The Comparative Metrics of ISIS and “Failed State Wars” in Syria and Iraq

Part One: Regional Trends Shaping the Conflict

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Meeting the Analytic and Policy Challenges
Key Failures in USG Efforts

1. Policy level comes to focus on spin, lack of objective analysis and transparency, compartmentation. Congress goes for partisan and member advantage.

2. Denial of complexity, net for net assessment. Focus on hostile forces rather than overall security situation.

3. Lack of meaningful integrated civil-military planning

4. Poor accounting and conditionality, lack of measures of effectiveness, focus on past waste rather than future needs and effectiveness.

5. Military reverts to focus on tactical success, short-term civil buy offs.

6. Focus on force generation rather than combat effectiveness. Rush in too late, leave too early; don’t provide combat advisors, erratic programs and funding, lack of conditionality

7. Civil side pursues illusions of progress, tries to reform everything, then reverts to project aid that often ignores security and fighting.

8. We lie when we say we’ll focus on letting them do it their way, helping them evolve their civil and security systems on their terms.

9. Efforts at improving fiscal management, counter corruption, rule of law, police reform reflect our goals and culture, do more harm than good

10. High rotation rates, new policies: Every year is the first year. Fail to develop and retain core expertise in economic planning, state politics, governance reform, and security reform.

11. Erratic swings in funding. Emphasis on budget execution rather than effectiveness

12. We “take note of lessons” after the crisis, fail to learn from the past.
Areas of ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State) Control, Operation, and Affiliation
ISIS Area of Operation

Major events:  
- Attacks directed by/linked to ISIS  
- Attacks inspired by ISIS

Absorbing Other Groups

Countries with groups that pledged allegiance to ISIS

ISIS “Provinces”

Stratfor Estimate of Jihadist Threat: 2014
ISW Estimate of ISIS Regional Role: 1.2016 - II

1. Tunisian authorities arrested cells with links to ISIS in Libya and Syria in Bizerte and Kairouan on January 27, demonstrating how support for ISIS in West Africa benefits ISIS’s central organization in Iraq and Syria and its Libyan affiliates.

2. ISIS’s Wilayat Tarabulus (Western Libya) launched an SVBIED against a police training facility in Zliten on January 7, killing over 60 in one of the largest attacks in Libyan history. ISIS launched the operation to distract armed groups in nearby Misrata while executing its campaign on Libya’s oil facilities, thereby demonstrating its ability to coordinate attacks across multiple Libyan cities.

3. ISIS’s Wilayat Barqa (Eastern Libya) launched a major campaign targeting large oil facilities east of the ISIS-held city of Sirte on January 4. The group initially launched a SVBIED and rockets on the al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals before deploying gunmen.

4. A suspected ISIS militant conducted an SVEST attack in a tourist neighborhood in Istanbul, Turkey on January 12, killing 11 foreigners. Previous ISIS-linked attacks in Turkey had primarily struck government and Kurdish political targets. ISIS-linked operatives may increasingly shift to attacking popular tourist sites in order to inspire fear globally and harm Turkey economically.

5. ISIS claimed an unsuccessful attack on a bus of Israeli tourists at a hotel in Giza, central Egypt on January 7. The group claimed that the attack was in response to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s December 2015 call to “target the Jews everywhere.”

6. ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai claimed an IED attack against an armored police vehicle in al-Arish, Egypt killing two and wounding five on January 29. The group claimed five other IED attacks against security targets in January 2016.

7. ISIS’s Wilayat Damascus claimed a suicide attack against a checkpoint near the Shi’a Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus on January 31, killing 71. The Sayyida Zeinab shrine is symbolically significant as a target since it is one of Syria’s holiest Shi’a sites, and strategically significant as Iranian proxy groups are based in the vicinity of the shrine. The attack likely serves a dual purpose of militarily countering Iranian proxies in Syria and fueling sectarian tensions in the region.

8. ISIS’s Wilayat A‘dhn Abayn (Southern Yemen) launched SVBIEDs against the Presidential Palace and a police checkpoint in Aden on January 28 and 29, reflecting intent to target the political and security structures of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government.

9. ISIS’s Wilayat Khurasan (Afghanistan-Pakistan) attacked the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, eastern Afghanistan on January 13, in its first complex attack in an urban center.

10. ISIS claimed its first attack in Southeast Asia on January 14, a complex assault in a commercial district of Jakarta, Indonesia. Five attackers reportedly directed by an Indonesian ISIS member in Syria used SVESTs, small arms, and hand grenades to kill four and injure at least twenty. The attack cell and planner maintained links to militants in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, signaling the emergence of a growing pro-ISIS network in Southeast Asia.
Major ISIS Attacks and Arrests: 10.14 to 12.15


ISIL as a Transnational Threat, as of 12/2015

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has been reporting on the spread of ISIL based on its tracking of, among other things, social media and satellite imagery to provide a picture of ISIL’s spread of influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. ISW’s research shows that ISIL recruits local militiamen to establish provinces, imposing brutal Sharia law where they take hold. With affiliates in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, ISIL-inspired lone-wolf attacks have reached the West, including the killing of 14 Americans in San Bernardino, California, on December 2, 2015. These affiliates provide the group “strategic resilience,” making their destruction essential to defeating ISIL in the long term.


FIRST TIER
Rated as the most dangerous emerging element, extending across northern Africa and up through the Caucasus region. In Egypt, al-Wilayat Sinai (WS) is ISIL’s self-declared Sinai province, operating since July 2014. In 2015, WS increased signature vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks in Egypt, mirroring ISIL operations against the Government of Iraq. On October 31, the group was associated with Russia’s Metrojet in-flight explosion over the Sinai Peninsula, killing all 224 people on board.

SECOND TIER
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia
Wilayat Khorasan (WK) is a self-declared IS province operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan since January 2015, after multiple jihadist commanders in the region pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The WK has repeatedly attacked Jalalabad, a major provincial capital, and commits atrocities along the way to suppress local populations, including executing rival leaders and, in September 2015, destroying a UNICEF convoy in Yemen. ISIL killed 140 people in 3 coordinated suicide bombings, and it continues to use these tactics in the capital region. In Saudi Arabia, ISIL’s affiliates are threatening stability by targeting Shia civilians and Saudi security forces with multiple successful suicide attacks.

THIRD TIER
Algeria and Russia’s North Caucasus
Although ISIL has declared provinces in both Algeria and Russia, these affiliates have not emerged as a direct threat with demonstrated capability or confirmed connections to al-Baghdadi.
Iranian Influence

**Lebanon** Hezbollah is considered Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran’s interest.

**Syria** Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

**Iraq** Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

**Bahrain** Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

**Yemen** Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.

ISIS is Only One Threat, and Key ISIS Countries Face Many Equal or Great Challenges
Not Really a War Against ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State)

- Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have long been “failed states” in terms of politics, governance, economic development, demographic pressures, and security.
- Libya torn apart into two warring “governments,” many local factions, Islamists, and regional and ethnic differences.
- ISIS “Caliphate” is product of two sets of civil wars, growing out of Sunni and Al Qaida hostility to U.S. invasion of Iraq.
  - Rise after 2011 a product of major upheavals growing out of both internal problems and failed secularism.
  - Syria is divided into four main fighting factions: ISIS, Kurdish, Arab-Islamist, and pro-Assad factions. Impact of 250,000+ dead, 500,000+ injured, 4+ million refugees, 7+ million internally displaced persons, 60%+ cut in GDP
  - Iraq is divided in Sunni, Kurdish, Iraqi government and Shiite factions on the edge of civil conflict and with growing violence after 2010.
  - “Youth bulge” in very young populations creates further stress.
  - U.S. invasion of Iraq compound impact of Saddam’s blood coup in 1979, Iran-Iraq War, invasion of Kuwait, U.S. led invasion in 2003, fighting from 2004-2013 all have a legacy – as does Assad’s father suppression of Moslem Brotherhood.
  - Defeating or degrading ISIS with still leave violent Islamist extremists.
- Yemen scene of constant fighting and civil struggles since British leave Aden. Now is Houthi vs. Sana government struggle Massive population pressure, serious water and arable land issues, drug economy. Sunni vs. Shi’ite and north-south tensions. Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, not ISIS, is dominant Sunni Islamist extremist faction.
The Four Threats That Drive Serious Terrorism and Insurgency (In Order of Priority)

• 1. Host Country Government and Security Forces: Authoritarianism, failure to cope with internal divisions, poor governance and corruption, failed economy development and equity, population pressure and youth bulge, repression and violence by internal security forces, traditional and corrupt military.

• 2. The Overt “Threat”: Moderate and peaceful beginnings shift to extreme and violent movements that feed on the civil-military divisions and failures of the host country governments.

• 3. The U.S. Threat to the U.S.: Relearn counterinsurgency yet again. Separate military (tactical) and civil (project-oriented development) efforts. Threat oriented and downplay Host Country problems. No meaningful overall civil-military plan or net assessment. Rapid rotations with limited expertise. Cycle of denial, flood resources, rush to generate Host country forces, then leave too soon. “Take note” of lessons, then ignore.

• 4. Other Nations: Allied, Neutral, Hostile: Allied limits to engagement, national caveats, demands; neutral interference for competing national interests, hostile action because anti-U.S., support overt threat, opposing national interests.
The Uncertain State of “Progress”

- Years of war have now gone on since 2011 with no meaningful estimates of impact and the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.
- Rising GDP in petro-economics may disguise deep structural problems, impact of population growth, income distribution problems. Etc.
- Poverty estimates often fail to address rising costs, impact of urbanization, etc.
- Security remains a key problem that often is not taken into account in economic and human development estimates.
- Rising sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional and other internal divisions often ignored.
- Unemployment data ignore productivity, disguised unemployment, career opportunities.
- Data on progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raise major questions about quality of data.
- Critical near term challenges in revenues, job creation, electric power, agriculture, and roads.
- Estimate of future opportunities for progress often ignore reality that states at war need time to recover. No major near-term development options until.
- Military and aid spending have often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
ISIS, Failed States, and the Broader Patterns of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Refugees
Eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Eleven per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.

Deaths from Terrorism: 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased ninefold since the year 2000.


NOTE: In 2011 there was a change in the data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable. For more information on the methodology change please see Annex D in the 2014 Global Terrorism Index.
Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.

Terrorism and Refugees: 2008-2014

In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 60.
Between 1970 and 2014, there have been **176 occasions on which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people** (excluding perpetrators), in a particular country on a particular day. This includes both isolated attacks, multiple attacks, and multi-part, coordinated attacks. The first such event took place in 1978, when an arson attack targeting the Cinema Rex Theater in Abadan, Iran killed more than 400 people. Since the Cinema Rex attack, and until 2013, 4.2 such mass-fatality terrorist events happened per year, on average. In **2014, the number increased dramatically when 26 mass-fatality terrorist events took place in eight different countries: Afghanistan (1), Central African Republic (1), Iraq (9), Nigeria (9), Pakistan (1), South Sudan (1), Syria (3), and Ukraine (1).**

The occurrence of a series of attacks on a particular day that result in large numbers of casualties may or may not be indicative of explicit coordination among perpetrators. **Nearly half (11) of the 26 days in 2014 in which more than 100 victims were killed by terrorists in a single country involved the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as perpetrators.** In Nigeria, all nine of the highly lethal days involved the perpetrator group Boko Haram. Other perpetrator groups responsible for attacks on these high-fatality days include the Taliban in Afghanistan, militia groups in the Central African Republic, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), al-Nusrah Front, and the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, both in Ukraine.

Between 2000 and 2014, there were 83 days on which more than 100 people were killed by terrorist attacks in a single country. These attacks took place in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; however, they were especially concentrated in Iraq and Nigeria.

Although Western Europe has historically experienced thousands of terrorist attacks, **highly lethal attacks like the recent events in Paris are extremely unusual.** The deadliest terrorist attacks in Western Europe between 2000 and 2014 took place in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004 when assailants attacked six different transportation targets with explosives. Four of the devices detonated, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,800.

The recent attacks in Paris reportedly involved both explosives and firearms. These two types of weapons are those most commonly used in terrorist attacks worldwide.

Between 2000 and 2014, explosives were used in 58 percent of all terrorist attacks, and firearms were used in 34 percent of all terrorist attacks. However both firearms and explosives were used much more rarely—in less than 4 percent of all attacks.

Attacks that involved firearms were somewhat more deadly than those involving explosives, causing 3.1 fatalities on average (including perpetrator deaths), compared to 2.4.

Despite the potential for explosives to cause mass casualties in certain cases, they were also more frequently used in attacks that are non-lethal (57%), either because they targeted only property or were unsuccessful at causing human casualties.

In comparison, 24 percent of all attacks involving only firearms worldwide between 2000 and 2014 were non-lethal.

Attacks that involved both explosives and firearms caused, on average, 6.8 deaths per attack. This rate of lethality is 2.8 times that of all attacks overall, and attacks involving explosives. It is 2.2 times the average lethality of attacks involving firearms.
## Coordinated Attacks: 2000-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>% Coordinated Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Perpetrator Fatalities</th>
<th>Victim Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2170</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4592</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3009</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Global Terrorism Database*

Like the recent attacks in Paris, some of the highly lethal terrorist attacks described above were carried out as part of coordinated events in which perpetrators execute multiple attacks simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, typically in a single country or city. Between 2000 and 2014, 14 percent of all terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide were conducted in coordination with other attacks.

On average, individual attacks that were carried out as part of a coordinated event were slightly more deadly, causing 2.84 total fatalities on average, compared to isolated attacks, which caused 2.35 total fatalities on average. The average number of perpetrator fatalities among attacks that were part of a coordinated event were slightly higher as well—0.39 perpetrator deaths per attack, compared to 0.33 for isolated attacks.

More than 10,000 coordinated terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries between 2000 and 2014. Much like terrorism in general, these attacks were concentrated among a small number of countries. More than half of all coordinated attacks (54%) took place in Iraq, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. Among countries that experienced more than 50 attacks between 2000 and 2014, France had the highest proportion of attacks that were carried out as part of multi-part, coordinated events, with 40 percent. The majority of these (87%) were carried out in Corsica by separatists including the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), causing property damage but no deaths and few injuries.
The perpetrator of the attack was unidentified for 40 percent of all coordinated terrorist attacks that took place worldwide between 2000 and 2014. The remaining 60 percent were disproportionately carried out by a relatively small number of perpetrator groups.

While the recent attack in Paris shares similarities with the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India, the perpetrator group in that attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is not among the most frequent perpetrators of coordinated attacks.

In contrast, ISIL, under its current incarnation, carried out more than 750 coordinated attacks during this time period—specifically in 2013 and 2014. However, this is a conservative assessment because the Global Terrorism Database records the names of perpetrator organizations at the time of the attack.

Thus, it is important to note that al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), ISIL’s predecessor, carried out at least 400 coordinated attacks as well. Also, 25 coordinated attacks were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another identity previously assumed by ISIL, and several other coordinated attacks were carried out by provinces of the Islamic State, including the Sinai Province and the Tripoli Province.

Other organizations that have carried out more than a hundred coordinated attacks include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Communist Party of India- Maoist and unaffiliated Maoists in India, al-Shabaab primarily in Somalia and Kenya, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, Fulani militants in Nigeria and the Central African Republic, and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In addition, at least 50 coordinated attacks between 2000 and 2014 were carried out by individuals who reportedly were not affiliated with a particular terrorist organization or group. These attacks took place in 10 countries; however, 30 of them (60%) occurred in the United States and were carried out in pursuit of a wide variety of ideological goals. Eighteen of the attacks were part of a series in which a single perpetrator motivated by anti-government sentiment planted pipe bombs in mailboxes in five U.S. states.

### Key Perpetrators: 2000-2014

The table below provides a breakdown of the most coordinated terrorist attacks, categorized by perpetrator group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Group</th>
<th>Coordinated Attacks</th>
<th>Percent of Coordinated Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in Iraq</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) / Maoists</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New People’s Army (NPA)</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani Militants</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk People’s Republic</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemaah Islamiya (JI)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated Individual(s)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database

### Key Perpetrators: 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Total Injuries</th>
<th>Hostages Taken</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>6286</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>5808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3492</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>3312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al–Shabaab</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6644</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>1742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists/Communist Party of India–Maoist</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Among these five perpetrator groups, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL (6.46 people killed per attack), the Taliban (4.07), and Boko Haram (16.86) were higher than the global average (2.57) in 2014. The average lethality of attacks carried out by al–Shabaab (2.46) was slightly lower than the global average. Attacks carried out by Maoist perpetrators in India were by far the least deadly and the least likely to be deadly, causing 0.63 deaths per attack.

- All five of the most active groups markedly increased the number of hostages taken in 2014; however, the increases in hostage–takings by ISIL and Boko Haram were exceptionally large. Attacks carried out by these two groups in 2014 involved more than 4,300 hostages, 50% of all hostages taken in terrorist attacks worldwide in which the perpetrator group was identified.

- Boko Haram also increased its use of suicide tactics in 2014, carrying out 31 suicide attacks, compared to three in 2013.

Although terrorist attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 60% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria), and 78% of all fatalities due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria).

Given the limitations of media coverage in Syria, the data presented here are conservative estimates of terrorism in Syria. Consistent with START’s practice of including in the GTD only those attacks that have been verified by at least one well-regarded source, these statistics represent those incidents that were reported by independent news outlets. Globally aggregated statistics do not represent uniform patterns worldwide. They are produced by diverse trends in violence and heavily influenced by events in several key locations. The statistical profiles in Table 2 illustrate many of these dynamics.

**Attacks:** Large increases in Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that also experienced high numbers of attacks in 2013, comprise more than one-third (37%) of the 35% increase in total attacks worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Fatalities:** Large increases in Nigeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three countries that also experienced high numbers of fatalities due to terrorist attacks in 2013, comprise more than two-thirds (72%) of the 81% increase in total fatalities worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. Also, approximately one-quarter (26%) of the increase in total fatalities was attributable to increases in perpetrator fatalities, which were especially prevalent in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria.

**Injuries:** The total number of injuries due to terrorist attacks increased slightly (6%) in 2014. This was largely a product of various regional trends, including a 376% increase in injuries in Nigeria in 2014, and a 44% decrease in injuries in Pakistan in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Hostages:** Several countries observed large increases in the number of hostages taken in terrorist attacks in 2014. However, the largest increases took place in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria, comprising more than two-thirds (68%) of the 201% increase in hostages worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. This considerable increase in the total number of hostages taken by perpetrators of terrorist attacks is a result of a large increase in the number of attacks that involved any hostages as well as a large increase in the number of attacks that involved more than 100 hostages.

Four of the five countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2014 were the same as those that experienced the most terrorism in 2013. The one exception was the Philippines, which experienced a 24% decline in attacks, and ranked 10th among countries with the most terrorism in 2014. Nigeria, which ranked 7th among countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2013, experienced a 114% increase in attacks and a 308% increase in fatalities in 2014.

UNSCR Estimate of Refugee Impact

The total number of refugees has increased significantly and consistently over the past four years. Starting from 10.4 million at the end of 2011, the number increased to 10.5 million in 2012, to 11.7 million in 2013, and finally to 14.4 million by the end of 2014. By mid-2015, it had reached an estimated 15.1 million, its highest level in 20 years. Within three and a half years, then, the global refugee population grew by 4.7 million persons – some 45 per cent.

The main contributing factor to this trend has been the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. Excluding that country, the increase from the end of 2011 to mid-2015 would have been only half a million refugees (+5%). Clearly, the devastating effect of the Syrian conflict is being felt far beyond its neighbouring countries.

The Syrian Arab Republic remained the largest source country of refugees, with a refugee population of 4.2 million by mid-2015. This figure has increased dramatically, rising from below 20,000 at the end of 2010. As such, starting in mid-2014, the Syrian Arab Republic replaced Afghanistan as the main source country of refugees worldwide, a rank Afghanistan had previously held for more than three decades. The Syrian refugee population grew by more than 300,000 people during the reporting period. The Afghan refugee population remained relatively stable at about 2.6 million.

Surrounding countries continue to be impacted heavily by the crisis, with the number of registered Syrians in Turkey (1.8 million), Lebanon (1.2 million), Jordan (628,800), Iraq (251,300), and Egypt (131,900) remaining high. Outside the immediate region, Germany was hosting 66,000 Syrian refugees at mid-2015, up from 41,000 six months earlier.

During the first half of the year, at least 4.2 million persons were newly displaced by conflict and violence within their countries, compared to 4.1 million in the corresponding period of 2014. Yemen reported the largest number of newly displaced persons (933,500) followed by Ukraine (559,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (558,000), Nigeria (378,500), Iraq (366,500), and Pakistan (309,200).

The number of newly displaced persons within the Syrian Arab Republic was not available for the first six months of 2015. However, with 7.6 million IDPs, the Syrian Arab Republic remained the country with the highest such number worldwide. Despite security concerns, UNHCR was able to assist an estimated 1.3 million of these individuals by mid-2015. According to the Government, 6.5 million individuals were registered as IDPs in Colombia at mid-year. Other countries where significant IDP populations were protected or assisted by UNHCR included Iraq (4.0 million), Sudan (2.3 million), Pakistan (1.6 million), South Sudan (1.5 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.5 million), Nigeria (1.4 million), and Ukraine (1.4 million). Afghanistan too has seen a surge in internal displacement of some 50 per cent compared to 18 months ago as conflict intensified, reaching a figure of 948,000 IDPs by mid-2015.

UNSCR Estimate of Refugee Impact - II

Fig. 2: Where do the world's refugees come from?

Fig. 3: Major refugee-hosting countries

Correlation is Not Causation, But:

• Many forms of correlation cover only small part of factors involved.
• Many key factors like ideology and religion do not lend themselves to reliable quantification.
• Polling very uncertain if pushed beyond limits.
• Political and social scientists, economists, often choose heavily biased “sets” of variables focusing on their own areas of interest.
• Nation-wide data disguises key sectarian, ethnic, regional, and local differences.
• But, Some key population and economic trends clearly do have some impact:
  • Massive population pressure (More than 5 times larger since 1950)
  • Youth “bulge” and link to unemployment.
  • Low per capita income and poor income distribution.
  • Failed secularism in the form of poor governance by every measure.
• “Worst case” or failed countries in MENA area do have some important things in common.
Losing Touch with Reality: UNDP Human Development Trends

War has No Impact?

Ranking in total of 187 countries in 2014

- Libya: 55th
- Syria: 118th
- Iraq: 120th
- Yemen: 154th

Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism

Lower ranking = less effective government

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index “The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.”

The Economist Threat to Counterinsurgency Economics

1. The economic factors that divided and sometimes shattered a nation are largely ignored.

2. The specific economic forces driving given factions, areas, and terrorist-insurgency threats are not measured or taken into account. (Sects, ethnic groups, regional tensions, conflict/war zones, IDP-refugee impacts, etc.)

3. Reliance on classic national wide metrics for developed nations at peace: GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation, debt, Balance of Payments, etc..

4. Fail to address major uncertainties, limits to data.

5. Focus on classic nation-wide development as if war and causes of war did not exist, and need to reconstruct and construct basic services and functions did not exist.

6. Economic aid becomes project aid without valid national analysis and plans. Fails to alter dominant military focus on fighting, conflict termination, departure, (possibly short-term stability) and not national stability.

7. Largely ignore demographic pressures, youth needs, corruption costs and impacts, critical problems in governance and budget planning and execution.

8. Live in “now”, rather than economic history, examine best-case, not real futures.


10. Focus on getting money and spending, not auditing use of money and measuring effectiveness.
Gulf GDP Per Capita by Country

<table>
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<td>1,958</td>
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International Monetary Fund, [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)
The “Youth Bulge”  
(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq’s population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008): The Threat From POAYMs

Source: IMF, *World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia*, October 2010, p. 38
## Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050

(In Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>6,410,000</td>
<td>X 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>22,900,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,160,000</td>
<td>33,300,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

- **Bahrain** (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),
- **Egypt** (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),
- **Jordan** (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),
- **Kuwait** (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),
- **Lebanon** (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),
- **Morocco** (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),
- **Oman** (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),
- **Qatar** (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),
- **Saudi Arabia** (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism),
- **Turkey** (which is a long-standing NATO ally)
- **UAE** (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).
Saudi, UAE, GCC Influence

Conflicting Threat and Allied Interests
(Other nations too have vital security interests)

- **Iran**: Expanding regional influence, role in Syria and Iraq, Challenge to U.S.
- **Russia**: Ukraine, basing, regional influence, support of Assad, U.S. is destabilizing region, Putin’s desire to reassert Russia.
- **Lebanon**: Hezbollah, Shi’ite Alignments, ties to Iran, refugees.
- **Iraq**: Shite-dominated government with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions, distrust of reliance on U.S.
- **Kurds**: Wide mix of factions and interests in Syria, Iraq, Turkey (Iran?), refugees
- **Israel**: Focus on Palestinians, Iran and nuclear, own security.
- **Turkey**: Erdogan’s ambitions, Kurdish issue (s), focus on Assad, higher tolerance of Islamist movements, own security, refugees.
- **Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait**: Focus on Assad in Syria matches focus on ISIS, support Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Iran in Gulf a primary threat, uncertain trust in U.S.
- **Bahrain**: Focus on tensions with own Shi’ites (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf)
- **Egypt**: Internal struggles, uncertain trust in U.S., Sinai unrest.
- **Jordan**: Major internal security concerns, border threats, uncertain trust in U.S., Palestinian issue, refugees.
- **Europe**: Ukraine, refugees, no common interest in region, focus on domestic needs, limit defense spending and military efforts.
Terrain factors and Key Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions
Regional Topography

Source: Collins World Explorer Premium, Natural Earth

Unpaved Road Nets in Syria and Iraq

Key Divisions by Islamic Sect

**Key Shi’ite Areas in the Middle East**

Shi’ite Population density is very different from geographic
There are about three Shiites for every five Sunnis in the
Middle East.

Iran and Iraq have mixed populations, but Shi’ite-
dominated governments. All other Arab states and Turkey
have Sunni-led governments.

Iran is home to about eight million Sunnis who make up
about 11 percent of the population.

Most of the Shiites are in Iran, but they are also the
majority in countries like Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq, and
are a significant political and military force in Lebanon and
Syria.

Iraq is Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%),
Christian 0.8%, Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1,
folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1

Syria’s population is Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni
74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13% -- Alawites are not
Shi’ites and have very different beliefs), Christian (includes
Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) 10% (includes Orthodox,
Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining
in Damascus and Aleppo)

Bahrain’s total population is Muslim 70.3%, Christian
14.5%, Hindu 9.8%, Buddhist 2.5%, Jewish 0.6%, folk
religion <.1, unaffiliated 1.9%, other 0.2% (2010 est.) The
native population is 60-70% Shi’ite.

Shiites are a significant minority in Saudi Arabia, making up 15% to 25% of residents. Conservative Wahhabi practices are followed by some 15% of Saudi Arab’s
population as well as most native Qatars. The majority of Saudis and other Gulf Sunnis practice less conservative forms of Islam.

Yemen is Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha’i, Hindu, and
Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)

Turkey is some 99%, largely Sunni but with some scattered Shi’ites and other Islamic sects. Its ethnic structure is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities
7-12% (2008 est.).

Pakistan is Muslim (official) 96.4% (Sunni 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3.6% (2010 est.). Afghanistan is Muslim 99.7% (Sunni 84.7
- 89.7%, Shia 10 - 15%), other 0.3% (2009 est.)

• Iran mixes Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen and Turkic tribes but the CIA does not estimate percentages.
• Iraq is Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%.
• Syria is Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%
• Turkey is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.).
Kurds in the Middle East - II