The United States is not ready for the next catastrophe. More than seven years have passed since the country was attacked on September 11, 2001 by violent Islamist extremists who remain free, and who have made clear their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, should they be able to acquire or build them. Three years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and laid bare myriad flaws in the nation’s preparedness and response system. Simply creating the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Northern Command has not been enough to prepare the country. The United States still lacks detailed, government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. Very few dedicated military forces are on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home. And, there are still no guidelines to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst.¹

A number of significant steps have been taken, and the United States is clearly more prepared than it was seven or eight years ago. There is a National Homeland Security Strategy which provides overall direction for the federal government’s homeland security policies and programs. Hundreds, if not thousands, more people than before the September 11 attacks focus each and every day on improving national preparedness. A National Response Framework (NRF), formerly known as the National Response Plan, describes how the federal government will work with state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents. Fifteen National Planning Scenarios have been drawn up to guide

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There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster.

government planning for catastrophes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed more than 200 pre-scribed mission assignments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events. The Department of Defense (DOD) has created a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Force of about 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe. And the National Guard has almost completed development of 17 CBRNE Emergency Response Forces spread around the country to help bridge the gap between the immediate response to a crisis and the arrival of more extensive federal capabilities.

Despite these signs of progress, current efforts to provide homeland security, particularly at the federal level, are not unlike the governmental equivalent of a children’s soccer game. There is a tremendous amount of activity and considerable energy on the field, but the movements are often not well coordinated. In such an environment, it is not impossible to score a goal, but that outcome is usually due more to luck than to skill. Why is the United States still not ready to respond effectively to a catastrophe so many years after the September 11 attacks? Why are there so many gloomy assessments of national preparedness even after two congressional reports and one White House report detailing lessons learned from Katrina?²

Who’s in Charge When No One is Solely in Charge?

The next administration has a tremendous opportunity to reevaluate how the nation prepares for and responds to catastrophes within the United States. If the United States is to respond effectively to another calamity, it will need to rely on a network of relationships between government organizations, private corporations and small businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and possibly individuals. The only way to orchestrate the complex assembly and deployment of capabilities drawn from so many sources is to ensure that a set of flexible, clearly defined, and well-understood relationships are in place to govern the stakeholders and their interaction. Unfortunately, these relationships do not exist today.
Confusion in Washington

At the federal level, considerable confusion still exists about which federal agency and official is in charge, which responsibilities are borne by what agencies, and whether assets and capabilities like trucks to move supplies or military forces to evacuate people and provide security are guaranteed or merely potentially available. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 “Management of Domestic Incidents” state that the secretary of homeland security will serve as the federal coordinator for domestic incident management. The Post-Katrina Management Reform Act of 2006, however, identifies the FEMA administrator as the principal adviser to the president, HSC, and secretary of homeland security for emergency management.\(^3\) The NRF echoes this confusion. The NRF chapter “Roles and Responsibilities” clearly names the secretary of homeland security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management, noting that “the FEMA Administrator, as the principal advisor to the President...helps the Secretary in meeting these HSPD-5 responsibilities.”\(^4\) This formulation emphasizes the role of the secretary as the lead official in Washington, but later sections in the NRF place far more emphasis on the role of FEMA.

Confusion over possibly overlapping roles during a catastrophe is not limited to the secretary of homeland security and the FEMA administrator. Interaction of other cabinet secretaries, particularly the attorney general and the secretary of defense, with the secretary of homeland security is not well defined either. The attorney general has lead responsibility for the criminal investigation of terrorist acts, and has broad law enforcement authority following terrorist threats or an actual incident. Since the formation of DHS, intense turf battles have raged over the roles and authorities of the Department of Justice and FBI relative to other federal departments, including DHS. Due to vague and sometimes conflicting language in law and presidential directives, it is not clear whether the secretary of homeland security, as the federal coordinator for domestic incident management, has the authority to determine during a catastrophic terrorist incident whether other aspects of crisis management and response, such as saving lives and protecting property, could be prioritized above law enforcement activities. As a result, today it may be left up to the president to resolve any conflicting priorities.

Similarly, the relationship between the secretary of homeland security and the secretary of defense is not clear cut. By law, the secretary of homeland security is the coordinator during a catastrophe for the federal government. As a

DOD still does not have a sufficient number of trained and ready forces to respond.
matter of official policy, however, the secretary of defense is required to provide support during a catastrophe only if directed by the president. There is no doubt that cooperation between DHS and DOD is stronger today than it was just a few years ago. Yet, the formal policy governing the role of DOD in a catastrophe has reinforced its long-standing view that providing military support to civil authorities can be treated as a lesser included case. In practice, this means that, despite the September 11 attacks and the failed response to Katrina, DOD still does not have a sufficient number of trained and ready forces that are consistently available on very short notice to respond to a catastrophic event at home. In the last year or two, however, in response to growing pressure from the White House, Congress, and outside critics such as the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, DOD has begun moving away from its minimalist approach to civil support. For example, DOD has just created a specially trained force of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers who are ready at any time to respond to a catastrophe within 96 hours.

The continuing uncertainties and ambiguities about the roles and responsibilities of cabinet agencies during a catastrophe are not bureaucratic minutiae whose consequences are confined to Washington, D.C. Since the United States still lacks a clear and well-understood set of relationships to guide actions during a crisis, if a catastrophe occurs in the near future, it may well trigger a replay of the disastrous response to Katrina, particularly if that catastrophe is not another major hurricane, which the federal government has been planning for, down to the last detail, for the last two years. Who is in charge at the federal level? The secretary of homeland security? The FEMA administrator? The FBI director? Or is it the secretary of defense and the military?

Time spent in Washington sorting out who has the lead in a crisis and who is supposed to work with whom translates into lives lost and delays in delivering federal assets. Even without a crisis, the lack of clarity about roles and relationships is undermining efforts to develop solid catastrophe plans, and exercising and training for those plans. Confusion about roles and relationships is preventing the federal government from effectively identifying the requirements needed to manage various kinds of catastrophes, and to then include those requirements in the federal budget process. Instead, precious time is being consumed in arguments over who will do what in the future, rather than ensuring that the federal government actually stands ready to respond should the worst happen.

**Coordinating with States**

Not only are relationships at the federal level of the U.S. government a major challenge, the relationship of the federal government to state and local governments, who are essential actors during domestic catastrophes, is
extraordinarily complex. Indeed, our feder-
alist form of government lies at the root of
many of the challenges that make providing
homeland security so difficult, as the federal
government lacks authority over state gov-
ernors or even locally elected mayors. The
U.S. Constitution grants the states and
territories a wide range of sovereign rights
and responsibilities, which are taken very
seriously by elected officials at the state and local levels. For all the clamor in the
wake of Katrina for someone—anyone—to be in charge, it is not possible to
achieve “unity of command,” in the military sense of the term, during a
domestic catastrophe unless the American public agrees to rewrite the
Constitution, which is, to say the least, unlikely.

No governor or city mayor, who has been elected by constituents and
entrusted with the responsibility of developing a plan at the state or local level to
handle an emergency, will stand idly by and let a federal official impose a plan
created in Washington. Preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and
responding to catastrophes inside the United States requires a national
approach based fundamentally on coordination and cooperation horizontally between
different types of organizations such as governments, the private sector,
nonprofit organizations, and individuals, as well as vertically between the
federal, state, and local levels of government.

A key issue for federal and state governments is whether the traditional model
for providing federal assistance during a catastrophe still makes sense in an era of
potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
Historically, the Stafford Act, which was passed in 1988 mandating which level
of government pays for particular types of assistance under what circumstances,
envisions that the initial response to all disasters is local. If local authorities are
overwhelmed, state government will intervene. Only if state capabilities are also
overwhelmed may the federal government become involved. Once a state
government determines that local capabilities are overwhelmed in a disaster or
catastrophe, the state government can submit a formal “request for assistance”
that pulls federal assistance down to the local level. In the absence of such a
formal request, the federal government’s ability to push assistance out to local
communities is limited.

The aftermath of Katrina throws a harsh light on the potential shortfalls of
the traditional U.S. model for disaster assistance. Although the federal
government bore the brunt of public criticism, the weakness of both the state
government of Louisiana and the local government in New Orleans contributed
significantly to the poor overall response. The current disaster response model

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relies on state and local governments to assess their needs and request assistance from the federal government. In the case of Katrina, the sheer devastation wrought by the storm left both the city of New Orleans and the state government in Baton Rouge without sufficient situational awareness to assess in any detail what was needed. Making matters worse, Governor Kathleen Blanco’s office apparently did not know how to request assistance effectively. Twelve hours after Katrina made landfall, Blanco spoke with President George W. Bush on the phone and reportedly said, “I need everything you’ve got. I am going to need all the help you can send me.”

Under the current model, a verbal request from a governor to the president of the United States is not an official request for assistance, nor was her televised plea to the president two days later. This failure to formulate a request for assistance that the federal government could recognize delayed critical federal help for two to three days.

In the wake of Katrina, the question of the appropriate relationship of the federal government to state and local governments during a catastrophe remains extremely sensitive. In his September 2005 speech to the nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, Bush declared: “It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires a broader role for the armed forces – the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s notice.”

This statement generated considerable concern among state governors and leaders of the National Guard. Efforts by the DOD to pass a law in 2006 that would have given greater authority to the president to federalize the National Guard during disasters without the consent of state governors poured more fuel on the fire.

Despite the fierceness with which state and local governments defend the existing balance of power, a genuine debate is taking place about whether the traditional Stafford Act model can adequately serve the country. Prominent former defense officials have argued that in a catastrophe such as a nuclear event of some kind, it is foolish, if not downright irresponsible, to assume that state and local governments will be able to “pull” federal assistance effectively to where it is needed. The Katrina experience did not resolve these issues. If anything, it gave new life to long-simmering disputes. Assertions of the need for a “federal takeover” are fighting words to most emergency managers, first responders, and governors. In the post-September 11 security environment, it is time for a frank national discussion of what kind of federal-state relationship the American public wants, what expectations they have of government during a true catastrophe, and what trade-offs, such as the preservation of full state sovereignty or the creation of new ways to deliver swift federal help, they are willing to make.
Weak Strategies, Plans, and Programs

Not only are homeland security relationships weak and unclear in many places, the processes to prepare the nation at all levels to respond effectively to a catastrophe are nascent at best. In some areas, such as developing requirements for federal preparedness capabilities, they simply do not exist yet. Strong mechanisms to develop strategy and conduct strategic reviews of homeland security programs are not yet in place, nor is there a process to translate strategy into planning and program guidance. Finally, no mature planning process exists to prepare for future catastrophes. And, the few promising planning efforts that are up and running are not well linked to the requirements and budget process.

At the strategic policy level, the U.S. government’s current vision of how to prevent, protect against, prepare for, and respond to future catastrophes is diffuse and disjointed. The capstone strategy document for homeland security is supposed to be the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS). The White House issued the first in 2002 and the second almost five years later, in October 2007. Many observers have questioned the value of delivering a long overdue strategy in the last year of a two-term administration. Furthermore, the strategy was not the product of any sort of comprehensive review that examined goals and objectives, assessed current programs and activities, or articulated priority areas and potential trade-offs.

Numerous other strategy and guidance documents address various aspects of potential catastrophic events. Yet, they often are inconsistent in their treatment of particular concepts, offer competing definitions of key terms, and at times have even directly contradicted one another. For example, the NSHLS defines homeland security strictly in terms of terrorism and terrorist attacks, while the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support considers the full range of external threats to the United States, as well as natural disasters. Similarly, the NSHLS and certain homeland security presidential directives use the term ‘preparedness’ but do not define it. Other presidential directives and documents define the term, but also use other terms like ‘readiness’ interchangeably with ‘preparedness,’ which has created confusion and made it more difficult to develop a consistent intellectual architecture for homeland security. There are at least ten major documents describing different aspects of strategy, planning, and policy guidance for homeland security. Not surprisingly, many of the documents reflect the confusion about roles and responsibilities within the federal government, and between the federal government and state and local governments.

Just as the process of strategy development for homeland security is immature, so is the state of official guidance that translates overarching strategy into more specific articulations of planning assumptions, priorities, and program guidance.
There is no well-established analogue in DHS to the DOD’s Guidance for Development of the Force, which used to be known as the Strategic Planning Guidance and Joint Program Guidance. As a result, federal efforts (and those below the federal level) to prevent, protect against, prepare for, and respond to potential catastrophes in the future are not well-coordinated to produce optimum results. In this environment, achieving U.S. homeland security objectives is not impossible, but it is much more difficult than it should be.

Another key step in readying the nation to face a potential future catastrophe is establishing a mature requirements generation process and planning system. This system will serve as a prerequisite for thoughtfully determining what kinds of capabilities will be needed for particular types of events, how quickly they will be needed, which agencies will provide those capabilities, how they will get to where they need to go, and how they can be effectively integrated. For example, the government needs to determine what level of mass decontamination capability it needs at the federal level; what level of capability does the federal government already have, if any; how quickly such a capability needs to deploy and how will it be transported around the country, as well as whether such a capability should be developed in DHS, DOD, the Department of Health and Human Services, or some other federal agency. It has taken the Bush administration years to even begin to develop processes to identify requirements for managing domestic catastrophes and develop detailed plans to address potential scenarios. Sadly, these efforts have been hampered by turf battles and controversy.

Without a well-understood process for developing requirements for homeland security, there is confusion over what kinds of capabilities are actually required, which agencies should develop them, and how to link requirements to the larger federal budget process. Capabilities are sometimes identified by specific organizations through ad hoc processes or institutional initiative, but resistance from almost any institutional quarter can prevent those proposed capabilities from going into the budgeting system. The lack of a formal validation process to connect requirements identification, to budgeting has resulted in a sort of lowest common denominator approach to developing capabilities for homeland security. Only those capabilities on which all stakeholders agree inside a particular federal department, or which can generate sufficient support in Congress, are actually funded.

These are not esoteric issues relevant only to academics or bureaucrats. Without a solid strategy and clear federal planning guidance for prevention,
preparation, and management of future catastrophes, federal efforts in these areas will continue to be disjointed, incomplete, and generally inadequate to the task. Unless it undertakes deliberate planning to drive the creation and allocation of required capabilities and resources, the government risks being caught flat-footed during a future disaster. If the threat of an attack on the United States with a weapon of mass destruction is truly possible, then the new administration must ensure that basic plans for how to respond to these kinds of attacks are in place. It must also ensure that all levels of government have trained and exercised their capabilities using these plans, that the plans have guided investments in specific capability areas, and that there are mechanisms in place to make sure these capabilities are ready when they are needed.

**Weak Structures Outside Washington**

Finally, beyond lacking clear and mature intergovernmental relationships and strategic processes to manage a catastrophe, the nation is struggling to put in place the structures needed to translate these relationships and processes into capacity and competency in the real world.

Part of the problem is that the connective tissue linking the federal government in Washington with state and local governments all around the country is weak. Beyond the Beltway, frustration with “the feds” is high. According to the most recent National Governors Association annual survey of homeland security advisers, “states continue to report uneven progress in their relationship with the federal government, specifically with the Department of Homeland Security.” State and local emergency managers greeted DHS’s effort to revise the NRF after Katrina with resignation, and were openly dismayed by the September 2007 draft version that the administration released.

The annual grant process has been another major source of contention between federal authorities and state and local governments. Though the particular sources of dissatisfaction vary, certain common themes emerge in conversations with state and local officials. Many fault the federal government for having a decisionmaking process that lacks transparency, and for generally not sharing information with lower levels of government. They also argue that the federal government does not include them in policy development. As a result, issues multiply and grow burdensome. Lack of transparency, information sharing, and general inefficiency at the federal level sometimes leads to conflicting guidance and reporting requirements. In the states’ view, policy and guidance seem to change so frequently that many state and local officials feel they simply cannot keep track of what the current policy is at any given time.
Part of the reason for this weakness lies in DHS itself, whose offices throughout the country have been relatively scattered and have acted without much coordination either with state and local authorities or with DHS headquarters back in Washington. FEMA’s traditional regional offices began to atrophy when FEMA was placed inside of DHS, mainly because most of its ability to fund grants was reassigned elsewhere, stripping FEMA of much of its authority and relevance. Consequently, FEMA regional offices no longer had as strong a reason to call state and local officials with regularity. And local officials, knowing that regional offices no longer controlled grants, were certainly less motivated to answer their calls. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act passed by Congress in 2006 mandates that DHS reinvigorate FEMA’s regional offices, a process that is only now, two years later, getting under way.

Even if the homeland security system had clear authorities and lines of communication coupled with a clear strategy and strong planning and resource processes, the nation still does not have a professional education and development system that can recruit, train, and develop the thousands of professionals needed to run the homeland security enterprise effectively. Today, the education and experience of homeland security professionals tend to be relatively narrow. Customs officials understand how to screen and control people and things transiting borders. Emergency managers are well schooled in natural disasters but lack familiarity with terrorists’ capabilities. And law enforcement officers understand investigations but are not trained to manage events using the Incident Command System, which is the system first responders use to command and control response assets during a disaster.

These differences in training and experience make it difficult for this diverse group of professionals to work together effectively and efficiently during a crisis. With few exceptions, most senior executives inside DHS have no operational experience and minimal exposure to other Cabinet agencies, the very agencies with which they must partner during any major response effort. Without an education and development system specifically designed to produce and sustain a professional homeland security workforce, it will be very difficult to implement any sort of preparedness system that will be effective during relatively minor incidents, much less provide the kind of response that the American public would expect during a true catastrophe.
What Can Be Done?

Although thousands of hardworking political appointees and civil servants across the federal, state, and local levels have devoted endless hours since the September 11 attacks to better prepare the country for a future catastrophe, the fact remains that the United States is still not ready. Homeland security expert and former Coast Guard officer Stephen Flynn has called the country “America the Vulnerable,” while former DHS Inspector General Clark Kent Irvin has termed it an “Open Target.” A Century Foundation task force composed of experts and former government officials has labeled the country “The Forgotten Homeland.”10 What can the new administration do to rectify this untenable situation?

One of the worst solutions would be to abolish the DHS or begin yet another dramatic reorganization. A new administration is often tempted to make its own mark by rejecting initiatives and programs identified with its predecessor, and DHS’s poor reputation within the executive branch and Congress will make it a particularly attractive target. Nevertheless, major structural reforms would be highly disruptive, painfully time-consuming, and probably yield little in the way of results. Wounds suffered in the course of previous reform and reorganization battles help to explain why the homeland security system is plagued by poor relationships and ineffective processes. More bloodletting is unlikely to improve matters. Rather than wiping the slate clean and spending two years reinventing every part of the department to little positive effect, the next administration should concentrate its energy, resources, and political capital on a handful of selected, targeted reforms, paying close attention to aggressive oversight and effective implementation. Maintaining an intense focus on four priority reforms would greatly improve the readiness of the country to manage a potential future catastrophe.

First, merge the National Security Council (NSC) and HSC into a single organization with a single staff. The U.S. government has artificially separated homeland security from national security. Securing the homeland is a matter of national security, and it has both domestic and international components. Dividing homeland security from national security has resulted in fractured, partial solutions, and has greatly weakened the ability of the federal government to generate unity of effort. Merging the two councils and their staffs would greatly enhance the federal government’s ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and would ensure that the homeland security aspects of national
security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House.

Second, establish a clear chain of command inside DHS to ensure that the secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management. The relationship between DHS and FEMA continues to be murky and confusing. If the Katrina experience showed anything, it illustrated the perils of not having a clear understanding of who is in charge of what, both in Washington and in the field, during a catastrophe. The absence of a clear framework for the DHS-FEMA relationship has had an extremely pernicious effect on homeland security policy in the past several years and has noticeably hampered the federal government’s efforts to improve preparedness. The next administration and Congress should work together to put into law a clear chain of command, from the president down to the field level, for the coordination of domestic incidents. Under this new clarified framework, the secretary of homeland security will serve as the principal federal coordinator of domestic incidents as directed in HSPD-5 “Management of Domestic Incidents” and will report directly to the president. The FEMA administrator should be an expert on emergency management and could certainly continue to advise the president on emergency management matters, but it should be made clear that the FEMA administrator reports to the secretary of homeland security.

Third, establish a robust interagency organization, overseen by a merged NSC but housed at DHS, that is responsible for the development of integrated, detailed interagency plans and for identification of specific requirements for the federal departments. Although considerable progress has been made in 2007 and 2008, the federal government still does not have a set of detailed interagency plans associated with the 15 National Planning Scenarios which describe the kinds of catastrophes for which the nation needs to be prepared. Creating such plans is one of the most important steps that the federal government can take to improve national readiness. To insure their continued utility, they should be updated regularly, perhaps every year or two. The interagency organization should be backed strongly by the NSC, staffed with the best possible personnel with planning expertise, and should be high on the radar screen of the next secretary of homeland security. Complementing its deliberate planning function, the organization should be a focal point for identifying specific requirements for federal departments, which are then validated by the relevant agencies and fed into their internal resourcing systems.

Fourth, complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices. Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s
recent initiatives to reinvigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for working with states to develop regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field that have homeland security responsibilities.

Many of the building blocks required to move the country toward being truly prepared to handle a catastrophe already exist in some form, but the new administration needs to bring the pieces together, fill in the gaps, and provide the resources necessary to get the job done. While these four reforms are not the only steps the new administration needs to take in the area of homeland security, if implemented they would go a long way toward getting the United States ready to manage the next domestic catastrophe, whatever form it might take.

**New Administration, New Opportunity for Progress**

The country is still not ready for a domestic catastrophe because the major relationships and processes needed to coordinate a response are not yet clear or mature, and recent attempts to implement a homeland security system that organizes these relationships and processes have yet to succeed. What ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come, but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. Although homeland security received scant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign, the task of readying the United States to face the threats of the post-September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the new president.

The four policy recommendations presented here are critical first steps the new administration needs to take toward building a post-September 11 system that can manage catastrophic national disasters as well as man-made attacks and improve the United States’ resiliency. Taking these steps will require significant political leadership, willingness to set aside bureaucratic prerogatives, and a renewed focus on and commitment to preparedness at all levels of government. Without this leadership and renewed focus on homeland security issues, the nation will not be ready to respond the next time the unthinkable happens.
Notes


8. Although the title and content of the DOD planning guidance document has evolved substantially in recent years, for many years this document has played a critical role in translating strategy into the planning, programming and budgeting system. In the past, DHS has issued an integrated planning guidance document that has attempted to link strategic objectives to its five year budget, but the document’s impact on the overall DHS planning, programming, and budgeting system has been modest at best.
