Japan-Korea: Working Together in East Asia and Beyond

Japan-Korea Working Group, Pacific Forum CSIS

Issues and Insights, Vol. 14, No. 10

SPECIAL REPORT

The Japan-Korea Working Group is a project of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program.
Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as a non-partisan, non-profit foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. The Forum’s programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, and international relations issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with academic, government, and industry leaders from across the Pacific Rim. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the region, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public around the world.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and scholars to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, builds adaptive leadership capacity, promotes interaction among younger professionals from different cultures, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is possible with generous funding support by governments and philanthropic foundations, together with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more information, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Nicole Forrester, Director – Young Leaders Program, at youngleaders@pacforum.org.

The Japan-Korea Working Group

The Japan-Korea Working Group addresses niche opportunities for strategic cooperation between the two countries with the goal of complementing and building upon the previous work done by the Pacific Forum’s trilateral dialogues. This mechanism is meant to facilitate and be a catalyst for fresh ideas on Japan-Korea strategic relations amidst a challenging and rapidly changing time for Seoul and Tokyo. The working group is driven primarily by Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders with occasional input and guidance from senior experts at Pacific Forum CSIS and beyond.
Table of Contents

Executive summary ............................................................................................................. 3

Reinvigorating inter-parliamentary diplomacy between Japan and Korea .................. 5
  Background .................................................................................................................. 5
  Benefits ....................................................................................................................... 5

  Reinforcing political accountability and bipartisanship ............................................. 6

  Capitalizing on favorable structural conditions ......................................................... 6

  Limitations .................................................................................................................. 7

  Policy recommendations ......................................................................................... 8

The Korea-Japan security relationship: moving from historical mistrust to practical cooperation ................................................................. 10
  Background ................................................................................................................ 10

  Policy recommendations .......................................................................................... 11

North Korean collapse and Korean reunification ......................................................... 14
  Background ................................................................................................................ 14

  Section I: The fall of the North—Korean and Japanese interests .............................. 15

  Section II: Overcoming mistrust .............................................................................. 16

  Section III: Avenues for cooperation ...................................................................... 18

  Section IV: The regional picture ............................................................................. 19

  Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 20

Strengthening energy cooperation between Japan and Korea .................................. 22
  Korea’s efforts .......................................................................................................... 22

  Japan’s efforts ........................................................................................................... 23

  Korea’s growth in nuclear power and overseas development status ....................... 24

  Financial incentives for bilateral energy cooperation .............................................. 28

  Policy recommendations .......................................................................................... 28

Enhancing cooperation on counter-piracy and secure sea lanes ............................. 30
  Background .............................................................................................................. 30

  Bilateral ..................................................................................................................... 30

  Information sharing and structured dialogue ........................................................... 31

  Annual Coast Guard talks ...................................................................................... 31

  Increased frequency of Naval and Coast Guard exercises ..................................... 31
Executive summary

The inescapable image from 2013’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit in Bali was that of a daydreaming Japanese prime minister hunched over in his chair next to a visibly indignant president of Korea. However, the frigid personal relationship between Abe Shinzo and Park Geun-hye is symbolic of a strained bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea. Indeed, ties have become so troubled over the past year that Park even indicated that a summit with Abe would be “pointless.” Park’s refusal to entertain a summit with Abe appears to be partly vindicated after Abe’s controversial and provocative decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine at the end of 2013. Abe’s contentious views on historical events have only caused a greater rift between the two countries.

This political divide between Tokyo and Seoul has powerful consequences that transcend their economic relationship. One of the most worrisome is its effect on trilateral efforts with the US to maintain a united front against North Korean provocations, as well as adequately preparing contingencies for potential conflict or regime collapse in the North. There are long-term strategic implications that go beyond the deterrence of Pyongyang, however. For example, the broken relationship between Japan and Korea has opened the door to stronger ties between Seoul and Beijing. This reinvigorated relationship was on full display when Park Geun-hye welcomed Chinese leader Xi Jinping to Seoul in July 2014 for an official state visit while snubbing Abe’s call for a head-of-state meeting. Abe’s stance on history, along with other factors such as Beijing’s disenchantment with North Korea, brought Korea and China together.

Amidst this backdrop, a small group of Pacific Forum Young Leaders established a Japan-Korea Working Group in the summer of 2013 to look at important ways in which both Japan and Korea can work together on more peripheral areas of cooperation. This mechanism is meant to facilitate and be a catalyst for fresh ideas on Japan-Korea strategic relations amidst a challenging and rapidly changing time for Seoul and Tokyo. These initiatives, many of which already have working-level capital, need to be complemented by a parallel track at the political level which would bring Seoul and Tokyo together in a mutually acceptable compromise on their quarrel over historical and territorial issues. While not ignoring the need for a comprehensive resolution to these issues, however this Working Group has intentionally placed its focus on enhancing and forging cooperation in areas outside these sticking points.

The Working Group has been driven primarily by Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders with occasional input and guidance from senior experts at the Pacific Forum as well as outside experts. The Working Group consists of 10 Young Leaders who are all emerging specialists on Japan and Korean affairs from a range of backgrounds and nationalities. Since its inception, the Working Group has operated both virtually and through real-time communication at conferences hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS. The group has also shared some of its ideas with senior officials and academics and has published an abridged policy brief series in cooperation with The National Interest.
This report is the final product of the first effort of the Working Group, with a focus on the theme “Japan-Korea: Working Together in East Asia and Beyond.” The group has focused initially on building trust and politically feasible areas of collaboration. This report includes five policy briefs with concrete recommendations on areas of cooperation between Japan and Korea. While these recommendations are specific to the Japan-Korea relationship, they are also tied to the US rebalance and its desire for stronger trilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea. One of the areas explored argues for enhancing Japan-Korea inter-parliamentary exchanges as another avenue for political cooperation. The report also has briefs focused on improving security cooperation between Japan and Korea with a focus on deterrence against North Korea as well as contingency planning for eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the report details other critical areas for cooperation including energy security and counter-piracy.

In the coming months, it will be vital for both sides to recognize that incremental change is better than no change. A ‘grand bargain’ on all issues may not be realistic now, but this is not to say that both sides cannot work toward this goal through a reduction of the current trust deficit. In this sense, Japan and Korea should continue to look at non-sensitive areas for enhanced cooperation without focusing on regional tensions. Unfortunately, efforts to build strategic cooperation at the bureaucratic and business level will suffer if political gridlock continues. Japan and Korea will first need to put political weight behind these confidence-building measures, which will help bring the relationship back from the brink.

Jonathan Berkshire Miller,
Chair of the Japan-Korea Working Group.
Reinvigorating inter-parliamentary diplomacy between Japan and Korea

Jiun Bang

Background

One of the first informal traces of Japan-Korea inter-parliamentary interaction was a meeting on June 6, 1968, attended by nine Japanese and 22 Korean parliamentarians in Seoul, to discuss issues ranging from trade and commerce, the treatment of Korean residents in Japan, and mutual security assurance. This occurred only a few years after the 1965 normalization of relations between Tokyo and Seoul. Officially, a friendship association was launched in 1972, which later evolved into the parliamentarians’ league in 1975 and finally took on the name of the parliamentarians’ union that is used to this day. Not to be confused as one monolithic whole, there are counterparts in almost mirror-image of each other with similar operational properties in Japan and Korea—the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union, respectively. As of October 2013, the Japanese body is headed by Nukaga Fukushiro, former finance minister and a member of the House of Representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), while its Korean counterpart is led by Hwang Woo-yeo, the ruling Saenuri Party chairperson. Aside from their annual general meeting, the two groups aim to enhance bilateral cooperation through exchanges, visits, and consultations.

As evidence of how receptive incoming administrations are to these groups, a delegation led by Representative Nukaga visited Seoul on January 4, 2013, and held talks with the then president-elect, Ms. Park Geun-hye, this was soon followed by a courtesy call on newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo by the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union on January 9, 2013. The most recent and notable event involving the two organizations was a consultative meeting between Hwang Woo-yeo and Nukaga Fukushiro on August 23 coinciding with Nukaga receiving an honorary doctorate from Yong In University in South Korea.

Benefits

**Realizing the advantages of parliamentary diplomacy**

---

4 Here, parliamentary diplomacy denotes “the full range of international activities undertaken by parliamentarians in order to increase mutual understanding between countries, to assist each other in improving the control of governments and the representation of a people and to increase the democratic legitimacy of inter-governmental
Japan and South Korea have yet to hold a formal bilateral summit since May 2012, with the latest encounter occurring at the US-brokered trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague. Unlike head of state meetings that represent the pinnacle of official exchange between two countries, meetings among parliamentarians are less susceptible to symbolic interpretation. Therefore, parliamentarians can supplement traditional diplomacy as they have greater flexibility in their actions and are well positioned to mediate between the government and the public given their proximity to domestic constituents. In this vein, the ability to shape and influence public sentiment at a close range is critical in furthering Japan-Korea relations, as policy implementation in both countries are often described as being at the mercy of public opinion or volatile ‘nationalism’—such as the unsuccessful attempt at signing the Japan-Korea General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)\(^5\) or the growing anti-Korean rallies in Japan.\(^6\) Subsequently, tapping parliamentarians as actors of incremental diplomacy will create the space for typical state-to-state interactions to incorporate a larger state-to-society element.

**Reinforcing political accountability and bipartisanship**

Unfortunately, 2013 showed that politicians are susceptible to verbal gaffes or actions that create high-profile controversy. In July, Japan’s Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro remarked that Japan should take lessons from the Nazi Party in constitutional reform, causing a media storm.\(^7\) As the inter-parliamentary group is reinvigorated, the level of responsibility that would fall on parliamentarians will likely increase, adding another layer of restraint and accountability to the words and actions of those involved. Moreover, the inter-parliamentary group has the potential to reinforce bipartisanship within the domestic arena of Japan and South Korea, as cross-party membership will stress unity to facilitate cooperation at the inter-state level.

**Capitalizing on favorable structural conditions**

A fact often buried under media reports of spiraling sentiments of hostility between Japan and Korea is that, comparatively speaking, Japanese and Korean lawmakers have historically had successful interactions. For instance, the US-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program was

---


launched in 1968,\textsuperscript{8} the same year that the Japanese and Korean parliamentarian delegation first met; however, the US-Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange was only established in 2000.\textsuperscript{9} In fact, after the administration of Park Geun-hye took office in Korea, there were reports that the Korea-China Inter-Parliamentary Group (which is housed under the National Assembly Secretary) only received a sixth of the government subsidy of that of the Korea-Japan Inter-Parliamentary Group (which is its own independent entity).\textsuperscript{10} Both Japan and Korea should not take for granted the advantages of a long-running institutional framework that has the specific objective of consolidating bilateral relations.

\textbf{Limitations}

Despite these overwhelming benefits, there are two potential limitations when discussing enhancing parliamentary diplomacy. The first involves a deep-seeded idea—both in theory and practice—that politicians are constantly seeking votes, meaning their motives or preferences are highly instrumental: their behavior is driven by their core desire to stay in office. If lawmakers are given the impression that parliamentary diplomacy does not translate into votes, or worse, believe that their domestic constituencies are right-leaning or against the ideals of the inter-parliamentarians’ union, the overarching goal of improving relations between Japan and Korea will suffer. This is, however, merely a short-sighted preconception that can be resolved by understanding that enhanced bilateral relations present tangible gains that can help with their goal of maintaining office, such as attracting more trade and investment through renewed relations.

The second concern is the prospect of each inter-parliamentarians’ union turning into another arena for political bickering. In 2010, there were reports of paralysis within the Japan-Korea inter-parliamentary group due to the emergence of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) after decades of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership, with the latter fighting to retain its power of appointing an LDP member at the helm of the inter-parliamentary group.\textsuperscript{11} While acknowledging that efforts at the inter-state level may become hostage to such internal politics, strong vision and guidance on the part of the ruling administration should suppress most of the squabbling. In fact, a tentatively optimistic signal is the end of the ‘twisted Diet’ in Japan (a period


in which no party claimed majority control of both houses of Parliament), with the LDP becoming the majority through the July 2013 House of Councillors’ elections. To prevent politicization of diplomatic activities, each member of the respective parliamentarians’ union should keep in mind that the benefits of a smooth-running organization far outweigh any potential pitfalls.

Policy recommendations

With the advantages and potential limitations clearly outlined, the following are five concrete policy recommendations on ways to reinvigorate inter-parliamentary diplomacy between Japan and Korea:

1. *Increase transparency and outreach of both the internal workings and external activities of the inter-parliamentarians’ unions in both countries:* as of October 2013, it is extremely difficult to find any systematic data: from simple factual information regarding the history of the groups, to more recent coverage regarding their latest activities. This may contribute to the lack of general interest or awareness regarding the potential role of the groups in enhancing Japan–Korea relations.

2. *Educate the respective publics about the benefits of inter-parliamentary diplomacy:* the concept of inter-parliamentary diplomacy is not only an under-theorized topic in academic disciplines, but also a rather unfamiliar mechanism of diplomacy for the general public. This means that without a clear understanding of the objectives and contributions of the inter-parliamentarians’ unions, its existence will be susceptible to politicization and questions of legitimacy if relations hit bottom. Thus, building a solid consciousness and expansive support for the groups will be critical.

3. *Incentivize the members of the inter-parliamentarians’ unions to treat their affiliations as a diplomatic mission rather than another administrative task or title:* money may not be able to engineer momentum or create political will where there is none, but inter-parliamentary diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo has long-established roots. Thus, each government should tap this framework and acknowledge its importance by elevating its priority in the foreign policy realm. This may mean increased resources and statements that would justify the existence and legitimacy of the organizations.

4. *Commission a joint study exploring the link between parliamentarians’ appeal to nationalism and whether this translates into votes:* while politicians are sensitive to vote-gathering there has yet to be a comprehensive study on whether appealing to certain nationalist rhetoric has an impact on votes, which has meant that intuition has filled the empirical void. If politicians can be liberated from thinking that their fate as office-holders is tightly coupled to a public that is particularly ‘hawkish,’ their role as diplomats will be more effective.
5. Utilize the inter-parliamentarians’ groups as ‘human hotlines’: aside from building an esprit de corps and camaraderie through regular bilateral interaction, these groups can help prevent any political controversies by serving as a consultation mechanism. Various members would conduct prior consultations and negotiations on issues ranging from visits to the Yasukuni Shrine or the disputed territory of Dokdo/Takeshima.

6. Integrate efforts already undertaken at the grassroots level: harmonization between the activities of civic society groups and organizations with initiatives that become subsumed under inter-parliamentary diplomacy is key. A possible candidate from the Japanese side is the Genron NPO—a private non-profit think tank that launched a “Japan-Korea Future Dialogue” in May 2013—and the Korea-Japan Forum from the Korean side—a non-governmental organization (NGO) formally registered with the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

The Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union and the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians’ Union, respectively, have been under-appreciated and underused channels of bilateral communication for Tokyo and Seoul. Not only are politicians generally less susceptible to media sensationalism that inhibits genuine inter-state diplomacy, but they are also well positioned to mediate between the government and the public given their proximity to domestic constituents. The policy recommendations listed above should increase the visibility of the parliamentarians’ unions with the citizenry as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the decision-makers.

---


The Korea-Japan security relationship: moving from historical mistrust to practical cooperation

Ashley A.C. Hess and John K. Warden

Background

Given the complex strategic environment that South Korea and Japan face—a belligerent, unstable North Korea and a stronger, more assertive China—foreign policy elites in Seoul and Tokyo should be eager to move past divisive historical issues and build a more cooperative security relationship. However, the latest attempts at institutionalizing security cooperation—the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Military Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)—were put on hold in June 2012. Both sides were ready to sign the agreement, but Korean President Lee Myung-bak encountered significant domestic opposition. Any future attempt to move toward a cooperative security relationship will likely be a political minefield, but leaders on both sides could improve their chances by narrowing the initial scope of cooperation and improving the message they sell to the public.

Even with lingering mistrust, there have been signs of an improving security relationship between Japan and Korea over the past decade. Following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the United States, Japan, and Korea released a trilateral statement declaring that they would oppose North Korean provocations and work to enhance regional stability through coordination, consultation, solidarity, and partnership. In a sign of further thawing relations, Japan and Korea agreed, beginning in June 2012, to participate in annual trilateral naval exercises with the United States. Moreover, in August 2013, Korea and Japan participated in a 60-aircraft multinational training exercise that was described by Korea’s Yonhap News as “unprecedented for the US allies.”

Moving beyond the current impasse would benefit Japan and Korea and potentially open the door for a formalized US-Japan-Korea trilateral security relationship. The Japan-Korea GSOMIA was a relatively standard agreement, similar to Korea’s other intelligence sharing accords. It would have benefitted both sides by sharing classified information on threats such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles programs, Chinese military modernization, among other potential threats to regional stability. Japan and Korea would also benefit from an ACSA that would establish the framework for bilateral logistical cooperation for humanitarian and

---

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm


16 However, to varying degrees, both Japan and Korea worry that U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral security cooperation would sour their respective bilateral relationships with China. Therefore, cooperation is likely to proceed slowly and will have to be balanced against Chinese opposition.
peacekeeping operations. Such an agreement would likely be less controversial than intelligence sharing and would allow the two countries to more seamlessly respond to humanitarian emergencies in the Asia-Pacific.

But for Seoul an emphasis on general strategic value is not sufficient. Korean historical memory of colonization and comfort women\(^\text{17}\) will not fade anytime soon, making any publicized effort to increase cooperation with Japan politically very risky. Given the family histories of Park Geun-hye and Shinzo Abe, Park is especially prone to accusations of being soft on Japan, making resumption of GSOMIA talks a political gamble. In order to move toward a more robust security relationship with Tokyo, Seoul must highlight the concrete benefits of cooperation while deemphasizing historical grievances and ongoing territorial disputes. By pursuing a narrower security cooperation and reframing the public narrative—emphasizing the North Korean threat and clearly articulating how cooperation with Japan would make the Korean people safer—Seoul could improve the chances of obtaining sufficient domestic support. At the same time, Korea could work to pass ACSA by emphasizing the humanitarian importance of the agreement. Indeed, successful passage of the less controversial ACSA could pave the way for passage of GSOMIA.

**Policy recommendations**

First, the Korean government should emphasize the strategic necessity of increased military exercises and information sharing with Japan. Rhetorically, the government should present GSOMIA and improved military cooperation as key elements of an effective North Korea deterrence strategy. Seoul must frame this as a strategic necessity, arguing that increasing interoperability and demonstrating a more united front would help deter North Korean provocations. Furthermore, any resumption of negotiations on an intelligence sharing agreement must be conducted in a very public and transparent way. Polling in 2012 showed that while 61 percent of Koreans were against the agreement, 44 percent saw it as necessary. In September 2013, 60 percent of Koreans believed GSOMIA was necessary.\(^\text{18}\)

Second, if Japan and Korea cannot find a way to make a bilateral information sharing agreement work, they should explore possibilities for a more robust trilateral arrangement with the United States. Under this framework, the three countries would set up procedures for exclusively trilateral data sharing, including some type of data fusion center. Given the recent expansion of trilateral cooperation, and that the respective alliances with the United States are relatively popular in Korea and Japan, such an arrangement would likely garner more popular support than a Tokyo-Seoul bilateral arrangement.

\(^{17}\) Women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II.

Third, the Korean government should make it clear that it is not seeking a formal alliance or defense treaty with Japan, nor is it even committing to collective defense. During the June 2012 domestic debate on GSOMIA, it was not emphasized enough that the agreement had a limited scope. Publicly it was excoriated as a form of submission to Japan and even compared to Japan annexing the peninsula in 1910. For now, Seoul must push for public acceptance of Tokyo as a security partner, not as a friend.

Fourth, Japan and Korea should pursue an incremental approach. Instead of a full-scale intelligence cooperation agreement, they should instead work toward an agreement on one or two issues of mutual concern, picking off the low-hanging fruit before moving toward more difficult issues. Trilateral and multilateral military exercises should be expanded beyond the limited number conducted predominantly in the naval sphere (as long as training is not carried out on the Korean Peninsula). The countries should focus on expanded naval drills, increased air force training, and Special Forces exercises. The Korean public seems to have paid relatively little attention to the military training drills with Japan, making it a notable way to accelerate cooperation without significant domestic political impact.

Another area that the two countries should emphasize in a narrow agreement is missile defense. In Northeast Asia, missile defense is becoming an increasingly important part of defense architecture. The United States is strengthening extended deterrence by enhancing and expanding its regional missile defense capabilities while Tokyo and Seoul are developing and deploying capabilities of their own. Although there is robust missile cooperation between the United States and, respectively, Japan and Korea, there has unfortunately been no progress in completing the triangle. Both Japan and Korea are developing missile defense to counter the North Korean missile threat—either by introducing the possibility of operational failure or defeating a launched missile—but the challenge is enormous. Cooperation between the two countries could improve the capabilities of both. Most obviously, the two countries should begin to share real-time radar data, allowing both to have a better operational picture. Given the short flight-time between North Korea and each country, early and accurate warning is essential. If initial data exchanges succeed, the two countries could move toward greater operational integration and perhaps make arrangements where Japanese missile defenses would shoot down missiles launched at Korea and vice versa.19

Last December, 61 percent of Koreans wanted to see improved relations with Japan and 60 percent supported signing GSOMIA. Later in the month, when Abe visited the Yakusuni Shrine,20 bilateral tensions increased significantly. However, 50 percent of Koreans still supported a Park-

---

19 Though such an interpretation of “collective self-defense” would require Japan to, at the very least, reinterpret its constitution. South Korea has thus far been skeptical of Japan’s attempts to move toward collective self-defense. However, if it is was reframed as a way to assist in countering the North Korean missile threat, rather than a way to allow Japanese troops to operate on the Peninsula then the Korean public might be more supportive.

20 The Yakusuni Shrine is viewed negatively by many Koreans as a symbol of Japanese militarism.
Abe summit and 51 percent were in favor of a GSOMIA. Tokyo and Seoul must acknowledge this reality and find ways to make security cooperation politically palatable. If they control the narrative and adopt a gradual approach, focusing on areas likely to be the most publically acceptable, Korea and Japan should be able to build a mutually beneficial security relationship.

---

North Korean collapse and Korean reunification

Meredith Shaw and Taylor Washburn

Background

Although it is hard to predict when and how the Korean Peninsula might be reunified, the North Korean government occupies a precarious position atop the poorest and most isolated state in East Asia. The regime’s crumbling, gradual or sudden, would present the government of Korea with unfathomable challenges—militarily, financially, politically, strategically, and administratively. The North’s fall would also pose significant risks for other powers in the region: China and the United States, of course, but also Japan, which has long regarded Korea as a potential threat to its own security.

Indeed, Korea’s historic significance in the eyes of Japanese strategists has produced much of the mistrust that plagues Seoul-Tokyo relations today. Japan’s fear that another major power could dominate the Korean Peninsula was one of the driving factors behind Tokyo’s decision to annex Korea in 1910. Throughout the postwar era, Japan has sometimes sought to balance between the competing Korean regimes in Seoul and Pyongyang, which has led some to believe that Japan favors a divided Korean Peninsula. There are varied sources of mutual suspicion between Korea and Japan today but disputes over their troubled history remain at their core.

Even as Korea and Japan continue to spar over the past, the two share many important interests—including the successful integration of people and territory north of the 38th parallel into reunification. Although some in Korea continue to question whether Tokyo truly supports reunification, there is reason to believe that Japan would not only endorse it but would also take concrete measures to help secure the realization of a united, stable, democratic, nuclear-free Korea.

Although this shared interest should create an imperative for bilateral planning and cooperation, Seoul and Tokyo have engaged in only limited discussion on the possible collapse of North Korea and Korean reunification thus far. Korea, which will bear the bulk of the danger and expense if the North falls, could benefit from Japanese financial assistance, logistical support, and disaster-response expertise in the event of a crisis. For its part, Tokyo’s cooperation with Seoul would limit the danger that chaos in the North might affect the Japanese archipelago, and would

22 Jennifer Lind and Bruce Bennett have estimated that stabilizing a collapsed North Korea would require between 200,000 and 400,000 military personnel. "The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements." *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 36 (Fall 2011).

23 This was primarily true in the 1970s (see, e.g., Charles Armstrong, ed., *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*, p. 131), but can also be seen in subsequent Japanese efforts to normalize relations with North Korea—none of which, obviously, have come to fruition.
also help ensure that a unified Korea would regard Japan as a partner rather than an antagonist and strategic rival.

Section I of this paper identifies and compares Korean and Japanese interests relating to the fall of the North Korean government and Korean reunification, showing that the two states share a range of important goals. Section II explains why, despite this congruity, Seoul and Tokyo have failed thus far to engage in serious bilateral cooperation and planning relating to North Korean collapse. Section III outlines a number of concrete initiatives which could help each country address core concerns relating to such a scenario and how to alleviate strategic distrust. Finally, Section IV evaluates how enhanced Japan-Korea cooperation relating to Korean reunification would fit into broader regional and great power politics.

Section I: The fall of the North—Korean and Japanese interests

Whether it arrives through a German-style collapse or a gradual, guided integration, Korean unification is likely to be costly. The North’s economy will need to be transformed, its basic infrastructure reconstructed, its people trained and educated, and its military disarmed and disbanded. Law and order will need to be maintained. If unification results from war or sudden implosion, millions of dispossessed refugees may need to be sheltered. Yet even in a best-case scenario, unification is expected to severely strain Korea’s finances, disrupt the stability of the region and frighten investors. For these and other reasons, Korea has an obvious need to engage in early planning for unification even while the North survives.

Yet some of the cost of Korean unification is also likely to fall on other regional stakeholders. For years, Korea’s government has engaged in “unification diplomacy,” trying to persuade its neighbors—as well as its own people—of the feasibility and legitimacy of a unification process led by Seoul. One consistent theme in this campaign has been the idea that a gradual and managed process will bring benefits of political stability and economic opportunity to the entire region, while erasing “costs of maintaining division.”

Japan, unlike China, has welcomed this message. In an address at a symposium on unification diplomacy in Seoul, Yachi Shotaro, a leading Japanese diplomat, noted the vexing security problems that emanate from Pyongyang, including Japan’s long-running dispute with North Korea over the status of Japanese citizens abducted from their own shores in the 1970s and 1980s. Tokyo “support[s] a unified, free and open Korea,” Yachi said, because such an outcome would resolve these security and political problems, and would indeed “open new opportunities for all Asian countries.”

export market, and some scholars have even argued that a strong and unified Korea could balance a rising and assertive China.27

But while Tokyo would be more than happy to see North Korea evaporate, a chaotic or violent transition would create enormous risks for Japan and could even result in disaster. The region’s financial markets would take a hit as overseas investors reacted to the turmoil, and the danger of a conventional or nuclear missile attack remains as long as elements within the North Korean leadership and military retain control over their substantial arsenals. Pyongyang has regularly threatened Tokyo in the past, and the North Korean elite could use the megacity as a non-Korean hostage in an attempt to reverse a loss of control. Considering such costs alongside the advantages of reunification, Tokyo has an imperative to contribute to order and peace. Any such Japanese contributions would be far more effective if coordinated with Korea, which knows more about the North and has done more to plan for its eventual collapse.

From Seoul’s perspective, one advantage of working with Tokyo could be felt immediately. Korea’s credit rating has been discounted by the prospect of a messy unification process, and international investors tend to be spooked by signs of North Korean instability or aggression.28 A formal mechanism for unification cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo could help to alleviate such anxiety by broadcasting a credible mutual commitment to planning and funding a process that would be minimally damaging to economic concerns.

Joining forces with Japan on unification planning and diplomacy could also send an important message to China, which remains North Korea’s political and economic guardian even as Beijing has grown frustrated with Pyongyang’s nuclear intransigence. To date, China has been unwilling to engage in any bilateral discussion of a future without North Korea. That could begin to change, however, if Beijing believed it was missing out on an opportunity to sway the direction of a consequential regional conversation. China may remain uncomfortable with the idea of a unified Korea but if unification starts to look inevitable, it will have more incentive to play a cooperative role if it sees that Seoul and Tokyo have begun to reconcile.29

Section II: Overcoming mistrust

Given their shared interests, an observer might imagine that Korea and Japan would have engaged in extensive cooperation and consultation regarding the fall of North Korea and Korean reunification. In fact, however, coordination and discussion have been limited, hampered by persistent mistrust and misunderstanding.

28 In 2011, credit rating concerns were a major factor behind the Lee Myung-bak administration to proposal to setup a “unification fund” for rebuilding and integrating the North Korean economy after unification, an initiative that failed in the National Assembly.
29 Tension between Korea and Japan gives China more leeway in dealing with the North because Beijing can be confident that Seoul will not react by moving closer to Tokyo. Together, Korea and Japan represent approximately 12 percent of China’s exports (per the CIA World Factbook), and greater coordination between them would make it harder to apply economic and political pressure to either of the two US allies.
The most obvious source of mistrust between the two countries is a fundamental disagreement about the nature and implications of Japan’s occupation and annexation of Korea in the first half of the 20th century. This divergence manifests itself in various forms—bitter debates about the sufficiency of Japanese acknowledgement, apology and recompense; a territorial dispute over two tiny islands—and has been exacerbated by politicians and the media in each country. The fact that prominent figures in Japan continue to deny or rationalize actions from the imperial era, for example, has encouraged reckless Korean speculation about Japanese revanchism. But such “history issues” are not the only reason many Koreans are wary of including Japan in discussions regarding Korea’s future. Even after the normalization of Seoul-Tokyo relations in 1965, Japan has sometimes pursued a policy of “equidistance” between the two Koreas. This was particularly pronounced in the early 1970s, when Tokyo rescinded a 1969 affirmation that “the security of the Republic of Korea [is] essential to Japan’s own security,” and also made overtures to Pyongyang. Justified as a rational pursuit of national interest and a response to the escalating brutality of Korea’s military dictatorship, such equivocation is still regarded by many Koreans as evidence that Tokyo prefers a divided Korea.

Whether this was ever the case, it is certainly not today. To be sure, Japan’s priorities regarding North Korea differ from those of Korea, just as they differ from those of the United States. But among these, none ranks higher than reducing Japan’s own exposure to a nuclear-armed North Korea which has already fired several missiles over the archipelago, and has recently made threats to strike Tokyo. Japanese attempts to achieve détente through diplomacy have proved fruitless, and there is little reason to believe that the threat to Japan will be eliminated as long as much of the Korean Peninsula is in the grips of a regime that has staked its survival on “military first” bellicosity and virulent nationalism.

Moreover, Japan would pay a lower cost in the event of reunification than Korea. While many younger Koreans have come to question whether the value of a unified Korea can outweigh the economic pain and social upheaval that could be wrought by the process, the risks Japan faces subsequent to any initial period of chaos are more remote. Considering this fact, alongside the danger inherent in the status quo, it is not surprising that Japanese diplomats have repeatedly affirmed Tokyo’s support for Korea’s unification under Seoul, or that polling finds majority support for reunification among Japanese citizens.

BBC World Service polls in 2013 revealed that 19 percent of Japanese believe Korea has a positive influence on the world, as compared with 28 percent who view its influence as negative. Koreans are slightly more likely to regard Japan as having a positive influence (21 percent), and far more likely to regard Japanese influence as negative (67 percent).

This was the so-called “Korea clause” of the Nixon-Sato communique. It was rescinded by PM Tanaka Kakuei, who was also the first Japanese leader to meet Mao. The overtures to North Korea continued well after the 1970s. See, e.g., Kanemaru Shin’s bizarre visit to Pyongyang in 1990 and Koizumi’s attempt to resolve the abductee issue in 2002.

A series of incidents in the 1970s contributed to a general decline in relations. These included the assassination of Park Chung-hee’s wife by a North Korean sympathizer who had lived in Japan, and the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from a Tokyo hotel by the KCIA.

Most notably, US negotiators have been frustrated by Japan’s single-minded focus on the abductee issue, which limited Tokyo’s ability to influence the direction of the Six-Party Talks.
Considering what is at stake in managing the decline or collapse of North Korea, it is important that Koreans realize that even an ice-cold calculation of Japanese interest would yield support for a peaceful and successful reunification. Reconciliation may be desirable, but it is not a precondition for collaboration. As the next section will outline, it is possible to find avenues for cooperation even as each nation ruthlessly pursues its own material interests.

Section III: Avenues for cooperation

Given the poor track record of Japan–Korea security cooperation, it would make sense to begin any planning process with a “Track II” dialogue, one in which security analysts, academicians, and retired officials from each country meet for informal discussions. Among the questions that might be addressed are the net costs (incorporating potential benefits) of unification over the first five, 10 and 20 years; the forms of cooperation that would be most valuable and realistic; and the political and logistical obstacles to such cooperation. As an example, the participants might produce estimates of refugee outflows in a crisis scenario, and discuss proportionate burden sharing among stakeholder governments and NGOs to deal with the problem.

Such Track II talks would be followed by the creation of a Track I conversation, which would include the legislative, diplomatic, finance, and defense personnel necessary to adjust, ratify, and implement programs proposed in the Track II meetings. Crucially, a major goal of such Track I dialogue should be to establish a Joint Unification Fund, combining Seoul’s already considerable “Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund” with reparations that Japan owes to the North but has not paid because the two states lack normal diplomatic relations. This negotiation will take time and is likely to arouse considerable controversy, but an agreement on joint funding will be essential to all that follows.

The Track I process should also establish a formal legal standard for transitional justice for ex-North Korean officials. A clear legal definition of crimes of collaboration and human rights violations in the North Korean context may affect the behavior of North Korean officials even now, and clarifying the mitigating factors and standards of justice may lessen some North Korean officials’ fears of blanket punishment post-unification. While the formal framework of transitional justice will be the responsibility of Korea alone, Japan can help by providing insight from its own experience with transitional justice at the end of WWII and the repercussions of mistakes made during that hasty process that have become clear with hindsight.

The timing of the Track I meetings and the content of any joint communiqués must be carefully managed. The Track I dialogue should automatically hold emergency sessions in the wake of any future Cheonan-like North Korean provocations, which can be interpreted as “signs of instability or leadership failure,” thereby justifying the need to plan for a potential crisis. In this way, Japan and Korea send the message that North Korean attempts to divide the allies and disrupt their internal politics will only strengthen their commitment to cooperation.

34 The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group and the recently attempted Japan-Korea GSOMIA are examples.
35 Since the abductees issue has been a major obstacle to delivering Japanese reparations to North Korea in the past, a key to securing Japan’s financial commitment would be for Seoul to guarantee that, post-unification, the recovery of surviving abductees would be a priority.
Such bilateral meetings are also likely to displease China, but this is not necessarily undesirable. If China is uncomfortable with the prospect of Japan-Korea cooperative crisis management, Beijing might be motivated to take more effective measures to manage the DPRK and prevent provocations or risk being left out of the regional conversation regarding North Korea. Once the Track I dialogue is firmly established, Japan and Korea may extend invitations to China and other regional players to join the discussion, under the precondition that participants accept the legitimacy of Korean unification and contribute to the unification fund. China would then face a choice between joining the Track I talks (unlikely) or resuscitating the defunct Six-Party Talks with renewed purpose, more enforceable mechanisms, and an expanded agenda.

North Korea’s likely response to such developments, of course, will not be favorable, which is why major Track I meetings and decisions must be timed to coincide with episodes of North Korean bad behavior. Scheduled Track I meetings may even be postponed or canceled as a “carrot” in exchange for North Korean concessions on issues like Kaesong development or meetings of separated families. The message must be clear: the more North Korea acts up, the more neighboring powers expect—and prepare for—its demise. The more North Korea shows capacity for cooperation and development, the less perceived need there is for such discussions.  

For cooperation to produce the desired effect, both Japan and South Korea must enter the dialogue with the clear understanding that it is the appearance of calm and sustained cooperation, rather than the substance of agreements, that is the most important. Theatrics, bullying, or angry walk-outs will only negate the diplomatic power of a united front, ultimately harming the interests of both sides. For this and other reasons, talk of military cooperation should be kept off the table for the foreseeable future. Because of the supreme importance of continuity and compromise, participants in the Track I dialogue should be carefully selected from among political moderates with broad bases of support and long tenures.

As an indispensable ally of both countries, the United States may be expected to participate in this dialogue. Yet excluding the United States—at least as a founding member—has at least two benefits. First, it demonstrates that Japan and Korea can undertake major diplomatic initiatives on their own without requiring a US “chaperone.” Second, China will have less ground to complain of “containment” if the United States is not directly involved.

Section IV: The regional picture

Although the purpose of this proposal is to consider avenues for bilateral cooperation between Korea and Japan, it is also important to consider how such initiatives might fit into the broader strategic environment of Northeast Asia. Korea sits at a great-power crossroads—like “a shrimp among whales,” to borrow a hoary cliché—and since 1894 has been a battlefield in major conflicts involving China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Even now, each of these

---

37 A precedent for this are US-Korea joint military exercises, which are sometimes canceled out of deference to progress in North-South relations, or ramped up in response to the Cheonan attack.

38 Among these, Russia is the weakest player in contemporary Northeast Asia. Despite the Kremlin’s efforts since 2000 to arrest the decline of its influence in Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union, it remains an also-ran in the competition for regional clout.
nations—which include the world’s three largest economies and three of the permanent members of the UN Security Council—maintains a significant interest in Korea’s future.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has constructed military alliances and partnerships with a variety of nations in the Asia-Pacific. Yet whereas US allies in Europe are linked in a multinational alliance, those in Asia are arrayed in a “hub and spoke” structure, with Washington at its core. The two most important American allies in the region, Japan and Korea, each house tens of thousands of US troops, yet their own bilateral relations are frosty.

In a tough fiscal environment, Washington wants its allies in the Asia-Pacific improve their individual capabilities as well as work together to address shared threats, few of which are more pressing than those posed by a North Korean collapse. Setting aside the recurring “history issues,” Seoul’s wariness of being pulled into an “anti-China” alliance is likely to inhibit security collaboration with Tokyo. But such concerns should not preclude dialogue.

Besides Korea, China exhibits the most anxiety about Japanese involvement since few have forgotten that an annexed Korea was once used as a staging ground for the occupation of Manchuria. Given the dire state of Sino-Japanese relations, efforts to include Tokyo in planning for and responding to the North’s collapse may compound Chinese fear about the fall of the Kim regime and thus increase Beijing’s incentives to interfere with the reunification process.

On the other hand, one of Beijing’s most pressing concerns regarding North Korean collapse is that China would take a financial hit and it is conceivable that a major Japanese commitment to a joint reunification fund might undermine the Chinese rationale for supporting the North Korean government. To the extent that China fears Japan might assume a greater political role in Korea by way of its participation in the planning process, Beijing can at least rest assured that this sentiment is felt a fortiori by the Koreans themselves.

Conclusion

The short-term costs and risks associated with Korea’s reunification—particularly if it comes following a major political crisis, or is accompanied by violence—will be immense. Yet both Korea and Japan have an opportunity to reduce those costs and risks if they are able to begin a conversation now about ways in which they can be managed jointly.

39 An American attempt to create a Pacific version of NATO failed in 1977 when the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) crumbled after two and a half decades.
40 Reading of Japan’s separation of Korea from China’s tributary sphere was among the events that galvanized a young Mao Zedong to enter politics. A conviction that Korea could never again be dominated by a foreign power was one of the factors that compelled China to enter the Korean War.
41 While many experts are quick to dismiss the notion that China has designs on the North, the possibility of unilateral Chinese action there cannot be discounted.
It would be easy for both sides to make excuses. From a Japanese perspective, Korea must seem an unwilling partner, while many Koreans continue to imagine that Japan is trying to undermine their nation’s progress. Yet the notion that Japan wants to see Korea remain divided is impossible to square with a realistic appraisal of the status quo, which features a rogue regime that has tested nuclear weapons, routinely threatens Tokyo, refuses to honestly address its past kidnapping of Japanese citizens, and generally sows uncertainty and instability, harming Japanese firms and financial markets. As Japanese officials have made clear, the best scenario from their own perspective would be a peaceful reunification under a democratic government.

For Korea, the price of failing to appreciate this fact could be incalculable. In dealing with any collapse or reunification scenario, Seoul would have the backing of the United States, but it might face this challenge without substantial support from another major power. Russia would like to build pipelines and railroads through the North, but has been at the periphery of regional politics; while China—the foreign country with the greatest investment in Korea’s future, and the greatest ability to affect it—remains an enigma, as Beijing refuses to enter even preliminary talks on North Korean collapse or unification contingency planning.

The missing piece in the puzzle is Japan, which shares many of Seoul’s interests while also having the capability to be an important contributor to the reunification process. The notion that Japanese reparations to the North might instead be put toward reunification would not only reduce the financial burden on Korean citizens, but could provide a mechanism for Tokyo and Seoul to begin discussing history without rehashing all of their own disputes.

Given the dire state of bilateral relations today, such an initiative would face significant political hurdles and require compromise on both sides. But if any risk is dire enough to bring about some degree of conciliation, this should be it. While many Koreans remain loath to trust Japan’s intentions, they would be better to look at Tokyo’s interests, which are largely in line with their own. As for Japanese leaders, the question may be whether it is more important to defend the dead or work for the living, helping to realize a future in which Japan can interact with a strong and united Korea as friends.
Strengthening energy cooperation between Japan and Korea

Young-june Chung and Aiko Shimizu

Rising oil prices and oil consumption, coupled with limited supplies, have made energy security one of the most important strategic issues in East Asia. Japan and Korea are two of the major energy consumers in Asia and continue to play an important role in shaping the energy climate not only in the East Asian region, but throughout the world. The US and Korea are the two largest importers of liquefied natural gases (LNG) and coal in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, the demand for energy by Tokyo and Seoul has significant implications and far-reaching consequences. For instance, if Japan and Korea significantly increase their natural gas consumption, the availability and prices in the rest of the world will also be impacted.

Individually, the two countries have worked significantly on strengthening nuclear safety levels and the development of renewable energy. Both countries are currently working to reduce their reliance on nuclear power following concerns over Japan’s Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Indeed, this past summer, Japan and Korea were hit by power shortages due to heat waves which hastened their drive to diversify energy sources. With future concerns of the global shortage of energy sources, environmental degradation, nuclear safety, and global warming, it will become increasingly important for both countries to turn to alternative energy sources, such as renewable energy.

Korean President Park Geun-hye’s call for the creation of the Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation initiative has come at the right time. This initiative aims to foster trust and cooperation among the countries in Northeast Asia through the promotion of regional peace and the development of dialogue on non-political issues, such as the environment, disaster response, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety. The Fukushima incident proved that nuclear accidents transcend national borders, as evidenced by the emphasis on nuclear safety at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. Initiatives to cooperate on the reduction of nuclear energy and the creation of alternative energy sources by formulating a comprehensive energy security framework for the region would benefit both Japan and Korea.

Korea’s efforts

Korea gets 96 percent of its energy from imports. As the world’s 13th largest economy and 7th largest exporter, it is an energy-intensive nation: the world’s 11th highest in energy consumption

---


44 Ibid.

and 5th in oil imports. As it lacks international oil and natural gas pipelines, Korea relies heavily on tanker shipments of LNG and crude oil. In 2008, Korea announced its Low Carbon, Green Growth initiative as a national vision to create momentum for economic growth through the use of clean energy and green technology. Korea’s energy policies have concentrated on reducing energy emissions while implementing various energy efficiency policies, such as applying stricter standards on fuel efficiency and building stronger design codes.

Still, as a major consumer, Seoul also needs to look at diversifying its energy sources and reducing its use of fossil fuels. Currently, fossil fuels account for roughly 82 percent of Korean energy consumption, as compared to nuclear energy (16 percent), and water power (0.5 percent). Meanwhile the contribution of renewable sources to total primary energy supply (TPES) is said to be the lowest in the OECD. Specifically, 80 percent of the existing renewable energy supply in Korea comes from wastes energy and 20 percent from water power. Use of new renewable energy such as solar power, wind power, and biomass remain very limited. Increasing energy self-sufficiency through the promotion of overseas energy development projects is a priority for the resource-poor Korean government. Currently, the Korean government plans to raise its energy self-sufficiency rate to at least 18.1 percent for crude oil and natural gas from 2007’s 4.2 percent level, and to 32 percent from 2007’s 18.2 percent for six major mineral resources.46

Against this backdrop, the Korean government came up with the 3rd Basic Plan for New and Renewable Energy Technology Development and Usage/Distribution at the end of 2008. Its goal is to become the world’s 5th largest renewable energy powerhouse by 2015 and, by 2030, to replace 11 percent of primary energy with renewable energy. It will focus on key technologies such as photovoltaic, solar thermal, geothermal, and bio energy in the Basic Plan. The government expects the plan to bring in $36.2 billion in exports through the renewable energy industry and to create 110,000 jobs by 2015.47 Governmental research, development, and deployment (RD&D) is a crucial part of Korean energy policy and is now among the highest in the OECD.

Unlike its world-class manufacturing industries, however, Korea has not been able to establish a top-notch business in renewable energy. Blame various factors: lack of full-fledged government support, small domestic demand and market-size, and an ambivalent public where renewable energy is concerned. As a nation over-dependent on foreign energy resources, the Korean government has sought to modify domestic laws and regulations to facilitate the development of renewable energy industries, such as providing government subsidies to venture enterprises, building housing that runs on solar panels, and preferential treatment on taxation of renewable energy-related facilities.

Japan’s efforts

Japan has been trying to reduce its dependence on nuclear power since the Fukushima nuclear accident after the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 2011. Since then,

47 http://www.investkorea.org/ikwork/iko/eng/cont/contents.jsp?code=1020205#_2_1_2
Japan regularly shut down all of its nuclear reactors for scheduled safety checks and has worked to diversify its energy sources. Japan currently relies heavily on oil and gas imports, especially LNG, but tensions in the Middle East have increased concerns about the possibility of disruption of supplies. In its efforts to diversify its energy mix, Japan has been developing its renewable energy sector, especially in solar power. Japan’s development of solar power slowed down in the mid-2000’s partly as a result of its 10-year energy plan that focused on nuclear power, but has picked up again since the 2011 disaster. The Japanese government has since introduced many initiatives to encourage development of renewable energy, such as the approval of feed-in tariffs for renewable energy. As a result of the government’s efforts to encourage renewable energy development Japan recently became one of only five countries to achieve 10 gigawatts of cumulative solar capacity. So far, only four other countries have reached this capacity—China, Germany, Italy, and the United States. Japan is predicted to surpass both Germany and the United States later this year as the second largest solar power market.

Korea’s growth in nuclear power and overseas development status

Korea’s use of nuclear energy dates back to its pre-testing of the Kori Unit in the late 1970s. Since then, the development of OPR1000 and APR1400 Reactor Models have been constructed with Korea’s own technologies, its Capacity Factor amounts to 91.7 percent—16 percent higher than the world average. More than 20 nuclear power plants are currently in operation, and the government plans to supply more than half of Korea’s total power generation with nuclear power by 2030, with plans to construct an additional 10 more power plants by 2035. Korea has relied on cheap nuclear power for more than 39 percent of the nation’s gross national electricity generation, a level similar to Japan before its 2011 Fukushima plant disaster (Table 1). Korea is currently world’s 5th nuclear energy producer with an installed capacity of 17,716 MW. In 2010, the Lee Myung-bak government successfully signed its first overseas nuclear power contract in the United Arab Emirates to build four Korean-standard nuclear power plants by 2017 with a total contract amounting to $20 billion.

---

49 Ibid.
Table 1: Korea’s Electric Power Generation by Energy Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hydro</th>
<th>Anthracite</th>
<th>Bituminous</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Gas</th>
<th>Nuclear (Market Share)</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Power Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'80</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5 (9.4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'90</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>52.9 (49.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>107.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'00</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>109.0 (40.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>266.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'01</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>112.1 (39.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>285.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'02</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>119.1 (38.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>306.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'03</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>114.9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>129.7 (40.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>322.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'04</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>130.7 (38.2)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>342.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'05</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>129.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>146.8 (40.3)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>364.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'06</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>134.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>148.8 (39.0)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>381.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'07</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>150.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>142.9 (35.5)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>403.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'08</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>168.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>151.0 (35.7)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>422.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'09</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>187.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>147.8 (34.1)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>433.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>193.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>148.6 (31.3)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>474.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: GWh, percent)

Until renewable energy technology and supply can sufficiently meet demand, nuclear power may be the next best alternative for a sustainable and safe energy supply. Therefore, carefully tailoring the management of the Fukushima plant disaster so that the market’s trust in nuclear energy can be reinvigorated is an essential part of Japan-Korea nuclear cooperation. Nuclear power is also economically sensible and environmentally friendly as it emits very low greenhouse gas (only 1 percent of CO2 compared to emissions from coal gas).

Currently, the government-owned KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Corporation) runs all aspects of electricity generation, retail, transmission, and distribution. Additionally, it owns major shares of Engineering and Construction, Korea Nuclear Fuel, Korea Plant Service and Engineering, and Korea Electric Power Data Network. KEPCO is also a strong independent power producer (IPP) globally. In the Philippines, KEPCO accounts for 12 percent of the nation’s total installed capacity. Its successful wind projects in Shanxi (4,472MW), Gansu (99MW), and Inner Mongolia (495MW) are some of KEPCO’s latest renewable energy investments in China. In the near future, Korea is predicted to be the largest foreign wind power supplier in China. KEPCO is also entering into overseas energy businesses in South America and Africa through the construction of

51 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Korea, South, (January 17, 2013).
power plants and energy resources development (Table 2). In 2010, KECPO successfully achieved total sales of $1.37 billion in overseas business including $520 million in nuclear projects.53

Table 2: KEPCO’s Current Overseas Energy Development Status

The importance of Japan-Korea-China energy cooperation

Both Japan and Korea have strengths in renewable energy development and face similar challenges from nuclear power plants. The Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 illustrates the fact that nuclear power management and development must be addressed collectively because of its far-reaching repercussions. Northeast Asia (Korea, Japan, and China in particular) has many nuclear power plants (Table 3). China hosts multiple nuclear reactors on its eastern coastlines and, should a disaster occur in one of those power plants, it will be a disaster for Korea and Southeast Asia. In this respect, an institutional framework designed to tackle disaster prevention and nuclear safety should be recognized as a key part of not only Japan and Korean bilateral cooperation as well as relations with China as a state-party.

Against this backdrop, Japan, Korea, and China agreed to deepen trilateral exchange to establish consultative mechanisms on disaster management, earthquake disaster mitigation, and nuclear safety during the first Trilateral Cooperation Summit in December 2008. Since then, the Trilateral Heads of Government Agency Meetings on Disaster Management, to discuss sharing of information and technology, have taken place every two years. To tackle nuclear safety, Japan, Korea, and China have established the Northeast Asian Top Regulators Meeting (TRM) on Nuclear Safety, which has met annually since September 2008. High-level officials from China's Ministry of Environmental Protection, Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and Korea's Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) make up the TRM. A breakthrough happened during the fourth Meeting in November 2011 when the three countries succeeded in signing the Cooperative Nuclear Safety Initiative. The three countries agreed to design a Cooperative Framework to make the TRM a practical and tangible framework for cooperation and to establish working groups on specific fields of common interests. A List of Action Items was also inserted into the Initiative to promote international nuclear safety cooperation. However, the trilateral cooperation in nuclear safety is still in its nascent stage and further concrete action plans that would systematically facilitate information sharing among the three countries are needed.

From a foreign policy perspective, Japan-Korea cooperation on renewable energy and nuclear safety is indispensable for President Park Geun-hye. Throughout her campaign, Park articulated an approach to the nation's foreign policy that placed trust at the center of international cooperation, believing that trustpolitik was the required asset needed in Northeast Asia where a trust deficit was most evident. The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative is the roadmap for implementing trustpolitik at the regional level. In this sense, the beginning of Japan and Korea's trusting relationship—starting with building a consensus and cooperating on softer issues like energy security and renewable energy—can yield to habits of cooperation that

Table 3: Nuclear Power Plants in Northeast Asia

(December 31, 2012)

may lead to addressing harder security issues. Eight months into office, however, the Korean government has not been able to make progress on the NEA Peace and Cooperation Initiative. In this vein, Japan-Korea cooperation on renewable energy can be a vital starting point and catalyst for both Korea’s domestic and foreign policy.

Given Japan and Korea’s shared energy security challenges, especially after Japan’s Fukushima disaster, Japan should endorse President Park’s Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative and take a leading role with Korea in the areas of nuclear safety and energy security cooperation. Moreover, taking a lead in these areas would boost Japan’s international image as a responsible global actor in the midst of recent tensions with its neighbors. Japan’s history has caused much of the structural conflicts with East Asian nations—political and ideological disparities with China and chronic territorial disputes with Korea, China, and Russia, suggest that political issues in Northeast Asia need to be reconciled to perpetuate stability and peace. In this manner, Japan’s efforts to lead in areas of common interest and concern to the region, such as nuclear safety and energy security, will enhance trust-building between states. As a great power in the region, such leadership by Japan is indispensable for institutionalization of cooperation, especially among Korea, Japan, and China.

Financial incentives for bilateral energy cooperation

According to World Bank statistics, Japan and Korea both receive over 80 percent of their primary energy consumption from overseas sources. In this respect, it is critical for both nations to secure stable and continuous supply of energy and resources, increase their usage-efficiencies, and prevent environment pollution after use. In 2011, before the Fukushima disaster took place, nuclear energy accounted for 11 percent of Japan’s total consumption in primary energy. However, this is likely to decrease after the disaster and would leave Japan with no choice but to reconfigure its energy supply structure. Although China is a global power in energy and resources, its domestic sources are insufficient to supply the needs of China’s rapid economic development. Again, carbon emission from energy consumption is a common concern among all three countries.

The need for energy cooperation, both bilaterally (Japan-Korea) and trilaterally (Japan-Korea-China), is an issue of common concern and strategic interest because energy—or the lack of supplies—can pose a nontraditional security threat. In this manner, the moral and strategic incentives for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia are already in a mature state.

Policy recommendations

Addressing nuclear safety and energy security issues could be done through President Park’s Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative. Within the context of this initiative, the two countries could discuss ways to cooperate on nuclear power issues, such as ensuring nuclear
power plant safety, disaster response management, and safe disposal of nuclear waste, while simultaneously seeking ways to cooperate on developing alternative and renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, and clean coal technology, through boosting investment in these sectors. It could not only bring the two governments together, but also involve private sector companies, lobbyists, and nongovernmental organizations. Ultimately, the goal would be to involve the public and private sectors of Northeast Asia, including China, Russia, and Mongolia.

Japan and Korea can begin cooperation on renewable energy by locating joint investment projects. North Korea or Russia’s Far East, for example, are cases where both significant economic and political profits could be obtained, since both these countries will welcome foreign direct investment into their vastly underdeveloped territories. The European example of renewable energy joint investment in Eastern Europe and Africa in the form of Overseas Development Assistance and profit-oriented investment could be a model of Japan-Korea cooperation. Of course, Japan-Korea investments would have to be largely fostered from a governmental level, leaving room for state-owned enterprises, multinational corporations, and private firms to come and invest. It would most resemble the two Koreas’ experiences in the Kaesong Industrial Complex where the government’s role is primarily political and limited to protecting the rights of private entities.

Second, the successful implementation of President Park Geun-hye’s NEA Peace and Cooperation Initiative will depend on the degree of Japan’s activity and participation in the Japan-Korea renewable energy cooperation. Taking into consideration Japan’s economic capital, overseas development experiences, and technological superiorities, there is no more suitable country than Japan to help Korea create trustpolitik in Northeast Asia. Because the ultimate objective for bilateral cooperation is enhancing the trust between the two countries, Japan’s proactive role in the Seoul Process will come to be recognized by Korea and help reduce the suspicion that both countries have toward each other. During the process, Japan’s activities in regional nontraditional security threat issues would also help to elevate Japan’s international status which has altogether been tarnished. In this regard, Japan can use its diplomatic status to push for renewable energy cooperation and joint investments in North Korea and Russia’s Far East, persuade other countries to invest, and create the political climate to make the project succeed. This will be a starting point to plant the necessary seed of trust that the region direly needs.
Enhancing cooperation on counter-piracy and secure sea lanes

Miha Hribernik and Troy Stangarone

Background

Japan and Korea are two of the world’s most significant trading nations. Each has more than $1 trillion in total global trade annually, the majority of which is maritime trade. The two countries rank third and fourth, respectively, in terms of the shipment of cargo containers in the world behind only the United States and China. Moreover, both are dependent on the seas for more than exports, they also import many of the raw materials that are needed to sustain their economies. For example, Korea’s lack of energy resources make it the world’s second largest importer of LNG, fifth largest importer of petroleum, and third largest importer of coal. Japan surpasses Korea in all three categories.

As a result, it is necessary for both Japan and Korea to guarantee the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOC). Maritime piracy and armed robbery (PAR) remain an impediment to global freedom of navigation and maritime trade. There are two main piracy hotspots along the SLOC extending from Europe to East Asia: the Gulf of Aden and parts of Southeast Asia. Historically, most PAR activity in the former region was concentrated in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, but attacks have recently begun to shift toward the waters and harbors of Indonesia. Other, less immediate threats to SLOC security—such as maritime terrorism and transnational crime around parts of Indonesia and the Philippines—also linger.

This transnational threat to the global supply chain requires a dynamic multinational response. Both Japan and Korea already devote resources to tackling PAR activities and take part in multilateral initiatives. However, bilateral cooperation remains underdeveloped and presents a niche opportunity for strategic cooperation. Joint counter-piracy and other activities to secure sea lanes are less politically sensitive than direct military-to-military cooperation. These activities are predominantly conducted by constabulary forces and can be accomplished with relatively little financial investment, though the current political environment may require the use of political capital on both sides. Crucially, such cooperation would help build trust, which is essential for the eventual signing of the postponed Acquisition Crossing Supporting Agreement (ACSA) and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Additionally, in a time when resources are constrained or being reallocated to other challenges, this would bolster cooperation in a politically and fiscally affordable way. Both states should consider new bilateral initiatives or pursue closer cooperation through multilateral fora. The following are some concrete steps that Seoul and Tokyo can take in this regard, bilaterally and multilaterally.

Bilateral

Information sharing and structured dialogue

The signing of a bilateral information sharing agreement to facilitate cooperation on militarily and politically less sensitive issues in the maritime domain—such as PAR, organized crime, pollution, and illegal fishing—amongst agencies and institutions on both sides would be a significant confidence-building measure. It would also be a politically acceptable step that could pave the way for a future GSOMIA.

Such an agreement could enable the integration of both states’ sea border surveillance systems into a real-time vessel tracking system that could help detect threats. This degree of integrated information sharing is sensitive and would also need to take into account the reaction of China, which is entangled in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute with Japan. One example of an existing system of this kind that could serve as a template is the EU-initiated I2C.\(^5^8\) The I2C allows constabulary forces and law-enforcement agencies from EU states to track the movement of vessels in real time. Crucially, it allows them to immediately flag suspicious activities through the I2C interface, which can be acted upon quickly by the authorities of another state. The I2C was developed principally to facilitate cooperation in countering threats such as clandestine immigration, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and pollution, rather than traditional security threats. If undertaken by Japan and Korea, this type of comprehensive information-sharing project should be focused on threats common to both countries. Apart from the non-traditional security issues noted above, it could also facilitate cooperation within initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), where it could assist in tracking North Korean vessels.

Annual Coast Guard talks

Inspired by the Japan-India annual coast guard talks, this form of sustained institutional contact would ensure continued information and experience sharing, as well as help with trust building. Such structured dialogue could later be expanded to include other agencies and institutions and serve as a platform to launch new bilateral initiatives. For example, within the context of the Coastal Communities Initiative (CCI; described below), these talks could include not only both coast guards, but also bring together the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Such sustained and structured mid-level dialogue would allow a greater degree of institutional cooperation, the launching of pilot projects, and the identification of areas of potential synergies before they can be expanded or further developed in high-level political talks. If combined with CCI and other recommendations in this document, such annual talks could become the main forum for reviewing, evaluating, and expanding these measures on a regular and sustained basis.

Increased frequency of Naval and Coast Guard exercises

\(^5^8\) Full name: Integrated System for Interoperable sensors & Information sources for Common abnormal vessel behavior detection & Collaborative identification of threat. More information is available on: http://www.i2c.eu/.
The Coast Guards and Navies of Japan, Korea and the United States already hold trilateral exercises, even though their frequency has decreased after the tensions over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands flared again in 2012 with former President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the islands. Bilateral activity is even scarcer, despite some cooperation in maritime search and rescue operations. Still, it is important for the two countries to hold more bilateral naval and coast guard exercises and patrols.

Both Navies are already conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, offering an ideal opportunity for joint naval drills removed from the disputed areas. Closer to home, bilateral Coast Guard exercises could be undertaken in the waters of either country. Initially, such drills should be limited to less sensitive areas— for example, off the coast of Busan, where multilateral exercises have an established history. In other areas still at risk due to PAR, terrorist insurgencies, and organized crime activity (such as the Strait of Malacca), bilateral activity could also be complemented by a greater frequency in tri- or multilateral exercises, alongside constabulary forces of regional states or alongside the US Navy and Coast Guard. As has become commonplace, the US could act as a facilitator in case there is little political impetus for bilateral projects between Korea and Japan. The US has expressed its desire for more trilateral cooperation, which would make the implementation of such projects relatively uncomplicated if issues of political will can be overcome. These exercises also have the benefit of helping both navies develop transferable skills that could become applicable in the case of a crisis near either Korea or Japan.

A Japan-Korea ‘Shiprider’ Program

Japan and Korea could follow in the footsteps of a smaller-scale version of the US-Canada Shiprider Program: officers from one Coast Guard could be delegated to the vessels of the other for a period of time. Initially, this could be limited to the duration of bilateral or multilateral drills. Later, both the number of crew members on such ‘exchanges’ as well as the duration of their stay could increase, and they could become actively involved in the regular operational activities of the other force.

The US-Canada Shiprider Program allows for the Coast Guard vessels of one state to enter the territorial vessels of another if the other country’s officer is on board. While this brief recommends that a similar agreement between Japan and Korea should be the program’s ultimate goal, this would be difficult to implement in the foreseeable future. To overcome this problem, two steps should precede implementation: a series of track 2 or 1.5 dialogues, before discussing the project at track 1 level; and testing the concept through limited pilot projects (e.g., one-time operations of limited scope and duration), which would serve as ‘proofs of concept’ to help gain governmental support for the program.

Coastal communities initiative
Maritime piracy cannot be eliminated through operations at sea alone. In areas such as the horn of Africa, naval operations can only minimize the threat. To combat piracy more comprehensively, a more concerted effort is necessary targeting the root cause of piracy—a lack of profitable economic opportunities— and the lack of adequate local governance and law enforcement infrastructure.

Rather than merely focusing on policing the seas to protect the sea lines of communications, Korea and Japan could work together to improve the conditions in coastal areas along key SLOCs through development and governance projects. The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) could establish a joint office to coordinate and cooperate on projects related to the development of communities along key coastal areas. Rather than taking the traditional model of development projects that focus on the construction of physical infrastructure, the program could be established along the lines of Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program.

The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) was designed to support the development of partner countries by providing knowledge from Korea’s own experience as a developing country. Unlike the current program—which focuses only on the economic side of development—Korea and Japan should expand upon the concept to also provide knowledge and experience related to good governance. Aspects of this initiative could be modelled on the Africa Partnership Station, which utilizes US and European troops working alongside NGOs and governmental organizations to promote maritime stability.

More traditional maritime activities could also be weaved into the program to integrate efforts from coast to sea. These could include training on maritime domain awareness and the provision of technology or equipment to constabulary forces of third states (primarily those in Southeast Asia), which could be undertaken jointly. Such a combined approach could also greatly reduce costs, while allowing the law enforcement and Coast Guard forces of regional states to shoulder a greater degree of responsibility in their own jurisdiction.

In the long-run, developing people-to-people ties beyond governmental cooperation will be important for improving relations between Korea and Japan. In addition to the KSP-based joint program, Korea and Japan should consider the establishment of a joint program modelled on the United States Peace Corps where young Koreans and Japanese citizens would go abroad to work together to help those most in need, but also to develop a deeper understanding and appreciation of each other’s country and culture. KOICA already runs a program based upon the Peace Corps, World Friends Korea, and could house such a cooperative project with JICA. Specifically, the joint program could be run in conjunction with the knowledge-based Coastal Communities Initiative.

**Multilateral**

59 Introduction to the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) of Korea: [http://www.keia.org/publication/introduction-knowledge-sharing-program-ksp-korea](http://www.keia.org/publication/introduction-knowledge-sharing-program-ksp-korea)
Cooperation through existing multilateral forums

a) Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP): The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established in Singapore in 2006 and has since become the central hub for information exchange on PAR incidents on Asia, as well as for experience sharing and capacity building between its 19 Contracting Parties. Both Japan and Korea are parties to the ReCAAP agreement.60

The mandate of ReCAAP allows for tailored capacity-building initiatives and joint exercises. This allows the Contracting Parties to work on bilateral cooperation through ReCAAP. Due to its very general provisions on bilateral cooperation, the ReCAAP agreement allows countries significant flexibility in joint activities. This cooperation appears to be relatively under-utilized by contracting parties, allowing Japan and Korea to develop projects aimed directly at bolstering their anti-piracy capabilities, such as training seminars, workshops, or Coast Guard exercises. One example of such partnership is the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India.61 The Declaration has led to joint Coast Guard anti-piracy exercises through the ReCAAP mechanism. Significantly, such a document provides these agencies with a mandate to carry out such activities through a multilateral forum in which both countries take part, even when diplomatic tensions preclude the implementation of bilateral projects.

b) ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): Both states are participants in the ASEAN+3 and the ARF, which includes “Cooperative approaches to sea lines of communication, beginning with exchanges of information and training in such areas as search and rescue, piracy, and drug control” under its list of confidence-building measures. The forums also allow for bilateral consultations and dialogue between participating states. The ARF has a variety of bodies where such cooperation could be pursued in more concrete terms, at least on the sidelines. These include the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC), the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF).

Toward an Asia-Pacific Coast Guard Forum

The existing North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) brings together the coast guards of Canada, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States. Korea and Japan could place a greater emphasis on PAR and SLOC security within one or more of the existing five NPCGF Working Groups: Maritime Security, Information Exchange, Combined Operations, Fisheries, and Illegal Drugs & Migration.

60 ReCAAP Members: http://www.recaap.org/
This brief also recommends the creation of a new Working Group that would focus specifically on PAR. As virtually all PAR incidents in Asia take place in the Southeast, such a Working Group could tentatively begin to expand the scope of NPCGF further south. Japan and Korea could spearhead an initiative that would see the forum membership expand to coast guards of other countries in the Asia-Pacific, with the goal of expanding the NPCGF into an Asia-Pacific Coast Guard Forum (APCGF). Alternatively, both states could propose the creation of a smaller South Pacific Coast Guard Forum (SPCGF). Tokyo and Seoul could provide organizational and material assistance in creating such a forum, keeping in mind the obstacles that could accompany its creation. As founding members of the NPCGF, both countries have the needed expertise, with the Japan Coast Guard particularly experienced as the initiator of the NPCGF and one of the main providers of Japanese-made equipment to countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Conclusion

Despite the current tensions between Korea and Japan, significant scope exists for cooperation on maritime issues. Through enhanced cooperation on bilateral and multilateral levels both nations have a unique opportunity to secure the sea lanes that support their integration into the global economy. By taking an integrated approach to these issues, Korea and Japan can address concerns related to piracy and non-traditional threats at sea, while working to address the root causes of disturbances in troubled areas. As this cooperation is developed, it can be expanded to multilateral forums and help to serve as a foundation for broader regional cooperation on these issues.

62 This expanded geographic scope might allow for synergies with the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA). This high-level body convenes annually and brings together the heads of coast guards from 16 Asian countries, but unlike the NPCGF does not include Canada, Russia or the United States.

63 These include ongoing maritime disputes, overlapping exclusive economic zones, the absence of unified coast guards in some countries, and the material and operational shortcomings of some regional constabulary forces.
Annex

Biographies of Virtual Working Group Members

Jiun Bang

Jiun Bang cultivated an early interest in anything 'international' throughout her time at university, culminating in a degree in international studies from Ewha Womans University (Seoul, Korea). She later narrowed her passion to international security, which she further explored through a Master’s degree from the Security Studies Program (SSP) at Georgetown University (Washington D.C., US). Since then, she has bounced back and forth from policy and academia through her stint with the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Seoul, later moving back to academia by continuing her doctoral studies in the Political Science and International Relations (POIR) program at the University of Southern California (USC), where she is thrilled to be working close with her advisor and mentor, David Kang. She enjoys working in both the policy world and the more academic discipline of international relations—specifically, the discourse concerning Northeast Asian security. She is currently working on her dissertation, which deals with status competition, rivalries, and dyadic disputes short of war.

Contact details: jiunbang@usc.edu; cell (U.S.): +1-213-447-8359

Young-june Chung

Chung, Young-june is a PhD candidate in international relations at China Foreign Affairs University and a part-time researcher at the Center for US-China Relations, Tsinghua University. He has attended international schools in numerous places—Singapore (1988-1991), Beijing (1991-1994), and Colombo (1996-1998). After serving as military police (MP) for the ROK Presidential Security Service, he assisted with research at the Institute of East and West Studies at Yonsei University and the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), based in Washington D.C. His writings include “Middle Powers in Great Powers’ Grand Strategy: Korea’s Soft Hedging in the East Asian Security Structure” (Journal of East and West Studies, 2013) and “A New-Type of Great Power Relationship Between the U.S. and China and the Korean Peninsula,” (In 2012-2013 Tsinghua University U.S.-China Relations Review, ed. Sun Zhe, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2013). He received the best thesis award for his Master's program and the outstanding paper award at the University of International Relations in 2013. His research interests include East Asian international relations and grand strategy studies.

Contact details: vjchung81_cfaou@outlook.com; Tel: +86-138-1124-5084 (China), +82-10-8560-7568 (Korea)
Ashley Hess

Ashley Hess received her BA in international relations and classics from Brown University in 2008. While teaching in South Korea, she was accepted as part of the Korean Government Scholarship Program in 2010. She received her MA in international relations from Seoul National University in 2013, during which she focused on terrorism, national security policy, and the Northeast Asian strategic environment. She has co-authored several reports on the Northeast Asian and Korean military balance and Chinese force modernization with Dr. Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy. She is also a non-resident Kelly fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS.

Contact details: AshleyACHess@gmail.com; (U.S.): +1-860-265-4884

Miha Hribernik

Miha Hribernik is a research coordinator at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels and an analyst at the geopolitical consultancy, Wikistrat. His research and analysis focus on the foreign and security policies of Japan, and maritime security in East Asia—with an emphasis on the role of coast guards in territorial disputes and on counter-piracy information sharing networks such as ReCAAP. Prior to joining EIAS, Miha interned at the Slovenian Embassy in Austria and at the Foreign Ministry of Slovenia. He holds an MSc in international security from the University of Bristol and a BA in international relations from the University of Ljubljana.

Contact details: m.hribernik.2011@my.bristol.ac.uk; Phone: +386 40639 294

Meredith Shaw

Meredith Shaw is a PhD student in political science and international relations at USC, specializing in political and social interactions between Japan and the Koreas. She originally hails from Dixon, Illinois, but has spent a decade living and working in Japan and South Korea. She has BA degrees in computer science and East Asian studies from Brown University and an MA in international relations from Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto. She has worked as a lecturer in the international relations department at Kyoto Sangyo University, as a research associate at the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, and as a translator for numerous organizations in Japan and South Korea. Her research interests include maritime disputes, North-South Korean economic cooperation, Japan-ROK soft power rivalry, historical awareness conflicts, and comparative civil society. Her MA thesis explored the potential for cooperation between Japanese and South Korean NGOs conducting aid projects in North Korea. Through the VWG, she hopes to link up with other East Asia scholars to produce joint research on these and other projects.

Contact details: meredirs@usc.edu
**Aiko Shimizu**

Ms. Aiko Shimizu is a non-resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her BA in political science and international studies from the University of Chicago, an MA in international affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Her professional experiences include working at the United Nations, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Her works have been published in the *Journal of International Affairs* and the *Atlantic Community*.

Contact details: aiko.shimizu@gmail.com

---

**Troy Stangarone**

Troy Stangarone is the senior director of Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). He is also a 2012-2013 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fellow in South Korea, sponsored by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He oversees KEI’s trade and economic related initiatives and serves as the editor for *Korea’s Economy* and *The Peninsula* blog. His research focuses on South Korean trade and foreign policy, South Korea’s relations with China, and North Korea. His work has appeared in the *Seattle Times, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Global Asia, The Diplomat, China-US Focus, JoongAng Ilbo, Korea Herald, and Korea Review*. His comments have appeared in the *New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg News, Politico, Reuters, CQ Today, Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo*, and Yonhap News Service. He has also appeared on CNBC Asia, BBC Radio, and KBS News.

Prior to joining KEI, Mr. Stangarone worked on Capitol Hill for Senator Robert Torricelli on issues relating to foreign affairs and trade. He also served as an aide to Governor James McGreevey of New Jersey. He holds a MSc in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a BA in political science and economics from the University of Memphis.

Contact details: ts@keia.org
John K. Warden

John K. Warden is a Master's candidate in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, concentrating in US national security. Previously, he worked as a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he worked on various projects relating to nuclear deterrence, arms control, and US alliances as a research assistant and program coordinator for the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and Defense and National Security Group (DNSG). He was executive director for working groups on US-Russian Arms Control and US-China Nuclear Issues and Relations, managed a project on Forging a Consensus on the US Nuclear Posture, coordinated the US-Japan-ROK Track II Trilateral Dialogue on Nuclear Issues, and twice directed the Nuclear Scholars Initiative, including editing the accompanying journals. He has published articles in Proceedings Magazine, PacNet, and Infinity Journal and was a frequent contributor to the PONI Debate the Issues blog. He earned his BA in political science and history from Northwestern University and remains involved with the Northwestern Debate Society as an assistant coach and visiting instructor.

Contact details: jkwarden@gmail.com

Taylor Washburn

Taylor Washburn is a Master's student focusing on the international relations of Northeast Asia, and a political and security affairs intern with the National Bureau of Asian Research. Before moving to Washington, D.C., last fall, he was a visiting professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), and spent several years in the legal profession. He received his JD from Columbia University in 2007, his AB from Bowdoin College in 2004, and is expected to receive his MA from Johns Hopkins SAIS this winter.

Contact details: taylor.washburn@gmail.com ; (US): +1-413-210-3553; Twitter: @washburnt
Japan-Korea Working Group Chairs:

Jonathan Berkshire Miller

Jonathan Berkshire Miller is an international affairs professional with significant expertise on security, defense and intelligence issues in Northeast Asia. He has held a variety of positions in the private and public sector, including several roles at the Canadian foreign ministry on international security and intelligence issues. Jonathan is currently a senior advisor on the Asia-Pacific for the Canada Border Services Agency. He is also a non-resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow with the Pacific Forum CSIS.

Jonathan is a regular contributor to several journals, magazines and newspapers on Asia-Pacific security issues and currently is an analyst with the Economist and Forbes. He has been published in other outlets including Foreign Affairs, Global Asia, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Non-Proliferation Review, CNN World, Newsweek Japan and Monocle. Jonathan has a Masters of Arts in International Affairs from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa.

Contact details: ibmlr@gmail.com

Nicole Forrester

Ms. Nicole Forrester is the Director of the Young Leaders Program at Pacific Forum CSIS and concurrently holds a WSD-Handa Fellowship for her research into the impact of social media on Next Generation attitudes towards international issues. In 2011, Nicole was awarded an Asia Pacific Leadership Fellowship by the East-West Center, Honolulu. Formerly, Nicole was the Senior International and Government Relations Adviser for the Australian Industry Group. At the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, she served as the Acting Director of the United Nations and Commonwealth Section and as Consul for Economic and Political Affairs at the Australian Consulate-General in Los Angeles. Prior to her diplomatic service, Nicole was an associate lecturer at the Queensland University of Technology.

Contact details: Nicole@pacforum.org