Changing Security Paradigms and Korea’s New Asia Policy: Visions for 2030

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Introduction

The 2nd annual Young Leaders Conference, “The Changing Security Paradigm in Southeast Asia and Korea’s New Asia Policy: Searching for a Confidence-building Method with Young Leaders,” began in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK) on May 29, 2010. Thirty-five Young Leaders from 13 different countries explored regional dynamics and the future of Korea’s relationship with Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the US over the course of four days. The program started with a full day of roundtables featuring guest speakers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in addition to presentations and discussions led by Young Leaders. Young Leaders were grouped into region-based teams covering Southeast Asia-ROK, Northeast Asia-ROK, and US-ROK relations. The teams were tasked with presenting an outline for a 2030 joint vision plan for its region and South Korea by the end of the conference. The papers in this publication are the 2030 joint vision plans as envisioned by next generation leaders.

The 2030 vision plan for Southeast Asia-ROK relations focused on developing the economic relationship, institutionalizing cooperation on nontraditional security issues, and increasing soft-power exchanges, such as tourism and educational programs. The Northeast Asia-ROK joint vision suggests strengthened economic ties, institutionalized security cooperation, and a dialogue mechanism that will help the region overcome the deeply imbedded historical animosity that remains an obstacle to cooperation. The US-ROK team evaluated the current joint vision plan and identified its strengths, weaknesses, and what it signifies for other states in the region.
Southeast Asia-South Korea 2030 Vision Statement
by Mark Garnick, Chin-Hao Huang, David Lee, Mohd Syamin Marwan, Andy Tirta, and Nirupama Verma

It is impossible to accurately predict the state of the world in 20 years. We can, however, extrapolate trends and make assumptions on the direction they may take. With this in mind, we can make several assumptions about South Korea in 2030, and the role it will play in Southeast Asia as well as globally.

While North and South Korea will likely not be unified, the latter will enjoy a more confident, assertive role in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. South Korea will be more engaged with the developing world and more pro-active in approaching nations with the intent of enhancing bilateral and multilateral relationships.

A rapidly aging population is one of the challenges South Korea faces in the next 20 years. As Koreans get older and more reliant on social welfare mechanisms such as health care facilities and government assistance, the need for a younger generation of workers and students will grow. This will cause the government to assist and encourage families with children, and in the short term, to accept migrant workers from Southeast Asian countries.

South Korea will enjoy the benefits of steady economic growth with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and will gradually employ a two-tiered approach with respect to its interaction with ASEAN. One approach will focus on the more developed nations in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. These relations will focus on improving free trade and forging strong economic bilateral and multilateral relationships. The second approach will focus on the less developed nations in the region such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. These countries will receive assistance in the development of their economy and industrial capabilities.

Common Interests: Economic, Security, and Political

Economic Development

The foundation of the economic relationship between Southeast Asia and South Korea is the ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA), the last portion of which was finalized in 2009. This broad framework governs trade of goods and services between the two parties and will be the impetus for trade to double in the next few years.

Once one of the poorest nations in the world, South Korea is a recent member of the Group of 20 (G20), a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and a new addition to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Considering South Korea’s rapid economic growth in the last half-century, it is in a unique position to assist the nations of ASEAN in their pursuit of further development. This is a responsibility that South Korea has gradually embraced and a responsibility that will shape its identity as a positive influence in the developing world.
The catalyst for economic cooperation between ASEAN and South Korea is South Korea’s private sector. The opening of markets will provide opportunities for companies both in ASEAN and South Korea. South Korean companies will be particularly important in building infrastructure in Southeast Asia. Additionally, South Korean companies can add tremendous value to ASEAN through the transfer of technology and sharing of management lessons learned as these companies expanded beyond South Korea to compete in the world marketplace.

ASEAN and South Korea also face common problems that require coordinated solutions. As South Korea faces a rapidly altering demographic profile, migrant workers from Southeast Asia have often filled South Korea’s labor shortfall. More attention needs to be focused on the needs and treatment of these migrant workers. They are not only critical for South Korea’s economy but the remittances of these workers are an important source of capital for their home countries.

Besides migrant workers, ASEAN and South Korea also should work together to address energy instability and to pursue green business initiatives. The pursuit of stable sources of energy to fuel development in both ASEAN and South Korea concerns both parties. As the economies of Southeast Asia grow, energy instability will become even more important. Working together, ASEAN and South Korea can make headway in finding a cleaner, more efficient development path that can stimulate green business opportunities.

**Peacekeeping Operations/Nontraditional Security**

South Korea can assist Southeast Asia by promoting peacekeeping and peace-building operations. There are currently 401 South Korean peacekeepers operating around the world, but only four are in Southeast Asia (East Timor). If South Korea increased its participation in peacekeeping forces in Southeast Asia, it would demonstrate a commitment to promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia. South Korea could assist in peacekeeping operations in the Philippines to help promote a ceasefire between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. It could continue to promote peace-building dialogues in East Timor, while maintaining the ceasefire. South Korea could also contribute to the Cambodian ceasefire promoting dialogue and consultations. An increase of South Korean peacekeeping forces to Southeast Asia would signal its commitment to the region and promote peace, stability, and dialogue.

South Korea can assist Southeast Asia to counter a number of nontraditional security threats as well. Areas where South Korea can support Southeast Asia include cyber-security and maritime security. South Korea has a comparative advantage in these areas and can assist other nations to develop their capabilities.

In the cyber-security realm, South Korea can help Southeast Asian countries secure computer networks from malware to prevent vulnerability to attack. Since South Korea is one of the most networked countries in the world, it can transfer its know-how to Southeast Asia. South Korea can also provide training and transfer technology to assist the cyber-development of ASEAN nations.
Maritime security could be enhanced through joint training for piracy, which will assist in ensuring that sea lanes remain safe and open. India and South Korea have begun joint piracy training exercises and South Korea could expand joint exercises to involve nations in Southeast Asia. South Korea could assist Malaysia and Indonesia in anti-piracy operations. ASEAN and South Korea could also conduct joint exercises to prepare for humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.

**People to People ("P2P") Diplomacy**

While business, trade, and economic activities between South Korea and ASEAN member states remain a priority, there is also a strong need to deepen and broaden “people-to-people diplomacy.” This would build on the socio-cultural activities between South Korea and its Southeast Asian neighbors and help improve relations beyond the governmental levels and put greater emphasis on the grassroots level interfaces.

Sports, for example, are an important component in strengthening ties. Both sides should continue to support such regional activities as the Asian Games that promote good sportsmanship. Such regional sports activities inevitably boost tourism for both sides. The activities and mandate of the recently established ASEAN-Korea Center should be given greater priority and emphasis as a mechanism for promoting regional tourism. To facilitate greater exchanges, the South Korean government should consider providing greater flexibility in its visa-waiver program to Southeast Asian nationals. Likewise, Southeast Asian states should consider granting reciprocal mechanisms to encourage South Korean tourists to travel to the region.

Civil society exchanges from both sides should also be encouraged. Evangelical groups as well as other religious communities should expand their networks in the region to help promote inter-faith dialogues, build knowledge, and support religious diversity and understanding. Other advocacy groups and nongovernmental organizations focusing on human rights, labor rights, public health, climate change and environmental issues should be encouraged to increase dialogue to promote region-wide awareness of these critical issues.

On the educational front, a proposal to establish the “Sejong Scholarship” should be considered, modeled after educational exchange programs like the Fulbright Scholarship. This scholarship would encourage South Korean students to study abroad in Southeast Asia and to conduct research in the sciences, arts, literature, and social sciences that would promote inter-regional understanding and offer an opportunity to increase and build global and scholarly exchanges, professionalism, and collaboration. Southeast Asian nationals should be encouraged to apply for the scholarship to study in South Korean universities and graduate programs to help enhance two-way dialogue and communication.

**Does Southeast Asia want a strong South Korean presence in the region?**

With the introduction of President Lee Myung-bak’s New Asia Initiative, we can expect that this relationship will be set to become stronger and better in the future. South Korea has become critical for ASEAN countries as a source of cutting-edge technology.
South Korea targets ASEAN as a market to supply goods such as textiles, agriculture, and maritime technologies, electronics, and education.

According to Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, secretary general of ASEAN, the ASEAN community will be built in part on the following pillars. First, political stability and security, and Southeast Asia countries have the ASEAN Regional Forum for that. South Korea can contribute to this pillar through participation in that 27-member security forum. Then there is the ASEAN economic community. ASEAN is hoping to become a 567-million person market comprised of 10 integrated economies with one production base, one investment area, and with free mobility for “qualified and skilled labor.”

South Korea can play a key role in ASEAN, through:

a. **Dialogue and Exchange**: South Korea should continue to open its markets to products from ASEAN countries. Tourism and cultural exchange should be increased. This can be facilitated by liberalization of South Korean visa restrictions on some ASEAN countries.

b. **Economic Development**: South Korea is known for its rapid economic growth over the last four decades. Lessons from the Han River miracle can assist ASEAN countries. South Korea’s strong governmental leadership, efficient public transportation system, infrastructure, and bureaucracy can serve as role model for ASEAN countries. Additionally, South Korea has made a major commitment to increasing development assistance in Asia, particularly to “strategic partner countries” like Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Cambodia. South Korea’s comparative advantage in development cooperation lies in its capacity for training and knowledge and technology transfer.

**What does South Korea see in its relationship with Southeast Asia?**

The principal driver for the relationship between South Korea and Southeast Asia is the opportunity for mutual economic prosperity through increased partnership. From South Korea’s perspective, Southeast Asia is a burgeoning market where South Korean companies face less competition from global competitors and can increase brand value and dominate market share. South Korea has made inroads in the region and hopefully will continue to do so, particularly as Southeast Asia’s strength as an economic bloc grows.

South Korea has benefited greatly from the assistance from other countries during its development. As such, a large part of the relationship between South Korea and Southeast Asia will touch on the lessons that the Korean growth story has to offer as opposed to the prescriptions that have been offered by the West.

In addition to economic development, South Korea views Southeast Asia as one of the focal points President Lee’s New Asia Initiative. As South Korea strives to expand its influence beyond its neighbors in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia is a critical component of its desire to participate in not only economic but political, security, and cultural cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
ROK and Southeast Asia in 2030
By Frassminggi Kamasa, Jonizel Lagunzad, Mikael Fernandus Simalango, and Thuy Tran

In this ASEAN-ROK 2030 Vision Statement, we assume that ASEAN is already a fully integrated economic community – an economic powerhouse in which some member states have fully developed economies while others are transforming to become developed economies, albeit with immense regional support. This achievement of middle-power economic status by ASEAN has brought substantial change in its ability to deal with major powers and other significant economies in the Asia-Pacific such as the ROK. In the areas of political integration and the building of a socio-cultural community, however, progress has been gradual.

We also assume that the political status quo will continue on the Korean Peninsula: North and South are still divided in 2030. The new North Korean regime, however, is in survival mode and has no choice but to place considerable importance and seriousness on talks about reunification as the new regime finds itself very weak amid hostile foreign policies pursued by its predecessors. Along with this change, the new North Korean regime attempts to slowly open the North Korean economy and institutionalize changes that will allow foreign investors to operate more freely. Negotiations relating to reunification will face difficulties. South Korean leaders will demand that North Korea meet the security demands of South Korea such as putting an end to North Korea’s nuclear programs while North Korean leaders will insist on post-unification power sharing with the South Korean leadership. A host of contentious issues surrounding the crafting of a post-unification national identity will complicate negotiations. Economically, by 2030, ROK has joined the top level of world economies.

The ASEAN-ROK relationship by 2030 will go beyond the issues affecting the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. ASEAN countries and the ROK will identify agendas that resonate across all of Asia and will initiate cooperative interactions addressing issues that include (but are not limited to) terrorism and proliferation of WMD; averting effects of economic/financial crisis, climate change, and political conflicts.

Vision Statement:

We argue that delivering prosperity to the people and prioritizing economic growth as the source of national strength are common denominators between ASEAN and the ROK now and even more in 2030. We see ASEAN and the ROK as middle powers with mutual interest in preventing disruptive competition among the major powers in East Asia and in maintaining an atmosphere favorable to sustaining economic growth.

With that framework, what follows is our Vision Statement:

THE ASEAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 2030 VISION:
Middle Powers in Tandem: Parallel Prosperity Key to National Stability and Regional Security

Who are WE?

We, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) composed of member states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have banded together as middle powers in tandem committed to pursuing national and regional progress and delivering prosperity to our people. We endeavor to protect our mutual interest in preventing disruptive competition among the major powers in the region in order to maintain an atmosphere favorable to economic growth and regional security. We solemnly commit ourselves and pledge our resources to bring a stable future to our future generations.

What is OUR Vision?

We envision an ideal relationship between ASEAN and the ROK with the following elements:

Driven by our commitment to national and regional development through sustained economic growth, we envision ASEAN and the ROK as having greater openness and high-level cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, and financial management, which include an ASEAN-ROK Free Trade Area, an equal playing field in ASEAN countries and the ROK for ASEAN companies wishing to enter South Korean industries and vice versa, and an ASEAN-ROK investment board.

Stressing the importance of harnessing local talent and enabling human resources, of nurturing their ingenuity and innovation, we envision a sophisticated knowledge exchange platform between ASEAN and the ROK, which involves synchronizing our IT infrastructures, developing policies with a focus on Science and Technology, creating Design Councils that will oversee cooperation in producing world-class product innovations, and coordination in basic and higher education, developing advanced Math, Science, and English curricula for ASEAN and South Korean institutions of learning.

Conscious of the contribution of tourism as an engine of economic growth and more importantly, an avenue for cultural exchange and understanding, we envision expanding our partnership in tourism and cultural exchange to an over-all package of Image Promotion of ASEAN in the ROK and vice-versa. In line with our framing of the relationship as Middle Powers in Tandem, we envision our peoples as having a positive image of each other.

Determined to bring social and economic progress in our national societies and in the region, and guided by the values of good governance and accountability, we envision sharing Best Practices and “Leadership by Performance” in a wide-range of sectors from energy to banking to judicial reform to tax collection to efficient management of civil service to cutting-edge environment-friendly business practices to agriculture to medical and biotechnology.
And finally, affirming our aspirations for a peaceful East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific, we envision open lines of communication between our high-level national leaders and the preponderance of the use of diplomacy during crisis as well as technical cooperation in the areas of nontraditional security such as piracy, international money laundering, cybercrime, human and drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and disaster management.

Believing that through hard work, self-discipline, and creativity, we can achieve our collective vision and produce the best of ASEAN and the ROK in 2030 and beyond, we hereby support this Vision with an Action Plan.

**Action Plan**

To achieve our ASEAN-ROK 2030 Vision, we propose the following measures:

**A. Greater Openness and High-Level Cooperation in the Areas of Trade, Investments, and Financial Management**

- Adopt the “single window” policy for trade and FDI in each ASEAN country to cut red tape and facilitate trade and investments quickly. The single window policy aims to fast track and synchronize processing and conclusion of application for export and import permits using a “single window” instead of documents going from one department to another. This aims to boost investments and increase economic competitiveness of ASEAN countries.
- The “single window” policy will be supported by establishment of a supervising committee composed of trade and investment experts from ASEAN countries and the ROK to help ASEAN member countries plan for the necessary infrastructure (i.e., IT, roads, bridges, energy supplies, etc.) and standardize trade and investment procedures between ASEAN and the ROK.
- Devise a common ASEAN currency or common means of financial transaction to reduce the cost of currency conversion and fluctuation.
- Organize an annual ASEAN-ROK Entrepreneurs Summit, which will involve trade and product exhibitions and business matching. Hosting of this event (host country) will be done in alphabetical order or other scheme agreed upon.
- Organize a biennial Women Business Leaders’ Meeting (same format as Entrepreneurs Summit – but exclusive to women business leaders).

**B. Sophisticated Knowledge Exchange Platform**

- Create ASEAN-ROK Design Councils that will oversee cooperation in producing world-class product innovations.
- Gather ASEAN-ROK top educators (basic and higher education) in a forum where they can develop advanced Math, Science, and English curricula for ASEAN and South Korean institutions of learning.
- Arrange regular regional forums of ASEAN-ROK scientists and climate change experts where they can share cutting edge science and technology for future sustainability and a green economy for ASEAN and the ROK.
- Provide governmental financial support to local inventors in ASEAN and the ROK.
• Institute “Adopt a School” program where Korean schools adopt elementary/high schools in ASEAN and provide funding for computers, Internet connection and e-library for use of students and faculty.

C. Tourism, Cultural Exchange and Image Promotion Partnership
• Enable visa-free travel for short visits between ASEAN countries and the ROK.
• Organize an Annual ASEAN-Korean Youth Camp with a focus on Leadership Training, Music, Food, and Culture. Hosting of this event (host country) will be done in alphabetical order or other scheme agreed upon.
• Establish a Safety and Emergency Helpline for ASEAN and Korean tourists, migrant workers, business people, and permanent residents in ASEAN countries and in the ROK. This hotline connects the concerned individuals or groups with police and law enforcement bureaus, rescue groups, and consular officers of Foreign Ministries. The helpline will also have in-house interpreters.

D. Sharing of Best Practices and “Leadership by Performance” in various sectors
• Create a knowledge center for Models of Governance, a platform for sharing Best Practices/”Leadership by Performance” case studies in ASEAN countries and the ROK in all sectors. The knowledge center will disseminate theories, practices, and good governance case studies from ASEAN countries and the ROK as well as provide good governance implementation training and seminars to policymakers, national and local government officials, legislators, corporate leaders, and their respective staff, and partner NGOs and academic institutions.
• Bring together ASEAN and Korean experts in the field of finance and banking who will study and develop a plan on how “best practices” of Islamic Finance and Banking system can be incorporated into finance and banking systems in ASEAN countries and South Korea.

E. Open Lines of Communication between National Leaders during Crises and Technical Cooperation in the Areas of Non-Traditional Security
• Institutionalize a high-level Crisis and Emergency Hotline between the national leaders of ASEAN and the ROK. This is to facilitate open lines of communication, consultation, and immediate appraisal of the situation to prevent miscommunication and escalation during crisis situations and to lay out the most amicable and appropriate response to the issue in question.

Stumbling Blocks

The following challenges, if left unaddressed, could impede the realization of our ASEAN-ROK 2030 Vision:
• Domestic political structures and state institutions of most ASEAN countries have no organizational capacities to carry out such an ambitious vision. It appears that the key to national strength is national wealth. But economic development requires political stability and rule of law.
• On the economic front, to realize an integrated economic community, it has to overcome numerous obstacles. The PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council) identified infrastructure, uncertain legal environment, and poor corporate governance as barriers to economic integration in ASEAN.\(^1\)

- Another impediment to realizing our 2030 Vision, which is closely related to obstacles to achieving an ASEAN economic community, is the development asymmetry between old (ASEAN-6) and new ASEAN members—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). This imbalance implies that some members have the institutional capacity and the material wherewithal to go ahead of others in trade liberalization and economic integration, while others will be more cautious due to their inability to fight off the immediate negative consequences of regional economic integration and globalization. This, according to Thang et al., encourages the development of blocs within ASEAN (such as the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship) and the signing of bilateral FTAs with major economies outside ASEAN, which in turn, creates a “centrifugal of the bloc itself.”\(^2\)

- It will be difficult for ASEAN to achieve middle power status and be treated as the ROK’s equal partner if the tendency to keep the status quo (i.e., preserving existing power relationships) prevails. If ROK is to present itself as a real partner of Southeast Asian countries, it has to treat ASEAN as an equal partner of the same value and status, not as a group of weak and poor countries asking for handouts. If ASEAN wants to be accorded with respect and treated as a power, it resolve not just the incoherence among national and regional agendas, but intramural disputes as well. It cannot be fragmented (politically) if ASEAN is to become a force to be reckoned with.

- Finally, prioritizing domestic problems over regional issues can stand in the way of our 2030 Vision for ASEAN and the ROK. Post-colonial states such as ASEAN countries have not yet completed the process of state consolidation and nation building. And thus, countries that are still politically vulnerable and economically fragile will put national agendas over regional initiatives when the two conflict. For the region to be strong and resilient, its constituent parts have to be nationally strong and when they are not (as in the current case), ASEAN has to bridge the disconnect between national and regional agendas to make the idea of one Southeast Asian political, security, economic and socio-cultural community meaningful. Only then can ASEAN deal with the ROK as middle powers, of equal strength, in tandem.

**Process**

In our group discussions, the following common concerns and issues emerged:

On the question “Does the region want a strong ROK presence?”, our group agreed on the value of having an active ROK presence in the region, but we disagreed on the degree

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\(^1\) Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, *The ASEAN community: unblocking the roadblocks* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 3.

of activity. This question raised more questions such as “What does a strong ROK presence entail? What does it mean? Are we talking about more ODA? Or security cooperation?” We also discussed how “active” ROK might want to be in 2030. One suggested that ROK might aim at a balancing role between China and Japan. Another argued that it would be best if Korea develops an equal partnership with ASEAN rather than present itself as an alternative to China or Japan.

The issue of whether ROK will benefit more if it deals with ASEAN as a group as opposed to bilateral relationships was also raised. This led to disagreements on whether ASEAN as a group carries diplomatic weight or whether ASEAN speaks with one united voice. On the economic side, we asked if ASEAN could reach its target of a single economic community by 2015 with all the stumbling blocks that need to be addressed.

We agreed that ROK has to address a “problem of perception,” or how Southeast Asian countries view the capacity of South Korea to deliver its New Asia Initiative. We agreed that ASEAN might not be a priority of ROK in this initiative. It could be that the real purpose of the new initiative is to get countries to side with South Korea as the two Koreas line up supporters. And we asked whether programs laid out in the new initiative would be sustained if situations change in the Korean Peninsula. There was concern that ROK’s strategic relations with the US might interfere with the control and direction of the New Asia Initiative campaign as other powers in the region might view it as a way to strengthen US influence in other countries through the ROK.
Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in 2030
By Brittany Billingsley, Eunil Cho, Hye Ryeon Jang, Kei Koga, Cornelis Oudernaarden, Ni Shan, Kevin Shepard, and Pan Xiaolin

Northeast Asia in 2030

What will Northeast Asia look like in 20 years? What constitutes Northeast Asia? Northeast Asian economic growth is unquestionable, and with this growth has come the emergence of political and military powers that challenge some current understandings of international order. Japan, China, and South Korea are at the forefront of Asia’s rise, but these and other Asian neighbors often exist within an uneasy balance of power. Diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia carefully juggle historical disputes, nationalist zealotry, and competition over resources and power with increasingly interdependent economies, shared security concerns and threats that do not recognize national borders, and an Asian identity that offers the international community an alternative to American or Euro-centric visions of democracy, capitalism, and international relations.

Northeast Asia’s growth has led to many discussions on regional architecture. Some argue for integration following an EU model, while others advocate expansion of the Six-Party Talks framework of regional powers now negotiating to denuclearize North Korea. Others support the ‘noodle-bowl’ of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral ad-hoc and institutionalized arrangements now linking neighbors, while others are still suspect about further integration, calling for relations based on non-intervention and voluntary participation.

In order to ensure that Northeast Asia remains stable as it grows, and to avoid the pitfalls of mistrust or even conflict, a group of Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders from the region gathered in Seoul to identify common interests, flesh out expectations, and discuss the development of stronger inter-regional relationships over the next two decades. This paper highlights the discoveries made through the group’s sharing of ideas, and offers a glimpse of where Northeast Asia is heading, and what path appears most appropriate.

Enhancing Cooperation

As the group began discussions, it quickly became clear that there were several commonly shared assumptions regarding Northeast Asian regional architecture in 2030. First, cooperation in Northeast Asia would likely be enhanced by the ROK-Japan-China trilateral relations. Second, multi-trilateral relations, including ROK-Japan-China, US-Japan-ROK, and US-Japan-China, would serve as a political check-and-balance function.

Enhanced Cooperation through Japan-China-ROK Relations

While the most prominent security issues in Northeast Asia include stability of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, Northeast Asian security architecture would not, at first, aim at resolving these issues due to political disagreements among Northeast Asian states. Rather than focusing on these security issues, cooperation among Northeast Asian
states would likely be enhanced through the existing intergovernmental framework, the ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Cooperation.

The ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Cooperation, arising from the “+3” dialogue from ASEAN+3, was institutionalized in 2008 and focused on building mutual trust in the political field through dialogues and exchanges; developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation; pursuing security cooperation through dialogues and consultations in regional and sub-regional organizations including ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC; and cooperation over global issues, including climate changes, financial risks, energy security, public health, natural disasters, terrorism, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and UN reform. Although the three states do not always hold compatible political positions on these issues, it is important to note that this is the first institutionalized regional political framework to promote cooperation in Northeast Asia.

The future of ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Cooperation remains to be seen; nonetheless, the framework can play a central role in the early phase of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Since the agendas of this framework are also politically less sensitive to states outside the framework, rather than remaining an exclusive trilateral arrangement, this framework can be utilized to expand cooperation to other states in Northeast Asia, especially the United States and Russia, and form the penta-lateral cooperation in the future. This potential framework is different from the idea of five-party talks emerging from the Six-Party Talks. Given the potential Japan-China rivalry, political coordination among the three primary states is vital to maintain this trilateral framework. The ROK may play a coordinating role; however, considering Japanese and Chinese rejection of South Korea’s proposed “balancer role” in Northeast Asia during the Roh Moo-hyun era, a coordinating role among the three needs to be flexible and considered on an issue-specific basis. For example, on the issue of technological cooperation, Japan can play a leading role, if necessary.

The institutionalization of trilateral relations between the ROK, Japan, and China will encourage coordination and cooperation within Northeast Asia. While the relationship between these countries will be primarily political and economic, it will allow for military discussions and cooperation. In addition, considering its economic liberalization, China would likely be more open and have a stronger civil society by 2030, which will lead it to be more socially and economically inter-connected with South Korea and Japan. At the same time, addressing common concerns in a trilateral sense raises the dialogue beyond traditional issues and allows for discussion of broader issues that affect not just these three, but the entire region and beyond.

A Political and Economic Relationship

The relationship between the ROK, Japan, and China is based on increasing economic interdependence and this trend is not expected to change in the near future. As was recently noted by former Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan at the fifth Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum, the three countries are “mutually complementary in economy and closely linked in trade.” As China’s economy continues to grow, Japan and the ROK will do more business with it because “the considerable disparity in their resources, technological levels and labor
costs highlights enterprises’ comparative advantages and is conducive to transnational investments and trade. Their significant economic relationship would also facilitate increased political cooperation between these three countries. Not only are they more likely to share certain global interests, they will also deal with each other more closely politically to maximize potential economic gains. At the political level, we are likely to see agreements on labor immigration, student exchanges, mutual recognition of standards, and other integration of economies. This political cooperation for economic gain may spill over into other areas where there are shared concerns and mutual interest.

Despite increased political and economic cooperation, military cooperation between the ROK, Japan, and China is unlikely to be institutionalized for two primary reasons. First, these players will continue to have traditional security concerns that conflict with those of their neighbors, and second, history will make it hard for the ROK and China to accept Japan as a military partner. Nevertheless, the economic and political relationship among these three countries allows for ad-hoc cooperation on a case-by-case basis. For example, nontraditional security issues that affect all three countries, such as piracy, could be dealt with jointly.

A More Open China with a Stronger Civil Society

China’s economic growth has been remarkable over the past few decades and can be attributed to its move away from a planned economy to a market economy. This economic shift has not, however, translated into major changes at the political level. Nevertheless, China is facing new challenges from business communities as well as an emerging civil society. A case in point is Google’s challenge to Beijing to stop government censorship of the internet. Although Google did not achieve its aims, the case is a precursor for the future. Another example is the growing labor discontent in China. Low wages and poor working conditions are causing protests, and this has led several foreign investors to re-evaluate business practices in China.

From an economic perspective, the situation is improving for more people in China. However, there are cracks in society that will eventually lead to a more responsive and power-diffused government; this will bring about a more open China. This more open society will, in turn, be more cooperative vis-à-vis Japan and the ROK, as it will have more in common with these countries. A more transparent China will be easier to deal with and is likely to become a more responsible global player.

Overcoming Traditional Issues

There is still historical baggage in the relationship between China, the ROK, and Japan. The legacy of Japan’s WWII actions and different interpretations of history are a stumbling block in enhancing relations between the three. Emotions in all countries run high when it comes to these issues, and politicians use them to their advantage. Politicians play the nationalism card to gain domestic support. By 2030, however, many of these tensions will be eased. Although traditional issues will still exist, they will no longer pose a major

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obstacle to the trilateral framework as increased interdependence will likely recede in political importance. The trilateral relationship will move beyond these issues due to institutionalization of dialogue and continued interaction, despite occasional flairs of nationalism.

**Potential Multi-Trilateral Frameworks**

In addition to the ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Cooperation, there is the potential for institutionalizing other regional trilateral cooperative arrangements, including the US-Japan-ROK and the US-Japan-China frameworks. These two potential trilateral frameworks are likely to be formulated in the future – possibly the near future – since they not only enhance cooperation among member states but also serve a check-and-balance function, so that no regional power fears political marginalization by the process of Northeast Asian cooperation.

**US-Japan-ROK:** US-Japan-ROK diplomatic and military cooperative frameworks exist informally. However, since the eclipse of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in 2003, no new institutionalized framework has been formed. Re-launching this trilateral framework would have three primary benefits: first, it would signal to domestic and international audiences that relations between Japan and the ROK have improved. Second, it would be seen as an international public good by including agendas on trilateral policy coordination on regional and global issues. Third, it would better promote an image of trilateral policy coordination toward North Korea. At the same time, it would be necessary for member states to assure China that this framework is not geared toward countering Beijing’s influence.

**US-Japan-China:** This framework aims to facilitate better communication and understanding of each government’s stance on relevant regional and global issues. Given persisting policy divergences between the United States and China, it would serve more of a coordinating role among the three states than as a forum for setting new agendas or as a driving force for regional cooperation. The establishment of this trilateral framework is expected to raise South Korean concerns about political marginalization but they can be mitigated, given the ROK’s participation in the other two trilateral frameworks and the limited role of the US-Japan-China framework.

**The Korea Question**

The future shape of Northeast Asia cannot be drawn without answering the question of Korean unification. While unification is touted as a core interest of both the North and the South, there have been no significant moves toward reunification, and it appears that public opinion, at least in the South, is moving away from support for what will be a costly endeavor. By 2030, if North Korea is more stable and more responsible, Seoul and Pyongyang are expected to maintain divided but stable relations. Within the next two decades the two Koreas may be able to normalize relations as two separate states.
Normalized Relations between the ROK and DPRK

Barring a political crisis in Pyongyang, it is very possible that the ROK and DPRK normalize bilateral relations and maintain divided but stable relations in the next two decades. An increasing number of South Korean citizens do not want quick unification with the North for two primary reasons. First, they do not feel a strong sense of national identity. Sixty years have passed since the division of the peninsula. The number of South Koreans who remember an undivided Korean Peninsula is small and shrinking. Thus, for younger generations, it is more difficult to recognize the necessity of unification. Second, South Korean citizens are averse to shouldering the economic burden of unification. After witnessing unified Germany’s economic difficulties, South Korean citizens do not want to sacrifice their economy to sustain the DPRK. The current economic gap between South and North Korea is much larger than that of West and East Germany at the time of their unification. Therefore, in the near future, the ROK will pursue a ‘stable if divided peninsula’ policy.

The Chinese government also does not believe a reunified Korea would be beneficial to PRC national interests. The DPRK is an important buffer zone, and is used by China to balance against US and Japanese influence. China does not want to lose its political and diplomatic leverage – the DPRK – within Northeast Asia. In addition, if the North collapses, China would have to deal directly with ROK-based US military troops. China wants to avoid such an uncomfortable situation. Hence, China will continue to desire separate Koreas.

As for the United States and Japan, the ideal environment on the Korean Peninsula depends on whether North Korea becomes more stable and responsible. If the DPRK maintains stability and shows more responsible behavior, and does not suffer an unforeseen crisis, states – including the United States and Japan – would not see the need to actively pursue reunification on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, by moving toward normalization, the two Koreas can improve their bilateral relations and allow more interaction between citizens and businesses, which would result in the further economic and social integration of the two Koreas.

On the other hand, we need to consider the political sensitivities of normalization issues in the ROK. The Lee Myung-bak administration attempted to abolish the Ministry of Unification as the first step in pursuing normalization with the DPRK. However, there was an outcry that blocked Lee’s policy. In addition, normalization would mean amending the South’s constitution, which includes the clause ‘The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.’ Amending it to recognize North Korean sovereignty would trigger political controversy. Normalizing relations with the DPRK will need to tiptoe around these political sensitivities.

Regional Free Trade Agreements

No trilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is anticipated by 2030 between South Korea, Japan, and China. Rather, only bilateral FTAs will be pursued, the first of which is an FTA between the United States and South Korea. President Obama has shown interest in
presenting the KORUS agreement to Congress in the fall of 2010. The second FTA, expected with the not-too-distant future, is between China and South Korea.

**US-ROK FTA**

The United States and South Korea will soon ratify the KORUS FTA. According to the agreement reached in 2007, they will abolish 95 percent of tariffs on products within three years of ratification. Through this FTA, both governments also seek to strengthen the overall US-ROK alliance. Watching Northeast Asian countries’ economic integration, the United States is concerned it could be excluded from Northeast Asian markets. Surrounded by military powers, South Korea sees its security relations with the United States as critical to the fulfilling of its role as a middle-power in the region. Therefore, the FTA would be beneficial for both Washington and Seoul.

**Sino-ROK FTA**

China and South Korea will likely sign an FTA by 2030. There are currently no official negotiations between the two, but both countries have expressed interest in negotiating a bilateral FTA, with talks expected in late 2010 or early 2011. Economically, the ROK expects to gain by promoting exports of industrial products to China, and China wants to increase exports of its agricultural products to the ROK. By recognizing the mutual benefits of combining each economy’s strong points, they will be able to reach a consensus. Both states also want to strengthen their bilateral political relations through an FTA. Unlike South Korea and the United States, China and the ROK are not allies. An FTA could serve as one of the most important political means of promoting bilateral relations. Both Seoul and Beijing understand the substantial necessity of a Sino-ROK FTA and will actively pursue it.

**Potential for a ROK-Japan-China FTA**

“Comprehensive and in-depth studies” on trilateral free trade have been ongoing in all three countries since 2002. Yet, South Korea, Japan and China have been unable to reach consensus on a trilateral FTA. Before establishing a trilateral FTA, bilateral FTAs between the three will be necessary. However, this is unlikely to occur in the near future (with the exception of a Sino-ROK FTA), making substantial discussion on a trilateral FTA premature. All three countries face critical issues which are hard to resolve with a trilateral FTA. Neither the ROK nor Japan wants to fully open its agricultural market. China is concerned with the competitiveness of its high-tech products. As such, a trilateral FTA would cause more problems than benefits at the current time and would therefore be difficult to bring into fruition by 2030.

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Multilateral Security in Northeast Asia

Unlike other regions, there is no institutionalized security mechanism among Northeast Asian countries. Historically, states have relied on themselves and their bilateral alliances to protect their sovereign rights and national security. After the Cold War, states began to explore institutionalized bilateral and multilateral cooperation on a wider range of issues, including economic and financial, sanitation and health, transnational crime prevention, environment and resource preservation, and more. On security issues, however, there has been only ad-hoc coordination, not an institutionalized security mechanism. Even as regional interdependence deepens, states are still very sensitive on some issues, especially those related to security and political decisions.

Political Differences

One obstacle to security cooperation in the region is different political systems. Admittedly, this does not prevent short-term or economic cooperation. However, when it comes to security cooperation, democratic states, Japan and South Korea, see China’s political system as lacking military transparency as well as accountability. In this sense, it is difficult for them to enhance security cooperation. On the other hand, the term, “democracy” is perceived differently among states. Not only are there wide divergence between the degree to which states pursue or reject democracy, there are also different views of the definition of democracy. These differences inhibit trust among them and preclude creation of an institutionalized security mechanism in Northeast Asia.

The Importance of History

Historical issues between China, Japan, and South Korea are complicated. Each state has had conflicts with the other two on historical facts and interpretations, as well as invasions, occupations, and territorial border disputes. These disputes also color the impressions decision makers have of their neighbors, which hinders building mutual trust and impacts strategy and policy. Additionally, historical issues are important to governments and citizens. Hostile perceptions complicate private and public sector cooperation. Different interpretations of history also breed distrust and instigate narrowly defined nationalism that revitalize the image of the “enemy,” further hindering cooperation on security issues.

A Joint Vision for the ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Relationship in 2030

With these dynamics in mind, South Korea, Japan, and China should coordinate in the following areas to promote a stronger trilateral relationship in 2030. Recognizing that greater trilateral cooperation will lead to broader regional cooperation, the three countries should:

- Share best practices on good governance through institutionalization of regular dialogue on good governance. The European Union, which has no direct regulatory power over these issues, has been engaging in similar dialogue. This kind of engagement would pave the way for improvement of all three countries’ governance standards.
• Pursue recognition of historical issues, and seek to recognize all sides’ perspectives. This will be a long and arduous process, and should be pursued via track-1 dialogues and academic exchanges. The three countries should continue efforts at jointly writing history books, creating compilations of what each side has declared as fact in order to find gaps in understanding and accounts. By agreeing to disagree and diminishing emphasis on absolute consensus-building, all sides can be presented and recognized on equal footing. The three sides should also use academic exchanges to encourage historical and cultural preservation through a regional joint study of culture to find and promote common threads, such as traditional philosophy and writing. Cultural preservation introduces an element of shared identity as well as mutual interest.

• Work to maintain a stable if divided Korean Peninsula. While we recognize that reunification is a possibility, and no side should actively discourage unification, the three countries should acknowledge that it might not be the best outcome, in relation to 1) regional stability, 2) Korea’s economy, and 3) Korea’s social divisions, as it is possible the North’s citizenry could be discriminated against as second-class citizens in the South. Instead, the ROK, Japan, and China should encourage continued economic cooperation between North Korea and South Korea; pursue trilateral collaboration to integrate the DPRK into a healthy political framework through economic and political interdependence; and collaboration via 5-Party multilateral discussions on how to denuclearize North Korea.

• Coordinate to maintain political and military stability within Northeast Asia. Peace and stability in the region is an important goal of the ROK, Japan, and China, as it promotes positive development and relations. Through on-going track-1 and track-2 dialogues, and ad-hoc military coordination, the three countries can work together to prevent misunderstandings and miscommunication. Trilateral military discussions have begun as of 2010 with plans to continue – coordination which the US supports – and we believe functional military cooperation should continue to be expanded toward this end.

• Pursue greater economic integration and cooperation. Working-level meetings will have positive spill-over effects, and at the very least will function as confidence-building measures. Working groups should be formed to discuss common technical standards and diploma recognition. The three countries should work together to develop regional medical licensing boards, establish pharmaceutical and prescription standards, and regional healthcare plans. On labor flows and international migration, regional work and student visas between the ROK, Japan, and China should be developed. While the number of people immigrating matters, and thus would prevent completely open borders between the three countries, regional visas would promote greater exchange between academic and working classes. By increasing opportunities for students in South Korea, Japan, and China to study in one of the other three countries in an economically feasible way, exchange will promote broader engagement. In the case of migrant workers, however, it is not the visa alone, but also their social welfare that needs to be considered. Healthcare and working conditions are often problematic within each country. Therefore, the ROK, Japan, and China should cooperate to protect migrant workers. In another area, the three countries should continue working to advance intellectual property rights (IPR).
IPR standards ensure a companies’ ability to compete in international markets. By establishing working-level discussions and negotiations, and interaction between companies, standards for IPR protection can be developed and adopted.

- Collaborate on nontraditional security issues. By 2030, we assume that there will be a framework for working-level government initiatives regarding these issues, which will require consistent and regular security and safety personnel coordination. In the political sense, these issues would include climate change, environment, human rights, and food security. The three governments should collaborate with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on these “intermestic” (international and domestic) issues to find best practices for tackling them. In the functional sense, nontraditional security issues include: pursuit of energy security, cyber security, addressing transnational crime, promoting anti-terrorism initiatives, and encourage disaster relief collaboration.7

From 2010 to 2030: Steps needed to reach the Joint Vision Statement

Challenges to trilateral cooperation exist in Northeast Asia. To tackle regional and transnational challenges, South Korea, Japan, and China should create a more effective and efficient trilateral mechanism with a new division of labor and a new equality of roles and responsibilities. A good place to start would be to develop a common approach with shared power and responsibilities to ensure lasting cooperation on a concrete agenda for Northeast Asia.

- All three countries should agree to set up an annual meeting of track-1 diplomacy. This dialogue allows for confidence building and information sharing in the political and military realms.

- All three countries should build a government-funded Joint ROK-Japan-China historical research committee. The committee would conduct public education programs that could lessen gaps in historical understanding and publish monthly reports analyzing South Korean, Japanese, and Chinese history textbooks to share historical understanding.

- All three states should institutionalize the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), which was created by the Feb. 13, 2007 Joint Statement. This mechanism helps integrate North Korea into the broader regional economy and consolidates an engagement policy that manages North Korean issues in sustainable ways.

- All three countries should agree to create a new security mechanism for Northeast Asia that includes the participation of the United States and Russia. They would deal with a host of economic, environmental, transnational, diplomatic as well as security questions on which they have shared tangible and vital interests. It can and must meet on a regular basis, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Durable and effective mechanisms are more likely to emerge from a clear, agreed purpose.

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7 These issues are considered “functional” because they are not as politically sensitive domestically.
All three countries should initiate a Northeast Asian Free Trade Area (NEAFTA). Northeast Asia has experienced a profound geo-economic shift with deepening intraregional economic interdependence. As such, growing economic interdependence may guarantee peace and stability in the region. NEAFTA may renew the US' interest in bilateral trade agreements and rearrange the institutional landscape in Northeast Asia.

**From 2010 to 2030: Obstacles to Achieving this Vision**

South Korea, Japan, and China have expressed interest in furthering regional cooperation. However, there are still issues among the three that will be obstacles to development of trilateral relations. China’s rise has triggered concerns in both Japan and South Korea. Japan’s attempt to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council led South Korea to organize a “Coffee Club” with other developing countries to object to Tokyo’s bid. While the success of the Shenzhou 7 manned spaceship and hosting of the Olympic Games brought much pride to the Chinese people, the same accomplishments caused anxiety for many in Japan. Even though growing cooperation between South Korea and China has boosted the image and impact of Korean culture in China, cultural and political differences have also yielded to conflicts in the debate over cultural origins, giving rise to new frictions.

There have been many twists and turns in the development of relations between China, Japan, and South Korea. Among them, historical issues and territorial disputes have been most sensitive. These issues influence feelings in all three countries, exacerbating the lack of strategic trust. The integration of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese publics has lagged behind government policies of cooperation.

In addition, external factors impact trilateral cooperation. North Korea stands out as a prominent factor. The recent Cheonan incident sparked conflict between China and ROK due to China’s over-cautious attitude and refusal to condemn Pyongyang. China’s historical relations with North Korea trigger anger from South Korea. Even concerning the North’s nuclear issue, China was pressured by the ROK and Japan to sanction the DPRK.

The US is another factor in trilateral relations among China, Japan, and the ROK. In Northeast Asia, the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances and informal US-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation are the base of Washington’s strategic interests, while the United States at the same time is pursuing deeper cooperation with China. The US encourages greater trilateral cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea; it also maintains bilateral security alliances with Japan and the ROK. To China, these look threatening, and Beijing will need reassurances.

The bilateral and trilateral relationships among China, Japan, and South Korea are complicated. Many new challenges will rise as they seek to further integration. However, their relationship is the core of regional stability and the future of Asia. Mutual respect, shared confidence, and institutionalized communication between Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo are the keys to reaching the goal of a secure and prosperous Northeast Asia.

**The Process: Lessons Learned in the Young Leader Discussions**
The Northeast Asia Focus Group

During both group and plenary discussions, it was evident that the majority of participants had relatively similar goals for Northeast Asia, and that many shared common strategies and milestones for realizing these goals. In group discussion on the vision of Northeast Asia in 2030, there was agreement that South Korea, China, and Japan should continue to work together to form more institutionalized cooperative opportunities, and that a multilateral framework in the region would increase security and stability as a common good.

Group discussions also reflected the reality of coordinating efforts; the devil will be in the details. Fundamentally, our group agreed that a regional community would be beneficial. However, there was no clear definition of “regional community,” no agreement on whether that was “community” with a lowercase or uppercase “C,” and no resolution of the question of which countries would participate in such a community. Before we would be able to move forward on the implementation of a joint statement or deepening multilateral cooperation, it would be vital to determine if we envisioned a geopolitical community, which would entail an agreement to adhere to a common set of practices based on shared values and goal, or whether the community we envision would require more enhanced cooperation in the pursuit of economic or security gains. The definition of “community” would also greatly impact the identification of concerned parties. While the group agreed that Japan, South Korea, and China would be key players in any multilateral regional environment, several important questions remained unanswered: Is the United States a Northeast Asian country? Could any regional architecture exist that excluded the United States? What role would Russia play, and how would Russian participation be viewed by other regional powers? How would China’s adherence to a policy of noninterference impact its role, and if a regional security group played down to the lowest common denominator, would China’s participation render any regional forum “toothless?”

These questions led the group’s vision of Northeast Asia in 2030 to include multiple overlapping and sometimes balancing bi- and trilateral relationships. There was a consensus that increased cooperation and the establishment of a new regional blueprint for security and stability was beneficial, but not at the expense of existing alliances. It will be important as we move toward a more collaborative region to avoid simply adding more acronyms to the list of non-binding gatherings, yet the need for an inclusive and non-threatening forum makes this a difficult task.

It was also apparent during the group discussion that if the Young Leaders in the room were representative of future decision-makers, different interpretations of history, threats, and roles will continue in Northeast Asia, but these will be less emotionally charged, and will be less of an obstacle to cooperation. There is a growing recognition of the benefits to setting these differences aside and enhancing cooperation among neighbors. Rather than allowing these differences of opinion to undermine cooperation by fueling distrust and sanctimonious nationalism, Young Leaders recognized that their counterparts from other countries had opposing views, and sought to first identify issues and opportunities that would avail themselves to functional cooperation as a means to slowly build relations and trust.
It appeared, overall, that the group was more open than past generations to cooperation and more supportive of some variation on a regional community. However, when the Young Leaders discussed possible issues and opportunities for cooperation, few, if any, new ideas emerged. Rather, it appears that as Northeast Asia moves toward more interactive and cooperative relations in 2030, the newfound appetite for regional multilateralism will be filled by seeking new approaches to existing problems, and deepening cooperation by avoiding contentious issues, rather than by resolving them.

Young Leader Plenary Discussion

After drafting a joint vision statement for deepening regional cooperation by 2030, this group of Young Leaders gathered with other teams that focused on other areas and issues in which South Korea has interests. In sharing visions of South Korea’s future role, several issues arose that should shape discussions on regional issues, regional architecture, and where South Korea will fit into multilateral cooperative efforts.

Overall, groups appeared to view an increased role for and further integration with South Korea positively. However, ambitions expressed by some South Koreans for “sharing experiences of economic development and democracy” were not shared by regional neighbors. Groups focused on Southeast Asia did appreciate economic opportunities in cooperation with the ROK and encouraged increased exchanges and cooperation with Seoul, while this group noted rejection of former President Roh Moo-hyun’s vision of South Korea as a “balancer” and a “hub.” It is a positive development that President Lee Myung-bak emphasizes pragmatism and a middle-power role for South Korea. If Seoul is to deepen ties within the region, it should continue to seek roles as a facilitator of cooperation while recognizing the limits of its ability to influence its neighbors. Also discussed in the plenary discussion was South Korea’s “national brand.” South Korean companies have made significant progress over the last decade in improving the quality of their products and the reputation of their brands. Now, the South Korean government is working to boost recognition among international consumers of these brands as South Korean products. This is a promising indication that Seoul recognizes the need to improve its reputation within countries with which it wishes to deepen relations.

There was no agreement – even among South Koreans – on the role of the United States in a more integrated Asian community. In particular, the presence of US troops was problematic to some, while others felt the US-ROK military alliance was the foundation of South Korea’s expanding role in the region. The United States is not expected to walk away from its alliance relationships in Asia. Under the current administration the US has repeatedly emphasized its recognition of the importance of Asia, signaling that it seeks to further engage. At the same time, Washington’s support for the East Asia Summit, trilateral ROK-Japan-China dialogue, and other regional forums in which it is not a member indicates its confidence that a US role in the region is secure, particularly due to its bilateral alliances in Northeast and Southeast Asia. What role Asian countries envision for Washington, what role Washington expects to play, and what political, economic, and security realities will frame any debate on this subject provide much fodder for discussion.
There was significant divergence in expectations of the political reality on the Korean Peninsula in 2030. Multiple surveys of South Korean public opinion have revealed generational differences in views on North Korea and unification. However, the differences emerging during this plenary session were not about what participants wanted; there were fundamental divergences in the expectations of Young Leaders regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula. North and South Korea will be united in 2030, and the impact this will have on Seoul’s ability to project its influence throughout the region should not dominate discussion of regional political transformation. It will, however, be a determinant of South Korea’s role in Asia and the world.
Evaluation of the Joint Vision for the US-ROK Alliance
By Lisa Collins, Euijin Jung, and Ju-Eun Shin

Almost every state has noticed the congenial relationship between the US and South Korea during the Lee and Obama administrations. The most recent event that emphasizes their ties is the South Korean and US militaries’ four day “Invincible Spirit” naval exercise off the east sea of South Korea on July 25, 2010. Wall Street Journal described this exercise as the apogee of a series of statements and diplomatic measures coordinated by the South Korea and the US to express their anger over the Cheonan sinking. Even if this naval exercise has been part of an annual plan, involvement of the US and South Korea forces was more enthusiastic this year than before. It is obvious that the Cheonan incident pushed the US and South Korea to conduct a higher scale military exercise and strengthened the alliance of the US and South Korea. However, the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, issued June 16, 2009, provides the foundation for this alliance its ability to hold cooperative military exercises.

During the second Young Leaders Conference at Yonsei University, held May 29 - June 2, 2010, the ROK-US group discussed Joint Vision for the Alliance of the US and ROK. As this type of joint statement becomes the backbone of diplomatic and military cooperation for the US and ROK, we must better understand its importance. Based on this consideration, this policy brief consists of four parts. Part 1 explores the strengths and weaknesses of the Joint Vision. The strength of the statement is that it provides national and regional security in the Korean Peninsula while the weakness of the statement is the disagreement over the future alliance system and implicit language regarding burden sharing within the alliance system. Part 2 examines positive and negative views of neighboring states such as China, Japan, North Korea and ASEAN. As tension on the Korean Peninsula is escalating, evaluations of the Joint Vision of Alliance is more important because of its influence on regional and national security.

Part 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of the Joint Vision for the Alliance

Strengths

Northeast Asia is a rapidly changing security environment with convergence and divergence of existing and emerging issues and phenomena – the North Korea nuclear weapons problem, the division of Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, a rising China, and etc. Under the circumstance, the current Lee Myung-bak administration, based on the National Security Strategy – ‘Global Korea,’ is pursuing a “ROK-US Strategic Alliance for the 21st Century” that embraces comprehensive and cooperative alliance with the US based on common values and trust that go beyond security cooperation. Agreement on the Joint Vision Statement makes a turning point where the two allies could work toward “real peace”

8“US, South Korea Start Military Drill,” July 26, 2009
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870399510457538521627216484.html?KEYWORDS=South+Korea+exercise
–peace by action. Focusing on “real peace” means eliminating the threat of war and reducing conventional weapons through action rather than just declaring that there is peace.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore, it appears that the mere act of having an agreement itself strengthens US-ROK relations and helps the two nations move forward toward peace in a dynamic environment. The joint vision statement enhances relations between the two nations and strengthens their ties through the process of setting common goals, and seeking and solving common threats and problems. The redefinition of the alliance between the United States and Republic of Korea will support and strengthen their relationship by affirming their roles as an ally or partner. In other words, the statement could strengthen alliance relationship by clarifying each other’s role in different issues.

For both the United States and the ROK, a regular security concern is North Korea since genuine peace in the region cannot be achieved before the two Koreas are reunified. The Joint Vision Statement allows both nations to discuss a more comprehensive approach to dealing with North Korea’s problems such as political contingencies and humanitarian situations, beyond a technical perspective. Considering the possible emergence of power struggles in the region, a strengthened alliance can serve as an effective countermeasure against regional powers – Japan and China. Cooperation between the US and the ROK can help promote peace in the region preventing the US’ temptation to contain China. These actions will help achieve the alliance’s goal of maintaining peaceful coexistence in the region. While maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region, the two nations could plan cooperation on matters and issues beyond regional borders, helping this transform into a comprehensive alliance.

Moreover, it not only focuses efforts on urgent and immediate goals such as working to halt North Korean nuclear proliferation activities and mid-term goals to maintain peaceful coexistence, but also long-term goals such as peaceful reunification. Then, these actions will prepare the reunification and post-reunification process, which need to be addressed today and solved in the near future. The US-ROK alliance is crucial to preventing foreign interference in the reunification process and even after the reunification of the two Koreas. The Joint Vision Statement would be a stepping stone for the two parties to work on those areas and would strengthen ROK-US relations as a whole.

**Weaknesses**

Given the complexity of US-ROK alliance relations, it is no small feat that the two countries have agreed on a set of issues and principles to guide development of the alliance. However, no alliance vision statement is without weaknesses and the Joint Statement has a few that will be analyzed now.

The Joint Statement’s greatest strength may also be its largest weakness: the fact that it is a compromise between the US and ROK’s respective national interests. This compromise, while necessary for mutual cooperation on priority issues, also means that in

some cases one party may have to make sacrifices or trade-offs that are not in its national interest. This is evident from the language in at least two sections. In the first section, the US promises to reinforce the “continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the US nuclear umbrella.” The explicit reference, in conjunction with the Mutual Defense Treaty clause, could be interpreted to mean that in the event of a conflict between South and North Korea, even a small one, the US would be responsible for defending Korea even if it could lead to war. Given that US resources are still tied up in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would be against the US national interest to have another conflict start in Northeast Asia. As has been suggested by experts, this reference to extended deterrence could signal a “lack of trust” in the relationship, and will require patience and persistence to follow through on specific discussions about “strategy, structure, operational doctrine, and even nuclear targeting” on this matter.

In another section of the statement the parties agree to “enhance coordination on peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and development assistance, as is being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.” This section represents a significant compromise by Korea to support US military and peacekeeping operations around the world. While there is no explicit language about sending Korean military forces to fight in conflict zones, this language might be used to pressure Korea into sending combat forces to support the US military. In South Korea, there is strong domestic political opposition to sending troops to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and would likely be perceived as not being in the national interests of Korea.

This reflects the reality that while the joint statement is fundamentally based on the concept of a “comprehensive strategic alliance,” the implementation of specific alliance initiatives may be difficult to achieve since the vision is still highly contested in domestic politics of both countries.

Political parties and experts in both countries still have significant disagreements over how the alliance should develop and what issues should be tackled bilaterally. Reflecting the domestic political divisions between the left and the right in both countries, some continue to question the very rationale of the alliance. An expert from the CATO Institute even calls for the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty and suggested that the US military alliance commitment to the ROK should not be maintained because it is “outdated, unnecessary, and dangerous.” This may be an extreme viewpoint, but liberal commentators in South Korea also condemn the emphasis on the Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and the explicit mention of the US nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence in the vision statement because of the

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15 See Bandow p. 7.
perceived negative impact on North-South Korean relations. These critics claim that the vision statement contradicts North-South Agreements and the promise to protect Korea with a nuclear umbrella is out of line with the Obama administration’s “world without nuclear weapons” initiatives. Any contractions in the vision statement may be attributed in part to the fact that the vision is trying to address two underlying fears in an alliance relationship: “[o]n the one hand, a country fears that it might be abandoned by its allies precisely when its security is threatened, because its allies may judge it too costly to save it from the threat. On the other hand, a country worries that it might get pulled by its alliance commitment into a conflict in which its allies are embroiled, even if it does not want to get involved.”17 South Korea’s insistence on including the “extended deterrence” language and, at the same time, its reluctance to adopt stronger language on its contribution to peace-keeping and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of these fears at work.

Another issue which is not addressed explicitly in the vision statement but is an implicit part of the underlying framework in the document is an increase in military spending or financial burden-sharing. The lack of explicit language about burden-sharing could also be considered a weakness in the vision statement that should be addressed more explicitly in the future. According to a recent paper on US-ROK military spending, the typical spending logic and increase in alliance costs does not apply in the US-ROK case. Increases or decreases in Korea’s military spending are not inversely proportionate to US spending and neither are they directly dependent on the perceived North Korean threats; rather they are a combination of external threats, internal spending drivers, and costs of allied military cooperation. In the midst of the global financial recession, and with the recent agreement to postpone OPCON transfer to December 2015 instead of April 2012 and the associated costs, there may be a need to make specific burden-sharing plans a part of the new strategic alliance plan for 2015.18

Finally, both a strength and a weakness of the joint vision is the fact that it does not expressly mention cooperation and coordination between the US and ROK on relations with China and Japan. While the political sensitivity of the issues may have made it impossible to come to any agreement or shared vision on these policies, the omission may create doubt about the depth of commitment and coordination on certain alliance issues. The sections in the vision statement on the KORUS FTA and regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region would also benefit from specific language that lays out how the two allies will cooperate to achieve positive results in these areas.

In sum, the Joint Vision has many strengths that will help pave the way for positive development if the US-ROK alliance relationship. While some points could be addressed more fully, the primary weakness of the vision statement appears to be an inherent part of the compromise process in creating a vision for a complex relationship. Future vision statements

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might be improved by including not only visionary ideas but also more specific measures for implementation of the vision.

**Part 2: Neighbors’ views of the Joint Statement**

It is also important for the US and South Korea to understand how other states or organizations of states in the region may view their vision. Below, we investigate views of the Joint Statement from four perspectives: China, North Korea, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

**China**

While many in the US and South Korea assume that Beijing would not support the strengthening of their alliance, China may take many positives away from the statement. (Admittedly, it will also see many of the statements in the document as contrary to Chinese interests.) First is the Joint Vision Statement’s emphasis on regional peace and stability, which is considered a “core interest” of China. By declaring this as one of the preeminent goals of the alliance, the two nations are aligning themselves with Beijing, though the means to this ends may be different. Second, Beijing may view positively the fact that the vision statement de-emphasizes the importance of the military dimension of the relationship, which is the part of the alliance China finds most detrimental to its interests. Third, the clear US reaffirmation of its nuclear umbrella over the ROK may be viewed positively by China, which has long-feared the destabilizing effects of a regional nuclear arms race. By reaffirming nuclear deterrence via the US, South Korea is in many ways saying that it continues to trust its ally and does not feel the need to develop its own deterrent capabilities. Fourth, the Joint Statement notes the importance of regional institutions, bodies that increasingly provide China with a loud voice and active role in the region. Finally, and perhaps most important for Beijing, which is still largely governing a developing nation lacking resources to reach far beyond its borders, the Vision Statement sees a larger role for South Korea in the provision of public goods, such as piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, energy security, and epidemic disease. China would largely benefit from increased security over public goods while having to spend little (or even less, given a larger ROK role) to ensure this.

On the other hand, many aspects of the Joint Vision Statement may concern China. First, it is inherently a declaration of the US commitment – military and otherwise – to Northeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region. While this is not a change of the status quo, many states in the region had complained over the last decade that the US was distracted by the war on terrorism or domestic issues. China, though, has hoped for a distracted US, believing that it could step in to fill the vacuum in leadership. Although the words of the statement reasserting the US’ commitment to the region may be only that – words – they are welcomed by its allies and partners in the region. Second, Beijing may be disturbed by the stress on “values” throughout the statement, such as democracy and human rights. While the emphasis is not necessarily directed toward China, leaders in Zhongnanhai almost reflexively react negatively when they hear Americans discuss democracy and human rights. Third, by calling for a greater role for South Korea in global and regional affairs, Beijing, always a
believer in a zero-sum world, may view another US “crony” playing a greater role as a loss for China.

However, the largest concern for China in the Joint Vision Statement is likely its language about North Korea. Although South Korea has enshrined ROK-led unification of the Korean Peninsula in its Constitution, the Joint Statement for the first time makes it a priority of the alliance. By specifying that unification would occur under democratic and free-market principles, the US and South Korea are rejecting Chinese influence in the process – something the Chinese have certainly never rejected. In addition, the document inherently supports the end of the status quo and the demise of the North Korean state as it currently exists, both of which are likely detrimental to Chinese interests. Finally, with their stress on denuclearization and elimination of North Korean ballistic missiles, the allies are not necessarily aligning themselves with Chinese interests that often place North Korean stability ahead of denuclearization.

North Korea

There is almost nothing that North Korea would welcome in the Joint Statement and, in fact, would see many of its declarations as confirmation of the existential security threat posed by the alliance. While the allies condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs is commonplace these days, the fact that the document affirms the allies’ desire to eliminate North Korea as it currently exists takes the vision further than past alliance accords. By saying that the peninsula should be reunified under a democratic and free-market system implies that the alliance stands for toppling the current regime, even though it does not say that either the US or the ROK will actively pursue regime change. Further, the DPRK likely sees the declaration of the US nuclear umbrella as a continuation of the very threat that led it to develop its nuclear program. In short, from a North Korean perspective, the document only confirms – if not strengthens – the argument that the US and South Korea pose a significant security threat to the regime and the nation.

Japan

From the Japanese perspective, there are many positive takeaways from the Joint Statement. First and foremost, Tokyo is pleased to see the United States’ strong declaration of its commitment to the region. Japan realizes the important stabilizing role the United States plays in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the US role in providing for Japan’s security. To that end, Japan will be encouraged by the restatement of the US’ nuclear umbrella, which reduces the need for Japanese politicians to grapple with whether to develop their own nuclear weapons. Japan welcomes the recommitment by the United States to the elimination of nuclear weapons in North Korea, which in turn reduces the likelihood that other countries in the region will develop their own, leading to a regional arms race.

Tokyo also is likely to support the fact that the statement goes beyond simply talking about a security alliance and moves into other areas that Japan has long sought in its own relationship with the United States. This includes the statement’s commitment to values that Japan shares, including democracy, human rights, free markets, and trade and investment
liberalization in the Asia-Pacific. Japan will also be encouraged to see greater participation by South Korea in regional multilateral institutions, which provide public goods that benefit Japan, primarily in nontraditional security areas.

However, the Joint Statement may also cause some consternation in Japan if the statement is viewed as giving South Korea the status of being Washington’s “best” or “favorite” Asian ally. There is jockeying between South Korea and Japan to be seen as the lynchpin to the US presence in the region, and any slight gain by one may be viewed as a lost opportunity by the other. Japan may also fear that if South Korea is seen as bearing more of the burden in the region, Washington will ask for more from Japan. Tokyo has often used the “excuse” that it cannot legally contribute more to the security of the region, but it may feel compelled to do so if Seoul proves itself a capable and trusted partner of the US.

ASEAN

The 10 nations of ASEAN likely support many of the concepts spelled out within the Joint Vision Statement. Like Japan, ASEAN will be pleased to see the US recommitment to the region and may welcome a greater role for South Korea. South Korea can help balance growing Chinese influence in the region, which is increasingly an aim of many ASEAN states. Further, South Korea is largely viewed as a trusted partner by ASEAN countries and does not carry the historical baggage of other Northeast Asian states, so its increased presence will be viewed less skeptically. ASEAN will also be encouraged by the mentioning of regional institutions because many of them are creations of or led by ASEAN. Additionally, ASEAN will be encouraged by the hope of more public goods passing through its waters and the South Korean commitment to help secure those public goods. Finally, ASEAN will be heartened to see that the US is looking to move beyond being primarily a military force in the region, and is aiming to increase its diplomatic, economic, and political footprint in the Asia-Pacific, improving the region in new ways.

While ASEAN has made some small steps in the area of human rights and values, the inclusion of these in the statement may not be welcomed by all its member states, as ASEAN has often sidestepped these issues to gain cooperation in other areas. It may worry that a renewed focus on rights and values could weaken the cohesion of the organization and make advancements more difficult. ASEAN may also see the document as reaffirming the belief that the US is primarily focused on Northeast Asian issues (particularly North Korea), while Southeast Asia remains second for US aspirations and largess.

Conclusion

The Joint Vision of the US and ROK can build concrete cooperation of the two states to maintain a high level of security on the Korean Peninsula. Regional states can embrace the US-ROK joint vision as a way to promote regional stability. However, there are concerns. The Joint Vision statement can drag the two states into matters that are not consonant with their national interests because of their duties as an ally. The ambivalent language of the Joint Statement can exacerbate asymmetrical financial burden sharing. And for China, Japan, North Korea and ASEAN member states, this Joint Statement may alienate the two allies
from regional cooperation. We conclude that the Joint Vision for Alliance of the US and ROK can advance regional stability and strengthen the bilateral alliance system if it can avoid unnecessary sacrifices by each state.
Appendix A

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Pre-Conference Assignment

What is your country’s relationship with South Korea? How can it be improved?

Australia

Ms. Nirupama VERMA

Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) began their relationship over 50 years ago with Australia’s participation in the Korean War. Bringing the war to an end was the Korean Armistice in 1953, after which Australia remained in Korea for four years as military observers.

ROK and Australia now have a longstanding and robust relationship. They are not only important economic and political partners, but friends who share common views and concerns over the security of Southeast Asia. The relationship has been built on initiatives taken from countries, and they look toward the future. Both countries are close allies with the United States, functioning democracies, and graced by leaders with an honest, open and frank relationship.

ROK and Australia regularly meet for political discussions, international forums, and strategic discussions to pave a way forward in Southeast Asia. Most recently, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith met ROK’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu Myung-hwan, Prime Minister Chung Un-chan, Minister for National Defense Kim Tae-young, and Minister for Unification Hyun In-taek. This meeting developed the strong ties between the two countries and sought ways to strengthen this cooperation. Earlier in December 2009, former ROK Prime Minister Dr. Han Seung-soo visited Australia as President Lee's representative at a track 1.5 conference on the development of an Asia-Pacific community.

Negotiations between the two countries are under way to launch a Free Trade Agreement. They also discussed shared regional and global challenges, including the global financial crisis.

Both Australia and ROK see security and stability in North Asia and the Asia-Pacific as a key interest, and regard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as critical for their economic performance and security. Australia and ROK both support a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and consider the continued commitment of the United States to the Asia-Pacific critical to stability and prosperity in the region.

The Joint Statement of Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation, released by Prime Minister Rudd and President Lee in early 2009, outlines the shared values and the importance both countries attach to security issues in the region and the world. It paves the way for closer
cooperation bilaterally and in regional and multilateral forums. Specific areas of cooperation include: law enforcement, border security, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, defense and disaster response.

Direct personal contact between Australians and Koreans is an important part of the bilateral relationship. Exchanges for education, tourism, cultural and media purposes have increased over past decades, bolstered by strong support from the two governments, the Australian Korean community, ROK citizens in Australia and the growing Australian presence in the ROK. People-to-people links have also been fostered through sister-city and sister-state relationships, such as those between Townsville and Suwon, Queensland and Gyeonggi Province, New South Wales and Seoul, and Victoria and Busan.

Overall, the relationship between Australia and ROK is based on mutual interests, political and social, diplomatic and friendship, and can only be enhanced with time, strong communication and open relationships.

Cambodia

Mr. Vannarith CHHEANG

Diplomatic Relations

Cambodia-South Korea diplomatic relations was established in 1970, but official relations were suspended from 1975 until 1996 when an agreement was reached to establish a Korean representative’s office in Cambodia. Official diplomatic relations were formally re-established in 1997. Since 2004, there has been cooperation between the parliaments of the two countries. Since 1996, there were a series of VIP visits between the two countries. Most recently, South Korean President Lee made an official visit to Cambodia. During that occasion, South Korea agreed to set up “master plans” for the development of Cambodia and promised to provide $200 million in development loans to Cambodia from 2009-2012. In addition, the Agreement on Extradition was signed by both parties.

Bilateral relations between Cambodia and South Korea are also pushed by the grand cooperation framework of ASEAN-South Korea. South Korean ambassador to Cambodia, Mr. Lee Kyungs-soo, stated that:

> With Cambodia’s admission into ASEAN in 1999, Korea and Cambodia had the opportunity of holding four bilateral summit meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN+3 Summit. The establishment of formal ties between Korea and ASEAN member countries served to increase the exchanges and cooperation between the two countries.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\) Interview with H.E. Mr. Lee Kyung-soo Ambassador of the Republic of Korea by Mr. George Mcleod, the Phnom Penh Post available at [http://khm.mofat.go.kr/eng/as/khm/main/index.jsp](http://khm.mofat.go.kr/eng/as/khm/main/index.jsp), last access on May 16, 2010
Box 1: Brief History of Korea-Cambodia Diplomatic Relations:
- 1962. 7. Korean Consulate General in Cambodia established
- 1967. 1. Korean Consulate General in Cambodia withdrawn
- 1970. 5. Formal diplomatic relationship between Korea and Cambodia established
- 1970. 7. Korean Representative’s Office in Cambodia established
- 1970. 8. Korean Embassy in Cambodia established
- 1975. 4. Korean Embassy in Cambodia withdrawn and diplomatic relations ceased
- 1996. 5. Agreement to establish Korean Representative’s Office in Cambodia made
- 1996. 9. Korean Representative’s Office in Cambodia established and official operations launched
- 1997.10. Formal diplomatic relations between Korea and Cambodia re-established
- 1998. 2. Korean Representative’s Office in Cambodia elevated to Embassy
- 2001. 4. Cambodian Embassy in Korea established

(Source: South Korean Embassy in Phnom Penh)

Box 2: Exchange of Visits
- 1996. 7. Official visit to Korea by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
- 2001. 4. Official visit to Korea by Prime Minister Hun Sen
- 2001.12. Official visit to Korea by Norodom Ranariddh, President of the National Assembly
- 2002.11. Official visit to Cambodia by Prime Minister Kim Suk-soo, on the occasion of ASEAN+3 Summit in Phnom Penh
- 2004.10. Official visit to Cambodia by Kim Won-ki, Speaker of the National Assembly
- 2006. 3. Official visit to Korea by Prime Minister Hun Sen
- 2006. 7. Official visit to Cambodia by H.E. Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- 2006.11. State visit to Cambodia by H.E.Roh Moo-hyun, President of Republic of Korea
- 2007. 1. Official visit to Cambodia by H.E. Lee Sang-soo, Minister of Labor
- 2007.8. Official visit to Korea by Heng Samrin, President of the National Assembly
- 2008.2. Visit to Korea by Prime Minister Hun Sen and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Hor Namhong (the inaugural ceremony for the 17th President Lee Myung-bak)
- 2009.10. Official Visit by the President of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak to Cambodia

(Source: South Korean Embassy in Phnom Penh)

Cultural Relations

Cultural exchanges have been improving since the signing of the Cultural Exchange Program in 2001 and the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between Korea and Cambodia on July 2006. The most remarkable cultural event was Angkor-Gyeongju World Culture EXPO 2006. It lasted 50 days in Siem Reap, Angkor, with the participation of thousands of local Cambodians, Korean visitors, and other international tourists. The image of Cambodia was brought to Korea and vice versa.

Box 3: The key cultural exchange status in as follows:
- 2003.11. Korean Classical Music Performance Troupe (part of southeast Asia area round performance) performed in Cambodia
- 2003.11. Huh Trio Concert Performance in Cambodia
- 2004.06. Angkor Wat Relic Exhibition held at Seoul Historic Museum
- 2004.08. Cambodia Royal Ballet performed in Korea
- 2004.11. Korean Traditional Dance (Inchon Dance Troupe) performed in Cambodia
- 2006.07. Signed the agreement on cultural cooperation between Cambodia-Korea
- 2006.08. Visit of the lady Han (Yang Mi-kyung) and B-Boy Expression as friendly messenger to commemorate the 15th Anniversary of Establishment of Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and Korea
- 2006.09. The First Korean Film Festival opened in Cambodia
- 2006.11. Angkor-Gyeongju World Culture EXPO 2006 (50days)
- 2006.12. National Group of Korean Music & Dance performed in Cambodia
- 2007.02. Joint Performance of the Cambodia-Korea Art (Gimhae Municipal Gayageum Orchestra)
- 2007.08. Grand Presentation of Korean Percussion Group “Gong Myoung” to commemorate the 10th Anniversary of re-establishing diplomatic relations between Korea and Cambodia
- 2007.10. The Second Korean Film Festival held in Cambodia
- 2008.10. The Third Korean Film Festival held in Cambodia
- 2008.11. Gyeonggi Provincial Dance Troupe of Korea performed in Cambodia

(Source: South Korean Embassy in Phnom Penh)

Economic Relations

- South Korea is the largest foreign investor in Cambodia. Total Korean investment in Cambodia was $1.21 billion in the period 2007-2009.
- Korea exported $294.4 million worth of goods to Cambodia in 2008, including $117.5 million in textiles, $54.8 million in car machinery and $43.2 million in textile goods. It imported $14.3 million in goods from Cambodia, including $8.8 million in textile goods, $2.4 million in non-ferrous metals and $1.6 million in agricultural food.
- Korean grant aid for Cambodia was more than $39.5 million in 2001-2009.
- In 2008, there were 260,370 Korean tourists visiting Cambodia.
- Air service between the two countries was a record 22 flights per week to the capital of Phnom Penh and Siem Reap.

Box 4: ODA : EDCF Loan
The Korean government provides EDCF loans that support economic and social development in Cambodia, which is separate from grant aid through KOICA. In April 2001, the Basic Agreement on the Provision of EDCF was made between Korea and Cambodia, and Cambodia was selected as an EDCF priority nation in 2003. In addition, improvements in the provision of the EDCF loans were made by lowering the interest rate from 1.0 percent to 0.5 percent and extending the repayment period up to 30 years.
As of December 2007, 6 EDCF loaned projects (a scale of $159.4 million in approved amount) have been approved by Korean government.
The projects are as follows:
1. Government Administration Information System (GAIS)
   - Total approved EDCF loan: $20 million
   - Completed in October 2004
2. National Vocational Training Center (National Polytechnic Institute of Cambodia, NPIC)
   - Total approved EDCF loan : $27.7 million
   - Completed in June 2005
3. Rehabilitation of National Road No. 3 Phase I (Trapang Ropaou - Kampot)
   - Total approved EDCF loan : $17.1 million
   - Completed in May 2007
China

Ms. NI Shan

China established official relations with South Korea in 1992 and has since made remarkable progress. China is the first trade partner and biggest investor as well as exporter to South Korea; they created a “21st Century Partnership” in 1998, a “Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership” in 2003 and “Strategic Cooperative Partnership” in 2008. Thus, the two countries have expanded their mutual cooperation in politics and security.

Despite deepening ties between the two countries, there are challenges. An increase in big-nation chauvinism and decreased trust are the biggest challenges. The media in both countries have sparked nationalist sentiments and although China is working hard to balance the relationship between South Korea and North Korea, it seems difficult for China to remain neutral. South Korea expects China to exercise its influence on North Korea. China is always stuck in a dilemma between the two sides’ strategic conflicts. Although the trilateral relationship among China, South Korea, and Japan is a core factor in East Asian integration, problems of territorial and historical issues remain obstacles to cooperation.

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak expanded his Asian practical diplomacy to improve Korea’s influence in the region. He repeated that “the Alliance of South Korea and US is the core of national security strategy, while close relations with China is the complement to the alliance.” Consequently, China is to adhere to a foreign strategy of “peaceful and development,” and will continue to support the peaceful reunification of Korean Peninsula with a firm stand on denuclearization. To further strengthen the relationship between South Korea and China, it is necessary for us to expand mutual exchange and encourage people to know more deeply about each side. We may refer to the communication system of ASEAN to solve problems using both track-one and track-two mechanisms to find the best solution for issues between South Korea and China by improving mutual-understanding and mutual-trust.
India

Mr. Navjot Bir SINGH

The foundation of India’s relationship with South Korea lies in the similar context in which they emerged as modern nation states, exactly a year apart, on Aug. 15, 1947 and 1948 respectively. Both states are products of partition, of earlier colonial entities, which also created their adversarial neighbors Pakistan (in the case of India) and North Korea (in the case of South Korea). The need to ensure survival in a hostile neighborhood and the ideological divide of the Cold War constrained South Korea and India within their East and South Asian regions despite establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973.

The end of the Cold War more or less coincided with strengthening of liberal democracy in South Korea (1987) and with the liberalization of the Indian economy (1991). This created a political and economic common ground that has led to rapid progress in India-ROK relations over the past two decades. India’s ‘New Economic Policy’ was accompanied by the ‘Look East Policy’ launched in 1992 to tap South East Asia’s economic potential and to establish India as an important regional actor. “India has since included China, Japan, South Korea and other Asia Pacific states in the gamut of this policy” (Kuppuswamy 2010).

South Korean companies were the first to venture into the Indian market driven by a shift in “Korean trade policy from (being) export oriented to trade oriented…to solve difficulties arising from Asian financial crisis of 1997” (Pattnaik 2006). Over 400 Korean companies including LG, Daewoo, Samsung and Hyundai are active investors in India and have contributed to bilateral trade growing from $2.6 billion in 2002 to a high of $15.6 billion in 2008. South Korea is the fifth largest investor in India.

Despite this growth, trade and investment volume remains comparatively low given that South Korea and India are Asia’s third and fourth largest economies, respectively. It is with the aim of doubling bilateral trade to $30 billion by 2014 that a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, a de-facto free trade agreement (FTA), was signed in 2009 by the two states. It entered into force in 2010 and is only India’s third FTA after those with Sri Lanka in 1998 and Singapore in 2005.

An indicator of the importance India attaches to its relationship with South Korea is the 2010 visit of President Lee Myung Bak to New Delhi as the Chief Guest for the Republic Day celebrations. During this visit the two states upgraded their largely economic relationship to a ‘Strategic Partnership.’

India and South Korea share security concerns about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly after unearthing a Pakistan-North Korea nexus, and about energy security, terrorism, and hegemony of any single state in Asia. They have sought to counter these by pursuing cooperative security, manifest in India’s ‘Look East Policy,’ and complimented by South Korea’s 2009 ‘New Asia Initiative.’
Scarlatou (2010) argues, “South Korea and India have acted as hubs generating bilateral FTAs in the (Asian) region and beyond resulting in an unprecedented degree of integration between East and South Asia.” The two states are members of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only security grouping in the Asia Pacific. They also have an expanding bilateral security cooperation agenda. There is emphasis on cooperation between the Navies and Coast Guards to ensure safety of critical energy supplies transiting the Indian Ocean for the energy deficient economies.

However, an important stepping stone to underpin the new ‘Strategic Partnership’ is the proposed bilateral civil nuclear cooperation. South Korean support at the Nuclear Supplier Group helped India obtain a waiver to engage in nuclear commerce. It has been suggested by analysts like Rakhra (2010) that India and South Korea should move fast on the proposed nuclear energy cooperation as it holds great potential to transform bilateral relations by providing India cost-effective, safe, reliable, and clean energy to meet its growing demands while providing South Korea a big share in the nuclear energy export market.

The two states can also extend their coordinated efforts in global multilateral economic institutions such as the G20 to regional economic structures. South Korea is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and could assist India’s entry into this cornerstone of the emerging Asian economic architecture.

A strong India-South Korea relationship powered by growing trade and backed by closer political and cultural ties ensures development of not just these states but also helps progress towards development of a larger Asian Community.

References

Indonesia

Mr. Frassminggi KAMASA

Thirty-seven years of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Indonesia (RI) and Republic of Korean (ROK) have been fruitful. The signing of the Joint Declaration (JD) on Strategic Partnership to Promote Friendship and Cooperation between the RI and the ROK in December 2006 helped pave the foundation of bilateral relations. With this signing, it’s expected that the relations and cooperation between the two countries will augment and expand. RI-ROK also created a RI-ROK Joint Task Force (JTF) on Economic Cooperation in 2007. At the first JTF, eight working groups were formed: trade and investment; energy and mineral resources; infrastructure and construction; information and technology; defense industry; forestry; agriculture and fisheries; research and technology; and policy support.
It’s well-recognized that the RI and ROK complement each other. RI has an abundance of natural resources and rich biodiversity as well as a labor forces and market potential while the ROK has high-technology, capital, and skilled-management. This condition has facilitated trade, investment and economic cooperation, and the strengthening of political and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries.

The government of ROK supports territorial integration of RI and respects the democratization process in Indonesia. RI is consistently supporting the peaceful reunification of Korea. For this reason, RI is ready to facilitate a two Koreas meeting and host a negotiation process. At the macro level, given the fast development in the region, such as the East Asian Summit, Korean-ASEAN–FTA, APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, it is crucial that the two countries start viewing problems or common concerns through the prism of a strategic partnership.

There are challenges ahead for RI-ROK. Both countries must do their utmost to meet the objectives stipulated in the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership. To make these commitments effective, the full involvement and support of all stake holders is necessary. There are plenty of opportunities to make it real. RI and ROK can share commonalities in terms of patriotism in gaining independence and democratic values, maintaining international peace and stability, as well as achieving both nations’ prosperity in a globalized world economy.

**Mr. Mikael Fernandus SIMALANGO**

Since establishing diplomatic ties in 1973, Indonesia and South Korea have enjoyed a thriving and cordial relationship. South Korea has grown to be the 6th largest trading partner of Indonesia and Indonesia is the 10th largest trading partner for South Korea. The trade volume between two countries reached $19.25 billion in 2008, a 29.4 percent increase compared to 2007.

In 2006, both countries signed a joint declaration of strategic partnership in 32 fields encompassing various sectors: politics and security, economy, trade and investment, and socio-culture. At the summit, South Korea was led by President Roh Mo-Hyun while Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono led his delegation. After President Lee Myung-Bak too office in 2008, the Indonesia-South Korea relationship keeps flourishing. President Lee has boosted Seoul’s commitment to the 2006 momentum resulting in more positive engagement between the two countries.

South Korea has transformed from post-Korean War rubble into a distinguished country with cutting-edge innovations and technology breakthroughs. These characteristics drive closer ties between Indonesia and Korea while guiding the future of the bilateral relationship.

Recent issues may have put Jakarta and Seoul into a path of closer ties. Addressing the increasing tension in the Korean Peninsula, Jakarta may continue to support peace in the region by mediating between the North and the South as it did in April 2005. Indonesia and South Korea as members of G20 may intensify discussions which will yield comprehensive recommendations and plans to accelerate the economy, especially in Asia. Indonesia plays an important role in Southeast Asia. With big interests in the region, it is necessary and beneficial
for South Korea to maintain a healthy and improving relationship with Indonesia and other multilateral forums like ASEAN+3.

Japan

Mr. Kei KOGA

Japan-ROK relationship is characterized as the “hedgehog’s dilemma,” a situation in which a group of hedgehogs need to stay close to share heat in cold weather but, because of their closeness, also suffer from one another’s sharp quills. While Japan and ROK have similar security interests in the region, ally with the United States, and share values such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law, historical issues hinder building mutual trust.

On one hand, there has been political intention to strengthen bilateral cooperation from both sides. The most notable is the 1998 “Japan-ROK Joint Declaration: A New Japan-ROK Partnership towards the 21st Century,” which aims at regularizing high-level bilateral talks, functional economic and security cooperation between them, including bilateral security dialogues and policy coordination toward North Korea to make relations more future-oriented. While Prime Minister Obuchi expressed his “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for the fact during a “certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea” in this declaration, President Kim Dae-jung took the “Japanese Culture Liberalizing Policy” that allows Japanese cultural products, such as movies, music, cartoons, and TV games, to enter the Korean markets. Since then, more information has flown, and exchanges have taken place.

Nevertheless, these initiatives didn’t have an immediate impact on bilateral relations. As an April 2010 public poll of Japanese and South Korean conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun indicates, South Koreans seem to have strong anti-Japanese sentiment: 92 percent of South Koreans feel that Japan has not sufficiently apologized for the colonization of Korea. Only 1 percent of South Korean say that South Korea “should consider Japanese claims” to Takeshima/Dokto Islands. Considering the historical antagonism between Japan and ROK, including the Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese History Textbook, this is understandable; yet, it has been the biggest obstacle to enhancing mutual trust.

To overcome these obstacles, three ideas are worth considering, especially when administrations in Japan and South Korea are eager to enhance bilateral cooperation. First, both sides should patiently continue joint research on the history issues. Collective memory is difficult to change, but generational changes provide opportunities and different perspectives and interpretation of experience. Young generations should be educated to gain perspectives from both states by increasing exchanges for future reconciliation. Second, both states should more effectively publicize by use of multimedia what bilateral cooperation has achieved. The outcome of bilateral cooperation is underpublicized, and the public in both states is not well-informed. Third, strengthening bilateral cooperation for East Asia community building should be encouraged. Japan and South Korea, two stable democratic states in East Asia, can assist democratization processes in the region by sharing their experiences and best practices.
Malaysia

Mr. Mohd Syamin MARWAN

In Feb. 23, 1960, the Federation of Malaysia and Republic of Korea established bilateral foreign relations. Since then, bilateral relations have been strengthened by both nations’ leaders. Bilateral relations grew significantly when the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, started a new policy during his first year in his administration, the “Look East Policy.” Through this policy, diplomatic relations, economic cooperation and cross-cultural education between the two countries had spurred.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries have developed meaningful and substantial cooperative relations. Malaysia is one of South Korea’s most important trade and investment partners among ASEAN countries. In 2009, trade volume between Malaysia and South Korea was $11.9 billion, the third largest among ASEAN member countries. Malaysia is South Korea’s important partner in terms of natural resources and energy cooperation. Malaysia exported about one-fourth of South Korea’s annual consumption of liquefied natural gas. Malaysia and South Korea are also cooperating in developing green technology. Korean private sectors invested in Malaysia on renewable energy production and eco-friendly businesses such as biomass and bio-technology. More than $100 million has been invested by the Korean private sector in Malaysia to establish a bio-diesel plant, which is operating in Sabah.

Through Mahathir Mohamed’s Look East Policy, the Public Service Department of Malaysia has sent young bright minds that scored well in national public examinations to pursue their education in the engineering field in the Land of The Morning Calm, where they are encouraged to learn not only the Korean language, but the culture, attitudes and work ethics of South Koreans. It is estimated that there are about 600 Malaysian graduates who claim alma maters in Korean universities and about 400 undergraduates currently studying in South Korea. In 2008, scholarships totaling about $2.5 million were given by the Korean government to Malaysian students to support pursuit of master degrees, doctoral degrees, or other post-graduate research in South Korea.

Although the 50 years of friendship between Malaysia and South Korea have been productive, especially from the economic and education perspectives, improvements can be made in other areas, especially tourism. Although South Korea is the third largest economic power in Asia, it still lacks globalized foreigner-friendly infrastructure that can act as a business hub for the Far East. South Korea can improve by establishing more foreigner-friendly infrastructure for tourists especially Malaysians, such as encouraging more Halal food restaurants or providing more English translation for tourists.

Ms. Elina NOOR

In February, 2010, the Republic of Korea and Malaysia celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations. Trade and investment have contributed the bulk of the steady growth in relations that began in earnest with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s “Look East Policy” in 1981. Whereas in 1979, trade volume between the two countries totaled $460 million, at the end
of 2009 that number had climbed to $11.9 billion. South Korean investment in Malaysia since the 1980s, has exceeded $3 billion with Korean giants like Samsung operating its second largest electronic overseas manufacturing complex in Malaysia. South Korean investment in the country rose by 133 percent between 2008 and 2009, mostly in fabricated metal products, electronic and electrical products, as well as basic metal products.

One of the most discernible marks of South Korean – indeed, East Asian – partnerships with Malaysia is represented by the iconic Petronas Twin Towers in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. While Tower 1 was constructed by a Japanese-led joint venture, the joint venture construction of Tower 2 was led by Samsung Engineering & Construction Co. In Korea, Malaysian conglomerate Berjaya Group is currently developing the Yerae Recreational Resort and Housing Complex in Jeju Island with a total investment of $1.8 billion.

Real estate in Malaysia is emerging as an investment area for many South Koreans. Malaysia is the second most popular destination for real estate investment among South Koreans after the United States.

As the two countries move beyond their initial 50 years of friendship, several concluding observations may be drawn. First, any effort to further boost bilateral ties will be complemented by the ASEAN+3 community-building process, involving the 10 ASEAN countries as well as Japan and China. This will be true notwithstanding the nebulousness and uncertainty of the East Asian Summit dialogue. Second, politics and security will remain a secondary issue-area in the Malaysia-South Korea bilateral relationship and topics such as a nuclear and unstable North Korea post Kim-Jong il will continue to be discussed in multilateral regional settings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Third, cultural interest will continue to deepen between Malaysia and South Korea, although the latter will likely benefit from this most. Finally, both countries will be looking to strengthen the economic ties that have underpinned a mutual admiration for each other’s rapid development. Trade, investment, and technology transfer will likely be the mainstay of developing bilateral ties in the future.

**The Netherlands**

**Mr. Cornelis OUDENAARDEN**

The relationship between the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea dates back to the middle of the 17th century when a Dutch cargo vessel, the Sperwer, ran aground on Korean soil. The surviving crew was forced to remain in xenophobic Korea and only eight managed to escape to Japan after 13 years of captivity.

The relationship between our two countries has drastically changed since then. From a more general perspective this is due to South Korea’s changed outlook toward the rest of the world. Certainly, the Dutch participation in the Korean War was also much appreciated by the ROK. On a bilateral front, a surprisingly important element in this development was played by soccer coach Guus Hiddink, who is revered in the ROK for having successfully coached their soccer team during the 2002 World Cup. Since this event, awareness of the Netherlands in the ROK has
reached an all-time high and the country has been widely seen in a positive light. To a lesser extent, awareness of South Korea in the Netherlands has also been heightened by this event.

The most important aspect of the relationship is trade. Dutch multinationals such as Philips and ING have offices in South Korea. Exports from the Netherlands to the ROK mainly revolve around precision instruments. Imports from South Korea are mainly telecommunication devices and cars. Over the past few years the Netherlands has had a positive trade balance vis-à-vis South Korea. Due to last year’s economic crisis, trade slumped between the two countries but is likely to pick up again in the near future. At the EU level, South Korea is recognized as an important trading partner. An FTA agreement concluded in 2009 assures that trade will expand between these two partners in the future.

Neither the Netherlands nor the EU is interested in involving itself in the enduring conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Both the Netherlands and the EU have condemned North Korea on several occasions and provide vocal support for the Six-Party framework. The security issue on the Korean Peninsula does not appear to be a direct priority.

To improve its relationship with the ROK, it is important that the Netherlands capitalize on the positive emotions that Koreans have toward it. Economically, there is certainly room to expand the relationship and the FTA is likely to prove an important step forward. A recent visit by PM Jan Peter Balkenende included a delegation of Dutch businessmen interested in operating in Korea. There is great potential between the Netherlands and the ROK and the Dutch will remain favored trading partners as long as the 2002 World Cup afterglow lasts. The relationship between the Netherlands and the ROK is economic and any improvement in this relationship will thus come through increased trade.

**Philippines**

**Ms. Jonizel LAGUNZAD**

The Philippines and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been close friends and partners for more than 60 years. On March 3, 1949, the Philippines established bilateral relations with ROK, making the Philippines the fifth country to recognize the newly established Republic of Korea. More than the present-day development aid (from ROK to the Philippines) and bilateral technical cooperation in various areas, the ties that bind the two countries were formed during the Korean War, when the Philippines sent a Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK) in September 1950, in support of UN Security Council Resolution demanding North Korea to withdraw north of the 38th parallel. Five Battalion Combat Teams composed of 7,420 Filipino officers and personnel served in Korea – more than 100 lost their lives, about 300 were wounded, and 57 are missing.\(^{20}\)

For the past 60 years, Philippines-ROK relations can be characterized as solid, with no major irritants. Constant appraisal of the relations through policy consultations and high-level exchange

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of visits, bilateral cooperation on economic, defense and security, and on matters concerning
candidatures in international organizations has meant they are further strengthened.  

The Korean private sector is very active in the Philippines with about 900 Korean companies
operating in the Philippines. These companies have put up shipbuilding facilities (Hanjin Heavy
Industries); operate power plants (KEPCO), and a logistics hub (Samsung) to name a few. However, according to a 2005 report by the Korea Export-Import Bank, ROK’s FDI in the
Philippines amounts to merely 1.26 percent of the ROK’s total FDI in Asia. In terms of Official
Development Assistance, ROK has supported infrastructure projects in the Philippines such as
the Metro Manila North/South Railway Link, the construction of the Laguindingan international
airport in Southern Philippines, and road widening in Central Luzon, among others. In terms of
defense cooperation, ROK provides logistics support to the Philippines under the Military
Equipment and Supplies Agreement signed in 1994.

Overall, on a state-to-state level, the two countries’ relationship is in good shape. On a people-to-
people level, however, in the Philippines there exists a negative perception of Koreans living in
the country (about 100,000). This calls for an active public diplomacy that will involve creative
redescription of a new, positive Korean image in the Philippines from “cultural invaders” to
“brothers in arms” or “long-time friends.” Apart from investing in physical infrastructure, 
Philippines-ROK relations can be improved by ROK’s involvement in mutually beneficial social
and institutional infrastructures. Supporting social infrastructure refers to winning the hearts and
minds of the community or “community integration” – an example of which is Korean
companies giving back to their communities, through humanitarian efforts during natural
disasters, or spearheading other corporate social responsibility initiatives. Supporting
institutional infrastructure, on the other hand, is a form of high-impact “institutional
consolidation” targeting important institutions in the country such as education and the new
“economic heroes” – the overseas Filipino workers. Fresh energy may be infused into the
relations through special labor agreements that will fill the gap in the Korean labor force and
development needs of the Philippines. A Worker-Scholar Scheme may be instituted in 10 years’
time, wherein for the first five years, ROK will open its labor market to nurses, doctors,
caregivers, and medical technicians to care for the aging sectors of the Korean population. The
next five years will be for English teachers in the basic education and universities. Their contract
will involve Korean government-funded six month scholarships studying Korean
language/culture, computer literacy/new technology relevant to the sector, and lastly, financial
management/entrepreneurship trainings. These are practical skills that will aid workers while in
Korea and will increase their competitiveness upon their return to the Philippines. Contract in
Korea will be for five years and returnees must stay in the Philippines for at least two and a half
years. Over 50 years, this “experimental program” has the potential to transform the relationship
into one that not only commands state-to-state respect, but will also directly change for the better
people-to-people relations, especially for those Filipino families who will be lifted from poverty.

21 Overview of Philippines-Republic of Korea Relations prepared by Northeast Asia Division, Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs.

22 Ibid.

23 Speech of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo during the Welcome Reception for the Philippines-Republic of

24 In honor of the 7000+ Filipinos who served in Korea during the Korean War, the target is to send 700 workers
annually for 10 years.
Relations between South Korea and Thailand have become more expansive and increasingly institutionalized on the political, economic and security sectors. A strong sense of historical amity between Bangkok and Seoul underpins this evolving relationship, where Thai soldiers were deployed in the Korean War to support the South Korean government as well as allies like the United States in the 1950s. Under the broadening array of regional political and economic architectures such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ARF, East Asia Summit, and APEC, the two sides have increased consultations and cooperation to provide for greater stability in the region. Over the last five decades, bilateral relations have also matured, with trade, economic, and business activities amounting to more than $10 billion per annum. Thailand remains an important tourist destination for South Koreans, and the two sides are developing increasing interfaces and exchanges on the cultural and educational levels, and deepening the overall people-to-people diplomacy. The reciprocal visa-waiver initiative is another step in the right direction in forging positive levels of amity between the countries. On the security front, Bangkok and Seoul have stepped up coordination in conducting joint exercises under the *Cobra Gold* exercises since 2002, along with other allies and security partners in the Asia-Pacific region. More recently, in March 2010, the two sides co-chaired the fourth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting in Bangkok. The meeting served as an important venue to expand bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.

Bilateral relations could be further enhanced with a more forward-looking approach by improving and expanding the scope and scale of exchanges between Bangkok and Seoul. South Korea could, for example, consider establishing a regularized, high-level strategic dialogue with Thailand, arguably one of continental Southeast Asia's largest and most important security and economic partners for Seoul. This would help elevate bilateral relations into one of a comprehensive partnership, and both sides could discuss issues pertinent to regional security that are complementary yet more in-depth than the existing multilateral dialogue frameworks.

**Mr. Fuadi PITSUWAN**

The evidence of Korean cultural influence in Thai society is ubiquitous. In virtually every media outlet – billboards, TV commercials, TV series, pop music industry, among others – one can find popular Korean idols with their stylish clothing and close-to-perfect physical features. This cultural presence cultivated over the last few years has generated tremendous goodwill for Korea among the general Thai population. The “Korean Wave,” or “Hallyu” in Korean, is a strong foundation for the country to engage Thailand on other fronts, i.e. political and economic.

Among the ASEAN member states, the Korean Wave arguably has the greatest impact on Thailand. While Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia also welcome the Korean cultural presence to a significant degree, Thailand embraces its influence. Korean series are played daily on Thai television. Korean singers, boy bands and girl groups travel frequently to Bangkok to hold live concerts in front of Thai teenagers – mostly girls. Some Korean actors and actresses to endorse Thai products targeted for Thai consumers. Thai singers add Korean phrases to their
songs, hoping to make it to the top of Thai music charts. Korean BBQ has become a food for shoppers of all ages strolling Bangkok’s lavish malls. Korean language classes are full of Thai students wanting to be able to comprehend Korean songs and dramas. A few years ago, a Thai teen was even picked to join JYP Entertainment, Korea’s popular record label, and released an album singing in Korean and dancing with his Korean band-mates.

Such anecdotal evidence of Korean cultural hegemony in Thailand is backed by interesting indicators. According to the Korea Tourism Organization, the number of Thai visitors, both tourists and businessmen, to Korea grew by almost 20 percent from 2008 to 2009, while visitors from Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia to Korea declined – 0.6 percent, -1.7 percent and -4.4 percent respectively – during the same period. Although no credible statistics exist, it is obvious that the fan-base for Korean pop music and drama is comprised predominantly of women. This coincides well with the fact that, in 2009, 57 percent of Thai visitors to Korea were female; while visitors from other ASEAN countries were mostly male.

Thailand epitomizes the success of Korea’s cultural power. However, history shows that foreign cultural infiltrations in Thailand do not last long. The prevalence of the Korean pop culture and Korean drama will fade, as witnessed in the rise and fall of the popularity of Cantonese movies and soap operas and the Japanese pop culture in Thailand of earlier decades. As such, the Korean government should realize that it must reap the most benefits of its current status in Thai society by stepping up political and economic engagement with Thailand before the “Korean Wave” begins to lose steam.

Thais’ fondness of Korea and its culture is the key to strengthening Korea-Thailand relations. Coupled with the signing of Korea-Thai Free Trade Agreement last year and the commemoration of 50 years of diplomatic relationship in 2008, the socio-cultural ties that Thai people have with Korea should serve as a building block for closer relations in other arenas. For example, Korean products and services would be looked at preferably due to the already-positive perception that Thai citizens have of Korea. Government-to-government relations can also be strengthened through this optimism. The Korean government, businesses, and its people must realize that the gate of opportunities has been opened for them in Thailand. They must capitalize on the success of their cultural exports.

**United States**

**Ms. Brittany BILLINGSLEY**

The US-ROK relationship has been long characterized by their alliance, which has been a cornerstone of bilateral security ties since 1954 and will continue to be so. However, the 2009 Joint Vision Statement highlighted the expansion of bilateral relations from strictly military to economic, social, environmental, space and nuclear cooperation. The relationship seems to be in an upswing, but this is not to say that everything is running smoothly. Operational Control (OPCON) transfer anxieties, KORUS FTA friction, dealing with the DPRK, credible extended deterrence, equality within the alliance…there are enough issues to keep alliance managers busy easing tensions while looking for new paths to broader cooperation.
The question of commitment is a sticking point. OPCON transfer led to speculation over decreases in US troop presence, which has inspired both sides to stipulate official guidelines on troop levels to dispel misunderstandings and reaffirm the alliance’s solidarity. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) placed nonproliferation and counter-nuclear terrorism as a key issue for US nuclear policy. The ROK recognizes this concern, but does not necessarily agree that nonstate actors are the most dangerous threat, not with a state just north of the border which could attack. Some in the ROK are concerned the US would tolerate a nuclear DPRK rather than demand denuclearization; the Joint Vision Statement reaffirmed that this is not the US stance. The credibility of US extended deterrence has also been questioned. While the “nuclear umbrella” was explicitly stated in the Joint Vision Statement and the NPR, there is still concern: how can the US guarantee effective nuclear deterrence while pursuing “Global Zero?” Civilian nuclear energy presents another issue. The current bilateral nuclear agreement provided extensive civilian nuclear energy cooperation, but the ROK has begun considering pyroprocessing, a “proliferation resistant” reprocessing technique. The US worries about unintended consequences – what the DPRK would do, how other powers would react – which is perceived by some as inherent bias in US policy.

The Joint Vision Statement offers steps that must be pursued to improve perceived commitment, and by extension the relationship. One is the need for stronger PR campaigns. It is important for both publics to understand the alliance’s mission and importance. Opportunities for civilian exchange will help dispel concerns over mutual benefit and commitment. Another step is “strategic cooperation at every level.” The ROK is taking on a greater role in its own defense, but military strategy must incorporate mutual commitment to coordinate, from senior through operational levels. Joint military exercises, perhaps joint interdiction exercises, will build mutual understanding and reliance. The ROK is playing a greater role in trade, foreign development assistance, and peacekeeping operations and US-ROK cooperation in these areas should be encouraged. The ROK is expanding its civilian nuclear energy program, so the US must closely consider its options regarding reprocessing on the Peninsula. Different perceptions – while perhaps not “detrimental” to the alliance – are significant enough that they must be addressed for the relationship to achieve the Joint Vision Statement’s objectives.

Mr. Marshall BROWN

The United States’ relationship with South Korea is significant in both its breadth and depth. The formal alliance established after the Korean War in 1954, facing peaks and valleys over the decades, has remained a key component of the US bilateral alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, as North Korea proves to pose a growing threat to nuclear nonproliferation initiatives, South Korea plays a vital role in the monitoring and management of the delicate US-North Korea relationship. In this sense Korean government and citizenry are as pivotal a part of regional security as their more traditionally recognized neighbors China and Japan.

Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang is a crucial factor in Washington’s ability to facilitate regional stability and achieve its nonproliferation goals, so every step should be taken to keep the US-ROK relationship strong and united. However, this task faces many challenges. First is South Korea’s generation gap, which divides older Koreans who fought the North (and generally favor
a hardline policy against the North) and the younger ‘386 generation,’ many of whom know little about the Korean War and feel empathy for starving North Koreans.

Another important challenge is South Korea’s roller-coaster political culture. This culture is a product of the generational divide as well as of the relative infancy of the South’s democracy – with an under-developed party system whereby presidential candidates in the past have been successful due to their image and policy promise almost strictly vis-à-vis the previous administration. This lack of consistency combined with inevitable American political fluctuations has proven a stumbling block in maintaining effective North Korea policy among the allies. The resulting policy divergence, many argue, gives North Korea the opportunity to extract concessions it would not otherwise be able to achieve, and further destabilize the region.

In 2008 South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak’s “Vision 3000” clarified Seoul’s North Korea policy strategy as one of pragmatism. Perceived as hard-line by the North, it fit relatively well with George W. Bush’s participation in the Six-Party Talks and fits well with Barack Obama’s promotion of Washington’s nonproliferation initiatives. To improve the US-ROK alliance, Seoul and Washington must exploit opportunities for greater policy convergence. There are many of these opportunities available, including but not limited to: the creation of a mutually beneficial Free Trade Agreement between the allies; maintenance of the long-standing strategic partnership through the US’s military presence in the South; a strong and unified policy towards the North during this time of increasing strain in the North-South relationship; and the continuation of open dialogue regarding South Korea’s ties with China and Japan.

Ms. Lisa COLLINS

The relationship between the United States and South Korea is complicated and multifaceted. The US-ROK alliance, the strong economic trade partnership, and a shared belief in the value of democratic societies are the cornerstones of the bilateral relationship. However, relations between the US and South Korea are not just determined by the bilateral relationship but are heavily influenced by relations with other countries including China, Japan, Russia and North Korea. This is due to the leadership role that the US continues to play in Asia, South Korea’s unique geopolitical position, and power dynamics at work in Northeast Asia. The growing role that South Korea is taking in international affairs and in the global community also affects the relationship between the two countries. In addition, the sensitivity of security issues and the importance of bilateral economic trade often make the bilateral relationship susceptible to influence from domestic political conflicts in each country. All these factors make the US-ROK relationship very dynamic and often difficult to define.

The primary issues that the US must deal with in its relationship with the ROK are concentrated in three main areas: security, economics and politics.

Security
The security relationship between the US and ROK is defined by both traditional and nontraditional relationship issues. Traditional security issues initially defined relations and prompted both sides to build strong ties because the Cold War made the military alliance between the two countries an absolute necessity. This Cold War history still helps define many alliance issues, such as the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the UN
command to Korean military command and the stationing of US troops in South Korea. The North Korean nuclear problem, the state of North-South Korean relations, and relations between the US and North Korea are often the most important issues at stake. However, non-traditional security issues are receiving greater attention from leaders in both countries, prompting both sides to seek greater cooperation with each other. The change in the nature of warfare, the growth of terrorism, increasing security threats from environmental pollution and the lack of natural energy resources have forced the countries to cooperate on nontraditional security issues.

**Economic**
The economic relationship is defined primarily in terms of the large volume of trade between the two countries. Although a free trade agreement has been signed that could strengthen the relationship, the main issue is whether the US Congress will ratify the agreement.

**Political**
The US-ROK relationship is affected by both international and domestic politics. Regional power dynamics and domestic political conflicts often serve as an impediment to improving relations between the two countries.

The US-ROK relationship can be improved by continuing close consultation between government leaders and scholarly experts. Both sides should seek to communicate better and to focus comprehensively on issues affecting the entire Korean Peninsula rather than issues that pertain just to the bilateral relationship.

**Mr. Mark GARNICK**

The US-ROK Joint-Vision Statement represents the US and ROK commitment to a partnership based on shared social, economic, and security elements. The principle element of US-ROK security relations is the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty which ensures peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The US reassures ROK of its commitment by maintaining 28,000 US troops in Korea. ROK has also supported the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is important for preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The US and ROK are also developing stronger economic ties. Trade relations have steadily grown, and the US maintains a trade surplus with the ROK. The ROK and US student exchanges have grown with programs such as the Visa Waiver program, and the Work, English Study and Travel (WEST). Currently, there are over 100,000 Korean students studying in the US, which is more than Chinese or Japanese students.

Significant challenges in the areas of security and economics can cause further divisions between the allies. First, Operational Control (OPCON) transfer raises concern within the ROK about the US commitment to the defense of the ROK. While the US reassures South Korea that it is committed, South Korea harbors fears that the US will leave the Korean Peninsula, leaving South Korea vulnerable to the DPRK. Second, a lack of effective measures to deter the DPRK from undertaking provocative actions raises doubts about the US’s ability to defend the ROK. Third, the Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is a great opportunity to promote Global Korea, and the US failure to ratify hurts the ROK’s image as an economic power. The last challenge centers on the US-ROK nuclear agreement and ROK access to pyroprocessing to recycle spent fuel. The
growing stockpiles of spent fuel in South Korean reactors require action to prevent an environmental hazard. Steps can be taken to mitigate these challenges.

To strengthen US-ROK relations the US should: assist the ROK develop effective intelligence capability through satellite technology to improve tracking and surveillance of the DPRK should develop a US-ROK nuclear agreement to allow them to have pyroprocessing technology. Since the 2005 US-India nuclear agreement there is no reason not to support South Korea.

Dr. Kevin SHEPARD

The relationship between the United States and South Korea is fundamentally solid, and growing stronger. Originally established as a patron-client military alliance, ties between Washington and Seoul have diversified and deepened as South Korea has, over the years, transformed into an economically and technologically advanced democratic state. Unlike other patron-client relationships, this development by South Korea has not weakened the alliance, as could be expected as a client grows out of dependency on the patron state. Rather, the alignment of national interests and the mutually complementary strengths of Washington and Seoul mean the alliance has been able to grow into a much broader relationship.

Following the end of the Cold War, the political and economic environment in which the alliance existed shifted dramatically – much more dramatically than the relationship between the two states evolved. This meant that in the past decade, the US-ROK relationship has played ‘catch-up’ in light of domestic and international transformations. This has also led many to question the value and the resiliency of the US-ROK alliance, but the transformations through which Seoul and Washington have gone are indicative of the importance both place on the relationship and the strength of ties between the two allies. As South Korea emerges as a regional ‘mover and shaker’ and takes on a larger role as a responsible and influential middle-power state in Asia and on the international stage, it becomes a more valuable ally to the US, and as the South demands a more equal partnership with Washington, so, too, does it take on more responsibilities.

The military assistance provided to South Korea by the United States continues to be the most strategically important realm of the alliance, even as traditional Cold War foes are gone and relations with North Korea transform. The latest clashes with Pyongyang’s naval forces reinforce the importance of military cooperation. This has also led many to rethink the timing of the return of wartime operational control of ROK forces to the South Korean military. By the end of the year, Seoul will formally request that the timeline for OPCON transfer be re-examined, and Washington will agree. Only when both partners feel that USFK and ROK forces are at a place where OPCON can be transferred without compromising the integrity of the fighting forces in South Korea, OPCON transfer will take place.

There are many non-military arenas in which Seoul, in pursuit of its own best interests, is increasingly supportive of US objectives. Seoul’s hosting of the G20 and Nuclear Security summits, ROK President Lee Myung-bak’s New Asia Initiative and Global Korea policies, the 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement and other ambitious initiatives give me great confidence that the US and South Korea have shared ideals, complementary assets, and a strong, allied future.
Mr. Micah SPRINGUT

The United States and Republic of Korea have a robust military alliance, which has served the interests of stability on the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century. The alliance has overcome numerous challenges, and today both nations find their relationship on solid ground. President Obama said at his 2009 summit with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that the US alliance with the ROK “has never been stronger than it is today.” Both sides intend to expand cooperation on challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula and build, according to the 2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance, “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust.” The alliance is, indeed, growing in scope. The ROK has sent troops to Iraq, provided logistical support for operations in Afghanistan, combated piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and cooperated in responding to the global financial crisis.

Improving US-ROK relations rests on expanding cooperation on North Korea, while extending efforts to confront regional and global challenges. The US and ROK should maintain robust coordination mechanisms for conducting diplomacy with the DPRK, lest distrust and fears of betrayal sidetrack the alliance, as they have done in the past. As the US plans to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea in 2012, the two nations’ militaries should work together to clarify defense responsibilities, bolster coordination and planning mechanisms, and aid the ROK’s defense transformation. Maintaining this military approach will make South Korea a more confident and competent military partner while ensuring a more equal relationship that should enhance mutual trust. And in preparing for potential crises or collapse in North Korea, the two sides should pursue a “whole of government” and “whole of alliance” approach, initiating a planning process involving multiple agencies, that will defuse underlying tensions about the long-term US role on the Korean Peninsula.

Relations between the US and ROK should also be improved by expanding cooperation that can shape the emerging order in Asia and influence global politics. Doing so will allow the alliance to be rooted in common values and will strengthen bonds between the two governments and peoples. The ROK, with US assistance, ought to expand its policing of the global commons, its response to transnational threats, and its efforts on post-conflict stabilization, nonproliferation and development assistance, thus bolstering its soft power and role as a security provider. The US and ROK should cooperate on enhancing multilateral mechanisms to multiply their nations’ presence in Asia. Economic ties should be expanded, and Congress should pass the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement as a starting point. The US and ROK can also look to jointly pursue cooperation on democracy and human rights in the region and globally, and to enhance their identities as thought leaders. Making progress on these goals will make the US-ROK relationship more resilient and their alliance truly indispensable.

Mr. Josh STARTUP

South Korea continues to be one of the United States’ strongest allies in Asia. The two countries continue to have strong defense bonds, forged during the Korean War. The US has nearly 30,000 troops stationed in South Korea to serve as a deterrent to North Korean aggression, although that number is supposed to be slowly reduced. The two countries have the common desire to prevent the North from gaining nuclear weapons and developing its missile program, and are two of the members of the Six-Party Talks. The alliance also provides both countries
with leverage on issues pertaining to China, and its growing influence in the region. Aside from strategic and defensive issues, the two countries have a robust trade relationship, with South Korea being the US’ seventh largest trading partner.

Relations could be improved on several fronts. The Senate has yet to ratify the South Korean Free Trade Agreement due to domestic political concerns that were strengthened by the economic crisis. The Obama administration has been less keen to push for ratification too hard due to its Democratic base, much of which perceives itself as threatened by increased trade with South Korea. US relations were strained due to the Bush administration’s opposition to South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward the North, but, with a change of both administrations and the South’s movement away from the Sunshine Policy, those strains have eased.

However, North Korea remains the driving force in the relationship. A hostile North ensures a strong relationship will remain intact, as both countries need each other to resolve the issue, although differences in approaches may cause minor friction. It remains to be seen how South Korea will respond to the sinking of its ship by the North, but the US is likely to support sanctions in response. A smooth transition in the number and role of US forces in the South, which both governments and the South Korean public support, is also a key factor in maintaining a strong relationship. Additionally, how the North Korean succession after Kim Jong-il is viewed and handled by both countries will impact relations. A coherent and well thought out strategy for the turmoil that could follow would help ensure the relationship continues to be strong.

Each country’s relationship with China, and to a lesser extent Japan, also bear on US-South Korean relations. South Korea has remained wary of China since the Korean War, and seeks assurances that the US will keep its interests ahead of those in the growing US-Sino relationship. The US-Japan defense alliance also impacts US-South Korean relations, and a sharp change in Japan, such as the status of US Marines in Okinawa or Japan’s development of nuclear weapons, could affect US-South Korean relations in a number of ways.

Mr. David SZERLIP

Since the election of Lee Myung-bak in 2008, the US and South Korea have significantly improved relations and now have arguably the strongest alliance in East Asia. North Korea has made this improvement extremely easy: when Pyongyang’s behavior is checked, the allies tend to have disagreements; when Pyongyang is provocative, the allies come together. Given that Pyongyang in 2009 launched a second long-range missile and tested a second nuclear weapon and in 2010 played at least a passive role in the sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, it is true that North Korea has been unchecked recently.

Other than North Korea, what has brought the allies closer together? Improved bilateral relations have gone hand-in-hand with the revitalization of the security alliance, driven by a series of agreements made during the second half of the Bush administration that reduced the US military footprint in South Korea to only 28,500 troops, closed and relocated numerous bases from Seoul to southern South Korea, begun the process of normalizing tour rotations to the peninsula, and planned for the transfer of wartime Operation Control from the US to the ROK by April
2012. In addition, the allies have launched a series of regular dialogues that have helped to smooth out the relationship and tackle stickier subjects, such as missile defense and intelligence sharing. Finally, South Korea has proven a significant supporter of US-led efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, including by announcing in late 2009 that the ROK will soon lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Afghan province of Parwan.

What could improve the relationship? First and foremost, the Obama administration could support passage of the Free Trade Agreement between the US and South Korea. Through painstaking negotiations, the allies were able to craft what has been called the most detailed and significant trade agreement in US history. However, the administration, over one year in, has yet to introduce a trade policy, and KORUS FTA has yet to be submitted to Congress. Beyond KORUS FTA, the relationship could be improved if the allies put politics aside when making security decisions. In two areas, this has affected the relationship. First, the continued calls to delay OPCON transfer only hurt the ability to plan for and implement the significant shift of responsibility. Retired South Korean generals have led the charge against OPCON transfer, and although some of their criticisms are legitimate, preaching that their nation’s military is not prepared to defend the nation in wartime is counterproductive. Second, US defense leaders have pushed their South Korean counterparts to be more progressive in their thinking about the future of the alliance, but proposals have been met by reluctance. For example, the US has called for the alliance to be more strategically flexible – in essence, to be able to operate in limited ways off the peninsula to tackle rising nontraditional security threats in the region. However, this proposal has only drawn South Korean ire out of fear that US forces operating off the peninsula would reduce the deterrent effect of the alliance. In order to operate side-by-side with a fully globalized military force, though, South Korea will likely have to get on board or be left behind.

Ms. Adrian Yi

The US-ROK relationship is based on military, economic, and social pillars. The relationship was largely defined by its military alliance in the past but now, although the military alliance is no less important, it has transformed into a multidimensional global relationship. The military alliance will always be a strong component of the relationship despite the anxiety and controversy surrounding OPCON transfer, the dismantlement of the CFC, and USFK base relocation. The Mutual Defense Treaty is not going anywhere and will continue to be the foundation of the US-ROK relationship. However, economic and social aspects are increasingly important to keeping the US-ROK relationship relevant in today’s globalized world.

In order to improve the US-ROK relationship, the two countries can ratify the FTA and renegotiate a bilateral nuclear energy agreement that allows South Korea to reprocess its spent fuel. Ratification of the KORUS FTA is the biggest opportunity in the US-ROK relationship because it will reflect the maturing of the relationship while securing US economic interests in Northeast Asia. With the scheduled OPCON transfer and the agreement to dismantle the CFC, Koreans are expressing increasing insecurity and lack of confidence in the US-ROK relationship. The economic pillar of the relationship can reinvigorate the confidence in the relationship by strengthening both economies while deepening economic and political ties.

Protectionist measures that were tolerated when South Korea was a weak and developing economy are no longer pertinent for the 15th largest economy in the world. Both the US and
South Korea are ready for fair competition in the form of a US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. The US is South Korea’s third largest trading partner (surpassed by China and Japan in 2003 and 2005, respectively) and South Korea is America’s seventh largest trading partner. Ratifying the KORUS FTA will prevent the US from slipping further down the rank of trading partners and help regain its competitive presence in Asia. An increased economic presence in Asia will provide the message to South Korea and to other US allies in East Asia that the US recognizes and prioritizes its vested interests in the region. This will allay fears of abandonment and restore confidence in the relationship.

South Korea is taking its place in the global nuclear energy market as seen by the UAE deal and it is now set to host the second Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. South Korea is displaying an unprecedented drive not only in pursuing the nuclear energy market but also in nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. If the renegotiation of the bilateral energy agreement does not accommodate the ROK’s new momentum and status, the US-ROK relationship may be strained and the ROK may move forward without US support. Although South Korea is currently limited by employing US-based technology in its reactors and by using US-origin nuclear material, it plans to decrease reliance on US technology by 2012. The renegotiations can either facilitate South Korea’s development of a legitimate fuel cycle or it can isolate its efforts and create more nonproliferation concerns.

**Vietnam**

**Mr. Thuy TRAN**

Diplomatic relations between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (Vietnam) and Republic of Korea (ROK) were established Dec. 22, 1992. ROK has since become one of the five biggest partners of Vietnam. Vietnam and ROK frequently hold high-level political visits. During the latest visit to Vietnam by President Lee Myung-bak on Oct. 22, 2009, the two countries issued a joint statement on the establishment of a “strategic cooperative partnership” and a strategic dialogue mechanism at the level of deputy foreign minister to help deepen bilateral cooperation.

The core of cooperation between two countries is economic, especially in direct investment with more than $10 billion and 1,400 projects. In 2006, the two-way trade reached $5 billion and it was planned to rise to $20 billion in 2015. Vietnam has been keen on increasing cooperation in Korea’s key sectors of shipbuilding, steel, chemicals, automobiles, infrastructure development and construction. Major Vietnamese imports to Korea include electronic goods, machinery, textiles, minerals, coal, agriculture and marine products, especially fish, coffee, crude oil, and tropical fruit.

The ROK has committed and disbursed $309 million in soft credits from its Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) and $54 million in grants. Under the EDCF framework agreement signed July 24, 2007 by the two governments, the ROK’s total financial assistance to Vietnam has increased to $100 million per year in the 2007-2009 period.

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25 While Westinghouse still retains patents for a few technologies in the Advanced Pressurised Reactor – 1400 (APR-1400), South Korea aims to become fully self-sufficient in this sector by 2012. (David Stott, “South Korea’s Global Nuclear Ambitions,” Japan Focus)
In the field of culture and education, the two countries signed the Agreement on Culture Cooperation in 1994. Now, more than 40,000 Vietnamese people are working and studying in the ROK and more than 500,000 South Koreans are staying in Vietnam. Each year, about 400,000 tourists from ROK come to Vietnam. Korean film and music have become popular in Vietnam, which help bring images and products of Korea to every Vietnamese household.

From the ROK view, Vietnam is a golden land for investment. With a similarity in culture, Korean enterprisers can catch up with the investment and business environment of Vietnam. Vietnam is also the gateway for Korean products to the ASEAN market.

For Vietnam, ROK is an importance source of investment, which can provide money, science and technology, and management experience to the cause of Vietnam economic development. However, relations between Vietnam and ROK still have much space to develop, in comparison with Vietnam-China relations and Vietnam-Japan relations.

Good relations with Vietnam will help ROK maintain its interests and role among ASEAN countries, where China and Japan have great influence.

Traditional relations between Vietnam and North Korea are also an important factor in Vietnam-ROK relation. It can provide another channel for ROK to consider the inter-Korea issue.

For Vietnam, support and resources from Korea will play a more important part in the development of the Vietnamese economy, especially in the field of infrastructure development. Moreover, close relations can help Vietnam have more choices on the international stage and in East Asia.

Vietnam-ROK relations should have great development while Vietnam is the ASEAN Chairman. If two countries can exchange ideas and have a detailed plan for issues of mutual concern, relations will reach a new height.

**ROK**

**Mr. David S. LEE**

Since 1950, South Korea’s most important diplomatic partner has been the United States. Though diplomatic history between the United States and feudal Korea exists, the summer of 1950 created the bond that exists between the two nations today. The intervention of United Nations forces led by the United States during the Korean War is the foundation of a relationship that has spanned 60 years.

Over that period, South Korea has enjoyed rapid economic development and transitioned from military dictatorship to consolidated democracy. Accordingly, the relationship between South Korea and the United States has evolved as well. In many respects, the United States has supported and facilitated many of the positive changes that have occurred in South Korea’s
recent history. The United States is the partner that South Korea has leaned on the most to achieve what it has in such a short amount of time.

South Korea’s increasing global stature is further defining the parameters of its partnership with the United States. Over the last few years, South Korea has steadily grown to become a more contributing member to the partnership and not just a recipient of assistance. The alliance between the two countries has evolved beyond the treaty relationship that is so critical for South Korea’s security, and now includes economic initiatives and even South Korea’s contribution of its military forces to United States led efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The partnership between South Korea and the United States is strong, and perhaps stronger now than it has ever been. In spite of this fact, the United States’ most important partner in the region, at least historically, has been Japan and not South Korea. Indeed, considering the symbiotic relationship that has developed between the economies of China and the United States, there are some situations in which South Korea could only be the United States’ third most important partner in Northeast Asia.

Admittedly, this asymmetry is not new. That said, due to its economic growth, South Korea has never had more influence both regionally and globally than it does now. Therefore, while maintaining a strong partnership with the United States, South Korea should continue to focus on proactively engaging its regional neighbors and countries in South and Southeast Asia. Simply put, while strengthening its current partnerships, it needs to forge new ones as well. The Lee Myung-bak administration is headed in this direction with its New Asia Initiative. This policy will require continued focus to be successful, but if executed correctly it will further improve South Korea’s stature as a middle power in Asia.

Ms. Ju-Eun SHIN

A genuine diplomatic partner is formed when states share common values, interests, and threats. To socially and economically prosper, the state has to be secured from external threats. South Korea faces many different security challenges and threats. For South Korea, strong diplomatic ties with the United States are important to overcome security challenges such as North Korea, to maintain peace in the region, and to foster cooperation among neighboring powers.

The Northeast Asian region is in a rapidly changing security environment due to issues such as the North Korea nuclear weapons problem, the division of the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, a rising China, etc. This environment creates uncertainty for states; they need to cooperate through diplomatic partnerships – and South Korea sees the United States as its most important diplomatic and security partner.

Geopolitically, the Korean Peninsula has been a point where neighboring powers’ divergent interests intersect. Geographically, it is connected to China and Russia, and close to Japan, and historically, the area has been a flashpoint where great world powers’ interests clash. These geopolitical and historical factors influence Korea’s strategic thought. Since the Cold War, South Korea’s single most important strategy was deterring North Korean aggression. With uncertainty
about the North Korea regime, South Korea has to be prepared for a North Korean contingency and needs to take steps and prepare for unification. This process requires South Korea to win the support and cooperation of the world, and the US will be an important mediator and balancer between and against neighboring states as it did in the German unification process.

Many important diplomatic partners exist in the region. However, the US, as a state that shares common values, interests, and threats with South Korea, has been and is going to be the most important diplomatic partner of South Korea. Further, North Korea’s nuclear weapons problem can most effectively be resolved with US’ support and mediating role maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula.
Appendix B

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Pacific Forum CSIS/Yonsei University
Biographies

Australia

Ms. Nirupama VERMA is a PKI Officer at the Department of Defence in Australia. Niru completed a BA in information and communication technology at the University of Wollongong. She joined the Department of Defence Graduate Development Program in 2008. In 2008, Niru began working closely with the Kokoda Foundation and Young Strategic Leaders Forum (YSLF), serving on the YSLF Planning Committee, helped organize congresses, attended workshops and been on the organizing committee of the Australian National Security Careers Night.

Cambodia

Mr. Vannarith CHHEANG is an executive director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP). He received his BA in international relations from the Institute of International Relations, Hanoi, Vietnam and an MA in international relations from the International University of Japan. He worked with the Japan Assistance for Small Arms Management in Cambodia. He was a research fellow at the Japan-US Research Institute in Niigata, Japan and the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace.

China

Ms. NI Shan is a graduate student in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). She graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University with a major in public administration/cultural administration and a minor in law. She is vice president of CFAU Graduate Student Union and does volunteer work with the Shanghai Charity Federation.

Ms. PAN Xiaolin is a PhD Candidate in international cooperation at GSIS, Yonsei University. She received her BA in law and MA in public international law at Peking University. She worked as a teaching assistant in international law at Peking University. She was news editor of www.hrol.org operated by the Human Rights Research Center at Peking University.

India

Mr. Navjot Bir SINGH is a PhD candidate at the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His research interests include international relations theory, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, ethnic conflict, and processes of regionalism in South Asia in particular and the Asia Pacific in general. He holds an MA in
politics and an M.Phil in disarmament studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Recently, he has been making short films on India’s new Marine Police and on Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India.

**Indonesia**

Mr. Frassminggi KAMASA is a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia and is taking Korean Language and Culture Program at Seoul National University. He received his BA at the Faculty of Humanities (FIB) at the University of Indonesia (UI) majoring in Russian Studies. He took part in the Student Union (Koperasi Mahasiswa) FIB UI and the Islamic Forum Studies FIB UI in 2002, and in the Student Senate of FIB as well in SHARE Economic Forum.

Mr. Mikael Fernandus SIMALANGO is a researcher at WISE Research Lab, Ajou University, were he finds new technology that can bring comfort to human beings. He took his B.Eng degree from the Institute of Technology Bandung (ITB) Indonesia in 2006 and was awarded a scholarship to study in South Korea by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy and Ajou University from 2007 to 2010. He was also appointed Secretary General of the Association of Indonesian Students in Korea (Perpika) for 2009-2010.

Mr. Andy TIRTA is a PhD student at Yeungnam University. He is Director of World Indonesia Student’s Radio. He was president of Indonesian Student Organization, 2008-2009; president of Executive Student Board of Faculty Engineering, University of Indonesia, 2006-2007; founder of Indonesian Metallurgy and Material Student Union, 2005; and president of Metallurgy and Material Student Union, Department of Metallurgy, University of Indonesia.

**Japan**

Mr. Kei KOGA from Japan, is a 2009 Vasey fellow and a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, terrorism, East Asian regionalism, US-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he served as a research fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

**Malaysia**

Mr. Mohd Syamin MARWAN is a mechanical engineering student at Korea University and is expected to graduate in December 2010. He studied the Korean language at the Seoul National University Language Education Institute. He continued his studies at Dongyang Mirae University in 2007 and chose mechanical design engineering as his major. He went to the US during his primary years and studied there for three years.

Ms. Elina NOOR was a Senior Analyst at the Bureau of Foreign Policy and Security, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia where she focused on issues of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as national and regional security more broadly. Elina read law at
Oxford University and obtained an LL.M in public international law from the London School of Economics and Political Science, graduating with distinction at the top of her class.

The Netherlands

Mr. Cornelis OUDENAARDEN is a student at Yonsei University in Seoul where he is taking classes for his MA in International Cooperation with a focus on Foreign Policy and International Security. In the Fall of 2010, he will attend the Universität St. Gallen in Switzerland as part of a dual-degree program with Yonsei University. He was a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Jan.-Feb. 2010, where he focused on humanitarian assistance to North Korea. He has a BA in History and Religious Studies from Indiana University of Pennsylvania and a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University.

Philippines

Ms. Jonizel LAGUNZAD holds an MA in Diplomacy with Distinction, and an MA in International Affairs, both from the Australian National University. At ANU, she specialized in Asia-Pacific security, China’s global engagement and domestic transformation, ASEAN and Asian regionalism, as well as crisis management, negotiation, and conflict resolution. Her professional experience is mainly on public policy, foreign relations, strategic communications, and advocacy campaigns.

Republic of Korea

Ms. Angie Jeeyun AHN was born and raised in Bangkok, Thailand. She attended the State University of New York at Binghamton, (SUNY Binghamton) and majored in Political Science with a minor in French. She is a Graduate Student at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University and is finishing her master’s thesis on “Enduring Powerhouse: US Hegemony Crisis in Northeast Asia.”

Mr. Hyo Joon CHANG is a research assistant in the Yonsei MacArthur project. He received an MA at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. Hyo Joon will be a doctoral student at the University of Maryland, College Park in the Fall 2010. His academic interests include international relations of East Asia, non-traditional security issues in Asia and peace operations.

Ms. Eunil CHO graduated from Waseda University in 2008 with a major in political science. She is currently an MA candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. Her academic interests focus on Northeast Asian security issues and regional security cooperation. She has interned as: a research assistant at New York Times Tokyo bureau in summer of 2006; a press-room intern at the 6th Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Seoul in July 1-5, 2007; and liaison for Japan’s finance minister at the 2008 ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting held in Jeju Island.

Ms. Hye Ryeon JANG is an MA candidate at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. Her major is Chinese area studies with a focus on Chinese foreign policy and international relations. She graduated from Yonsei University, Department of Political Science. She was an
exchange student at the University of Maryland, College Park. Upon graduating from Yonsei GSIS MA Program, she would like to pursue a PhD in Chinese foreign policies.

Ms. Yeon-Kyung JEON is studying at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Yonsei University, concentrating on the International Trade and Finance Program. She has served as an assistant to the Dean Chung Min Lee of GSIS, Yonsei University since the beginning of 2010. Ms. Jeon received her BA in Business Administration and Architectural Engineering from Kyungbook National University in 2009, and during her BA, she completed a year exchange study in Business Administration at Warsaw School of Economics in Poland.

Ms. Eujin JUNG is a graduate student at GSIS Yonsei University majoring in international cooperation. She received her BA in political science at the University of California. She is an assistant at the MacArthur Foundation-Yonsei. She worked as a trading manager at Hanil Rainbow and an assistant at the East Asian Library at UCLA.

Mr. David S. LEE worked for Goldman Sachs. He will spend the remainder of 2010 working on a non-profit initiative designed to provide opportunities to disadvantaged groups in South Korea, particularly orphans and North Korean refugees. He earned his J.D. from UCLA School of Law, where he was an Articles Editor for the UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, his MA in East Asian Studies from Harvard University, where he was Korea Area Editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly, and his BA, cum laude, in International Politics and Asian Studies from Brigham Young University.

Ms. Ju-Eun SHIN is an MA candidate at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. She lived and studied in India, Canada, the US, Slovakia, and Austria. Her experiences in different parts of the world taught her the importance of becoming a “mirror” of Korea and the importance of knowing about Korea for a deeper understanding of foreign diplomacy and security relations with other nations.

Thailand

Mr. Chin Hao HUANG was a researcher at SIPRI from 2007-2009. Until 2007, he worked at the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies in Washington, DC. He has written on China’s role in international peacekeeping and on China-Africa-US relations. A graduate of Georgetown University, he is working on a PhD in political science at the University of Southern California (USC).

Mr. Fuadi PITSUWAN is an associate at The Cohen Group, a strategic advisory firm headed by former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, which assists US companies in their business engagement both in the domestic and international markets. Mr. Pitsuwan focuses on Asia, particularly the ASEAN region. He is also an adjunct research scholar at the Georgetown University’s Asian Studies Department. Mr. Pitsuwan received a B.Sc. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University (Phi Beta Kappa). His thesis discussed the dynamics and power-play among the littoral states in maintaining maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.
**United States**

**Ms. Brittany BILLINGSLEY** is a 2010 visiting Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She is pursuing an MA in international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, specializing in Asia security. She spent a semester at the Beijing Foreign Studies University and received a BA in East Asian studies from the Pennsylvania State University with a minor in political science and Chinese language. Brittany interned twice with the Department of State: at the Foreign Service Institute in 2006, and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in the Regional Affairs office in 2009.

**Mr. Marshall Bradford BROWN** is an MA candidate in international cooperation at Yonsei University, Graduate School of International Studies. He attended the University of Missouri-Columbia. Mr. Brown lived in Korea for three years and hopes to go into IGO or NGO work as a career when he finishes a graduate degree. His personal interest is in climate change policy and his area of focus is in maritime policy and security.

**Ms. Lisa Dalem COLLINS** is a research associate at the International Policy Studies Institute of Korea (IpsiKor) and an assistant manager at the Bidding Committee for the 2022 World Cup Korea. Previously, she was a research associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2008-2009) and completed a year-long internship at the East Asia Institute (2007-2008) in Seoul. Ms. Collins studied Korean language at the University of Hawaii and at Korea University as a fellow in the National Flagship Language Program (NFLP) from 2006 to 2008. She received a JD from the University of New Mexico School of Law and a BA from Oberlin College in Ohio.

**Mr. Mark GARNICK** is a Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is pursuing his MA in international policy studies with a concentration in East Asia studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is also a part of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, East Asia Nonproliferation Department where he researched China’s Aerospace industry, and China’s military modernizations. He holds a BA in International Relations from California State University Sacramento.

**Dr. Kevin SHEPARD** is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a research fellow with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University and recently earned his PhD in North Korean Politics and Unification Policies from Kyungnam University, Graduate School of North Korean Studies. He holds an MA in International Policy Studies from Sydney University and an MA in Korean from the University of Hawaii.

**Mr. Micah SPRINGUT** is an analyst at CENTRA Technology, Inc., where he writes on Chinese military and national security issues for US government clients. Before that Mr. Springut wrote widely on Asian national security affairs and US foreign policy at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he served as a consultant and Joseph S. Nye Jr. National Security Intern. At CNAS, Mr. Springut conducted research on US relations with Japan and India, the Taiwan Strait, naval competition in the South China Sea, and US-ROK diplomatic and military coordination; his work was published in World Politics Review, Asia Times and the book, *The US-ROK Alliance in the 21st Century*. 

B-5
Mr. Josh Startup is an international trade compliance analyst at the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce. He received his BA in international relations with a concentration in Political Economy at Carleton College. He was a White House intern during the Clinton administration and was a Legislative Correspondent for a US senator for a year covering foreign affairs and defense issues. Mr. Startup taught English for a year in Ningxia, China, a Muslim autonomous region. He then went to law school at the University of Iowa, where he focused on international law and was on the Law Review.

Mr. David Szerlip is a graduate researcher for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Northeast Asian security issues. He is also an MA candidate in Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University. Prior to joining CSIS, David worked in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he served on the Korea Desk. At DoD, David helped to develop a US-ROK dialogue on stability and reconstruction operations and to promote trilateral security cooperation between the US, Japan, and the ROK.

Ms. Adrian Yi is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her MA in Korean Language at the University of Hawaii as a part of the National Security Education Program (NSEP). She studied abroad at Korea University for a year and interned as a research assistant at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). She received a BA in International Relations and Foreign Languages (Chinese and Japanese) from the University of Puget Sound. She studied Chinese at Middlebury College and has studied abroad in Japan through the Rotary Program. She has also worked with the Department of State at the American Institute in Taiwan.

**Vietnam**

Mr. Thuy Tran is a desk official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He received his BA and MA in international relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. His research interest is China’s emerging power and its impact on Asia-Pacific relations. He has joined two research projects at the minister-level: “Myanmar Issue and Its implications to ASEAN and Vietnam” in 2008 and “Live with bigger neighbor countries: Relations between Lao PDR and China” in 2009. He is also a collaborator for newspapers such as *Vietnam and the World*, *New Ha Noi Newspaper* and *Vietnamnet*. 
May 29 (Sat)
18:00 WECOMING DINNER

KEYNOTE SPEECH- Dr. HONG Kyudok (Deputy Minister for Defense Reform, Ministry of National Defense)
Location: Yonsei University, Sangnam Institute

May 30 (Sun)
08:30-08:45 WELCOMING SPEECH- Mr. CHOI Jong Moon (Director-General for South Asian and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
Location: Yonsei University, New Millennium Hall Room #104

08:45-09:00 Program Introduction

09:00-10:30 SESSION 1: NEW ASIA INITIATIVE – Korea’s relations with Southeast Asia
Speaker: Mr. CHOI Jong Moon, Director-General for South Asian and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Session 1 focuses on the ‘New Asia Initiative’ announced by President Lee Myung Bak in the spring of 2009. Session participants will discuss the meaning of Korea’s new initiative as it relates to both economic and security interests. Discussion will focus on how confidence-building measures can be implemented, in what areas they are needed, and what goals are sought when engaging South and Southeast Asian countries. Questions to be addressed include: 1) How do states in the region view Korea? 2) How does the New Asia Initiative fit into Korea’s over-all trade and security policies? 3) What confidence-building steps need to be taken to successfully implement the Initiative?

10:45-12:00 SESSION 2: GLOBAL KOREA: How Korea sees its role in the International Society
Speaker: Professor LEE Seok Soo, National Defense University

This session will introduce Young Leaders to Korean perspectives of its role as an international player. The discussion examines political and social aspects of Korea emerging as a leader of initiatives in the international community. Discussion will cover President Lee Myung Bak’s “Global Korea” foreign policy initiative and Korea’s role in new international forums including the G20 and the Nuclear Security Summit. This session will also touch on
South Korean public opinion regarding the country’s growing influence, what brought Korea to where it is today, and whether Korea’s influence will continue to grow.

SPEAKER- BAE Han Jin (director for International Security Affairs at MOFAT)

13:30-14:45 SESSION 3: KOREA IN ASIA: How Korea sees its role as a regional player and how regional actors see Korea’s role in the region
YL Panel: Eunil Cho (ROK), Lisa Collins (US), Kei Koga (Japan), Ni Shan (China)

This session will provide Young Leaders perspectives on Korea’s regional ambitions, strategies and policies regarding her neighbors, and perspectives on recent trends and events in the region. This session will explore economic, strategic and security-related issues, including: 1) Relations with Japan? 3) progress on historical and territorial issues with both China and Japan? 4) Can China rise peacefully? 5) What role will Korea play in U.S.-China relations? 6) What does China’s rise mean for Korea’s regional role?

14:45-16:15 SESSION 4: SOUTHERN STABILITY- The rise of non-traditional security risks in South and Southeast Asia
YL Panel: Elina Noor (Malaysia), Mikael Simalango (Indonesia), Angie Ahn (ROK) Marshall Brown (US)

This session examines new threats in South and Southeast Asia and how the ROK can help combat them. Discussion will focus on non-traditional security threats, including proliferation, piracy, cybercrime, environmental and energy issues, and more. Questions of interest include: 1) What has allowed the rise of non-traditional security risks? 2) How can these risks be most effectively addressed? 3) What do trends in the development of these risks indicate for the future?

16:30-18:15 SESSION 5: EAST MEETS WEST- Korea’s relations with South and Southwest Asia
Professor LEE Seok Soo, National Defense University

This session investigates growing relations between Korea and states in South and Southwest Asia. Questions of interest include: 1) What objectives is Korea pursuing in South and Southwest Asia? How do the above security threats impact Korea’s interests in the region? 2) Through what channels does Korea work to ease these risks? 3) How does Korea’s strategy toward this subregion differ from that of Southeast Asia?

17:45-18:15 Group Exercise, Post-conference Assignments

Young Leaders will be divided into groups and introduced to group exercise where participants will map out a “2030 ROK/South Asian/Southeast Asian architecture” and provide an action plan for the ROK, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
May 31 (Mon)
07:30-08:00   Continental Breakfast
09:00-15:00   Cultural Experience
18:45   Meet in Lobby

June 1 (Tue)
08:30-10:30   Group Exercise
   YLs paired w/ ROK participants to work through exercise. Refer to Group Exercise instructions.
10:45-12:00   PLENARY SESSION (Presentation and Discussion of results)
12:00-13:30   WORKING LUNCH / Recap; Next Generation views on Day 1-Day 4 discussions
13:45-16:00   PUBLIC PANEL DISCUSSION (Opening Remarks by Ralph Cossa)
   (4 YL Speakers present key take aways/10 min. presentations, 50 min. Q & A)
   YL Panel: Kevin Shepard (US), Frasmsminggi Kamasa (Indonesia), Thuy Tran (Vietnam), David Lee (ROK)
   Location: Yonsei University, New Millennium Hall, Room #101 (Auditorium)