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Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000.
SINCE 1908, when historian and ethnographer Shin Chaeho propagated the notion of minjok, and identified the Korean people based on their shared ancestry and heritage, ethnonationalism has defined Korean society. It was the dominant ideology that unified the people against foreign influences during the Japanese colonial period, and it provided potent rhetoric for state-orchestrated economic development under former president Park Chung-hee. However, the exclusivity of a racially defined identity poses limitations for contemporary Korea’s increasingly multiethnic and multicultural society. This article reviews the evolution of Korean ethnonationalism as a public narrative for social integration. It evaluates current policy measures and social responses to growing diversity, before concluding with recommendations for transitioning to a national identity based on civic values, rather than ethnicity. This has major stakes: failure to address South Korea’s growing demographic diversity could result in the emergence of a racially defined, underprivileged class, and a disjointed, xenophobic society.

**Ethnic Identity and Rise of Ethnic Nationalism**

Korean ethnonationalism was born as a narrative of resistance and autonomy as a result of Japanese colonialism. Shin Chaeho, a Korean independence activist and historian, was the first to introduce minjok and define the Korean people based on common ancestry and cultural heritage. In his serialized essay *A New Reading of History* (1908), Shin Chaeho recounted the history of Korea as the progression of minjok, the Korean ethnic group. He traced the origin of the Koreas origin to the mythical figure Dangun, who he identified as the father of Korean minjok’s singular genealogy. By defining Korean ethnicity through this common ancestry, Shin constructed a notion of familial unity that extends to all Koreans. This powerful rhetoric helped to create solidarity among a highly factionalized and striated society.

Shin’s historical narrative differed dramatically from conventional dynastic history, as it shifted the genealogy of the state from the king to the people. In the opening lines, Shin declared, “without the minjok there is no history; without history, the minjok cannot have a clear perception of the state.” This redesignated the nature of state sovereignty, representing a departure from the pre-modern, Sino-
centric world order, and a rejection of Chinese influence over Korea. In so doing, Shin was campaigning for modern, republican ideals that empowered the people as the legitimate agents of Korea.

*Park Chung-hee, Minjok, and Industrialization*

In the 1960s and 1970s, former South Korean president Park Chung-hee employed the minjok narrative as an ideological tool to encourage a value system compatible with state goals, namely industrialization and rapid economic development. The Park administration established the Patriotic Ancestor Statue Committee in 1966 to systematically designate national heroes and promote value systems. The first ancestors to be honored with statues were Admiral Yi Sunshin (erected 1968) and King Sejong (erected 1968). These historical figures became the Korean military and cultural pillars to support nation building. In his public speeches, Park evokes Korean duty to minjok as he relates Yi’s military achievements to industrial diligence and King Sejong’s self-reliant spirit to the duty of “modernizing the fatherland.” As he connects ancestors to a contemporary audience, Park underscores minjok’s innate capabilities to achieve national goals and channels ethnic pride and devotion to the state. This ethnic narrative highlighted individual dedication, selflessness, and responsibility and successfully contributed to achieving the state goal of nation building and industrialization.

*New Korea and Changing Demographics*

Today, Korea is among the highest-income countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of 27,970 USD in 2014, and ranking 17th on the Human Development Index (HDI). Consequently, Korea has become a destination for immigration, and its societal needs have changed. Since the 1990s, an influx of immigrants entered Korean society as migrant spouses and laborers. With an increasing non-Korean population, the notion of *minjok* is fading. A survey taken in 2011 suggests that a majority of the population (58.7 percent) did not feel strongly attached to the idea of *minjok*, and 55.6 percent did not consider it better to remain relatively homogeneous.

*Public Policies*

The South Korean government has adapted to demographic changes, and has taken progressive measures to incorporate ethnic diversity. In July 2007, the Korean Pledge of Allegiance was revised to replace the ethnocentric phrase “the fatherland and Korean race (*minjok*)” with “liberty and justice.” The Military Service Act, which defines Korean civic duty, underwent revisions to eliminate racial discrimination and include multiethnicity. Since January 2009, the Act protects any person from “discrimination on the grounds of race and skin color.” In July 2010, Article 63, which prescribes a transfer of multiethnic persons
to supplemental or second citizen services,6 was deemed discriminatory and removed.7 In February 2012, enlistment and officer oaths were revised. The term minjok was replaced with “people,” since “designating minjok as the target of loyalty is no longer relevant due to increasing multiculturalism.”8 The first multiethnic staff sergeant was commissioned in 2012.

Mixed Attitudes toward Immigrants

The public remains ambivalent toward growing diversity. According to a 2014 public poll, 53 percent of the respondents think immigrants contribute to new ideas and cultural diversity in Korean society, and 63.2 percent think that immigrants contribute to the Korean economy. Although 90 percent of people agree to welfare programs for multicultural families, 53 percent think immigrants increase crime rates, and 67.7 percent support stronger measures to prevent illegal immigration. A more recent survey from 2016 confirms Korea’s negative perception of migrants: 54 percent of respondents disapprove of migrant laborers.

These mixed responses stem from an ambiguous classification of “migrant population,” made of migrant spouses, foreign laborers, and illegal immigrants. The public deems migrant wives—64.6 percent of whom are from less developed countries—and their multicultural families as economically marginalized and in need of public support. Lee Jasmine, the first non-Korean-born member of the National Assembly (2012), and a wide array of popular culture sympathetic to multiethnicity, provide additional examples of Korea’s embracement.

However, recent back-to-back incidents of a Chinese couple and Vietnamese man breaking through Incheon Airport in January 2016 fixed public attention on the government’s border-control policies. Disappearances of tourists on a visa waiver program have increased by 1,500 percent from 282 to 4,353 between 2011 and 2015. Increasing cases of violent crimes (murder, mugging, rape, theft, and assault) and untraditional crime (drugs), which are “apparent indicators of the public’s fear of crimes,” associated with the migrant population also add to the broad xenophobia.

Policy Recommendations

Korean society is presented with the twofold issue with increasing ethnic diversity. The government needs to ensure social integration by promoting equal opportunities and preventing the emergence of a racially defined, economically underprivileged class. The government also needs to enhance its border controls and public security measures. The failure to provide public safety will not only erode trust in the government’s capability, but the entire immigrant population will fall victim to xenophobia and discrimination.
Progressive, pro-multicultural policies may lose their momentum. Finally, society needs to identify new civic values that define Korean identity. Just as Korean ethnic identity offered a modern ideology to integrate society and bring progress, contemporary Korean society needs to adopt a new set of values that will integrate a multiethnic Korea.

**Conclusion**

Korea's ethnic identity was critical to creating and building the nation in the twentieth century. It was a powerful zeitgeist to unify the people and inspire national pride. However, just as Korea adopted an ethnic identity to depart from its pre-modern state and offer a value system congenial to nation building, Korean society today needs to transition and define civic identity compatible with a multiethnic society.

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1 Park Chung-hee, Address on Admiral Yi’s Birthday, April 27, 1968: “Admiral Yi’s spirit of self-sacrifice is the exemplary spirit of the minjok that we all need to remember through the generations. Protecting and constructing our fatherland, fighting and working, working and fighting are directly related to Admiral Yi’s spirit. We need to maintain the greatness of our ancestors. That is the way to successfully accomplish modernize our fatherland today.”

2 Park Chung-hee, Hangul Day Statement. October 8, 1969: “Let us consider the self-reliant and democratic spirit of hangul as the foundation of developing Korean heritage and modernizing the fatherland to further the historical project of reconstructing minjok.”


5 Military Service Act No. 8834, enacted on December 31, 2007, and effective on January 1, 2009.

6 Military Service Act No. 9955, January 25, 2010, “those determined incapable of performing active duty service or supplemental service as a result of a draft physical examination or physical examination, but determined capable of engaging in military support affairs through a call-up for wartime labor, and those assigned to the second citizen service under this act.”


Climate Neutral Disaster Response: Challenges and Opportunities

**Will Heegaard**

Introduction

As global temperatures rise, confronting the link between human-induced climate change and humanitarian disasters has become a pressing component of U.S. foreign policy. While the effects of climate change on humanitarian crises are well documented, the impact of disaster response activities on climate change remains largely invisible. Emergency humanitarian assistance actors must do more to understand and address their direct contribution to climate change.

Relief agencies have long sought to “do no harm” to the communities they intend to serve, but initiatives to improve intervention strategies and build a better response have yet to involve climate change mitigation in a meaningful way. Providing emergency humanitarian aid is energy intensive and leaves a significant carbon footprint. Efforts to calculate and reduce the carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions of disaster response activities deserve sustained attention from both humanitarian policymakers and practitioners.

Emergency aid organizations and their donors can mitigate their climate impact by 1) requiring and performing detailed audits of CO₂ emissions, 2) integrating sustainable solutions into fieldwork, and 3) offsetting irreducible emissions with carbon credits. Aside from obvious planetary benefits, a climate-neutral approach to humanitarian relief would improve operational efficiency and reduce the long-term costs of providing assistance. Most importantly, by reducing emissions, responders truly fulfill their mission to do no harm.

The Footprint of Response

The first challenge is to calculate the CO₂ emissions generated by humanitarian agencies providing emergency aid. This carbon footprint can be surprisingly large. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group attempted to calculate the total carbon emissions for “items shipped to point of entry” during the first six months of the response. They estimated a total of 1.14 million tons, nearly equivalent to the annual carbon cost of all active UN peacekeeping missions, or putting over 240,000 vehicles on the road for a year.

Next to shipping consumables, providing shelter and energy for disaster-affected populations is also emissions intensive.
After the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a life-cycle assessment found that post-tsunami reconstruction housing types were linked with CO₂ emissions “up to fifty times higher than traditional types.”⁷ In refugee settings, energy needed for basic utilities (cooking, lighting, water distribution) leaves a huge, often overlooked, carbon footprint.⁸

Overall, a profound lack of data on the carbon footprint of relief activities makes it difficult to understand problems and share solutions. The availability, consistency, and quality of emissions information all pose immense challenges for anyone seeking to complete a carbon audit of a humanitarian response mission.⁹ So far, emissions assessments are performed on a case-by-case basis, and most focus only on home-country operations. For example, Mercy Corps has completed a Climate Change Impact Assessment, but the evaluation omits carbon emissions “associated with emergency operations (such as the delivery and provision of material aid) and emissions associated with other parties (such as partners or donors of the material aid).”¹⁰

While performing emissions audits of home-country offices is a start, agencies can and should reach higher. The UN’s “Greening the Blue” campaign serves as a model for measuring and acting on emissions, but few others have made such far-reaching commitments.¹¹ A comprehensive carbon inventory would cover the lifecycle of the mission, calculating the footprint of the responding organizations’ headquarters activities, the CO₂ cost of field-country operations, and the emissions generated by beneficiaries using the services delivered (for example, cooking fuel used in refugee camps). Humanitarian agencies have piloted rapid environmental impact assessments on the ground, but these tools do not include comprehensive carbon inventories.¹²

Though detailed carbon accounting adds to overhead costs, it is a vital step toward reducing the footprint of humanitarian response. Emergency aid organizations have a long way to go in understanding how they contribute to climate change, and until clear data exists quantifying the carbon emissions of disaster relief activities, efforts to mitigate impact will remain piecemeal at best.

**Integrating Sustainable Solutions**

When it comes to lowering the carbon cost of response, opportunities and obstacles abound. Pre-positioning materials and personnel can help prevent international air transport, and effective fleet management can reduce fuel use. INSEAD’s Haiti study suggests that 17,000 tons of CO₂ could have been saved if pre-positioning had been 20 percent higher.¹³ The UN World Food Programme (WFP) attributes its “biggest single source of GHG savings” to smart fleet management.¹⁴ In Afghanistan, new software has helped them reduce diesel consumption by 25 percent since 2008.¹⁵
Integrating renewable energy into relief programs and strategies would also yield huge benefits. An estimated 6.85 million metric tons of CO$_2$ equivalent (mtCO$_2$eq)—more than double the annual emissions of Washington, D.C.—could be saved per year through widespread introduction of improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns in refugee camps.\textsuperscript{16,17}

For many humanitarian agencies and donors, the upfront investment in mitigation may appear daunting, but the long-term payoff is clear. Heavy carbon emissions are linked to operational inefficiencies. By streamlining travel plans, supply chains, vehicle dispatch, and utility usage, aid organizations serve themselves as well as the earth. WFP has saved $400,000 by delivering remote training sessions, and the British Red Cross has saved £497,000 since 2009 by reducing electricity and gas consumption.\textsuperscript{18,19}

The estimated 6.85 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO$_2$eq) reduced through improved cookstoves and basic solar lanterns in refugee camps would also save $323 million a year in fuel costs.\textsuperscript{20}

Operational changes have their limitations, however. In unstable, low-tech settings, humanitarian agencies hoping to reduce emissions are constrained by urgency, reliability, and security. Disasters cannot be managed solely through videoconference, and Tesla has yet to invent an electric armored vehicle. Greening supply chains, reducing international travel, and using renewable energy are all steps in the right direction, but for the time being, certain humanitarian activities will remain emissions intensive by technical default.

While a zero-carbon response is currently unfeasible, agencies can offset their irreducible emissions by purchasing carbon credits.\textsuperscript{21} To achieve climate neutrality, WFP offset over 160,000 mtCO$_2$eq from 2014 by financing renewable energy and conservation projects that reduce emissions elsewhere. One program distributes fuel-efficient cookstoves that reduce firewood usage to combat deforestation in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{22} As humanitarian organizations work to reduce the direct CO$_2$ emissions of their response activities, they can reach climate neutrality through carbon offsetting.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Although barriers to climate neutral disaster response exist, agencies can reduce their footprint without compromising the quality of assistance. Many agencies have already taken their first steps toward addressing their climate change impacts.
contribution to climate change, and the humanitarian community should build upon and institutionalize these efforts. Organizations can reduce their climate impact by:

1) Strengthening their carbon accounting. Disaster response agencies should apply a lifecycle approach to evaluate their impact, spanning from the home-country office to the beneficiaries. The UN cluster system would provide an excellent forum for documenting emissions and sharing solutions across organizations working on the ground.

2) Pursuing sustainable solutions, when and where possible. Lowering CO$_2$ emissions goes hand-in-hand with increasing operational efficiency and cutting expenses.

3) Offsetting irreducible emissions with carbon credits. When greening humanitarian logistics chains and budgeting for solar over diesel is unfeasible, carbon credits offer a flexible option.

Notably, donors (governments, private foundations, companies, and individuals) have a crucial role to play in encouraging partners to include climate neutrality as a core element of response programming. Relief agencies that integrate carbon accounting and sustainability plans into proposed projects should be recognized for their efforts, and funding streams should be dedicated toward climate neutral aid to spur innovation.

Emergency aid organizations should view their investment in curbing CO$_2$ emissions as an integral part of meeting the core humanitarian standards and reducing the risk of future disasters (i.e., disaster risk reduction). Operationalizing climate neutrality allows responders to extend and improve the services they provide to communities in need, while reducing the negative impacts of intervention. The costs of addressing the footprint of relief operations are significant, but so are the benefits. Climate neutral disaster response is possible, and if the humanitarian community truly seeks to do no harm, it is necessary.

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CLIMATE NEUTRAL DISASTER RESPONSE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES


5 Ibid.


“Greening the Humanitarian Response: 2010 Haiti Earthquake


Carbon offsetting is the use of carbon credits generated by zero-emission projects to enable organizations and individuals to compensate for their emissions. Purchasing carbon credits finances essential renewable energy, forestry, and resource conservation projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See Natural Capital Partners, “Carbon offsetting explained,” http://www.carbonneutral.com/resource-hub/carbon-offsetting-explained.


Pakistan’s Military Courts: The Army’s Newest Political Tool

Sahar Khan

ON DECEMBER 16, 2014, seven militants, dressed in Army uniforms, entered the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar and killed more than 130 children, and injured many more.1 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organization of various Sunni militant groups operating in Pakistan, claimed responsibility, stating that the attack was in retaliation for the Pakistan Army’s Zarb-e-Azb counterinsurgency operation in the tribal areas.2

The APS attack stunned the nation. The sheer brutality by which the TTP killed teachers and children, coupled with a warning of future attacks,3 pushed military and civilians leaders to promise action.4 In a televised address on December 24, 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif unveiled the National Action Plan (NAP), a 20-point initiative with various provisions, including: continuing the policy of executing convicted terrorists; cracking down on sectarian and religious extremist groups by countering hate speech; and dismantling financial and communication networks of terrorist organizations. The NAP also created “special trial courts” designed to implement “speedy” trials for terror suspects.5

The Pakistani legislature acted quickly to turn the plan into law. In January 2015, Parliament amended the constitution. Originally, the constitution called for a separation of executive and judicial powers.6 The amendment—known as the 21st Amendment7—discarded this separation of powers for those charged with terrorism and gave the military jurisdiction over the newly established special courts, essentially creating military courts.8 Shrouded in secrecy, there is little to no information available on military courts, except that they are set to expire in January 2017.

The creation of these courts highlights two issues. First, they expose the extent to which Pakistan’s political leadership empowers the military’s reach into matters that are traditionally within the scope of civilian institutions. By implementing the military courts, the civilian institutions have legitimized the Army’s political power, allowing the Army to preserve its political control, while neglecting to reform the country’s civilian institutions. This is not a new phenomenon. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s government has turned to the military to address challenging domestic political issues. Constant civilian legitimization of military intervention has created a general
imbalance of power between military and civilian institutions, and has hindered the development of Pakistan’s civilian institutions. Second, military courts are a way for the military to distract from their own failed policies. Since Pakistan’s inception, the military has used jihad as a national security tool. By perpetuating a false image as the only institution protecting Pakistan against internal and external threats, the military courts allow the Army to politically distance itself from its role in the creation of militant groups, and give the Army tacit permission to continue the distinction between “good” and “bad” terrorists.

Pakistan’s Strongest Institution: The Army

The Army has long been the most powerful institution in the country. It is the largest and the most dominant of the three armed service branches (the other two being the Navy and the Air Force). Since independence, the Army has injected itself in every facet of Pakistani society. For example, the Fauji Foundation (Soldier’s Foundation) is one of the largest business conglomerates run by the Army and owns farms, plastic factories, security guard companies, and vocational training centers. The Army Welfare Trust owns commercial banks, fish farms, sugar and rice mills, and pharmaceutical companies. The Army also owns residential neighborhoods in every major urban area, creating an exclusive group in which both serving and retired military officers—and politicians—have made millions of rupees by investing in real estate.

In addition to the economy, the Army has long seen itself as a prominent player in the political system. Seen as a periodic antidote to corrupt and inept civilian leadership, the Pakistani public has often welcomed Army leadership and interference. Military rule has also often enjoyed judicial sanction, providing legitimacy to the Army and creating a warped civil-military relationship. For example, the latest military dictatorship under General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2007) enjoyed various instances of judicial sanction: his 1999 coup was legalized, extraconstitutional actions, such as declaring himself as the president, were validated, constitutional amendments were upheld, and he was allowed to retain his post of chief of army staff (COAS) while president. But it was a clash with the judiciary that resulted in his eventual downfall. In 2007, as his five-year presidential term was coming to an end, General Musharraf wasn’t sure if the Supreme Court would approve a second term. When he tried to oust the chief justice, the country erupted into a civil movement that eventually resulted in him conceding his army post and being sworn in as a civilian president. National elections were held in February 2008, and the newly elected Parliament sought his impeachment. Musharraf resigned later that year.

To restore the Army’s reputation after General Musharraf’s resignation, COAS General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani ordered active soldiers to resign from civilian
posts and prohibited all soldiers from meeting with politicians. General Kayani’s policies were considered a welcome change by both the civilian government and the public. But the retreat was tactical; General Kayani—and the Army—continued to see the military’s role as a manager of the government rather than a subordinate to civilian rule. For example, in March 2010, Kayani presided over a meeting of top civilian officials to discuss key economic and security issues—without the prime minister. It was the first meeting of its kind—and the first ever to be presided over by a military chief under a civilian government. General Kayani also allegedly pressured the government to dismiss some corrupt ministers, an indication that the Army remained a political player that viewed itself as superior to the civilian government.

The Army’s desire to rehabilitate its image while holding onto political power behind the scenes continues under the leadership of the current COAS General Raheel Sharif. General Sharif was appointed in November 2013 under a newly elected government—the first civilian transfer of power following the successful completion of a five-year term by a previously democratically elected government. More visible and vocal than his predecessor, General Sharif is especially focused on preserving the Army’s image as Pakistan’s ideological and territorial guardian. For example, he has approved a proposal to use film as a propaganda tool, showing brave soldiers fighting terrorists and warding off Indian spies. Huge billboards featuring General Sharif adorn each major city, often with slogans thanking the general for saving Pakistan. Images of the prime minister, however, are largely absent from public spaces.

The APS attack created an opening for the Army to reassert itself more forcefully into Pakistan’s political affairs. The civilian government quickly legitimized the Army’s role in countering the TTP: it passed the 21st Amendment that eradicated the separation between executive and judicial powers, and changes to the 1952 Pakistan Army Act, giving the military jurisdiction over the newly established special courts.

The Judiciary Is a Weak Check on the Army

The judiciary has historically been the only effective check on the military’s authority. For example, the judiciary has struck down military courts twice. In 1977, a civilian government created military courts to suppress civilian protests, while in 1999 another civilian government set up military courts to address ethnic violence and the breakdown of law. In both instances, the judiciary rebuked these courts, upheld the primacy of civilian rule over military authorities, and criticized the creation of a parallel judicial system. Breaking with previous trend, however, the Supreme Court found the current military courts to be constitutional.

In an 11–6 decision, the Supreme Court found that because there are no legal limitations on the Parliament’s power to amend the constitution, the military courts
Military courts expose the extent to which Pakistan’s political leadership empowers the military’s reach into matters that are traditionally within the scope of civilian institutions.

a constitutional amendment could be struck down if it violated the constitution’s preamble—and the 21st Amendment violated the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice, along with the independence of the judiciary as stated in the preamble. In other words, the Parliament does not have unlimited power to amend the constitution. The minority also argued that the military courts violated the principles of independence, fair trial, and justice, and were unnecessary in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism. In what may have been a compromise position, the Supreme Court did retain the right of judicial review and the right to overturn the decisions reached by the military courts. The 902-page verdict highlights the division within the judiciary and points to a larger struggle between the branches of government and the Army.

The judgment is also in line with the judiciary’s history of providing an important, but severely limited, restraint on the military’s view of its power. Though the judiciary previously struck down military courts that sought to try civilians, it has rarely challenged the set of laws that protect the secret trial procedures of the military’s internal judicial system for enlisted personnel. And as stated earlier, the judiciary backed General Musharraf’s takeover and various political moves. In upholding the current military courts, however, the Supreme Court not only lost a unique opportunity to control the Army’s reach for judicial power, but also allowed the Army to keep the military courts secret.

Military Courts Are Not a Solution to Pakistan’s Terrorism Problem

On the first anniversary of the APS attack, families gathered to mourn the loss of their children. Many have sought solace in each other, meeting once a month, their grief providing a special, eternal bond. But some families believe that the government hasn’t done enough. They yearn for more information. One father
said, “Show us the faces of the people who did it, who planned it,” while another said it is his right to know why his son was killed.\textsuperscript{32} Shrouding the military courts in secrecy is doing little for those most affected by the brutal attack.

It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of military courts for two main reasons. First, the courts are opaque: Unnamed judges are convicting unnamed individuals to death in an undisclosed location without any mention of charges, the prosecution's case, the defense's plea, and in the absence of independent observers.\textsuperscript{33} The Army claims that the secrecy is necessary to ensure protection of all those involved in the proceedings, especially since civilian judges and witnesses constantly feel threatened.\textsuperscript{34} The opacity, however, is troublesome and casts a wide net for abuses to take place. Second, the specific criteria for transferring a case from the existing civil antiterrorism courts (ATCs) to the military courts are unknown. In January 2015, the federal government had instructed the provinces to compile a list of “jet black terrorists”\textsuperscript{35}—a term that had been originally used by the COAS and later permitted as a valid classification by the Supreme Court—whose cases would be transferred to the military courts. But again, there are no criteria for determining what makes an individual a “jet black terrorist.” Apex committees, special provincial committees consisting of both civil and military leaders, have been tasked with deciding which cases get transferred from the ATCs\textsuperscript{36} in a show of civil–military cooperation. But these committees offer little to no information on actual cases. Military courts therefore serve as a mechanism for the Army to circumvent the civilian criminal justice system—a practice that sets a dangerous legal precedent for countering terrorists.

\textit{Conclusion}

Despite the NAP and military courts, Pakistan continues to experience terrorist attacks. On January 20, 2016, four gunmen opened fire at Bacha Khan University near Charsadda, killing 22 students.\textsuperscript{37} On March 27, 2016—Easter Sunday—a suicide bomber blew himself up in a public park in Lahore, killing 72 people and injuring 350. TTP claimed responsibility for both attacks. The Pakistan Army has launched its most comprehensive counterinsurgency operation in the tribal areas and has actively gone after some terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{38} But it continues to make a distinction between “bad” terrorists like the TTP who attack the Pakistani state and “good” terrorists like the Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Taiba who target India, Pakistan’s archrival.\textsuperscript{39} Although the military is unlikely to abandon this distinction—and its policy on using jihad—the military courts give it the appearance of cracking down on terrorism, when in fact the military only intends to go after what it deems “bad” terrorists—even though the distinction is unclear to anyone outside of the military.

Several steps are necessary to restore the balance of power within Pakistan’s political system. Legislation must be improved: the definition of terrorism with
respect to Pakistan should be specified, overlapping special courts should be eliminated, and sweeping powers to law enforcement enabling them to search without warrants and detain suspects in undisclosed locations must be eradicated. ATC judges and prosecutors need to be specially trained on how to construct a case with sensitive information. Law enforcement agencies, especially the police, need to be provided with more resources and investigative training, especially forensics training. A witness protection plan needs to be put in place to ensure the safety of witnesses.

Without these basic reforms, Pakistan will continue to rely on “specialized” judicial systems like military courts. Military courts do not only maintain but also increase the Army’s political power, allowing the Army to perpetuate an image as Pakistan’s guardian and savior, and distracting attention from the need to reform Pakistan’s civilian institutions. Furthermore, the 21st Amendment has given the Pakistan Army an unprecedented monopoly on judicial proceedings linked to terrorism-related crimes, dangerously blurring the line between the executive and judicial branches of government and threatening Pakistan’s fragile democratic processes under the cover of providing “justice.”

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PAKISTAN’S MILITARY COURTS:
THE ARMY’S NEWEST POLITICAL TOOL


6 In Pakistan, the Army is an executive functionary.


PAKISTAN’S MILITARY COURTS: 
THE ARMY’S NEAREST POLITICAL TOOL


Ibid., 122–123.

Ibid., 170.


Farooq, “Enter the General,” 80.

Ibid., 86. While conducting fieldwork in Pakistan, I saw numerous posters and billboards.

Pakistan has established military courts five times before, and twice under civilian rule: in 1977 and 1999. This article focuses only on the military courts established under civilian rule.


See Farooq, “General Justice,” 47.

This claim is supported by my fieldwork in Pakistan.


Zahid Gishkori, “NACTA meeting: Provinces asked to identify ‘jet black terrorists,’” Express Tribune, January 1, 2015,

Personal interview, October 22, 2015, Rawalpindi.


During fieldwork, numerous interviewees stated that the Army makes a distinction between “good” and “bad” terrorists. But also see Footnote 11.


Pakistan antiterrorism legislation consists of a variety of laws that call for the establishment of specialized courts. For example, the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act established the ATCs that are functioning in each province. The 2014 Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA) also established special courts focused on terrorism, though they are not yet fully operational.

Legislation I am referring to is: 2011 Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation and 2014 POPA.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is currently conducting workshops that train ATC judges.


Interviews of police officials in Karachi and Lahore in March and October 2015, respectively.
THE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SYRIA has prompted outrage and horror around the world, but few countries have taken serious action to aid the more than four million refugees the crisis has produced. For the most part, domestic fears over the economic and security effects of accepting large numbers of migrants have deterred politicians from opening doors to these imperiled individuals. Germany represents the rare and most determined exception to this rule. Berlin’s open-arms immigration policy, Willkommenskultur, has allowed more than one million migrants to enter German borders and earned the government of Chancellor Angela Merkel praise for its strong moral stance. However, what often goes unrecognized is that such a policy makes not only moral, but economic and political sense. There is a large body of empirical evidence illustrating the substantial benefits of migrant inflows, and demonstrating how the supposed security threats related to migrants are often exaggerated. Far from a burden, mitigation of the ongoing migrant crisis could prove a profound political opportunity. The orchestration of a shared Willkommenskultur from Brussels to Washington has the potential to save thousands of lives, intelligently redistribute human capital, and reaffirm a well-intentioned solidarity amongst developed global players.

The economic case for migration is compelling. En masse, economic studies find that migrants have a positive effect on the GDP of host countries. For example, one study of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries found that a 50 percent net increase in migration is found to correlate with a 0.3 percent increase in economic productivity. Empirical support for this relationship is abundant, resonating across the political spectrum and around the globe. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study projects that current migration inflows will provide a boost to the economy of the EU, raising average GDP by 0.25 percent over baseline projections in 2020. The members most receptive to migrant inflows, Germany, Austria, and Sweden, could see increases of up to 1.1 percent. The underlying conclusion of this empirical research is simple: all else being equal, economies are more productive and dynamic when foreign populations are introduced.

It is also important to consider the multilayered, diffuse, and compounding effects that generate these positive
In fact, far from burdening taxpayers, migrants may actually represent one of the only paths to long-term fiscal solvency for developed countries. Some economists find evidence of a slight depression in wages for the most unskilled portion of the workforce, but, even withstanding a minor negative effect amongst unskilled workers, wages economy-wide tend to increase by 0.1 to 0.6 percent. Furthermore, concerns for unskilled workers should spur investment in education and forward-thinking job training, not the fallacious condemnation of foreigners.

In fact, far from burdening taxpayers, migrants may actually represent one of the only paths to long-term fiscal solvency for developed countries. The aging populations and low fertility rates endemic to developed societies all but necessitate external inputs to maintain public finances, keep benefits schemes feasible, and support long-term growth. Migrants making the journey to Europe tend to be young, adaptive, and motivated, making them an ideal counterbalance to graying local populations. Importantly, migrants, legal or unauthorized, tend to be net contributors to federal budgets, especially over the long term. Though uneven distributions of migrants can disproportionately raise initial costs for individual states, conscientious investments in these human resources predominantly lead to improved outcomes vis-à-vis scenarios that exclude migrants. Given Europe’s current demographic trends, the reality is that migrant contributions may be the only path to a larger societal solvency.

The economic benefits of workforce diversity are also substantial, whether looked at in terms of the inclusion of women in the workforce, the blending of different ethnic perspectives, or the mixing of age groups. These phenomena are supported by large amounts of historical evidence, which systematically demonstrate how societies subjected to routine cultural diffusion adapt more readily to technological change. The introduction of diverse perspectives into entrepreneurial environments facilitates innovation and adaptation. In the United States, migrants are 30 percent more likely than native-born Americans to open new businesses, and, amongst more educated brackets, apply for three times as many patents. Migrant contingents are famous worldwide.
for providing newfound labor and entrepreneurial flexibility that transforms industries and spurs economic activity. Mid- to late twentieth-century Indian immigrants revolutionized the hospitality industry in the U.S. by expanding and economizing franchises in rural places where others had previously been unwilling.\textsuperscript{14} Lebanese migrants in the Ivory Coast own the country’s largest retail firm and boast responsibility for 40 percent of the country’s economic activity.\textsuperscript{15} To the benefit of entire societies, developed or otherwise, migrants facilitate economic dynamism.

Nonetheless, the issue of migration raises inevitable questions about national security. To be sure, robust screening processes and counterterrorism policies are vital to preventing terrorist attacks. However, the empirical evidence shows that claims of migrants representing a malign security threat are overstated, whereas our trepidation about providing assistance has directly contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions.\textsuperscript{16} For the United States and European Union, redemption (to a point) and improved security prospects can come from the orchestration of a broad, cooperative strategy in line with \textit{Willkommenskultur}.

The numbers tell a clear story: statistically, migrants are rarely complicit in terrorist plots. Since September 11, 2001, more than 784,000 refugees have entered the United States and only one has been charged with perpetrating a terrorist act.\textsuperscript{17} Over the same time period, firearms have killed well over 400,000 across the United States. Of the major terrorist attacks in Europe during this century, which include the tragic bombings in Madrid, London, and Belgium, and the two Paris attacks, the major perpetrators were all native-born or long-time citizens. Not only is labeling migrants as terrorists a misreading of the evidence, but, more importantly, it is not an effective way to combat terrorism. Given this, it provides a poor reason to deprive millions of individuals their rights to opportunity and safety.

Moreover, labeling those fleeing from terrorism and deprivation as the harbingers of those same threats has the effect of marginalizing these populations and creating greater potential for radicalization, both in refugee communities abroad and in domestic populations.\textsuperscript{18,19} Strategies that aim to keep migrants contained on the peripheries of Europe are not the path to security. In fact, they are more likely to strengthen contempt for the West and help to further destabilize already troubled regions. Syrians in particular are capable and well-educated,\textsuperscript{20} but refusing them access to the relative abundance of Western markets will leave them in dire straits and give credence to anti-Western rhetoric. By contrast, welcoming migrants doubly combats radicalization by removing at-risk individuals from difficult circumstances and by discrediting depictions of the West as intolerant, self-concerned, and malicious. Just this century, the United
States and EU have absorbed roughly 30 million migrants, with enormous benefits to their economic health and moral standing in the world.\textsuperscript{21}

The current crisis provides an opportunity to do this once again. Even minor changes in American policy can result in the salvation and inclusion of millions, or conversely in their marginalization, endangerment, and potential radicalization. Given this, the United States should help to alleviate pressures on its European allies by providing a safety valve for immigrants already in Europe. A pledge to start receiving more migrants could capitalize on European screening processes, which migrants already undergo, and couple them with a streamlined version of the exhaustive U.S. investigative process.\textsuperscript{22} The resulting inflow would need to be gradual, to allow for ample security checks, but would help to alleviate both real and political pressures in Europe by creating a further sink for migrants. The economic upside of such a move should already be clear, but such an approach would more critically reaffirm a sense of political responsibility and combat anti-Americanism abroad.

More broadly, the overarching solution to the migrant crisis is a compassionate and holistic commitment to engagement and integration. The speed and depth with which host countries address issues of labor market flexibility and social inclusion will have a direct influence on migrants’ ultimate economic and security ramifications.\textsuperscript{23} Cooperative orchestration of this crisis would not just create safer and more productive societies, but enhance political understanding of global responsibility between the willing and able states of the twenty-first century. The politics of the migration crisis in the United States are difficult, and the likelihood of such actions may be remote. Nonetheless, there is an opportunity for Washington to lead and set a vital precedent for other nations, by showing, as the United States has done throughout its history, that migrants can be intelligently integrated into a secure, prosperous, and dynamic society.

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Refugees and economic migrants will be classified together here as migrants to make the larger point that these populations have a positive effect on host countries regardless of their reasons for immigrating.


Diana Furchtgott-Roth, “Does Immigration Increase Economic Growth?”


OECD, “Is migration good for the economy?”


OECD, “Is migration good for the economy?”


Two were charged with financing overseas terrorist operations, one was charged with planning a rather speculative plot, and a fourth memorably helped perpetrate the San Bernardino attacks that killed 14. Kathleen Newland, “The U.S. Record Shows Refugees Are Not a Threat” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, October, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/us-record-shows-refugees-are-not-threat.

The Economist.
20 Ibid.
22 Kathleen Newland, “The U.S. Record Shows Refugees Are Not a Threat.”
THE MEETING IN FEBRUARY 2016
between President Barack Obama and President Juan Manuel Santos highlighted U.S. support for a peaceful solution to Colombia’s 50-year conflict with the country’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC-EP). Ensuring a lasting peace is vital for the United States, as it would eliminate a major drug trafficking organization while also bringing further stability to an important ally in South America. Through Paz Colombia, the successor of the $10-billion Plan Colombia, the United States will therefore seek to extend its assistance to the country’s post-conflict phase. Valued at $450 million for its first year, the plan will be composed of three pillars: insurgent reintegration, the reparation of victims, and the development of war-struck areas. Given the domestic nature of the first two pillars, this paper will argue that U.S. support will be most effective if focused on the latter, namely the economic development of previously affected areas.

The success of any peace agreement is dependent upon the acceptance, if not support, of the society it affects—and Colombia’s process is no different. It will be up to the Colombian society to judge the fairness of the final peace agreement—including the reduced sentences for fighters who have committed war crimes. These decisions will have a decisive effect on its willingness to reintegrate insurgents. Whether FARC’s political successor experiences a fate similar to that of Unión Patriótica, a guerrilla-formed party exterminated in the 1990s by right-wing groups, remains to be seen. That is not to say that the United States does not have a role to play in FARC’s reintegration process. The U.S. government should direct funds to social programs that promote insurgent inclusion into civic life, including education and job-training initiatives. Paz Colombia could go as far as helping fund the government’s victim-reparation program, which according to a Bank of America report will need as much as 1.4 percent of Colombia’s annual GDP for a 10-year period. Yet, these initiatives will not fully exploit the potential of U.S. aid to Colombia.

U.S. support for the post-conflict phase will be most effective if focused on Colombia’s economic development and reconstruction. Indeed, the growth of previously affected, mostly rural areas is central for the success of the peace process. Not only does the Colombian government need to ensure military presence, filling the power vacuum left by FARC forces, but it will also have to invest massive amounts
of money to integrate these areas into the rest of the country’s economy. What’s more, the government needs to help create jobs for the thousands of demobilized individuals who decide to give up arms in exchange for a “normal” life. In this sense, Paz Colombia should focus on implementing a “Colombian Marshall Plan” that encompasses two factors: the creation of incentives for responsible U.S. investment in Colombia, particularly in rural areas, and support for Santos’s infrastructure initiative launched in 2011.

According to the U.S. Department of State, U.S. assistance to Colombia in 2015 included support for private investment in rural areas. Yet, Colombia’s 2015 Investment Climate Statement by the State Department argues against investing in these areas, as guerrilla attacks on infrastructure, particularly in the extractive field, are still common. Such inconsistency must be dealt with once a peace agreement is signed and Paz Colombia is implemented. Here, the United States can offer financial incentives, either through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) or a peace-specific program, to American companies that want to move to Colombia’s war-struck zones. Such incentives would not be an entirely new concept. In late March 2016, the State Department released a notice of funding of up to a million dollars for NGO projects that supported Colombian refugees and internally displaced persons. This could serve as a template for a government initiative that focuses instead on private investment. Ideally, such an initiative would prioritize companies that commit to hiring former combatants, thus providing them with technical training.

The Santos administration has also committed funds and political will to help revitalize Colombia’s rural areas. In 2011, the Colombian government approved a new infrastructure plan allocating $50 billion over the next decade to aging railways, ports, airports, and water navigability capacity. The plan hopes to integrate the country’s economy and increase its productivity, which has lagged behind other countries in the region due to its 50-year conflict. A recent energy crisis could cause the government to divert some of this funding toward more urgent, short-term projects. Such change would be detrimental to the post-conflict phase, as improved roads and railways are needed to increase the country’s economic potential, which in turn will aid insurgent reintegration and decrease the likelihood of recidivism. For this reason, Paz Colombia needs to act as a tool for the continuation of Santos’s infrastructure initiative.

Inevitably, there will be resistance, particularly from former FARC members, to accept U.S. private investment as a part of Paz Colombia. As with the first two pillars of the plan, many Colombians may feel rural development must be led by Colombians. Moreover, even as millions of dollars are poured into the country’s war-struck areas, this might not be enough to incentivize insurgents to enter civic life. To address these issues, the U.S. government must ensure that there is a corporate social...
responsibility component to the private-sector incentive plan. Going through OPIC might present the best option, as its statute obeys “high environmental and social standards” when partnering with local companies to conduct their projects. On the other hand, incentivizing former FARC insurgents to join civic life may have become more viable, given the government’s announcement in March 2016 of a formal peace process with Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). If successful, this new process will limit the likelihood of former FARC members joining the ELN, making the prospect of re-entering the civilian life much more attractive.

Ensuring the success of Colombia’s peace process is vital for U.S. strategic interests in the region. On one hand, it limits the growth and flow of illicit drugs orchestrated by FARC, one of the highest cocaine producers in Latin America. On the other hand, it strengthens relations with Colombia, as well as the economic prospects of a historic U.S. ally and a rising star of South America. Ultimately, directing Paz Colombia toward a development-driven project will advance economic opportunity in the country, helping former insurgents integrate into society and decreasing the likelihood of recidivism. Whether Colombians themselves accept FARC’s inclusion to Colombia’s civic and political life will depend on their judgement of the final peace agreement.

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PAZ COLOMBIA: A MOVE TOWARD U.S. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AID


2 Some insurgents that have committed war crimes, for example, may be eligible for alternative sentences that do not include jail time. These seemingly unfair sentences may cause a large part of the Colombian society to reject the peace agreement, and in turn, to reject insurgents who wish to reintegrate into civic society. Justicia, “Así quedó el modelo de justicia para la paz acordado con las FARC,” El Tiempo, December 16, 2015, http://www.eltiempo.com/política/proceso-de-paz/modelo-de-justicia-transicional-del-proceso-de-paz-16459330.


10 Ibid


“WHO DO I CALL IF I WANT TO SPEAK TO EUROPE?” This question, attributed to former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, succinctly captures a central challenge of European foreign policy: how to build a unified front across 28 sovereign states. In 2011, the answer came in the form of the European External Action Service (EEAS), an institution designed to act as the voice of the European Union’s (EU) foreign and security policy overseas. However, many observers feel the institution has since failed to live up to its initial mission and promise, leaving Kissinger’s apocryphal European phone call as yet unanswered.

This position is understandable, given the myriad challenges currently facing EU foreign policy. Nonetheless, it misses many of the successes of the EEAS, which may point the way toward its future. Even as the EEAS has struggled to provide Europe with a common voice in matters of high politics, it has achieved notable success in other areas, such as providing common strategic analysis to all EU member states and helping the EU to speak more coherently overseas on issues such as development policy. Going forward, it should continue to focus on these niche areas, while further strengthening its ability to assist in the coordination of EU foreign policy in times of peace and in crisis management.

The goal of a unified European foreign policy dates back decades, but the institutions to implement such a common policy are more recent. After years of informal consultations among EU member states, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 established the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was later institutionalized in the form of the EEAS via the Lisbon Treaty. According to the agreement, the EEAS was to be responsible for implementing the CFSP by managing EU foreign, security, and defense policies through activities such as opening and maintaining foreign delegations, developing an EU global strategy, promoting information-sharing, and strengthening habits of cooperation among EU members.

These latter two areas are examples of where the EEAS has since enjoyed significant success. As part of its day-to-day activities, the service provides strategic analysis to assist member states in developing a common foreign policy across the EU28. It regularly authors and disseminates reports that outline EU policy on counterterrorism operations and conflict prevention, on environmental policy and energy diplomacy, as well as on country-specific trends and regional strategies. The service also boasts 139 delegations that produce
strategic analysis at the country and regional levels, serve as embassy-equivalents for the EU overseas, and, in capital cities such as Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, and at international organizations like the UN, bring together national embassies to share information and identify common policies. For smaller EU countries, in particular those with less extensive diplomatic and intelligence resources, these activities have already begun to play a vital role in helping to support a shared European perspective and policy consistency. Providing an additional boost to policy coherency is the Foreign Affairs Council, a monthly meeting of EU foreign ministers chaired by the EU high representative.

Another area where the EEAS has begun to find a niche is in helping to diversify the direct diplomatic options available to the EU, allowing the institution to develop a voice that is both representative of its members’ interests and distinct from them: a truly European product. For example, the EEAS has the ability to leverage the EU’s attractiveness as a single market for investment through cultural diplomacy efforts, such as “EU Days.” In its diplomatic efforts, the EEAS can also sidestep the colonial legacies of many individual European countries, allowing a less historically burdened channel for communication between developing countries in Africa and South America.

To be sure, the EEAS has not been an unalloyed success. There have been instances where the competing priorities of EU states have won out over the attempts of the EEAS to promote coordination. The Normandy Format, where the absence of the EEAS from discussions among Russia, Ukraine, and European powers over a ceasefire in Ukraine led to a barrage of criticism, provides an example of this challenge. However, it is important to understand the EEAS in the context of both its mission and the EU’s overall institutional structure. The EEAS does not have the authorities of a European foreign ministry. No such institution yet exists. Rather, its policies, by design, reflect the common positions—or the absence of agreement—among the 28 member states of the EU. The fact that member states still view foreign and security policy as a national competency and a non-negotiable part of their sovereignty, and that the European Commission retains responsibility for aspects of trade, development, and enlargement policy, circumscribe the space for public EEAS leadership. Recognizing this, the EEAS has instead begun to specialize in setting the diplomatic framework within which problems can be solved, while allowing better-suited departments—be they in the Commission or in the member states—to take the lead and solve it.

In addition, there are some notable instances where the EEAS has shown clear leadership. In 2013, former high representative Catherine Ashton played a vital role in keeping then-shaky negotiations over an Iran nuclear deal on track. Since 2008, the EEAS (and its predecessor in the Commission) have been successfully coordinating development aid from the Commission, and rule-of-law expertise and
technical support from member states, to support NATO in Operation Atalanta, which focuses on protecting aid shipments from Somali pirates. However, the clearest success has been the 2013 Kosovo-Serbia accord, where the EEAS played a key role in negotiating the agreement that aimed to normalize relations between the two Balkan neighbors.

From the standpoint of institution-building, perhaps just as important is the work the EEAS does behind the scenes that made these successes possible. The creation of the EEAS has regularized many processes of intra-EU coordination across a variety of foreign policy issues, such as trade, enlargement, and geopolitics. Furthermore, the EEAS houses trade officials from the Commission, seconded national diplomats, and EEAS experts—often within one delegation—to foster this coordination.

The EEAS has not solved all of Europe’s foreign policy challenges, as any glance at the news will illustrate. However, this is not the metric by which it should be judged. In spite of the many institutional constraints on its actions and the inherent difficulty of its task, the EEAS has achieved measurable successes that point to the potential for an even brighter future. To build on these successes, the EEAS should focus special attention on continuing to build its core competencies of analysis, EU promotion, and coordination. In particular, the EEAS must continue to establish itself as an institution that can further the foreign policy objectives of its member states rather than obfuscate them. While the department lacks the abilities of a traditional State Department, its head lacks the authority of a foreign secretary, and the institutional design creates inevitable areas of weakness, the potential effectiveness of the EEAS should not be overlooked. Europe still does not have a single, robust foreign and security policy, but the EEAS is certainly helping to move the EU closer to realizing this dream.

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3 “EU Days” are when the EEAS delegation coordinates with member states’ embassies in a foreign capital to advertise and promote embassy open houses that allow the member states to attract investors and tourists and the EU to promote its commonalities.


7 For instance, in Washington and other capitals, there are separate weekly or biweekly meetings among press officers, cultural attachés, and deputy ambassadors and monthly meetings among the EU28’s national ambassadors.
ON DECEMBER 12, 2015, the state-run Russian news agency TASS announced that the Russian military is currently testing a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), armed with air-to-surface missiles, capable of reaching speeds of 800 kilometers per hour. While UAVs are common throughout the world, this would be the first such vehicle capable of carrying out strikes—an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)—in Russia's UAV fleet and would allow Russia to access capabilities that have of yet been limited to only a handful of other states.¹

The resulting (and undoubtedly intended) image is one of a high-stakes arms race in which the United States struggles to pit its MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) models against increasingly stealthy, quick, and lethal Russian counterparts. This rhetoric is strongly linked to Cold War-era understandings of military competition and mirrors the Soviet-era propaganda call to “dognat’ i peregnat” (“catch up and overtake”) the United States through technological superiority.²

The reality of Russian drone warfare is far removed from this picture. Instead, the Russian military is currently using its existing drones to support and improve upon conventional warfare practices in unique ways. Although Russian UAV/UCAV development should continue to be a topic of interest, it is more likely that advances in Russian military success will come from the innovative deployment of existing equipment, rather than a direct challenge to U.S. technological superiority.

While the modern Russian UAV fleet is largely a collection of small, lightweight reconnaissance vehicles, Russia currently has three UAV models in production that are meant to be direct competitors with U.S. technologies.³ The Altius-M, which was planned to enter into service 2015–2016, but has not yet been confirmed as being in use, was designed with the goal of mirroring the intelligence-gathering, strike, and stealth capabilities of the M-9 Reaper. A second model, the Inokhodets, is meant to mirror the MQ-1 Predator. In 2013, the non-weaponized, non-classified version of this model demonstrated its flight endurance and altitude capabilities. Both models are significantly larger than the UAVs in Russia’s existing fleet and are being designed with the aim of carrying heavier payloads, flying longer missions at higher altitudes, and conducting precision strikes.⁴

A third rumored model, the “Proryv” project by the Yakovlev firm, was initially designed with similar capabilities in mind.⁵
However, none of these models in development, nor the recently discontinued third “Skat” model, have been officially brought into use or seen in combat. The most advanced UAVs in Russia’s fleet are in fact Russian-produced versions of Israeli models: the Forpost, from the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Searcher; and the Zastava, from the IAI Bird Eye 400.

Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, the technological prowess that such models aim to realize—precision strikes based on satellite or laser guidance—are not currently being widely utilized by existing manned aircraft. Throughout Russia’s intervention in the conflict in Syria, observers have noted that, while Russia has taken the opportunity to showcase its more advanced capabilities—the Kh-25ML laser-guided air-to-ground missile, as well as KAB-500S satellite-guided precision guided munitions—in reality most strikes are carried out by “dumb” bombs that do not require advanced guidance systems.

Instead, Russia’s intervention in Syria, as well as the conflict in Ukraine, have demonstrated how existing Russian UAV technology is being utilized in innovative ways to support conventional warfare tactics.

In addition to providing generic reconnaissance, existing Russian UAVs have been used with great effectiveness to jam enemy communications. In both Ukraine and Syria, Russia has used three existing drone models—the ZALA 421-08, Eleron-10, and Orlan-10—for this purpose. This capability supports wider Russian tactical aims to “blind” and isolate enemy forces: by utilizing so-called hybrid methods such as jamming, Russia has been able to establish an asymmetric warfare environment in which conventional superiority can be offset in favor of Russian forces.

In pursuit of this goal, Russia is currently using the Richag-AV electronic warfare (EW) system, which is mounted on Mi-8SMV helicopters to knock out the crucial radar systems that enable antiaircraft (air-to-air and surface-to-air) missile defense systems, with a range that spans hundreds of kilometers. The Leyer-3 EW system, while limited to a range of 120 kilometers, is currently being mounted on Orlan-10 UAVs and can deliver similar effects. At the same time, Russia is expanding the number of its own UAVs that utilize its satellite guidance system, GLOSNASS, and are able to avoid jamming; the ZALA 421-08M reconnaissance UAV already has this capability.

Russian UAV tactics also work to support conventional efforts, and these models have also been used to provide artillery support with highly effective, devastating results. In Ukraine, Russian separatists use UAV reconnaissance capabilities to support heavy bombardment of Ukrainian forces. UAVs provide reconnaissance regarding the position of Ukrainian armored vehicles and tanks, allowing strikes to be carried out with high accuracy and with little warning to the targets. In Syria, the Orlan-10, as well as small UAV quadcopters, have been used to support artillery...
spotting for Russia-trained and -equipped militia battalions. In this way, Russian UAVs enable the delivery of greater firepower in a spotter role, rather than being employed in a hunter-killer role.

As such, while Russia is unlikely to “catch up and overtake” the United States in terms of UAV/UCAV technology, this is less consequential than commonly portrayed. Russia is able to use the less-advanced UAV units that it already employs in order to increase the effectiveness of its existing tactics. Simply put, although Russian technology may never be able to compete with that of the United States in terms of precision strike capability and individual UAV capability, the Russian military has demonstrated that its existing capabilities, which are often cheaper and less advanced, are able to effectively shift the balance on the battlefield in Russia’s favor.

Acknowledgment of this is important for understanding Russian capabilities, now and into the future. While both the Russian and U.S. media are quick to sensationalize the possibility of advanced Russian UCAV capabilities, the reality is that these projects are not likely to be soon realized. U.S. efforts should focus less on the potential of Russian hunter-killer drones and more on the less bombastic elements of modern Russian tactics, namely cyber warfare, propaganda efforts, electronic warfare measures such as jamming, and other methods meant to settle a “fog of war” around enemy combatants.

However, the rhetoric surrounding UCAV development has useful implications for understanding Russian views of their military capabilities and the current world order. By returning to the Soviet-era narrative of technological parity between two competing hegemons, Russia is betraying its own insecurity regarding its position and capabilities. At the same time, by repeating the narrative linked to speculative Russian UCAV projects, U.S. analysts risk playing into Russia’s hands in the informational realm by affording Russia a place of global threat and importance—without Russia actually needing to bring these projects to fruition.

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IN 2013, President Barack Obama faced a critical policy choice that would ostensibly determine global perception of U.S. credibility in foreign affairs. Evidence emerged in the midst of the Syrian civil war that the armed forces reporting to President Bashar al-Assad had used chemical weapons, an act that President Obama stated would “change [his] calculus” and require a U.S. policy shift.  

The subsequent lack of choreography—the decision to ask Congress for strike authorization and its ultimate refusal of the request—is one of the primary examples Ian Bremmer cites as evidence of Washington’s directionless foreign policy in the years since the end of the Cold War and the George H.W. Bush administration. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush displayed a similar lack of strategic intent when they committed U.S. troops to interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq without a clear strategy for victory and withdrawal. In Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World, Mr. Bremmer claims that an improvisational approach to policymaking confuses allies, foes, and the citizenry; further, it results in bad outcomes that are costly and dangerous.

The 2016 election provides an opportunity for Americans to choose a policy direction and forces candidates to publicly commit to a strategy that governs America’s role in the world. Mr. Bremmer offers three broad concepts to the American people and the slate of presidential candidates: Independent, Moneyball, and Indispensable America.

- Independent America drastically reduces U.S. commitments abroad to focus on nation-building at home.
- Moneyball America is the “goldilocks” solution that most closely resembles the orientation of the Obama administration.
- Lastly, Indispensable America asserts that only the United States can assume leadership responsibility in global affairs and ensure its values are defended at home and abroad.

In separate chapters the author defines and builds upon each concept, offering a mix of facts and anecdotes.

The major shortcoming of the book results from its structure. The author does not lead with his definition of
strategy, inhibiting a proper accounting of policies from past presidential administrations. Without an upfront definition or a level-setting exercise, the reader lacks guidance in later chapters for evaluating the three choices, which read more like a laundry list of values and historical anecdotes than cohesive arguments. Mr. Bremmer, the president of the political risk consultancy The Eurasia Group, has established a reputation in recent years as a prolific author of books that provide conceptual frameworks to explain global affairs. It is unclear why Superpower lacks something similar. One often employed by management consultants defines strategy as the formulation of an organization’s purpose, a desired end state, and the methods to achieve that goal. Under that definition, there are two clear examples of foreign policy strategy utilized during the post–Cold War period: the Global War on Terror and the Pivot to Asia. While both are discussed in Superpower, Mr. Bremmer fails to adequately grapple with these policies. Doing so would have disclosed their merits as foreign policy strategies but undermined one of his central arguments.

The book also fails as an argument for the efficacy of strategy (often called “doctrine”) in foreign policymaking. Why must we choose one of Mr. Bremmer’s paths? The question is never directly addressed, and the book suffers for it. His obvious fondness for the doctrines that guided Washington during the Cold War presupposes that adhering to one is a superior option for foreign policymakers today, when there is sufficient evidence doctrines do not necessarily produce good outcomes in global affairs. Containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War may have provided clarity to Washington decisionmakers, but it also led to the strategic disaster in Vietnam. Mr. Bremmer criticizes President Obama for choosing flexibility over a foreign policy doctrine to address the situation in Syria, but does not explain how one could have produced a better outcome for the United States or its allies than the Assad regime agreeing to remove its chemical weapons. The author appears to agree with a Washington establishment view that doctrines are inherently good because they provide signals of intent to reassure allies and threaten enemies—and that not following through has negative consequences. That traditional view deserves a challenge. Indeed, President Obama explained his distaste for doctrine when interviewed by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic. Writing in Foreign Policy, Daniel Drezner has catalogued recent international relations research that argues facts on the ground “matter far more in how leaders assess each other’s intentions than past reputation.”

As an overview of three broad choices for the United States going forward, Superpower is an efficient read, and the 2016 voter could likely identify a candidate’s platform to fit the description of Independent, Moneyball, or Indispensable America. Yet, the book’s structure prevents a thoughtful
comparison of the three choices, fails to properly evaluate each choice as a strategy or the implications of each, and ultimately does not support the premise that the United States must choose a path forward.

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EUGENE ROGAN’S *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2015) combines wide-ranging archival work and an impressive synthesis of the growing body of scholarship on the oft-neglected Ottoman front of World War One (WWI). Coinciding with the hundred-year anniversary of that war and the intensification of conflicts over a wide swath of the Ottoman Empire’s former Arab territories, Rogan’s book provides a thorough, accessible, and up-to-date account of a critical period in Middle Eastern history. Given that many commentators cite WWI and its aftermath as the ultimate origin of the current wars in Syria and Iraq, policymakers seeking to understand today’s conflicts in the Middle East may find *The Fall of the Ottomans* very useful. In particular, Rogan’s argument that WWI in the Middle East had no predetermined and natural outcome for the Ottoman Empire or the populations or territories under its control is important for policymakers considering how to respond to today’s wars.

Rogan does an admirable job of shedding light on the Ottoman experience of WWI—previously ignored by most Western scholarship on the war—by describing both the thinking of military strategists and the lived experiences of Ottoman soldiers. Despite its title, *The Fall of the Ottomans* therefore constitutes a rebuttal to the so-called “decline thesis”: a previously dominant theory that the Ottoman Empire was in a state of terminal, irreversible decline in the face of European power from the end of the seventeenth century. Rogan is not the only author to take aim at this thesis; much recent scholarship has argued that despite mounting structural limitations to its power, the Ottoman Empire’s collapse was not preordained. This growing literature has also contended that by treating the empire’s fall as inevitable, the decline thesis unfairly marginalizes the Ottomans as historical agents capable of influencing the course of events. Rogan is firmly within this revisionist camp in Ottoman historiography, highlighting the contingency of WWI’s outcome and emphasizing Ottoman agency in the war despite the empire’s relative weakness. While acknowledging the long odds the Ottomans faced, Rogan gives due credit to the Ottoman leadership’s efforts to survive the war, the possible futures for the empire envisioned by elites and non-elites, and the contingent reasons why the empire did not ultimately endure.
Rogan’s narrative is chronological, opening with the period of upheaval and warfare in the Ottoman Empire that preceded WWI. Starting with the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, which initiated a brief democratic opening in the empire, Rogan describes the series of coups and counter-coups that led to the consolidation of power by the Young Turks’ Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). By 1913, the loss of key European provinces to Balkan states, counterbalanced by a string of successes in defeating an Armenian insurgency in eastern Anatolia, sponsoring another insurgency in Libya against Italian occupying forces, and recovering important territory in Europe, gave the CUP a contradictory mixture of military confidence and existential fear for the empire’s territorial integrity. Ottoman leaders rightly feared that further military defeat would intensify separatist forces within the empire and allow its dismemberment from without, but believed that additional military victories could safeguard its integrity. Rogan persuasively argues that this mix of confidence and fear among the Ottoman leadership drove their prosecution of the war on the international front as well as its internal policy toward dissenters. But early moments of euphoria brought on by battlefield successes—the near-rout of a large Russian army, the successful defense of the capital against the amphibious assault at Gallipoli, the capture of a large British imperial force in Iraq—faded as the war dragged on and the Ottomans suffered military defeats. Fearful that those losses would intensify domestic unrest, the CUP then turned on suspect populations within the empire to prevent its disintegration, inadvertently hastening it. In this way, contingent outcomes on the frontline had a direct impact on Ottoman domestic policy, shaping the contours of the postwar Middle East. As Entente forces destroyed the Ottomans’ Third Army in the Caucasus, stymied the Ottoman invasion of British-occupied Egypt, and made inroads into Iraq, Armenian soldiers defected to the Russian army and Arab nationalists began doubting that their future lay with the empire. To stave off large-scale nationalist uprisings, the Ottoman authorities undertook the systematic displacement and murder of Armenian civilians and executed the young leaders of the Arab nationalist movement. By October 1918, facing pressure on multiple fronts and internal insurrections by Entente-backed Armenian and Arab fighters, the Ottomans ultimately succumbed and surrendered. In sum, battlefield losses against foreign foes encouraged domestic resistance to Ottoman rule. The Ottomans’ violent responses to that resistance not only failed to deter rebels, but also confirmed for many Arabs and Armenians that the Ottomans were the enemy. Increasing internal resistance to Ottoman leadership then eased the advance of Entente troops into Ottoman territory.

*The Fall of the Ottomans* is perhaps most useful for its emphasis of historical contingency in these events—especially its insistence that the Ottoman empire was not destined to collapse into a series of more natural ethnic or sectarian units that either received or failed to receive a nation-state. Rogan argues, for instance,
Rather than accept the empire’s collapse as predetermined, *The Fall of the Ottomans* highlights the moments when the empire might have survived, and the possible futures that Ottoman citizens imagined for their empire.

that the Ottomans might have been victorious on the critical Caucasian front against Russia early in the war, which could have altered the course of WWI by diverting Russian forces away from the eastern front and preventing the Armenian armed resistance that led the Ottoman authorities to regard the entire Armenian population as a threat. Rogan also argues that the Arab nationalist movement might not have developed into a fully-fledged separatist uprising had the Ottomans not martyred its young leaders, or had the British failed to support the Arab Revolt at critical junctures. This represents a deliberate rebuttal of the kind of historical determinism inherent in the decline thesis. Rather than accept the empire’s collapse as predetermined, *The Fall of the Ottomans* highlights the moments when the empire might have survived, and the possible futures that Ottoman citizens imagined for their empire: some saw a pluralistic parliamentary democracy, others an Islamic power finally capable of resisting European imperialism, and still others an Arab-Turkish dual monarchy on the model of Austria-Hungary. Rogan does an admirable job of giving these visions the respect they deserve while pointing out the contingent forces that stymied them.

Yet *The Fall of the Ottomans* suffers from two main limitations. First, because of its extensive use of English-language sources representing the perspectives of Entente strategists and soldiers, the book primarily examines the empire from its front lines. This is not unusual for military history, and Rogan bolsters this evidence with many Turkish and Arabic primary and secondary sources, but this approach undermines this book’s aspiration to relate the history of a polity’s collapse. From Rogan’s narrative, the reader is unable to appreciate the work and strain of the war effort in the Ottoman interior, which scholars like Hasan Kayali and Abigail Jacobson have examined in recent years. Moreover, while Rogan attempts to convey some of the lived experiences of Ottoman soldiers on the battlefield, he says very little about the experiences of, say, the starving Arab inhabitants of what is now Lebanon. Given the attention he also gives to the recollections of British soldiers fighting Ottoman troops on the front lines, Rogan could have devoted more space to Ottoman women and men on the home front.

The second limitation—which is perhaps of greater importance to policymakers—is in Rogan’s scanty analysis of WWI’s aftermath and consequences for the
Middle East. Rogan’s narrative concludes with the Ottomans’ signing of an armistice with the Entente powers. Yet the Ottoman Empire did not formally end until 1923, when nationalist insurgents declared the dissolution of the caliphate and the founding of the Turkish Republic following their victory over European occupying forces in Anatolia. Over the same 1918–1923 period, France crushed a nascent Arab Kingdom and, together with Great Britain and local allies, negotiated administrative boundaries between Syria, Iraq, Greater Lebanon (now Lebanon), Transjordan (now Jordan), and Palestine (now Israel and the Palestinian territories). In his conclusion, Rogan suggests that “Had the European powers been concerned with establishing a stable Middle East, one can’t help but think they would have gone about drafting [its] boundaries in a very different way.” Yet as he himself recognizes, European powers did not simply create the region’s borders—the boundaries of the famous Sykes-Picot agreement, which many commentators regard as a European master plan for a divided region, bear little resemblance to the national borders of the contemporary Middle East. Rather, those borders emerged largely as a result of contingent conflicts and negotiations between 1918 and 1923. This point weakens the causal line Rogan draws between the signing of Sykes-Picot in 1917, the string of internal and international conflicts endured by Middle Eastern states across the twentieth century, and the Islamic State’s “smashing” of Sykes-Picot through the erasure of the Syrian-Iraqi border in 2014.

Yet this critique is perhaps unfair to the overall thrust of Rogan’s argumentation about war and history, which has the most relevance for policymakers. As noted above, Rogan contends throughout The Fall of the Ottomans that the Ottomans were not destined to fall, and that the empire was certainly not destined to collapse in the way that it did. His respect for the contingency of WWI serves as a useful corrective to the way in which contemporary commentators like James Stavridis and Joshua Landis conceptualize the current wars in Iraq and Syria as the natural outcome of the postwar partition of the Ottoman Empire and age-old sectarian conflict. Where these and other analysts see the Iraqi and Syrian nation-states collapsing along natural boundaries and into more “authentic” ethnic and sectarian communities, the logic of this book suggests that the polarization of these states’ populations is the result of the contingent and ongoing policy decisions of local, regional, and international actors. As some commentators suggest the “hard” or “soft” partition of Iraq and Syria along ethnic and sectarian lines, The Fall of the Ottomans warns policymakers against conflating the contingent consequences of wartime policy decisions with an illusory natural course of history.

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Rogan sides with Turkish and non-Turkish scholars who regard the displacement and extermination of Ottoman Armenians as an intentional act of genocide, implemented through orders delivered through parallel oral and written channels, as documented in Ottoman and German archival sources.


Inconveniently, the world does not follow the foreign policy platforms or visions of U.S. presidential candidates. Thus, the next U.S. president’s top foreign policy priority will likely be the crisis that is specifically provoked during the presidential transition when decisiveness is required but is very difficult to achieve. Tragically, we have an international crisis buffet before us: Libya? North Korea? Pakistan? Greater Russian military action? Despite billions of dollars spent on U.S. intelligence services, it is always the crisis that we do not foresee.

One critical foreign policy action that must be addressed is understanding the value of America’s allies and our alliance structure. Are U.S. allies “free riders”? Is America not getting a “good deal” from alliance structures? Or, do U.S. alliances and allies amplify and multiply U.S. national interests and foreign policy goals? The United States developed today’s international liberal-based order and allied treaty-based system 70 years ago. This system is now under threat. It is time to modernize and reinvest in this concept for the twenty-first century—a strategic renovation that is long overdue.

Given the state of the U.S. presidential campaign, the first foreign policy priority for the next president will be to make clear to allies, adversaries, and all parties in-between that the United States intends to be a leader on the world stage working, in concert with like-minded nations wherever possible, to protect its citizens, territory, and allies, promoting the liberal international order that supports our economy, advancing the rule of law, and improving the human condition, including support for human rights.

As a part of this overarching strategic messaging priority, the next president will need to advance in word and deed the U.S. interest in promoting the rule of law, by deterring and, if necessary, responding to threats to national sovereignty and/or freedom of seas and international airspace, working in concert with allies and partners. All tools of statecraft must be leveraged in this regard, notably including diplomacy, economic power, the information domain, the peacetime deployment of military forces, and, in extremis, the use of military force.
| **James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program** | We should stop pretending that America’s foreign relations are not at their lowest point since 1980. Any new president faces a long and difficult rebuilding. Even with this, it is unlikely that the United States can regain the preeminence it had before 2001. Renewal requires the next President to make some early demonstration of resolve against a hostile state (probably involving a degree of force) and engage both opponents and new powers (particularly Germany). | The term of engagement must also change. Rebuilding influence means rethinking stale priorities from the last 15 years. If our strategy remains a defense of the fraying post-1945 status quo rather than reshaping it, a pursuit of feckless adventures and boutique issues at the periphery of American interests, we will forfeit leadership. No other nation can set the global agenda when America declines to do so, and too much restraint only produces instability. There is no such thing as lead from behind. |
| **J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center** | Commit to walk back the burgeoning crisis in Syria and Iraq. Though utterly bereft of any easy solutions, there is no ignoring the geopolitical threat it poses. Any steps to mitigate the crisis, however imperfect, require sustained U.S. leadership, in partnership with Russia, Iran, the Saudis, Turkey, and others. And U.S. boots on the ground will be needed. | Get truly serious about health security. Budget annually for pandemic preparedness. Establish a senior empowered director in the White House. Tell the American people why it is essential to be far better equipped to meet the ‘new normal’ of recurrent emerging threats. |
| **Frank A. Verrastro, Senior Vice President and James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics** | From an energy perspective, the big challenge will be navigating the transformation to a low(er) carbon future, while keeping the current (traditional fuels) system robust and working and avoiding economic calamity and upheaval in the process. When it comes to keeping our planet livable, we are all environmentalists, but the lofty aspirational goals and timetables articulated during campaign season are likely to succumb to more somber discussions about infrastructure, investment, technology, fuel, adaptation, and lifestyle choices once the reality of what deep decarbonization really means sets in. | I would raise the issues of inequality and trust in government as items that sorely need to be addressed – especially in the aftermath of the contentious debate we are currently experiencing at home. The inability to restore belief or public trust in the notion that elected officials can come together to redress wrongs and improve the conditions for both current and future generations, will surely undermine any effective leadership at home and abroad, regardless of who is elected this fall. |
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