A New Era for Cooperation:
Next Generation Views of the
US-Japan Alliance

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwan matters: Taipei’s role in expanded US-Japan relations</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Lauren Dickey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-International Space Station project: Japan-US cooperation in outer space</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Akira Igata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhancing the US-Japan alliance through partnership programs and public diplomacy</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Miha Hribernik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Securing the maritime commons: A coalition strategy for the US-Japan alliance</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Erik French</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix A: Biographies</strong></td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix B: Tour Agenda</strong></td>
<td>B-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

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Executive Summary
by Shelley Brandt

Japan’s passage of new security legislation and reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense have created opportunities for greater cooperation and partnership on security affairs between the United States and Japan. As both Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Barak Obama have expressed their desire for and commitment to a strong US-Japan relationship, they have provided a vision of a strong alliance working together for the betterment of the region and the world.

Believing that the sustainability and growth of the US-Japan alliance demands an engaged next generation, the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program and the US Embassy Tokyo called on Young Leaders to think of bold and innovative ways the two countries can work together to take on current and future challenges. The pieces selected for this volume were written by four Young Leaders in the rising generation of policy experts to promote their ideas for the future of the US-Japan alliance.

These essays explore not only how to strengthen the alliance but also how it can be used as a problem-solving mechanism to reinforce regional stability and security. Lauren Dickey recommends developing trilateral relationships between the US, Japan, and Taiwan to promote prosperity and security. Looking to possible future obstacles, Akira Igata presents the need and opportunities for the alliance to further cooperation in the space domain. To tackle issues like maritime security and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, multilateral approaches are suggested as the best solution. Miha Hribernik proposes the creation of a Partnership Coordination Mechanism and a Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism to facilitate multilateral partnerships, using NATO as an example. Erik French recommends coalitions of the willing to address security risks in the maritime commons. These groups would give partner countries the ability to adapt the purpose and extent of their cooperation with the US-Japan alliance to fit their specific needs and interests. This kind of multilateral cooperation would move the region toward sustainable security, especially in the maritime domain.

This project and the Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program seek to motivate the next generation to realize the necessity of and opportunities provided by the US-Japan alliance. The generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo sent the authors to tour Japan in October 2016, sharing their recommendations to inspire engagement in foreign policy and regional security. We hope this volume stimulates debate among current and future policy leaders and encourages creative problem-solving for the US-Japan alliance, prompting others to think more about Japanese foreign policy generally, and about the US-Japan alliance in particular.
The geostrategic dynamics of East Asia are in a state of flux. Washington is endeavoring to support a strong, rebalanced presence in the region by building key alliances, a crucial component of the traditional hub-and-spokes regional system of alliances. Tokyo continues to eye a rising China with caution while bolstering its own defensive capabilities. Taipei has opportunities to carve out a new role for itself – politically, economically, and militarily – with a new government taking power in May 2016. At first glance, these three trajectories may seem more divergent than similar; each seems preoccupied with their own national goals rather than shared interests. Yet, given the evolving nature of the US-Japan relationship, and Japan’s role as a US security partner and regional bastion, a necessary step in deepening the existing bilateral partnership is the comprehensive inclusion of Taiwan. Such a step would support US efforts to network bilateral relations into trilateral relations; if the US can meld its ties with Japan and Australia into a US-Japan-Australian strategic partnership, why not do the same with Taiwan?

The 23 million people on Taiwan have an irreplaceable role to play in support of regional and international stability. Taiwan is, in many ways, Japan’s closest friend and ally; despite lacking all the formalities of a normal diplomatic relationship, ties between Tokyo and Taipei are largely free of the historical legacies and public opinions which threaten to freeze other regional relationships. Immediately after Japan passed bills amending restrictions to its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Taiwanese officials welcomed the development as progress in deepening both US-Japan ties and Japanese involvement in international security affairs. With this historical moment as a starting point for further analysis, this paper will outline the rationale for engaging Taiwan through the US-Japan alliance and then turn to feasible policy initiatives for both Washington and Tokyo to consider. The analysis will conclude with an overview of the challenges the US-Japan alliance may face in engaging Taiwan and offer options for pressing forward with this important step in bolstering regional security and stability. Research and policy discussions frequently focus exclusively upon the US-Japan, US-Taiwan, and Japan-Taiwan alliances, but few successfully examine the opportunity of a trilateral relationship. This paper aims to fill this gap. To begin, in the following two sections, this paper will look to the policy documents and strategic rationale for expanding US-Japan ties to include Taiwan.

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1 The author is grateful for the thorough reviews of earlier drafts by M.L.R. Smith, Alessio Patalano, Jesse Sloman, and Brad Glosserman.
A foundation for including Taiwan

The expansion of the US-Japan alliance to a trilateral mechanism that engages Taiwan may be readily dismissed by some as falling beyond the scope and purview of existing agreements and relations between Washington and Tokyo. To the contrary, however, formal agreements from the early 2000s to the Joint Defense Guidelines issued in April 2015 have created significant flexibility for policymakers on both sides of the Pacific. Looking even farther back to the earliest days of Japan’s policy toward Taiwan, Japan will no doubt abide by its commitment to the “one China” principle as delineated in the 1972 Joint Communiqué with Beijing, namely that the government in Beijing is the sole, legal government of the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, Tokyo can uphold the promises of the 1998 Joint Declaration with China in maintaining exchanges of a “private and regional nature” with Taiwan.3

An additional set of US-Japan accords and declarations set the stage for discussions on whether and where there is space for Taiwan in the US-Japan relationship. Taiwan was first declared a mutual security concern for both Washington and Tokyo in a 2005 joint statement from the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee.4 Less than a decade later, Taiwan was stated to be an “unpredictable and uncertain [regional] element,” an outstanding issue in US-China relations with an inimical impact upon US-Japan ties.5 The 2013 Japanese National Security Strategy and National Defense Program Guidelines raised further concerns of lingering “gray zone” situations in northeast Asia – including cross-Strait relations – with the potential to become serious contingencies.6

Most recently, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation link bilateral security and defense ties and a renewed emphasis upon cooperation with regional or global partners and international organizations. The US-Japan alliance is explicitly tasked with responding “to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security,” including a bilateral response to an armed attack on a third country.7

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avoiding superficial predictions of a future attack on Taiwan, the US and Japanese ability to commit to working alongside and – if appropriate – in defense of Taipei (or other countries, for that matter) is clear. Tokyo and Washington have agreed to take a leading role in cooperation with regional partners, providing “a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in [the] region and beyond.” Taiwan has no shortage of advantages to offer to the US-Japan alliance; as such, the island occupies a unique place in efforts led by Washington and Tokyo to preserve regional stability and prosperity. Taiwan matters.

Lastly, both Washington and Tokyo have robust relationships and cooperative mechanisms with Taipei that can serve as a springboard for deepening US-Japan-Taiwan ties. For the US, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 set a legal precedent for unofficial relations that Washington has continued to honor. Aside from maintaining the quasi-official channels of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and its counterpart in the US (Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or TECRO), defense coordination has improved significantly since the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review under President Clinton. High-level dialogues with Taiwan’s National Security Council and Ministry of National Defense are regularly held with counterparts from within the US government; the Taiwan-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) also offers a channel for economic and trade consultation. 8 There are also private actors such as the US-Taiwan Business Council – host to the annual US-Taiwan Defense Industry conference – with vested interests in a resilient relationship with Taipei.

In the Tokyo-Taipei relationship, the absence of cooperative mechanisms aside from occasional think-tank dialogues has yielded to extensive networks between political and business elite. 9 Beyond the well-known relationship of former President Lee Teng-hui to Japanese officials, members of ruling and opposition political parties in both countries regularly conduct private, non-official exchanges and meetings. 10 In advance of taking office in May 2016, for instance, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during a visit to Japan. 11 Like the US-Taiwan relationship, Japan-Taiwan ties are similarly complicated by the presence and influence of mainland China. Japan is not in a position to hand Taiwan a carte blanche given both Tokyo’s actions in concert with the United States and its desire to avoid offending mainland China. What Japan has done to date, however, includes cooperation with Taipei in terms of fishery resources and aid when natural disasters, such as the February 2016 Tainan earthquake, strike. Taiwan is also notably reluctant to criticize Japan on historical issues that plague Tokyo’s tensions with Beijing; in 2002, for instance, when Prime Minister

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11 Author interview, Washington DC, July 2016.
Koizumi Junichiro visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the Taiwanese foreign ministry called for tolerance in Japan’s wartime past rather than criticizing the decision.

The US-Taiwan and Japan-Taiwan relationships set a precedent for the future. While the foundation of bilateral agreements and existing relations is an important start for US-Japan-Taiwan cooperation, as this paper will discuss, it is an awareness and understanding of Taiwan’s strategic importance that should also guide US-Japan engagement of the island and its leadership. Throughout the remainder of this paper, recommendations to “include,” “work” and/or “cooperate” with Taiwan in various issues serve as a call to policymakers to proactively define and develop opportunities for Taiwan to both contribute to and benefit from the US-Japan alliance.

Taiwan: East Asia’s linchpin

Taken in sum, documents from the Japanese government that have been supplemented with bilateral agreements with counterparts in Washington point to a series of steps targeting sources of instability in East Asia – destabilizing regional contingencies that include the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Incorporating Taiwan into the existing US-Japan alliance can and should be understood as one initial step in mitigating possible sources of regional tension. Keeping the Taiwanese in close proximity to US and Japanese officials aids in preempting repercussions caused by miscommunication or misperception. Given the 2016 transition of Taiwanese leadership, it will behoove both Washington and Tokyo to know Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Tsai Ying-wen and understand her perspective on the East Asian security environment.

In advance of the January 2016 election, Tsai made clear her intention to safeguard cross-Strait stability through a somewhat ambiguous policy mixture of “communication, no provocation, [and] no surprises.” She neither accepted nor refuted the 1992 Consensus deemed by Beijing as an essential precursor to cross-Strait dialogue. While questions on the specifics of Tsai’s cross-Strait policy will likely be answered throughout the early years of her administration, for the US and Japan to have,

12 Such contingencies include the Korean Peninsula and territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas; these discussions necessarily fall beyond the scope of this paper.
13 Japanese parliamentarian Kishi Nobuo noted that Japan has been paying close attention to Tsai and he is hopeful that the cooperative Japan-Taiwan relationship will continue under the new Taiwanese administration (“Power transition not to affect Japan-Taiwan ties: Japanese legislator,” Focus Taiwan News Channel (March 8, 2016), http://focustaiwan.tw/search/201603080021.aspx?q=%20Nobuo%20Kishi, accessed March 2016).
at minimum, a working relationship with Tsai will offer the chance to stymie potential challenges caused by any assertions the DPP administration may seek to make on Taiwan’s contested sovereignty. In short, closer working relations with the new Taiwanese president – of an informal, but constructive nature – will support US and Japanese endeavors to encourage a moderate Taiwanese policy toward mainland China. In turn, a moderate cross-Strait policy bolsters the status quo: a status quo that keeps volatile Chinese nationalism at bay and ensures neither Washington nor Tokyo are prone to be pulled into conflict between mainland China and Taiwan.

Moreover, for policymakers in Washington, building out the US-Japan bilateral relationship to engage Taiwan can be thought of as another component of the rebalance to Asia. Amid continued concerns that the rebalance has been mostly rhetorical, incorporating Taiwan as an element of the rebalance supports the US role as a regional catalyst by increasing the capabilities of regional partners. The shared security ties of both Tokyo and Taipei to the United States, interest in regional stability, and concerns stemming from an assertive neighboring China, make Japan and Taiwan natural partners.

For officials in Tokyo, Taiwan also directly supports Japan’s new maritime strategy and reconceptualization of the role of sea lanes in enhancing regional deterrence and international diplomacy. The Tokyo-Guam-Taipei (TGT) triangle is an area that both Japan and the United States seek to protect. For Japan, the area encompasses maritime disputes over possibly resource-rich islands; for the United States, the triangle is crucial for regional power projection. Increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and coordination within the TGT triangle by the Japanese reconfirms both a willingness to take advantage of Japan’s maritime defense posture, as well as to further expand capacities through the support of partners in Guam and Taipei.

A US-Japan-Taiwan trilateral relationship will not escape Beijing’s staunch opposition or antagonism. Despite this obvious challenge, the political and strategic dividends of including Taiwan should not be undervalued. Ties between Tokyo and Taipei are built upon shared values of democracy, freedom, and peace; expanding the US-Japan relationship to engage Taiwan helps all three capitals bolster their claims that Beijing, not Washington, is the source of regional tensions. A trilateral relationship that includes Taiwan becomes an opportunity for Tokyo to “stand up” to China, an action

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highly suited to consumption by the domestic Japanese audience.

Of greatest significance to Japan, however, is the fact that Tokyo’s strategic future rests upon Taiwan’s ability to retain de facto separation from mainland China. As Daniel Twining aptly notes, the foundations of Japan’s post-World War II strategy are likely unsustainable if Taiwan cedes its sovereign authority to a China that continues to define Japan as an adversary. Reunification would put Taiwan on the wrong side of the China-Japan relationship, threatening Japan’s interests and security, the existing US-Japan alliance, and regional stability. Thus, both the United States and Japan must have a continued, compelling reason to protect the current cross-Strait status quo of no war, no independence, and no reunification. To further protect Taiwan’s autonomy and regional stability more broadly, this paper now turns to specific steps requisite for creating a US-Japan-Taiwan trilateral relationship.

Creating space for Taiwan in US-Japan relations

As one Taiwanese think tank has pointed out, “the existence of the US-Japan alliance allows Taiwan an advantageous strategic acknowledgement, and the strengthening of US-Japan relations affords Taiwan an unprecedented strategic opportunity.” Even as Taiwan, under the new Tsai administration, explores deeper ties with Japan, policymakers in Washington and Tokyo can begin to coordinate specific efforts which create space for a trilateral US-Japan-Taiwan relationship. While there are many avenues for such efforts to occur, subsequent discussion will focus predominantly upon deepening security and economic ties.

The US-Japan-Taiwan annual security dialogue, hosted in 2015 by the Heritage Foundation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, offers a springboard for more meaningful trilateral defense and security conversations. Beginning in 2011, this annual conference enables government officials and scholars to discuss the trilateral partnership, regional security, economic ties, and avenues for cooperation. In the August 2015 dialogue, President Ma heralded the fruits of the annual meetings, pointing to stronger ties between Taiwan and the United States as well as between Taiwan and Japan. But President Ma seems to have missed the point: the dialogue is intended to boost security and economic ties in a trilateral,

21 On the mechanics and rationale of alliance formation, a helpful primer can be found in Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chapter 2.
23 Other areas of interest to the trilateral relationship include expanding cooperation in international organizations and cultural ties.
triangular network, rather than via two separate sets of bilateral relations. He barely discussed US-Japan-Taiwan ties, only briefly noting trilateral trade and economic interactions. Thus, while the mechanism of annual US-Japan-Taiwan dialogues is, in theory, conducive to building more comprehensive trilateral ties, it has yet to be used as such. Moreover, without action steps and clear policy recommendations to support these dialogues, progress in the trilateral security relationship will be slow. Given the heretofore limited utility of the US-Japan-Taiwan annual security dialogue, other interim steps to deepen the trilateral relationship in the defense and security realm should be considered.

Defense and security ties

One point of discussion prior to next year’s US-Japan-Taiwan dialogues should be how Washington and Tokyo can, in tandem, support Taiwan’s defense capabilities. Facing a heavily militarized and increasingly assertive mainland China, the Taiwanese defense sector is interested in the development of asymmetric systems, hardware that would offer a technological edge over the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In other words, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense must focus upon technology that would impede PLA control of the air and maritime spaces around the island, deterring cross-Strait reunification by force.25

Taiwan is already tackling one of the largest weaknesses in the Republic of China Navy (ROCN): submarines. A search for submarines to supplement the two Dutch-built Hai-Lung/Zwaardvis-class diesel submarines and World War II-era US Guppy-class submarines has occupied Taiwanese defense planners for decades. The Pentagon has no interest in resurrecting its long-defunct diesel-electric submarine program simply to assist Taiwan. Allowing US companies to assist Taiwan risks placing sensitive technology within arm’s reach of mainland Chinese espionage.26 Similar efforts to garner European support have fallen short.27 Such reluctance has forced a push for a domestic submarine program in cooperation with foreign defense firms.28

This is a unique opportunity for the US-Japan alliance. As an initial step, before exploring the specifics of deeper defense cooperation, the Taiwanese must improve their counterintelligence capabilities to curb opportunities for Chinese espionage. Once

25 For more on this point, see Jim Thomas et al, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan Through Deterrence and Protraction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014).
26 Mark Stokes of Project 2049 argues that the US should allow private firms to assist Taiwanese submarine procurement processes, particularly given the deadlock of weapons systems sales to Taiwan on Capitol Hill (“Taiwan’s Future Submarine Program: A Deep Dive,” conference at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Dec. 1, 2015, available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iS3NrtJSp8)
progress is made, both the US and Japan could lend current or retired experts and engineers to Taiwan throughout the submarine procurement process. Technology from the Soryu-class of diesel-electric submarines could be shared with – or sold to – Taiwan, as the Japanese had hoped to do with the Australians.29 As Seth Cropsey of the Hudson Institute points out, Japanese assistance in building indigenous Taiwanese submarines is well worth the effort. A strengthened defense relationship among countries facing the same threat should not be undervalued.30 Additionally, while some experts have suggested the US and Japan could support Taiwan’s development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), it is unrealistic to hope such know-how can be transferred to Taiwan, given the incomplete evolution of UUV capabilities in both countries.31

While submarines would bolster Taiwan’s anti-surface warfare capabilities, other platforms would be needed to reduce the challenge created by China’s latest submarines. The US and Japanese could jointly support the Taiwanese in developing anti-submarine capabilities, such as the Kawasaki P-1, Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircrafts, or the Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine helicopter. With PLA naval forces already operating more than 60 submarines, and rapidly expanding anti-submarine warfare technology, diverting Taiwanese energies to a domestic submarine development program may be rendered inconsequential by developments in mainland China.32 And even as the final deliveries of P-3C Orions are slated for 2015, Taiwan still lacks the strong maritime patrol aircraft force requisite for its geostrategic position.33 Additionally, the US and Japan could support Taiwan in bolstering ground-based air defense systems, rather than investing to update its antiquated fighter jet fleet. As analysis from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment has highlighted, roughly $3.8 billion in funds could be reallocated from upgrades and used instead in acquiring approximately 1,800 Enhanced Sea Sparrow missile-class (ESSM) air defense missiles and 50 all-terrain vehicles for missile transport.34

33 Officials from the Ministry of National Defense announced in early 2015 that the P-3C Orion operations would focus on claimed Taiwanese territory in the South China Sea. (see Gavin Phipps and James Hardy, “Taiwan to deploy P-3Cs to Spratlys,” IHS Jane’s 360 (April 20, 2015), http://www.janes.com/article/50829/taiwan-to-deploy-p-3cs-to-spratlys, accessed December 2015.
34 Jim Thomas et al, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan Through Deterrence and Protraction, pp. v-vi.
For the US and Japan to effectively support the Taiwanese defense sector, both sides must conduct annual evaluations of Taiwanese military capabilities. The seemingly endless lists of weapons Taipei would like to purchase or develop are counterproductive; with outside analysts, the island can better acquire the specific capabilities necessary to strengthen asymmetric competence. Defense experts from the think tank or academic communities, or even retired officials from the US and Japanese militaries, sent to conduct evaluations, will ensure that such evaluations remain “unofficial” in nature, abating the ire of Beijing. Such annual evaluations, rather than ad hoc assessments, will prove more effective in supporting the development of self-defensive capabilities on the island of Taiwan.

Given that both the US and Japan have legal frameworks for the sale and transfer of weapons technology to other countries, annual assessments of ROC capabilities could spur the sale and transfer of weapons to Taipei. For the US, weapons sales could continue under the terms and conditions of the Taiwan Relations Act by providing “arms of a defensive character.” In Japan, the 2014 Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology enable Tokyo to cultivate new markets for defense exports through the transfer of defense technology that contributes to (a) the active promotion of peace and international cooperation, and (b) Japan’s security.

US and Japanese joint support for Taiwanese defense procurement should not be understood as doing the work of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Rather, as a step in deepening US-Japan ties, these two countries are, in tandem, offering Taiwan the tools and knowledge necessary to strengthen its domestic procurement and weapons development programs. Given the extremely costly nature of such endeavors – and the limited reach of the Taiwanese defense budget at just above 2 percent of GDP – even a small amount of support for the Taiwanese defense sector will help alleviate some of the fiscal burden. Moreover, a Taiwan that is offensively and defensively stronger is better able to contribute to regional stability.

Support for hard military capabilities does not exhaust the potential of the US-Japan-Taiwan relationship, as the US and Japan can also expand bilateral or multilateral military exercises to include Taiwan. Beginning with humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) training – an area in which Taiwan is already a central contributor – integration of the ROC military forces in training should include the island defense simulation of Keen Sword, joint exercises in the South China Sea, the Malabar exercises with India,

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and the *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training* (CARAT) exercises with Southeast Asian nations. All offer Taiwan the opportunity to develop core competencies in areas critical to its own defense and in support of regional stability. Given Japan’s creation of an amphibious force modeled after the US Marine Corps, in the long-term as the operational capabilities of the force deepen and it can operate farther afield, an opportunity for Tokyo to aid in mitigating the self-destruction of Taiwan’s thinning Marine Corps may emerge. In the near-term, however, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces can support joint training with Taiwan in the maritime and air domains. Beyond sending Mandarin-speaking liaison officers for day-to-day operations, Tokyo could assist Taiwan in a transition to light artillery and anti-ship cruise missile missions, in exploring the feasibility for a 30,000-ton landing helicopter dock, and in exploring alternatives to expensive precision-guided weapons and targeting systems. Japan, with US support, should be less reluctant to support the Taiwan military in ways that contribute to the region, as well as in ways which bolster Taiwan’s own security.

Finally, in addition to qualitative reforms of capabilities and platforms in the Taiwanese defense sphere, the US and Japan can support Taipei’s efforts to tackle another element of defense reform: its image. The reputation of the ROC armed forces has declined, causing additional challenges for recruitment and retention of able-bodied soldiers. To remedy this, the US and Japan can encourage the ROC armed forces to explicitly define their mission, giving troops a clear sense of purpose and national duty. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense must also embark on reforms to shape a professional fighting force and offer the military as a career option for young Taiwanese, rather than the present brief period of conscripted national service. The US military has much experience in this regard – with educational and professional development offered throughout the career of a US service member – a structure Taiwan would benefit from emulating.

**Economic ties**

The US and Japan should also take economic linkages into consideration. Today, the power of debt, deficits, and economic trend lines weighs heavily on the calculus of national security for all governments. For Asian economies, economic tools have evolved into tools of statecraft. And while Asia will continue to be the driving force in world economic growth in the near future, these positive trends will not be without challenges. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) forecasts that Asia’s per capita income could rise

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six-fold in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms by 2050; emerging Asian economies are expected to grow by 6.9 percent by 2018.41 Yet even as urbanization spurs economic integration, there is likely to be greater fragmentation along regional lines, caused by nationalism and other tensions. To reduce the consequences of such fragmentation, the US-Japan alliance should incorporate Taiwan into its trade and economic relationship.

The United States and Japan together account for over 30 percent of world domestic product.42 The relative significance of this trading relationship has declined somewhat – given the rise of other emerging economic players – but the nations still share a strong flow of merchandise, automobiles, and electronics. Bilateral trade between the US and Taiwan reached $64 billion in 2013; Japan-Taiwan trade topped $56 billion in 2014, and is likely to reach the $50 billion mark again in 2015.43 Even though Taiwan is a shrimp between the economic whales of Japan and the United States, the island offers competitive advantages through the strength of Taiwanese R&D, as a linkage to Asian supply chains, and in semi-conductor manufacturing.

An additional avenue for deepening the US-Japan alliance entails turning to the linkage between economics and statecraft. Most prominently, Washington and Tokyo must encourage Taiwan’s inclusion in future negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).44 The name Taiwan takes upon ascension to the TPP should not be debated fruitlessly between current members; rather, given the scope of Taiwan’s contributions to the regional trade agreement, the US and Japan should, in tandem, support Taipei’s place in the TPP. Carving out a niche for Taiwan will be challenging. Aside from the thorny issue of “one China” – and in this case the question of which China joins the TPP – several Taiwanese trade policies will first require revision.45

Taiwan is well qualified in other ways to join TPP: it is active in APEC and has successfully signed free-trade agreements with both New Zealand and Singapore.46 Despite the challenges of its unique sovereign status, Taiwan remains a trading nation, and one that is actively interested in economic diversification and the pursuit of multilateral initiatives to remain economically competitive. Actively pursuing Taiwan’s

44 This assumes that the TPP will receive approval from the US Congress.
45 A 2015 report from the American Chamber of Commerce urges Taiwan not to expect the US to feel “obliged to sponsor” Taiwan’s TPP membership simply given the nature of the US-Taiwan relationship. Instead, Taiwan must move to resolve major outstanding trade disputes with the US and 11 other parties and implement the international regulatory norms to meet TPP membership criteria (“Taiwan and the TPP: The Time is Now,” American Chamber of Commerce (June 2015), accessed December 2015).
inclusion in the TPP enables Taiwan to grow alongside other signatory states, fostering growth that will benefit the region for generations.

**Obstacles to linking Taiwan to US-Japan relations**

Both Japan and Taiwan have strategic interests in an Asian order that is not dominated by mainland China, a pluralism that the United States, too, continues to support. With cultural and political ties forming a natural linkage between Taiwan and Japan, fitting Taiwan into the US-Japan framework appears to be a relatively straightforward task. Yet, the way forward is hardly clear-cut. As vital as Taiwan’s inclusion may be, Taiwan’s role in the US-Japan alliance will be challenged by mainland China.

Taiwan’s unique political status as a *de facto* but not *de jure* state means that any actions taken alongside other regional partners will be closely scrutinized by Beijing. Both Japan and the United States have, at various historical junctures, endorsed the “one China” principle. From Beijing’s vantage point, efforts from Tokyo and Washington to expand ties with the “other” China will be perceived as violations of the “one China” principle, as well as bilateral communiqués each has signed with the PRC. Stronger ties between Taiwan, Japan, and the United States are likely to also be perceived by Beijing as attempts to contain China’s “peaceful rise,” rather than as a means to “reinforce and diversify sources of regional stability.”

China will try to undermine steps between the US and Japan that aim to include Taiwan. Such attempts will likely be geoeconomic in nature, a policy tool Tokyo is familiar with. In 2010, amid disputes over the detention of a Chinese fishing trawler captain near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, PRC customs officials halted shipments of rare earth elements to Japan. China mines 93 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals, a necessary component of many Japanese industrial manufacturing processes. Such sustained coercive pressures dealt a blow to the Japanese economy with ripple effects for the US and elsewhere, a contingency both governments should anticipate. Given Taiwan’s economic linkages and dependencies upon mainland China, Taipei also faces increased vulnerabilities should Beijing decide to inflict economic pain upon the island. Economic pressures are a reality that could threaten to deflect the trajectory of US-Japan-Taiwan engagement.

Closer cooperation with the Taiwanese military also raises concerns of espionage from mainland China. In 2015, 13 of 15 alleged spy cases in Taiwan involved either 12

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49 On this topic, a good starting point is Murray Scot Tanner, *Chinese Economic Coercion: A Tricky Weapon to Use* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), chapter 4-5.
active or retired military personnel.\textsuperscript{50} Reports suggest that the predominant collection targets included Taiwan’s radar and passive early detection systems, military exercises, Patriot missile systems, military mobilization and defense plans, and C4ISR infrastructure that affect air defense awareness and electronic warfare.\textsuperscript{51} The Chinese intelligence collectors operating against Taiwan span the whole of the CCP, PLA, and Chinese state. Any technology that is transferred by Washington or Tokyo to Taiwan can be assumed to also pass under the scrutiny of Chinese intelligence collectors. For older platforms, such concerns are less valid but, should Washington or Tokyo deem it necessary to aid Taiwan in development of newer, cutting-edge military capabilities, espionage is a problem. Part of the solution entails fixing the morale of Taiwanese military personnel; disgruntled officers are more likely to betray their country and sell-out secrets to Beijing.\textsuperscript{52} But even if this psychological component can be handled the danger of loose lips linger. Naming and shaming the Chinese in their spying endeavors will be ineffective. Both Japan and the US must prioritize military cooperation with Taiwan in ways that both powers are comfortable with the Chinese having eyes and ears on.

With a new DPP-led administration in place, two domestic factors will shape Taipei’s ability to work with the US and Japan in a trilateral context: slowed economic growth and a limited defense budget. By mid-2015, economic indices revealed that Taiwan’s economy has grown at its slowest pace in three years due to a collapse in exports and rising competition from regional rivals.\textsuperscript{53} Closer economic linkages to mainland China have been tapped to their full potential, forcing Taiwanese to think creatively both about Taiwan’s economic rejuvenation and its role in the regional and global economies. These factors contribute to the likelihood that domestic politics will occupy the bandwidth of the new administration at the outset. Additionally, for Taiwan to effectively contribute to the US-Japan alliance in the defense and military realm, it must either rethink its limited defense budget, or it must be willing to work smartly within those fiscal limitations. Raising military spending to 3 percent of Taiwan’s GDP as the DPP has promised would be an improvement, but even such an increase would not be adequate to provide Taiwan the flexibility in procuring and maintaining the long list of platforms it aims to acquire.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{54} Rich Chang, “Increase defense budget to 3 percent of GDP, DPP says,” \textit{Taipei Times} (March 5, 2014), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/05/2003584915, accessed November 2014; “Chair Tsai Ing-wen: Our Role in Maintaining Regional Stability,” speech delivered at DPP headquarters in
For the US, the 2016 presidential election poses a similar challenge. President-elect Donald Trump will be forced to balance the demands of domestic and foreign policymaking. President Obama made tremendous progress in the US-Japan strategic alliance – heralding a “new era” in ties. His successor would be faced with a simple choice: continue the rebalance to Asia and progress of the US-Japan alliance or modify the US network of security commitments and alliances across the region at the risk of regional stability and security. Impediments to a continuation of the rebalance include whether and when the TPP will take effect – and whether the agreement can be further expanded to include other Asian powers – and debates regarding the basing of US forces in Okinawa and elsewhere in the region.\textsuperscript{55}

Finally, for Japan, challenges exist primarily in the policy realm. While extensive rules and regulations are in place to oversee the transfer of Japanese defense technology, ambiguities in the legal documents do not guarantee Tokyo’s willingness to aid Taiwan in platform procurement. Politicians in Tokyo must decide if the “gray zone” of cross-Strait contingencies merits Japanese assistance, and more importantly, if weapons transfers to Taiwan contribute to the promotion of peace, international cooperation, and Japan’s regional security. Some may argue that deeper ties between Tokyo and Taipei run counter to historical memory; specifically, that Taiwan should not be so quick to heal scars of Japanese police brutality, severe social control, discrimination, war, food shortages and the like that characterized its colonial presence in Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. Yet, given that the colonial style and authoritarian rule of the Kuomintang since 1945 seemed worse to many Taiwanese, surprisingly few today harbor animosity toward Japan. Polling from the Japanese Foreign Ministry supports this conclusion, revealing close feelings and cordiality between the Japanese and Taiwanese people.\textsuperscript{56} A shared, if even sometimes dissonant, history should not stand in the way of Taiwan’s engagement in the US-Japan alliance.

The way forward for Washington, Tokyo, and Taipei

On the campaign trail, Tsai Ying-wen made clear her intention to “work with Japan to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.”\textsuperscript{57} She plans to lean toward and manage the island’s ties with both the US and Japan. But are Washington and Tokyo ready and willing to work with Taipei?

For the US and Japan, existing legal frameworks and agreements are in place to expand the bilateral relationship to include Taiwan. There is sufficient strategic


ambiguity within these documents to allow both parties to add a third participant. The challenges of China’s influence, espionage, Taiwanese domestic constraints, and the “gray zones” within Japanese policy pose a formidable task for policymakers the largest of which will be the perceptions and reactions of the political community in Beijing.

Beijing will air its concerns with Washington and Tokyo should both states make moves that challenge the “one China” policy principle through a trilateral relationship with Taiwan. China also remains apprehensive of any fundamental changes in the US-Japan alliance due to a “historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan,” stemming from a legacy of atrocities in the 1930s rather than a byproduct of contemporary Japanese power. To mitigate such concerns, the way forward must include a strengthening of Japan-China and US-Japan-China ties to help dispel Chinese misperceptions of encirclement or containment which are likely to result from a stronger US-Japan-Taiwan relationship. These three countries should begin with opportunities for trust-building and confidence-building measures (CBMs). For Beijing and Tokyo, their national choices remain tightly intertwined even in the current period of diplomatic discord.

They could begin with lower hanging fruit. Tokyo can assist in stabilizing ties by ensuring that Japanese leaders refrain from paying tribute at the Yasukuni Shrine. At a trilateral level, the once widely discussed idea of trilateral US-China-Japan security dialogues could begin first as an economic summit, rather than immediately wading into sensitive issue areas. Within the security realm, all three countries could commit to a working group on enhancing joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief monitoring and response; establish a consultation mechanism on maritime safety; or look to establish a trilateral defense hotline. Such trust- and confidence-building measures should be pursued gradually, step-by-step but in a methodical way aimed at focusing the attention of officials in Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington upon their shared interest in regional stability. These steps would elevate the Japan-China and US-Japan-China relationships even as the US-Japan alliance cooperates more with Taiwan.

When it comes to the TPP and the likely opposition from Beijing to Taiwan’s ascension, one alternative would be to advocate the greater Chinese region’s inclusion in the trade agreement. China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan could work alongside Japan and Washington to near-simultaneously gain a place in the trade framework. In the military realm, public diplomacy and assurances from all sides are requisite to alleviate Beijing’s concerns of containment and continued apprehension on the future status of Taiwan. As

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59 This point is discussed at length in Shelia Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia UP, 2015).
important as public statements on the nature of a US-Japan-Taiwan relationship are, of
greater importance will be the quiet, high-level discussions between government officials
in Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington that build interpersonal trust, aid in avoiding false
perceptions between actors, and reassert regional stability as the modus operandi
underpinning regional relationships.

For the US-Japan alliance to continue to foster peace and prosperity in the East
Asian region, it is time to think creatively about new policy initiatives. Engaging Taiwan
allows both Washington and Tokyo to further their shared interest in preserving the
cross-Strait status quo. Taiwanese engagement provides opportunity for deeper regional
economic integration and stronger interoperability of defensive capabilities. While often
overlooked in many of today’s policy discussions and research, there are significant
benefits and stabilizing power to be had in building a US-Japan-Taiwan cooperative
mechanism in East Asia. Taiwan is situated at the forefront of strategic competition in
East Asia; should the US and Japan choose to further nurture their shared ties to the
island, they can ensure having a say in the trajectory and outcome of the region’s future.
Post-International Space Station project: Japan-US cooperation in outer space
By Akira Igata

The Japan-US bilateral relationship has deepened and expanded. Under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration from 2009-2012, the “alliance” deepened to mean more than the simple security relationship that the word implies – it was characterized as a comprehensive relationship based on the three pillars of “security, economy, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.”¹ The subsequent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration expanded the scope of the alliance by including issue areas such as cyber and outer space in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (2015) that were not included in the previous Defense Guidelines (1997).² The track record of the Japanese government under two major political parties demonstrates that the general direction of deepening Japan-US cooperation has a bipartisan support in Japanese politics.

Assuming that the international developments in the Asia-Pacific continue to evolve along the current trajectory, Japan-US cooperation in outer space would benefit both countries in the medium- to long-term, because: (1) outer space will increase its significance in terms of both security and economy; and (2) outer space is one of the most under-developed areas of cooperation between the two countries compared to other issue-areas.

This paper argues that Japan and the US should draft a comprehensive joint space cooperation strategy encompassing security, civil, and commercial elements with a proposal for invitation to a joint development of the international post-International Space Station (ISS) project as its crown jewel.³

Outer space as an issue area

Outer space is a domain that deserves increasing attention for several reasons. Let’s categorize them into three general areas: commercial, civil,⁴ and security, while noting that the lines between the three are increasingly blurry as space-related activities develop. While the primary focus of this paper is the security aspects of space cooperation, I will first briefly mention civil and commercial aspects. Before delving into

⁴ This article borrows the distinction between civil and commercial activities made by James Clay Moltz. Civil activities refer to “nonmilitary, government-run space activities, such as space science, remote sensing, and exploration.” Commercial activities refer to “activities conducted for profit, most often by private companies.” James Clay Moltz. Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012): 222.
the importance of space, it is worth noting that while the domain of outer space is often lumped together with another new domain of cyber space in government documents and in academia, outer space should be treated as an independent domain with an exclusive focus. To be sure, cyber space is closely related to various issues of outer space. However, this is true of any other domain – cyber is now deeply involved in land, sea, and air domains as well. Space is not unique in this regard. To put space and cyber in the same basket is misleading and dilutes the attention that both domains deserve.

Civil activities

First, space is critically important due to the benefits that it bestows upon humanity. States benefit profoundly from the use of satellites. They give access to medical advice or education to those living in remote areas. Earth observation systems can be used for disaster management in terms of prevention, monitoring, prediction, early warming, recovery and rehabilitation. Satellite images and GPS tracking can be useful in agriculture, which relates to food security. Satellite remote sensing can be used for “Space Archeology,” etc.  

Canadian astronaut Julie Payette has succinctly summarized the merits of the ISS, arguably the hallmark of civil space activities.

The benefits of the space station are manifold. As a permanent, habitable infrastructure in lower Earth orbit, it advances the understanding of the impacts of living outside the boundaries of the planet, helps build a foundation for future technologies and for the human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. A world-class microgravity laboratory also adds to our knowledge base in human health and physical sciences and enhances the quality of life here on Earth. The station also benefits the science and engineering community by creating jobs for tens of thousands of highly qualified personnel involved in the design, development, fabrication, mission control, management, training, and operation of such a complex infrastructure. Finally, the presence of humans onboard an orbital outpost is viewed by many as quite inspiring and serves to motivate the next generation of scientists, engineers, writers, artists, politicians, and explorers. However, the ISS’s tour de force is not simply in engineering and R&D, it is in the unprecedented collaboration, synergy, and entente the partners have displayed through its planning, construction,

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5 In terms of strategic documents, the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation lumps together “Space and Cyberspace Cooperation” into a same section. In NDPG 2013, “Responses in outer space and cyberspace” is lumped in under the subsection on the “Effective deterrence of a response to various situations” (p.14-15) as well as “Functions and capabilities to be emphasized” for “Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces.” (p. 20) In terms of research programs, the “Emerging Strategic domain Policy Research Platform In international relationship (ESPRIT), “is a projected funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which proposes the “direction of outerspace and cyberspace diplomacy for Japanese government.” ESPRIT, “Main activities,” Accessed on April 1, 2016. <http://www.space-cyber.jp/concept>

and, now, utilization phase.\textsuperscript{7}

There are other mundane benefits for ordinary citizens in industrialized countries who are living their everyday lives – telecommunications, navigation, and weather prediction, to name a few. In short, outer space is already an indispensable part of the lives of citizens who live in industrialized countries such as Japan and the US.

\textit{Commercial activities}

The growing presence of nongovernmental commercial entities in space is another reason the Japanese government must step up its game. Unlike the past when governments had a monopoly on the means and ends of space exploration, private commercial entities are increasingly entering the space domain.

For instance, SpaceX has recently announced that it is planning to build a settlement in Mars by the 2060s.\textsuperscript{8} Following this announcement, Boeing has proclaimed that “the first person to step foot on Mars will arrive there riding a Boeing rocket.”\textsuperscript{9} Behind these bold, ambitious claims is the rapid rise of commercial sector into the space domain, which signals much cheaper access to space. There are indications that forays by private companies into the space domain will be welcome by the US government. Congressman James Bridenstine’s draft bill, “American Space Renaissance Act,” contains a section on the commercial sector, which encourages the development of the commercialization of space.

\textbf{Recent developments in space policies}

\textit{Japan}

There has been a major shift in Japan’s policy toward outer space in recent years. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Japan was banned from engaging in a research development of space-related technologies. While this was lifted after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japanese space policy has long maintained a policy, \textit{de facto} at first, later explicit, to use space development solely for peaceful purposes. This principle of the “peaceful use of space” was codified by a Diet Resolution in May 1969. This “peaceful use of space” has a unique interpretation in Japan, which is completely different from the standard understanding of the phrase elsewhere in international society. Normally, this term is roughly synonymous with \textit{non-weaponization} of space,” which implies that there should be no placement of weapons in

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space. However, the standard set in Japan’s 1969 Diet Resolution was a “non-militarization of space,” which implied that neither the Defense Agency nor the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) would be allowed to fund, possess, or operate any space-related systems. In short, Japan’s space policy since the end of World War II has focused solely on science and technology and research development.

The Basic Space Law in 2008 was a milestone that changed Japanese space policy from a strict, no-tolerance-for-SDF principle to a comprehensive security strategy composed of three pillars: science and technology, industrial development, and security. This law mandated the establishment of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy under the Cabinet Secretariat and the creation of a comprehensive strategic document of Japanese space policy. Since then, “Basic Plan for Space Policy,” which outlines the general Japanese space policy, has been renewed three times – 2009, 2013, and 2015. The 2015 document is significant for several reasons. First, this strategic document is meant to be revised every five years, yet the 2013 space policy was revised after only 2 years under the same Cabinet that adopted the 2013 policy. This revision was short so that the space policy would fall in line with the higher-order National Security Strategy (NSS) (2013) as well as other strategic documents subordinate to the NSS, such as the Development Cooperation Charter (2015). This implies that Japanese space policy will henceforth be conducted as part of larger Japanese strategic considerations.

Another noteworthy change is the revision of the Law of Establishment of the Cabinet Office in 2012, which eliminated MEXT’s (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) control of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and created the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP) under the Cabinet Office. This revision also amended article 4 of the JAXA law (2002), which changed the original stipulation that the activities of JAXA are “limited to peaceful purposes,” understood as “non-military” in the Japanese context. Now, the activities of JAXA will be “based on the basic principles of peaceful uses of space,” which effectively opened up the possibilities of JAXA engaging in defense-related research. Another notable institutional change is the establishment of a Space Policy Division under the Foreign Policy Bureau at MOFA in April 2012. In April 2016, the administrative functions of the ONSP and the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy were consolidated into the Space Development and Strategy Promotion (SDSP) Secretariat under the Cabinet Office.

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11 However, the 2013 document was adopted only one month after the inauguration of the Abe government.
Benefits that states can obtain from the utilization of space have spurred the Japanese government to stipulate the increasing importance of space in its strategic documents. Japan’s NSS in 2013, the first comprehensive national strategy written after the end of World War II, refers to the intention of expanding outer space activities in various areas: norm development in the area of outer space; strengthening maritime domain awareness capabilities through the use of outer space; and ensuring stable use of outer space and promoting its use for security purposes. Two subordinate documents adopted along with the NSS, the National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG, 2015) and the Medium-Term Defense Program (MTDP, 2015), also touch upon the increasing importance of outer space. The NDPG mentions the importance of outer space in terms of securing environments surrounding Japan, active promotion of security cooperation with the US and international community, and effective deterrence and response – all in tandem with cyberspace. The MTDP specifically stipulates the development of an X-Band communication satellite system.

United States

From the point of view of space security, Iraq’s attempt at GPS jamming during the Iraq War in 2003 was the first case of obstruction of space use during a military operation and China’s 2007 ASAT test was a wakeup call for space security policy. The National Space Policy (2010), National Security Space Strategy (NSSS, 2011), National Space Transportation Policy (2013), and NOAA Commercial Space Policy (2016) were all drafted by the Obama administration, proof of the heightened concern of US government officials regarding the changing nature of outer space. William Shelton, commander of US Air Force Space Command, stated in July 2014 that space used to be “a peaceful sanctuary” for the US due to its unparalleled dominance, but this has changed as a result of the increased capabilities of other countries. In February 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper remarked that “[t]hreats to US space systems and services will increase during 2015 and beyond as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities,” specifically mentioning Chinese and Russian capabilities. The US government has also called for expanding international cooperation to strengthen US leadership in space, identify areas for potential international cooperation, and develop transparency and confidence-building measures.

Policy experts are also beginning to raise alarms about the need for the US to increase activities to ensure space security. Elbridge Colby argues that US reliance on space is increasing as the improved capabilities of Russia, China, and others pose new

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risks to US satellites. Furthermore, the US is projecting space to be the domain in which the US would lose its relative technological superiority by 2025. In the Asia-Pacific, there is a burgeoning regional rivalry in space among Asia-Pacific countries, and China is heavily investing in counterspace capabilities. In addition to such capabilities, intentions of these regional countries are also cause for concern, as demonstrated by the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007. Furthermore, technological developments in this field have forced decisions in the security arena to be made quicker to prevent and mitigate damage. To do so, timely information gathering is necessary. Space surveillance is thus essential and its importance will rise technology advances.

Given this change in the strategic environment, the US government is increasing its space spending in both civil and military realms. The House and Senate passed a bill that would give NASA nearly $1.3 billion more than FY 2015, which is $750 million higher than NASA’s request. On the military side, it has been reported that the US will add up to $8 billion to budgets for US security space capabilities from FY 2016-2020. Given that US space-related spending alone was higher than the rest of the world combined according to the latest OECD data (2013), this increase would allow the US to maintain its edge in its space related programs.

Japan-US bilateral cooperation

Recent developments have nudged the two countries to cooperate on issues related to outer space. Japan-US space cooperation is considered to be “the deepest and most extensive of any Asian country.” While true, outer space remains one of the most underdeveloped areas within the global commons between the two governments. The two countries have only begun increased cooperation in space.

The two countries concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on the sharing of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) information in 2013. The foreign ministries of Japan and the US have been holding an annual comprehensive dialogue on space since March 2013. These dialogues have focused on issues ranging from the exchange of

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information on space policies, collaboration on US Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) that complements the GPS system, SSA, use of space for maritime domain awareness (MDA), cooperation on ISS, transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM), etc.\textsuperscript{26}

The defense bureaucracies are talking as well. Following the new Japan-US Defense Guidelines in April 2015, the Japan-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) was established to enhance defense cooperation on space and cyberspace.\textsuperscript{27} The first SCWG took place October 2015, and the two ministries have engaged in discussions relating to space policies, information sharing, training and TTX, personnel training, and cooperation with other departments and private sectors.\textsuperscript{28} There have also been inter-ministerial talks at the vice-ministerial level on security issues in space in 2012, 2014, and 2015.

Bilateral coordination is not limited to the individual diplomatic and defense bureaucracies. Space is discussed at the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2), which includes ministers from foreign and defense ministries of the two countries. Most recently, the two governments have agreed on a new bilateral cooperation framework called the “Japan-United States Open Platform Partnership Program [JP-US OP3]” in December 2015.\textsuperscript{29} This framework stipulates that the two countries will: (1) develop new initiatives for the operations of ISS; (2) increase cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; (3) promote new ways to utilize the ISS; and (4) promote utilization of space-related technologies. Furthermore, the two countries have been expanding bilateral cooperation into a trilateral one, holding an annual trilateral dialogue on space security with Australia since December 2011.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Multilateral cooperation}

There are two space-related frameworks in the Asia-Pacific: the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and China-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). APRSAF was established in 1993 under the


leadership of Japan. It started out as a relatively informal institution with a flexible membership, holding an annual conference primarily aimed at practitioners as participants exchanging information. The second space-related framework, headed by China, gave impetus for Japan to shift the nature of APRSAF. The China-led APSCO, which grew out from the Asia-Pacific Workshop on Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA) in 1992, was established in 2006. The main focus of APSCO is technology transfer to developing countries, which is more substantial than APRSAF. APSCO is also institutionally more formal than APRSAF, allowing China to impose more influence over member countries. Concerned that Japan will lose its leadership role in space development in the Asia-Pacific, Japan revitalized APRSAF, but this shift is less a result of Japan’s strategic initiative and more a reaction to Chinese activities through APSCO. APSCO is continuing to boost its influence in the Asia-Pacific by jointly organizing and adopting the Beijing Declaration of the APSCO Development Strategy Forum in 2015 hosted by the China National Space Administration (CNSA).

A comprehensive space cooperation strategy: “the next big goal” as a crown jewel

Given the increased importance of outer space and still-growing bilateral cooperation, the two countries should adopt a comprehensive space cooperation strategy that encompasses security, civil, and commercial activities with multilateral joint development of the post-ISS project as its crown jewel. Although JP-US OP3 is a step in the right direction, it nevertheless is a single-page document that is essentially bullet points on areas of civil cooperation. A new comprehensive space strategy should include both ambitious elements as well as other practical, bland, space-related cooperation. Fora for discussions on these issues exist, as detailed above, and both countries should fully utilize them. Five elements could be a part of this new comprehensive Japan-US space strategy.

(1) “The next big goal”: Post-ISS ISECG project

The ISS is a truly international project, which includes Russia, Europe, and Canada, along with Japan and the US. However, the ISS is currently scheduled to end its operation in 2024. Despite the announcement by the head of Roscosmos that it will be working with NASA to “work on the programme of a future orbital station,” NASA did not confirm the joint-development of “ISS 2.0” with Russia. This reluctance stems from

31 Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, “About APRSAF.” [http://www.aprsaf.org/about/]
34 Ibid., 225.
several factors: (1) the vast amount of budget required; (2) development of technology may have rendered a massive space station obsolete; and (3) the desire of the US to go beyond low-earth orbit to cislunar space and beyond.

JP-US OP3 reconfirms Japan’s involvement in the extended operation of ISS until 2024. However, the benefits of continuing operation of the ISS do not disappear with the end of the current ISS. As such, Japan and the US should begin discussions on what the bilateral cooperative framework for ISS would look like after 2024. Even if the two countries decide to further extend the operation of ISS, experts estimate that its maximum lifespan is around 2028, “due to life limitations on crucial station elements, obsolescence, and a lack of replacement parts.”36 As such, this discussion should include ambitious “next steps” for cooperation. Japan should proactively begin discussions with the US on possible joint-development among the US, Russia, Japan, Canada, and Europe.37 Bilateral discussion should focus on the purpose, timetable, and the budget of the project, which should result in conclusion of a MOU that would become the basis for inviting other countries to join the joint project.

What should this post-ISS project look like? There are various options for this “next big goal” in space exploration. The space community is split between camps, some of whom support building “ISS 2.0,” while others argue that the funds would be better spent on other ambitious space goals.

For one, the symbolic nature of ISS is relevant for international politics, as it determines who will have the leadership in space in the future. Senate testimony by Scott Pace, the Director of the Space Policy Institute, illuminates this point.

China is planning to deploy its own space station in less than a decade, about the same time that the International Space Station may be ending. If China is able to offer pragmatic opportunities for space cooperation on its own space station or as part of efforts to send human to the Moon, and the United States cannot, then other countries will likely find it attractive to forge closer relationship with China. Such a shift in international space influence away from the United States and toward China will, no doubt, impact a wide range of US national security and foreign policy interests, both in space and in other arenas.38

However, conflicting assessments of technological feasibility and budget exist among specialists, and the creation of an “ISS 2.0” is dismissed as worthy by many. Another post-ISS project candidate includes human exploration beyond the lower orbit. First, the Moon has been identified as “our nearest and first goal” by the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (Diese) and Pace recently argued that going back to the Moon should be the next post-ISS international project; some go even further

37 The European Space Agency currently has 22 member states.
and argue for establishing a moon base.\textsuperscript{39} Under the Obama administration, “sending astronauts to an asteroid for the first time in history” has been the stated goal, not the Moon, since “we’ve been there before.”\textsuperscript{40} Congressman James Bridenstein’s draft “American Space Renaissance Act” bill proposes that “[u]ntil American land on Mars, NASA’s main priority shall be to land Americans on Mars.”\textsuperscript{41} Whether a manned mission to the Moon, an asteroid, or Mars, these advocates support the view that a human exploration beyond the low earth orbit – beyond ISS – should be the next big project.

I will not specify which of these goals should be “the next big goal” for the countries to pursue. I argue that this goal, whether ISS 2.0 or something else, should be a symbolic, multilateral endeavor, and it should be identified as a goal well before the ISS ends its operation in 2024 (or 2028 if extended). Furthermore, both Japan and US should engage in close discussions on what the goal should be, how they should be financed, and which countries they would be willing to cooperate with. This discussion should start now.

(2) Adoption of legal guidelines as a precondition for capacity building assistance

As promoters of a rule-based order, Japan and the US should make capacity building assistance in the area of space contingent on other countries abiding by legal guidelines and code of conducts for a peaceful use of space.

For instance, Japan has endorsed the creation of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC).\textsuperscript{42} The draft of these transparency and confidence-building measures in space is under development through consultation with the EU and other countries such as the US, Japan, and Australia.\textsuperscript{43} Unfortunately, the prospects for the adoption of ICoC seem quite low. However, Japan can actively promote the endorsement of ICoC or other legal guidelines and codes of conduct, such as the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, as a precondition for offering capacity-building assistance related to space. Conditional technological transfer is not new (look at the nuclear regime). Similar incentives could include sponsoring astronauts from endorsing countries for training and launches.

(3) Use APRSAF as a forum to develop a regional policy position

\textsuperscript{40} Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Space Exploration in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Merritt Island, Florida, April 15, 2010.
\textsuperscript{41} Discussion Draft of the American Space Renaissance Act. Feb. 26, 2016: Section 203 (c). The author would like to thank Todd Harrison for sharing this draft.
As explained above, APRSAF is a gathering with a light political hue. Whether the charter of APRSAF can easily be changed so that political issues can be discussed is arguable, but Japan should consider expanding the activities of APRSAF so that a regional space policy position can be argued and solidified.

As Clay Moltz argues, there is a “missing middle” in Asia’s space programs: “the absence of substantive cooperation among the major four Asia space programs themselves (China, India, South Korea, and Japan).” Japan can attempt to fill this void by trying to consolidate its role in the Asia-Pacific through leadership in APRSAF. Space expert Victoria Samson notes that the Brazil Group punches above its weight in COPUOS through prior coordination with neighboring countries to solidify regional policy positions on space issues. If Japan can do something similar using APRSAF as a forum, then Japan and Asia’s position may be better reflected in discussions in larger international fora such as COPUOS.

(4) Participation in Space-related TTXs

To increase readiness for contingencies related to space, Japan should increase its participation in space-related Tabletop Exercises (TTX). There is a multinational space-related TTX called the Schriever Wargame, which includes countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Participating in Schriever and other TTX would increase Japan’s readiness, and overcome its tendencies to have training exercises where everything proceeds according to plan. This seems to be obvious if Japan wants to avoid having to say “souteigai” – “unexpected” – repeatedly as it did after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident in 2011. Japan should consider asking for permission to take part in space-related tabletop exercises, perhaps as an observer at first, then later as a full participant.

(5) Further cooperation on information sharing

Enhancing cooperation in SSA and MDA has been recommended repeatedly. Increased SSA would contribute to both detecting space debris for safer use of space as well as monitoring space so that suspicious activities can be detected. Better coordination in MDA would contribute, again, to both natural and man-made problems – dealing with natural disasters as well as suspicious maritime activities. As this paper’s analysis has shown, space surveillance is important for all areas of security, civil activities, and commerce. Furthermore, this cooperation is amenable to expanding the bilateral framework into trilateral and regional cooperation.

Strategic justifications for comprehensive bilateral space cooperation

There are various rationales for adopting a comprehensive space cooperation strategy between Japan and the US. First, the alliance has long been much more than a bilateral relationship: it has championed the goal of providing global public goods. The two countries have been contributing to secure the maritime domain, the Arctic, and to a lesser degree cyberspace. Outer space remains the most underdeveloped area of global commons in which the two countries have yet to cooperate significantly. Given the increasing reliance on space, space should be seen as part of a critical infrastructure. Every state would benefit from its protection.48

For Japan, taking on a leadership role in space would be natural as a country that prides itself for being a “science and technology major power (Gijyutsu Taikoku).” This has both domestic and international implications in terms of increasing Japan’s soft power. Domestically, increasing its activities in space could become a rallying point for Japanese national pride. Space would be an apt goal for several reasons. First, Japan has experienced a sense of malaise in the two decades that followed the end of Cold War, a period where many observers now call “the lost decades.”49 In addition to this domestic development, international developments – the rise of China and rapid economic development of regional countries – have caused Japan’s relative geopolitical influence to decline. However, Japan still maintains a relative technological edge in many space-related technologies. Furthermore, the current rallying point call for Japanese national pride is the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, but this will only be temporary. It is critical for Japan to begin the discussion on what might be the next source of Japanese national pride. The public would likely welcome making outer space and being a “science and technology major power” a goal, since around 30 percent of the population identify “science and technology” as an area where developments are moving in the right direction.50

Internationally, advancing space cooperation would function as a “science and technology diplomacy,” which would burnish Japan’s image as a country that strives to work for the good of all humanity.51 These space projects will contribute to human security, which is also consistent with the long-held goal of Japanese foreign policy. Medical experiments conducted in ISS and beyond will aid the development of cheaper, more effective medicine. Global surveillance and monitoring systems could be utilized for better response to natural disasters. Dealing with space debris will allow for more satellites to be safely launched into space, which could be used for HA/DR.

Given that Japan has a technological edge in many space-related technologies, exploiting this advantage would give Japan strategic advantages. The space program

49 Yoichi Funabashi and Barak Kushner Eds, Examining Japan’s Lost Decades (New York: Routledge, 2015).
advanced dual-use technologies during the Cold War. With the change in its arms export principles in 2014, Japan can now participate in multinational joint development programs that it could not previously join.\textsuperscript{52} The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases (2014) touches upon issues in space, albeit in a limited fashion, and it will be “studying the future of defense production and technological bases which will be necessary in the future in terms of defense of Japan.”\textsuperscript{53} This would allow the private security sector to increase its competitiveness. Due to budget constraints in both countries, there is an economic incentive for joint cooperation.

Japan-US space cooperation would contribute to regional stability of the Asia-Pacific as well. Space cooperation can be a confidence building measure among countries in the region. Mirroring Obama’s Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, announcing an aspirational goal that benefits humanity as a whole could help shift the tone away from the “us-vs-them” mentality that is increasingly prevalent in the Asia-Pacific. Recent maritime disputes in the region have resulted in increasingly negative images of the other. The ISS was a project between the US, Russia, Japan, Canada, and the EU because these were the only countries with the technological capacity to contribute. However, now other countries have the technological capacity to cooperate in space, such as China, India, and the ROK. Cooperation among them would build confidence among nations that may not be allies or close partners.

**Potential obstacles**

There are several obstacles to the conclusion of a Japan-US comprehensive joint space cooperation strategy: (1) budgetary issues, (2) bureaucratic divisions, and (3) insufficient data sharing.

**Budgetary issues**

Budgetary issues are the foremost obstacle to comprehensive space cooperation. Both countries face tight budget constraints and public opinion often favors limiting state expenditures to existing, tangible problems at home rather than spending money on outer space.

Space exploration grasps the hearts and minds of people around the world. Astronaut tops the list of most prestigious occupations.\textsuperscript{54} The mainstream media picks up developments relating to outer space, be it the sharpest photo image of Pluto taken by a probe, a successful launch and first-stage landing of Falcon 9, or the first flower ever to


bloom in space. However, the exotic nature of space exploration often means that space programs are considered costly endeavors aimed at fulfilling the intellectual curiosity of elite scientists and are irrelevant to the general population.

The prospects are brighter for the US than Japan when it comes to budgeting. The US has historically had large space-related funding. In addition, the recent increase in space-related budgets for civil and military programs bodes well for US space programs. Japan experienced a substantial increase in space-related budget from 2006 to 2007. There were fluctuations after 2007, ranging from a low of 298 billion yen ($2.6 billion) in 2012 to 382.7 billion yen ($3.3 billion); the average budget between 2007 and 2016 has been 334 billion yen ($2.9 billion). Given that the US budget on space-related activities is estimated to be around $39 billion in 2013, Japan’s space programs are severely underfunded in comparison. The percentage of the US space budget per capita is almost 5 times that of Japan as well, with the US at around 1.23 percent and Japan at 0.27 percent. Given the increasing importance of space as an issue area, Japan should allocate more resources to space.

Table 1: Japan’s recent space-related budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Billion Yen)</td>
<td>260.3</td>
<td>251.4</td>
<td>326.8</td>
<td>316.0</td>
<td>348.8</td>
<td>339.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To overcome this obstacle, the two governments must present rational, clear-eyed arguments for how outer space development and exploration will benefit ordinary citizens and serve the strategic interest of their countries. The fact that space affects every facet of daily life is underappreciated by both the general public and decision-making elites. A strong political determination and a clear presentation of why space-related policies are relevant and necessary will be essential to justify this budget. Having a post-

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57 Ibid.

ISS project within the joint cooperation strategy and highlighting it will be especially important, since public opinion would be more excited by the thought of a space platform for manned space exploration to Mars and possibly beyond, than details of how space debris can be hazardous to satellites. The pronouncement of a joint space strategy will be instrumental in two ways: (1) government pursuit of the same goals bolsters the argument that these are worth pursuing and (2) cooperation with other countries will eliminate duplication and allows for maximum cost-effectiveness.

Increasing the budget is not the only way to deal with lack of funding. Prioritization is also necessary. This could be done easier in Japan if the budget allocation for space can be easily changed. This leads to the problem of bureaucratic stove piping.

**Bureaucratic stove piping**

There is a bureaucratic divide within Japan regarding space policy, which has begun to be addressed, but requires more effort. Establishment of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy under the Cabinet Secretariat following passage of the Basic Space Law in 2008 was a watershed moment for Japan’s space policy, which coincided with the establishment of the Strategic Headquarters, and was followed by the establishment of ONSP in 2012. Until then, Japan’s space policy had been primarily, if not solely based on MEXT and JAXA’s technological development-centered space program rather than a larger space development involving numerous ministries.59 Furthermore, consolidation of the Strategic Headquarters and the ONSP into the SDSP in 2016 is a welcome sign of bureaucratic consolidation.

More work must be done. For instance, the Time Schedule for the Basic Plan for Space Policy (2015) has a section for increasing cooperation between JAXA and MoD, which is necessary since MoD has historically been detached from space-related policy making as a result of the Diet resolution on the principle of peaceful use of space (1969). Substantial cooperation between JAXA and MoD has been limited to research cooperation on satellite-borne infrared sensors thus far and there are no concrete projects planned in the next 10 years. 60 Furthermore, certain aspects of space policy would by necessity involve various ministries, but the case of Japan is excessive. For instance, the signatory of the Japan-US SSA information sharing MOU for the US is only the Department of Defense, but the Japanese side has five signatories: Cabinet Secretariat; MEXT; MLIT; MoD; and JAXA. 61 Another example is the number of agencies involved in the area of remote sensing. The development of remote sensing satellites includes the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, MOFA, METI, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and Ministry of Environment, but the usage of remote sensing data includes another set of ministries – the Cabinet, National Police

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59 Suzuki, Ucyuu Kaihatsu to Kokusai Seiji, 204.
60 Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Government of Japan, Uchû Kihon Keikaku Kouteihyō (Heisei 27-nendo kaiitei) [Time Schedule for the Basic Plan on Space Policy (Revised for FY2015)] (Dec. 8, 2015): 40.
61 Japan-US Memorandum on SSA, 6-7.
The space budget for FY2016 includes funding for 11 different ministries in total. Various new dialogues on space conducted between Japan and the US are a positive development, but this can also be seen as needless repetition. To overcome this obstacle, the Headquarters for Space Policy, in conjunction with the Office of National Space Policy, should promote increased cooperation among the relevant ministries. Furthermore, taking up security issues related to outer space at the National Security Council would also facilitate inter-ministerial interaction.

**Insufficient data sharing**

Many of the benefits that could be reaped from space cooperation such as SSA and MDA benefit from further information sharing. However, there are obstacles to sharing data, especially sensitive information.

Historically, Japan lacked the mechanism for domestic data protection and a security clearance system that caused other countries to feel uncomfortable sharing sensitive information. To remedy the situation, Japan passed “the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets” in December 2013, and this entered into force on December 2014. Furthermore, the security clearance for current relevant government personnel was completed in December 2015. Legal and institutional safeguards have now been put in place.

Despite these developments, there still exists lingering skepticism among the US security community regarding sharing intelligence with Japan. First, a Japanese track-record in terms of protecting sensitive information under the new legal framework needs to be established. Second, there is a lack of faith in Japan’s counter-intelligence. These anxieties may partly derive from unfamiliarity of the Japanese information protection system, but there is work that must be done. Given the gradations on the degree of information sharing, from partners, to allies, to the Five Eyes (FVEY) as a gold standard, Japan should strengthen its counter-intelligence apparatus (while making sure that an institutional mechanism is set up so that civil liberties of the Japanese citizens are not jeopardized and promulgating this fact) and push for increased sharing of information with the US. This should give further impetus to sign the failed GSOMIA with ROK, improving Japan’s crisis management capabilities related to the Korean Peninsula. US could then share information with Japan and encourage other partner countries to trust Japan with their information. This would expedite the building of a track-record for secure sharing of information to build confidence with the other FVEY countries.

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62 Time Schedule for Basic Plan for Space Policy, 5.
63 The 11 ministries, in the order of the size of the budget of FY2016, are: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (179.3B); Cabinet Secretariat (71.8B); Ministry of Defense (34.2B); Cabinet Office (20.3B); Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (10.2B); Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (6B); Ministry of the Environment (5.9B); Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (3B); National Police Agency (1.2B); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (0.3B); and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (0.2B). Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Ucyuu Kankei Yosan ni Tsuite [On space related budgets],” <http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/budget/yosan.html>
Conclusion

Humanity is becoming increasingly reliant on space. Technological development will render space even more important in the future. Accordingly, Japan and the US have been adapting to this changing environment through actions both domestic and international. However, more needs to be done given the continued advancement of technology. A joint comprehensive cooperation strategy that encompasses security, civil, and commercial activities should be negotiated between Japan and the US. Potential elements to this strategy include (1) promoting an international post-ISS project; (2) making capacity building a precondition for endorsing legal frameworks; (3) expanding APRSAF into a political forum; (4) participation in space related TTX; and (5) expanding information sharing. Such a strategy will be beneficial for both countries, as well as for the region. Although there are obstacles such as budgetary issues, bureaucratic stove piping, and insufficient data sharing, these are not insurmountable.
Enhancing the US-Japan alliance through partnership programs and public diplomacy
By Miha Hribernik

Solving the complex set of security issues facing the Asia-Pacific increasingly requires multilateral approaches. These problems include traditional security threats – such as the North Korean nuclear program and territorial disputes in the South China Sea – as well as a proliferation of nontraditional security threats, including international terrorism and maritime piracy around Indonesia and the Singapore Strait. None of these issues can be effectively tackled by a single country or a single method. Rather, finding a solution requires cooperation with other countries within multiple geographies in Asia and across the globe.

The US and Japan appear well aware of these complexities. The April 2015 revision of the US-Japan Defense Guidelines enshrined cooperation with global and regional partners as one of the core postulates of the alliance.¹ This change represented a major step forward in the transformation of the alliance from a regional ‘military-centric’ pact to a global alliance with strategic interests and like-minded partner countries across the world.² The Guidelines envision cooperation on two levels: international activities (including peacekeeping operations; international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; maritime security; partner capacity building; noncombatant evacuation operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; training and exercises; and logistic support) and trilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Plainly, there is both a need and intent to enhance partnerships with third countries. However, despite the alliance’s strengthening on paper, the two countries have yet to make the necessary political decisions to translate this ambition into practice.³ While the relatively open-ended provisions of the Guidelines allow the allies to shape the trajectory of such cooperation over the next several years, they also present a challenge: without sustained, formalized, and structured effort, the intent of the Guidelines could fail

² The ongoing changes to Japan’s security posture have paved the way for this revision. Reforms include the 2014 establishment of the National Security Council and the relaxation of the ban on arms exports introduced in the same year. A 2014 Cabinet reinterpretation of the constitution and the new Guidelines, in turn, made possible the adoption of new security legislation in September 2015. The new laws entered into force in March 2016. The legislation resulted in the lifting of Japan’s long-standing ban on collective self-defense. As a result, Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) can now, among other things, provide logistical and rear-area support to friendly militaries, and participate in multilateral peace and security operations. Some countries, particularly China, believe the new legislation is eroding Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution. For more information, please see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Security Policy,” MOFA (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/, accessed December 2015; Xinhua, “China ‘pressures Jepan to enact controversial security laws amid strong opposition,” Xinhuanet (Sept. 19, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/19/c_134638856.htm, accessed December 2015.
³ Interview with Christopher W. Hughes, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies, Warwick University, Nov. 30, 2015.
to be realized, or alternatively, remain limited to sporadic initiatives or *ad hoc* exercises.

Although the implementation of partnership programs would present a major step in the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, and the closer integration of the two countries’ military, diplomatic, and other services, it would not be unprecedented. Institutions established by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – an alliance which has had to perpetually evolve and reinvent itself since its founding in 1949 – hold valuable lessons for the creation of similar structures within the US-Japan alliance. This process would be facilitated by the two allies’ existing ties with NATO: the US is a founding member of the alliance, and Japan is its oldest global partner.

To effectively implement the Guidelines, this paper recommends the introduction of formal partnership programs with third countries, organized and managed by a new Partnership Coordination Mechanism (PCM). The PCM would maintain a standing menu of options for cooperation, which individual partner states could draw upon, depending on their needs and capabilities. This would provide the US-Japan alliance with the flexibility to expand or limit each individual partnership program in response to changes in diplomatic, security, economic and other circumstances. As a result of this flexibility, the allies could consistently engage both existing close partners, such as Australia and India, as well as countries that may be reluctant to pursue fully-fledged military cooperation, lest they risk antagonizing China. These countries may nonetheless be willing to collaborate in areas of common concern, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or counter-terrorism.

By cooperating with partner countries as an alliance, rather than two individual states, the US and Japan would more effectively build the security and defense capabilities of partner countries. Such improvement, even within states that choose limited cooperation, is crucial given the diverse security challenges in the Asia-Pacific. As the NATO experience shows, partner states would in turn benefit from, among other things, increased interoperability with the two allies; support with defense sector reform; and allied assistance in addressing security threats within their territory.

Partnership programs would, nevertheless, almost certainly raise questions as to their intent. Public opinion in partner countries may initially not be receptive to closer cooperation with the alliance. Domestically, discontent centered on outstanding issues between the US and Japan – such as the relocation of Marine Air Station Futenma in Okinawa – could be channeled against the alliance. Furthermore, China may interpret the reforms as part of a broader US-Japan containment strategy. To address these concerns, this paper recommends the establishment of a new Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism (PDCM), which would closely coordinate with the new partnership programs and draw upon the resources of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the US State Department.\(^4\) As a result, the two allies could more effectively alleviate any

\(^4\) There is no one recognized definition of public diplomacy. For example, the one put forward by the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tuft University’s Fletcher School – one of the leading institutions in the field of public diplomacy – has evolved since the center’s foundation in the 1960s. One of the more comprehensive attempts at defining the term was outlined by Alan K. Hendrikson, the center’s
concerns and present a united front, both at home and abroad.

**Third-country partnership programs**

**The experience of NATO**

Partnership programs led by NATO benefit the alliance because they provide it with added legitimacy; bring in additional military assets to NATO operations (such as counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden); provide knowledge about local conditions outside the alliance; extend NATO’s geographic reach; and enable the alliance to address security issues it could not tackle on its own.5

Partner countries benefit from such cooperation as well, providing the rationale for participation in the programs. Partners gain from practical military experience; exposure to NATO standards and capabilities; high-level consultations with NATO officials; assistance with defense reform; interoperability with the alliance’s military; and support in addressing regional security challenges.6 Perhaps most important is the ability to obtain knowledge on newly emerging threats within the Euro-Atlantic area, which have the potential to spread into other geographies. Two recent examples are the threat of hybrid warfare (the combination of disinformation, covert means and military action) and the ‘weaponization of information’ (employing propaganda and manipulative narratives).7 Both were used successfully by Russia in its actions in Ukraine in 2014, and could be adopted by other countries in the future.

NATO’s partnership programs evolved out of the alliance’s need to reinvent itself after the end of the Cold War. Partnerships were initially designed to help maintain stability and strengthen democracy in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. One of the first such initiatives was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, established in 1994. The PfP proved to be successful in facilitating reform in Eastern Europe, and prepared the countries for eventual NATO membership. The PfP encompasses activities such as defense reform, military-to-military cooperation, civil emergency planning and

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disaster response, and cooperation on science and environmental issues.\textsuperscript{8}

Over the subsequent two decades, NATO’s partnership programs expanded, and now include cooperation with 41 states. Partner countries that wish to pursue closer cooperation can request an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP), which outlines the goals and priorities for each partnership program. These two-year programs allow partners to choose from approximately 1,400 activities on NATO’s Partnership Cooperation Menu in thematic areas such as defense sector reform, research and development (R&D), disarmament, maritime security, mountain warfare, information security, arms control, demining, air defense, and cyber defense.\textsuperscript{9}

As Table 1 below demonstrates, cooperation extends to different structures within each partner country. This flexibility allows partners to determine the extent of cooperation based on their needs and capabilities, while taking into account political sensitivity. For example, Kyrgyzstan – which heavily depends on Russia for economic stability and defense – has restricted cooperation to the civilian sphere. In the case of aspiring NATO member Georgia, however, ties are much more extensive, and encompass cooperation between military structures, a NATO information office in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi, and a permanent mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels.\textsuperscript{10}

Table 1: NATO’s cooperation with selected partner countries\textsuperscript{11}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAR</th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>HOS</th>
<th>PM</th>
<th>MFA</th>
<th>MOD</th>
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<th>INFO</th>
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\textsuperscript{9} NATO does not release detailed information on specific partnership activities to the public. For basic information on the activities available, see: NATO, “Partnership tools,” \textit{NATO} (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_80925.htm, accessed November 2015.


\textsuperscript{11} PAR = Parliament; HOS = Head of State; GOV = Government; PM = Prime Minister; MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOD = Ministry of Defense; MIL = Military/Chief of Staff; DEL = National Mission or Delegation to NATO; INFO = Information Centre. For more information, see: NATO, “Partners,” \textit{NATO} (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm#fn02, accessed November 2015.
Although NATO-Japan relations date back to the late 1970s, the partnership was only formalized with the signing of an IPCP in May 2014. The document outlines 10 priority areas of cooperation, including counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and maritime security.\textsuperscript{12}

However, the timing of the IPCP did not allow it to take into account some of the experiences of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its assistance to Ukrainian separatists from 2014 onward. The aforementioned ‘weaponization’ of information and hybrid warfare were both employed to strong effect by Moscow during the conflict. Their successful implementation in Ukraine could lead other countries to emulate the approaches in the future.

In the most extreme scenario, hybrid warfare in the Asia-Pacific could entail using fishing and merchant vessels, crewed by ostensibly civilian personnel, to seize disputed territories.\textsuperscript{13} This would sow confusion and provide a degree of deniability similar to Russia’s use of soldiers without insignia during the initial stages of the seizure of Crimea. NATO’s experience from the Ukraine conflict therefore directly benefits Japanese security planning and, as an extension, that of the US-Japan alliance. Highlighting the knowledge-sharing nature of NATO’s partnership programs, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow recently stated that NATO and Japan will jointly analyze the new methods adopted by Russia and explore ways of countering them.\textsuperscript{14}

NATO partnership programs benefit both the alliance and its partners by allowing them to address common security threats, share knowledge and improve military interoperability. Partnerships ensure structured, formalized, and sustained security and defense cooperation with non-allied countries, which may be difficult to achieve through bilateral arrangements or \textit{ad hoc} exercises. Finally, the flexible nature of the programs allows them to be tailored to each country’s needs and capabilities, while taking into account any political and diplomatic considerations. All of these aspects would prove of great value for any similar programs introduced by the US-Japan alliance.

The US-Japan alliance: toward a Partnership Coordination Mechanism

This paper recommends establishment of a mechanism within the US-Japan alliance, which would manage and oversee cooperation with third countries. The Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), established in November 2015, would act as a


\textsuperscript{13} Civilian ships are occasionally used in incursions into disputed territories and are frequently involved in incidents at sea. For example, over the course of 2016, Chinese and Taiwanese fishing vessels, backed by coast guard assets, were detected in waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku and Okinotori islands respectively.

\textsuperscript{14} Alexander Vershbow, “Benefits of Closer Japan-NATO Cooperation.”
precedent. However, the ACM’s main purpose of coordinating bilateral activity leaves it ill-suited for tri- and multilateral cooperation.

A new body, tentatively called the Partnership Coordination Mechanism (PCM), would assume this role. The structure of the PCM would ensure effective coordination in the planning and implementation of trilateral and multilateral activities with partner countries. Its establishment would represent a major strategic decision, necessary for translating the provisions of the Defense Guidelines from paper into practice.

Table 2 below outlines the initial proposal for the PCM’s structure, which would bring together both governments and include input from civil society, think tanks, and academia. The participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would increase the scope of partnership programs and lend them additional legitimacy. Such participation would not be unprecedented within the alliance, as NGOs already form an integral component of the US-run Pacific Partnership Program.

**Table 2: Proposed structure of the PCM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Potential participation/input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Strategic Center  | Adopts strategic decisions on the partnership program, its funding and future trajectory | • US Department of State  
• United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
• US Department of Defense (USDOD)  
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)  
• Ministry of Defense (MOD)  
• Ministry of Land, |
| Operational Center| Maintains regular communication with partner countries; coordinates activities of US and Japanese ministries and other bodies; oversees implementation of partnership activities | |

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15 The ACM allows the US and Japan to coordinate military (and to an extent, diplomatic) operations during peacetime to more effectively respond to ‘gray zone’ situations, such as armed fishermen occupying contested islands. The ACM consists of three levels: a coordinating group which develops security policy; a center for joint operations discussion between the MSDF and the US military; and a second center which coordinates land, sea and air forces. For more information, see Tajima Yukio, “Defense coordination extended to peacetime,” Nikkei Asian Review (Nov. 4, 2015), accessed December 2015.

16 Interview with Kotani Tetsuo, Senior Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Nov. 29, 2015.

17 For example, by holding conferences or organizing fellowship programs for high-ranking military and civilian officials from partner states.

| Development Center | Proposes and develops activities for inclusion on partnership menu; directly participates in their implementation | Broad range of potential governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including all of the above plus:
- Think tanks
- Universities
- Civil society |

Each third-country partnership would be established after the conclusion of an Individual Partnership Program (IPP), agreed between the PCM and the partner state. Each IPP could be concluded for a set duration or remain open-ended. As a strategic document, the IPP would outline the main areas of cooperation between the US-Japan alliance and the partner country. Separate action plans would operationalize the IPPs and contain provisions for specific activities, tied to concrete deadlines.

**Partnership activities**

Due to space constraints, this paper only provides an outline of some of the main activities that could be implemented. Examples include military and coast guard exercises; research and development (R&D); support for defense sector reform; sharing of intelligence and military information; joint naval and coast guard patrols; counter-terrorism and counter-piracy drills; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercises; acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs); sales and transfer of defense systems; capacity building; assistance with demining; personnel exchanges; and annual bilateral visits between heads of state and other officials.

In addition to new initiatives, existing cooperation could be incorporated into partnership programs, thereby improving coordination and reducing duplication of...
Programs such as the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) naval exercises could serve as an example. The drills are already evolving beyond their initial bilateral scope, as demonstrated by the trilateral US-Japan-Philippine exercises held in June 2015. By bringing CARAT under the PCM umbrella, the program could transform from a US initiative to one co-headed by Tokyo and Washington, improving the US Navy’s and the Maritime Self Defense Force’s (MSDF) interoperability with regional navies.

A list of all activities would be published annually, allowing partner states to create a tailored program for the following year. Although the activities would be available to all partners, their implementation in practice would most likely vary due to geographic limitations. Each IPP and action plan would delineate and focus partnership activities into several thematic areas. Table 3 below provides an example of how a priority area may be defined within each partnership, starting with the broadest definition (IPP) through the more detailed (action plan) to the most specific (individual activities).

Table 3: Example cooperation with fictional country X

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Detailed</th>
<th>Specific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>Action plan</td>
<td>Individual activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Maritime security | • Joint coast guard exercises before the end of 2017  
• Establishment of maritime piracy and armed robbery information-sharing network by end of July 2018 | • Joint US-Japan-country X coast guard drills held off the coast of country X in September 2017  
• New 24-hour information-sharing center established in capital of country X in June 2018. Funding provided by country X, training provided by the US and Japan. Center employs 10 full-time personnel, and is jointly operated by the US, Japan and country X |

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20 This possibility of integrating existing bilateral and trilateral activities into alliance-wide partnership programs also exists within NATO. Source: Interview with Barbora Maronkova, Programme Officer, Engagement Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Dec. 1, 2015.

21 Started in 1995, CARAT is a series of bilateral naval exercises organized by the US, and held together with partners in Southeast and South Asia. CARAT partners include Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste. For more information, please see: Prashanth Parameswaran, “US Eyes Expanded Military Exercises with ASEAN Navies,” The Diplomat (May 7, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/us-eyes-expanded-military-exercises-with-asean-navies/, accessed December 2015.

22 For example, a nearby partner such as Australia may prefer regular naval exercises or joint counter-piracy drills, while a land-locked partner state in Europe, such as Hungary, may prefer to limit cooperation to research and development or personnel exchanges.

23 In this fictional example, the IPP came into effect on Jan. 1, 2017, and has no set time limit/duration.
The establishment of a single coordinating body would facilitate the creation of new bi- and multilateral initiatives. For example, the PCM could expand cooperation between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the US Coast Guard (USCG) to third countries. One expert suggested the two could introduce ‘shiprider’ programs, allowing officers from one to serve on the vessels of the other. This shiprider program could serve as a kernel for future inclusion of other regional partners (such as India) through the PCM.24

Geographic focus

This paper recommends that the partnership programs be made available without geographic restrictions. There are three reasons for this.

First, many security threats in the Asia-Pacific – such as terrorism or transnational crime – are global in nature. It would be almost impossible to address them without cooperation with partners in other parts of the globe.25

Second, persistent and formalized sharing of experience with partners outside the Asia-Pacific would greatly benefit the alliance. The European experience with hybrid warfare and weaponization of information during the Ukraine crisis is a case in point.

Finally, the contributions of the US-Japan alliance to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific are not universally known. Indeed, one expert argued that it is generally perceived as a narrow military alliance, lacking the kind of legitimacy afforded to NATO through its promotion of universal liberal values.26 By concluding IPPs with partners across the globe, the allies could begin to address this ‘image deficit’ and boost international support for the alliance.

Although the reach of the PCM would be global, the breadth of cooperation with specific countries would differ from region to region. Detailing the type of cooperation with each potential partner country is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it can provide a broad overview of some of the major geographic areas of interest.

The convergence of security interests would likely result in much closer cooperation with nearby states than with other parts of the globe. Countries that already pursue comprehensive security cooperation with the two allies, such as Australia, and India, would most likely also opt for closer ties through the PCM to better tackle

24 Interview with Scott Cheney Peters, Nov. 2, 2015.
25 The most recent example is the growing number of attacks committed by Islamic State in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and elsewhere. The terrorist organization is increasing its influence in Asia, and has already become active in countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. For more information, please see: Ahmed S. Hashin, “The Impact of the Islamic State in Asia,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (February 2015), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PR150211_The_Impact_of_the_Islamic_State_in_Asia.pdf, accessed December 2015.
26 Interview with Ashizawa Kuniko, Adjunct Instructor, School of International Service, American University, Nov. 23, 2015.
traditional and nontraditional security threats. Even so, not all countries in the Asia-Pacific would follow suit. Securing trilateral cooperation with US ally South Korea, for example, will be difficult given the continued friction between Seoul and Tokyo over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands and lingering historical issues. Furthermore, some regional countries, such as Vietnam, have traditionally been wary of over-relying on a single outside partner for security, and would balance cooperation between the US-Japan alliance and China, potentially limiting its participation in the PCM. The flexibility afforded by the PCM would allow each IPP to be tailored to individual circumstances.

Within the Asia-Pacific, the PCM could reduce duplication of effort by transforming bilateral cooperation into trilateral initiatives. For example, both allies have separate programs for training and equipping Philippine law enforcement agencies. Between 2016 and 2018, the Philippine Coast Guard will receive 10 new high-speed patrol vessels, built by the Japan Marine United Corporation and financed by a low-interest 19 billion yen ($158 million) Japanese loan. Similarly, the Philippine National Police Maritime Group is set to receive four US-made patrol vessels. By concluding an IPP, cooperation with the Philippines could be more closely coordinated, potentially leading to savings as a result of a unified training program provided by the JCG and USCG.

Unlike the Asia-Pacific, where bilateral and trilateral security cooperation is already well developed, other regions represent a ‘blind spot’ for the alliance’s current institutional setup. Within Japan’s MOFA, the North American Affairs Bureau is in charge of alliance activities; in the State Department, this responsibility is assumed by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. This suggests that the alliance’s institutional makeup is yet to adjust to the ‘global’ shift. By extending alliance-level cooperation across the globe, the PCM would help address this shortcoming.

Cooperation with Central Asia may be particularly promising. Both the US and Japan have expressed interest in making the region more institutionally connected and

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27 Australia is a US ally, and its close security relationship with Japan has been referred to as a “quasi-alliance” by Japanese officials. India is pursuing close security cooperation with both the US and Japan, as recently demonstrated by the October 2015 trilateral naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal.

28 Security relations between South Korea and Japan were set to improve with the signing of a military accord, which included an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2012. The agreements stalled due to public opposition within South Korea.

29 Interview with Alex Calvo, Guest Professor, Nagoya University, Nov. 3, 2015.


31 After he assumed office in June 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte began to signal a shift in foreign policy away from the US, which includes reduced defense and security cooperation. At the time of writing there was no indication that this reduction would directly affect the delivery of US and Japanese vessels or the training of Philippine law enforcement agencies.

32 Interview with Ashizawa Kuniko, Nov. 23, 2015.
integrated, akin to Southeast Asia; progress has been limited, however.\textsuperscript{33} For example, the US and Japan have planned to hold trilateral talks with Kazakhstan, but these were not publicized because “Japan feared offending China.”\textsuperscript{34} By utilizing the PCM, Tokyo and Washington could assist regional states through capacity building and defense sector reform, while simultaneously presenting a viable alternative to the growing influence of China and Russia by filling in the institutional ‘blind spots.’

Finally, cooperation with partners further afield (Europe, Africa, the Americas) would most likely be more limited in scope, given the distance. However, various countries may nevertheless have a stake in security in the Asia-Pacific, or may be interested in exchanging experience and knowledge from different geographies. France, with its Pacific territories, is a potential partner with an interest in maintaining security in the region.\textsuperscript{35} Paris is particularly interested in cooperating on maritime surveillance in its expansive and resource-rich exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna. New Caledonia holds an estimated 25 percent of the world’s nickel reserves, in addition to hydrocarbons and other seabed resources within the EEZ.\textsuperscript{36}

**Potential obstacles and proposed solutions**

a) Constitutional and legal restrictions in Japan

Japan’s pacifist constitution continues to shape the country’s security and defense policies, and cooperation in many areas may face some limitations. According to one expert, the legal limits of Japanese security legislation are “complex and obscure,” particularly to outside observers.\textsuperscript{37} Given the PCM’s broad mandate – encompassing everything from R&D to military drills – most concluded IPPs would need to conform to some restrictions. For example, any official development assistance (ODA) provided to foreign armed forces must be nonmilitary in nature, effectively restricting the type of equipment that can be donated to partner countries. Another example is cyber defense cooperation, as US and Japanese cyber units face greatly different operating restrictions, which would need to be taken into account by partner states.\textsuperscript{38} Due to these limitations,

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} SDF cyber personnel are banned from staging counterattacks, defending civilian infrastructure or recruiting ‘white hat’ hackers from outside the government, among other restrictions. For more information, see: Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” *Congressional Research Service* (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf, accessed March 2016.
Japanese legislation would effectively determine the maximum possible depth and breadth of partnership activities agreed between the alliance and a partner state.

Nevertheless, the work of the PCM would not be significantly impeded. Japan’s security posture has been undergoing gradual transformation for decades; a process that appears almost certain to continue. The legal reforms and Cabinet decisions taken during Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s second term in office have intensified this process and substantially reduced limitations on international security cooperation. These are now lower than at any point during the postwar period, particularly for peacetime activities. Since the proposed partnership programs would neither extend to times of war nor entail the use of force, they would not be problematic from a constitutional perspective.39

A recent example of reform is the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, which allows the disbursement of official development assistance earmarked for countering “threats to stability and security.”40 This broad heading encompasses categories as diverse as maritime security, terrorism and threats to the global commons. The charter has effectively transformed Japan’s ODA into a potent policy tool for building the capacity of law enforcement agencies in partner countries.41 Similarly, the 2014 relaxation of its self-imposed arms export ban now allows Tokyo to export military equipment to, or jointly develop it with, any country not involved in conflict or under UN sanctions. Finally, the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution in 2014 paved the way for the September 2015 adoption of new security legislation, which entered into force in March 2016. Among other things, the SDF is now authorized to provide ammunition to foreign forces and rescue civilian personnel when taking part in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).

These and other legal reforms have enabled Japan to establish a number of bilateral defense and security partnerships with countries across the globe. Such initiatives prove that remaining constitutional and legal constraints are not decisive obstacles to cooperation in practice. The France-Japan defense pact of 2015, the February 2016 defense agreement with the Philippines, and the April 2016 joint military exercises with Australia highlight Tokyo’s ability to engage in comprehensive security and defense cooperation within the confines of the existing legal framework.

b) Public opposition to Japan’s changing security posture

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39 Interview with Ashizawa Kuniko, March 25, 2016.
40 Although the charter retains the ban on the transfer of military equipment, one interviewed expert suggested such limitations are almost always flexible in practice and can be circumvented given sufficient political will.
The July 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 and the September 2015 changes to security legislation were met by large protests across Japan. Opinion polls showed that around half the population opposed the changes, and Prime Minister Abe’s approval ratings declined. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) spearheaded opposition to the reforms and attempted to prevent their adoption in the Diet. The newly reformed Democratic Party (DP) and other opposition parties have continued to dispute the new security bills, and would almost certainly attempt to reverse the changes should they secure a Diet majority in the future.42

The public and political challenges to the new laws highlighted the existence of opposition to reforms that could be perceived as subverting the pacifist constitution and paving the way for the ‘militarization’ of Japan. As a consequence, future legal changes may be contested by civil society organizations and some political parties, particularly if reforms entail changes to Article 9 of the constitution.

The rolling back of recent reforms could impede the work of the proposed PCM. For example, a renewal of the ban on weapons exports could prevent the export of Japan-made equipment to partner countries or hinder joint R&D projects. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with legislative changes could be redirected against the US-Japan alliance itself, particularly if reforms continue to be justified as a necessary step in the evolution of the alliance.43 This, for now admittedly limited, risk will increase if there are Japanese combat casualties in military operations enabled by the new legislation. An erosion of public (and political) support for the alliance would have a destabilizing effect on US-Japan relations, and by extension, the partnership programs.

However, the likelihood of major legislative reversals or an erosion in support for the alliance is very low at the time of writing. After the security laws were adopted, Prime Minister Abe’s approval ratings quickly rebounded from 38.5 percent in September 2015 to almost 50 percent in November.44 The rapid recovery highlighted the relatively greater importance the electorate places on non-security issues – particularly economic development – and the lack of viable political alternatives to the ruling Liberal

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42 The Democratic Party (Minshinto) was formed in March 2016, following the merger of the DPJ with the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Other parties that actively oppose the new security legislation include the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s Life Party.

43 Although this risk remains low it merits consideration. Stephen Harner believes the changes to security legislation are “fraught with risk [and] largely devoid of compelling justification – except to appease the Americans.” Furthermore: “The U.S.-Japan alliance remains sacrosanct in most political discussion in Japan (and of course in the United States). But by framing his security agenda as elemental to the alliance, Abe has turned a glaring and highly contentious light on it. Paradoxically, Abe’s security legislation – ostensibly passed to support the U.S.-Japan alliance – could be the beginning of its undoing.” Although Harner’s views are controversial, they highlight the potential that legislative changes – aimed at strengthening the alliance – could weaken public support for it instead. See: Stephen Harner, “Abe’s Security Law Putsch: TheUndoing Of The U.S.-Japan Alliance?,” Forbes (July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2015/07/20/abes-security-law-putsch-the-undoing-of-the-u-s-japan-alliance/, accessed December 2015.

Democratic Party (LDP). Despite attempts at consolidation and cooperation, the DP and other parties continue to trail far behind the LDP in opinion polls. Although as much as half the population may agree with the DP on security legislation, the lack of support suggests that, while contentious to an extent, the laws themselves are insufficient to mobilize voters.

Perhaps most important, the latest annual Cabinet Office survey on diplomacy, published in March 2016, revealed a great deal of continuity in the public’s view of foreign policy issues facing Japan, which appears to have been unaffected by the controversy surrounding the new security bills. One analysis of the survey concluded that the public is not worried about the content of the laws, but predominantly opposes the way in which the government ‘pushed’ them through the legislative process. The survey also registered that a record 88 percent of the population see US-Japan relations as positive, revealing that the controversy around Japan’s perceived ‘militarization’ has not been channeled against the US-Japan alliance.

Even though public opinion and political opposition pose a low risk to the proposed PCM at present, future changes cannot be ruled out. Japanese combat casualties, a revision of the constitution, or even a surge in longstanding tensions over the relocation of US Marine Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, could galvanize opposition to security reforms or the US-Japan alliance. Such a substantial shift in public opinion would need to be carefully managed. The two allies would need to invest additional resources into explaining the benefits of international security cooperation, the US-Japan alliance, and the PCM to the Japanese public. Efforts would be most effectively coordinated through the creation of a new Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism (PDCM), described in more detail at the end of this paper.

c) Overlap with existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives

The US and Japan already closely coordinate foreign policy efforts, and the addition of another coordinating body may be seen as a redundancy. However, the PCM would not replace all bilateral/trilateral and other agreements, just as NATO member states retain the ability to pursue international cooperation in parallel to partnership programs. Rather, the partnership program and the PCM should be seen as an addition or

48 The potential impact of an escalation in the Futenma dispute on the US-Japan alliance is discussed in more detail later in this paper.
complement to current initiatives. Their flexibility would allow them to act either as a mechanism for improved coordination on existing programs; as a way to introduce new initiatives or pilot projects; or remain a minor element of the alliance’s foreign policy in cases where trilateral cooperation would be ill-advised due to diplomatic or other considerations.

d) Competition from existing structures

Officials within institutions such as the State Department or MOFA may prefer the status quo, because the PCM could effectively ‘usurp’ some of the responsibilities – and finite funding – afforded to them.\[^{49}\] Any lobbying against the PCM could be minimized if the staffing of the new mechanism mainly involved “redeploying existing human assets” rather than the hiring of new personnel – a decision which would also limit costs.\[^{50}\] Similarly, the actual implementation of specific IPPs would most probably not represent a major expense. If the PCM follows the example of NATO, each participating country would fund its own partnership program and related activities, and would not represent a direct financial burden for the alliance.\[^{51}\]

e) Finite resources

The transformation of the alliance notwithstanding, wartime military cooperation between the US and Japan will always remain the core of the alliance. The two countries must allocate limited resources, making the proposed partnership programs just one of many different priority areas. However, the recommendations in this paper would not be a major drain on the alliance’s resources. As such, they would prove a cost-effective solution for strengthening the alliance and its contribution to global and regional security, occurring in parallel – and without hindering – reforms to US-Japan wartime cooperation or the purchase of new defense systems.


\[^{50}\] Interview with Alex Calvo, Nov. 3, 2015.

\[^{51}\] Interview with Barbora Maronkova, Dec. 1, 2015.
f) Chinese concerns

China could perceive the introduction of a comprehensive partnership program as part of a wider US-Japan containment strategy aimed at curtailing Beijing’s rising regional and global influence. There are two ways of addressing this concern:

First, the US and Japan should, with the assistance of a new public diplomacy mechanism, strongly emphasize the multi-faceted nature of the partnerships, which do not solely focus on building the hard power of partner states, but rather extend across multiple areas, such as counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. By developing third-country capabilities in these areas, the alliance helps partners tackle threats throughout the Asia-Pacific and the globe – including those facing China. In this respect, transparency and the regular publicizing of partnership activities in these ‘areas of common concern’ would play a key role in alleviating any misgivings.

The second measure to allay Chinese fears is to extend it an invitation, either in the form of a full partnership or a more limited observer status. A standing invitation could remain open to China, as well as other major powers with a stake in the region, such as Russia. This gesture would reinforce the inclusive nature of the partnership programs and the fact that they were not designed for excluding or countering China.

The supporting role of public diplomacy

The NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Aware of the need to influence the perception of domestic and international audiences during its post-Cold War transformation, NATO established the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) in 2004. The PDD provides public diplomacy outreach and support for NATO missions and partnership programs. The mandate allows it to work both within the borders of the alliance and externally.

In addition to its headquarters in Brussels, the PDD has two offices in Kiev and Moscow respectively. These are staffed by NATO personnel and provide information on NATO activities in the local languages, as well as offer funding for the production of publications, curriculum development and the organization of conferences and other events. Significantly, the Moscow office has remained opened despite the deterioration of NATO-Russia relations after 2014.

52 The PDD is headed by an Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. The division’s 90 staff work within three different pillars: the Press and Media Section, Communication Services, and the Engagement Section. Two separate cells – the Assessment and Evaluation Cell and the Strategic Communications Cell – report directly to the Assistant Secretary General. The PDD is funded by NATO’s civilian budget, however, the size of the funding available is confidential.
53 Their legal status, privileges and immunities are agreed between NATO and the host nation, but generally equal to diplomatic status.
To date, the PDD has carried out a number of concrete activities to boost support for the alliance and its partnership programs. For example, it has supported the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and reassured Eastern European partners during the crisis in Ukraine. Specific programs within NATO member states include the examples of Germany and the Netherlands, where the PDD worked to boost public support for sending troops to Afghanistan. This was achieved through media appearances by NATO officials, conferences with decision-makers advocating for ISAF, and arranging travel to Afghanistan for journalists and influential personalities.55

The PDD is also active in support of the NATO-Japan partnership. The division’s key task is to counter the Japanese public’s perception of NATO as a Cold War military organization, which limits Japan’s ability to participate in the partnership program. The PDD works to explain NATO priorities and partnerships to key audiences in Japan, and has established regular track 2 and track 1.5 dialogues between NATO and Japanese security experts.56

Institutionalizing public diplomacy within the US-Japan alliance

Although the alliance has bolstered its public relations efforts over the past several years, with the goal of portraying itself as a guardian of universal liberal values in the Asia-Pacific, these efforts have yet to result in the kind of legitimacy possessed by NATO.57

The creation of a new public diplomacy body within the US-Japan alliance would address the shortfall. Tentatively named the Public Diplomacy Coordination Mechanism (PDCM), it would assume some of the responsibilities currently within the remit of the two countries’ diplomatic services. Like the PDD, the PDCM would project a uniform image of the alliance at home and abroad, and assist with the shift in the perception of the US-Japan alliance from a ‘military-centric’ pact to a values-based alliance with a global reach and interests. Although the core task of the PDCM would be to support the PCM and the partnership program, unlike the PCM, the PDCM’s activities would also take place domestically, within the US and Japan. Table 4 below outlines the proposed structure of the PDCM, and the responsibilities of each segment.

Table 4: Proposed structure of the PDCM58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Potential participation/input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Center</td>
<td>Adopts strategic decisions on the alliance’s public</td>
<td>• US Department of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 Interview with Barbora Maronkova, Dec. 1, 2015.
56 Ibid.
57 Interview with Ashizawa Kuniko, Nov. 23, 2015; interview with Christopher W. Hughes, Nov. 30, 2015.
58 Elements of the PDCM have been adapted from those of the NATO PDD. Information obtained from the author’s interview with Barbora Maronkova on Dec. 1, 2015.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Center</th>
<th>diplomacy efforts, their funding and trajectory</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Press and Media Section</td>
<td>Handles media inquiries related to the US-Japan alliance</td>
<td>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Section</td>
<td>Oversees all public-facing communication and publications. Includes management of the alliance’s social media presence, and the promotion and distribution of official written output</td>
<td>• Embassies of both countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement and Research Section</td>
<td>Provides grants for the organization of events to NGOs; organizes people-to-people exchanges; and offers funding for research on the US-Japan alliance</td>
<td>• Partnership Coordination Mechanism (PCM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Other relevant ministries and bodies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Externally, the PDCM would promote the values and activities of the alliance within East Asia and further afield. Although its main goal would be to support the PCM, it would also reassure other international actors – particularly China and Russia – that the partnership programs are not part of a containment strategy. This would require close coordination with the PCM and the adoption of a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy.

The PDCM would employ a variety of different tools, including: providing information to the local press on the US-Japan alliance and their country’s partnership program with the alliance; funding research and publications on the alliance, its values and importance for security in the Asia-Pacific; providing funding to local NGOs for the organization of events on the alliance; coordinating people-to-people exchanges, allowing the partner country’s nationals to spend time within prominent think tanks or university departments in the US and Japan; funding research on the alliance; and promoting publications on the US-Japan alliance within the partner country.

Although its geographic focus would largely correspond to that of the PCM, the PDCM could also undertake activities in countries outside the partnership framework, should the need to raise awareness of the alliance be identified for a particular country. The US and Japan could establish dedicated information offices in major capitals (for example, Canberra, Manila, Jakarta, London, Paris, and even Beijing and Moscow); however, this will likely be unnecessary, at least in the early stages of operations.
Initially, the existing network of embassies and consulates could carry out public diplomacy tasks.

The use of existing embassies and consulates would also limit the costs of the PDCM, which are unlikely to be substantial. NATO’s PDD – serving a 28-member alliance – currently employs 90 people, and the PDCM would likely have lower staffing requirements. By relying on existing diplomatic staff, the alliance would also head off potential resistance from the State Department or MOFA, which might see its work impinging on established public diplomacy efforts. Nevertheless, one expert advised that in the long run, the PDCM should not solely rely on career diplomats. Any other obstacles that would be encountered in the creation of the PDCM – such as competing alliance priorities – would closely mirror those encountered by the PCM.

While the PDCM’s domestic role would likely prove secondary in importance to that of promoting alliance interests abroad, it would nevertheless have major long-term strategic benefits. The body would inform the general public in both countries on the US-Japan alliance and build public support for alliance activities and partnership programs. The PDCM would also be tasked with presenting a coherent message on divisive issues to domestic audiences and help prevent a shift in public opinion.

The relocation of US Marine Air Station Futenma on Okinawa is an example of a longstanding controversy that could escalate into a country-wide issue if not managed correctly. As much as 80 percent of the Okinawan population opposes the relocation, and anti-base protests are frequent. Tensions run high between the central government in Tokyo and the prefectural government headed by Gov. Onaga Takeshi. While the former favors the base’s relocation to Henoko Bay, the latter insists on its complete closure. Both sides have filed a number of lawsuits over the relocation and remain entangled in a protracted legal battle at the time of writing.

Apart from practical steps to mediate in similar disputes and finalize the relocation process, the two allies could employ the PDCM to help manage public opinion and ensure the anti-base sentiments are not channeled against the alliance. The growth and possible radicalization of anti-alliance views on Okinawa would be of major concern for Tokyo and Washington given the strategic significance of the Ryukyu Islands.

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59 According to one interviewed scholar, “many [Japanese] career diplomats are more worried about not offending China than they are about defending Japanese national interests. From an administrative point of view, it therefore might make sense to keep things separate. The best people for this job might not be the same as career diplomats, even if this involved extra costs.”

60 The subsequent paragraph focuses on public diplomacy activity within Japan because the core of the PDCM’s domestic efforts would take place in the country. Most pressing issues that have the potential to split public opinion in the near future – such as the relocation of US Marine Air Station Futenma on Okinawa – are taking place within Japan.

Conclusion

The US-Japan alliance is making progress in its transformation from a ‘military-centric’ pact toward an alliance with a global outlook and with extensive partnerships with like-minded countries across the globe. The 2015 revision of the Defense Guidelines has paved the way for these changes. However, without a focused, formalized and sustained effort, the Guidelines may not become reality.

The recommendations in this paper would facilitate such cooperation. The creation of third-country partnership programs, supported by coordinated diplomacy efforts, would help the two allies more effectively address the numerous security threats facing the Asia-Pacific and the world, while facilitating their transition into a flexible, values-based alliance equipped to handle the broad array of regional and global challenges of the 21st century.
Securing the maritime commons: a coalition strategy for the US-Japan alliance
By Erik French

US and Japanese interests in Asia’s maritime commons face significant challenges. Piracy continues to pose a threat to the safety of shipping through the South China Sea. The potential for maritime terrorism in and around critical shipping lanes similarly remains a threat. Perhaps most visibly, China’s excessive maritime claims and harassment of vessels in international and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters loom large as a challenge to the allies’ interests. China’s rejection of the Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling on the South China Sea has only intensified US and Japanese concerns. This paper argues that the allies must mitigate these regional risks to the maritime commons, but that they should not limit themselves to acting unilaterally, bilaterally, or through regional organizations. Rather it proposes that the allies develop a coalition of the willing, forging multilateral partnerships with other interested and capable states. In support of this argument, this paper surveys the existing policy problem, assesses options for strategy, and analyzes several case studies where coalition strategies have demonstrated their effectiveness. It concludes with policy recommendations for how the alliance can go about building a coalition to address the risks to Asia’s maritime commons.

The policy problem

Free and secure access to Asia’s maritime commons is of critical importance to both the US and Japan. President Obama recently stated that the US possesses “an interest in upholding the basic principles of freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce.” Similar sentiments can be found in the most recent US Naval Strategy and US Counter-Piracy Strategy. The stakes for the US are clear. First, a sizable portion of US trade – $1.2 trillion yearly – flows through the South China Sea, giving the US a commercial interest in free and secure access to these waters. Second, freedom of navigation gives the US the ability to apply its considerable maritime power in the event

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1 Freedom of the seas refers to 1) the right of all surface vessels to innocent passage through territorial waters and 2) the unrestricted right of all vessels (military or civilian) to navigate and operate – that is, to survey, train, patrol, etc. – in waters outside the 12 mile territorial seas. Secure access refers to the ability of vessels to exercise their freedom of the seas without the threat of physical harm (from both state and nonstate actors).


Japan shares the US interest in free and secure access to Asia’s seas. In 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated that “Japan must continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the maritime commons.” Similarly, the 2015 Defense of Japan whitepaper stresses that “ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the survival of the nation.” Like the US, Japan benefits tremendously from commercial activity along Asian sea lanes. Perhaps more importantly, 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports – totaling as much as 60 percent of its total energy demand – arrive via sea lanes through the South China Sea. With Japan’s nuclear restart moving slowly, Japan will continue to depend heavily on imported oil and liquefied natural gas shipped along these sea lanes. Any disruption of this energy supply could have pernicious consequences for the Japanese economy.

Threats to the allies’ interests in free and secure access come in two forms: state and nonstate. State threats are largely the product of excessive maritime claims, including 1) claims to territorial seas around artificial islands and 2) claims to special privileges outside territorial seas. China is engaged in both. It has created roughly 2,900 acres of new land as of 2015 throughout the Hughes, Cuarteron, Gaven, Fiery Cross, Subi, Mischief, and Johnson South Reefs. Chinese leaders have implied, in defiance of UNCLOS, that this land generates territorial seas. China also claims additional privileges within its EEZs and its nine-dash line in the South China Sea. These claims provide the basis for Chinese forces to harass other states’ vessels in these waters, as in 2009 when Chinese government vessels threatened the USNS Impeccable. Despite The Hague’s Arbitral Tribunal’s recent rebuke of Chinese claims and activities throughout the South China Sea, China has shown little interest in moderating its position or behavior.

Nonstate threats are also a concern. In particular, maritime piracy and terrorism are growing problems. In 2014, the International Maritime Bureau reported that global

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8 Robert D Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Random House, 2014).
hijackings increased “due to a rise in attacks against coastal tankers in South East Asia.” Figure 1 highlights the disproportionate frequency with which piracy incidents occur in and around the South China Sea. Similarly, maritime terrorism remains a concern, in no small part due to potential for a large number of Asian nationals currently fighting for ISIS abroad to return home and reinvigorate terrorist movements in Southeast Asia. Figure 2 highlights some estimates of the number of foreign fighters from these states. More ambitious terrorist groups could seek to mine heavily trafficked sea lanes, carry out suicide attacks using speedboats, and smuggle explosives aboard passenger or cargo ships. These threats pose a significant risk to the safety of vessels and mariners engaged in commerce along critical sea lanes in the South China Sea.

Figure 1: Global Piracy by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2014 Piracy Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Subcontinent</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Top Regional ISIS Contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign Fighter Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>34-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional stakeholders have sought to address these challenges through a variety of unilateral and multilateral measures. The main measures to cope with state threats to the maritime commons have been unilateral US initiatives, most notably the US Freedom of Navigation (FON) program. This program 1) conducts military operations within waters that are subject to excessive claims and 2) engages in diplomatic protests against these claims. To address nonstate threats, regional actors have created several multilateral initiatives: the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP).

15 “SE Asia tanker hijacks rose,” International Chamber of Commerce.
The former is a broad-based agreement among 16 states created in 2004 that includes an Information Sharing Center where members can share data on instances of piracy. The latter is a narrower coalition composed of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and more recently Thailand, engaged in coordinated patrols and surveillance in the Straits of Malacca.

Each of these measures contributes to free and secure access to the maritime commons; nonetheless, gaps remain and improvements can be made. A recent RAND study concluded that “security for Asia’s energy major sea-lanes… currently lags behind the growing criticality of these waterways.” As highlighted above, the threats posed by extraordinary maritime claims, piracy, and regional terrorism remain problematic in Southeast Asia. Existing measures are limited in geography, scope, and capacity. MSP has made progress in sea lane security, but remains under-capacity and only covers the Malacca Straits (leaving much of the South China Sea unaddressed). ReCAAP only involves information-sharing and excludes key regional naval powers like the US and Australia. US unilateral action presents problems in terms of its legitimacy and sustainability. For these reasons, this paper argues that the US-Japan alliance needs a new strategy to upgrade the security of the maritime commons in East Asia.

**Options for a US-Japan strategy**

These interests and threats create a set of critical strategic objectives for the US-Japan alliance in regards to free and secure access to the maritime commons in Asia:

1. delegitimizing excessive state claims;
2. deterring states from hindering access to areas subject to excessive state claims;
3. responding to emergencies/contingencies to ensure international and EEZ waters remain free and secure; and
4. deterring & denying nonstate actors seeking to raid or attack commercial or governmental vessels

There are four options for addressing these strategic objectives: unilateralism, bilateralism, organizational multilateralism, and coalitions of the willing. The next section conducts a cost/benefit analysis of each option, focusing on the following criteria: capacity, sustainability, legitimacy, speed, flexibility, and practicality. It concludes that coalitions of the willing offer the best option for the allies.

**Option 1: Unilateralism**

One option is for the alliance to rely primarily on the independent application of

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19 The MSP includes both naval patrols (initially under the heading of Malsindo) and air patrols (the “Eyes in the Skies” initiative).
US power to maintain free and secure access to Asia’s maritime commons. To address state threats to the maritime commons, the US could rely on more robust patrols through Asia’s international waters (building on FON operations) and diplomatic protests to delegitimize China’s excessive claims and to deter it from hindering access to these areas. To address nonstate threats to the maritime commons, this strategy would have the US increases its own counter-piracy and counter-terrorism activities, including patrols, surveillance, and interdictions.

The primary advantages of unilateralism are its speed, flexibility, and practicality. Unilateral policy can be created and adjusted rapidly without time-consuming negotiations. Unilateralism is also often more practical than formal multilateralism, particularly in the Asian context. There are no clear examples of existing regional institutions that would be capable of guaranteeing free access to the maritime commons. Even ASEAN, the most prominent intergovernmental body in the region, has been stymied by a broad membership with disparate interests and a consensus-based decision-making process.

Despite these strengths, unilateralism has many weaknesses. First, unilateralism sacrifices opportunities for burden-sharing. East Asia is home to many of the world’s fastest-growing navies with many states fielding upgraded maritime capabilities — capabilities that could augment US naval power in securing the maritime commons. Second, there are questions as to whether unilateralism will prove sustainable as a strategy. The share of global power and wealth held by the US is expected to continue to decline as states like China, India, Indonesia, and others grow (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the US must cope with growing debt and an increasingly constrained military budget. The US capacity to act as a liberal hegemon policing the global commons will decline if its relative power and available resources diminish. Last, unilateralism undercuts the legitimacy of the US and its endeavors. As Joseph Nye has argued, “soft power is fragile and can be destroyed by excessive unilateralism.”

Many Asian states are interested in seeing a strong US in the region to balance Chinese assertiveness, but strident unilateralism might erode sympathy for US policy, particularly given ASEAN states’ normative preference for multilateralism.

Figure 3: GDP in USD billions (percent of global total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>17,416 (21.0%)</td>
<td>20,513 (19.6%)</td>
<td>25,451 (17.6%)</td>
<td>32,471 (16.3%)</td>
<td>41,384 (14.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>10,355</td>
<td>16,789</td>
<td>26,667</td>
<td>37,736</td>
<td>53,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>5,076</td>
<td>5,994</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>7,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>3,544</td>
<td>7,304</td>
<td>14,720</td>
<td>27,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,673</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>2,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>3,266</td>
<td>4,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>4,910</td>
<td>8,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>2,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>2,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>2,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>2,555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Option 2: Bilateralism*

The US-Japan alliance could serve as the foundation for free and secure access to Asia’s maritime commons. Although the allies have traditionally used the alliance primarily for the defense of territorial Japan, the two allies could join their diplomatic and military efforts in the maritime commons. The US and Japan could coordinate in FON operations, diplomatic pressure, and contingency-planning for the South China Sea, particularly given the allies’ powerful, highly interoperable military forces. In addressing nonstate threats, the two could similarly prioritize bilateral, rather than unilateral, steps to upgrade counter-terrorism and counter-piracy actions in and around the South China Sea. There is precedent for this approach: the alliance has contributed to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

The main advantage to employing the bilateral alliance as the mainstay of a maritime commons strategy is the added capacity it would bring, with limited corresponding losses in flexibility and speed. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and Coast Guard have been some of the strongest maritime forces in the region for some time (see Figure 4). Furthermore, the interoperability of US-Japan forces is impressive,

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and the two militaries conduct regular joint exercises (*Keen Sword* and *Keen Edge*). This familiarity would facilitate the execution of joint patrols and contingency measures. Japan’s new security legislation, which allows Japanese forces to be deployed overseas and to coordinate more closely with the US in regional contingency planning, will further enhance the effectiveness of a US-Japan bilateral strategy in policing the maritime commons. Under the new legislation the SDF can be deployed in a supporting role in response to threats that have an “important influence on Japan’s peace and security” and can also help protect US assets during exercises and patrols if asked.29

Figure 4: Japanese Maritime Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Regional Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal Surface Combatants</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Craft and Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Submarines</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, a strategy focused exclusively on the US-Japan alliance faces many of the same challenges as unilateralism. The additions of the MSDF’s formidable capabilities increases capacity, but a bilateral approach still fails to draw on the many other growing naval powers around the region as well as littoral states that could offer useful support and intelligence in the South China Sea. Moreover, it still may face challenges in terms of sustainability. Japan’s relative power is also on the decline, more so than the United States’ (see Figure 3). Regional legitimacy remains a problem in this strategy; without expanding its initiatives to include additional participants, the alliance is unlikely to confer additional legitimacy on efforts to police the South China Sea.

A bilateral strategy faces an additional hurdle: Japanese public opinion. The Japanese public is reticent to support a more active role for the SDF due to both constitutional concerns and fears of entanglement in a US-led conflict. These concerns were on display in 2015 when Japan’s new security legislation failed to win much popular support.31 Public reticence will only be exacerbated if the SDF operates without multilateral support or UN authorization. The Japanese public has been persuaded incrementally over the last 20 years to accept a stronger and less-restrained SDF, so in time the LDP may be able to convince the public of the need to contribute to protecting the maritime commons as part of the broader goal of defending Japan. Nevertheless, public opposition would prove a significant initial obstacle to a purely bilateral strategy.

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**Option 3: Organizational multilateralism**

Alternatively, the allies could work through regional multilateral intergovernmental organizations in maritime security. Organizations with an appropriate focus include the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The US-Japan alliance could focus its efforts on utilizing these organizations to pursue the strategic objectives highlighted above. In particular, it could focus on the guidelines laid out in the recent ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security involving capacity-building workshops and exercises to improve the region’s capacity to combat nonstate maritime threats.³²

There are several advantages to pursuing a formal multilateral route through regional institutions. Perhaps the most important “value-added” is legitimacy. ASEAN (and similar regional organizations) can provide legitimacy and bolster regional support for this strategy.³³ Utilizing a rules-based multilateral institution could also alleviate the Japanese public’s concerns about entanglement in US adventurism. Furthermore, operating in a multilateral setting would increase opportunities for burden-sharing, improve the pool of resources and capabilities behind the initiative, and – by incorporating developing Asian states – improve the sustainability of the strategy.

Despite these advantages, this strategy is ultimately unviable due to its slowness, inflexibility, and most importantly, impracticality. Within WPNS, ASEAN, ARF, and APEC there are simply too many different incompatible interests; broad-based membership may confer greater legitimacy, but it also reduces the scope and scale of what the organization can agree upon.³⁴ The constraints of broad-based membership are exacerbated by these organizations’ emphasis on consensus decision-making. As a result, the process of developing new agreements/initiatives or adjusting existing arrangements is time-intensive and requires extensive compromise. China is a member of most of these organizations – as are its partners Cambodia and Laos – and will delay and/or veto progress on agreements (even statements) designed to delegitimize or deter excessive maritime claims.³⁵

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Option 4: Coalition of the willing

A fourth strategy – the approach that this paper advocates – recruits other regional states willing and able to promote maritime security into ad-hoc coalitions. This strategy would hinge on the creation of two coalitions of the willing, the first dedicated to maintaining freedom of the seas in the face of excessive state claims and the second tailored to address nonstate threats (piracy and terrorism) to the maritime commons. The former would contribute to coordinated or even joint FON operations, expanded multilateral naval exercises, denouncements of excessive maritime claims, and joint contingency planning. The latter would expand on some of the measures taken by the MSP, initiating multilateral patrols covering vulnerable areas in the South China Sea beyond the Straits of Malacca and bolstering coordinated surveillance, intelligence-sharing, emergency response planning, and capacity building among participants.

A FON coalition led by the US-Japan alliance would ideally include both Australia and India, two stakeholders in Asia’s maritime commons with the will needed to support a more ambitious effort to secure freedom of navigation in the face of excessive Chinese claims. Australia voiced support for the US FON operation near Subi Reef, and has expressed a clear interest in upholding a rule-based order at sea that includes freedom of the seas and secure maritime commons. India has regularly argued that “freedom of navigation in the East Sea/South China Sea should not be impeded,” has offered to help keep these sea lanes open, and has a clear stake in freedom of navigation and overflight. Both of these countries have a sizable economic interest in free and secure trade in the region (see Figure 5). Both are concerned with upholding a rules-based order in the maritime domain, and in constraining China’s ability to unilaterally alter the status quo at sea. Both have had vessels face harassment by Chinese ships outside Chinese territorial waters. Australia and India are also willing to oppose China’s excessive claims – unlike states such as Cambodia that are too cozy with Beijing.

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36 One of the best articulations of this general approach to international governance can be found in: Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War (CFR, 1997).
A counter-piracy and counter-terrorism (CP/CT) coalition could have a broader base, including many of the other Asian states alongside the FON coalition membership. Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand are likely candidates. Many of these countries appear to be reticent to actively confront China over its excessive maritime claims, making them less likely to join a FON coalition.\(^{44}\) Given their extensive trade in the South China Sea and previous participation in counter-piracy and counter-terrorism cooperation, however, each has a strong interest in mitigating the threats posed by piracy and maritime terrorism.\(^{45}\) Indonesia and Malaysia might also be persuaded to join, although both have expressed concerns about US-led maritime security initiatives in the past due to sovereignty concerns.\(^{46}\) China could also be invited given its strong interest in protecting commercial shipping against nonstate threats. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to join a coalition initiated by the US-Japan alliance given current tensions over freedom of the seas disputes.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Philippine President Duterte’s overtures toward China and cancellation of joint maritime patrols and exercises with the US military also suggest that his administration would be unwilling to engage in a coalition – although future administrations may prove more receptive.


The strength of a coalition strategy is that it includes a high degree of adaptability, speed, and practicality without sacrificing the legitimacy, capabilities, and greater sustainability of multilateralism. Coalitions are generally quick to assemble and easy to adjust as they do not rely on international treaties (which are difficult to create, ratify, or amend) or formal international organizations with time-consuming decision-making procedures. Furthermore, ad-hoc coalitions only include participants that are willing to cooperate in pursuit of common strategic objectives. This exclusive, like-minded membership would make decision-making easier and faster than in a broad, inclusive regional organization. Dissenters cannot hold up decision-making or implementation of a coalition initiative, making ad hoc coalitions more practical than many of Asia’s consensus-based regional organizations.

At the same time, the multilateralism inherent in a coalition strategy bolsters the legitimacy of any US-Japan initiative, following Nye’s principle rule of thumb for maintaining soft power: “try multilateralism first.” The Japanese public would still be reluctant to support an expanded role for the SDF, but the multilateral, limited, and ad hoc character of the coalition would help alleviate concerns of entanglement in any broader US adventurism. Additionally, these coalitions are not dependent on US maritime hegemony, and are sustainable long term; by incorporating developing states, they set up an enforcement regime that could endure US relative decline. Finally, as shown in Figure 5, these coalitions could give the alliance access to a broad range of additional capabilities both for countering state and nonstate threats. In many ways, coalitions represent an ideal strategy for contexts where allies would prefer to not go it alone, but intergovernmental organizations are too deliberative or static to allow fast, decisive action. Many of these strengths will be emphasized in the case studies below.

Coalitions are not without problems. Coalitions are voluntary and states can abandon them with limited reputational costs.\(^{48}\) Coalitions can struggle with initiative fatigue. Even within a coalition, incentives exist to free ride. Nonetheless, a coalition strategy is the best option for the US-Japan alliance as it avoids many of the most problematic elements of unilateralism, bilateralism, and organizational multilateralism while retaining each of these strategies’ core strengths.

**Coalition strategy: case studies**

This paper now examines two case studies where coalitions proved successful: International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a peacekeeping operation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a nonproliferation operation. These case studies highlight the different models/structures for coalitions of the willing and demonstrate the limitations and difficulties involved in past coalition strategies that contemporary coalition-builders must be made aware of. They also provide evidence that coalitions can manage pressing international issues while highlighting the advantages that this approach offers over unilateralism, bilateralism, and organizational multilateralism.

**Case Study I: International Force for East Timor**

INTERFET, launched in September of 1999, was an ad-hoc coalition of 16 countries under the leadership of Australia engaged in peacekeeping in East Timor.\(^{49}\) As East Timor sought to establish independence from Indonesia, violence orchestrated by pro-Indonesian militants led to displacement of 75 percent of its population and the destruction of 70 percent of its infrastructure.\(^{50}\) Australia, given its historical ties to East Timor, pushed for intervention to end the violence and restore order.\(^{51}\) Eventually, Indonesia was persuaded to ask for an international peacekeeping force. With the UN’s blessing, Australia assembled an ad-hoc peacekeeping coalition that rapidly suppressed the militants and was able to turn over administration of the country to a separate UN authority in February 2000.\(^{52}\)

The INTERFET model was a highly centralized, vertically organized coalition under a strong lead-state. Although INTERFET was UNSC sanctioned, it was not organized by or commanded through the UN; instead, Australia assumed a leadership

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\(^{50}\) Leonard Sebastian and Anthony Smith, “The East Timor Crisis;” James Cotton, “Against the Grain.”

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

role. Australia lobbied various countries to contribute and set up a unified command under an Australian officer. Australia’s leadership role extended to funding and supporting the operation; it provided equipment and logistics to undersupplied troops from developing states, and administered claims for reimbursement from the trust fund set up to compensate developing states for their contributions. The bulk of the trust fund was contributed by Japan.

Despite its overall success, the coalition strategy used by INTERFET faced several obstacles. First, while Australia was able to recruit significant commitments from Thailand and the Philippines, several other ASEAN states either refused to join or under-participated; free-riding remained a problem, particularly given Australia’s willingness to shoulder much of the burden in leadership and manpower. Second, the diverse makeup of the coalition limited information-sharing, as some participants were hesitant to provide intelligence to other members of the group; this would not have been as much of a problem in a unilateral or alliance operation. Third, developing states had limited capabilities and funding and depended on wealthier states to supply them with logistics, equipment, and funds to support their troops. Several states with limited military capabilities were recruited for the symbolic importance of their commitment; in some ways, the pursuit of a broader coalition to secure legitimacy for INTERFET ended up diminishing the capabilities of the coalition. Fourth, Australia’s dominant role in the command structure drew criticism from participants that expected to be given more authority or representation among the command staff.

INTERFET’s successes demonstrate the advantages of a multilateral coalition strategy in handling global governance. ASEAN and other regional organizations were hamstrung in attempts to address the East Timor crisis in no small part due their broad membership and consensus-based decision-making process. The coalition sidestepped ASEAN’s decision-making process, incorporating only those Southeast Asian states willing and able to confront the crisis. Meanwhile, the use of a coalition rather than a unilateral Australian operation gave INTERFET regional legitimacy, particularly given

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54 A. Ryan, “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks;” A Ryan, “The Strong Lead-nation Model.”
55 Ibid.
57 A. Ryan, “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks,” 47.
59 Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, 37.
60 Ryan, “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks,” 55.
61 Australian National Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, 36.
the prominent role of several ASEAN members in the coalition.\textsuperscript{63} The multilateral approach augmented Australian capabilities with additional manpower from Thailand and the Philippines, US strategic lift and intelligence capabilities, and Japanese funding.\textsuperscript{64} Ultimately, INTERFET was successful in stabilizing East Timor rapidly, securing the border with West Timor while administering humanitarian aid, eventually turning the country over to a UN transitional administration in February 2000.\textsuperscript{65}

\textit{Case Study II: The Proliferation Security Initiative}

In May 2003, 11 states – the US, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK – formed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a coalition effort to address the challenge of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation on the high seas.\textsuperscript{66} Previously, limited capacity, coordination, and legal precedent had made interdicting WMD trafficking a challenge.\textsuperscript{67} The PSI aimed to rectify these difficulties, developing a Statement of Principles that authorized participants to share information on, interdict, and inspect suspicious vessels that might be trafficking in WMD components.\textsuperscript{68} The PSI is widely regarded as a major success: members operating under the initiative have reportedly interdicted dozens of suspicious vessels.\textsuperscript{69}

The PSI model is a highly decentralized and horizontally organized coalition. Although the PSI today includes 102 members and a core Operational Experts Group of 21 states who meet frequently to discuss strengthening cooperation, it remains “an activity not an organization.”\textsuperscript{70} The PSI has no joint command system, bureaucracy, or formal leadership, although the US has played a significant leadership role in the construction and maintenance of the initiative.\textsuperscript{71} The US has developed a sub-coalition of members in Asia that is particularly active – Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and New Zealand – holding rotating annual interdiction exercises.\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{63} Moreen Dee, “Coalitions of the Willing and humanitarian intervention.”
\textsuperscript{65} Moreen Dee, “Coalitions of the Willing and humanitarian intervention.”
\textsuperscript{69} Amitai Etzioni, “Tomorrow’s Institution Today: The Promise of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 88 (2009), 9.
\textsuperscript{71} Amitai Etzioni, “Tomorrow’s Institution Today.”
\end{flushright}
The PSI is not without its shortcomings. Most noticeably, the PSI has faced declining exercise participation in recent years; “initiative fatigue” may be proving problematic over time.73 The PSI also must confront budgetary constraints. As an informal activity rather than an organization, participants self-fund their activities – there is no dedicated budget, which may diminish enthusiasm by developing participants or states facing budgetary constraints.74 Furthermore, the PSI has limits to its cohesiveness, coordination, and information-sharing, again partially due to the highly informal and decentralized character of the coalition.75 Several key coastal states have also refrained from joining the PSI, reducing its overall capacity and geographic coverage.76

Despite these limitations, the PSI is widely regarded as a successful coalition. Officials from participating states have claimed that the coalition has engaged in dozens of interdictions; the most famous of these cases included stopping the M/V Light and the BBC China.77 In addition to the interdictions themselves, numerous PSI exercises have strengthened participants’ overall capacity to engage in these operations.78 The PSI has also given widespread legitimacy to interdiction of WMD-trafficking vessels on the high seas, successfully cultivating a new international norm and deflecting concerns about the legality of participants’ operations.79 At the same time, however, the PSI’s coalition approach avoided the problem of getting all members of the UNSC on board with the initiative. Furthermore, the PSI was assembled with impressive speed in the aftermath of an embarrassing incident where the US and Spain failed to prevent a vessel from delivering ballistic missiles from North Korea to Yemen.80

Findings

INTERFET and the PSI illustrate some of the common challenges that coalitions face. The most problematic obstacles include: under-participation (free-riding, initiative fatigue), coordination challenges (information-sharing limits, command disagreements), and budgetary challenges (overall funding problems, developing participant challenges). Any potential CP/CT or FON coalition must be aware of these prospective difficulties and prepare for them.

These case studies also indicate that there are at least two viable coalition models, centralized/vertical and decentralized/horizontal. Both centralized and decentralized models have the potential to produce success, and have advantages and disadvantages. The former offers advantages in terms of closer and simpler coordination but also may create problems if a) participants feel disenfranchised in command decision-making or b)

77 Amitai Etzioni, “Tomorrow’s Institution Today.”
79 Amitai Etzioni, “Tomorrow’s Institution Today.”
participants believe they can free-ride on the lead-state’s contributions. The
decentralized/horizontal model, on the other hand, is particularly susceptible to initiative
fatigue with no strong central authority to encourage continued participation.

These case studies also illustrate the strengths of coalition strategies. Both
cohesion were assembled quickly in response to urgent challenges in global governance
(1-3 months), circumventing intergovernmental organizations that either lacked the will
or speed to take the lead. Both provided broader legitimacy and capabilities than
unilateral action would have. In large part, these cases confirm favorability of coalition
multilateral strategies over unilateralism and organizational multilateralism in addressing
regional security governance.

Conclusion: suggestions for implementation

How can the US-Japan alliance move ahead with a coalition strategy for securing
the maritime commons? This paper recommends that the US-Japan alliance utilize a
decentralized/horizontal model for organizing these coalitions. A vertical coalition under
US-Japan leadership would encourage free-riding, defeating one of the key strengths of
this strategy: sustainability. Similarly, the allies should not take a dominant role in
commanding either coalition; any such model would likely be highly contentious,
particularly in a context where states are intensely concerned about their sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the US and Japan will clearly need to play an informal leadership role in
recruiting, coordinating, and sustaining the coalitions. Both members will need to watch
for initiative fatigue and push for cooperation over time.

A critical issue is the potential Chinese reaction to both coalitions. Chinese
diplomats will seek to persuade prospective CP/CT and FON members to refrain from
participating. To handle this, the allies will need a concerted diplomatic effort to
convince prospective members that the benefits of joining outweigh the risks. Both will
need to emphasize common interests – particularly in a rules-based maritime order –
while highlighting the growing regional threats to the maritime commons. The allies
could also try to deflect Chinese criticism of the coalition by inviting China to join the
CP/CT coalition. This would help dispel Chinese claims that the coalitions are designed
to contain China rather than uphold the regional order. Perhaps most importantly, the
allies will need to present themselves as credible and engaged regional partners. To do
this, both must make every effort to participate in regional dialogues, meetings, and talks,
and continue to develop and field substantial regional military capabilities.

The US-Japan alliance needs to incorporate third parties to most effectively
ensure free and secure access to Asia’s maritime commons. A purely unilateral or
bilateral initiative would struggle with limited capabilities and legitimacy, and could
prove unsustainable. Regional organizations like ASEAN, however, are hamstrung by
internal division and time-consuming decision-making processes. The allies must look
elsewhere for partners. To succeed in securing the maritime commons against state and
nonstate threats, the US-Japan alliance should develop ad-hoc coalitions that offer a
viable mix of legitimacy, capabilities, sustainability, speed, flexibility, and practicality.
Lauren Dickey (USA) is a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore. Her research focuses upon the cross-Strait relationship in the Xi Jinping era; she also writes on Chinese foreign policy and security topics.

Akira Igata (JPN) is pursuing his PhD at the Faculty of Law, Keio University. His expertise is in Japan’s foreign and security policies, Japan-US relationship, and International Politics in East Asia. He is a former Sasakawa Peace Foundation resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. Akira earned his MA in International Relations from Columbia University.

Miha Hribernik (SVN) is a Pacific Forum CSIS non-resident fellow and an analyst at Verisk Maplecroft, a research and strategic forecasting company in London. Prior to taking up his current role, he was Research Coordinator at the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels, and worked in Washington, DC and Vienna. Miha’s research focuses on Japan’s security policy and the country’s role in promoting multilateral cooperation against maritime piracy in Southeast Asia.

Erik French (USA) is a former Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He received a BA in history and political science from Colgate University in 2010 and a MA in political science from the Maxwell School in 2012.
Next Generation Views of the US-Japan Alliance: Looking Over the Horizon  
*A regional tour hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS*  
*with support from the US Embassy Tokyo*

**October 11, 2016 – October 14, 2016**

### Tour Agenda

**October 11 (Tue)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>Program at American Center Japan with around 40 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:45</td>
<td>Taxi to Hosei University (20 minutes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Discussions with Mori-Sensei’s undergraduates at Hosei University</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5-10 minute remarks followed by small group Q&amp;A)</td>
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**October 12 (Wed)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:25</td>
<td>Participants depart on flight NH995 to Naha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Meeting with Consul General Joel Ehrendreich at the US Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30</td>
<td>Briefing with the interpreters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30</td>
<td>Program at P’s Square with around 50 academics, university students,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>graduate students, journalists, business people, and general public</td>
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</table>

**October 13 (Thu)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:10</td>
<td>Participants depart on flight NH1200 to Fukuoka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:50</td>
<td>Participants arrive at Fukuoka University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Pre-program briefing with professors and interpreters</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:40</td>
<td>Lecture program (90 minutes with simultaneous interpretation) to 400</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>people at Fukuoka University</td>
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**October 14 (Fri)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:13</td>
<td>Depart for JR Shin-Osaka on Shinkansen Mizuho #604</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15</td>
<td>Arrive at Osaka University Toyonaka Campus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Briefing with interpreters and Prof Toshiya Hoshino and PAO Spelman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45</td>
<td>Symposium on “Next Generation Views of the U.S.-Japan Alliance:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Looking Over the Horizon” in the 6F Library Hall at Osaka University</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Library with 100 graduate students and diplomats from developing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>countries</td>
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