CSIS released, on July 12, 2006, an 18-month long study on the future of the National Guard and Reserves. The study examined:

**Roles and Missions**

- **The Reserve Component (RC) should remain multi-mission capable, but put less emphasis on conventional campaigns.** The RC should broaden its focus to include irregular warfare and preparing for catastrophic or disruptive challenges, just as the active duty military is doing.

- **Employing the Reserve Component as part of the operational force is mandatory, not a choice.** The paradigm shift away from a purely strategic reserve model is imperative, it is not a risk-free endeavor. If the shift is not made successfully, the strength of the military as a whole will suffer.

**Force Structure**

- **The Army – active and reserve – needs more combat structure, not less.** The Army needs at least 43 active BCTs and 34 Guard BCTs in the near-term. Ideally the Active Army would eventually grow four to five additional BCTs.

**Employing the RC as Part of the Operational Force**

- **DoD needs to provide at least $13 billion more over the next six years to reset Army Guard and Reserve equipment** from ongoing operations, modernize the equipment they received under the “tiered readiness” strategy of years past, and cover all of the costs of creating the new modular BCTs and multifunctional support brigades.

**The RC in Homeland Defense and Civil Support**

- **DoD needs to accept civil support as a central mission and act accordingly.** If protecting the homeland is really the top priority, DoD needs to start planning, programming, and budgeting for the mission.

- **Leverage the National Guard to form the backbone of regional Civil Support Forces.** One National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters in each FEMA region should be dual-hatted as an interagency entity responsible for organizing and coordinating regional planning, training, and exercising. These ten CSF headquarters would have assigned response forces drawn from the state Guards in their region.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THE RC IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT (CONT.)

- **Appoint a National Guard general officer as Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM.** The National Guard is likely to form a significant component of any response force to a major event in the United States. In light of the Guard’s role in Homeland Defense, a senior leader from the Guard community should be integrated directly into the NORTHCOM chain of command to ensure that partnerships between NORTHCOM, the states and territories, and the National Guard Bureau are strong.

- **Designate the Chief of the National Guard Bureau as the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters concerning the Guard in homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support missions.** Ensuring that the National Guard is well integrated into DoD’s broader homeland defense and civil support plans and policies, and that the Guard is sufficiently trained and equipped for these missions, is critically important. The Chief should continue to be the principal adviser to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force on all other Guard matters.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

- **Shield prior service personnel from deployments for a two year period upon joining the National Guard or Reserves.** National Guard units in a number of states have recently adopted this approach, and DoD should encourage its use by all reserve components.

- **Keep the average total length of mobilization to no more than a year.** Although longer tours of duty may be optimal for some types of operations, such as stability operations, longer mobilizations are frequently cited as a major source of dissatisfaction by RC personnel and their families.

ADAPTING THE SOCIAL COMPACT

- **DoD needs to implement the Continuum of Service approach.** The old “one size fits all” approach to service in the Reserve Component no longer works. DoD needs a much more flexible system to bring RC members on to active duty, access RC members more easily and make it easier for more people to serve in new and different ways.

- **Efforts should be accelerated to develop an “intensive reserve”** that enables RC members to serve above and beyond once every five to six years and to leverage personnel in key specialty areas.

- **Retain the current Reserve Component healthcare benefit and retirement system without further expansion** until it can be demonstrated that modifying these programs would likely enhance recruiting, retention, and medical readiness.