 64 people were killed and more than 160 were injured.

Fourteen other groups, including a number of Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Republican Army, and the United Baloch Army, carried out attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan.

Two-thirds of terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016 targeted the police (29%), private citizens and property (27%), and non-diplomatic government entities (11%). Although attacks on educational institutions, religious figures and institutions, and transportation targets each comprised 4-5% of all terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016, these types of targets were approximately twice as prevalent in Pakistan, compared to worldwide.

Key START Country Profile Data – Pakistan - II

- The majority of attacks in Pakistan in 2016 took place in Balochistan (41%) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (29%). The declines in terrorist violence between 2015 and 2016 were particularly steep in Sindh province, where attacks decreased by 54% (178 in 2015 to 82 in 2016) and total deaths decreased by 77% (293 in 2015 to 68 in 2016). In contrast, a 25% decline in attacks in Balochistan between 2015 and 2016 coincided with a 50% increase in total deaths.
Incidents in Pakistan: 2000-2015
(10,951 Incidents)

Pakistan 2011-2016
9,125 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Attack Type in Pakistan: 2000-2015

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
### IHS Jane's 2016 Global Attack Index – Pakistan

NOTE: START reports 1,238 incidents in 2015 and 861 in 2016

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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</tr>
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<td>1,422</td>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Terrorism in South Asia
The data in this section show that India is a major center of terrorist activity, although its large size and immense population must be considered in making such assessments. Unfortunately, the data do not distinguish between the religious nature of the perpetrators and targets in a country where religion is a key factor, and do not distinguish by ethnic group.

This is a critical problem throughout the sources now available. They often report on weapon and target type, and data like casualties, but ignore some of the key factors driving terrorism in given countries and on a regional and global basis.

The START analysis rather strikingly does not mention Pakistan or the role of Pakistani extremist groups in supporting terrorism in India in the country summary provided in the State Department analytic annex for 2016. It does note, however, that:

- Although India ranked highly among countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2016, the lethality of these attacks remained relatively low compared to other countries that also experienced a great deal of terrorist violence. On average, terrorist attacks in India caused 0.4 total deaths per attack in 2016, compared to 2.4 deaths per attack worldwide. Nearly three-quarters of attacks (73%) in India in 2016 were non-lethal. The deadliest attack in India in 2016 took place in July, when the Communist Party of India – Maoist detonated explosives and opened fire on Central Reserve Police Force personnel in Bihar state. Sixteen people were killed in the attack, including six assailants.

- The number of perpetrators killed in terrorist attacks in India decreased 20% in 2016.

- There was a sharp increase in the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in India in 2015. This pattern – which was largely the result of relatively few attacks involving especially large numbers of people kidnapped or taken hostage – reversed in 2016. The total number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in India, decreased 63%, from 866 in 2015, to 317 in 2016.

- A majority of terrorist attacks in India in 2016 involved either bombings/explosions (47%) or armed assaults (18%). In addition, kidnappings were particularly prevalent in India (15% of all attacks, compared to 10% worldwide), as were facility/infrastructure attacks (12% of all attacks, compared to 6% worldwide).
• More than half of the terrorist attacks in India in 2016 took place in four states: Jammu and Kashmir (19%), Chhattisgarh (18%), Manipur (12%), and Jharkhand (10%). This geographic pattern is relatively stable compared to 2015, with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, which experienced an especially large (+93%) increase in attacks in 2016.

• Information about the perpetrator groups responsible for terrorist attacks in India was reported in source materials for 55% of all attacks. Compared to the other countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks and fatalities in 2016, the diversity of perpetrator groups was much greater in India, with 52 active groups. However, nearly two-thirds of the terrorist attacks carried out in India in 2016 (65%) were attributed to the Communist Party of India-Maoist or Maoist perpetrators not specifically identified as belonging to a particular organization.

The data also show that Bangladesh and Nepal have also had high levels of terrorism, but that levels have recently dropped sharply. Once again, the charts show that the START incident counts and IHS Jane’s attack counts often differ strikingly.
Incidents in South Asia Region: 2011-2016
23,741 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents by Selected Country in South Asia Region: 1970-2016

30,165 Incidents

CSIS Map of START Estimate of Attacks in South Asia in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
# IHS Jane's 2016 Global Attack Index – India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka

**Start Estimates of Incidents:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>469</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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### India

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>369</td>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>1,836</td>
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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- Islamic State, PKK

### Bangladesh

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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- Islamic State

### Nepal

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<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
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**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- Islamic State

### Sri Lanka

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**
- Islamic State

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
START Country Profile Data 2016 – India

• Both the number of terrorist attacks (+16%) and the total number of deaths (+17%) increased in India in 2016.

• Although India ranked highly among countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2016, the lethality of these attacks remained relatively low compared to other countries that also experienced a great deal of terrorist violence. On average, terrorist attacks in India caused 0.4 total deaths per attack in 2016, compared to 2.4 deaths per attack worldwide. Nearly three-quarters of attacks (73%) in India in 2016 were non-lethal. The deadliest attack in India in 2016 took place in July, when the Communist Party of India – Maoist detonated explosives and opened fire on Central Reserve Police Force personnel in Bihar state. Sixteen people were killed in the attack, including six assailants.

• The number of perpetrators killed in terrorist attacks in India decreased 20% in 2016.

• There was a sharp increase in the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in India in 2015. This pattern – which was largely the result of relatively few attacks involving especially large numbers of people kidnapped or taken hostage – reversed in 2016. The total number of people kidnapped or taken hostage in terrorist attacks in India, decreased 63%, from 866 in 2015 to 317 in 2016.

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• More than half of the terrorist attacks in India in 2016 took place in four states: Jammu and Kashmir (19%), Chhattisgarh (18%), Manipur (12%), and Jharkhand (10%). This geographic pattern is relatively stable compared to 2015, with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, which experienced an especially large (+93%) increase in attacks in 2016.

• Information about the perpetrator groups responsible for terrorist attacks in India was reported in source materials for 55% of all attacks. Compared to the other countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks and fatalities in 2016, the diversity of perpetrator groups was much greater in India, with 52 active groups. However, nearly two-thirds of the terrorist attacks carried out in India in 2016 (65%) were attributed to the Communist Party of India-Maoist or Maoist perpetrators not specifically identified as belonging to a particular organization.

Incidents in India: 2000-2015
(6,900 Incidents)

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
India 2011-2016
4,711 Incidents

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
Attack Type in India: 2000-2015

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – India

NOTE: START reports 883 incidents in 2015 and 1,019 in 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>369</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>1,836</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of India as of 2015

Terrorism in China
The data on China, like that on Central Asia, seem to only include major incidents. They are unusually uncertain totals and clearly lack in comparability to the data for most other regions. This may reflect START's dependence on media reporting, which is subject to higher levels of censorship in some regions than others.

It is important to note that the U.S. and China do differ over the definition of terrorism and how to characterize a number of activist groups. This is particularly true of some Uighur groups. The START chronology data shown here indicate, however, that they largely agree on characterize terrorists once they use any form of violence.

Once again, a table in this section shows significant differences between the START and IHS Jane’s estimates.

A detailed breakout of the data on China is not provided for these reasons.
(247 Incidents)

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in China: 2011-2016
(79 Incidents)

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Attack Type in China: 2011-2016
(79 Incidents)

- Armed Assault (37)
- Assassination (2)
- Bombing/Explosion (33)
- Facility/Infrastructure... (4)
- Hostage Taking (Kidnap)... (1)
- Unarmed Assault (3)
- Unknown (2)

Attack Type in China: 2000-2015

Target Type in China: 2011-2016
79 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Weapons Type in China: 2011-2016
(79 Incidents)

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Weapons Type in China: 2000-2015

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
China – Casualties: 2011-2016

(79 Incidents)

Fatalities Per Incident

Injured Per Incident

Source: START Data Base,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0.
NOTE: START reports 17 incidents in 2015 and 5 in 2016

IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – China

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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016

<table>
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<th>GTD ID</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>PERPETRATOR GROUP</th>
<th>FATALITIES</th>
<th>INJURED</th>
<th>TARGET TYPE</th>
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Source: START, [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx); All incidents regardless of doubt.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GTD ID</th>
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Source: START, [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx); All incidents regardless of doubt.

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Source: START, [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx); All incidents regardless of doubt.

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Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Terrorism in Central Asia: 1970-2016
The data on Central Asia, like the data for China, seem to only include a small selection of major violent incidents. Like the data on China, they seem unusually uncertain and lacking in comparability to the data for most other regions. This may reflect dependence on media reporting which is subject to censorship, but China’s tight internal security may keep the number of attacks low even for a country of its size and population.

Once again, there are significant differences between the START and the IHS Jane’s estimates.

Only a limited breakout of the data is provided for these reasons. It is clear, however, that as in other regions, terrorism differs strikingly by county and that national causes and conditions – rather than broad regional or ideological trends and causes – drive the real-world nature of terrorism in any given case.
Incidents in Central Asia: 1970-2016

2011-2016
62 Incidents

1970-2016
554 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Central Asia Region: 2011-2016
62 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan: 2011-2016 37 Incidents

Source: START, (Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan)
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan: 2011-2016

Kazakhstan: 16 Incidents
Kyrgyzstan: 9 Incidents
Tajikistan: 10 Incidents
Turkmenistan: 1 Incident
Uzbekistan: 1 Incident

Source: START database, All incidents regardless of doubt. Country: (Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=103,107,202,210,219
### HIS Jane’s Global Attack Index -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan: 2015-2016

#### Start Estimates of Incidents:

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Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016. The report does not cover Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
Terrorism in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania
The data on various subregions of Asia make it clear that regional summaries can disguise the true nature of terrorism and threat. The key patterns are national and plays out in strikingly different ways even in neighboring states.

The START data on East Asia and Northeast Asia, for example, show that China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea all have low levels of terrorism, but that China and Japan still stand out – somewhat surprisingly – relative to the two Koreas.

The START data on Southeast Asia – Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam – show that Thailand is the driving center of terrorist activity in the sub-region. A country-by-country breakout shows, however, that Myanmar and Indonesia also have significant activity at a much lower level. The data again fail to show the causes and underlying patterns because they do not take account of political unrest in Thailand and problems with Muslim minorities in the South.

The data for Myanmar do not trace the extent to which they are impacted by the Rohingya minority, tribal violence, and various warlord and drug groups in the East. The data on Indonesia do not characterize the tribal, ethnic, or religious character of the targets, but seem to be driven by Islamic extremism.

The data on the Philippines show high levels of terrorism and receive special attention in the START annex to the State Department’s country reports on terrorism. The summary in the START analysis for 2016 also provides some additional useful comparisons of global trends:

- Terrorist violence in the Philippines was relatively consistent between 2015 and 2016. However, due to declining frequency of terrorist attacks elsewhere, the Philippines ranked fifth among countries in terms of total attacks in 2016. The number of attacks in the Philippines declined by 2% (490 in 2015 to 482 in 2016), and the total number of deaths in the Philippines increased by 5% (260 in 2015 to 272 in 2016).

- Like India, the average lethality of terrorist attacks in the Philippines (0.6 deaths per attack) was markedly lower than the global average in 2016 (2.4 deaths per attack). Terrorist attacks in the Philippines were slightly less likely to be successful (76%), compared to worldwide trends (81%).
• Among the ten countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2016, the percentage of people killed who were perpetrators was lowest in the Philippines – 7%. This figure has declined since 2014, when 21% of all deaths in the Philippines were perpetrator deaths.

• Although the number of terrorist attacks in the Philippines in which people were kidnapped or taken hostage remained stable between 2015 and 2016, the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage increased 70%, from 127 in 2015 to 216 in 2016.

• For 57% of all attacks in the Philippines in 2016, the source materials did not identify the perpetrator group responsible for the attack. Among the remaining attacks, 57% were carried out by the (CPP/NPA), 20% were carried out by the ASG, and 13% were attributed to the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement. An additional 6% of remaining attacks (12 events) were attributed to ISIS or the ISIS-linked Maute Group.

• Terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 2016 targeted non-diplomatic government targets more than any other type of target. In fact, these targets comprised 39% of all attacks in the Philippines, compared to 10% globally. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the attacks on government entities targeted politicians, political parties, and political rallies/meetings, rather than government employees and facilities (17%), or election-related targets (10%). An additional 21% of attacks in the Philippines in 2016 targeted private citizens and property, and 12% targeted the police.

• The primary tactics used by terrorists in the Philippines differed considerably from global trends in 2016. Although bombings were the most common tactic in the Philippines, they comprised one-third (33%) of all attacks in the Philippines, compared to more than half (57%) worldwide. In contrast, assassinations were more than four times as prevalent in the Philippines (29% of all attacks) as globally (7% of all attacks). The frequency of assassinations increased 131% between 2014 and 2016. In 2016, the vast majority of these attacks (81%) targeted politicians and political party members.

• Sixty of the Philippines’ 81 provinces experienced terrorist attacks in 2016. Although the attacks were geographically dispersed, five locations experienced more than 20 attacks throughout the year: Maguindanao (62), Basilan (32), North Cotabato (27), Masbate (23), and Batangas (22).

The data on Oceania show negligible levels of terrorism.

Once again, there are significant differences between the START count of incidents and the IHS Jane’s count of attacks.
Incidents in East, Southeast, and Oceania Asia: 1970-2016

2011-2016
5,490 Incidents

1970-2016
12,511 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
CSIS Map of START Estimate of Attacks in East Asia in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
Incidents in China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea: 2011-2016 97 Incidents

Source: START, (Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan)
Incidents in Southeast Asia Region

1970-2016

11,543 Incidents

2011-2016

5,356 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar; Thailand; Vietnam: 2011-2016

2,359 Incidents

Source: START, Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia, Myanmar; Thailand; Vietnam
Incidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand: 2011-2016

Indonesia: 175 Incidents

Myanmar: 162 Incidents

Thailand: 1,962 Incidents

Malaysia: 51 Incidents

Source: START database, NOTE: VIETNAM IS REPORTED TO HAVE ZERO INCIDENTS
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=164&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Attack Types in Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar; Thailand; Vietnam: 2011-2016  
2,359 Incidents

Source: START, Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia, Myanmar; Thailand; Vietnam

8,199 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

10,583 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/?back=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=147,182,1004,195&weapon=6,5,8
START Country Profile Data 2016 – Philippines

• Terrorist violence in the Philippines was relatively consistent between 2015 and 2016. However, due to declining frequency of terrorist attacks elsewhere, the Philippines ranked fifth among countries in terms of total attacks in 2016. The number of attacks in the Philippines declined by 2% (490 in 2015 to 482 in 2016), and the total number of deaths in the Philippines increased by 5% (260 in 2015 to 272 in 2016).

• Like India, the average lethality of terrorist attacks in the Philippines (0.6 deaths per attack) was markedly lower than the global average in 2016 (2.4 deaths per attack). Terrorist attacks in the Philippines were slightly less likely to be successful (76%) in the Philippines, compared to worldwide trends (81%).

• Among the ten countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2016, the percentage of people killed who were perpetrators was lowest in the Philippines – 7%. This figure has declined since 2014, when 21% of all deaths in the Philippines were perpetrator deaths.

• Although the number of terrorist attacks in the Philippines in which people were kidnapped or taken hostage remained stable between 2015 and 2016, the number of people kidnapped or taken hostage increased 70%, from 127 in 2015 to 216 in 2016.

• In three cases, one carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in January and two carried out by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) in November and December, approximately 20 to 30 civilians were abducted from a bus and released the same day.

• For 57% of all attacks in the Philippines in 2016, the source materials did not identify the perpetrator group responsible for the attack. Among the remaining attacks, 57% were carried out by the (CPP/NPA), 20% were carried out by the ASG, and 13% were attributed to the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement. An additional 6% of remaining attacks (12 events) were attributed to ISIS or the ISIS-linked Maute Group.

• Terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 2016 targeted non-diplomatic government targets more than any other type of target. In fact, these targets comprised 39% of all attacks in the Philippines, compared to 10% globally. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the attacks on government entities targeted politicians, political parties, and political rallies/meetings, rather than government employees and facilities (17%), or election-related targets (10%). An additional 21% of attacks in the Philippines in 2016 targeted private citizens and property, and 12% targeted the police.

• The primary tactics used by terrorists in the Philippines differed considerably from global trends in 2016. Although bombings were the most common tactic in the Philippines, they comprised one-third (33%) of all attacks in the Philippines, compared to more than half (57%) worldwide. In contrast, assassinations were more than four times as prevalent in the Philippines (29% of all attacks) as globally (7% of all attacks). The frequency of assassinations increased 131% between 2014 and 2016. In 2016, the vast majority of these attacks (81%) targeted politicians and political party members.

• Sixty of the Philippines’ 81 provinces experienced terrorist attacks in 2016. Although the attacks were geographically dispersed, five locations experienced more than 20 attacks throughout the year: Maguindanao (62), Basilan (32), North Cotabato (27), Masbate (23), and Batangas (22).
Incidents in Philippines

1970-2016

6,212 Incidents

2010-2016

2,997 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
CSIS Map of START Estimate of Attacks in Oceania in 2015

Source: Max Markusen. Project Manager, Research Associate, Dracopoulos iDeas Lab | Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS |
(34 Incidents)

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt, Country: (Australia; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=14,144,157
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>329</td>
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</table>

## IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – China, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand

### China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</table>

### Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>332</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>257</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
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</table>

### Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
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### Thailand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

### Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:

- **Islamic State**

---

*Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016*
# IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Myanmar, Australia, South Korea, Japan

## Start Estimates of Incidents:

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Myanmar</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
Islamic State, PKK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
Islamic State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic of Korea</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
Islamic State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
Islamic State

Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa presents a number of complex problems in estimating terrorism. As the graphs in this section show, countries differ sharply within a given sub-region. START estimates that several countries dominate in terms of incidents – Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, and Somalia. Its estimates do, however, present problems. The graph total estimated incidents for 2011-2016 for Somalia are 2,697, which is exactly the same as the graph and total for Al Shabaab as a perpetrator. This means that every incident could assigned to one perpetrator, and ignores reported Al Shabaab activity in Kenya.

Several broad patterns do emerge. Islamist extremist groups dominate the rise of terrorism in Western and Eastern Africa, but tribal and regional differences also play a major role and the struggle is at least as much one for power as over religion per se. Stability, and conversely the level of terrorism, is highly dependent on the quality of governance and popular support and unity, which helps explain the high level of differences between neighboring states.

One key case where terrorism is largely a function of poor governance and internal tribal and regional differences is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has now experienced chronic instability for over half a century.

The START reporting on South Africa makes a sharp contrast to the reported levels of terrorism in other areas of Africa. The numbers of incidents are very low.


This again illustrates how difficult it is for any outside organization to estimate terrorist patterns that lacks the resources and access a government has to intelligence data, as well as the fact that reporting and definitions vary sharply by country and according to a government’s political stand and control of its media.
Incidents in Sub-Saharan Africa: 2011-2016
8,937 Incidents

Incidents in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1970-2016

2011-2016
8,937 Incidents

1970-2016
15,491 Incidents

Highly Violent Incidents in Nigeria, the Sudans, and Somalia: 1970-2016

5,623 incidents of armed assault and bombing/explosions

6,809 incidents using firearms, explosives, bombs, and incendiaries

Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/?back=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=147,182,1004,195&weapon=6,5,8
Incidents in West Africa: 2011-2016
3,751 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt. Country: (Benin; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Chad; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Togo; Western Sahara)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=23&country=33&country=37&country=42&country=73&country=76&country=84&country=85&country=112&country=123&country=128&country=146&country=147&country=174&country=204&country=349&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Incidents in Different selection of Countries in N.W. Sub-Saharan Africa
1,124 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=34&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
734 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt. Country: (Benin; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Chad; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Togo; Western Sahara)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=23&country=33&country=37&country=42&country=73&country=76&country=84&country=85&country=112&country=123&country=128&country=146&country=147&country=174&country=177&country=204&country=349&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Nigeria: 2011-2016
3,017 Incidents

Source: START,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=147&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=. ; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Boko Haram: 2011-2016
2,063 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=30101&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=?; All incidents regardless of doubt.
IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Nigeria

START counts 637 incidents for 2015 and 531 for 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>852</td>
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<td>Non-Military Injured</td>
<td>1,754</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: Islamic State

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
IEP Estimate of Nigeria as of 2015

698 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=23&country=33&country=37&country=42&country=73&country=76&country=84&country=85&country=112&country=123&country=128&country=146&country=147&country=174&country=177&country=204&country=349&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Incidents in East Africa: 2011-2016
3,998 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt. Country: (Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Somalia; Sudan; Tanzania; South Sudan)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=23&country=42&country=37&country=33&country=33&country=76&country=73&country=84&country=85&country=112&country=123&country=128&country=146&country=147&country=174&country=177&country=204&country=349&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
2,697 Incidents

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=182&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Incidents Caused by Al Shabaab: 2011-2016
2,697 Incidents

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=182&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
IEP Estimate of Somalia as of 2015

START – Al Shabaab 2011-2016

2,528 Incidents

Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
9 Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

Scope: Transnational
Orientation: Sunni
Objective: Revolutionary

In Somalia and Kenya, a total of 388 attacks were claimed by, or attributed to, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in open sources in 2016. This made Al-Shabaab the ninth most active group recorded worldwide, up from tenth in 2015, alongside a 64% increase in attacks. Across the year, Al-Shabaab put increasing pressure on AMISOM peacekeeping forces in rural areas, forcing further withdrawals from bases and towns in southern Somalia and allowing the group to re-establish itself operationally and territorially. Consequently the tempo of mass-casualty attacks, typically utilising suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) in the capital Mogadishu also rose.

Countries in which the group is active:
- Somalia
- Kenya
Incidents in Sudan and South Sudan: 2011-2016

Sudan: 612 Incidents

South Sudan: 171 Incidents

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=182&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
232 Incidents

Source: START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=182&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Democratic Republic of the Congo
482 Incidents

Ethiopia
33 Incidents

Kenya
449 Incidents

Burundi
199 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=34&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=.
# IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda

## Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>353</td>
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<tr>
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<td>423</td>
<td>335</td>
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<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
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<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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## Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>232</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
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</table>

## Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>926</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>897</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
- Islamic State
- Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

## South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>323</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tbody>
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Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
- Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

## Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>0</td>
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## Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:
- Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
# IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, South Africa, Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Republic of the Congo</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td><strong>2016</strong></td>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**

- Angola
  - 2015: 1, 2016: 2
  - Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: **Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen**

- South Africa
  - 2015: 59, 2016: 52
  - Groups Operating in Country from Top 10: **Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen**

- Mozambique
  - 2015: 9, 2016: 73
  - 2015: 2, 2016: 34
  - 2015: 2, 2016: 0

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Terrorism in Caribbean and Central and South America
The START and IHS Jane’s reporting on South America makes a sharp contrast to many other regions in the world. The level of terrorism is very low compared to the patterns in other developing regions and shows a sharp decline since the levels of Marxist guerilla activity in the mid-1970s to early 1990s.

START does not report any significant level of terrorist activity for the Caribbean and Central America during 2011-2016.

The only major source of guerrilla activity in the northern part of South America was in Colombia, and the START data shows a sharp drop that seems likely to be prolong if Colombian peace negotiations prove to have a lasting impact.

The START data for the southern part of South America do show more terrorist activity, but the levels remain very low and no one country emerged as the center of even low level activity.

Once again, START and IHS Jane’s differ, even though both sources agree that the levels of activity are very low. In the case of Colombia, START reports 135 incidents for 2015, and IHS Jane’s reports 213 attacks. START reports 85 incidents for Columbia in 2016, and IHS Jane’s reports 156 attacks. Similarly, in the case of Venezuela, START reports 3 incidents for 2015, and IHS Jane’s reports 27 attacks. START reports 6 incidents for 2016, and IHS Jane’s reports 27 attacks.
Incidents in Caribbean, Central and South America: 1970-2016

2011-2016
1,033 Incidents

1970-2016
29,102 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Caribbean: 2011-2016

8 Incidents

Source: START, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Central America: 2011-2016

16 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt. Belize; Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Nicaragua; Panama.
Incidents in Guatemala: 1970-2016

2011-2016
7 Incidents

1970-2016
2,050 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=45&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Northern South America: 2011-2016

830 Incidents

Source: START, Country: (Colombia; Ecuador; French Guiana; Guyana; Suriname; Venezuela)

2011-2016
808 Incidents

1970-2016
8,163 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=45&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Southern South America: 2011-2016

178 Incidents

Source: START, Country: (Colombia; Ecuador; French Guiana; Guyana; Suriname; Venezuela)
Incidents in Peru: 1970-2016

2011-2016
41 Incidents

1970-2016
6,088 Incidents

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=45&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=; All incidents regardless of doubt.
Incidents in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela: 2011-2016

Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&country=45&asmSelect1=&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=; All incidents regardless of doubt.
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominican Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honduras</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jamaica</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nicaragua</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:**

**Dominican Republic**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

**Guatemala**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

**Haiti**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

**Honduras**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

**Jamaica**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

**Nicaragua**

- Number of Attacks
- Non-Militant Fatalities
- Non-Military Wounded
- Suicide Attacks

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
### IHS Jane’s 2016 Global Attack Index – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Paraguay, Venezuela

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
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<td>Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Attacks</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Militant Fatalities</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Military Wounded</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groups Operating in Country from Top 10:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: IHS Janes, Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016

Acts of terrorism, insurgency, and violent protest recorded by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre in 2016
Sources, Analytic Cautions and Challenges
This analysis provides a comparative overview of some of the leading open source different metrics for measuring the patterns in global and regional terrorism in 2016, how terrorism varies by region, and the relative impact of extremism.

It should be stressed that it relies on summary graphs, charts, and maps to explore a range of metrics that have many key limitations and problems, and where the caveats and definitions used by each source require a reader seeking to fully understand the trends presented in this report to examine the sources listed, read the description of how the data are collected, defined, and presented and the supporting narrative.

**Drawing on the START Data Base and Other Sources**

The report draws heavily on the START data base maintained by the University of Maryland and used by the State Department in its annual country reports on terrorism. ([https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)) The START database is now the closest thing available to an official U.S. data base, and is the primary source of most U.S. media, research center, and academic estimates.

It also draws heavily on the summary public reporting of IHS Janes, the EU and Europol, and the work of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) and its *Global Terrorism Index 2016*. The IEP also makes use of START, but is a source of independent estimates and narrative analyses, and makes independent assessments of the impact of terrorism and its economics. ([https://www.google.com/search?q=institute+for+economics+and+peace+global+terrorism+index&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8.](https://www.google.com/search?q=institute+for+economics+and+peace+global+terrorism+index&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8.))

**Key Challenges and Problems In the Metrics of Terrorism**

Many of the broad trends presented in this study seem valid, and comparative views are presented where major differences exist between sources. However, no analysis can overcome the fact that the START data base and most open source reporting rely heavily on media reporting and have major gaps and uncertainties that are normally clearly recognized in their detailed description of their database and its supporting analyses.
Reporting varies sharply for given countries in a given region, but is particularly weak in the areas where many governments fail to allow accurate reporting on terrorism in their media. Useful as the START data base and other independent analyses are, relying on public reporting leaves major problems and gaps in the data available, particularly in East and Central Asia.

**Broader Problems in the Data and Reporting**

Moreover, cataloguing the trends, methods of analysis, and data from the wide range of sources used in in this survey has revealed a much wider range of problems. It is clear there may be critical problems in the ways many analysts approach terrorism and counterterrorism:

- The definition of “terrorism” used in many sources is not clearly stated, and it is often politicized.
- Most sources do not show how they separate “terrorism” from insurgency, internal conflicts, and low-intensity conflict. The rising level of such violence in the MENA and other regions is either treated as terrorism or not addressed.
- Sources vary in attempting to estimate uncertainty, and many do not fully explain their methodology and source of data.
- Reporting on state-sponsored terrorism is extremely erratic and is limited largely to criticism that focuses on a few hostile powers in ways that are highly politicized and lacking in detail. No effort is made to estimate state covert action or terrorism against given elements of its population, or the widespread use of military forces to kill and terrorize civilians by regime like the Assad regime in Syria.
- Responsibility and are catalogued as hate crimes. The end result is often massively undercount the actual level of violence by Islamist extremists, sectarian and ethnic fighters, and tribal violence.
- There is no clear source of comparative data on the size, cost, nature, and comparative effectiveness of various counterterrorism efforts by country and international organization.
Only limited snapshots exist of the factors that cause terrorism, insurgency, and internal violence. Key factors like population pressure, “youth bulges,” underemployment and unemployment, critical problems in governance, corruption, barriers to development, critical problems in income distribution.

Cronyism and nepotism, repression and failed rule of law, internal discrimination, and alienation of key segments of the population, are rarely addressed except in human rights reporting.

Comparative assessment of efforts to address the level of Islamic extremism in given countries and areas -- and to address the efforts to counter such extremism on a religious, ideological, and political basis – also are limited snapshots of part of the problems and efforts involved. Many are special interest efforts supporting a given proposed approach or solution.

Some broad measures of the cost-effectiveness of the U.S. counter terrorism effort – and its strength and weaknesses -- are provided by the Department of Homeland security, but these cover only a small part of part of the U.S. domestic effort, however, and do not cover overseas contingency operations. The basic focus of DHS effectiveness data is immigration and border/coastal security.

As a result, virtually all terrorism and extremism reporting focuses on non-state actors.

Excessive repression in the name of counterterrorism -- and state activities that amount to de facto state terrorism -- are not reported as terrorism even when they clearly have such impacts. These problems in the counterterrorism activity of various states – some U.S. partners and allies – are only officially reported – if at all -- in the State Department annual human rights report and reports by various human rights NGOs.

No clear source or method exists to estimate the impact of terrorism in creating refugees, internally displaced persons, lasting human and humanitarian impacts, collateral damage, and economic impacts.

Casualty data are highly uncertain. Most sources only attempt to count casualties caused by non-state actors. They often confuse terrorism with insurgency and internal power struggles, and many sources only address killed, rather than injured or wounded.

Incident/attack counts, target, weapon, attack type, and weapon, data are also highly uncertain, and the other impacts of extremism and terrorism such as intimidation, extortion, torture, and misuse of the justice system cannot be quantified and no reliable methodology exists for estimating areas of geographic influence.
There is no reliable way to estimate the impact of terrorism in areas dominated or controlled by various groups of non-state actors, and once again, insurgent groups the U.S. sees as enemies are often labeled as “terrorists” regardless of the fact they are insurgents using forms of irregular warfare which are not “terrorism” per se and/or are reacting to abuses by the governments they are challenging.

Most sources do not identify attackers, attacks, and targets by sect, ethnicity, and tribe. It is impossible to trace the patterns of violence that drive terrorism, and reporting often does not distinguish clear between terrorism and hate crimes.

Perpetrator data are often very uncertain, and estimates vary sharply from source to source.

Both the identification of the perpetrators and the level of affiliation with given terrorist groups are often uncertain, and many assessments do not attempt to deal explicitly with these uncertainties.

Most sources have made major changes in their method of analysis and reporting overtime, and the historical comparability of data shown is often uncertain.

There is no reliable way to estimate the impact of terrorism in areas dominated or controlled by various groups of non-state actors, and once again, insurgent groups the U.S. sees as enemies are often labeled as “terrorists” regardless of the fact they are insurgents using forms of irregular warfare which are not “terrorism” per se and/or are reacting to abuses by the governments they are challenging.

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Perpetrator data are often very uncertain, and estimates vary sharply from source to source.

Both the identification of the perpetrators and the level of affiliation with given terrorist groups are often uncertain, and many assessments do not attempt to deal explicitly with these uncertainties.
• Most sources have made major changes in their method of analysis and reporting overtime, and the historical comparability of data shown is often uncertain.

• Most data are global, regional, or nationwide. It is generally difficult to trace the patterns within given parts of what often are deeply divided countries or movements that cross national borders.

• The impact of key regional, ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and other internal conflicts may or may not be reported as terrorism and are not addressed by source, cause, or reasons for choosing given targets.

• No reliable data exist on foreign volunteers, on international flows of terrorist activity, and on the overall patterns in extremism.

• The actual date of many sources is not specified or unclear.

• Aside from chronologies – whose content differs sharply from source to source – reporting – the nature of how attacks are being selected for reporting and defined as terrorism is often unclear.

• Most sources seem to undercount countries where there is limited media reporting on any form of dissent. This lead to low figures for Central Asia and parts of East Asia, and suspiciously low totals for a large number of countries.

• Scattered small attacks on various ethnic groups, sects, tribes, and minorities often add up to major cumulative levels of violence and terrorism over time, but are not generally reported as terrorism unless some terrorist group claims
Key Challenges and Problems
In the Metrics of Terrorism

• No agreed definition of terrorism of other how to define and measure any key metric.
• Reliance on media sources or unstated sources. Cancelation of NCTC and all official public reporting on trends and data.
• Radical differences in level of reporting by region, lack of credible data in Central and East Asia.
• No reporting on state terrorism, large scale killing of civilians in countries like Syria.
• Failure to report ranges in many key areas of large-scale uncertainty – particularly perpetrators and casualties.
• Failure to clearly distinguish between insurgency and terrorism.
• Labeling of asymmetric threats and enemies as terrorist, regardless of methods of attack.
• Failure to distinguish ethnicity, sect, tribe and other key data in patterns of terrorism in reporting.
• Constant changes in method of analysis and reporting, and unclear historical comparability of data shown.
• Lack of clear handling of hate crimes in collecting terrorism data.
• Focus on ideology and religion rather than full range of causes of terrorism.