After the September 11, 2001, attacks, governments throughout the world rushed to improve their counterterrorism policies. Several countries tightened legislation, increased resources available to their intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and established repressive policies to uncover and prosecute terrorist networks. Policymakers, fearing an imminent attack, understandably focused their attention on aggressive methods. Yet, over the last few years, many governments have started thinking about more nuanced, comprehensive, and long-term counterterrorism policies, understanding that simply trying to dismantle terrorist networks is like playing a never-ending game of “whack-a-mole,” unless steps are also taken to prevent the radicalization of scores of potential new militants.

Several Muslim countries have formulated various programs to fight extremism. From Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, authorities have devised more or less comprehensive measures to deradicalize committed militants and prevent the radicalization of new ones. This soft approach to counterterrorism has also been adopted by some European governments. The 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks, as well as the arrest of hundreds of European Muslims who had been involved in a variety of terrorist activities, have clearly shown that radicalization is a problem in Europe. Over the last few years, various European governments have decided to combat radicalization processes among their Muslim population by enacting various counterradicalization programs, acknowledging that they cannot simply arrest their way out of the problem. Initiatives vary from convening...
interfaith meetings to creating government-funded Muslim magazines and TV channels, from promoting lectures of Muslim clerics exposing the theological flaws of al Qaeda’s ideology to mentoring projects and professional development seminars.

A crucial component of the programs enacted in all European countries is the participation of the Muslim community itself, which is deemed a necessary ally to stem radicalization among its youth. Yet, the Muslim community of each European country is characterized by deep divisions along ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, and political lines. This fragmentation has prevented the formation of widely representative Muslim organizations in virtually all European countries. “When government officials look for a responsible interlocutor,” one commentator perfectly summarized, “they find that the Muslim voice is a cacophony rather than a chorus.” European authorities face a difficult challenge in their choice of which of the many and often competing Muslim organizations they should partner in their counterradicalization programs.

A source of particularly heated debate among policymakers is the role that could be played in these programs by nonviolent Islamists, such as European Muslim organizations that trace their ideological roots to various forms of political Islam. Hardly a homogeneous category, they include movements that range from those that publicly express their desire to participate in the democratic process, such as offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, to others such as political Salafists, who openly reject secular democracy but still oppose the use of violence against the West. Critics argue that these organizations, while possibly playing a role in swaying some young Muslims from committing acts of violence against Europe, spread an interpretation of Islam that clashes with Western values and undermines the delicate integration process of European Muslims. Authorities in most European countries are therefore faced with the same dilemma: can nonviolent Islamists be engaged and used as partners against violent radicalization?

**Nontraditional Partners: Moderate Islamists**

Various experts from Europe and the United States believe that nonviolent Islamists can be effective partners in minimizing radicalization. “Bin Laden-ism can only be gutted by fundamentalism,” argues former Central Intelligence Agency official Reuel Marc Gerecht. He further stated that “Muslim ‘moderates’ can’t defeat bin Ladenism since they don’t speak to the same audience with the same language and passions.” An argument supporting this view was expressed by Nixon Center analysts Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke in their article tellingly entitled “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” According to the authors, the Muslim Brotherhood “works to dissuade Muslims from violence,
instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities.” As a result, Western authorities should find ways to work with it to pursue the common goal of swaying young Muslims away from the appeal of jihadist groups. The argument that only nonviolent Islamists could serve as a firewall against al Qaeda–style radicalization is also made by many Islamist leaders throughout Europe, who have actively sought forms of partnership with governments on counterradicalization efforts.

On the other hand, critics of this approach argue that even assuming nonviolent Islamists can indeed sway some young Muslims from committing acts of terrorism, these short-term gains in security would be offset by the long-term implications of such a partnership. These critics maintain that although opposing acts of terrorism in the West, nonviolent Islamists have views and goals that are incompatible with those of the secular and multifaith societies of modern Europe. Their refusal to condemn acts of violence in Palestine and Iraq, as well as their ambiguous position on women’s rights, apostasy, and homosexuality, are just some of the issues raised to prove the real nature of nonviolent Islamists. Seeing them as part of the problem rather than the solution, critics argue that governments should not legitimize and empower them with any form of partnership. The long-term repercussions on social cohesion and integration of such engagement, they add, would be much greater than the yet-to-be-proven short-term gains that can be achieved in preventing acts of terrorism.

European governments are clearly struggling with how to reconcile these opposing groups. Denmark is a prime example. In January 2008, the Danish government, spurred by a series of arrests of Danish-born Muslims involved in terrorist activities, established an interministerial working group to devise an action plan to fight extremism and radicalization in the country. After months of research and meetings, Minister of Integration Birthe Hornbech, who chaired the task force, released a 65-page report with several recommendations. The document argued that the Danish government should have worked with a wide range of Muslim organizations, including those with an Islamist bent, in order to stem violent radicalization among Danish Muslims. The report was immediately criticized by Karen Jespersen, the minister of welfare and a fellow member of Hornbech’s Liberal Party. Along with other critics, who belonged mostly to Hornbech’s coalition government, Jespersen accused the report of adopting a narrow interpretation of extremism and advocating partnership with Muslim organizations that did not adhere to basic Danish values. As the rift moved from the cabinet to the front pages of Danish newspapers, Danish authorities decided to shelve the action plan until an agreement on engagement criteria was found.
A new plan that significantly limited the cases in which cooperation with nonviolent Islamist organizations was acceptable was finally approved in February 2009.\(^8\)

Even though no European country can be said to have adopted a cohesive and definitive policy on the matter, despite numerous ongoing debates within most European governments, the Danish example makes it apparent that the decision of partnering with nonviolent Islamists is closely linked to the formal and informal definitions of extremism and radicalization adopted by authorities in any given country. Authorities that tend to closely associate those definitions with the use of violence are more likely to be open to some form of partnership with nonviolent Islamists. That is the case in the United Kingdom, where the aim of Prevent, the government’s counterradicalization program, is to “stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists.”\(^9\) As a consequence, over the last few years, various Islamist organizations that reject violence inside the country have been engaged as partners and have received funding from the British government.

Other European countries adopt a broader interpretation of what constitutes extremism and, consequently, of what the aim of their counterradicalization programs should be. Dutch authorities, for example, define radicalization as “the growing preparedness to wish to or to support fundamental changes . . . in society that do not fit within our democratic system of law.”\(^10\) The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst [AIVD]) specifically states that violence is not necessarily part of the extremism they are monitoring among segments of the Dutch-Muslim community. “There is no threat of violence here,” states a 2007 AIVD report, “nor of an imminent assault upon the Dutch or Western democratic order, but this is a slow process which could gradually harm social cohesion and solidarity and undermine certain fundamental human rights.”\(^11\) Consequently, Dutch authorities are much more reluctant than their British counterparts to partner with nonviolent Islamists, even though they have not completely ruled out the possibility of doing so in extraordinary circumstances. Similarly, German authorities have opened a dialogue with various nonviolent Islamist organizations operating in the country, inviting them to their discussion forums on Islam in Germany. Yet, at the same time, German officials state that a true partnership could be formed only when their interlocutors will consistently and unambiguously embrace German values.
Each country’s assessment of what constitutes extremism and their subsequent determination of what the goals of their counterradicalization programs should be are the necessary starting points from which these countries examine the issue of partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations. Yet, an array of concurrent factors also plays a role in the complex decisionmaking process over the matter.

The Security Environment
The most important factor influencing policymakers is the security threat facing their country. Governments faced by a relatively high level of radicalization among their Muslim population and a severe threat of a terrorist attack are more likely to focus simply on violent radicalization rather than more general and less immediately visible threats to social cohesion. As a consequence, eager to use any tool that can stop a terrorist attack, they are likely to be more open to the idea of partnering with nonviolent Islamists. In other words, the higher the terrorist threat, the lower the bar of partner acceptability is set.

The United Kingdom seems to be a perfect case in point. Since 9/11, the United Kingdom has been targeted multiple times by terrorists linked to or sympathizing with al Qaeda. Thanks to a combination of luck and impressive skills on the part of British authorities, terrorists have been able to strike successfully only once, but the threat to the country has dimensions that are unparalleled in any other European country. In 2008, for example, British security services estimated that 2,000 individuals, mostly British citizens or residents, were involved in al Qaeda-influenced terrorist activities and claimed to monitor around 30 serious plots at any given moment. It is no coincidence that British authorities, facing the most imminent and constant terrorist threat of any other European country, have established the most extensive forms of partnership with nonviolent Islamist organizations of any of their counterparts throughout the continent.

One of the best known examples of such cooperation is the 2005 takeover of the Finsbury Park mosque in the north of London. Originally founded as a mainstream, moderate mosque for the large Muslim community of north London, Finsbury Park was taken over by the notorious Egyptian cleric Abu Hamza al Masri and a small group of followers in the mid-1990s. After having intimidated the mosque’s trustees, Abu Hamza turned the place into what intelligence agencies from various countries considered the undisputed headquarters of jihadist activities in Europe. Scores of individuals linked to al Qaeda, from shoe bomber Richard Reid to the so-called 20th hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, passed through its doors. Hundreds of militants were recruited by Abu Hamza to fight or train with al Qaeda in places such as Afghanistan or Chechnya. British authorities kept the mosque under surveillance for years but only in January 2003, after it became apparent that it had been used by a cell of North African militants planning an attack in the United...
Kingdom, was the decision to swoop in on Finsbury Park made.\textsuperscript{14} After a dramatic night raid uncovered items such as military manuals, handguns, combat clothing, hundreds of stolen and forged documents, and even three nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare protection suits in the basement of the mosque, authorities decided to shut it down.

The decision proved to be unpopular in the Muslim community and boosted local support for Abu Hamza, who began holding his Friday sermons in the middle of the street across from the mosque. Even after Abu Hamza’s arrest in May 2004, his supporters kept holding sway in the area surrounding the mosque, creating a tense situation for the entire neighborhood. At this point, British officials became convinced that the mosque had to be reopened and turned to an organization that would be accepted by the community.\textsuperscript{15} Officials from Scotland Yard, the Charity Commission, and Islington Council then approached the leaders of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB).

Officially independent, the MAB was founded in 1997 by Kamal Helbawy, a former senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Most of its leadership openly declare their past membership and current support for organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas. Although various MAB leaders condemn acts of violence inside the United Kingdom, they have publicly vowed their support for suicide attacks in Palestine and in other places where “Muslims are oppressed.”\textsuperscript{16} After lengthy consultations, MAB leaders accepted British authorities’ offer to take over the mosque. On a cold morning in February 2005, some 70–80 MAB activists arrived at the mosque while police officers stood ready a few blocks away. A confrontation with Abu Hamza’s supporters ensued, but after a few hours of tension and some minor scuffles, MAB activists physically secured the mosque.

The MAB’s takeover of Finsbury Park has been touted by British authorities as a major accomplishment. Abu Hamza’s supporters no longer have a base, and what was a “suicide factory” has become a thriving community center with activities for Muslims and non-Muslims. Today, the mosque welcomes more than 1,000 worshippers every week. Moreover, Finsbury Park’s new leadership has established excellent relations with the local community and even participates in interfaith forums. Muslim and non-Muslim residents of the neighborhood are enthusiastic about the change, and law enforcement officials are relieved to be able to divert the human and financial resources needed to monitor Abu Hamza’s supporters elsewhere.
By turning Finsbury Park over to the MAB, British authorities have unquestionably removed a major center for incitement and preparation of attacks on British soil, bringing a problematic situation under control. Given the circumstances, no other solution was likely to achieve the same result. Only an organization like the MAB had the legitimacy to be accepted by the local Muslim community, as others that would commonly be considered more moderate lacked its street credibility. Yet, the very reasons that made the MAB palatable to some of London’s most radical Muslims had made many policymakers uneasy about cooperating with similar organizations in the past. In addition to the MAB’s selective condemnation of violence, its controversial positions on issues such as gay rights, apostasy, and integration have traditionally given pause to many British policymakers, who wondered about the long-term implications of indirectly helping such an organization to spread its interpretation of Islam to thousands of British Muslims. Yet, given the extreme circumstances, there is consensus among British policymakers that the Finsbury Park takeover was a perfect example of short-term success obtained by partnering with nonviolent Islamists. British officials do not consider partnering with nonviolent Islamists an established policy, but cutting deals on a case-by-case basis with admittedly less-than-ideal partners is seen as an unavoidable realpolitik move, dictated by the emergency of the severe terrorist threat under which the country finds itself.

Most other European countries that are not faced with a terrorist threat of the same magnitude hold more conservative positions, making the Finsbury Park mosque case a unique situation. Dutch authorities, who estimate the number of individuals involved in terrorist activities in their country at just a few dozen, seem to address the issue by drawing a clear line between “engaging” and “empowering.” All sorts of voices, as long as they do not advocate violence, should be engaged because pushing nonviolent Islamists to the margins could have negative repercussions. Nevertheless, Dutch authorities feel they cannot consider them as permanent partners, as there is a clear understanding that these forces espouse a message that clashes with the Dutch government’s ideas of democracy, integration, and social cohesion.

This assessment leads to a case-by-case approach in which authorities engage nonviolent Islamists when they must and when common ground can be found. This policy was implemented during the months preceding the release of the controversial movie *Fitna* by Dutch politician and leader of the Party for Freedom, Geert Wilders. The movie strongly criticized Islam, attempting to link verses of the Qur’an to acts of terrorism perpetrated by various Islamist groups. Dutch authorities feared that the highly publicized movie could have triggered violent reactions similar to those after the publication of cartoons by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005. Security services held several meetings with some of the most radical Salafist imams in the country, explaining that the Dutch government did not support...
Wilders and consequently obtained a promise from the imams that they would urge their followers not to react violently to the movie. That promise was kept. Yet, the security services do not consider political Salafists as permanent and reliable partners and discourage local authorities from doing so. The security services’ advice is particularly significant since political Salafists have been regularly approaching municipalities and provinces with offers of partnership in counter-radicalization and integration programs. If an open dialogue with the political Salafists is encouraged, any form of cooperation that would allow them to expand their sphere of influence within the Muslim community is considered negatively.

**Institutional Mandate**

Together with the reality of the security environment, another factor influencing the choice of whether to partner with nonviolent Islamists is the institutional mandate of the body making the decision within each government, leading to differences within European governments. Once again, the British example perfectly captures this reality.

In 2002, Scotland Yard established the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), comprised of a dozen highly trained Muslim and non-Muslim police officers whose task is to interact with London’s Muslim community. Building on a long-established tradition of community policing, the MCU attempted to establish trust-based relationships with community leaders who could help prevent terrorist attacks and counter the radicalization of local Muslims. Under the leadership of Robert Lambert, the MCU chose an unusual path, deciding to engage and, in some cases, partner with all sorts of Islamists, including some of the most radical voices in London’s relatively large Salafi community. Lambert argues that the “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders lack credibility in their communities and have no knowledge of radicalism. Thus, he advocates “police negotiation leading to partnership with Muslim groups conventionally deemed to be subversive to democracy.” According to Lambert, only these groups have the credibility to challenge the narrative of al Qaeda and influence young Muslims. Under the Channel Project, for example, Salafi imams work with police officials to identify youths that seem to be undergoing the radicalization process and attempt to sway them away from violent extremism. Lambert argues that nonviolent or political Salafis might have views that run against the feelings of most British citizens but they have an interest in preventing, as well as the capacity to

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**There is still no consensus on how and why radicalization takes place.**
prevent, young men from becoming terrorists and hence, are necessary counterterrorism assets.\textsuperscript{24}

The MCU understandably seeks to utilize all possible tools to fulfill its institutional mandate of preventing acts of violence from taking place. Other public institutions with different institutional mandates, however, look at such partnerships with suspicion. Top officials at the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), one of the agencies charged with finding long-term solutions to radicalization issues, have argued that the British government’s aim should be to target not simply violent extremism, but rather all forms of extremism. Top Labour and Tory members have publicly stated that being against al Qaeda is not enough. They insist that Muslim organizations should be treated as partners only if they adhere to nonnegotiable British values such as democracy, freedom of religion, and sexual equality. “It is only by defending our values that we will prevent extremists [from] radicalising future generations of terrorists,” argued Ruth Kelly, former secretary of state for the DCLG, in a 2006 speech in which she announced fundamental changes in the criteria used to disburse public funding for counterradicalization programs.\textsuperscript{25} In 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith reiterated the message that groups that condemn al Qaeda’s violence while promoting values incompatible with those of the United Kingdom are also part of the problem: “They may not explicitly promote violence, but they can create a climate of fear and distrust where violence becomes more likely.”\textsuperscript{26}

The two ministers’ views became policy in March 2009, when the British government released its latest counterterrorism strategy. Although upholding everyone’s right to express positions that most deemed radical, the strategy made it clear that the government was no longer going to support views that “fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion.”\textsuperscript{27} The Home Office in February 2009 seemed to make the shift even clearer:

Our strategy to prevent people becoming terrorists is not simply about tackling violent extremism. It is also about tackling those who espouse extremist views that are inconsistent with our shared values. Decisions on which organisations to fund are taken very carefully and are subject to robust scrutiny. We are clear that we will not continue to fund groups where we have evidence of them encouraging discrimination, undermining democracy and being ambiguous towards terrorism.\textsuperscript{28}

Institutions whose mandate is simply to prevent acts of violence naturally tend to focus on violent extremism and are therefore satisfied with short-term security gains that partnerships with nonviolent Islamists can possibly achieve. On the other hand, institutions that aim to preserve a harmonious and cohesive society will be more careful about the long-term repercussions of such cooperation. Although they might understand that occasional
What role do nonviolent Islamist organizations play in the radicalization process?

cooperation might be necessary in emergency situations, they fear that the legitimacy and financial support derived from a permanent partnership with the government could unduly empower organizations whose agenda they deem negative.

Lack of Unified Assessment
An additional factor influencing the decisionmaking process on partnership with nonviolent Islamists is divergent views about the radicalization process itself. Despite many studies, experts and policymakers disagree on how and why radicalization takes place. Analysts debate, for example, whether integration or the lack thereof is related to radicalization. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany argues confidently that “successful integration is a substantial contribution to the prevention of extremism and terrorism.”29 Others point to a lack of empirical evidence that definitively links the absence of integration with radicalism and violence.30

Equally debated is the role played by nonviolent Islamist organizations in the radicalization process. Do they work as a firewall against radicalization, or do they serve as conveyor belts for more extremist groups? The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) argue the former, stating, “Often, it is precisely these individuals who have the best chance of influencing the attitudes of the young people who are in a process of radicalisation, in a non-violent direction.”31 German authorities, on the other hand, publicly state in their annual reports that nonviolent Islamist organizations “do not carry out recruitment activities for the purpose of the violent ‘Holy War’ (Jihad). They might rather claim to immunise young Muslims against Jihadist indoctrination by presenting to them an alternative offer of identification. However, one has to critically ask whether their activities that are strongly directed at preserving an ‘Islamic identity’ intensify disintegration and contribute to the development of Islamist parallel societies.”32 Moreover, they argue, “there is the risk that such milieus could also form the breeding ground for further radicalization.”33

Various factors contribute to this asymmetry of analysis, from the cultural background of the analysts involved to political considerations. What is clear is that no European government has adopted a definitive analysis of the radicalization process, the role integration plays in it, and the effect nonviolent Islamists have on it. This, of course, often leads to unclear guidelines and incoherent decisions on how a counterradicalization program should work, what goals it should achieve, and how it should choose its partners.

The 2008 report of the British Audit Commission on the implementation of Prevent tellingly found “varying levels of clarity about what partnerships are
trying to deliver in Prevent and how this links with cohesion and other local strategies. These problems are nevertheless inevitable as authorities venture in unchartered waters, attempting to tackle an extremely complex and still unclear issue. Most programs have only been established for a few years, and authorities realistically recognize that the learning process will take years.

A Vexing Security Dilemma

Do European governments achieve their interests by engaging with nonviolent Islamists? Different perceptions of the state interest lead to different answers to the question. If the state interest in counterradicalization programs is to prevent terrorist attacks, then, prima facie, there seems to be reasons to say that engagement might bear some fruit, at least in the short term. The issue becomes more complicated if a more ambitious interpretation of state interest is adopted. If success in counterradicalization is deemed to be the marginalization of extremist and anti-integration ideas among young European Muslims, then many believe that partnering with nonviolent Islamists is counterproductive.

The debate goes to the heart of how to identify the enemy, as European policymakers have failed to find a consensus on this fundamental issue. If the enemy is simply “terrorism” or groups similar to al Qaeda that use violence to pursue their agenda, then partnership with nonviolent Islamists appears to be a useful tactic to counter them. If the threat is perceived to be coming more broadly from various forms of Islamism, however, the assessment must be different. In that case, short-term and occasional forms of cooperation with nonviolent Islamists can be used to achieve gains against jihadists, but such tactical partnerships should not develop into a permanent strategy.

Senior security officials in some European countries embrace the view that identifying the enemy only in violent groups is a self-deceiving act. Alain Grignard, deputy head of the Belgian police’s antiterrorism unit and a professor of Islamic studies at Brussels Free University, calls al Qaeda an “epiphenomenon,” the most visible aspect of the much larger threat that is political Islam. Alain Chouet, former head of France’s counterintelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, agrees with Grignard and believes that al Qaeda “is only a brief episode and an expedient instrument in the century-old existence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The true danger is in the expansion of the Brotherhood, an increase in its audience. The wolf knows how to disguise itself as a sheep.”

Chouet’s comparison of the Muslim Brotherhood to a wolf in sheep’s clothing is echoed by many security experts who fear that nonviolent Islamists are attempting to benefit from what in social movement theory is known as positive radical flank effect. According to the theory, more moderate wings of a political movement improve their bargaining position when a more radical
fringe emerges. Applied to nonviolent Islamists, the positive radical flank effect would explain why the emergence of al Qaeda and other jihadist groups has led European governments to see nonviolent Islamists more benignly and even to flirt with the idea of establishing forms of partnership with them. The emergence of a severe and prolonged terrorist threat, argue people such as Chouet, has led European governments to lower the bar of what is acceptable and endorse extremist organizations as long as they oppose violence in Europe.

The real problem, some argue, is the social engineering program envisioned by nonviolent Islamists, which entails rejecting many core Western values. Nonviolent Islamists seeking to become partners of various European governments portray themselves as firefighters, determined to extinguish the flames of violent radicalization among young European Muslims.\(^\text{38}\) That is unquestionably true in some cases, as many Islamist organizations have been consistent in denunciating acts of terrorism against Europe. Yet, it can be argued that they simultaneously play the role of arsonists, pushing a message that plays on the separate identity of Muslims as well as the alleged persecution to which Muslims are subjected in Europe and justifying violence in other circumstances. In the words of the Quilliam Foundation, a London-based think tank established by former Islamists who have rejected the ideology, nonviolent Islamists “advocate separatist, confrontational ideas that, followed to their logical conclusion, lead to violence. At the very least, the rhetoric of radicals provides the mood music to which suicide bombers dance.”\(^\text{39}\)

The lack of clarity over the overarching goals of their counterterrorism efforts and the consequent inconsistency of counterradicalization strategies; limited knowledge of various aspects of political Islam, the differences among various Islamist groups, and the nature of the radicalization process itself; and the tension between the need to prevent terrorist attacks in the short term while preserving social cohesion in the long run all have European authorities mired in a real security dilemma. Even viewing nonviolent Islamists in the most negative terms, there is room for some forms of cooperation when circumstances demand it. On the other hand, few would advocate publicly endorsing and financially supporting organizations that glorify violence in some parts of the world and reject basic human rights. Most would agree that engaging nonviolent Islamists for security purposes without empowering them seems the best strategy. Implementing such policy on the ground, however, is extremely challenging.
and constitutes a new security dilemma with which European and other
governments are now constantly grappling.

Notes

pub_detail.asp (press release).
5. One of the most vocal advocates of this approach is Kamal Helbawy, a former senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and currently a London-based activist.

16. Kamal Helbawy and Mohammed Kuzbar, interview with author, London, United Kingdom, December 2008 (MAB founder and top MAB official, respectively)

17. Ruth Kelly and Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, interview with author, London, United Kingdom, December 2008 (former British secretary of state for the Department of Communities and Local Government and former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, respectively).


31. 2008 Danish Radicalisation proposal, p. 36.

32. Integration as a Means to Prevent Extremism and Terrorism report, p. 5.


34. Audit Commission report, p. 10.


38. The comparison has been made to the author in two separate conversations with two Islamist leaders in two European countries.