A Conversation With Sekou Touré

During his June 26-July 2 unofficial visit to the United States, President Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea attended a luncheon in his honor at Vice President Bush’s home, and met with President Reagan, senior State Department officials, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and senior officials of AID, the World Bank, and the IMF. In New York, he addressed the Council on Foreign Relations, met with the UN Secretary-General, spent a day at the home of David Rockefeller, and opened a full-day seminar on investment prospects in Guinea organized by Chase Manhattan Bank. President Touré’s crowded agenda also included the hosting of a large reception in Washington, a working lunch at the Guinean Ambassador’s residence for journalists, and a pre-departure reception for African ambassadors; a visit to Howard University; and a dinner in his honor arranged by Martin Marietta Corporation.

On July 1, President Touré visited CSIS to participate in a lively morning roundtable with a group of specialists in African affairs representing a spectrum of institutional bases and points of view (see page 4 for list of American and Guinean participants). We believe that the following excerpts from President Touré’s responses to our questions will be of special interest to analysts following current developments and trends in Africa:

Why the OAU Matters

In 1957 there were only eight independent nations on the African continent, but a strong pan-African movement had already come into being, and was seeking to develop its own institutional structure. Under the auspices of our friend, the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, an initial conference to promote unity among Africa’s peoples was held in Accra under the chairmanship of Guinea. The first Secretary-General of that movement is with us here today as a member of my delegation. Around the same time, trade unionists from the British colonies met in Accra and adopted a pan-African structure. Meanwhile, the trade union leaders of the French colonies gathered in Cotonou in 1957 and founded the Union Générale des Travailleurs de l’Afrique Noire (UGTAN); I had the honor of being elected as a senior leader of that union.

In 1958, Guinea became independent under conditions which are well known to you. In 1960, the Belgian Congo became independent and entered a time of troubles and sorrow. [The Congo’s Prime Minister] Patrice Lumumba came to Conakry in August 1960 to ask for my help vis-à-vis certain great powers, as well as vis-à-vis some African countries. We initiated an appeal with a view to convening a conference of support for the Congo. The first reply came from the late King Mohammed V of Morocco, and it was accompanied by a proposal that Casablanca be the site of the conference. The meeting that was held in Casablanca [in January 1961] — unfortunately not attended by all the independent nations of Africa — founded a first movement of the African states and adopted what is called the Casablanca Charter. Countries represented at the meeting included Egypt, Libya, Ghana, Morocco, [the provisional government of] Algeria, Mali, and Guinea. A few months later, a number of other countries formed a second movement in the course of meetings held in Brazzaville and Monrovia.

At this point, then, the African countries were divided between two organizations. In 1962, while en route to Conakry following a Casablanca Charter summit in Cairo, I visited Khartoum, Addis Ababa, and some other capitals to meet with the members of the other organization, held in-depth discussions with them, and suggested that both organizations be dissolved as a prelude to unity among all the governments. I said to them that Africa was entering a period of decolonization and that the best way to help the populations still under colonial rule would be to have unity and harmony among those nations which were already independent. I was encouraged by the results [of my discussions], and so I officially proposed that some influential figures with great experience be made members of a sponsorship committee for a conference on unification to be held in Addis Ababa. In May 1963, this great assembly took place and gave birth to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has brought about a much greater degree of harmony in relations between African states and increased the effectiveness of African participation in the United Nations and other international organizations.

The OAU is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. It is a means placed at the service of the African continent in its struggle toward good relations among countries, a means of promoting the unity of action of these governments with a view to resolving problems that are common to all our people, to all our governments, a means of giving an
identity and greater dignity to the entire continent, and of helping it to become the partner of the other continents and of the other non-African countries and peoples. The OAU is a new instrument. It is an instrument which is useful and effective in planning, decision-making, and, above all, the practical pursuit of that happiness of which all peoples dream. But an instrument is never perfect, because history... is not something in which one rushes at top speed toward a given landmark and then it is over. No, history is a process, an uninterrupted process, an ongoing process... history knows no pauses... So the OAU is not a perfect organization. Just like any other organization, the OAU is motivated by the nobility of its objectives, but it also has its inadequacies, its structural deficiencies... But from a philosophical standpoint, it is clear that a poor organization of human beings is still better than no organization at all. And I will even say that humanity's first conquest, which made possible all the other conquests right up to going to the moon as you Americans have done, is organization — organization in time as well as in space. So the OAU, for the time being, is the supreme essence — the instrument for peace, harmony, and cooperation. Among its activities has been its support of liberation movements. Even if that support has not always been as vigorous as the liberation movements themselves would have wished, the political and moral assistance has never been lacking.

Chad: From Independence to Hissene Habré

In 1958, Guinea became Africa's ninth independent state [excluding South Africa]; 24 years later, scores of other new states have emerged. So, the evolution sanctioned the efforts that we had made [in choosing our course]. But there were many crises in these countries. Some were the result of internal conditions. Others were imposed from without. In any event, Africa has withstood violent changes which disturbed the normal course of its evolution. There occurred what was known as the era of military coups, when one saw an upheaval in one country or another every six months, one military coup following on the heels of another. All nations should know that stability is a prerequisite for the well-being of every people, and that respect for institutions is a cardinal virtue if a people wants to be able to evolve and progress in harmony. Thus, when those brutal coups were applauded by outsiders, I failed to understand how this could be and I was perturbed... The OAU managed to pull Africa out of this painful period of violence, marked by over 30 military coups. Some countries lived through three, four, or even five or six military coups. Millions of Africans became victims of this violence which disturbed, in some countries, the normal life of our populations.

The problem of Chad falls within this same philosophy of violence. Chad has not known peace, security, or tranquility for at least 16 years. The institutions of Chad gradually became frozen — jammed in their functioning. There no longer was a state. The first reason for this was the greed of some leaders who did not consider themselves to be instruments of the peaceful evolution and progress of their people, but who instead were concerned solely with securing individual security would be maintained, and (6) to work politically toward free elections, enabling the Chadians to recreate national institutions. This resolution was accepted by the OAU as a provisional constitution and a basis for the legality and legitimacy of any OAU action toward Chad. A committee was therefore formed, to which I had the honor of belonging. This committee met several times to study the manner in which the OAU would help fulfill the lofty objectives agreed upon by the 11 factions.

Without going into details, I will simply say that Hissene Habré, [although the leader of a key faction,] was excluded from the provisional government and there was a return to violence. The Lagos agreement spelled out that no neighboring country is authorized to introduce armed forces into Chad. But Goukouni Oueddel, [head of the provisional government,] after excluding his fellow countryman, Hissene Habré, secretly signed an agreement with Libya and Libya sent troops into Chad. Our committee met and condemned this event, calling it a flagrant violation of the Lagos agreement. The committee invited Libya to withdraw its troops. But Goukouni said to himself, "I'm the chief of a sovereign government, and I no longer listen to the OAU." But if he was the chief of government, it was because of this very agreement. This crisis was subsequently resolved because Libya did indeed withdraw its troops.

In 1981, we issued an appeal to the United Nations... The president of Senegal and I spoke at great length with the UN Secretary-General on behalf of the OAU's ad-hoc committee on Chad. We had a mandate from the committee to seek assistance that would not exceed $10 million for the purpose of enabling the OAU to carry out effectively its action de pacification in Chad under the umbrella of the UN Security Council. But we were told that "[The UN] cannot work through the OAU because it is not a state. Instead, the government of Chad itself must direct itself." You see what was going on. [These people were arguing as if there were already] a legal government in Chad instead of a provisional government... Any legitimacy it had was due to the OAU, yet the OAU, which was asking the Security Council for assistance, saw this request turned down under the pretext that "No, we can only deal with the government of Chad." This made the situation in Africa much more complicated... It enabled those with money, those who had petrodollars, to infiltrate even further into Chad and to place before us a fait accompli.

What counts in this matter is the final outcome. Because the [Libyan presence in Chad] was widely viewed as illegal, neighboring countries gave some support to Hissene Habré, who eventually came into NDjamena [and took power there in June 1982]. Now, I am personally well acquainted with all the Chadian leaders and senior figures. One reason for this is that before independence Chad belonged to the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, a pan-African party of which Félix Houphouët-Boigny was the leader and I was a senior official. So I have followed the evolution of the country and I know all the leaders. In addition, many of them visited or lived in Conakry at various times throughout the crisis. Habré appeared to be a perceptive man. One might not always agree with him, but I prefer an enemy who is aware to a friend who is unaware, because in my own view it
is the mind that determines the quality and the value of a person. Habré was greeted by the inhabitants of N’Djamena, and I give him credibility according to the welcome extended to him by his own country’s population, in particular in the political capital. And while flying through Chadian airspace I sent him a very warm telegram of congratulations. But I did not stop at that. I approached a number of African states, sending them messages, and I said that the time had come to give effective aid to Chad in order to strengthen the peace that is now occurring in Chad, and in order to help that brotherly people to normalize its constitutional life. So, for Chad our support is very sincere and we view this support as legitimate.

The Western Sahara Controversy

The OAU is in a state of crisis, but the analysis made by outsiders of this crisis is incomplete, because there are a number of causes for this crisis.

I referred a short while ago to the Casablanca Charter meeting [of January 1961]. At that gathering, two major resolutions were adopted. One opposed France and supported the independence of the Algerian people. The French had turned the Algerian Sahara into a French administrative subdivision as soon as they struck gas and oil there. The conference responded to this action taken under the cover of law [by supporting] Algeria in its claims for territorial unity as well as for liberation and independence. A second resolution was also adopted at that time. It supported the legitimacy of the Moroccan claim to the Moroccan Sahara.

Spain then occupied not only the so-called Western Sahara, but also... the Moroccan territory of Ifni. I had the privilege of defending these two resolutions before the United Nations and they were also submitted in September 1961 at Belgrade at the establishment of the nonaligned movement. And those resolutions were adopted.

It is significant here that “Algerian Sahara” is the term which appears in the first resolution. So if there was an Algerian Sahara, there was obviously a Moroccan Sahara, a Libyan Sahara, [etc.] The Sahara has never been a state, nor has it ever been a nation, nor has it ever been a people. It is just a strip of land that crosses all of Africa and splits it in two, which is why some people talk about Africa south of the Sahara and Africa north of the Sahara. Algeria supported Morocco and Morocco supported Algeria because they were pursuing identical objectives.

Finally, because of the efforts of many peace-loving nations, Spain agreed to withdraw. But it was said that Spain would withdraw for the benefit of Morocco and Mauritania, and the Sahara would be divided between those two powers. At the time, I was one of those African heads of state who rebelled against this decision by saying, “There are no great peoples and no small peoples, one has only the people in their unity and in their identity. A people cannot be divided up in the way that one splits up a pie. If all the Sahara is Mauritanian that’s fine, if all the Sahara goes to Morocco that’s fine, but I do not subscribe to any kind of partition or slicing this up like a piece of cake.” And every chief of state knows exactly what my position was. Nonetheless, it’s true that the others all agreed. Spain withdrew for the benefit of those two states, in accordance with the tripartite treaty which was the legal basis for the departure of the Spaniards and the installation of a new Mauritanian administration in the southern Sahara and a Moroccan administration in the northern part of the Sahara.

Contradictions multiplied in the region because Algeria and Morocco no longer got along with or understood each other, for reasons I am familiar with, and which have nothing to do with the Sahara, despite the fact that many outside observers assign the Sahara issue the whole blame for the region’s tensions.

Mauritania, which lacked adequate resources, was forced to withdraw from the confrontation, and Morocco then occupied the Mauritanian portion of the Sahara. Some criticized Morocco for having done that, and I responded: “The law is there, the logic is there, and I think that the legitimacy of this can be shown.” Let’s say two children inherit from their father a piece of property which they share among themselves. And the second child says, “I renounce my part of the inheritance.” Who legitimately should take up the part of the inheritance? The other brother will take the whole inheritance. So, if Mauritania renounces its right, Morocco has the right to occupy that territory, since it was the power that started the whole movement [to end colonial rule] in the first place some two decades before.

At its 1978 summit in Khartoum, the OAU created a Western Sahara committee, of which I was given the honor of being a member. At the OAU’s Monrovia summit [1979] and subsequently at the Sierra Leone summit [1980], the problem of the Sahara took up a very great portion of our debate. I remember one thing in particular out of all this. At the Sierra Leone summit, a group of activists [whom I shall not identify here] raised a question — a sort of off-the-wall question as it were — to the Secretary-General right in the middle of the proceedings. Contending that 26 states had recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, they proclaimed that, in accordance with Article 27 of the OAU charter, the Polisario and the SADR should be accepted, admitted as members, and that the leader should be invited to come in and join us. There was a violent reaction by certain chiefs of state, including myself. And even though we were only supposed to speak for 10 minutes, I said that I was going to make a speech which was going to be historical in nature and that I was not going to talk just for 10 minutes. And so I spoke for at least an hour and 15 minutes or an hour and a half to lay out the whole history of the thing and to face the OAU with its responsibilities. We proceeded to debate the issue, and wisdom prevailed. And so we withdrew from the agenda the application for membership and the request for a legal interpretation of Article 27 that had been submitted by Morocco, which disputed the conditions for accession to membership.

An ad hoc committee was established empowered to study the problem of the Sahara and arrive at a peaceful resolution. Some three or four sessions were held, and in the end we agreed on a certain number of provisions. We were divided over one very important matter, namely whether or not a referendum should be held. I initially opposed the idea of holding a referendum. Decolonization had already taken place, and the colonizing power in the Sahara had been Spain. When the Spaniards withdrew from Ifni there was no question of self-determination. Morocco simply recovered its province. And in the case of the Sahara, Morocco has the right to regain its former province. The decolonization process itself marked the end of an arbitrary situation which derived from the supremacy of force and strength, and which was characterized by foreign domination of victimized countries...

Toward the end, since Algeria and Libya are helping the Polisario, and they have a lot of means for propaganda, they tried to give the impression that the Polisario was a true liberation movement, that the principle of self-determination is a sacred one, and that therefore one cannot contest this in the case of the Polisario, of the Saharan people. After we analyzed the situation, I sided with those who exercised the

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Another resolution established a committee responsible for "No, see wisdom and to agree on setting a date both for the supreme arbiters of their fate. First by Morocco? favorable to the Polisario. I will leave aside anything that admitted as the fifty-first member of the later, we heard from Addis Ababa that the whole [the Polisario's claim that it represents the United Nations, . . . calling for the self-determination of all colonial peoples.

[Morocco's King Hassan II] came to [the June 1981 OAU summit in] Nairobi, and asserted that he was totally in agreement with this. As far as we were concerned, the problem was resolved. The summit actually strengthened the mandate of the ad hoc committee. We became an implementation committee, responsible for not only drafting but actually carrying out the terms of the cease-fire and of a referendum on self-determination. So, our powers were clear.

The implementation committee held its first meeting in August 1981 in Nairobi, and its second session in February 1982, again in Nairobi. And all of the conditions, the cease-fire and the referendum, were discussed and approved unanimously. All that remained was to choose the date. But here Morocco said, "Regardless of the date that you want to set, we're agreeable, and the sooner the better, in fact." And that statement is on the record. Then the Polisario said, "No, Morocco has to talk with us, the Polisario." But we said, "Why do you want Morocco to recognize you? You speak on behalf of the Saharanas who are there. And the Moroccans speak on behalf of the Saharanas who are there. And we've just decided that a referendum should be held, supervised by the United Nations, and we will guarantee that the election will be free, and that this will be a legitimate election. So, give the people the right to speak. They're the supreme arbiters of their fate. Only the people are the source of legality and legitimacy, where their national life is concerned. Why do you absolutely insist on being recognized first by Morocco? If Morocco were to propose to hold a referendum in two years, you should propose holding a referendum right away. This [attitude] would prove the legitimacy of the [Polisario's claim that it represents the Saharan people]."

We did everything we could with the Polisario to get them to accept the referendum, because up until then the main basis for their claims was that they wanted self-determination. But once they got it they gave it up on that whole letmotif and instead insisted that they be allowed to enter into a dialogue with the Moroccans. This, therefore, became a false issue. We asked the OAU chairman, President Daniel Arap Moi [of Kenya], to go to the various countries of North Africa to try and get the parties concerned to see wisdom and to agree on setting a date both for the cease-fire and for the referendum on self-determination.

Shortly after we left Nairobi, maybe less than a week later, we heard from Addis Ababa that the SADR had been admitted as the fifty-first member of the OAU. I will leave aside all of the comments on the various positions. Some might appear favorable to Morocco, others might appear unfavorable to the Polisario. I will leave aside anything that might be partisan in nature. I'll just come down to the matter of the right, of the law involved here. Recall that in Sierra Leone, the heads-of-state, by a resolution, removed [the SADR's application for membership] from the agenda. Another resolution established a committee responsible for handling the Sahara problem. The following summit in Nairobi did not reopen the case at all, and nobody made any
mention of the question of admission. They talked about self-determination and the cease-fire, but that was all. Does the Council of [Foreign] Ministers, legally speaking, have more power or greater prerogatives than a summit meeting of heads of state and government? That is the legal issue here. Thus, the Addis Ababa decision is illegal. There is nothing to warrant it, and that's why we condemned it.

We called immediately on the current OAU chairman to issue a communique declaring that this decision was illegal, because he is entitled to do that. But, unfortunately, our chairman is playing at being a neutralist. True, a chairman of any forum has to be neutral when a debate is under way... until a decision is reached by that assembly. But once an assembly makes a decision, one can no longer say as chairman that one is going to be neutral when the time comes to implement the decision. But this is what our chairman has done... Unfortunately, this is what has triggered the OAU's internal crisis. Many do not wish to see this state of confusion continue. If this precedent is not reversed it could be followed by subsequent similar events, and this would be the end to the rule of law and legality within our organization, and if that is lacking in an organization it will lose all of its effectiveness. So that's why the OAU is sort of smirked at the moment...

The SADR that has been admitted is not a reality. Can the United Nations admit a state without knowing that it's a geographic reality, and without knowing the institutions of that state, or even knowing whether it actually exists? I don't think that this is a question here. The Polisario cannot be likened to the liberation movements that are waging their liberation struggles on their own soil with the support of all peoples. This was a movement that was external to the Sahara. Suppose one assumed that the SADR has some sort of legitimacy. Who would confer this legitimacy on it other than the people, the Saharan peoples themselves? This would come from the referendum. It would be the referendum that would have to enshrine this legitimacy. But if this referendum isn't held, who in advance of the fact can confer legitimacy on the SADR?... Africa would look absolutely ridiculous to the rest of the world if it were to present the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as a national, sovereign, independent reality and then subsequently hold a referendum to determine whether the Saharan want to stay with Morocco or whether they want to become independent... This would be like baptizing a child before it was conceived. To conclude, we know that pressures were exercised at Addis Ababa and that the decision taken there was not a free decision. For this reason, we're certain that the day a real debate is held, a sense of responsibility will lead everyone [in the OAU] to realize the illegal nature of the decision taken in Addis Ababa.

On Relations With Neighboring Countries
[Let me turn briefly to relations] between Guinea and Ivory Coast and between Guinea and Senegal. I don't want to speak about foreign powers. What took place was imposed upon us; it was against us. But I will tell you something [about the March 1978 summit aimed at reconciling Guinea with its neighbors] which is true and which you don't know. I asked Liberia to invite us. I drafted a letter to be sent to Senegal, Gambia, and Ivory Coast. I said to the [Liberian] president, "Send us this letter, issue this appeal, and we cannot say no. And you will have the privilege of hosting this meeting of reconciliation." History proved us right. Reconciliation occurred and we are all relieved. Even during my short visit here, I've already had two communications with President Houphouët-Boigny [of Ivory Coast] and later on I'm to have another conversation. With the president of Senegal, total harmony. So, it's much better to agree even if differences exist than to be in opposition. Our policy is a policy of peace in Africa.

What happened in Sierra Leone [prior to Guinean intervention there in 1971] was illegal. Otherwise I would not have intervened. Normal elections would have taken place. [Siaka Stevens], the leader of the majority party, was faced with a rejection of the normal process of political succession. Thus, with legality on his side, he called upon the assistance of Guinea. I placed a company at his disposal to protect his own life — fortunately, because that very same night he was attacked. Until morning, shots were fired on all sides. [The Guinean military assistance succeeded] in strengthening his position, but [Stevens' power] already had a legal basis. I did not impose him upon the people; the people had already voted.

Because we supported Guinea-Bissau [against Portuguese colonial domination], we have never had a policy of integration with respect to that country. It was in Guinea-Bissau that I said, "We were once one nation. Here is the treaty under which France and Portugal say, 'In Guinea [in the beginning there was only one Guinea], the boundaries between Portugal and France are, etc.' The day you want to have a federation, a confederation, we are ready. But because we have helped you in the liberation struggle, we are not going to stain our support with immorality by leading you to believe that our support was 'interested.' We will offer no propositions. The day that you want a federation, a confederation, I say in advance, 'Yes, we are ready to go along with you, but it is up to you to make the initial proposal.' And that is our official policy."

Let me return to Sierra Leone. Apart from the coastal area which was occupied at a very early date by the British, the entire Sierra Leone area belonged to Guinea and was ruled by... the brother of my maternal grandmother. The countries are linked, but there has never been a policy of expansionism or of integrating with Sierra Leone... Guinea has recently [October 1980] become a member of the Mano River Union, which groups the two countries [and Liberia]. We are locally contributing to the progress of that sub-regional organization. Similarly, Guinea was not originally a member of the Organisation de Mise en Valeur du fleuve Gambie (OMVG), but we saw that Gambia and Senegal [could not obtain aid for development of the Gambia River] as long as Guinea, whence 70 percent of that river flows, did not support the project. When my brothers told me how important it was for Guinea to become a member, I said, "Very well, what we will ask of you is to take into account our development project needs." Guinea became a member two years ago, and I have just been elected as head of the OMVG by my peers at a conference in Banjul. As for the Niger Basin Authority, France had created a [Niger River] organization in colonial times. When independence came, I resigned for Guinea, and I said to my brothers, "As long as we cannot meet together, set our own terms, or decide upon our own union, I shall not be a member..." Finally, at Lagos in 1977 or 1978, on the insistence of my brother, [Nigerian leader Gen. Olusegun] Obasanjo, I joined... the organization, and there again I was elected head. [All of this] shows that a policy of being a good neighbor, of cooperation and solidarity, is more profitable than a policy of violence and belligerence.

Capitalism and Socialism
I have never said that we are doing away with capitalism... [My philosophy,] which I have discussed in public, is that
people should strive to be honest with one another and should not be monetized through opportunistic and mendacious practices. Ever since independence, I have given the commencement address at the university each year. This year my thesis was development, and I specifically talked about the false struggle between capitalism and socialism. Is there a socialist country that doesn’t collect profits? Can anyone show me such a socialist country? Once the costs of coffee and palm oil and raw materials are set, whether in New York, London, Paris, Bonn, or elsewhere, is there a socialist country that will say, “That’s too low; we will give you an extra dollar”? Let’s face reality. . . . We have not talked about socialist development in our country, but rather non-capitalistic development. . .

When I become a debtor, let’s say when I owe money to the World Bank, $100 million, I receive the $100 million as a state. If there are effective domestic entities capable of honoring these commitments, then it is to them that the benefit goes. But it is the state of Guinea that is incurring a debt vis-à-vis the World Bank.

At the outset, we had nothing. There were small merchants in Guinea, but no genuine capitalists capable of contributing to the economy. Now we have a small and medium-size business administration to gather and organize all of Guinea’s small businesses, and the [World Bank’s assistance] will enable them really to go into business, in a serious way. . . But before there was nothing. The state itself had to go into external debt to market the country’s commodities, and with the foreign exchange thus gained, it imported what the country needed in the way of food, clothing, or capital goods. There were no private companies, because France had suppressed all previous such entities. So what would you have done in our place? Suppose your country had no corporate entities and no financial groups. Suppose there were nothing and no one had money. What would you do? Would you say, “Well, let’s sit idly by. The state should do nothing until luck creates the national capital we need”? Look at the Guinean reality, and do not confuse it with the context of your own experience, which is different from ours.

(Edited translation from the French)

Africa Studies Program Calendar
(August-September 1982)


September 10. The September issue of CSIS Africa Notes probes the causes and implications of the breakup of the nineteenth annual Assembly of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity. The centerfold is a country-by-country chart of attendance and policy positions.

September 22-23. CSIS hosts a two-day conference on “Strategic Response to Conflict in the 1980s” under the chairmanship of Dr. William J. Taylor. The Africa panel, organized and moderated by Helen Kitchen, considers optional U.S. responses to (1) anti-regime uprisings in major Moroccan cities (Dr. I. William Zartman, Director of African Studies, Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies); (2) a new military leadership in Somalia seeking rapprochement with Ethiopia and the Soviet Union (Dr. David Albright, Professor of National Security Affairs, Air War College); and (3) escalating unrest in Mozambique and Zimbabwe leading to South African involvement (Michael Clough, Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey).

September 24. A group of ICA-sponsored mid-career foreign policy specialists from 18 different African countries are guests at a roundtable focused on the Center’s purposes, programs, and influence.

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