Tracking the Trends and Numbers: Islam, Terrorism, Stability and Conflict in the Middle East

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Introduction

Far too much of the current U.S. debate over immigration and terrorism is focused on fear, rather than an effort to understand the forces driving unrest and extremism in Islam and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, or on the data available on the trends involved.

These trends and data are complex, and there are many uncertainties and gaps in the numbers. Any survey also necessarily underestates the very sharp differences between countries, and a focus on the MENA region necessarily ignores the trends and forces shaping instability and extremism in other parts of the Islamic world like Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central Asia, and East Asian states like Indonesia and Malaysia.

At the same time, enough data are available to make several key points:

1. The MENA region is a region of instability and unrest. (pp. 7-9)

   - The MENA region may be a key source of violence and terrorism, but this is only one of many threats in the region, almost all of the violence is contained within the region and consists of Muslims killing Muslims, and the threat of terrorism and extremism is far broader than either ISIS/ISIL/Daesh, or Al Qa’ida and any of its affiliates.

   - U.S. strategic partnerships with the governments of MENA states are critical in fighting violence and extremism and deterring threats like Iran. 12 of 17 countries have some form of strategic partnership with U.S.: Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Only Iran and Syria are “hostile.”

   - The threats to stability in the region go far beyond Islamist extremism and affect every nation in the region:

     o **Morocco and Algeria**: Spanish Sahara and Polisario
     o **Algeria**: Islamist unrest and terrorism, human trafficking
     o **Libya**: Civil war and ISIS
     o **Tunisia**: Uncertain stability, some ISIS attacks
     o **Egypt**: Repression, border problems, Islamists, Sinai war Israel vs. Palestinians in Gaza, West Bank, Sinai issues, Hezbollah
     o **Israel**: Gaza, Hezbollah/Lebanon, Syria. Palestinian Authority, Iran, Sinai, US MOU.
     o **Lebanon**: Confessional struggles, Hezbollah vs. Army, border clashes
• **Syria:** ISIS, Arab civil war, Kurds, Turkey, Iran, U.S., Russia

• **Iraq:** ISIS, Arab civil war, Kurds, Turkey, Iran, U.S.

• **Jordan:** Internal tension, refugees, Israel-Palestinian, Syria, Iraq

• **Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE:** Iran, ISIS/AQAP, Iraq, Syria, Shi’ite vs. Sunni, internal divisions, 40-60% cut in petroleum revenues

• **Iran:** Arab threat, Baluchi and Arab internal, vs., expanded regional influence, missile, asymmetric sea-air missile, nuclear, Gulf-Gulf of Oman-Indian Ocean

• **Yemen:** Civil war, Houthi, Saleh, Saudi and UAE, Iran, AQAP, ISIS

• **Turkey:** Erdogan, Russia, NATO/US/EU, ISIS/Extremism, MENA stability, Kurds, Iran, Afghanistan/Central Asia

2. **Islam is a driving force in the MENA region and a rapidly growing force in the world, but polls show that the vast majority of Muslims do not support extremism and violence. (pp. 10-18)**

- Islam is a driving force in the MENA region and in the world, and one that cannot be isolated, ignored, or treated in ways that create anger and hostility among MENA and the world's Muslims. The number of Muslims in the world already number 1.6 billion and the Pew Trust projects that they will rise by 1.73 billion between 2010 and 2050 -- a gain of 73% in total numbers and 6.5% of the world's population.

- The number of Muslims in the Middle East will grow from 341 million to 589 million during this period, but the Pew Trust also projects that Muslims will increase their percentage of the total population by 5.2% in Asia, 5.6% in Sub Saharan Africa, and 4.3% in Europe. These projections do not take full account of the new waves in refugees and illegal immigrants.

- Polls show that most Moslems strongly support the role of religion in civil life and Sharia. They also show, however, that they do not support Islamic extremism and Islamic extremist violence. These polling data do, however, have serious gaps and uncertainties.

- The sectarian divisions within Islam is another major source of tension and violence. Sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi’ite is not related to extremism, but affects the tension between Iran and much of the Arab world, and has a serious impact on the stability of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
3. A focus on Islam ignores a key force in the region: the extent to which failed secularism affects the MENA region. (pp. 19-27)

- Many of the states in the MENA region have ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions and differences that can be as serious as sectarian divisions and lead to violence that has nothing to do with Islam per se. In practical terms, the level of tension between Kurd, Arab, Iran, and Turkey is now as critical as sectarian differences.

- Poor to failed governance at every level is a critical source of internal unrest in many MENA states, and the worst governance correlates closely with the worst instability and violence.

- The same is true of corruption, which polls show is a critical factor triggering mass upheavals and alienation from the regime. Transparency International ranks the most corrupt country in the world as being the 176th. Syria is ranked 173rd, Yemen as 170th, Libya is 170, Iraq as 176th, Lebanon as 136th, Iran as 131st, Egypt as 108th, Morocco as 90th, and Turkey & Kuwait tie at 79th.

- Radical differences exist in per capita income, and in development -- matched by equally critical differences in income distribution between rural and urban areas, sects and ethnic groups, and rich and poor. Like other civil problems, poverty and low per capita income correlate closely with the instability and violence.

- The population has already grown some 5-6 times through the region between 1950 and 2010, and will probably grow some 70% more by 2015. This has put a major strain on arable, land and water in a largely desert region, led to hyperurbanization and major slums, strained educational and infrastructure resources, shattered traditional social safety nets in some countries, and led to population movements that have further strained sectarian, ethnic, and tribal tensions.

- The region has an extremely young population or "youth bulge" that often has very high levels of direct or disguised unemployment. Some estimates put youth unemployment in Tunisia at 40%.

- Investment in education and health has not met the challenge of population growth in many MENA countries.

4. Iran is only one major source of military threats and confrontation in the MENA region, but Iran’s potential nuclear, missile, and irregular warfare threats, Iran’s naval-missile-air threat to maritime traffic in the Gulf, and Iran’s support of violence and unrest in neighboring threats is a warning that no strategy focused on Islamic extremism can deal with the major security and stability threats to the MENA region. (pp. 28-34)
5. Islamic extremism is all too real a threat, but it is only one source of terrorism. Moreover, the current emphasis on ISIL/ISIS/Daesh is grossly out of proportion to its present and problems future impact. (pp.37-49)

- The core Islamic extremist threats extend far beyond the MENA region, ISIL, and Al Qaida.
- The Trump choice of seven countries does not begin to reflect the full ranges of threats, and --aside from Iran -- involves countries where the U.S. has governments or non-state actors as strategic partners.
- There are many conflicting data bases on terrorism --all with major limits -- and the U.S. has abandoned the effort to issue unclassified official estimates--forcing outside efforts to focus on uncertain media reporting and methods.
- The START database is the one used in the U.S. State Department's annual country reports on terrorism, and does provide some good broad indicators of trends for the MENA region, but now only covers terrorism through 2015.
- It does show, however, how recent the peak in ISIL/ISIS/Daesh activity has been, and ISIS's reversal in 2016 may well indicate that it may have peaked in 2015-2016, and that other Islamist extremist movements will dominate threat in future years.
- A series of charts tracing the global, Islamic, and MENA wide patterns in terrorism from 2005-2015 show that terrorism in largely Islamic regions accounted for some 83% of terrorism during this period.
- They also show a major shift in the global patterns of assassinations to Islamic areas.
- Only 36% of the terrorist incidents worldwide occurred in the MENA region, but its share increased sharply between 2011 and 2015 -- along with that of South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa.
- But, both ISIS and Al Qaida still accounted for only 4,704 Incidents, or 5.9% of the world total, and 16% of the MENA total.
- ISIS alone only accounted for 2,867 incidents -- 3.6% of the world total and 9.8% of the MENA total. Even if one looks only at the peak period for ISIS attacks, it accounted for only about 1,200 attacks per year vs. 15,000-18,000 worldwide in 2014 and 2015.
6. There is no real "clash between civilizations." The data show that there is clearly a "clash within a civilization," and that civilization is the Islamic world. The threat within the United States has been minor since 9/11 and has been very limited in Europe. Almost all of the violence caused by Islamic extremism has been directed at fellow Muslims, and much of it has been concentrated in MENA states. (pp. 50-63)

- The patterns of violence in the MENA region are not dominated by terrorism, but rather by insurgencies, civil wars, and ethnic, sectarian, and tribal conflicts. No reliable data exist to estimate the casualties and costs, but they are at least three orders of magnitude larger than the casualties and costs in Europe and four orders larger than the casualties in the U.S. since 9/11.

- An estimate by the *Washington Post* for January 1, 2015 – July 16, 2016 shows 608 attacks in the U.S. and European combined vs. 28,031 in the rest of the world.

- The START data base does not attribute any direct ISIL or Al Qaida attacks or casualties in the U.S. between 2005 and 2015.

- ISIL has been far more threatening in Europe in 2016, but this is not shown in the START database. The START database counts a total of 4,835 incidents in Europe between 2005 and 2015. The data base only begins to shows Al Qaida and ISIL incidents in 2014. It only lists 8 for ISIL during 2014-2015, with a total of 5 casualties.

- It shows 2,861 for both ISIS and Al Qa'ida in the MENA in 2005-2015, rising sharply in 2012. The number of casualties—the vast majority Muslim -- is far higher.

- Some evidence is surfacing of ISIL efforts to trigger attacks in the U.S. and Europe from the outside, but the number of cases so far is very limited.

- If one looks at the patterns in U.S. deaths from terrorism during 1995-2014, According to the GTD, 80 Americans were killed in terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2013, including perpetrators and excluding deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority of which are combat-related. Of those 80 Americans killed, 36 were killed in attacks that occurred in the United States.

- More broadly, 3,066 Americans have been killed in terrorist attacks from 9/11/2001 through 12/31/2014, including perpetrators and excluding deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq. 2,961 of these deaths occurred on American soil but 2,902 of these deaths occurred during the attacks on September 11, 2001.
• A separate article in the *Washington Post* estimated in late January 2017 that about 400 individuals have been charged with or credibly involved in jihad-inspired activity in the U.S. since 9/11. Just under half (197) were U.S.-born citizens, according to research by the non-partisan think tank New America Foundation. Another 82 were naturalized citizens and 44 were permanent residents. Only 11 had non-immigrant visas, 8 were illegal immigrants, and 12 were refugees.

• A START estimate through 2014 showed that there were a total of 1,421 terrorist attacks. 88.2% were by native born Americans who were not first or second generation immigrants.

• 206 of the 1,421 (14.5) had some Islamist character. 39.3% of the Islamist attacks were by non-immigrant native Americans, 9.7% were by second generation immigrants, and 51% by first generation immigrants. A maximum of 7.2% were other or unknown.

• The number of proposed refugees in the U.S. is very limited, and should be minimal with existing vetting

7. The battle against Islamic extremism, and for stability in the MENA region, must be fought primarily by the governments of Muslim states. The struggle will be won or lost by U.S. strategic partnerships with states like Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. It will not be won by trying to isolate the United States or Europe from Muslims, or by measures that alienate the Islamic world. (pp. 64-68.)
Defining the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

12 of 17 countries have some form of strategic partnership with U.S.: Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Only Iran and Syria are “hostile.”

Note: Dome experts include Turkey, Somalia, and the Sudan

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+MENA+region&tbn=isch&imgil=znXk0x3W7G3aHM%253A%253BboqWD05Q7VHfgOM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.slideshare.net%25252FPresentationsat24point0%25252Fmap-of-mena-14114848&source=iu&pf=m&fir=znXk0x3W7G3aHM%253A%25252F%25252Fwww.slideshare.net%25252FPresentationsat24point0%25252Fmap-of-mena-14114848&ved=0ahUKEwjSyNj-­‐7rjLAhXKej4KHStlCX4QyjcIg&ei=RtniVtKNB8r1-QGrkKXxwBw#imgdii=HnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A%3BHnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A%3BUJJsQZYoHG_igAM%3A&imgc=HnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A.
Key Pressures on the Middle Eastern and North Africa (MENA) Security Structure

Morocco and Algeria: Spanish Sahara and Polisario
Algeria: Islamist unrest and terrorism, human trafficking
Libya: Civil war and ISIS
Tunisia: Uncertain stability, some ISIS attacks

Egypt: Repression, border problems, Islamists, Sinai war Israel vs. Palestinians in Gaza, West Bank, Sinai issues, Hezbollah
Israel: Gaza, Hezbollah/Lebanon, Syria. Palestinian Authority, Iran, Sinai, US MOU.
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Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE: Iran, ISIS/AQAP, Iraq, Syria, Shi’ite vs. Sunni, internal divisions, 40-60% cut in petroleum revenues
Iran: Arab threat, Baluchi and Arab internal, vs., expanded regional influence, missile, asymmetric sea-air missile, nuclear, Gulf-Gulf of Oman-Indian Ocean
Yemen: Civil war, Houthi, Saleh, Saudi and UAE, Iran, AQAP, ISIS

Turkey: Erdogan, Russia, NATO/US/EU, ISIS/Extremism, MENA stability, Kurds, Iran, Afghanistan/Central Asia

Afghanistan-Pakistan Central Asia: Stability, Extremism, Russia, China, Pakistan, India
Religion, Ideology, and Instability
The Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050

Number of people, 2010-2050, in billions

Christians and Hindus rise by 35%

Muslims rise by 73% or 1.6 billion.

During the next four decades, Islam will grow faster than any other major world religion.

% of global population, 2010-2050

Muslims will grow by 6.5% as a share of the global population.

The Growth of Islam Relative to Other Faiths: 2010-2050

- **Number of people, 2010-2050, in billions**
  - Christians: 2.17 to 2.92 billion
  - Muslims: 1.6 to 2.76 billion
  - Unaffiliated: 1.13 to 1.38
  - Hindus: 1.03 to 1.23
  - Buddhists: 0.49 to 0.49
  - Folk Religions: 0.40 to 0.45
  - Other Religions: 0.06 to 0.06

- **% of global population, 2010-2050**
  - Christians: 31.4% to 31.4%
  - Muslims: 23.2 to 29.7
  - Unaffiliated: 16.4 to 14.9
  - Hindus: 15.0 to 13.2
  - Buddhists: 7.1 to 5.9
  - Folk Religions: 5.9 to 4.8
  - Other Religions: 0.8 to 0.7

During the next four decades, Islam will grow faster than any other major world religion. By 2050, Christians and Muslims will make up nearly equal shares of the world’s population. The unaffiliated population will increase by nearly 10% in the decades ahead. But...

... from 2010 to 2050, the religiously unaffiliated will decline as a share of the global population.

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

## The Growth of Muslim Populations: 2010-2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REGION’S TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>REGION’S MUSLIM POPULATION</th>
<th>% MUSLIM IN REGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,054,940,000</td>
<td>986,420,000</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>4,937,900,000</td>
<td>1,457,720,000</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East-North Africa</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>341,020,000</td>
<td>317,070,000</td>
<td>93.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>588,960,000</td>
<td>551,900,000</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>822,730,000</td>
<td>248,420,000</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>1,899,960,000</td>
<td>669,710,000</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>742,550,000</td>
<td>43,470,000</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>696,330,000</td>
<td>70,870,000</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>344,530,000</td>
<td>3,480,000</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>435,420,000</td>
<td>10,350,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America-Caribbean</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>590,080,000</td>
<td>840,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>748,620,000</td>
<td>940,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MENA Grows by 72% between 2010 and 2050

Major growth outside the MENA region:

- +5.2% of population in Asia
- +5.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa
- +4.3% in Europe

May have the same impact globally as the emergence of China

Source: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050
Population estimates are rounded to the nearest 10,000. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers.

Public Perceptions of the Importance of Sharia

Recent surveys show that most people in several countries with significant Muslim populations have an unfavorable view of ISIS, including virtually all respondents in Lebanon and 94% in Jordan.

Relatively small shares say they see ISIS favorably. In some countries, considerable portions of the population do not offer an opinion about ISIS, including a majority (62%) of Pakistanis.

Favorable views of ISIS are somewhat higher in Nigeria (14%) than most other nations. Among Nigerian Muslims, 20% say they see ISIS favorably (compared with 7% of Nigerian Christians). The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram, which has been conducting a terrorist campaign in the country for years, has sworn allegiance to ISIS.

More generally, Muslims mostly say that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified, including 92% in Indonesia and 91% in Iraq. In the United States, a 2011 survey found that 86% of Muslims...say that such tactics are rarely or never justified. An additional 7% say suicide bombings are sometimes justified and 1% say they are often justified in these circumstances.

In a few countries, a quarter or more of Muslims say that these acts of violence are at least sometimes justified, including 40% in the Palestinian territories, 39% in Afghanistan, 29% in Egypt and 26% in Bangladesh.

In many cases, people in countries with large Muslim populations are as concerned as Western nations...about the threat of Islamic extremism, and have become increasingly concerned in recent years. About two-thirds of people in Nigeria (68%) and Lebanon (67%) said earlier this year they are very concerned about Islamic extremism in their country, both up significantly since 2013.

Source: Pew Research Center, Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world, December 7, 2015, p. 4.
### Middle Eastern Support for ISIS: 2016 – Part One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Refuse/Don't Know</th>
<th>Not Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<td>5.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not many Arabs sympathize with the Islamic State. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State’s goals range from 0.4 percent in Jordan to 6.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing with the Islamic State’s use of violence range from 0.4 percent in Morocco to 5.4 percent in the Palestinian territories. The percent agreeing that the Islamic State’s tactics are compatible with Islam range from 1.0 percent in Jordan to 8.9 percent in the Palestinian territories.

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Figure 2. Attitudes toward Islamic State of Younger Less Educated Men and Others

Figure 3. Support for Islamic State's Goals by Control and Treatments among Younger Less Educated Men

Arab Youth Does Not Support ISIS’s Core Ideology

Nearly 4 in 5 young Arabs rule out any support for the group even if Daesh stopped using so much violence and most believe it will ultimately fail to establish an Islamic State.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement?

“If Daesh did not use so much violence, I could see myself supporting it”

“Daesh will ultimately establish an Islamic State in the Arab world”

Sectarian Divisions in MENA

[Map showing Sunni, Shiite, Ibadi areas and areas where Wahhabism is predominant]

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-map-middle-east-iran-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0
The Broader Causes of Instability
The Broader “Kurdish Problem”

The Civil Side: Governance

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
The Civil Side: Worldwide Corruption Ranking in 2015

176 is Worst in the World in 2016

- Syria is 173
- Yemen is 170
- Libya is 170
- Afghanistan is 169
- Iraq is 176
- Lebanon is 136
- Iran is 131
- Egypt is 108
- Morocco is 90
- Turkey & Kuwait = 79

The Civil Side: GDP Per Capita

### Demographic Trends, 2000-2030

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>5,963</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>7,244</td>
<td>8,425</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Human Development Report, 2015

The Civil Side: Demographics by Country

Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)

Multiplication factors represent the change in population from 1950 to 2015

http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
The Civil Side: Youth Bulge

(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq's population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

## The Civil Side: Arab World Education and Health: 2000-2030

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab States</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Human Development Report, 2015

Iran and the Post (?) Nuclear Threat
Iranian Influence

**Lebanon**  Hezbollah is considered Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran’s interest.

**Syria**  Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

**Iraq**  Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

**Bahrain**  Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

**Yemen**  Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.

The “Shi’ite Crescent”
The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008
Most Alternative Routes Have Little or No Surplus Capacity or Are Not Operating
Missile Attack Range and Density

Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, *Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats*, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.
ISIS and the Threats from Global Terrorism and Violent Islamist Extremism:

Note: Insurgency and Civil War violence and casualties are Not Included
Countries Affected by Trump Ban Order

Keeping ISIS in Perspective

• If one looks at the most recent START statistics on terrorism in the State Department annual report on terrorism, and only considers the top five threats, three are clearly Islamist extremist: ISIS (in Syria and Iraq), the Taliban, and Boko Haram.

• There are more than 40 Islamist extremist groups listed in the START database, but if one looks only at these top three, ISIS was responsible for only 37% of the attacks and 38% of the deaths.

• There is no clear way to assess the role of ISIS role in terms of all Islamist extremist attacks, but if one looks at the total numbers of attacks in the countries with the highest rates of terrorism in the MENA region (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria), ISIS was responsible for 29% of the attacks in 2015, and 56% of the deaths.

• Islamic extremism also does dominate terrorism in the world, but ISIS was only responsible for for 9% of the attacks in the entire world in 2015, and 21% of the deaths.

• Depriving ISIS of control over population centers and sanctuary to raise funds and train fighters, and breaking it up as key organization, matters. Defeating it in any practical sense, however, will not begin to deal with the lasting threat.

The Bubble? START Estimate of ISIS vs. Total Incidents/Attacks

In 2015: **Before the wave in 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Kidnap/Hostage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>11,774</td>
<td>28,328</td>
<td>35,320</td>
<td>12,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>6,050</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>1,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2013-2015: From first Peak Year, but **Before the wave in 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>ISIS Attacks</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>17,417</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9,517</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0013%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West &amp; East Europe</td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.0031%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/?back=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2013&end_yearonly=2015&dtp2=all&country=200](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/?back=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2013&end_yearonly=2015&dtp2=all&country=200); All incidents regardless of doubt; and [http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257526.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257526.htm).
The Terrorist Threat is Rising: Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2015

- 79,533 Incidents in 2010-2015
- 62,022 Incidents in 2010-2015

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&end_year=&start_month=&end_month=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dt2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=
Islamic Extremism is Real: The Rise of Terrorism in Largely Islamic Regions

66,076 Incidents
- 83% of World Total
- 226% of MENA Total

Years: (between 2010 and 2015), All incidents regardless of doubt. Region: (South Asia; Central Asia; Middle East & North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa)
Source: START Data Base, [http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)
The Sharp Rise of Terrorism in the MENA, South Asia, and Sub Saharan Regions

29,297 Incidents

- 36% of World
- Grow 2-3 times in last 5 years if do not include insurgency.
- Peak of 7,300 in 2014-2015 vs. 15,000-18,000 World wide.
- MENA is worst, followed by South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
Patterns of Assassinations Shift Towards Islamic Regions

Terrorist Assassinations, by Decade, by Region

Years: (between 2010 and 2015), All incidents regardless of doubt. Region: (South Asia; Central Asia; Middle East & North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa)


43
Targets Shift to Government, Journalists, and Military

Most Common Targets of Terrorist Assassinations, by Decade

Source: Global Terrorism Database

*Assassinations of diplomatic targets made up 2% of all terrorist assassinations, 1970-2015

Comparative Threats: Al Qaida and ISIL Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2005-2015

4,704 Incidents
- 5.9% of World Total
- 16% of MENA Total

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
start_yearonly=2010&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20029
&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20492&perpetrator=20493&perpetrator=20522&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20496&perpetrator=20494&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Ears: (between 2010 and 2015)
All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM))

2,867 Incidents
- 3.6% of World Total
- 9.8% of MENA Total
- 1,200 ISIS vs. 15,000-18,000 Worldwide in 2014-2015

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
start_yearonly=2010&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20034&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Years: (between 2010 and 2015)
All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Comparative Threats: Al Qa’ida Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2015

1,837 Incidents

- 2.3% of World Total
- 6.2% of MENA Total
- vs. 2,867 for ISIS or 88%

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
start_yearonly=2005&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20493&perpetrator=20522&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20496&perpetrator=20492&perpetrator=20494&perpetrator=40242&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qaqa Brigade)
What to Count? Al Qa’ida + Al Nusra (Jabhat al-Nusra)
Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2015

2,086 Incidents

- 2.6% of World Total
- 7.1% of MENA Total
- One more group adds 249 attacks or 14% to total

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
start_yearonly=2005&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20493&perpetrator=20522&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20496&perpetrator=20492&perpetrator=20494&perpetrator=40242&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Qa’ida; Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qa’a Brigade)
All Terrorist Attacks in Syria and Iraq 2005-2015
(The Terrorism vs. Insurgency Gap)

841 Terrorist Incidents
• 1.0% of World Total
• 2.8% of MENA Total
• Under 2,000 killed from terrorism vs. 300,000 to 600,000 civilian dead from war since 2011.

Source: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?
start_yearonly=2010&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20493&perpetrator=20522&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20496&perpetrator=20492&perpetrator=20494&perpetrator=40151&dt2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Years: (between 2010 and 2015)
All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Qaqa Brigade)
A “Clash Within a Civilization,”
Not a “Clash Between Civilizations
“Clash of Civilizations” is a Fallacy

• No precise numbers are available but vast majority of casualties from these incidents are caused by Moslems killing or injuring fellow Muslims.

• Sectarian violence within Islam steadily rising. Most ethnic fighting is between Muslims.

• Civil wars, tribal conflicts, insurgencies and counter insurgencies not terrorism, dominate killings and injuries: i.e. Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen – fighting in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

• Moderate Moslem regimes in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE – and other parts of the world -- are key partners in counterterrorism and security.

• Other states, not extremists or terrorists, are often prime source of casualties.

• START data base includes many unknowns but indicate estimates ISIS killed under 2,000 in Syria between start of 2011 and end 2015. Various sources indicate overall fighting killed 250,000-470,000 – at least 70% by pro-Assad forces.

The START database counts a total of 190 incidents. It does not attribute any incidents to ISIL or Al Qaida even using its highest possible perpetrator index.

The START database counts a total of 4,835 incidents. Data base only begins to shows Al Qaida and ISIL incidents in 2014. Only lists 8 for ISIL during 2014-2015; Total of 5 Casualties.

ISIL and Al Qa’ida Terrorist Incidents versus Casualties in MENA Region: 2005-2015

Total Number of Incidents:
2861

Total Number of Killed and Injured

ISIL and Al Qa’ida Terrorist Incidents versus Casualties in MENA Region: 2005-2015

Total Number of Incidents: 2861

Total Number of Killed and Injured

ISIS’s Remote Control Terror Attacks? 10 Cases - I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 8, 2015</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Amédy Coulibaly was in contact with Islamic State operatives in Syria before storming a kosher supermarket in Paris, taking hostages and killing four of them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 3, 2015</td>
<td>Garland Tex.</td>
<td>Two men, initially thought to be “lone wolves,” opened fire at a community center. The F.B.I. said the attackers were in communication with the Islamic State via encrypted texts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 19, 2015</td>
<td>Villejuif, France</td>
<td>Sid Ahmed Gham was accused of killing a woman and trying to open fire on a church. He had been in touch with Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a prominent ISIS operative, the authorities say.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22, 2015</td>
<td>Morganton N.C.</td>
<td>Justin Nolan Sullivan was accused of plotting a mass shooting under the guidance of Mr. Hussain. He was also charged with killing his 74-year-old neighbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 21, 2015</td>
<td>Oignies, France</td>
<td>A man, who the authorities say was sent by Mr. Abaaoud, tried to open fire with an automatic rifle on a high-speed train traveling from Amsterdam to Paris, but he was tackled by passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 14, 2016</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>A girl, who was found later to be in contact with an ISIS planner, attacked a police officer with a knife.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5, 2016</td>
<td>Solo, Indonesia</td>
<td>A young man detonated a crudely assembled suicide vest outside a police station and blew himself up. He had received guidance from Mr. Naim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18, 2016</td>
<td>Würzburg, Germany</td>
<td>An asylum seeker stabbed passengers on a train, wounding four people. The German authorities later released a chat conversation running up to the attack linked to ISIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 2016</td>
<td>Ansbach, Germany</td>
<td>A Syrian refugee with a backpack bomb blew himself up at a bar near a music concert. Officials say they believe the attacker was chatting with an ISIS operative immediately before the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25, 2016</td>
<td>St.-Étienne-du-Rouvray, France</td>
<td>Two assailants killed a priest at a suburban church. French investigators believed that they communicated via a messaging app with Rachid Kassim, an ISIS operative in Syria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

American Deaths in Terrorist Attacks: 1995-2014: Aside from 9/11, Only 362 occurred in the U.S. and American Deaths in the U.S. were 256 out of 602 Worldwide (43%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Attacks in the United States</th>
<th>Total Fatalities in the United States</th>
<th>U.S. Fatalities in the United States</th>
<th>U.S. Fatalities, Worldwide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3003</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>2910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>3264</td>
<td>3158</td>
<td>3503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the GTD, 80 Americans were killed in terrorist attacks from 2004 to 2013, including perpetrators and excluding deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority of which are combat-related.

Of those 80 Americans killed, 36 were killed in attacks that occurred in the United States.

- More broadly, 3,066 Americans have been killed in terrorist attacks from 9/11/2001 through 12/31/2014, including perpetrators and excluding deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq.
  - 2,961 of these deaths occurred on American soil.
  - 2,902 of these deaths occurred during the attacks on September 11, 2001.

START, “American Deaths in Terrorist Attacks,” October 2015
Of about 400 individuals charged with or credibly involved in jihad-inspired activity in the U.S. since 9/11, just under half (197) were U.S.-born citizens, according to research by the non-partisan think tank New America Foundation. Another 82 were naturalized citizens and 44 were permanent residents.

Domestic vs. Foreign Terrorist Attackers in the U.S.: START Database – through 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Not an immigrant</th>
<th>Second generation immigrant</th>
<th>First generation immigrant</th>
<th>Valid N</th>
<th>% missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All cases</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamist</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far right</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far left</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. issue</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some significant differences exist in the generational status of individuals in the PIRUS data. By a large margin, Islamist extremists had the highest numbers of first and second generation immigrants, making up 80% and 55% of all immigrants in the dataset in those categories, respectively. Furthermore, a majority of Islamist cases were either first or second generation immigrants, at 60.7%. However, this immigrant generation statistic remains roughly consistent with figures from the U.S. Muslim population at large (Pew Research Center 2011) which is majority first-generation immigrants. Individuals classified as far right have the lowest levels of first or second generation immigrant status, at 1.3% overall.

Refugees Admitted to the U.S. FY1975-2016

Refugees Admitted to the U.S. from Top 15 Countries in 2106

Suspends the refugee admissions program for 120 days: The order suspends the program while a review of the screening process takes place. It resumes the program for certain countries only after the secretary of homeland security, the secretary of state and the director of national intelligence have determined security procedures are adequate in those countries.

Cuts the number of refugees admitted in 2017 in half

The number admitted so far is for the first four months of the 2017 fiscal year, through Jan. 20. The program will be capped at 50,000 refugees for the 2017 fiscal year, down from the 110,000 ceiling put in place under President Barack Obama. Nearly 30,000 have already been admitted since October, the start of the fiscal year. The order directs the secretary of state and the secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize refugee claims made by persecuted members of religious minorities.

Indefinitely blocks all refugees from Syria: The order also suspends the entry of Syrian refugees until the president determines that their admission would be “consistent with the national interest.”

Rising Global Impact of Islam Makes Partnerships Even More Critical
U.S Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR in 2017

U.S African Command (AFRICOM) MENA States with Large Muslim Populations in 2017

U.S Islamic Strategic Partners in 2017

U.S Strategic Partners Close to Iran

- Iraq-air and ground bases, naval access.
- Kuwait-Air bases, ground and naval access.
- Bahrain: 5th Fleet HQ, air base.
- Qatar: Key air base and HQ at Al Udaid
- Oman: Transit, prepositioning, UK
- Saudi: Interoperable, training
- UAE: air, port,
- Djibouti: Air, special forces
- Diego Garcia: Contingency air
- Egypt: Canal, air transit
- Jordan: Special forces, air transit, training
- Turkey: Air? Transit/Staging