Mistrust and Misperception: Overcoming Obstacles to US-China Cooperation

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Pacific Forum CSIS

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Report</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Chin-Hao Huang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road Ahead: US-China Nuclear Cooperation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Brittany Billingsley, Sungmin Cho, Mark Garnick,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Santoro, Tong Zhao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Vulnerability in Sino-US Relations</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Chin-Hao Huang, Isaac Kardon, Akane Kishimoto, Kevin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepard, Adrian Yi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Mutual Vulnerability”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective of Chinese Young Leaders</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Chaoyi Chen, Suhan Chen, Shan Ni, Qinghong Wang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Pre-Conference Essays</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: About the Authors</td>
<td>B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C: YL Agenda</td>
<td>C-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D: YL Participants</td>
<td>D-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.
Introduction

Pacific Forum CSIS, in collaboration with the Naval Postgraduate School and support from the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, hosted the fifth US-China Strategic Dialogue on May 2-4, 2010 in Honolulu, Hawaii. Seventeen Young Leaders from China, the US, and other countries attended to observe the conference. This gave them the opportunity to interact with senior counterparts on the sidelines, during breaks, and group discussions. Young Leaders joined government and academic participants during a breakout session to discuss the meanings and contexts of terms provided in the agenda. To reduce misperceptions and gain a better understanding of China’s and US policies arms control, disarmament and nuclear strategies, Young Leaders held a separate roundtable session after the conference.

Prior to the conference, Young Leaders were asked how the Asian regional security environment would change if ‘global zero’ was reached and how nations would adjust their security policies. The US Young Leaders sensed the countries affected would undergo a shift in their security environment and, nuclear security policies would also change. The US would focus more on conventional capabilities while the strategies of China and Russia would be less certain given their differing reliance on nuclear capabilities. To reach global-zero, Young Leaders agree that both states should be involved.

The Chinese Young Leaders stated that the US must take the leadership role and be the first to attain global-zero since the initiative was first proposed by the US. There is doubt that states will remain nuclear-free; therefore, Young Leaders felt verification agreements would be less certain given their differing reliance on nuclear capabilities. To reach global-zero, Young Leaders agree that both states should be involved.

For the post-conference assignment, Young Leaders were divided into three groups to collaborate on an essay. Young Leaders with a nuclear background were tasked to create a bilateral action plan for the US-China relationship. This team looked at problems associated with nuclear nonproliferation and security cooperation, and discussed ways forward following the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. The other two teams were separated into a US and a China group. These Young Leaders probed whether maintaining mutual vulnerability is the most effective way to achieve strategic stability.

This exercise generated suggestions and solutions for confidence-building measures between the US and China. Although China and the US have different approaches to achieving a nuclear-free world, they both support the idea and recognize that it will take a long time to achieve that goal. The dialogue provided Young Leaders an opportunity to share ideas and to continue their quest for strategic cooperation. This dialogue has been taking place for five years, yet mistrust and misperception continue to dominate both countries’ thinking.
The conference gathered the leading US and Chinese think-tank leaders, scholars, and policymakers with expertise in Asian-Pacific security studies, particularly in the realms of nuclear weapons, doctrine, and deterrence issues. Young Leaders were challenged at the onset to think through more critically three key questions throughout the two-day meeting: (1) while global trends and norms are pointing toward a “Global Zero” discussion, why does it appear that China is accelerating the build-up of its nuclear capabilities? (2) is missile defense part and parcel of strategic stability? If so, what is its significance for Beijing?; and (3) looking ahead, with continued US and Russian drawdown of their nuclear forces, what are China’s policy options? Will Beijing seek strategic parity or pursue other policies, and why? These questions helped frame the discussions over the course of the YL sessions. Based on observations from the Young Leaders Forum, the following points outline the core themes, conclusions, and conference outcomes on nuclear security in the Asia-Pacific, their implications for US foreign and security policy in the region and for US-China relations:

1. What role for China in Global Zero discussions? Continued concerns over the intentions and capabilities of Chinese nuclear forces. YL participants discussed the new momentum surrounding the denuclearization process or “Global Zero” prospects. Since the early spring of 2010, a series of events indicate that the denuclearization norm is gaining traction, especially with the agreement of Washington and Moscow on a new START treaty that would reduce the two sides’ nuclear forces. Other events, including the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and the latest US Nuclear Posture Review indicate that Global Zero discussions are making headway and emerging as an accepted global norm. There is a growing understanding among the community of nations of the need to collaborate in reducing and eventually eliminating the role of nuclear weapons globally. In spite of these positive developments, however, the participants find that China remains on the margins of these discussions, with limited, cautious, and lukewarm reactions at best from Beijing’s policymakers on Global Zero prospects. There were few indications that China would step up, taking a leading role among the developing states to support Global Zero. This points to the limitations of external normative pressures, and that such realpolitik considerations as hard power and security still dominate the Chinese foreign policy calculus.

2. Reality check: dampen down expectations for what China can and will do on Global Zero. China is poised to continue its hedging policy. It will not be a global outlier on nuclear nonproliferation issues. But, it will not take significant steps forward either. Some Chinese YL participants applaud the goals of Global Zero, while reminding other participants that there are lingering security concerns and core interest issues that “need to be resolved before China jumps on the Global Zero bandwagon.” Such concerns include the continued tensions in the Korean Peninsula,
age-old rivalries in South Asia, and potential disruptions across the Taiwan Strait (particularly with the continued US arms sales to Taiwan). These security concerns will be further complicated by external developments. According to Chinese participants, there is an expectation that the US and Russia first take significant steps toward eliminating their nuclear forces and stockpiles. There is also the concern that even if Washington and Moscow reduce their nuclear forces, their development of conventional and high-precision weaponry would expand rapidly and significantly, thus warranting a nuclear deterrent capability on the Chinese side. These internal security dynamics suggest that expectations for China to play a more significant role in Global Zero discussions need to be dampened. As long as these security concerns persist in the minds of policymakers in Beijing, their response and involvement will be limited. In fact, it should be expected that China will pursue a strategic hedging policy, which would also include a rapid build-up and increase of research and development in high-precision conventional, offensive weaponry.

3. **Strategic ambiguity over “no first use” policy.** China remains cautious about its no-first-use policy. While Beijing is on the record for having such a policy, there appears to be greater ambiguity over what this means in practice. If struck by conventional (rather than nuclear) forces, would China maintain its no first use policy? Some Chinese YL participants held the view that China should not be pushed to clarify what this policy means and that room for ambiguity is needed.

4. **Unexpected reactions to the latest US Nuclear Posture Review findings.** There is consensus that the latest NPR findings are quite progressive in nature and make a point to de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. The Chinese participants, however, seem to see this differently. The concern revolves around Washington’s insistence that it maintains the right to pursue a first-strike policy to protect its interests and partners. Who then are US partners in the region (e.g., is Taiwan included?), and how does one define US interests? As such, it appears that fundamentally there is a lack of trust between both sides, and deep suspicions linger in bilateral relations. There is also inconsistency in the Chinese reaction to the NPR. On the one hand, it appears that China wants to be regarded as an equal partner in global discussions on nuclear nonproliferation issues and enjoys the enhanced status and attention it receives in the report as a critical partner. On the other hand, Beijing is also uneasy with the fact it is singled out and held to close scrutiny and in some ways forced or cornered to react. Is this reflective of an inherent vulnerable weakness or is this shrewd, strategic negotiation tactics?

5. **Solicitation of Chinese support rests on the overall momentum in US-China relations.** While the NPR may reflect positive intentions to reach out to Beijing and build mutual trust between both sides, it is important to remember that the nuclear issue is just a sub-set of issues that shape the overall rapport in US-China relations. Bilateral relations remain cyclical, and at the time of the this summary, the mood has been dampened. The trend and direction in bilateral relations is thus still quite uncertain and unpredictable. As such, it will take great political will in both capitals
for proponents of a more stabilized bilateral relationship to champion nuclear nonproliferation as the priority area for collaboration and a starting point for a more regularized military-to-military dialogue.
Global efforts to enhance nuclear security, strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and move forward with nuclear disarmament is gaining new momentum in recent years. This year in particular, a series of remarkable events have taken place both in the US and world-wide including the conclusion of the new START Follow-on Treaty, the release of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Global Nuclear Security Summit, and the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. All of these events will undoubtedly have significant implications in terms of reshaping the landscape of global nuclear regime and the strategic relationship between major powers. Nonetheless, the US-China relationship, arguably one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, has experienced a relatively uneasy time in the first half of this year. The unexpected tough response from China to the US’s decision to sell arms to Taiwan and meet with the Dalai Lama has cast shadow on short-term relationship between the two countries, the most recent example of which is the aborted visit by Secretary Gates to China. Taking into account both the global nuclear security environment and US-China strategic relationship, this paper will look at the various “problem areas” of US-China nuclear nonproliferation and security cooperation and discuss ways forward over the next 12 months post-NPT Review Conference.

Why has US-China Nuclear Security Cooperation Stalled?

Before discussing ways forward for the next 12 months, we must discuss the subtext behind why there has not been more bilateral cooperation in the nuclear security realm. In official as well as off-the-record discussions, it becomes quite apparent that foreign and military policies alone are not the only obstacles to greater cooperation. We see the primary issues as failures of communication, standard bureaucracy, issues of trust and transparency, strategic nuclear doctrine, and commitments to other relationships. Because these are ongoing problems facing US-China relations, not only in nuclear security cooperation, they must be considered alongside any short-term policy recommendations.

Regular strategic communication mechanisms between the US and China seem to have worked relatively well in the past few years. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (previously the US-China Strategic Dialogue and US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue) has proven very successful as a high-level communication forum on strategic issues. However, military-to-military communication mechanisms have faced more problems and have been less fruitful in bringing mutual understanding and trust to both countries. Military hot lines between the two countries did not really function as they were expected to in time of crises, and high-level communication between the two militaries has proven too vulnerable to unexpected turmoil in the political relationship
between the US and China. As a result, substantive communication between the two countries on nuclear and other security issues is seriously lagging behind their trade and economic relationship.

As with all things, progress takes time. There are many competing entities within a state’s bureaucracy with their own interests that impede progress. In China in particular, the making of foreign policy is increasingly a matter of collective leadership. Decisions are made by a group of individuals who are more interested in promoting the status quo than achieving a compromise which may harm national interests. Meanwhile, although the US President, Congress, and the influence of interest groups formulate foreign policy, decisions are ultimately made from the top down. However, there are considerably more barriers to US-China nuclear cooperation from members of the US Congress than from officials within the Chinese government due to concerns of trust rather than bureaucracy itself.

The lack of trust in their strategic relationship is fundamentally affecting the prospect of future coordination and cooperation between the US and China on nuclear and other security issues. China’s resistance to more transparency in military development, for example, derives from its deep seated distrust toward Western countries represented by the US. On the other hand, one country’s nuclear development and operation as well as its national defense policies in other areas also send signals to the other country about its strategic intention. How to create conditions for confidence building and transparency in their nuclear interaction is a question that leaders in both capitals need to figure out.

The US and China’s strategic nuclear doctrines are also very different. The US must reduce its arsenal to fulfill its NPT Article VI commitments and to promote nuclear disarmament, but the US Asian allies are concerned by China and the DPRK’s nuclear development. This complicates the US efforts to disarm. At the same time, China’s strategic nuclear doctrine focuses on its second strike capability, and maintains that it will not disarm until the US arsenal reaches comparable levels. Being in the weaker position, it makes strategic sense for China not to reveal all of its capabilities and intentions to the US. However, this further damages trust between the two states. Military-to-military dialogues would be a good venue to mitigate these negative effects through discussion on nuclear cooperation, but China has discontinued dialogue and has not signaled an interest to return to the table. The difference in interests between the two states continues to hinder further development of the relationship.

The final obstacle, commitments to other regional relationships, has also been a serious sticking point in improving US-China coordination. US responsibility to its allies, in this instance namely Japan, South Korea, and continued arms sales to Taiwan. While China’s continued support of North Korea has consistently been an area of contention. For the US, its alliances in Northeast Asia have acted as a cornerstone to its regional security engagement. All action must be taken with consideration to the impact on or perception by Japan and South Korea. Considering the latter’s’ wariness regarding
Chinese military modernization and nuclear capabilities, further US-China collaboration is to some extent understood, but is not entirely supported. Meanwhile, China’s on-going support of North Korea has landed it more often than not on the receiving end of international criticism. The most recent incident – the sinking of the South Korean naval ship, the Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors and was dubbed a North Korean torpedo attack – has been no exception. By supporting a long-term ideological ally, China has consistently found itself trapped between a rock and a hard place – by supporting, condoning, or generally turning a blind eye to North Korean antagonism, China falls under the international community’s ire; but outright condemnation to the harshest extent could potentially drive the DPRK further away from Chinese influence.

With these obstacles in mind, we discuss below areas where greater cooperation in the field of nuclear security can be had.

**Nuclear Cooperation and Contention: Moving Forward Over the Next Year**

The next 12 months post-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is unlikely to see a dramatic shift in US-China relations or cooperation in the nuclear field. However, there are still several areas in which both sides make progress gradual, short-term progress in both improving their own bilateral relationship as well as moving toward greater nuclear security cooperation.

*Advancing Nuclear Disarmament*

The goal of nuclear disarmament has been a long-time objective of both China and the US. As such, it seems reasonable to expect positive cooperation in this regard, especially following President Obama’s adamant though cautious support for attaining zero. Despite this shared interest, however, bilateral momentum has stalled – though, admittedly, it was never very strong to begin with. This lack of a greater push is due to a number of reasons.

The understanding of deterrence strategies is one reason for this resistance to further nuclear disarmament. Uncertainty surrounding what constitutes a “minimal credible deterrent” legitimizes the weapons and institutionalizes their inclusion in strategic doctrine. To advance nuclear disarmament, deterrence policy needs to evolve to match the current security environment’s requirements, and nuclear weapons need to continue to be deemphasized and delegitimized in order to prevent further stockpiling and build-up. While multilateral engagement may be the preferred method of nuclear disarmament, bilateral negotiations, with unilateral measures, seems to be the most effective thus far. The extent of one’s nuclear capabilities is a sensitive issue, but as seen with negotiations between the US and Russia, progress can be made toward increasing transparency and decreasing numbers.
The United States has persistently called for transparency regarding the Chinese nuclear capabilities and intentions, demands which have only gained some momentum following the release of a fully unclassified Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the purposefully leaked official count of nuclear warheads, including both the active and inactive ones. These demands have been met with consternation. China has maintained a no first use policy since 1964, its nuclear arsenal thus rendered to a solely deterrent purpose, which is more than the US has done.

As was apparent in the new START treaty, neither the US or Russia is quite willing to take drastic reductions in their nuclear weapons arsenal. It would be foolish to assume that China does not factor into both countries’ strategic thinking in this regard. A lack of transparency on China’s side with regard to its own arsenal and its intentions behind the current nuclear build-up have fueled negative threat perception within the US and Russia. China insists that both of the countries make significant cuts in their numbers and will only then, “when the time is right,” come to the table to discuss disarmament. However, policymakers in both the US and Russia are concerned that should their own arsenals reach an “acceptable” level, there would be within China a push to achieve to parity.

In order to further facilitate US-Russia nuclear disarmament negotiations, encourage a quick turnaround on a START follow-on, and build on the post-NPT Review Conference, China should within the next 12 months make an official statement abstaining from a large-scale nuclear stockpile build-up. This would alleviate concerns regarding a possible Chinese push to parity once the US and Russia fall below a certain number of warheads. In addition to the abstention, capping the number of warheads produced would also aid in this regard. While there has been resistance from China regarding specific numbers, numbers are still important and need to be taken into account alongside doctrine and intentions.

In addition, because a lack of transparency has fueled threat perception of its capabilities and intentions, and has had an impact on how far the US and Russia are willing to cut their own arsenals, China could benefit from more transparency on its nuclear operation. While it may be difficult for China to openly declare the number and location of its nuclear arsenal, it could be more transparent in terms of how it operates its nuclear force, both in peacetime and at time of crisis. There may also be the option for private consultations with the US and Russia. If China is unable or unwilling to openly discuss its nuclear capabilities and intentions for fear of political and strategic backlash, closed door discussions with the US and Russia – the two countries with the largest arsenals – may be a viable alternative.

For its part, the US needs to use the nuclear disarmament momentum to continue with negotiations with Russia over the next 12 months, especially considering the fact that China has pressed both to take serious measures in reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

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1 Only recently has the US adopted a declaratory policy of moving toward a sole purpose of deterrence and deemphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons in its defense policy.
before it is willing to come to the disarmament table. Recognizing that China is acting pragmatically in this regard, the US must work with Russia to take verifiable, noticeable steps towards decreasing the number of deployed and stockpiled warheads in order to gain trust from not only other nuclear weapon states (NWS), but non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) as well. This would prove both countries are seriously committed to pursuing global disarmament and are upholding their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

The 2010 NPR stated that the US is seeking to discuss maintenance of strategic stability with China through high-level bilateral dialogue in order to promote a “more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic [relationship].” With China, this dialogue would provide a forum in which both countries could discuss one another’s “strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities” in order “to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust.” Bearing in mind the fact that the US missile defense and conventional capabilities are considered reason enough for Chinese nuclear modernization, preparation for this dialogue must begin as soon as possible, with the goal of initial consultations within the next 12 months.

Another factor to nuclear disarmament which warrants more attention is public opinion, both within the US and China. Without grassroots support, global nuclear disarmament cannot happen and as such, the US and China need to motivate public opinion in this regard. Both governments should lend official support to groups such as Global Zero as well as academic and scientific endeavors to drive public understanding and support for disarmament. In the short-term, the US and China should award funding – and if not funding, verbal support – for public outreach projects focused on nuclear disarmament, with special attention paid to attempts to bring members of the US and Chinese civilian communities together to increase exchanges on disarmament.

**Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime**

Tied inseparably to the goal of nuclear disarmament is the objective of nuclear nonproliferation. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, embodied largely by the NPT, requires the commitment of the international community to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related materials. In the past 20 years, however, the regime has been hit hard by nuclear weapons tests (India, Pakistan and the DPRK), the DPRK’s declared withdrawal from the NPT, Iran’s enrichment program, and general bending of established rules (the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement is the prime example). The regime needs to be shored up through short-term collective action if it is to continue to operate effectively in the long-term.

Consensus-building within the international community that nuclear proliferation will not be tolerated is needed, and is something both China and the US could collaborate on. Recognizing that nonproliferation is a shared interest, the two should make this a
priority in political discussions with their respective allies and partners, especially those who are categorized as NNWS. To gain momentum for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, however, they will need mutual support from NNWS. The so-called “grand bargain” embedded in the NPT is that the NNWS will adhere to their nonproliferation obligations…so long as NWS adhere to their disarmament obligations. In recent years, the latter group’s commitment to these guidelines has been questioned, which has subsequently detracted from nonproliferation objectives. By taking gradual but definitive steps toward disarmament (as previously discussed), China and the US could gain support for their nonproliferation objectives.

Another concern surrounding nonproliferation obligations and the NPT is how to promote multilateralism and technology/benefit-sharing without risking nonproliferation. Asia is seeing a rising demand and development of peaceful nuclear use, as there are inherent benefits of this alternative energy source over the current reliance on coal and fossil fuels. However, expansion of civil nuclear programs also has great risk if the necessary safety and security measures are not in place. While states are entitled to development of peaceful use under Article IV of the NPT, one must acknowledge the potential proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy use. Improving enforcement mechanisms and capabilities should be made a priority. For instance, all states parties to the NPT are required to submit nuclear material and facilities to safeguards under the IAEA, which serves as the verification authority for these agreements. But verification and inspection, as well as other nonproliferation-related activities, requires funding and resources. Therefore, during the next year, the US and China should both increase financial as well as political support for the IAEA.

Another area of concern, as acknowledged by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, was the question of withdrawal from the Treaty. While the NPT permits NPT Parties to withdraw from the treaty, definitive punishment for noncompliance with treaty obligations has been lacking. Considering China’s relationship with North Korea, the one state which has declared its withdrawal from the treaty – a withdrawal which is not fully recognized as legitimate – it would be good for the US to hold high-level consultations with China regarding what it considers to be a reasonable and effective reprimand for states found in noncompliance. Finding an acceptable response which would not discourage other states from joining the treaty in the first place, while simultaneously deterring further damaging actions and copycat disloyalty to treaty obligations, would greatly benefit not only the nonproliferation regime but prospects for more extensive US-China collaboration. As such, the two countries should use the following 12 months post-NPT Review Conference to open bilateral discussion on this issue and perhaps other areas of convergence/divergence as well.

Another important element of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which, as an export-control arrangement, implements guidelines for control of nuclear-related exports. In recent years, China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan has been the subject of controversies. China has argued that the additional reactor installations at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex were grandfathered in under
its admittance to the NSG. There is the counter-argument, however, that as a NWS, China is not permitted to supply nuclear material to Pakistan, as it is not an NPT signatory. Unfortunately, the US lacks its preferred moral high-ground in this regard, considering its own civil nuclear deal with India. Close coordination with the NSG over Chinese-Pakistani nuclear coordination would be greatly appreciated by the US. Engagement regarding how this coordination fits within the nonproliferation framework and under the IAEA is necessary. Discussions should occur within the immediate future, especially with China’s announcement of its intent to provide Pakistan with an additional two reactors.

*Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: “Tit-for-Tat”*

Among five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, only China and the US have signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT has been slow in moving forward entrance into force largely due to the lack of ratification by the United States for the last decade. Fortunately, President Obama explicitly expressed his will to pursue ratification as soon as possible. But there was no visible sign of such event yet. Likewise, Chinese experts and analysts on many occasions have said that once the US ratifies the treaty, China is most likely to follow the suit sooner than later. But this cannot be seen as an official commitment from Chinese government.

Bilateral cooperation between the two countries in this regard appears to be very problematic because the issue of ratification falls into the arena of domestic politics. Not only the Obama Administration needs to persuade the US Senate, the Chinese government also has to coordinate varying interests among different governmental agencies. It is hard for both governments to make commitment towards each other on the matter which is ultimately decided by the dynamics of each domestic politics.

To make the matter worse, the CTBT will not enter into treaty even if the US and China ratify. There are three states (India, Pakistan and North Korea) that have not signed and four more (Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel) have signed but not ratified the Treaty. Even after the US and China’s ratifications in the future, there remains a still long way to go until all these states agree to sign and ratify.

Even so, there is a room to maneuver for China and the US to facilitate the process towards ratification. One of many obstacles for both countries to reach the ratification is uncertainty towards each other’s intention. China is uncertain about the US intention when China eventually ratifies the CTBT in the future. If the US conducted nuclear tests and maintained/increased the current nuclear forces while China’s nuclear forces were frozen at the current levels, China may well feel insecure. Or if the US ratified but China conducted nuclear tests, the US would find it disturbing in terms of regional stability in East Asia. In order to escape from this, both countries need to ‘talk’ to each other.
In that sense, a policy memorandum drawn by Emily Warren, Ting Xu, and David Santoro “Strategizing Test Ban Diplomacy: China’s Play” is worth revisiting. The recommendation has been offered during the US-China Strategic Dialogue in May 2010 as a part of Young Leaders’ Program of the Pacific Forum CSIS. It is recommended that China show leadership by publicly committing to ratify the CTBT as soon as the US has done so. Such a statement by the Chinese government would help clarify China’s intention for the US Senate. In return, early ratification by the US Senate will generate even stronger effect of clarifying the US intention, as proved through action. At the very least, President Obama has started talking about his heartfelt intention to work towards ratification. It is China’s turn to reply and, by doing so, complete one round of conversation.

About the matter of the Treaty entering into force, China and the US have to show joint leadership in considering an alternative that ratification should be by “key nuclear states.” As seen during the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it appears to be very difficult to persuade these particular nations to comply with the Treaty in the near future. For example, North Korea is not likely to change its behavior either by international community’s persuasion or by coercion. If North Korea returns to the NPT and signs on the CTBT someday, it will be done so for its own interests. The point is, it is not worth waiting until North Korea changes its mind. In the mean time, the initial momentum to implement the CTBT will be lost again. It is expected that the US ratification, followed by China’s ratification, will raise expectations and create further momentum towards the enforcement of the Treaty. China and the US may have to consider and discuss the possibility to have the Treaty enter into force immediately after that, in order to not lose the momentum again.

Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

In May 2009, after over a decade of deadlock, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed to agree on a program of work that included setting up a working group to begin Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations on the basis of the so-called, “Shannon Mandate,” the document of reference on that issue since 1995. Shortly after the adoption of the program of work, however, Pakistan served as the leading voice opposing its implementation.

Pakistan is reluctant to see progress on FMCT negotiations because India, its traditional rival, has a larger nuclear arsenal and fissile material stockpile in addition to being in a strategically superior position at the conventional level. Islamabad considers this strategic imbalance to have been exacerbated by the new nuclear supply opportunities available to New Delhi as a result of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement: the latter led the NSG to allow nuclear trade with India despite the fact that, like Pakistan, it is not a party to the NPT. In these conditions, Islamabad has therefore

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been unwilling to allow its inferior status to be frozen in perpetuity in an FMCT – arguably at least not until it has “caught up” to Indian levels.

Determined to put an end to the Bush years and restore the US position in favor of the swift conclusion of an FMCT on the basis of the Shannon Mandate (i.e. with verification measures), the Obama administration has urged Islamabad to allow negotiations to begin promptly. But US efforts have so far been vain. To break the deadlock, some observers have argued that Washington should encourage China, which has had very close relations with Pakistan since the early 1950s, to flex its muscle and reverse the situation.

Yet, the prospects of China agreeing to help nudge Islamabad toward the FMCT are not brilliant because it is unclear whether Beijing really wants negotiations to proceed. Officially, China supports the conclusion of an FMCT. But it is also the only NWS that refuses to affirm a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes. Moreover, unlike the other four NWS, China has never admitted to have ceased such production, even though it is believed to have done so in the early 1990s. True, Beijing has since August 2003 de-linked the start of FMCT negotiations (which, except during the Bush years, Washington has wanted) to the start of Preventing Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) negotiations (which Washington does not want). Beijing, however, has continued to join Islamabad (and a few others) in expressing dissent at the CD about an FMCT.

The Chinese delaying tactics reflect Beijing’s assessment that it may need to resume fissile material production to strengthen its nuclear deterrent, which is significantly smaller than the United States’ and, for that matter, other NWS’. Developments in the US non-nuclear strategic force, notably the ballistic missile defense plans, but also space weaponization and the growing superiority in advanced conventional weaponry such as in precision-guided weapons, have been Beijing’s major concerns over the past few years. In addition, Beijing may well find it politically difficult to accept FMCT verification measures, which would presumably include intrusive inspections at defense industry plants.

Prima facie, what this suggests is that Beijing may therefore be perfectly content that Islamabad is blocking FMCT negotiations at the CD. Rather than seeking to reverse the Pakistani position, Beijing may even come to think that it should in fact quietly encourage it to last in order to use it as shield to hide behind, or at least avoid playing the role of the lead spoiler.

That being said, it would be a mistake to conclude that the situation is completely inextricable. The fact that Beijing has de-linked the start of FMCT negotiations to the start of PAROS negotiations is not insignificant. The implication is that Beijing has gradually come to consider that cutting off nuclear build-ups – an FMCT – is now more

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4 Beijing is also paying growing attention to increases in regional [read: Indian] ballistic missile forces.
in its interests than before, be it in its surrounding environment (South Asia and Northeast Asia) or in the Middle East, where it has growing interests due to its rising energy needs. Evidently, as suggested above, Beijing’s FMCT-PAROS de-link should not be interpreted as a sign that Chinese concerns about the US non-nuclear strategic force have dissipated. Instead, Beijing’s FMCT-PAROS de-link should be understood as a sign that China may be prepared to show more flexibility in its negotiating stance about an FMCT.

Now that Washington has abandoned the previous administration’s position against the conclusion of an FMCT on the basis of the Shannon Mandate (which prevented any progress whatsoever), US officials should seek to capitalize on the implications of Beijing’s FMCT-PAROS de-link.

In the short-term, this could mean linking Washington’s (silent) support for the imminent China-Pakistan nuclear agreement to the opening of FMCT negotiations. The United States is clearly not in a good position to make it difficult for China to export two nuclear-power reactors to Pakistan – a move currently in the works that will be in breach of NSG guidelines because Pakistan is not an NPT party. This is because the United States has concluded a similar agreement with India, also an NPT holdout, and, for that matter, because Washington is also in high need of Chinese cooperation on other proliferation crises (Iran, in particular) and on economic/financial matters. At the same time, Washington cannot – and should not – tacitly accept the China-Pakistan nuclear agreement without negotiating for some form of compensation because Pakistan’s non-proliferation track record, unlike India’s, is clearly not good. Therefore, Washington should signal to Beijing that its nuclear agreement with Islamabad will be given a free pass on condition that it makes every effort to convince Islamabad to at least allow negotiations to begin. One can expect that Beijing will be interested in keeping international criticism of the agreement to a bare minimum, and, most importantly, Chinese FMCT diplomacy (the FMCT-PAROS de-link) seems to suggest that a deal along those lines may well be within reach.

Evidently, Washington will need to do much more over the longer term to get Beijing’s outright support for the actual conclusion of an FMCT – because Beijing has clear security concerns. Considering that the United States is not on a strategic par with China, the emphasis should be laid on developing confidence-building and reassurance measures. It is urgently needed, particularly as top US defense officials have recently reiterated the United States’ commitment to developing an “effective ballistic missile defense” capability. The development of a high-level US-China strategic dialogue on nuclear weapons and non-nuclear strategic forces could contribute to achieve the desired goals. Until this can be achieved, track 1.5 and track 2 strategic dialogues should be considerably strengthened and seek to involve a wider range of policymakers on both sides, particularly as the process of foreign policy formulation is increasingly a multiplayer one in China.
Last April, approximately 50 countries met in Washington for the Global Nuclear Security Summit where they discussed the important issue of how to bolster international cooperation to improve security for nuclear materials throughout the world. It is at the same time vital to reflect on how to break the deadlock at the CD and conclude a legally-binding ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, particularly because those materials are produced outside of safeguarded facilities. Both the United States and China have key roles to play in achieving this.

*Preventing and Arms Race in Outer Space*

Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has been an issue between the US and China since 2005. While the idea of PAROS was established at the Conference of Disarmament (CD), the Conference has been unable to establish an ad hoc working group to prevent an arms race in outer space. While China and Russia are fully supportive of this group, the US has refused to participate, preferring a “rules of the road” approach. The US sees outer space as a common good and does not want to have any restrictions on what it can or cannot do in space.

The US is particularly concerned of Chinese and Russia nuclear ballistic missile modernizations and the threat of North Korea. The modernizations, for instance, were a particular reason why the US decided to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002. The US is more concerned about a ballistic missile from North Korea than Russia or China, but the Chinese do not think North Korea is the only reason for the US to have a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

Advancing the PAROS cause has been further complicated by the actions of the Chinese with the 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test and the 2010 BMD test. China and the US have a lack of trust in outer space more so than other areas. The two nations must engage in confidence-building measures to create rapprochement of tensions. Many people have suggested a test ban on ASAT weapons, but for domestic political reasons in both countries we have been unable to achieve this task. The question becomes what we must achieve to promote confidence-building measures to achieve an ASAT weapons test ban. In most cases, these measures are most successful when security threats have been removed.

The difficult task in removing security threats is they are often linked to multiple challenges on both sides. The biggest reason for the US to oppose discussion at the CD would be Chinese and Russian ballistic missile modernizations and the North Korea ballistic missile program. These elements require the US to develop a ballistic missile defense system, and China claims this weakens China’s second strike capability which leads to further modernizations. However, American specialists have tried to reassure Chinese counterparts that the US BMD systems are not capable of stopping a ballistic missile attack from China, but trust is lacking.
One option for confidence-building measures would be to exchange observers to the Chinese and American BMD tests. The US and the Chinese will be supervised and allowed to view the capabilities of the two countries. Another option would be for the US and Chinese counterparts to visit their space agencies facilities. However, the best venue to discuss these topics, and BMD and PAROS in general, is in military-to-military relations, interaction which has been suspended since January 2010. If military-to-military dialogue can be successfully reestablished, the two countries could begin to discuss ways to achieve an ASAT test ban on commercial satellites. This could improve upon the Outer Space treaty that was signed in the 1960’s. They should also begin discussion on signing a space debris treaty that prevents any nations from creating further space debris in low earth orbit. This is designed to prevent nations from launching a direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle that was used in the Chinese 2007 ASAT test, and the US ASAT test of 2008. These are all tasks that need to be discussed in order to promote trust between US and China and to further discussions at the CD.

Lastly, the US and China must establish a dialogue to discuss the topic of outer space and national security concerns. The topic would encompass BMD, PAROS, and an ASAT test ban or space debris ban. The dialogue could pursue agreements on codes of conduct and launch notifications, which could pave the road to a PAROS treaty to be negotiated at a later date. Such discussions could help alleviate many of Beijing’s and US concerns. The dialogue could be carried out at the track 2 level and could be an agenda item at an upcoming conference. This dialogue could invite representatives from NASA and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and China Academy of Launch Technology (CALT). Such a dialogue would be instrumental in addressing each nation’s concern and potentially serve as another avenue to discuss issues, even if military-to-military dialogues have not been addressed.

Missile Defense

China has long been opposed to the development and deployment of missile defense systems by the United States. Many observers believe that the potential threat that American missile defense systems imposes over Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability is much greater than that over Russia nuclear forces, because the Chinese nuclear arsenal is much smaller and much more vulnerable than Russia’s. From an American perspective, such Chinese concern is unnecessary because the United States has no intention of launching a nuclear first strike against Chinese nuclear forces. In practice, however, it has proven very difficult for the US to reassure its potential rivals about the impact of missile defense on strategic stability.

The dialogue between the US and Russia on the deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe has been on for a while, but the US has not been very successful in terms of convincing the Russians about the technical capability of the systems and the political objective behind the deployment plan. Substantial efforts have been carried out by the US, including data sharing and exchange with Russia and on-site visits by the Russians to American missile defense facilities. The Russians have received
briefings and have been offered – even heavily encouraged – to participate in NATO-led operations for a European missile defense. Nonetheless, the Russians do not seem to have been convinced or have been much more cooperative on American missile defense deployment, despite such confidence-building measures. As such, it is reasonable to imagine that it could be equally, if not more, difficult for the US to dismiss Chinese skepticism toward the development and deployment of American missile defense systems. This is particularly so if one considers the implications for American missile defense system on relatively vulnerable Chinese nuclear retaliation capability, which could be more severe than that of Russia.

A number of other potential problems face future dialogue between the US and China on missile defense. Firstly, because of the lack of trust on the strategic level between the two countries, Chinese perception toward the impact of American missile defense systems will be largely based on the actual technical capabilities rather than rhetorical reassurance provided by the US. The current plan proposed by the Obama administration to focus on the development of Standard Missile (SM) interceptors makes it even more difficult to convince the Chinese about the consistency between technical capability and the limited strategic objective. Chinese scholars have pointed out that advanced SM interceptors that are to be developed in the future will have the capability to intercept long range ballistic missiles launched from Chinese strategic nuclear submarines, and therefore, will have implications for China’s nuclear retaliation capability. More importantly, unlike silo based missile interceptors in Alaska and California, SM interceptors are either ship launched or based on mobile vehicles on land. The extraordinary mobility of SM defense systems will provide the US the capability to redeploy them from their original deployment positions to Chinese coastal waters under short notice and impose extra threats to China’s nuclear retaliation capability at a time of crisis.

Secondly, the Russian case demonstrates that rivals are particularly concerned about future uncertainty. Confidence-building measures such as on-site visits might help to mitigate Russian or Chinese concern about the current operational capability of American missile defense systems, but these could hardly dismiss their concerns about uncertainties in the future. As long as the Chinese feel uncertain about how capable missile defense technology will become in the future or how American policy over the deployment of missile defense will change over time, it will be difficult to expect a clear-cut position from the Chinese on issues related to missile defense.

What makes things more complicated is the fact that China has begun to develop its own ground based missile defense technology. So far, American reaction to the Chinese missile intercepting experiment in January 2010 has been unsurprisingly modest, taking into consideration that the US has been developing such technology for decades and it is hard to criticize China for following suit. However, the Chinese decision to develop missile defense technology might have strategic implications for the US in the long-term. The United States has been taking the strategy of calculated ambiguity with regard to its nuclear policy towards other nuclear weapons states. Both the Bush
administration’s 2001 NPR and the Pentagon’s 2005 draft Doctrine on Joint Nuclear Operations set the primary goal of American nuclear forces as deterrence against WMD attacks. Nonetheless, these documents also indicated that nuclear weapons also have a role to play in terms of crisis escalation control, which means if an adversary intended to avoid defeat by the US in a conventional battlefield by attacking US forces with nuclear weapons, the US would need to have the capability to disarm the adversary’s remaining nuclear forces in order to prevent further nuclear attacks. The 2010 NPR Report, however, avoided making statements regarding the role of nuclear weapons in terms of crisis escalation control. Instead, the report emphasized the importance of maintaining “strategic stability” with China, which presumably included the roles of nuclear weapons on both sides with regard to stability in crises. Therefore, the impact of Chinese missile defense on the survivability of Chinese nuclear forces in crises might be a concern to American strategists in the long-term. It would be helpful, as a result, for both sides to be open and straight in their future dialogue on missile defense.

It is doubtful whether joint threat assessment is feasible to be included in the agenda of future US-China dialogue on missile defense. Similar to the fact that China does not want to be involved in a joint planning with other countries for the possible collapse of North Korean regime, China might be unwilling to conduct joint threat assessments with the US because it might not want to send the message that China sees North Korea or Iran as adversaries or security threats. Instead, a potential area that both countries might be able to open dialogue in is the regional implication of missile defense in Eastern Asia. China is particularly concerned that the US might be creating a missile defense network in Eastern Asia with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The US has been cooperating closely with Japan on the development of Standard Missle defense systems, and has sold Standard Missile interceptors to South Korea and Japan, and Patriot missile defense systems to Taiwan. Part of the Japanese early warning radar system is reportedly looking in the direction of Chinese mainland. Moreover, China is extremely concerned that Taiwan has been incorporated into this huge network of missile defense in Eastern Asia, and the US arms sales to Taiwan – including the Patriot missile interceptors – has been the primary reason that blocks US-China military-to-military dialogue and communications.\(^5\) It seems that, regardless of the topic, if any high-level bilateral military dialogue is to resume, arms sales to Taiwan will have to be seriously addressed. As part of that, the issue of selling missile defense system to Taiwan will need to be dealt with head-on by both sides. Therefore, it might be feasible to hold a bilateral dialogue on the security implication of missile defense in Eastern Asia including the issue of missile defense on Taiwan Island. Both sides will have real interest in discussing such issues, and it might be an opportunity for the two countries to end the current impasse on military communication and pave the way for further dialogues on other related issues.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike

While US conventional prompt global strike (PGS) is still in development, the idea behind it is to deliver a conventional weapon to a target in less than an hour. The current developments toward PGS have explored hyper sonic cruise missiles and submarine launched conventional ballistic missiles. In this way, the US military is pursuing a conventional strike capability to eliminate a target in any part of the world that the US military deems a threat to US national security. The current US national security strategy is primarily focused on protecting itself from terrorist attacks occurring on US soil, and protecting its allies from nations that threaten their security. PGS is also largely directed toward nations that are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. However, the Chinese understandings of PGS are uncertain. They have speculated that PGS is an alternative to nuclear weapons, hurts disarmament, and thus should not be developed. They think it is just as destructive as a nuclear weapon and should be banned. However, the US has attempted to reassure China that these weapons were meant to reduce collateral damage and designed to eliminate a single target and avoid escalation.

The only knowledge the Chinese have of PGS is during a track 2 dialogue that occurred in China a year ago. In that dialogue, the US questioned China’s, “No First Use,” policy. Chinese representatives were asked if the US launched a conventional strike on a Chinese nuclear facility, whether China would respond with a nuclear weapon. The Chinese were alarmed by this hypothetical scenario, and fear the US is engaging in contingency planning toward such a scenario. Since then, many Chinese participants at subsequent track 2 dialogues have blocked any further dialogue on the subject of PGS. Their view is that until the US stops planning a conventional strike on nuclear facilities, then the Chinese will not discuss the issue. The question becomes how to begin discussion on this contentious issue with Chinese counterparts. First, the two need to reestablish military-to-military relations. Second, the US needs to fully define PGS, and the mission of such a weapon system. Third, PGS must be made a part of the agenda in future strategic dialogues, especially as the US and China’s nuclear arsenals reach similar levels.

The initial step towards progress on this issue is resuming military-to-military relations with China. This stagnation is as a result of the US arm sales to Taiwan, and as of June 4, 2010, China has refused a resumption of military-to-military dialogue. The Chinese feel that the continued sale of arms to Taiwan and frequent naval and aircraft reconnaissance of China’s exclusive economic zones represents a direct threat to China’s core national interests of territorial integrity, and promotes separatist activities in Taiwan. Although the US has sold arms to Taiwan since 1980, the Chinese are particularly angry with the US because US arms sales to Taiwan have been increasing over the years. The Chinese might have believed the US was finally moving past its Cold War mentality and realizing China’s point of view. However, with the recent arms sales, China was deeply insulted by this action.
What must the US and China do to reestablish military-to-military relations? First, the main source of contention is Taiwan. President Obama would need to tell President Hu Jintao that the Taiwan arms sales were carried out, because Taiwan had asked for them largely as a result of China’s conventional missile build up on the southern border across the Straits. President Obama needs to communicate to Hu that if China wants the US to stop selling arms to Taiwan, then China needs to provide appropriate guarantees to the island that their existence is not threatened. The US should communicate that the number of missiles pointed at Taiwan are the source of the conflict, and if they cap and over time reduce the number of missiles, then the Taiwan will feel less threatened. This will lead to improved relations, and allow further economic cooperation. The US should state to China that the US does not oppose reunification as long as it does not occur through belligerent action. China and the US need to take cross-Strait relations off of the agenda for the immediate future. The discussion on Taiwan yields no results, and creates unnecessary hostility. Removal of such discussions from the agenda will give opportunity to expand dialogue; and promote the economic dialogues between Taiwan and Mainland, which will lead to a more prosperous and harmonious relationship.

Once the two militaries have resumed dialogue, then they can engage in discussions on PGS. The two countries need to engage in a breakout session at upcoming military-to-military dialogues to describe and define what PGS is; and what the implications of such technology has towards China and US security.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Countering WMD Terrorism

The nonproliferation of ballistic missile and related technology is another area in which the US and China share common interests. China has stopped exporting ballistic missiles or missile technology to other countries and has established a domestic legislation to regulate the export and transfer of dual use items and technologies since the 1990s. Nonetheless, cooperation between the two countries on missile nonproliferation is not as close as it could be. A number of questions need to be addressed before progress can be expected in this area.

Most importantly, the two countries need to reach consensus on what is the ideal framework under which bilateral or multilateral cooperation could take place. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which was established more than two decades ago has been playing an important role in containing the proliferation of ballistic missile and technology across the globe. Nevertheless, whether the MTCR can maintain its momentum into the future is not quite clear. Countries like India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have all managed to develop advanced ballistic missile technologies in recent years even without significant external assistance. The efficacy and relevance of the MTCR as a supply regulating mechanism is challenged by this new reality.

In addition, the MTCR faces problems from within. From the technical perspective, the connection between ballistic missile technology and missile defense technology is significant. Missile interceptors are in fact ballistic missiles coupled with
kinetic kill vehicles which sit on top of the missiles. The SM-3 interceptors co-developed by the US and Japan, for example, fall into the criteria of Category I items of the MTCR. As a result, the cooperation between the US and Japan on building such missile interceptors is in principle a violation of MTCR regulations. The Obama administration’s plan to develop more powerful and advanced SM-3 missile interceptors with Japan in the coming decades will take a further step into the direction opposite to MTCR regulations. As such, it is necessary for the US and China to reach a consensus with regard to the relationship between ballistic missile proliferation and missile defense collaboration in order to lay the foundation for substantive cooperation between the two countries in either of these areas.

Last but not least, short-term cooperation between the US and China could be expected on issues related to countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism. Anti-terrorism cooperation has been proven relatively successful for the two countries in the aftermath of 9/11. It is reasonable to expect more close cooperation between the US and China in the short-term on countering WMD terrorism for at least two reasons. First, both countries have the technical and even military capabilities to conduct substantial cooperation in terms of joint research or crisis management exercises. The nuclear security “center of excellence” that China has pledged to establish during the Global Nuclear Security Summit in April could serve as a venue for deep bilateral communication and cooperation. Secondly, China has ramped up its anti-terrorism efforts in recent years as terrorism is becoming an increasing concern for Chinese leaderships who always attach top priority to domestic stability. Both the US and China have great political will to contain WMD terrorism and such common interests can serve as the basis for further bilateral cooperation.

Regional Nonproliferation: North Korea – A “Preemptive Measure”

The negotiation table to resolve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear proliferation has been set in the format of Six-Party Talks. Under this framework, the US plays a role of main negotiator while China is a mediator in China’s terms and a stake holder from the US perspective. However, the US, along with South Korea, has declared not to resume the Six-Party talks for the time being in the aftermath of Cheonan incident. China has been put in a difficult position as a hosting country for the Six-Party talks. At present, the joint efforts of China and the US to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear weapon have been halted due to another security issue.

Under these circumstances, it is speculated that North Korea may conduct a third nuclear test, following the first test in 2006 and the second in 2009. It is widely said that North Korea has many reasons to be tempted to conduct another round of nuclear testing, ranging from domestic reason to diplomatic purpose. But most importantly, there is a certain pattern of behavior emerging in North Korea’s nuclear testing: North Korea first announces the plan for the test, and the international community including China soon condemns the plan, but North Korea ignores it and takes action. Punitive action such as
economic sanction follows. But North Korea is bold enough to repeat the procedure as if clearly knowing what is going to happen after the test.

In addition, as seen in North Korea’s doubtful claim that they succeeded in testing a nuclear fusion device, it is vigorously pursuing its so-called nuclear ambitions. This may well be interpreted as a prelude to the third nuclear test.

China has effectively proven its resolve against North Korea’s attempt to develop nuclear weapon and nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asian region. China has voted in favor of the UN Security Council Resolution adapting economic sanction against North Korea both in 2006 and in 2009. By extension, China is most likely to stand in the same position with the US based upon the principle of nonproliferation if North Korea conducts the third nuclear test in the near future.

If so, it is recommended for China and the US to make a joint declaration preemptively before North Korea prepares for the third nuclear test. Both countries will make clear there will be a punitive measure if North Korea truly attempts to conduct the test. The purpose of the joint declaration is to convince North Korea of the predictable consequence following the nuclear test and prevent it from actually occurring.

Once such joint declaration is announced, North Korea is most likely to furiously react and to condemn the US’ hostile intention. But China appears to accrue more cost than the US by downplaying its relationship with North Korea. China may not want to push North Korea too far into a corner by joining the US efforts to impose pressure on it. In addition, it appears to be unfair to announce punishment in advance without any evidence of North Korea’s wrong-doing.

Nonetheless, both China and the US still need to reassess their cost-benefit calculus under the assumption that North Korea can really conduct the third test. As mentioned above, China is ready to take punitive action with the US under the framework of Security Council, given its adverse impact on the nonproliferation. Even so, China will be put in a more difficult situation because international community may claim far stronger punitive action knowing that North Korea will not give up its nuclear program in the end, as proven by the number of nuclear tests. The third test would definitely confirm North Korea’s nuclear status and the norm of nonproliferation would be seriously damaged. Thus, it is better for China and the US to make sure such will not happen by drawing a joint declaration against North Korea’s possible nuclear test in a preemptive manner.
“Mutual Vulnerability”
Perspective of Chinese Young Leaders
By Chaoyi Chen, Suhan Chen, Shan Ni, Qinghong Wang

Our Perception of this Concept

Generally speaking, the concept of “Mutual Vulnerability” emphasizes equal power or fair chances. Second, it is alarming that such a situation serves as a threat deterrent to each party, which means that their strength keeps them in balance and future conflicts would create damage to both sides. Third, only a limited number of countries have the capacity to be “mutually vulnerable” given the size of the arsenal required.

In the framework of nuclear security, the concept of “mutual vulnerability” highlights the “second nuclear strike capability” of nuclear-owned states, which means that those states nuclear capacities to execute in effective nuclear counterattack after it is hit by a first nuclear strike. When a nuclear state determines nuclear targets, it often makes nuclear weapons bases of enemies as the first choice. The most effective way to counterattack is to have nuclear retaliatory capability to attack big cities and industrial centers of enemies. A country with second-strike capability has a nuclear deterrent force.

The concept of “Mutual Vulnerability” originates in the “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) between the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. MAD may not be able to reduce the arsenals of either side, but rather helps them negotiate limits on future growth of those arsenals precisely to preserve mutual vulnerability. In retrospect, “Mutual Vulnerability (MV)” has played an important role in stabilizing the US-Soviet relationship and may have saved both from a worse nuclear arms race or even a nuclear war.

During the Cold War, the increasing nuclear power of the Soviet Union created US concern about crisis-stability. The mutual vulnerability of silo-based nuclear forces to preemptive attack had been a central concern of Soviet and US military planners and arms control negotiators. The potential for a disarming first strike had long been regarded as having a disturbing potential for escalating a super power political crisis into a military clash. In the 1960s, the US proposed the strategy of “mutual assured destruction,” which would ensure that a country retains sufficient forces to ride out a first strike and still have nuclear retaliation capability to destroy it’s opponent. Such mutual assured destruction could be seen as mutual vulnerability. Moreover, on account of the balance of power between the US and Soviet Union – the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons – both sides would not use nuclear weapons rashly. Therefore, the best choice of nuclear strategy is to have efficient nuclear counterattack on ability.

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However, this can’t be applied to other countries. MAD cannot be reached without the following preconditions. First, the two countries need to reach nuclear parity, or a state of equally destructive capability. In the US-Soviet case, the two nations built up their nuclear arms and expanded its arsenal in pace with the other. When they have reached a level when both could eliminate each other, MV is created. Second, MV guarantees that neither side could strike first and win. In other words, to avoid a first strike, both sides have the capability to do so. Since a first strike is likely to be followed by a retaliatory counterstrike, a first strike would be tantamount to suicide. In the US-Soviet case, MV (MAD) stopped both sides from building more nuclear weapons and launching a first attack.

Our Assessment of China’s Pursuit of This Goal towards the US

Many scholars in China believe that the MV between US and China doesn’t (necessarily) exist, which also explains why only a few papers on MAD and MV have been published in strategic, military, and foreign policy related academic journals in China. In our opinion, MV is not a suitable word to describe China’s nuclear policy. Instead, the Chinese government prefers to use “Minimal Deterrence (MD)” and “No First Use (NFU),” which are the two key principles of its nuclear development and policies.

In our opinion, China’s reluctance to embrace MAD can be explained from two perspectives (in response to the two preconditions we discussed above):

1) **China doesn’t have equal or near equal size of nuclear arsenals of the US.** As mentioned, MV exists when there is nuclear parity in two or more countries so that no one possesses a decisive advantage. In the case of China and the US, China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller than that possessed by the US. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the US and Russia lead the world in terms of nuclear weapons capabilities, with each country reportedly having more than 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads; China has an estimated 180. The unequal arsenal sizes means that the first precondition of MV and MAD is not met. It seems meaningless to discuss MAD under such an asymmetric situation.

2) Unlike from the US and Soviet Union, the essence of Chinese nuclear policy (doctrine) is **minimal deterrence** and **limited deterrence** and does not embrace MV. “Minimal deterrence” is characterized by a small, second-strike counter-value force bound by a no-first-use doctrine. “Limited deterrence” is comprised of counterforce, war-fighting capabilities “to deter conventional,

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theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war.”\(^\text{10}\) By claiming “no-first-use,” China’s nuclear strategy is not set up for “first attack” but for “defense” and “retaliation,” which is sometimes described as a “passive policy.” In addition, China emphasizes that it has never and will not participate in any nuclear arms race. As we mentioned, MV guarantees that neither side could strike first and stop the arm races. If China already gives up “first attack” and has never participated in an arms race, MV may not be as important as it was in US-Soviet Union relations.

China’s nuclear power has been a growing concern of other nuclear states; there is transparency of its nuclear arsenal and its second strike capability. Media reports on China’s nuclear capabilities highlight a qualitative leap in China’s nuclear submarines, such as having a water depth of 350-400m for hidden launch capability. True or not, they show the improvement of nuclear weapons both in quality and quantity. More important, we see progress in China’s counterstrike capability. It is also said that China can use ICBM’s in the central plains area even after a nuclear first strike.

Therefore, in our opinion, because of nuclear proliferation and the large gap among nuclear weapon states, China must maintain its second-strike capability with characteristics of “minimum deterrence” and “limited deterrence.” Minimum deterrence is premised on non-first use of nuclear weapons and negative as well as positive security assurance to use the smaller-scale second-strike force. Historically, there are problems in China’s nuclear deterrent. However, in many cases, the principles of its nuclear idea are similar to MAD. Recently, China published a number of articles calling for an alternative to limited deterrence. According to those articles, nuclear power should be able “to stop the conventional, theater and strategic nuclear war, and to control and contain the escalation of nuclear war,” which requires “greater quantity, smaller, high accuracy, survivability, and penetration ability more intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), sea-based ballistic nuclear force missile (SLBM), theater-level tactical nuclear weapons to combat battlefield and theater military targets with containment of escalation of the war, improvement of partial ballistic missile defense system with its limited nuclear deterrence viability, and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to attack military satellites of the opponents.”\(^\text{11}\)

Additionally, China has been struggling to halt nuclear nonproliferation in line with its diplomatic policy of “peaceful development.” As a result, China strongly objects to any nuclear arms race and requests other nuclear superpower to take the lead to reduce nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear power is based on the defense aim with no aim of seeking hegemony. Thus, China’s nuclear strategy could be seen as a signal of its own national strength. According to past decades of Chinese nuclear strategy and unswerving principles of China’s foreign affairs, China would continue to put national security interests and harmony of the region first, adhering to the common nuclear security of all

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of international society to further develop its role as a “stake-holder” and “responsible regional power.”

According to our prediction, in the near future (at least in the next 10 years), it is impossible for China to give up nuclear weapons or change MD/NFU policy. First, traditional hot security issues such as cross-strait relations, unification of the Korean Peninsula, and the territorial conflicts have not been resolved. China needs MD to keep the status quo in these areas. Second, to some extent, we should admit that China’s MD policy promotes a stable regional environment. Otherwise, the expansion of conventional weapons would promote a new round of competition in Asia. This is a natural reaction whether they are powers, such as the US, China, Russia and India, or small countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and other countries in the Southeast Asia. However, the unstable regional security environment caused by competition would not last for a long time and would result either in war or the establishment of a new security mechanism. Finally, in our perspective, China’s MD policy is also a response to the traditional alliance structure of the United States. Without mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and China, the traditional US-dominated hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances would cause suspicions and instability. So it is unlikely that the US would keep or reinforce the alliance while China changes its MD/NFU policy.

Our Assessment of US’ Pursuit of this Goal toward China

US doesn’t concede MV between the two countries. In the 2008 Sino-US Nuclear Security and cooperation symposium in a US expert said that the US might not easily admit (or promise) MV as China expected. Given the uncertainty of China’s role in international society, most US officials think that it is too early to make a decision about accepting MV. Due to the unequal arsenals of the US and China, some Americans still think the US should continue to possess unilateral preemptive deterrence (a decisive advantage) over China instead of accepting MV to elevate China’s position (balancing the deterrence of the US) in nuclear relations between the two countries.

Our Policy Suggestions

Our first suggestion is that both countries should seek stability through mutual deterrence. Instead of contemplating the scenario of MV between China and the US (speaking under the current situation, with continuing reductions in the US arsenal while China seeks a larger force structure etc.), we should create a more stable/peaceful mutual deterrence. Instead of chasing “nuclear parity,” China should maintain its “minimum deterrence” and “limited deterrence” for defense purposes (second strike) as well as participate in future nuclear cutoff talks such as Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT; the Chinese government has mentioned that it is willing to do so etc.) to assure other countries of its support for nonproliferation.

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The second suggestion is that both countries should redefine the concept of “mutual vulnerability” to match changes in international security as well as to bridge their conceptual gaps. The US may apply/switch to new deterrence methods in other areas (such as space, missiles etc.) after reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the overall US national security strategy. Those new deterrence methods may help the US avoid taking/accepting “vulnerability.” China should respond swiftly to this kind of potential change. Meanwhile, the US should understand China’s nuclear policy more accurately (such as China’s nuclear power is based on defense with no attempt of seeking hegemony), and not use any assumed English words to define China’s intention.

The third suggestion is that both countries should strengthen mutual trust and interdependence in international security issues. Realization of a nuclear weapon free world relies heavily on US leadership. If the US takes real actions to fulfill its goal, we believe that China will also take responsibility to pursue a peaceful world. Both countries can gradually deepen and enlarge their interdependence as well as build a mutual trust mechanism within multilateral frameworks such as establishing a new Asian collective security mechanism ruled by an “oligarchy” including the US, China, Japan, and India from existing sub-regional/regional cooperation mechanisms such as ASEAN+3, SCO.
Mutual Vulnerability in Sino-US Relations
By Chin-Hao Huang, Isaac Kardon, Akane Kishimoto, Kevin Shepard, Adrian Yi

The Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) uses the term “strategic stability” to characterize the relationship between the United States and China; this characterization contains several connotations, but could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the US is willing to accept de facto vulnerability with China. Many Chinese strategists argue that such a state of “mutual vulnerability” is desirable in Sino-US relations, while most of their US counterparts resist characterizing the strategic nuclear relationship in such terms. To American ears, this language is bitterly reminiscent of the US-Soviet nuclear competition, a hostile set of dynamics that are generally thought unnecessary and destabilizing under present circumstances. Many Chinese observers, however, do not view such an arrangement as an unwelcome vestige of the Cold War, preferring this mutual acknowledgment to arms-racing or spiraling strategic mistrust.

The following discussion will attempt to situate this debate in the broader political and strategic context from which it emerges. This effort grows out of the Young Leader component of the 5th annual US-China Strategic Dialogue, held in Honolulu in May 2010, hosted by DTRA and Pacific Forum CSIS. Drawing on the expert views offered during those two days of paper presentations, roundtable discussions, and small-group breakout sessions, we frame the subject of “mutual vulnerability” as both a tricky abstract concept and a matter of tremendous practical concern. First, we address the question of what mutual vulnerability means in general and as a function of the US-China relationship; we then discuss the circumstances and conditions under which mutual vulnerability is, in fact, desirable; finally, we offer concrete recommendations on how to achieve such an outcome.

What is mutual vulnerability in the context of US-China relations?

Mutual vulnerability refers to a bilateral circumstance in which each actor is able to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, and in which each actor comprehends that fact. Mutual vulnerability between the US and China is a state of affairs in which both parties’ strategic capabilities – both offensive and defensive – are sufficient to assure that neither side is willing to initiate an armed conflict with the other.

The most important effect that flows from mutual vulnerability is a robust and credible deterrent relationship. Confidence in this deterrence appears tautological: if both states are vulnerable, conflict is prohibitively costly, thus both states effectively deter one another. That characteristic, however, is dependent upon both sides being sufficiently vulnerable to the other’s strategic capabilities.

China’s assured nuclear second strike capability reflects the basic logic of the Chinese bid to maintain mutual vulnerability with the United States. Chinese strategists deem it necessary to maintain such a deterrent given the extent of United States’ nuclear
superiority in terms of both volume and technological sophistication of its arsenal and delivery systems, and the presence of forward-deployed US military assets in East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and along China’s western periphery. In response, the composition of China’s “lean and effective nuclear force”\textsuperscript{13} has evolved rapidly in recent decades; China has modernized its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, which are now deployed in increasing numbers as road-mobile, multiple-warhead, solid-fuel ballistic missiles, as submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and in strategic bombers. Meanwhile, the growing sophistication of US nuclear and conventional capabilities gives us two mutually constitutive independent variables – a moving target that complicates the task of describing the nature of the bilateral deterrent relationship.

There is nothing about mutual vulnerability that implies symmetry, as evidenced by China’s rhetorical commitment to retain minimal – and thus inferior – strategic forces. Especially in the case of Chinese military modernization, there is a steady accumulation of asymmetrical capabilities that exploit particular areas of US vulnerability without seeking parity in all domains – one of the central features of the US-Soviet nuclear relationship. In that dyad, a “stable balance” entailed mutual, secure, retaliatory threats of nuclear retaliation. That calculus that demanded tit-for-tat development in the types and numbers of offensive and defensive strategic forces. The dynamic in the present US-China strategic relationship is not predicated on this logic of parity, so we must be careful to account for the ascendance of counter-value – rather than counter-force – considerations informing each country’s decision on what kind of nuclear arsenal to field.

Space weapons and ballistic missile defense are two additional factors that complicate our ability to discuss mutual vulnerability as a purely nuclear issue. These new strategic arenas inject significant uncertainty into what type of a nuclear force can offer the secure second-strike capabilities believed necessary to maintain mutual vulnerability. Such evolving issues will remain at the forefront of Sino-US calculations of what constitutes mutual vulnerability. The remainder of this paper assesses the role mutual vulnerability may play in establishing strategic stability between the US and China.

\textbf{Is mutual vulnerability desirable in Sino-US strategic relations?}

It is regularly argued that mutual vulnerability of the United States and China to a nuclear second strike is not the most desirable form of deterrence. Indeed, during the May 2010 Strategic Dialogue, one US expert described the term “mutual vulnerability” as “toxic” vocabulary in Washington. While it may not yet be politically viable to speak of vulnerability \textit{vis-à-vis} China in the US domestic arena, the basic outline of this type of mutually assured threat appears to be the inevitable consequence of China’s current capabilities and its expected economic and strategic trajectory. Proper recognition of this “inconvenient truth” can serve as a stabilizing force in our bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{14} Deeper

\textsuperscript{13} 2006 MND White Paper
\textsuperscript{14} Here, we borrow Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.’s definition of stability. Pfaltzgraff explains that “a stable strategic relationship is one in which both sides gain knowledge about each other’s strategy such that the
understanding of the nature and consequences of this existing mutual vulnerability would also allow the United States to better devote resources to other aspects of our military, pursuing strategic policies that might ultimately discourage China from further expanding its nuclear arsenal.

George Perkovich pulls no punches when he acknowledges that “there is no way around the uncomfortable reality that mutual vulnerability is a fact of life once a potential adversary has survivable nuclear forces.”15 Given that China has shifted to a more survivable and flexible strategic nuclear force in which their land-based and submarine-based ICBMs are capable of targeting any location in the continental US, mutual vulnerability is now a fact of life.16

US damage limitation, especially in the form of ballistic missile defense, does not completely protect against possible strikes against the US. It does however provide China with a reason to rapidly modernize its forces, given Beijing’s emphasis on capabilities over numbers. In essence, as long as nuclear weapons are not contestable, mutual vulnerability is inevitable – meaning that whether it is “desirable” is a purely academic question. If American strategists ignore this fact, the US will drain its resources trying to pursue damage limitation efforts while providing strategic and political fuel for China’s nuclear modernization.

Is recognition of mutual vulnerability necessary for Sino-US strategic stability?

The interaction between Chinese nuclear doctrine and US nuclear capabilities as they currently exist suggests that mutual vulnerability is a necessary feature of a strategically stable relationship. The way that this arrangement is understood on either side, however, is not merely rhetorical: it will affect decisions about nuclear force structure, defense planning, and will inform leaders on both sides in the event of escalating crisis. A closer look at specific features of US and Chinese strategic postures will bear out this conclusion.

China has been clear in stating that it pursues deterrence by maintaining the capacity for retaliatory strikes against limited numbers of high-value targets. While the validity of US needs to develop ballistic missile defense systems is recognized, we also need to be cognizant of the fact that further development will encourage China to further expand its nuclear-strike capabilities. This is a particularly unwelcome development when the Obama administration is attempting to encourage Beijing to join Washington

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and Moscow in working to reduce the number of warheads in the world. Over a decade ago, China’s chief arms negotiator, Sha Zukang, stated that China would pursue a policy of nuclear build-up in response to large-scale missile defense by Washington. This position has, if anything, become even firmer. Willfully ignoring mutual vulnerability is unlikely to increase deterrence.

There is also an abundant literature in China indicating that a core principle of Beijing’s security doctrine focuses on “exploiting vulnerabilities of strong adversaries.” Many of those opposed to acknowledging mutual vulnerability point to this strategic focus of China’s as their principle argument. If the United States were to acknowledge vulnerability to Chinese nuclear second attack, it would only encourage Beijing to further strengthen that very asset, thus making the avoidance of an arms race between the two powers an impossibility. We feel confident, however, that despite the fact that China would recognize the vulnerability of the United States in this regard, it would also be aware of the depths of Washington’s technological and financial resources. China might focus its strategy on second-strike capacity in recognition of the US inability to completely deny such a deterrent, but would be careful to avoid upsetting any balance of power that would encourage the United States to “plug that gap” in its defenses. In fact, the ISAB Task Force that Roberts references highlighted as a Key Theme states: “Managing a positive relationship with the United States – at least for the short to medium term – is desirable to achieve other national objectives…China views the United States as its most significant trading partner…while China is preparing for armed conflict with the United States by seeking military advantages in asymmetric areas of warfare, it appears that Beijing does not desire such conflict.”

Rather than spark an arms race with China – one the United States is poised to dominate, but that would still fly in the face of Washington’s security objectives in the region and in the world – we should recognize that China is aware of the consequences of engaging the United States or its allies militarily, and be confident that Beijing feels sufficiently vulnerable to actively seek stability in its relationship with the United States. This logic kept the Cold War cold and has encouraged US-Russia disarmament dialog since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We support the ISAB Task Force recommendation to “move the US-China security relationship toward greater transparency and mutual confidence, enhance cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding or miscalculation that can contribute to competition or conflict.” Currently, China’s hesitancy to discuss its nuclear doctrine makes disarmament negotiations difficult, but all estimates of China’s nuclear weapons program indicate that the United States can continue disarmament talks with Russia for some time before mutual vulnerability with

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20 Ibid.
Beijing becomes an issue. In addition, by encouraging China’s responsible rise as a regional power and by engaging Beijing both politically, militarily, and economically, Washington can reduce the threat of a destabilizing Chinese “sprint for parity” as US nuclear stockpiles are reduced.

Collateral Benefits of Mutual Vulnerability

Acknowledging mutual vulnerability with China and encouraging the stability that it entails could offer benefits on several fronts. Fiscally, such a strategy could free up significant funds for spending on more immediate threats (such as efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Even the Heritage Foundation, generally inclined to doubt the current administration, determined that the Obama administration’s $8.4 billion in funding for the Missile Defense Agency, while “almost $1 billion less than the Bush administration’s budget request for the MSA for FY 2009,” would be able to maintain the status quo. While criticizing the administration, the Heritage Foundation nonetheless acknowledges that by maintaining stability through mutual vulnerability, the Obama administration has cut $1.358 billion from the budget that Congress would have needed to spend to pursue ballistic missile defenses desired by those striving for relative deterrent supremacy.

More important than dollars and cents, recognizing mutual vulnerability allows us to allocate other existing assets – to wit, manpower and technology – to more appropriately address more immediate threats. The tools needed to provide extended deterrence of North Korea to allies such as Japan and South Korea are not the same assets deployed to counter China’s nuclear arsenal, and multiple surveys in both Japan and the ROK reveal that these populations view Pyongyang as a more likely threat than Beijing. Acknowledging mutual vulnerability vis-à-vis China would help USFK and USFJ more appropriately deploy forces as the Pentagon pursues strategic flexibility and seeks to scale down the nuclear component of the extended deterrence offered to these allies.

In addition, the United States can set a global example of restraint: mutual vulnerability carves out space for strategists to acknowledge the detriments of competitive arms build-ups while allowing them to continue the push for disarmament. Washington can go long way toward displaying its commitment to arms reduction and further encourage other states to work toward a more cooperative international peace. In other words, by committing to the reduction of nuclear weapons, the United States can eliminate much of the incentive for problematic states to develop weapons of mass destruction that drive Washington to provide extended deterrence to its allies. Washington has acknowledged for almost half a century that missile defense and nuclear arms control are incompatible. This acknowledgement worked its way into policy regarding the Soviet Union as far back as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.


22 Ibid.
The same recognition of the inevitability and potential benefits of mutual vulnerability vis-à-vis China should make its way into Washington’s security and diplomatic policies.

Conclusion

Some degree of imprecision about the meaning and desirability of mutual vulnerability will continue to affect US-China relations. So, too, will the calculation of if and how mutual vulnerability can produce strategic stability – an acknowledged good for both sides. While both sides have agreed in principle to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, it will take a great degree of political will from both Washington and Beijing to implement the ideals of a “global zero” community. China can be expected to pursue the course of continued modernization of its nuclear force, especially in its retaliatory, second-strike capability and acquisition and development of more mobile and solid-fuel rocket force. A sizeable portion of China’s growing military budget will be channeled into these developments. Moreover, its security perceptions and concerns with potential confrontation and conflict with neighboring nuclear states (e.g., India, Russia, and the United States) will call for a hedging and deterrent policy whereby China continues to improve and expand the quality and quantity of its nuclear force. In the United States, the New START treaty with Russia is a positive step in the effort to reduce the number of nuclear forces on both sides. But Washington’s security perceptions and concerns, particularly with a nuclear Iran and North Korea, as well as China’s pursuit of a more robust nuclear deterrent policy, could become impediments to further unilateral reductions. As such, strong political will, mutual trust, and confidence-building measures in US-China bilateral military-to-military relations are needed to help reduce strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
Appendix A

Pre-Conference Essays

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Fifth Annual Meeting
US-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Connecting Long Term Goals to Contemporary Policy

Hilton Hawaiian Village • Honolulu, Hawaii
May 2-4, 2010

If ‘global zero’ was reached, how would the Asian regional security environment change? How would nations adjust their security policies?

Ms. Brittany Billingsley

“Global Zero” is unattainable until the prestige attached to nuclear weapons is eradicated and states are convinced that they are safer without the bomb. However, contemplating a world without nuclear weapons, and subsequent shifts in security policy, is necessary to determine implications for the Asian security environment.

Without nuclear weapons, there is no need for extended nuclear deterrence, a significant element of the Asian regional security environment. The nuclear umbrella, a long-standing element of the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances, becomes obsolete and US allies in Asia must accept a solely conventional deterrent, a strategy previously considered unacceptable. The perceived threat from North Korea declines, as it no longer possesses nuclear weapon capabilities. It is still considered a regional security concern, but the intensity of this threat wanes. The regional security environment shifts to strategic dynamics between the US and China. Given US conventional superiority, China feels the need to balance these capabilities by expanding its own. This draws attention of South Korea and Japan, who closely monitor China’s conventional capabilities, especially the reach of its naval arm. The US and China actively engage with regional allies and one another to prevent misunderstandings.

Shifting the security environment also requires shifting national security policies. The US takes action to maintain conventional superiority in Asia. Many previously dual-use systems, heavy bombers and missiles, are converted to conventional roles. Since the nuclear umbrella is no longer necessary, the US must reiterate its defense commitment to
regional allies. It thus maintains extended deterrence to Japan and South Korea, but it is now manifested as a forward military presence and conventional security guarantees.

China had continued for years to build up its own nuclear capabilities due to the perceived disparity with the US. Once global zero has been attained, the need for a nuclear deterrent against contingencies evaporates. There is however still a need to hedge, and as such, China shifts funds that were originally set aside for its nuclear program to modernizing its conventional capabilities. It focuses on naval development to extend its strategic focus and to secure sea lines of communication. China also develops its defense technologies and force-projection capabilities in light of the potentially destabilizing nature of US conventionally armed missile programs. Defense spending is still moderate, but the fact that there is additional spending and development at all garners attention from other states.

Japan and South Korea likely still experience uncertainty regarding US commitment and capabilities, especially about a solely conventional extended deterrent. Their regional security concerns shift from a nuclear-armed North Korea to an increasingly strong Chinese military presence. North Korea seeks closer alignment with China, knowing that its “ace in the hole” – nuclear capabilities – is now absent. Because the nuclear program is dismantled, traditional sanctions against North Korea are dropped, and it may look to China and other countries for collaboration expanding conventional capabilities, a development closely monitored by other Asian states.

Mr. Justin Bishop

Achieving what many consider impossible – a complete and verifiable global nuclear disarmament (in a peaceful manner) – would usher in a new era of international cooperation, transparency, and trust between Asia’s nation-states. This should raise stability throughout the region.

Or would it? The elimination of nuclear weapons also means that conventional military weapons would become more viable. Would nations reliant on both conventional and nuclear armaments (directly and indirectly) seek to increase conventional arms vis-à-vis perceived threats?

Probably not. Even in a world where nuclear weapons exist, only a few of the nations who possess them are modernizing their weapon systems. Moreover, the majority of nations transforming weapon systems are focused on delivery system renovations, i.e., submarines, missiles, and ICBMs (mobile and/or static), which are used to deliver BOTH nuclear and conventional warheads.

Additionally, the process of nuclear disarmament would take time. While the international community sheds nuclear arms, conventional military modernization will continue, and it’s doubtful that today’s conventional global military balance, (favoring the West) would shift enough to derail the international system. Additionally, it may be
safe to assume that in the new spirit of international cooperation accompanying global zero countries who lead Asia’s military balance will have enough foresight to recognize and avert a conventional arms race.

Fears that global zero as a result of new levels of collaboration and transparency would negate Asia’s need for US engagement and the US alliance system would dissipate, are also unfounded. The US and its alliances are not solely based on “Cold War military dimensions of offense and defense.” US engagement with its allies and partners is deep and multidimensional. The US and its allies collaborate in a variety of nontraditional security areas, including: trade, climate change, and energy. While it isn’t necessary for US cooperation in these areas to remain within the US alliance system, it is likely that collaboration through alliance mechanisms would be preferred by the US and its allies. An Asia in which nuclear weapons don’t exist won’t lack conventional/unconventional threats – North Korea’s conventional and/or unconventional threats. Thus US allies would continue to rely on the conventional dimensions of US extended deterrence.

The greatest uncertainty may come from China and Russia. Both countries’ nuclear arsenals are undergoing transformations that will increase their survivability and effectiveness. How would Beijing and Moscow’s security calculus’ change without their nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons are ONE component of both China’s and Russia’s multifaceted /multidimensional security calculus. The majority of conventional and unconventional threats faced by China and Russia would continue absent nuclear weapons. Moreover, nuclear weapons play a supporting role in dealing with the threats faced by Moscow and China. For example, nuclear weapons won’t solve Russia’s problems of Islamic militancy in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan, nor will they solve China’s problems of Xinjiang separatism and extremism; in both circumstances, socio-economic enfranchisement and respect for human/civil rights play a larger role than nuclear weapons.

A “future Asia” without nuclear weapons has nothing to fear. Transnational and other nontraditional security threats will persist as the most immediate threats, requiring the continued engagement of countries throughout the region. The increased cooperation that would be necessary to eradicate nuclear weapons would spread to other areas, enhancing the international responses necessary to deal with other security threats that will continue to exist absent nuclear weapons.

Ms. Chaoyi Chen

Global Zero is a long-term goal with a sense of uncertainty and unpredictability. On the one hand, realization of a nuclear weapon free world relies on the effect of the United States. However, in fact, the US is not prepared to give up nuclear weapons. The government pays much more attention to nuclear nonproliferation than disarmament. And nuclear policy is quite different between Democratic and Republican Parties, which will cause dramatic changes in the next administration. Obstructions also come from nuclear states whose conventional weapons are not comparable with superpowers such as the
United States. Nuclear force is the key pillar of national security strategy. Nevertheless, as former Sen. Sam Nunn said, Global Zero is like a mountain covered by a cloud: you don’t know if you can make it all the way up, but it’s important to start the climb.

If Global Zero is reached, there could be three changes or tendencies in the Asian regional security environment and, these changes might be synchronized with the process of Global Zero.

First, over time, the expansion of conventional weapons would be so prominent that states can get favorable positions and promote their international status in a new round of competition in Asia. This would be a natural reaction for powers such as the US, China, Russia, and India as well as small countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and others in Southeast Asia. However, the unstable regional security environment caused by this competition would not last for a long time and could end as a result of war or the establishment of a new security mechanism.

Secondly, traditional security issues such as cross-Strait relations, the Korean Peninsula, and territorial conflicts would be solved or could be solved under a multilateral mechanism with high standard of mutual trust before the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia. For example, rationally speaking, China would give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence if the US stopped arms sales to Taiwan permanently and China saw a large possibility of peaceful unification.

Finally, if Global Zero was reached, it would lead to a new Asian collective security mechanism ruled by an “oligarchy” including the US, China, Japan, and India. It would go through three stages: the weakening or disintegration of traditional alliances, the opening of sub-regional/regional cooperation mechanisms, and the establishment of a new Asian collective security mechanism (or the Asian Security Community). Without mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and China, the traditional US-dominated hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances would cause suspicion and instability. It is unlikely that the US would keep or reinforce the alliances and China would abandon its nuclear weapons. In order to avoid military turbulence, sub-regional/regional cooperation mechanisms such as ASEAN+3, or the SCO would shift from the economic level to the security level and include more states. A new Asian collective security mechanism or Asian Security Community would be the final goal of the transformation. However, it is obvious that without the traditional alliance system, the US would try to find a favorable place in the new Asian community to balance the power of China and other possible threats. In this case, such a mechanism or community would be based on a high standard of interdependence and be ruled by a small group of states who have dominance in conventional weapons such as the US, China, Russia, and India.

Ms. Suhan Chen

Given the growth in nuclear capabilities, “Global Zero” (GZ) is generally considered “Mission Impossible” or a utopian vision, even given recent steps by Russia and the US
to reduce their arsenals. If GZ were to transpire, it would have unprecedented influence on the Asian regional security environment:

1. **Eliminate the nuclear arms race in Asia.** One out of five nuclear states (NWS) and three known nuclear powers (non-NPT) are in Asia, in addition to those under the “nuclear umbrella.” Driven by national security and “weak deter strong” – or strong deter equally strong – factors, some nuclear powers and Nuclear Threshold States and Regions have implemented unsanctioned nuclear activities. Under GZ, the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan and nuclear activities in North Korea and Iran would cease.

2. **Defuse the nuclear aspirations of Nuclear Threshold States (NTS) and regions.** Among NTS, Japan has created civilian nuclear power plants (such Rokkasho) that are believed to have the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has its Bushehr I Nuclear Power Plant. Both South Korea and Taiwan had nuclear weapons programs that ended only through US pressure. GZ would eliminate these risks.

3. **Remove “nuclear hot spots.”** GZ would eliminate concerns about the Korean Peninsula, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Any country wanting to “go nuclear” would be the enemy of the global community.

However, **GZ would not eradicate all security issues in Asia.** Since the Cold War, major security concerns in Asia have not always related to nuclear issues:

4. Some are caused by **national policies** of superpowers, such as the “first strike” policy and imperialism of the US toward some countries in Asia (i.e., Bush administration policies toward North Korea).

5. Some are aroused by the **competition for resources** for technological and economic development. Unconventional security issues include conflicts over maritime resources, such as oil, minerals, and fish. Other cases include space exploration and new trade routes of energy (i.e., South China sea & Pirates near Malacca).

6. **Some reflect unsolved historical problems,** such as border disputes (i.e., South China Sea dispute).

GZ would be an opportunity for Asian countries to reassess their security framework. Given the multi-polarity of politics, economic globalization and the spread of it, nations in Asia would adjust security policies in three directions:

1. **Boost security cooperation** on the basis of mutual trust. The increased level of cooperation would go a long way toward guaranteeing a stable international

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environment distinguished from the “horrific peace” of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War.

2. The strategic trends of some Asian nations would switch from military development to the enhancement of overall strength, including economic, scientific, and technological development. Imbalanced development in North Korea and Iran would be adjusted.

3. Under GZ, a high-tech conventional weapons race may come to the forefront. Competition on the development of space satellites and information technology would escalate.

Mr. Sungmin Cho

What does ‘global zero’ mean in Asia? China, India and Pakistan will no longer possess nuclear weapons and North Korea will give up its nuclear program in a complete and irreversible manner. At the same time, the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ will be withdrawn. As long as nuclear weapons are concerned, there will be many visible changes in Asia. But most issues in the region will remain unchanged. Territorial disputes remain unresolved. Taiwan and two Koreas remain possible triggers of major wars. The US-ROK and the US-Japan alliances will persist, which confront China, Russia, and North Korea in nature. Then, the question is whether the eradication of nuclear weapons in this region will have any impact on these security issues. The answer is no, because nuclear weapons have been one of many elements of the security dilemma in Asia.

With the elimination of nuclear arsenals, how would the Asian regional security environment change? First, nonproliferation will be achieved and there will be no more fears of mishandling warheads or their falling into the hands of rogue states or nonstate actors. At the same time, the effect of nuclear deterrence will be gone, too. China will lose its minimal deterrent, which has been chiefly psychological rather than practical (in a military sense). Similarly, North Korea will see a great increase in its insecurity, even worse than before developing nuclear weapons. South Korea may feel insecure without the nuclear umbrella. There will be spread of insecurity, affecting nations in Asia. It is primarily because of this that the security dilemma in Asia will be destabilized by the absence of nuclear deterrence.

In a changing security environment, how would nations adjust security policies? Simply, they have to rely on conventional weapons. That means their military strategies need to focus on the initial phase of battle, (nuclear weapon used to force strategists to think from the end result of war). Accordingly, the quantitative and material aspects of conventional weapons will re-gain attention, while the qualitative and psychological aspects of nuclear weapons will lose effect. To compensate for the deterrent effect generated by the small number of nuclear arsenals, nations will seek to possess much larger numbers of conventional weapons with more sophisticated technologies. China is most likely to move in such direction and other nations will respond in the same way if there is no
regional security institution. In this way, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons may trigger a conventional arms race weapons in Asia.

I am not arguing against ‘global zero.’ Rather ‘global zero’ will not bring about fundamental change in Asia because this region has not yet escaped from the security dilemma. Indeed, the security dilemma may be further destabilized by the complete removal of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, there should be a certain order for nuclear abolition in Asia. Nonproliferation must be pursued first, but the relief of the security dilemma must precede ‘global zero’ in Asia.

Mr. Mark Garnick

Total disarmament of nuclear weapons is critical to regional peace and security in Asia. National military contingency planning for possible nuclear exchange would no longer be a part of the strategic calculus. Nations would not fear annihilation as a result of a provocative action. Dangers of nuclear fallout and environmental consequences would become obsolete. The two great implications of a world without nuclear weapons are its impact on extended deterrence, which would significantly affect US-ROK and US-Japan relations and threat perceptions. China and the DPRK would not fear the US nuclear umbrella. However, the relationship between the US and China would not change dramatically. There would be a shift toward conventional means, such as US prompt global strike capabilities.

If the DPRK were not developing nuclear weapons, then the US would maintain US troops in South Korea, but they would focus more on defense and the conventional capabilities of the DPRK. Japan would feel more secure if China or DPRK did not possess nuclear weapons, but it would continue to develop Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) to safeguard against Chinese short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, and the DPRK Nodong missiles. China would continue to modernize its military to be able to conduct local wars under conditions of informationalization, and would keep its defense spending opaque.

Threat perceptions would remain a strong element of national security decision-making. China’s continued military modernization would raise fears among Taiwan and Japan due to a lack of transparency, and ensure a US presence in Asia. China would continue to be threatened by US BMD systems and US Prompt Global Strike, which would oblige China to continue to modernize its forces. Taiwan would continue to be a flashpoint; however, with the elimination of nuclear weapons the balance of power in favor of the Chinese military disparity even larger. The Chinese would rely on development of new ballistic missiles that are conventionally armed, and capable of targeting US aircraft carriers over the horizon to promote access denial capabilities to protect maritime sovereignty and territorial integrity. Cities in US, China, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan would no longer be threatened by annihilation, which would ease tensions, but distrust would remain due to historical differences. Due to lingering concerns such as Taiwan, North
Korea, territorial disputes, China and the US would continue to develop their conventional capabilities. The US and China have began the development of conventional strike capabilities that are equally threatening; however, the fear of escalation has diminished. US raises fears within China. China is developing its conventional ballistic missile systems to strike US military assets in Asia in the event of a first strike on strategic assets, or a Taiwan crisis. The prospects for multilateral dialogues may increase complete disarmament.

Capt. Christopher Gin

In a hypothetical world where nuclear arms no longer constitute a portion of national arsenals, a reinvigorated security policy of engagement throughout Asia would be necessary. However, no matter how effective a policy of disarmament would be, former nuclear-capable nations would likely retain the technical expertise to quickly reproduce nuclear arms. This highlights the need to empower effective and impartial inspection organizations to keep countries honest in a global zero world, as state leaders and diplomats prepare for an uneasy period maintaining a new status quo.

If Asian nations help achieve a denuclearized world, then maintaining trust amidst differing national interests would be the new battlefield. A world without nuclear armaments does not necessarily provide a more stable foundation for diplomacy. On the contrary, the disappearance of the nuclear upper hand – as a deterrent and as an offensive threat – may give rise to greater insecurities and worsen current conditions.

In Asia, the Six-Party Talks could be resuscitated as efforts shift toward stabilizing the new status quo, but with several caveats. North Korea would likely maintain a covert weapons development program if the current regime remained in power. Russia could likely do the same as it moves toward recapturing its superpower status and rebuffs US expansion of its missile defense program. China would have the chance to live-up to its own moral call if it stayed true to a non-nuclear policy and thereby win some transparency and trust points with the international community, but its insecurities about the United States’ ability to intervene in Taiwan, Japanese future aggression, and a desire to expand its global reach may prevent it from complete adherence. South Korea and Japan would question the US as a serious ally unless the missile defense umbrella remained in effect; otherwise, the two may seek to improve conventional forces at an arms race pace. The US may regain some of its lost moral authority by taking the lead in the quest toward global zero, but at the cost of its strategic deterrent.

Global zero is an unrealistic goal as long as disparities in power distribution remain. Unless fringe leaders perceive relinquishment of their tool for international attention as a positive step for their people, global zero is unlikely. Furthermore, once supply goes

24 The views expressed in this article are the author’s own opinions and in no way represent his official position of employment, the US Army, or the United States Government.
down, the demand may go up for those wishing to acquire nuclear weapons to wrest control from or blackmail newly denuclearized states. With leadership changing throughout the world it is naïve to overlook the possibility of a future leader, regime, or group singlehandedly reversing progress made to reach global zero. It is in most states’ interest to concentrate efforts that result in the abatement of nuclear arms and the dismantlement of incipient programs in countries that are attempting to gain power through possession of nuclear arms. Any state that takes the lead in this effort by its actions deserves to be well-received and followed by the international community.

Mr. Chin-Hao Huang

Even as the goals of “global zero” are attained, the security arrangements and architecture in the Asia-Pacific region would probably only see moderate changes. For the most part, there would be continuity in the way the region thinks about security relations. The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone technically rules out and freezes the use of nuclear weapons in the region, and most countries in the region are signatory members of this treaty. The treaty itself, enshrines the spirit of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and seeks to limit and gradually reduce their role in maintaining regional security relations.

In relation to other regions, Asia enjoys a great deal of peace and stability. The region’s relations with China will probably maintain the dual approach of engagement and hedging. China’s nuclear arsenal has always been a source of concern for the region, but ever since it signed on to the SEANFZ principles in 1999, the region’s concern with China has shifted to one that has more to do with the opacity behind Beijing’s expanding military modernization. For what purposes will the world’s largest army use its growing military and economic prowess? Even if China signs on to the “global zero” commitments, it could, like most other major powers holding nuclear stockpiles, argue for certain limitations and exceptions. As such, there will be continued expectations for the region to engage China, to work with China on a broadening range of security questions including peacekeeping, joint training exercises, and cooperation on non-traditional security issues.

On the other hand, countries in the region will also diversify their foreign and security relations, maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening alliances and partnerships with the United States. Washington, for better or worse, will most likely remain the ultimate security guarantor for most countries in the region. Its role and significance in the region will not be diminished as a result of a “global zero” scenario. If anything, countries in the region could see a greater degree of armaments and military expenditure and continue to rely on the United States for such non-nuclear related weaponry. A world without nukes, and certainly a security guarantor without nukes, means that some countries in the region (e.g., Japan and South Korea) might need a more robust military program that could deter such outliers as North Korea.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Asian regional security environment has been conditioned to a significant degree by the presence and later proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whatever the discrete processes of nuclear disarmament leading to ‘global zero’, its realization would reconfigure the precarious strategic balance fostered by mutual nuclear deterrence. In consequence, states would have to rethink core security policies that had once simply bracketed many critical strategic issues under long-standing assumptions about the function of nuclear weapons.

America’s reckoning would probably be the most thorough and dramatic because of the centrality of its nuclear arsenal in its policies and force posture as well as the importance of its extended deterrence commitments to South Korea, Japan and perhaps Taiwan. Washington would seek to deploy more (and more sophisticated) conventional weapons to both maintain deterrent relationships with China and Russia, and to provide a credible substitute for its extended nuclear deterrent forces. Further, America’s hub-and-spokes model for regional engagement would be subject to long-term revision: even if a sufficient conventional deterrent force could be fielded as a functional substitute for nuclear weapons, it would be impossible to justify the expense and strategic commitments it entailed, ultimately leading to a looser valence between the US and its allies and partners.

These developments would not occur in a vacuum: China’s military modernization would continue on an even steeper trajectory. Beijing would not relinquish its minimum deterrent without first eroding US conventional advantages – particularly with respect to potential cross-Strait scenarios. Although nuclear weapons play a less seminal role in China’s force posture and strategic doctrine, alterations to its security policy would likely be pronounced vis-à-vis two dyads: China-Japan and China-India. The former seems primed for intensified strategic competition and arms-racing; the latter presents prospects for limited conflict over disputed territory – or even Tibet.

North Korea is the most vexing and uncertain variable in this equation. Without recourse to nuclear blackmail, the DPRK’s security (and perhaps even its sovereignty) would undergo drastic revision. One conceivable outcome would be tenuous stability through a reaffirmed alliance with China; another (perhaps more likely) outcome would be a rapprochement with America that afforded better integration into regional economic and political life; a third possibility is the dissolution of the regime, whose legitimacy could be fatally undermined by failure to cash in its nuclear bargaining chip.

Imagining other security dynamics presents comparable challenges – not least in anticipating the multilateral mechanisms that could facilitate full nuclear disarmament. The elaboration of an effective nonproliferation regime will demand changes to the region’s normative and structural features: transformed institutions, recalibrated strategic

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25 Unfortunately, due to space constraints, Russia, India, Pakistan, and (if we conceive of Asia more broadly) Israel and Iran will not receive specific attention.
doctrine and political culture, and updated norms for diplomatic and intelligence exchanges will be necessary to efface the specter of nuclear warfare. Even when the weapons themselves are dismantled, the technology will inhere in civil nuclear enterprises and in the body of scientific knowledge, producing a new and troubling phenomenon: a latent or recessed deterrent. Only with robust mechanisms for confidence-building, verification and enforcement built into the regional fabric could sufficient checks be placed on what would otherwise be a destabilizing (if slightly more remote) reincarnation of the traditional nuclear standoff.

Finally, the threat of nuclear terrorism would almost certainly be reduced in an absolute sense. No existing warheads, less fissile material, heightened port and border security, and a scarcity of technical expertise would combine to make it next to impossible for a terrorist organization to acquire nuclear weapons.

Ms. Ni Shan

As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said “we shall no longer live in the fear of global nuclear war,” and our international society is free of nuclear weapons, will the security environment become more stable or peaceful? The answer may be questionable.

Although there may be no nuclear threats, new troubles would emerge from unsolved conflicts, particularly for military powers, that would give other countries more freedom to act without worrying about nuclear threats. Small countries will in a dangerous and vulnerable situation. In addition, probabilities of making and using CBW\(^{26}\) for threats will be increased, resulting in challenges to international order and regional balance.

Similarly, the Asia regional security environment will be drawn into a complex security dilemma and intensify struggle among countries. Lack of nuclear deterrence will force countries to seek or adjust their own security policies. This will bring about new challenges in bilateral or multilateral relations.

Due to the geopolitical importance of the US, China, and Japan in Asian regional security, nuclear deterrence has played significant roles in their domestic and foreign security policies. If global zero is realized, the US would further expand its military advantage in Asia especially in East Asia in accordance with its global strategy. Since 9/11, the US has been fighting terrorism. The US would strengthen the US-Japan Alliance. To avoid any potential of revival of nuclear weapons in Asia, US would rely mostly on Japan’s primary roles in monitoring nuclear security as well as containing China’s rising regional influence. Correspondingly, without the US nuclear umbrella, Japan would continue to deepen strategic military partnership with the US with more frequent military joint exercises. Nevertheless, Global Zero and historical lessons will oblige the US to adopt policies that block Japan’s military rise. Additionally, China’s development and improved international status have notable impacts on the region.

\(^{26}\) CBM: chemical and biological weapons
China’s diplomacy will follow its peaceful and stable strategy but expect broader and deeper security regional cooperation with a far more positive attitude in global zero, promoting more multilateral security cooperation. Furthermore, solving the Taiwan issue is more critical and pressing because such problem is more likely to be used as a China containment tool by the US without nuclear deterrence.

Also, security policy in countries like Korea, DPRK, India and in Asia’s largest regional organization, ASEAN, should change under the promise of Global Zero. For instance, without nuclear weapons or legalization of developing nuclear weapons, the DPRK would have no excuse for developing nuclear weapons. Given its unique national system and undeveloped economy, DPRK would face severe security challenges both at home and abroad. In the meantime, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula would be on the agenda and owing to its central position in East Asia, the unification process is not only related to DPRK and ROK, but also serves regional interests more broadly.

Complete destruction of nuclear weapons is the common goal of international society. “Global Zero” is based on the principle of “maintaining balance and stability of global strategy” and “undiminished security for all countries.” As the global security environment will face new challenges and resuming threats of nuclear weapons production and imbalance among regional countries. Likewise, in Asia, a change of security policies would lead to new competition among regional powers. A regional security system characterized by multilateral cooperation is the most reasonable future choice.

![Asian Security Dynamics under Global Zero](image)

**Dr. David Santoro**

Bernard M. Baruch, the American financier and presidential advisor who played a key role in managing international relations from the First World War to the early 1960s,
once said that “[i]f the history of the past 50 years teaches us anything, it is that peace does not follow disarmament – disarmament follows peace.” Baruch was reflecting on his experience of the post-First World War world, during which the assumption was that disarmament constituted the chief solution to security problems and, therefore, that it had to be implemented as soon as possible. (Evidently, this assumption proved mistaken and was one of the core causes of the Second World War.)

These considerations suggest that “global zero” in Asia will only be within reach if – and only if – the Asian regional security environment changes first, not the other way around. In other words, nuclear disarmament cannot but be the consequence of the resolution of regional conflicts or at least of improved regional political and security relations. A non-comprehensive list of the conditions to be reached in Asia that would make nuclear disarmament possible includes the development of strong or relatively strong cooperative relations among the three main regional powers (the United States, Russia, and China), both among themselves and in their relations to others; a complete resolution or a robust and long-lasting stabilization of the conflict over Taiwan; the development of strong or relatively strong confidence in Japan, South Korea, and other Asian nations, as well as in the United States and Russia that China’s economic and military development is not threatening to them or their interests; a complete resolution or a robust and long-lasting stabilization of the South Asian Kashmir dispute and the development of strong or relatively strong confidence or reassurance measures between India and Pakistan.

Although it is fair to assume that these conditions will not be reached any time soon, it would similarly be a mistake to consider that progress toward nuclear disarmament is impossible. As spelled out in the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review, for instance, the United States is working to push the role of its nuclear weapons further into the background, it is calling for efforts to work toward maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels (the US-Russian disarmament dialogue could soon be extended to China), and it is strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of its allies by increasingly using its non-nuclear strategic force.

The conclusion is that the road to “global zero” will be long and take time, and that once complete, the state of international and regional relations will have changed in a manner that cannot be appreciated today. Perhaps this should come as no surprise. As former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared after the Yalta Conference to point out the uncertainties that major powers were facing in attempting to re-establish world order as the Second World War was coming to an end, “[i]t is a mistake to look too far ahead. Only one link in the chain of destiny can be handled at a time.”

Dr. Kevin Shepard

If ‘Global Zero’ were reached, it would mean drastic changes had been made in the Asian regional security environment. With two major nuclear states vying for power in Northeast Asia, it would be natural to focus on the denuclearization of the United States and China as the most influential change in regional security dynamics. However, with
fully three-quarters of the countries boasting nuclear arsenals located in (East and Central) Asia, it would be the denuclearization of these lesser nuclear-armed countries in the region and their changed relationships, both with the Great Powers and among themselves, that would have greater implications for the regional security environment. Reaching Global Zero would not, however, be the impetus for these changes in national security policies. Rather, these changes, and the resultant establishment of an atmosphere in which such disarmament was possible, would be the result of efforts to increase cooperation, transparency, and ultimately, stability in the region. Only then could we see movement toward Global Zero.

China has maintained, since its emergence as a nuclear power in 1964, that it supports complete denuclearization, and that until that time comes, it will maintain a purely deterrent nuclear arsenal and a no-first-strike policy. Therefore, concerns held by China’s neighbors over its emerging power focus more on economic and conventional military influence. The United States has limited its first-strike options, but has also labeled North Korea an “outlier” out of favor with the IAEA and in violation of the NPT, and therefore a potential target for nuclear attack. The denuclearization of North Korea, then, would necessarily mean a change in Washington’s security policy vis-à-vis Pyongyang, and the combination of a denuclearized North Korea and the long-sought removal of the threat of US nuclear attack on Pyongyang could go a long way toward advancing stability and integration on the Korean peninsula.

On the other hand, Global Zero, although supported by (the non-nuclear) Japan and South Korea, would also mean the end of the nuclear umbrella promised these allies of the US. The denuclearization of North Korea does not necessarily mean the forfeiture of Pyongyang’s vast chemical and biological weapons, weapons of grave concern to its neighbors. If Global Zero meant a build-up in US conventional weapons in order to reassure allies in Seoul and Tokyo, it could encourage the Chinese to answer in-kind.

Therefore, Global Zero should be pursued with open eyes, and an awareness of potential side-effects detrimental to regional security. The myriad benefits of Global Zero would begin with the increased cooperation between Beijing, Moscow, and Washington that would be required to accomplish such a feat. Trilateral cooperation on denuclearization could also lay the groundwork for a permanent regional security architecture. China’s denuclearization would have limited direct strategic impact, but Beijing’s leadership in the denuclearization process could help to boost its image as a responsible power, easing concerns of some of its neighbors. The level of trust that would first need to be established between Islamabad and New Delhi would help to bring peace and cooperation to a region long-thrashed by infighting. Global Zero would drastically increase the likelihood of a peace treaty replacing the Korean War armistice agreement, and the benefits likely to be gained by Pyongyang could add to economic and political stability in the region. Sharing the goal of Global Zero means much more for Asian regional security than removal of nuclear threats.
Mr. Qinghong Wang

If ‘global zero’ as a multilateral intergovernmental consensus is reached, Asian regional security environment and security policies of nations would substantially change. The agreed disappearance of one of the cornerstones of Asian regional security structures could lead to a power vacuum, imbalance, and realignment related to all nuclear weapon states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), de facto nuclear weapon states, and nuclear weapon free states in the region. Meanwhile, the agreed elimination of nuclear weapons will be marked not only as another milestone in Asian control and ban of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) but as an additional safeguard against global terrorism and transnational crimes.

Among the three nuclear weapon states in Asia, the US and Russia have to take the lead and make large adjustments of their defense systems by replacing nuclear weapons with alternative weapons. However, since both Washington and Moscow are financially strained by the current wave of financial crisis (Russia is also struggling for a post-Soviet revival), the complete destruction of dismantled nuclear warheads is questionable. Similarly, independent development of alternative weapons to replace nuclear weapons will be limited in a short term. Thus, the process of substantial reduction of nuclear weapons very likely lasts quite long. Consequently, China might not reduce its rather small nuclear arsenals until the US and Russia reduce their nuclear warheads to under 500 each. China might dramatically accelerate its development of alternative weapons and cooperate with other countries in checking and controlling the proliferation of nuclear materials. This might trigger an arm race among China, India, Japan, and South Korea, which have been less affected by the financial crisis than the US and European countries.

A ‘global zero’ consensus will reduce the legitimacy of any secret and open programs by any state, especially the ongoing nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and Israel. However, the implementation of complete denuclearization in Asia by nuclear weapon states, especially by the US, is the key to making those nuclear weapon maintenance and acquisition programs thoroughly illegitimate. A ‘global zero’ consensus will also promote the cooperation by countries to supervise the proliferation of nuclear materials from states to nonstate actors, especially terrorist and criminal organizations.

As the initiator of nuclear weapon proliferation, the only user of nuclear weapons, and the holder of the largest nuclear arsenal, it is strategically and morally meaningful for the US to take the leadership in completely eliminating nuclear weapons. Since this new ‘global zero’ initiative promoted by President Obama is very close to China’s nuclear policies, such as calling for a complete ban of nuclear weapons and no first use of nuclear weapons, Beijing and Washington have great potential for strengthening bilateral cooperation and deepening mutual trust in this field.
Ms. Adrian Yi

Assuming that a verification system for state and nonstate actors as a part of ‘global zero’ was reached, the biggest change in the Asian regional security environment would be the absence of nuclear deterrence. However, without nuclear weapons, nations will rely solely on conventional capabilities for defense and deterrence.

For ‘global zero’ to be achieved, not only will nuclear weapons states have to relinquish their arsenal but rogue states such as North Korea will also have to denuclearize. However, North Korea will most likely not give up its nuclear weapons under the current regime. The most plausible condition under which the Korean Peninsula would denuclearize in the short term requires North Korea’s complete collapse and absorption by South Korea. A unified Korean Peninsula under South Korean rule would be the most likely scenario under which a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula is achieved.

This loss of a buffer zone would cause China extreme unease and provide another reason, aside from the increased reliance on conventional capabilities with the absence of nuclear weapons, to bolster its military modernization efforts. Russia will not stand by without reinforcing its conventional capabilities. China’s increased military capabilities will in turn cause Japan and Korea to demand more security assurances. The US will then have to carefully balance providing enough security assurances to its Asian allies while not provoking a conventional arms race with China or even Russia. Even under such an extreme scenario, there seems to be no fundamental change in the overall Asian regional security environment. Regional dynamics will continue with countries relying on conventional weapons instead of nuclear weapons.

Consider another scenario; the current North Korean regime denuclearizes, allowing it to fully participate in international society. Economic competition would increase as Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea vie for access to North Korean ports, natural resources, and development projects. However, without a peace treaty, the North and South will remain at war and inter-Korean tensions may continue, especially if North Korea feels that its sovereignty is being encroached upon via excessive foreign influence. The US will be concerned about deepening China-DPRK ties. Although this scenario posits a more peaceful and stable outcome, there is no significant change in regional security dynamics.

In essence, even with the absence of nuclear weapons, extended deterrence will continue to play a large role in the US, Japanese, and Korean security policy and there will be no fundamental change in the overall Asian regional security environment.

Mr. Tong Zhao

Generally speaking, “global zero” could be achieved only after either or both of two conditions are met: first, prominent regional security problems have been solved and countries no longer see utility of possessing nuclear weapons against adversaries or
rivals; second, some conventional deterrent has been established and effectively replaced nuclear deterrence to prevent large-scale military conflict between previous nuclear weapon states and some kind of balance of power has been formed on the basis of a balance of conventional military capability.

If “global zero” is achieved under the first condition, there will no long be any serious regional security problem in Asia, which means conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the US and China over Taiwan Strait, confrontation between North and South Korea, North Korea and Japan, China and Japan, China and India, Iran and its neighbors, so on and so forth, will all have been resolved. If this is the case, the Asian regional security environment will have been greatly improved and trust between countries will have grown substantially. The next step for Asian countries to take, as a result, is to look into the future and take long-term measures to consolidate and further shape their security relationship in a cooperative way. One option is to follow the model of the European Union and create some security arrangement among Asian countries that resembles the Common Security and Defense Policy (previously known as the European Security and Defense Policy, or, ESDP) in Europe.

If “global zero” is achieved under the second condition, strategic relations in Asia are not necessarily better than the status quo except that a new form of conventional deterrence and a new balance of power based upon conventional military capabilities will have replaced the nuclear balance in the region. Under such a scenario, although the danger of nuclear annihilation no longer exists, relations between rival states could become more volatile due to at least two reasons: first, from the perspective of offense-defense balance of military technology, conventional strategic weapons are offense dominant; and second, the effectiveness and credibility of conventional deterrence are more questionable than nuclear deterrence. As a result, countries in the region will feel compelled to develop and deploy offensive conventional weaponries in peacetime and will tend to use their conventional weapons preemptively in a crisis. To prevent a conventional arms race and to maintain or even improve strategic stability between countries in such circumstances, measurements of trust and confidence building will be of critical importance. The good news is there will be opportunities for countries to take and make progress in this direction. In a “global zero” scenario, for instance, countries will need to reach and implement comprehensive verification measures to make sure that no country is secretly pursuing nuclear weapons. The process of negotiating and implementing such verification agreements is a good opportunity to increase transparency and mutual understanding and to build trust. Such measures could also be extended to conventional weaponries and help create a conventional arms control mechanism in the region that will ultimately contribute to long-term stability.
Appendix B

About the Authors

Ms. Brittany Billingsley is a 2010 visiting Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She is pursuing an MA in international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, specializing in Asia studies and focusing on Chinese security. She spent a semester abroad at the Beijing Foreign Studies University and received a BA in East Asian studies from the Pennsylvania State University with a minor in political science and Chinese language. Brittany has interned twice with the US Department of State: at the Foreign Service Institute in 2006, and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in the Regional Affairs office in 2009. Her research interests include Chinese domestic policy, Chinese security issues and US-China relations, in addition to China-India-Pakistan relations, nonproliferation and nuclear issues.

Mr. Justin Bishop is pursuing an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaii Pacific University with a focus on Chinese energy security and its implications for the global security environment. Justin currently works at Pacific Forum CSIS as a research assistant, and at Cubic Applications as a research analyst. Previously, Justin served as a research assistant at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, with a focus on counter-terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Bishop has worked on a wide variety of projects including: Chinese energy security, the CSCAP WMD Handbook, military modernization throughout Asia, and South/ South East Asia terror issues.

Ms. Chaoyi Chen is a development officer for the Fudan University Education Development Foundation in Shanghai. She received her BA in international politics in 2006 and MA in international relations in 2009 from Fudan University. Her focus is Sino-US relations and East Asia integration. She joined the Young Leaders from May, 2009 and wrote the trade and financial part with Scott Hartley in the task force report “US-China Relations: A Roadmap for the Future.”

Ms. Suhan Chen is an assistant director with the Confucius Institute at The Mansfield Center, University of Montana. Ms. Chen worked as an editor of international news for China Central Television and a reporter in training for the Science Department of Guangming Daily prior to her education in Japan and the US. She is fluent in English, Japanese and Chinese. She has been the executive vice president of the Chinese Students Association at the University of Montana, in charge of community outreach and culture education for K-12 schools in the Missoula School District. She also represented the University of Montana in leading the Montana Rocky Mountain Ballet Theater to China in 2008 as a pre-Olympic Sino-US exchange program.

Mr. Sungmin Cho is studying toward a Master’s degree in international relations at Peking University. He received his BA in political science and international relations at
Korea University. He spent one year as an exchange student at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada in 2003-2004. Upon graduating in 2005, Mr. Cho joined the Republic of Korea Army in the position of intelligence officer. Serving three years, including a seven-month tour to Iraq in 2006, Mr. Cho finished his military duty in 2008. Currently, he is an intern at the Beijing office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and is working on his dissertation with a focus on the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on Sino-US relations.

**Mr. Mark Garnick** is a Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is pursuing his MA in international policy studies with a concentration in East Asia studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is also apart of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, East Asia Nonproliferation Department where he researched China’s Aerospace industry, and China’s military modernizations. He holds a BA in International Relations from California State University Sacramento.

**Mr. Christopher Gin** is a 2005 West Point graduate and holds a Bachelor’s degree in English, and a field of study in Chinese. From 2005-2007, he was a Graduate Degree Fellow at the East-West Center and earned an MA in Chinese studies from the University of Hawaii. Previously, he served as an assistant China desk officer at US Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii in the Strategic Plans and Policy Division. Currently, he is stationed in Hawaii with an Infantry Battalion and will deploy for the second time to Iraq this summer. He is a graduate of the Army’s Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger, and Tank Commander’s courses.

**Mr. Chin-Hao Huang** is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Southern California. From 2007-2009 he was a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Until 2007, he worked at the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has written on China’s role in international peacekeeping and on China-Africa-US relations, including China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implications, (SIPRI: Stockholm, October 2009) (with Bates Gill); “China’s Renewed Partnership with Africa: Implications for the United States,” China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence (Brookings Institution Press, 2008); and “US-China Relations and Darfur,” Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 31, no. 4, 2008.

**Mr. Isaac Kardon** is a contract researcher at NDU-INSS, working for Phil Saunders on China security affairs. He has been working primarily on maritime issues (including energy security, naval modernization and logistics) and Chinese policy and interests in South Asia. He received his a Bachelor’s degree in history at Dartmouth College, where he focused on US cold war diplomacy. After traveling and writing for a year in East and Southeast Asia, he worked briefly as a business reporter before heading to Oxford to earn a Master’s degree in modern Chinese studies. During those two years, he specialized in Chinese international affairs and enjoyed the opportunity to study language for six months at Peking University. His thesis treated China’s counterterrorism efforts and international image-building. Following the Master’s degree, he won a scholarship to
continue studying Mandarin at Taiwan Normal University where he also worked as a research assistant studying East Asian maritime disputes.

Ms. Akane Kishimoto is a researcher at the Consulate General of Japan in Honolulu. She received her MA in ASEAN studies at the University of Malaya. She interned at ASEAN Secretariat in Indonesia. Ms. Kishimoto majored in international politics at the University of Hong Kong. She majored in law at Soka University in Tokyo.

Ms. Shan “Vency” Ni is a graduate student in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). Her research interests are diplomacy of nations from the Asia Pacific region and non-traditional security. She graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University with a major in public administration and minor in law. She participated in both the Harvard Model United Nations (2007) as the Tanzania delegate on the Legal Committee and in the Beijing Foreign Studies University Model United Nations (2008) as the US delegate on the Security Council.

Dr. David Santoro is a nonproliferation analyst at the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Research (Liu Institute for Global Issues, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver). A regular participant in the Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program, David is also a research associate at the Paris-based Center for Transatlantic Studies and at the Center for International Security and Arms Control Studies (Paris). Prior to that, he served as a teaching fellow in international relations and international security studies at Macquarie University (Sydney) and he was earlier involved with the Assembly of the Western European Union and the French Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. His current research is focused on P-5 nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy and East Asian security issues.

Dr. Kevin Shepard is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a research fellow with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University and recently earned his PhD in North Korean Politics and Unification Policies from Kyungnam University, Graduate School of North Korean Studies. He holds an MA in International Policy Studies from Sydney University and an MA in Korean from the University of Hawaii. He has published in The Dynamics of Change in North Korea (Kyungnam University: 2009), and contributed to the upcoming publication based on the projects “Roadmap for Expanding US-ROK Alliance Cooperation” (Center for US-Korea Policy/The Asia Foundation) and the upcoming Academic Paper Series published by the Korea Economic Institute.

Mr. Qinghong Wang, Qinghong Wang is from Beijing and currently is a PhD candidate in Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa. He is also Adjunct Fellow of the Pacific Forum CSIS since 2007 and the Vice President of Peking (Beijing) University Alumni Association of Hawaii (PKUAAH) since 2003. Mr. Wang received his BA in Chinese Language and Literature from Peking (Beijing) University, and he received his MA in Asian Studies and a second MA in Political Science from University of Hawaii at Manoa. Mr. Wang was the Lloyd (Joe) R. and Lilian Vasey Fellow of Pacific Forum
CSIS from 2006 to 2007 and the student affiliate of the East-West Center from 2001 to 2005. Mr. Wang’s research focuses on security issues and civil society development in the Asia Pacific region.

**Ms. Emily Warren** manages the Nuclear Security Initiative and other special projects at the Hewlett Foundation, a private grantmaking institution that provides resources to not-for-profit organizations working to solve social and environmental problems around the world. She attended Stanford University where she earned a Bachelors in economics with a minor in political science and was born and raised in San Francisco, CA.

**Ms. Adrian Yi** is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her MA in Korean Language at the University of Hawaii as a part of the National Security Education Program (NSEP). She studied abroad at Korea University for a year and interned as a research assistant at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). She received a BA in International Relations and Foreign Languages (Chinese and Japanese) from the University of Puget Sound. She studied Chinese at Middlebury College and has studied abroad in Japan through the Rotary Program. She has also worked with the Department of State at the American Institute in Taiwan.

**Mr. Tong Zhao** Tong Zhao is a second-year PhD student in the Program of International Security, Technology, and Policy in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. He received his BS in physics and MA in international affair, both from Tsinghua University in China. He worked for the Office of Foreign Affairs in the People’s Government of Beijing Municipality. His area of interest is arms control and disarmament. He joined the Sam Nunn Fellowship group on Science, Technology and International Security, and was a fellow of the Nuclear Threats Summer Fellowship (PPNT) program. He has worked on issues and published papers relating to missile defense, missile proliferation, regional strategic stability, and China’s security policy.
Appendix C

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS
Fifth Annual Meeting
US-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
Connecting Long Term Goals to Contemporary Policy
Hilton Hawaiian Village • Honolulu, Hawaii
May 2-4, 2010

Agenda

May 2, 2010 – Sunday

11:30am  YOUNG LEADERS lunch at Duke’s Restaurant

5:30pm  YOUNG LEADERS Introductory Session with Brad Glosserman – Paradise Lounge, Rainbow Suite

6:30pm  Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower)

May 3, 2010 – Monday

8:30am  Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom (Tapa Tower)

9:00-10:00am  Welcome and Introductions – Tapa Ballroom (Tapa Tower)

Prof. Christopher Twomey
Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc.
Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS

10:00am-12:00pm  Global Zero, a declared goal of both

How does each side visualize the regional and global security environment in a world without nuclear weapons? (In particular, how would global and regional stability be affected?) What new threats or challenges would each country need to take more seriously in such a world? Working backward from such a future,
what does the world look like during the period leading up to the elimination of the last weapon? What role does the NPT regime play in this evolution? What are the major obstacles to accomplishing this goal?

Chair: Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS
Presenters: Dr. Li Hong, CACDA
           Ms. Sharon Squassoni, CSIS

12:00-1:30pm Lunch – Palace Lounge

1:30-3:15pm Contemporary Strategic Doctrine

Each side has recently expanded on its nuclear doctrine. By April 2010, the United States should have completed its Nuclear Posture Review. In 2009, the leaders of the Second Artillery published articles in Qiushi and Zhongguo Junshi Kexue and the 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense included a more extensive deliberation of the Chinese’ strategic doctrine than previous White Papers. Continuities with the past in both sides’ policy are well understood. However, further discussion of changes is warranted. What is the fundamental nature of the changes in each side’s policy? What are the sources of changes? What steps are being taken to carry out such changes? What interaction between the two sides developments does each side see? What is the relation between capabilities and the policy changes?

Chair: S. Col. Yao Yunzhu, AMS
Presenters: Prof. Chu Shulong, Tsinghua
           Ms. Elaine Bunn, NDU

3:15-3:30pm Break

3:30-5:15pm A few definitions: breakout session – Tapa Ballroom 3, Iolani 6/7

The participants will be divided into three breakout sessions that will each be asked to come up with short definitions of a designated set of four of the following terms as they understand them. Clearly, “consensus” definitions will not be possible in all cases; caveats and dissentions should of course be related as well.
Group A
- nuclear threshold
- escalation control
- counter-coercion
- key point counterattack

Group B
- extended deterrence
- inadvertent escalation
- no first use
- qualitative arms race

Group C
- deterrence by denial
- crisis stability
- effective and reliable deterrence
- first strike

Other possible terms
- strategic deterrence
- conventional deterrence
- spiral (of escalation)
- secure second strike
- peaceful use of space

Chairs for each group: Zhu Feng/Teng Jianqun/Yao Yunzhu
Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamphausen

6:00pm Reception and Dinner – Rainbow Suite (Rainbow Tower)

May 4, 2010 – Tuesday

8:00am Continental Breakfast – Tapa Ballroom (Tapa Tower)

8:30-10:15am Reports from breakout session – Tapa Ballroom (Tapa Tower)

Chairs: Zhu Feng/Teng Jianqun/Yao Yunzhu
Wirtz/McDevitt/Kamphausen

10:15-10:30am Break

10:30am-12:15pm Missile Defense

How has the each side’s missile defense posture (capabilities, doctrine, and incorporation in broader national strategy) evolved? What are the sources of these changes? How do they contribute to security and stability?
What aspects of each nation’s policies are regarded as constructive and what as problematic? How has each side reacted to the other’s missile defense posture evolution? What is the range of possible future developments in this area faced by each side, and how might they interact? Do such systems suggest desires by each side for “absolute security.”

Chair: RADM (ret.) Michael McDevitt, CNA
Presenters: Dr. Dean Wilkening, CISAC, Stanford
            Dr. Wu Chunsi, SIIS

12:30-2:00pm Lunch – Palace Lounge

2:00-4:00pm The Next Negotiations

What issues belong at the table for future formal negotiations on confidence building measures and arms control discussions? In particular, after the current round of US-Russian negotiations what categories of issues should be American and Chinese priorities for international arms control, broadly conceived, negotiations? What should China’s role be in global or narrower multilateral fora? On space in particular, what concrete steps would advance the process beyond those already taken? What opportunities and challenges lie down such a path in general for each side?

Chair: Col. (ret.) Teng Jianqun, CIIS
Presenters: Mr. Gu Guoliang CASS
            Amb. Linton Brooks, CSIS

4:00-4:15pm Break

4:15-4:45pm Lessons Learned and Way Forward

Facilitator: Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS

4:45-5:00pm Closing Remarks

Mr. David Hamon, Analytical Services, Inc
Col. (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, CFISS
Prof. Christopher Twomey, NPS

C-4
6:15pm  Meet at Kalia Tower Lobby to walk to:
*Chart House Restaurant*
1765 Ala Moana Blvd. (boat harbor side)

5:10pm  YOUNG LEADERS Roundtable Discussion, moderated by
Brad Glosserman
Appendix D

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Fifth Annual Meeting
US-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Connecting Long Term Goals to Contemporary Policy

Hilton Hawaiian Village  •  Honolulu, Hawaii
May 2-4, 2010

Participants

US

Ms. Brittany Billingsley
Monterey Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Justin Bishop
Master’s Candidate, Diplomacy and
Military Studies, Hawaii Pacific
University
Researcher, Cubic Defense Applications

Mr. Mark Garnick
Monterey Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Capt. Christopher M. Gin
Education Program
US Army

Mr. Isaac Kardon
Researcher
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

Dr. Kevin Shepard
Kelly Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

China

Ms. Emily Warren
Fellow, Nuclear Security Initiative and
Special Projects
The William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation

Ms. Adrian Yi
Kelly Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ms. Chaoyi Chen
Development Officer
Fudan University Education
Development Foundation

Ms. Suhan Chen
Assistant Director
Confucius Institute
The University of Montana

Ms. Shan Ni
Master’s Candidate
China Foreign Affairs University
Mr. Qinghong Wang  
PhD Candidate  
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Mr. Tong Zhao  
PhD Student  
Georgia Tech University

**Others**  
Mr. Sungmin Cho  
Master’s Candidate  
Peking University

Mr. Chin-Hao Huang  
PhD Student  
University of Southern California

Ms. Akane Kishimoto  
Researcher / Adviser  
Political Affairs Section  
Consulate General of Japan

Dr. David Santoro  
Postdoctoral Research Fellow  
Liu Institute  
The University of British Columbia