"Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan and Iraq Wars"

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The “Hard Way”

Early Strategic Lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq
Grand Strategic Lessons

• Ensure valid goals for going to war.

• Understand the risks of limited war escalating in intensity, time, and level of strategic commitment.

  *Fully understand the dynamics of the host country(ies); consider the risk of insurgency, terrorism, and internal tensions.*

• Assess goals for war termination accurately; focus on grand strategic outcome, not the kinetic fight.

• Fully assess the risks in terms of stability operations and aftermaths, not simply war fighting; resource for stability operations or don’t engage.

• Build coalitions to achieve lasting results, not for short term political risks.

• Resource adequately or don’t engage.

• Fully develop and resource the civil side of war and conflict termination.

• Look at regional dynamics, not just immediate threat.

• Don’t engage conventionally if you are not ready for irregular or unconventional war.
The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
~49,000

**AFGHANISTAN**
- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: $35.6B GDP, $1,000 PC
- Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

**IRAQ**
- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI
- Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
~176,000
Armed Nation Building vs. Counterinsurgency

- The risk in counterinsurgency is generally proportionate to internal political stability and the quality of governance; bad states lead to bad wars.

- Failed or broken states present massive civil problems and risks in addition to the classic military problems in counterinsurgency.

- Dealing with different ideologies, religions, cultures, ethnic and sectarian structures, tribal groupings vastly complicate the issue.

- Demographics and economics present further problems.

- The US and West cannot impose mirror images in terms of governments, rule of law, economics, and human rights.

- Development goals must be realistic.

- De facto or de jure occupation alienates while undercutting the host country regime.
Exploiting the “Golden Hour”

- Begin stability operations and “shape, clear, hold, and build” before military operations begin.
- Fully resource the civil-military dimension and strategic information operations from day one.
- Finish the job in dealing with key threats; contain insurgent and terrorist threats from day one.
- Treat the host country as a partner from day one.
- Solve the short term before the long term. Don’t begin post conflict reconstruction before the war is really over.
- Contain neighboring states from the outset.
- Realistic goals for political and economic development, focusing on immediate needs, are critical to success.
- Political correctness loses the peace.
Learning the Hard Way

• The national culture or cultures -- as well as key fracture lines -- will decisively reassert themselves over time.

• Rule of law will revert to largely traditional or previous systems.

• If conflicts arise, police must be paramilitary; western policing concepts will not work.

• The disenfranchised become enemies.
  • Large amounts of young men without jobs or a role in society are a key risk.

• The invader/occupier/liberator will eventually leave. The country and its neighbors will stay.

• US and Western strategic patience is limited and dependent on evidence of success.
Host Country Lessons - I

• Preserve and build on the host country system of governance and security structure; don’t replace or “fix” what isn’t broken.

• Central governments cannot substitute for effective regional and local governments.

• Threat the host country as a partner from day one.

• Fully resource creation of effective host country security forces from the start.

• Legitimacy is a function of the quality of governance and the level of personal and economic security; democracy is simply a way of choosing governments.

• Inexperienced, fragmented political leaders without stable political parties and clear responsibility to a constituency are not effective.

• Wars release suppressed sectarian, ethnic, regional and other sources of national division and conflict.
Host Country Lessons - II

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- Rule of law will revert to largely traditional or previous systems.
- If conflicts arise, police must be paramilitary; western policing concepts will not work.
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  - Large amounts of young men without jobs or a role in society are a key risk.
- The invader/occupier/liberator will eventually leave. The country and its neighbors will stay.
- US and Western strategic patience is limited and dependent on evidence of success.
Learning from Experience

The 5 to 7 Year Prelude to Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build
Five to Seven More Years of Hard Lessons

• Adequate resources win in Iraq, inadequate resources lose in Afghanistan: Late in One Case, Still waiting in the other.

• Insurgents remain highly adaptive, can use low cost counters to many US advantages.

• Incrementalism and denial cede the initiative; need to react immediately once insurgency begins.

• Need a clear doctrine for counterinsurgency and stability operations, but...

• Second and third tours, and years of adaptive tactics, training, and equipment adjustments, accomplish far more.

• Often a war of who makes the least mistakes: Al Qa’ida made more; Taliban didn’t.
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

Five to Seven More Years of Hard Lessons

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Annual DOD Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in $ billions)

## Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>128,569</td>
<td>150,336</td>
<td>155,846</td>
<td>182,060</td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>20,947</td>
<td>26,480</td>
<td>26,607</td>
<td>48,250</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>56,000</td>
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Afghan and Iraq Security Forces Funding: FY2004-FY2009 Bridge ($US billions)

Building Host Country Forces

- Oversize to get adequate actual forces.
- Must have adequate training base, and trainers, but
  - Embedded mentors and partners are far more important.
- Officer performance critical; ability to transfer NCO system uncertain or failing.
- Pay, leave, privileges, promotion, death and disability benefits critical.
- Cannot afford to use up: Need serve, train, leave rotation.
- Enablers, planners, sustainers take time, and do it their way.
- Paramilitary and elite police critical in high risk areas.
- Border forces of dubious or uncertain value.
- Major target for corruption and political influence.
- Making truly national extremely difficult, but critical to try.
Win the Civil Side of War or Lose

• The center of gravity is ultimately the population and the quality of governance, not tactical or kinetic.

• Win the population centers in the ideological battle and battle or political attrition or lose the war.

• Civil-military operations are critical and must be linked to tactical situation -- dollars = bullets -- but are largely a military mission in high risk areas.

• Tactical victories (shape and clear) don’t matter unless they lead to lasting security and stability (hold and build).

• Shaping the impact of national fracture lines as critical as shaping the battlefield.
Implementing Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build:
The Afghan Case
Grand Strategic Fallacies: Afghanistan

- Taliban, Al Qa’ida, and other insurgent movements were shattered and could not recover.
  - Their initial operations were those of terrorist bitter enders and could be deal with tactically, rather than in struggle for control of population, ideology, and war of attrition.
- Could shift immediately to post conflict reconstruction; mid and long-term development.
- Political and governance issues could be solved through strong central government, democratic elections, and Western views of human rights and rule of law. Corruption and quality of governance were not critical.
- Pashtun, other ethnic divisions, cultural issues would not emerge as key problems.
- Quality of governance, aid, and services at local level was not critical; only required marginal US military, civil, and funding resources.
- Only needed aid and peace keeping forces; could shift much of burden to allies.
- Did not need strong and effective Afghan security forces.
- Pakistan was effective ally; “sanctuaries” in Pakistan and ties to ISI did not present critical problems.
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan  May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

- Total average daily attacks
- Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces
- Average daily attacks-Afghanistan security
- Average daily attacks-civilians

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

Afghanistan as A Host Country

• Can influence, but not transform.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations are quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:

2005 versus 2007

Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007

Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007
NATO/ISAF Events Map in 2008

- Change in Kinetic Event Density
  1 Jan - 28 Dec 07 and 08

- Decreased events in select areas
  - Kabul: City 47%; Province 15%
    - ANSF deaths down 61%
  - Garmsir: 43%

- 31% more kinetic events in '08 - same areas
- Increased event levels due to:
  - More ISAF / ANSF operating in more areas
  - Increased asymmetric methods
  - Continued sanctuary in PAK

*Density range / calibration differs from province to district in order to show differences
Attack Trends: Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

Suicide attacks were up 9%.

Attacks on GiRoA officials were down 11%.
Attacks on GiRoA infrastructure were up 156%.
Attacks on ANA were down 18%.
Attacks on ANP were up 15%.

Complex attacks were up 152%.
Complex attacks include those involving more than one means of attack (i.e., small arms plus IED, small arms plus indirect fire, etc.) or more than 20 insurgents.
Complex attack numbers do not include attacks against District Centers.

Kidnappings were down 27%.
The number of Assassinations did not change.
Insurgent Attacks by RC

**RC South**

- Direct Fire
- IEDs
- Indirect Fire
- Surface to Air Fire

**RC East**

- Direct Fire
- IEDs
- Indirect Fire
- Surface to Air Fire

**RC Capital**

- Comparing Jan-May ’08 to the same period in ’08, insurgent initiated attacks were down 21% in Kabul City but up 61% in the rest of the province (primarily Surobi District)

**RC North**

- Direct Fire
- IEDs
- Indirect Fire
- Surface to Air Fire

**RC West**

- Direct Fire
- IEDs
- Indirect Fire
- Surface to Air Fire

- Comparing Jan-May ’09 to the same period in ’08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
  - Up 78% in RC South
  - Up 41% in RC East
  - Up 29% in RC Capital
  - Up 21% in RC North
  - Up 73% in RC West

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Source: JOIIS, 2 Jun 09
NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008

- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*

*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations
Civilian Causalities:
Jan-Jun 2007, 2008 & 2009

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
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<tr>
<td>2007: Total 684</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008: Total 818</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009: Total 1013</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
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“Afghanistan Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”,
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights Unit, 2009, Page 4
Civilian Casualties Jan-Jun 2009 by Incident Type

Civilian Casualties caused by Pro-Government Forces by the Type of Incident from Jan-June 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Strike</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other tactics</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
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Anti-Government Elements Attributed Civilian Casualties Jan-Jun 2009

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Suicide &amp; IED Attacks</th>
<th>Assassinations</th>
<th>Other tactics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
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Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun)
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF

- Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC
  Standardized process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

- Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

Suicide Attacks: 2007 27%, 2009-2 26%
Snipers: 2007 20%, 2009-2 19%
Kidnappings: 2007 25%, 2009-2 31%
Coalition bombings: 2007 17%, 2009-2 16%
Coalition forces: 2007 24%, 2009-2 21%
ANA/ANP: 2007 16%, 2009-2 13%
Taliban: 2007 27%, 2009-2 24%

Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)

Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014

(Authorized Personnel)

Coalition, ANA, and ANP KIA, October 2008-May 2009

Source: NATO JOISS Database

Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
Defining the Concept

- Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

- Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

- Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

- Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

• Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.

• Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.
Hold

In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.
Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

- **Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.**

- **Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.**

- **Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).**

- **Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.**

- **Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.**

- **Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.**
Dealing with the Legacies of Past Failures

• Defeat the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Create an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Build up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to first support NATO/ISAF, then take the lead, and eventually replace NATO/ISAF forces or limit the mission of the remaining forces to an advisory role.

• Give the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Create an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts claim a unity of effort they do not have, are wasteful and sometimes corrupt, and often pursue unrealistic and unachievable goals. They provide unintentional aid to both the insurgency and Afghan corruption and the abuses of power brokers.

• Deal with the de facto sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. With the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

2) training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.
Dealing With the Aftermath?

The Iraqi Case
Grand Strategic Fallacies: Iraq

• Iraq’s WMD programs were a valid reason for war and would justify the invasion. Saddam’s ruthlessness and Iraqi ties to terrorism provided secondary validity.

• The US and Coalition would be broadly greeted as liberators -- not split Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds.

• No planning, major funding, or sustained troop levels would be needed for a stabilization phase. The Iraqi government would continue to function; Iraq had oil wealth and could fund its own reconstruction.

• Exile groups would be seen as broadly politically legitimate. DeBa’athification could be implemented broadly without alienating Sunnis and affecting Iraq’s secular character.

• There would be no residual Ba’athist or insurgent threat. What threat did emerge was marginal and largely terrorist and kinetic, not geared to dominating the population in a battle of political attrition.

• Sectarian (Sunni vs. Shi’ite), ethnic (Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turcoman), and secular vs. religious divisions would not be critical.

• Iraq could be fixed by a new constitution, and democratic elections for the central government.

• Iraqi forces could be disbanded without political consequences. Building up effective Afghan security forces had little priority.

• Iraq’s neighbors would not present major security problems.
Iraq “Good Enough” for How Long?

• The illusion of control: Does Iraq Revert to Past Norms?
  • 50% recidivism in UN peace keeping missions in 5 years.
  • Kurdish issue only one and most visible well-established fracture line.

• Can US influence and Iraq “good enough” credibly pass the 5 year test?
  • Anti-US “backlash” effects; US back out effects
  • Regional “Presidential syndrome”
  • Military coup, strong leader
  • Sectarian/ethnic fragmentation plus internal power struggles and low-level Jihadist violence
  • Impact of outside powers

• Demographics vs. economics vs. income distribution

• Major clashes versus micro-clashes

• Oil dependence without effective governance and development
Declining US Influence

• US had marginal popularity, even among those who saw invasion as desirable.

• Vast majority of Iraqis want US out. Many as soon as possible.

• No longer major source of aid.

• Not a major funder of Iraqi security forces.

• No clear US exit strategy beyond an exit. No clear operational civil and economic dimension to the Joint Campaign Plan.

• Maliki and others prepared to take substantial risks to lower US profile and influence.

• Strong leader, strong candidate must run against the US.

• Cannot be seen as bowing to US on key sectarian and ethnic issues.

• Even Kurds losing faith.
U.S. Assistance and GOI Capital Funding

FY 2004: 16.3
FY 2005: 0.0
FY 2006: 1.7
FY 2007: 2.2
FY 2008: 10.1
FY 2009*: 13.1
FY 2009: 11.8

Sources: NEA/I; Iraqi Ministry of Finance

* Budget requests for FY09 supplemental and FY10 base budget pending
Liberated, Or Not?

Views of the 2003 Invasion
ABC News/BBC/NHK poll

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
The US as Part of Perceived Violence

Experiences of Violence in the Past Six Months

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, February 2009
Scoping Internal Tensions
Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions, and Political Accommodation

• Accommodation cannot be legislated, but tensions can be eased --- particularly with money and power sharing. Neither currently working well.

• De facto segregation: Shi’ite vs. Sunni divisions have tended to become “islands” rather than “blobs.”

• Rising, but still fragile, sense of Arab identity.

• Failures of Shi’ite governance and Sunni extremism have limited support for Islamic governments, but is still strong.

• Kurd vs. Arab vs. Turcoman have divided into rival ethnic areas along a broad and indeterminate fault line.

• Year of elections both distracts and polarizes, as does economic crisis and unemployment.

• Data on refugees and displacements uncertain peaked more than 2 million internally and 2 million driven outside country in nation of 28 million. Some estimates reach 5+ million, but some evidence indicates may be far too high.
Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions
Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

◆ Sectarian Challenges
  • Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

◆ Ethnic Challenges
  • Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

◆ Tribal Challenges
  • Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.
# Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population Parameters?

Three sources:
- CIA World Factbook, unsourced;
- Average ABC News polls ‘07-‘08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points.

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<th></th>
<th>CIA WFB</th>
<th>LoC</th>
<th>ABC</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>60-65%</td>
<td>60-65%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td>12-22*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>15-20</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Muslims</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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</table>


*Extrapolated*
Most Iraqis (Except Kurds) Never Sought Division Even During Worst Part of Fighting: May 2007

Same True in March 2009

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
But Are Serious Differences

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, February 2009
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2009

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2009

Government Security Efforts are Effective

Iraq is Stable

Nationwide Average = 45%

Nationwide Average = 56%

The Kurdish Problem

Seen as the most likely near-term source of fragmentation. Both sides have powerful reasons to compromise, but this is the Middle East
Arab-Kurdish Relations Are Not Getting Better

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
Will There Be Arab-Kurdish-Turcoman Violence?

• Some low level clashes are occurring; more are inevitable.

• UN efforts have done as much to map exact areas of contention as to ease the situation: The ethnic fault line extends from Mosul through Kirkuk to Iran with islands further south.
  
  • Jihadist target. Problem for counterinsurgency effort.

• Kurdish elections have had polarizing debate as are politics of coming national elections.

• Maliki needs to be the strong Arab leader; Barzani and Talibani unwilling to compromise.

• Unclear a referendum will help.

• Oil, gas, and petroleum revenues critical. Both Kurdish and Iraqi central government face serious economic problems.

• Growing tensions over purges in ISF; Kurdish desire for Kurdish divisions and funding of Pesh Merga.

• But, Kurds have nowhere to go: Syria, Turkey, Iran.
Key Variables

- Flashpoints like Kirkuk
- UNAMI report impact.
- Conflicting Arab-Kurd-Turcoman narratives at every level.
- Petroleum resources, sharing income, Hydro-Carbon Laws, actual practice.
- Sharp demographic pressure; 40,000 land and property disputes, 12 months to resolve a dispute.
- Worst drought in 50 years, canal problems, water conservation.
- KRG versus the governor of Ninewa.
- Al Qaida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq, Jaysh Rijal Tariq Al Naqshabandi, SOI transition.
- Divisions along “prosperity line;” perceived inequality in Arab areas.
- Real world lack of investors, 40% unemployment, drop in public works.
- Perceived corruption, power brokering, lack of legitimacy.
“Presidentialism” vs. the Coup

The longer term source of disruption may not be fragmentation but centralization under a strong man
“Presidentialism” and Military Leadership

• Not necessarily a clash if “President” coopts the military.

• Many Iraqis who say they want democracy want strong leadership, security, government help and services more.

• The Iraqi constitution creates over-centralized paralysis without empowering provinces and true representative government. Recipe for popular anger as corruption, failure to act, lack of security.

• Not possible to really characterize Maliki’s ambitions at this point, but clearly wants more presidential powers, to appear strong leader, use the US as political foil.

• Unclear Maliki can build a strong enough coalition to act, time and national elections may weaken, not strengthen.

• Cannot discount military coup if government and/or economy fail.
“Presidential” Power?

Job Approval Ratings: Maliki
ABC News/BBC/NHK poll

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
Support for Democracy is Less Than Meets the Eye

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
The Coup Effect?

Confidence in Iraqi Institutions
ABC News/BBC/NHK poll

- Police
- Iraqi army
- National gov't

% confident

68%
67%
53%
74%
73%
61%

Nov 2005
March 2007
Aug 2007
Feb 2008
Now

Source: Gary Langer, ABC Polling Unit, March 2009
The Coup Problem: Projected Growth of Iraqi Forces

Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008
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Shi’ite vs. Sunni

Still possible to trigger a new wave of divisive violence in Arab population, but less likely with time
Al Qa'ida in Iraq Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008

Winter 2006-2007

Fall 2008

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
January 3, 2004 – February 28, 2009

High-Profile Attacks (Explosions)
May 2006 – February 2009

Weapons Caches Found by Coalition and Iraqi Forces
January 3, 2004 – February 28, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of February 28, 2009. Chart includes caches and explosive remnants of war.

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
December 1, 2008 – February 28, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of February 28, 2009. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
March 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of May 31, 2009. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.


Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths
January 2006 – May 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments Cl/O/C Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of May 31, 2009.
Civilian Deaths
January 2006 – May 2009

Shī’ite vs. Shi’ite

More likely to be a political than a violent power struggle, but Sadrists and splinter groups still a problem.
Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

Shi’ite vs. Shi’ite

- Deep and growing divisions in former Shi’ite coalition. Maliki rising above Dawa, competing with SIIC. Smaller national parties face serious competition; struggle to survive.

- Sadr movement has fragmented, but the end result is independent elements of the Mahdi Army and hard-line splinter groups.

- Still see Iranian help in arms and training.

- Questions about influence of Sistani and senior clergy, what happens after Sistani dies.

- Are significant numbers of secular and quietist Shi’ites.

- Most likely case is a Shi’ite victory, perhaps in coalition with non-Shi’ite or secular groups.

- Election campaign will set the stage for defining who really has power, but the winning coalition and not the winning candidates are likely to shape the result.
Sunni vs. Sunni

Fragmentation of both supporters and opponents of the political process
Sunni vs. Sunni

• Significant numbers of secular Arab nationalists.

• At this point, still jockeying to establish real Sunni political parties, and influence/control at the local and provincial level.

• Syria still plays a serious spoiler role -- supporting neo-Ba’athists and tolerating AQI.
  
  • Islamic State of Iraq/Al Qaeda in Iraq still have operating areas in Ninewa and Mosul, and operate in Diyala. Will be able to play a major spoiler role for some years to come.
  
  • Proto-Ba’athist groups like Jaysh Rijal Tariq Al Naqshabandi emerging as more serious threat.

• No unifying clergy or clear leader.

• SOIs, tribal groups, secular leaders, Islamic leaders fragmented and inexperienced. Limit ability to create an active structure of fragmentation and division.

• Much depends on coming election; sharing of power, oil wealth, and positions in government and ISF.
Economic, Budget, and Unemployment Pressssues

Losing/Finding the “Glue” That Can Hold Iraq Together
Key Tests of Progress and Unity

• Quality, integrity, and equity of government services: education, medical services, water, electricity.

• Sharing of state budget and oil wealth by region, sect, ethnicity.

• Volume of oil revenues, development of petroleum sector.

• Agricultural reform.

• Reform of state industries sector and employment.

• Employment and income distribution; who gets government jobs and key appointments.

• Limits to excessive corruption and power brokers.
Past Oil Revenues: 2007 = $41.0 billion, 2008 = $61.9 billion
Iraq’s Oil Sector: Production By Region: April 08-April 09

Oil Production and Export
April 2008 – April 2009

[Graph showing oil production and export by region from April 2008 to April 2009, with categories for North Production, South Production, North Exports, South Exports, and Total Production and Exports.]
GOI Budgets: 2005 - 2009

* 2008 supplemental budget not included; ** 2009 budget passed March 5

Source: Iraqi Ministry of Finance
GOI Spending: 2005 - 2009

Source: Iraqi Ministry of Finance

* Projection

Note: Unspent funds were rolled over in 2006, 2007, and 2008
GOI Fiscal and Monetary Reserves

Note: Currency reserves are legally unavailable for government expenditures

Source: Iraqi Ministry of Finance

* Projection
## Ministry Performance Trends: 2006-2008

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*Review of Ministry of Transportation conducted only in 2008*
Unemployment remains a significant problem. COSIT estimates national unemployment at 18%. Other sources (EIU, IMF, Brookings) estimate national unemployment from 20% – 40%.

Source: COSIT unemployment survey, 2008
Combined Wheat/Barley Production

- 2008/09 drought most affects northern provinces

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2008/09 information is a USDA forecast)
• More than 800 MW of new “feasible” (potentially available) generating capacity have been added to the grid since the beginning of the year. Additions during the current month have been the KRG’s Chamchamal project (400 MW) and two diesel units added by the national Ministry of Electricity (34 MW),
• May 17-23, electricity supply from the grid was 47% above the year-earlier period and met 67% of estimated demand compared with 50% for the year-earlier period.

Source: NEA-IPOG-DL@state.gov