The Comparative Metrics of ISIS and “Failed State Wars” in Syria and Iraq

Part Four: Stability and Conflict in Iraq

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Conflict Dynamics in Iraq
War, Tensions, and Crises in Iraq

**Internal Conflicts and Tensions:**
- ISIS vs. Iraqi central government, Kurds, Shi’ite militias, Sunni opposition factions, U.S. led coalition, Arab Gulf states and Jordan, Iran, Russia
- Sunni vs. Shiites
- Arabs vs. Kurds.
- Sunni vs. Sunni, Shiite vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Kurd

**External Conflicts and Tensions:**
- Conflict in Syria
- US vs. Iran
- Arab Gulf and Jordan vs. Iran
- Kurds vs. Turkey
- US vs. Russia
Failed U.S. Support of INSF – Pre-ISIS

• Officially disband Iraqi Army. Focus security on community policing (Order No. 2, May 23rd, 2003.)

• Start effort to rebuild Iraq security forces in 2005, but remain Shi’ite dominated. Funding, program structure erratic, problems with trainers, focus on force generation rather than quality.

• Broaden effort in 2005 with first real funds and support, but still emphasize police. Have to restructure all of National Police for being too Shi’ite


• Main Iraqi training effort gather momentum on 2006-2007, but bulk of forces is generated after major fighting is over.

• U.S. forces leave Iraqi cities in 2009.

• March 2010 election starts Maliki’s battle for power, effort to control all security forces, isolate and coop Sunni elements.

• U.S. combat forces, major military train and assist and police training effort effectively halt in late 2011. Only small OMC office left.

• Low level civil war, Maliki repression of opposition and Sunnis from 2011-2013. Iraqi forces gradually become political, corrupt, and ineffective.

Source:
Crisis-Driven U.S. Security Funding:
Reacting After the Fact
(Obligations Lag Threat and Spending Lags 6-14 Months More)

Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Bulk of Iraqi Security Forces Deploy After Key Fighting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Forces Protecting Iraq</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Total Forces Protecting Iraq**: 67,815
  - **Ministry of Interior, Assigned**: 301,286
  - **Iraqi Police Service**: 43,937
  - **Iraqi Federal Police**: 42,348
  - **Border Enforcement**: 29,396
  - **Oil Police**:

- **Ministry of Defense, Assigned**: 197,336
  - **Iraqi Army**: 46,459
  - **Training and Support**: 4,023
  - **Air Force**: 2,910
  - **Navy**: 4,120
  - **Special Forces**:

- **Total MOI**: 416,681
- **Total MoD**: 254,848

- **29% in Army**
Pulling Out More Quickly than Planned: U.S. Troop Levels Go from 45,000 to Zero in 3 Months

Note: “Assigned” is defined as all DoD servicemembers deployed to Iraq, whether currently in Iraq or not. This number does not reflect servicemembers on rest and recuperation leave or on temporary duty outside of Iraq. “Boots on Ground” is defined as all DoD servicemembers deployed to Iraq minus those on rest and recuperation leave or on temporary duty outside of Iraq and servicemembers in Iraq who are assigned to a newly arrived unit conducting Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority with a departing unit.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011 p. 51,
Army Only 22 Percent of ISF When U.S. Leaves (10/10/2011)

**IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AS OF 10/10/2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Assigned Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Interior</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>645,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-Terrorism Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>929,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.*

*Source: GOI, MOI IG, Information provided to SIGIR, 10/10/2011.*
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - I


- ISIS and aligned forces attack on Samarra on 5 June 2014, seize Mosul on 10 June and Tikrit on 11 June. Iraqi government forces flee south on 13 June, and Kurdish forces took control of the oil hub of Kirkuk, more of disputed areas in north.

- Iraqi forces retake Ramadi but fighting continues in 2014 to spring 2015 until ISIS retakes Ramadi after Iraqi Army collapses on May 21, 2104.

- In the north and outskirts of Baghdad, Iraqi Army effectively collapses back into Shi’ite areas of Iraq, Shi’ite militias emerge as key stiffening, fighting force, but abuses of Sunni emerge from start.

- March-April 12, retake Tikrit with U.S. air support after Shi’ite militias withdrawn.

- 10 June 2014, U.S. reacts with train and assist mission after examination of Iraqi forces find them almost universally ineffective.
  - Starts at 450. Gradually builds up to 3,500 advisors (4,600+).
  - But does not deploy forward, Establishes centers in rear in Iraq and KRG areas. Some use of Canadian Special Forces forward.
  - Problems in moving weapons, ammo, support from U.S. to Iraq, Baghdad to combat units.
  - U.S. plans for National Guard with Sunni and Kurdish forces at Provincial level make little progress.
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - II

- 29 June 2014, ISIS says is changing name to Islamic State, and declares 'Caliphate' including Syria and Iraq and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Caliph and leader of all Muslims
- Begin Coalition Air Campaign in August 2014 – nine months after first ISIS advance.
- 14-15 August, Maliki leaves, Abadi becomes Prime Minister.
- February-June 2015, false announcements of effort to liberate Mosul.
- U.S. concludes Iraqi armed forces critically weak, Focuses on creating two effective brigades, liberation of Ramadi.
- 13 July 2015, two-front Iraqi offensive starts in Anbar province. Iraqi security forces seek to retake after collapsing and losing city in May. U.S. begins air strikes against ISIS positions in Ramadi.
- June 2015 onwards: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Shi’ite militias continue operations to cordon off Fallujah and secure lines of communication. Fallujah has now been partly under ISIS control since January 2014.
- Mid-July 2015: Iraqi pilots today land the 1st squadron of Iraqi F-16s in Iraq.
- September 2015: Russian build-up begins in Syria.
- October 2015: Effort to liberate Ramadi still going on. Iraqi forces do not penetrate ISIS barrier of IEDs, suicide bombers.
- October 2015: Abadi announces joint Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian-Russian intelligence effort. Says would welcome Russian and more Iranian sorties because U.S. effort too weak.
- October 2015: U.S. seems to shift away from Iraq first strategy to support of Syrian Kurdish and Arab attacks on ISIS

Source:
Cost of U.S. Operations in Inherent Resolve

- Cost: As of Sep. 15, 2015, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on Aug. 8, 2014, is $4 billion and the average daily cost is $10 million for 404 days of operations.

### Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Cost Report

#### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Expense (# of Days)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$2.9</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$7.0</td>
<td>$6.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
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<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):</th>
<th>Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 15 Sep 2015)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Expense</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$1,977</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$954</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1,083</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$4,037</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| By Service                    | 404                                    | 404        |
| Army                          | $538                                   | 13%        |
| Navy                          | $555                                   | 14%        |
| Air Force                     | $2,632                                 | 65%        |
| SOCOM                         | $313                                   | 8%         |
| Total:                        | $4,037                                 | 100%       |

| By Category                   | 404                                    | 404        |
| Logistics Support             | $417                                   | 10%        |
| Operational Support           | $605                                   | 15%        |
| ISR                           | $37                                    | 1%         |
| OPTEMPO                       | $1,999                                 | 50%        |
| Military Pay                  | $24                                    | 1%         |
| Munitions                     | $954                                   | 24%        |
| Total:                        | $4,037                                 | 100%       |

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve), 21.10.15
U.S. Support of Iraqi Forces: 20.10.15 - I

- Kurdish forces in Syria are operating against ISIL lines of communication that extend from the group’s de facto capital of Raqqa to Mosul in Iraq and on to Irbil, he said. These operations will “make life difficult for ISIL,” the general said, and the Kurds have taken back “a not insignificant amount of ground from ISIL.”
- The coalition against ISIL inside Iraq is growing. “The number of Sunni that have been trained and armed is about 6,000 in Anbar province, and they want to grow to about 8,500,”
- On the police side of the ledger, the government was looking for 16,000 Sunni to volunteer, and they are now at around 11,000 to 12,000.
- The U.S. has, however, cut the number of Iraqi divisions it is concentrating on training from 10 to 8 for the near term.
- “Operations in Beiji were absolutely encouraging, because just a week ago, we heard [the Iraqi security forces] were going to start doing things, and they have had some pretty good success,” the general said.
- “They are now holding ground and securing the area,” he continued, “so that was, I thought, fairly positive. My perspective was always that we would support the Iraqis where we could have operational or strategic consequences.”
- Part of that is seeing success and reinforcing it, the general said.
- So, for example, if the Iraqis have a realistic plan for clearing Ramadi and a realistic plan for securing the city once ISIL is pushed out, then the United States will look at what unique capabilities it can bring to help the Iraqis, the chairman said.

Command and Control

- But not all is brightness and light, he acknowledged, noting that Iraqi leaders must concentrate on command and control. The government needs to appoint a military leader with command for the overall military effort in the country – including the Iraqi security forces, the Kurdish peshmerga forces, the tribes and the police, and Iraqi leaders will sit down tomorrow to discuss appointing just such a person, Dunford said.
- Having one person to talk to who can speak with authority about the campaign will make it easier for the coalition to provide support to all, he said.

Common Operational Picture

- The command and control solution is to have a “common operational picture of Iraq in one commander, who on

U.S. Support of Iraqi Forces: 20.10.15 - II

• behalf of the Iraqis can talk to the coalition about ‘Where do we go?’” the general said. “Success in this business is about being able to anticipate, and you can only anticipate if you really have a common understanding, common objectives, common sense of time and space.”
• More still needs to be done with the Sunni tribes, Dunford said. “It’s a physical manifestation of the government’s promise to be inclusive,” he told reporters.
• Outside factors also complicate the campaign, the chairman said. The conflict in Yemen complicates what is happening in Iraq and Syria, he explained, and Iran’s funding of proxies and surrogates complicates and already complicated picture. Russia’s involvement has added yet another layer of complexity, he said. “And you have to talk about the Shiia/Sunni dynamic in the region, as well,” he added.
• **Kurdish training effort**
• About 300 coalition service members from Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary work at the Kurdish Training Coordination Center here. The effort there is under Italian command.
• The effort trains peshmerga fighters in a modified infantry basic course. “We currently have 4,200 peshmerga in training,” said a senior coalition officer speaking on background. The officer briefed reporters traveling with Dunford.
• Essentially, the effort works like this: peshmerga units come off of the front line with ISIL here, and then they get a few days of rest and relaxation before entering training. They train together as a unit for five or six weeks, before re-entering the battlefield against ISIL.
• “We are able to tailor the training to the units,” the officer said. Units fighting ISIL near Mosul have different requirements than those in Kirkuk, the officer noted.
• The time off the line allows the peshmerga to reinforce skills they need, understand the capabilities of new weapons systems that are entering the peshmerga system, and to work together as a unit.
• Marksmanship, counter-ground tactics, combat medicine, and maneuvering as a unit are just a few of the military skills the peshmerga soldiers are being taught here. They also learn to be forward observers.
• **Training Paying Off**
• There are three training areas, and the command could train up to 5,000 peshmerga personnel at a time.
• The front line against ISIL is only 60 kilometers from Irbil. “There are many changes” in the 45-minute drive to the front, said the officer. The coalition soldiers work with peshmerga leaders before they come to training to understand what the unit needs, and afterward, they re-enter the line to find new, more effective ways to deliver the training.
• Improvised explosive devices cause most of the peshmerga casualties – roughly 80 to 85 percent – and coalition personnel are working constantly to teach tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to counter this threat, the officer said.

• The officer said the peshmerga are a brave, dedicated and coherent force.

• “They are the front line,” he said. “What is happening up here is working. It takes time to build this kind of capacity -- especially as a coalition. I think we are picking up speed and I think it is being reflected on the front line, as well.”
Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014
Iraqi Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions in late 2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
# Key Iraqi Insurgent Groups: 7.2014

## Naqshbandia Order/J.R.T.N.
**BAATHIST**
**Active in:** Diyala, Salahuddin  
**ISIS relationship:** ● Fighting  
Established in 2007, the group's reputed leader was a high-ranking deputy in Saddam Hussein’s regime. The group is believed to have initially assisted ISIS in its push south from Mosul.

## 1920 Revolution Brigades
**BAATHIST**
**Active in:** Diyala, Anbar  
**ISIS relationship:** ● Fighting in some areas  
Formed by disaffected Iraqi Army officers who were left without jobs after the Americans dissolved the military in 2003.

## Islamic Army of Iraq
**SALAFIST**
**Active in:** Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar  
**ISIS relationship:** ● Periodic fighting  
ISIS has targeted family members of the leadership of this group, which has long had a presence in Diyala and has been involved in past sectarian battles.

## Mujahedeen Army
**SALAFIST**
**Active in:** Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar  
**ISIS relationship:** Truce  
A nationalist Islamist group that advocates overthrowing the Iraqi government.

## Khata’ib al-Mustapha
**SALAFIST**
**Active in:** Diyala  
**ISIS relationship:** Truce  
Islamic militants who fight against the government.

## Army of Muhammad
**SALAFIST**
**Active in:** Anbar  
**ISIS relationship:** Allies  
Islamic militants who fight against the government.

## Khata’ib Tawrat al-Ashreen
**ANTI-GOVERNMENT SUNNI TRIBE**
**Active in:** Diyala, Salahuddin  
**ISIS relationship:** Truce  
Sunni tribes opposed to the Iraqi government.

## Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna
**ISLAMIST JIHADIST**
**Active in:** Diyala  
**ISIS relationship:** ● Fighting  
An Al Qaeda-affiliated group that has led a number of deadly attacks in Iraq over the years.

Kobani: 9.2014

Source: Satellite image by DigitalGlobe, via Google Earth

Iraq: River War Approaches to Baghdad: 10.2014

**Haditha** Sept. 6 to 15
Iraqi soldiers, supported by local Sunni tribes and U.S. airstrikes, fought ISIS militants and succeeded in driving them from the Haditha Dam and nearby towns.

**Hit** Oct. 2 to 7
ISIS began an offensive to take control of Hit. Within days, ISIS militants controlled large parts of the city and the nearby town of Kubaysa, besieged the local police station and threatened a major air base nearby.

**Ramadi** Sept. 19 to Oct. 12
Ramadi is the center of the tribal resistance against ISIS in Anbar Province and the home of Ahmed Abu Risha, a prominent anti-ISIS leader. ISIS has repeatedly attacked the area and killed the provincial chief of police on Oct. 12.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Fighting in March 2015

1. Government forces and allied militias continued to battle ISIS militants in Tikrit.

2. At the same time, ISIS fighters were mounting a fierce assault on Ramadi.

3. Kurdish and Sunni tribal fighters advanced on ISIS territory from the northern city of Kirkuk.

4. Residents of Hawija said that ISIS executed some of its own fighters for trying to flee as the group came under attack from Kurdish forces.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Takes Palmyra: May 21, 2015

ISIS fighters captured this district when the offensive began last week.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Fighting in Ramadi
ISIS Takes Ramadi: May 15-18, 2015

**Final Days Assault**
A sandstorm forces the American-led airstrike campaign to pause, giving the group time to carry out 10 car bombings followed by a wave of ground attacks that overwhelms the Iraqi forces.

**IRAQI SECURITY FORCES RETREAT**
Within days, Iraqi security forces flee, and Islamic State fighters take control of key government facilities.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Takes Ramadi: May 21, 2015

South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. "Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time," said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.
In about a week, a coalition of Kurdish militias and Syrian rebels seized two strategic towns controlled by the Islamic State near the border with Turkey. The latest advance led to the capture of Ain Issa, a town that is only 30 miles from the Islamic State’s stronghold, Raqqa

ISIS Counterattacks: 6.30.15

Anbar and Ramadi Area: 7.2015

Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

September 11, 2015

Iraq: Areas of Control: 30.10.15

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and “Popular Mobilization” recaptured the Baiji Oil Refinery on October 21 following operations to recapture Baiji city on October 14. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi then visited Baiji city on October 23, marking the city’s full recapture. ISW is thus upgrading Baiji and the Baiji Oil Refinery from Contested to ISF-held locations. PUK Peshmerga have also maintained limited gains in villages in southern Kirkuk near Taza and Daquq as part of anti-ISIS operations that began on September 12. ISIS has not launched substantive counter-attacks against the Peshmerga in these areas, and they remain under Peshmerga control. ISW has thus expanded the Populated areas under PUK Peshmerga control in southern Kirkuk.
Sinjar Road Campaign: Map

Sinjar Road Campaign: Satellite Photo

Post Paris Attacks Air Strikes on Raqqa: 20.11.15

CONTROL MAP OF RAMADI, Nov 11, 2015

Key Infrastructure and Important Locations:
1. Albu Faraj Bridge
2. Palestine Bridge
3. Ramadi Barrage
4. Warrar Dam
5. Qassim Bridge
6. Anbar Operations Command HQ
7. Government Complex
8. Anbar Provincial Council
9. Glass Factory
10. Ramadi Train Station
11. Grand Mosque

Formations Key:
- CTS: Counter-Terrorism Service
- ISF: Iraqi Security Forces
- Fed: Federal Police
- EBR: Emergency Response Brigades
- Tribes
- GD: Golden Division
- Mechanized Infantry
- Unknown Brigade Number

Areas circled in yellow indicate areas whose status has recently changed as a result of the most recent advances by the ISF north of Ramadi on November 1. Numbers and letters in yellow indicate key infrastructure and buildings. Habaniya is the primary base for Anbar Operations Command in the vicinity of Ramadi and is located east of Ramadi.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&search=inbox&th=150f89f8e0d0d1e3&siml=150f89f8e0d0d1e3, 11.11.15
Ramadi City Campaign Satellite Photo 10 & 28.12.15

The Iraqi government continues to advance in contested areas, but resistance remains to the north and east.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

CONTROL MAP OF RAMADI, DEC 22, 2015

Areas circled in yellow indicate areas whose status has recently changed as a result of the most recent advances. Numbers and letters in yellow indicate key infrastructure and buildings. Habaniya is the primary base for Anbar Operations Command in the vicinity of Ramadi and is located east of Ramadi.

Content by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team
Graphics by: Patrick Martin
Liberating Ramadi: 22 December 2015

Source: Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly report to Congress, January 2016, pp. 37
Sultan Abdullah lies on the front line between the Kurdish peshmerga and the Islamic State.
Airpower and Victory in Ramadi  
(Excerpt from brief by Col Steve Warren, 12/29/2015)

Q: Hey, Steve, I wonder if you can give an estimate when Ramadi will be completely cleared? General Milley, the Army chief, was over there last week. He was told by Iraqi generals, they expected it to be completely cleared by mid-January. I wonder if you agree with that assessment.

And also, talk a bit about the importance of U.S. airstrikes here in Ramadi. There was an Iraqi officer quoted as saying, 80 percent of the effort in Ramadi was due to American airstrikes.

COL. WARREN: Well, I would agree that probably 80 percent of the effort -- I would agree with that Iraqi officer who said that 80 percent of the effort in Ramadi was due to coalition airstrikes. I think that is a fair assessment.

We don't kind of keep those numbers. That is really just more instinct and feel. But I would not argue with that.

The airstrikes have been significant. We believe that over the last six months, in the over 600 strikes, which translates to over 2,500 kinetic events, 2,500 different targets that destroyed, you know, 70 VBIED truck bombs, almost 300 other enemy vehicles, nearly 800 structures, 400 various types of weapons. This is significant. And this is what really facilitated or enabled the Iraqi forces to move in.

And this is how modern warfare is, by the way. This is no different than the way any army should fight. It's using that air power as the force multiplier that it is.

How long will it take them to clear the rest of Ramadi? Too soon to tell, Tom. There are still -- so clearing is -- there is really -- there are two steps, right? Number one, eliminate the remaining enemy. Number two, reduce the obstacles, right, these IEDs, the booby-traps, you know, the entire houses that have been rigged to blow. This is going to take a while, because any house could be rigged to blow.

So as the Iraqi forces are trying to dismantle these various booby-traps, they still have to be on the lookout for the remaining bands of ISIL fighters who are out to harass them. So, it will be a process. I'm not going to put a time on it, Tom, because it will be wrong.

But it will take some time, I will tell you that much.
COL. WARREN: Well, I think the Iraqi army's willingness to fight is pretty well displayed on this Ramadi map, right? I mean, having seized Camp Warrar, having cleared Tamim -- al-Tamim neighborhood; having seized the Palestine bridge; seized the Anbar Operations Center, the Zangora checkpoint, and now moving into downtown Ramadi.

So I think their actions speak louder than any words that I could produce here. But keep in mind, all of this is done in conjunction with -- with this devastating air power that we're able to deliver, you know, across the breadth and depth of this battlefield.

Iraqi forces have worked well together. The CTS, the Counter-Terror Service, have been in the lead in most of -- in fact, most of these fights. The 10th Iraqi Division has the northern sector up there by the Anbar operations command -- the yellow circle on your Ramadi map. That was all 10th Division. The rest of it was kind of a mix of counterterror service and Iraqi army conventional forces.

Yeah, there's been no notable issues of these forces working together.

...We've enrolled about 8,000 Sunni tribal fighters in the TMF program. Of those, we've trained about 5,000 of them. The way this training works is that they come into a training location where Iraqi security forces provide the direct training. And those Iraqi security forces are overseen by American forces. So it's American forces providing guidance, advice and assistance to Iraqi army trainers who are training Sunni tribal fighters.

The training consists of some training in a garrison environment. The Sunni tribal fighters are then moved to the front line, if you well, where they cycle through the battlefield for a period of time, usually one to two weeks. They then come off the front lines, return back to the training site, to finalize their training, to figure out what they learned while they were on the front line.

When that’s complete, we now have a trained Sunni tribal fighter who will be used primarily as part of the holding and stabilization force. So they are beginning to cycle through -- well, they're really at the planning phase now -- of getting these tribal fighters cycled into downtown Ramadi where they will -- they will form the bedrock of the holding force in Ramadi.

The Sunni tribal fighters, they cycle through, you know, small groups for shorter periods of time. They were not, frankly, a significant player in the seizure of Ramadi. They will be significant players in the stabilization and the holding of Ramadi, but up until now, their -- their presence while, you know, every man counts, every rifle matter, they have not had a large -- simply not a large enough presence to really to make much of a difference.

...What the Iraqi army that collapsed in 2014 was a counterinsurgency army. They were not prepared and they were not trained and they were not ready for a conventional fight, the conventional assault that ISIL brought to Mosul and beyond.

So, the last year has been a process every constructing, rebuilding, and refitting the Iraqi army. So now, they are outfitted with modern American equipment, modern conventional training, and of course, supported by devastating air power.

But what are some exact examples of this combined arms training? Well, number one and I think, probably the most notable, is the river crossing. You know, the Interim 14th Combat Bridging Company came here to Iraq to train the Iraqi Bridging Battalion of how to do bridging operations. This is a complex operation. This is grown-up work here. This is advanced warfare.

There were no Shia militias involved in this operation for Ramadi. Primarily, we see the Shia militia really operate more in the Tigris River Valley. There were some in the Euphrates River Valley as well. But primarily, their focus has been in the Tigris River Valley.

And the Ramadi fight in particular, has been an exclusively an Iraqi army and a CTS fight. In Fallujah, it's primarily Iraqi army -- primarily Iraqi army. The vast majority, Iraqi army, but maybe not completely. But it is in the Tigris River Valley where we see the PMF operating.
Q: You talked about some of the specialized equipment that was used by the Iraqis. They were trained by the U.S. Could you talk about that in -- as it was used to try to get at the IEDs? And was it the same -- was it the same U.S. unit? I think it's the 814th that helped them with that portable bridge across the canal?

Also colonel, was -- were you running into -- in Ramadi, the tunnel complexes that have been evident in -- in other locations? And lastly, part of the specialized equipment -- did they -- did they have use of line charges to get rid of some of the IEDs?

COL. WARREN: Yeah. So, of the specialized equipment, two are most notable. Number one is the line charges. The Iraqi security forces did fire a MICLIC flying charge several days ago as they tried to breach the southern defensive belt that ISIL had set up. So it was a successful execution of the MICLIC.

And the other I think notable piece of unusual equipment are armored bulldozers. We sent about 21 armored bulldozers forward for the Iraqi security forces to use. They use these armored bulldozers to do two things: one, often to push -- to try to push minefields or improvised explosive devices out of the way. But much more importantly though, they use them to rapidly build up berms on the sides of an advancing unit. Because this enemy likes to try and bring truck bombs or we call them VBIEDs, around and into the flanks of attacking forces. So what -- in a great combined arms maneuver, using mobility, using engineering assets to generate mobility, tanks will provide security.

So they will look down the streets and shoot at anything that moves while the armored bulldozers build up berms on either side of the road which will prevent these truck bombs from coming in and striking flanks. And they will advance that way with armor -- you know, tanks, M1s and others, bringing protection and then the armored bulldozers providing the mobility.

In this case, counter mobility, by erecting berms, constructing berms on either side of the road to prevent VBIEDs from attacking into the flanks. We did see some tunnels. We destroyed many of them. Again, used to not really significant effect, obviously, because the Iraqis were able to come in and seize the government complex.

The tunnel will continue to be a problem as the Iraqis will go through the process of patrolling and clearing these neighborhoods. They will have to be on the lookout for these tunnels. These are areas where the enemy can hide and like ambushes.

These are areas where the enemy can move around and reposition if there is a confrontation or small firefight. So the tunnels continue to be something that the Iraqis need to keep their eye on. Our pilots and our targeters have done -- they've learned a lot about tunnels and how to identify them from the air. And so we strike them whenever we see them as well.

...Yeah, so, you know, the overall strength of the ISIL fighting force, we still estimate somewhere to be between 20 and 30,000. They have a robust recruiting program -- that has been acknowledged. And so, this is something that we have to deal with
Turkish Border Area: 7.2015

Approximate safe zone where U.S. and Turkish forces seek to clear ISIS militants.

A suicide bomber believed to have ties to ISIS killed at least 32 people in this ethnically Kurdish town.

Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

November 25, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IraqBlobby%20map%2025%20NOV%202015%20high_13.png
Iraq: Areas of Control: 9.2.16

Air Strikes in Iraq as of January 17, 2016

US-led coalition air strikes in Iraq
Estimated number launched by each country

Source: Airwars.org (data to 17 Jan 2016)

Iraqi Popular Perceptions

Funded by the U.S. government since 2010, the National Democratic Institute has commissioned the firm of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research to poll Iraqi citizens on a wide array of issues affecting security and development in Iraq. The survey covering August to September 2015 shows that an all-time low of 26% of Iraqis polled view Iraq as heading in the “right direction,” down from a peak of 48% in spring 2012. Security was cited by 48% of respondents as one of the two top issues confronting the GOI—down from 61% in September 2014 (arguably, at the height of the ISIL threat), indicating some improvement in the public’s view of the ISF’s performance. Other problems cited as top priorities for the GOI were mitigating corruption (43%) and improving public services (37%).

Security Issues

The poll’s results showed widespread support for counter-ISIL efforts, including relatively strong backing for the employment of PMFs on the battlefield.

- 78% of respondents from western Iraq felt that security there was getting worse.
- 60% of all Iraqis viewed the Iraqi Army as “represent[ing] all Iraqis.” Only 29% of Sunnis and 14% of Kurds agreed, versus 90% of Shia.
- 0% of Kurds and just 4% of Sunnis polled trusted the PMFs alone to ensure their security, versus 30% of Shia; however, 66% of all Iraqis polled trusted a combination of the ISF and PMFs to safeguard them.
- 81% of all Iraqis polled supported the use of PMFs against ISIL.
- 52% of Sunnis viewed the PMFs as important to their security, while 100% of Shia and 5% of Kurds polled felt the same.

The GOI’s Performance

On matters indirectly linked to security, the poll found:

- 69% of respondents still preferred democracy over all other forms of government.
- 65% approved of the Prime Minister’s job performance, while only 13% approved of the parliament’s performance.
- 58% of Sunnis responded in the affirmative when asked whether they wanted to continue “in the direction” the Prime Minister is taking Iraq.
- The Prime Minister’s favorability rating was 54% overall (75% among Shia, 39% among Sunni Arabs, and 5% among Kurds).
- 85% of respondents from the KRG categorized the GOI as unresponsive to their needs, though 70% also said the same of the KRG.
- 88% of Kurds, 61% of Sunnis, and 46% of Shia said sectarianism was getting worse.

U.S. Estimate of Iraqi Army Limitations

U.S. capacity-building support for the ISF has undergone repeated strategic adjustments since the fall of the Ba’athist regime in 2003. The Iraqi Army was initially intended to be a force focused on external defense, but the rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups resulted in the ISF’s shift to a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.

Therefore, when the U.S. forces left, at the end of 2011, the Iraqi Army was largely structured as a COIN force, focusing on missions such as route clearance and manning checkpoints.

Numerous reports detail how, after the U.S. departure, the ISF suffered from corruption, neglect, and a shortfall of combat-effective resources and personnel—all of which contributed to the ISF’s partial collapse in the north of the country in 2014.

After committing more than $25 billion to train and equip the ISF from 2003 to 2012, the United States and its coalition partners have re-embarked on a similar mission to train and equip the ISF.

As CJTF-OIR’s spokesman stated in December 2015, the Iraqi Army was “not ready for ... the conventional assault that ISIL brought to Mosul and beyond.”

Consequently, the coalition began anew the process of rebuilding and refitting the ISF, training them in previously underemphasized tactics, including combined-arms operations, river crossings, and close air support

The ISF continues to face the challenge of combatting corruption by preventing, detecting, and deterring the waste, fraud, and abuse of public funds. A report issued in early December by Transparency International details deep-rooted corruption within Iraq’s military institutions, placing “it in the highest risk category for corruption in the [defense] and security sector . . . with the highest risk sector[s] being Operations.”

The report also identifies the following problems:

- ghost soldiers
- leaking of intelligence by corrupt ISF officials
- ISF extortion of civilians
- diversion by senior officials of approximately $380 million intended for ISF salaries in 2015
- inadequate parliamentary oversight
- poorly vetted key appointments
- inadequate defense procurement processes

More specifically, Transparency International gave Iraq’s security institutions the lowest possible rating in several sub-categories. These included maintaining public trust, defense-acquisition processes, links to organized crime, the recruitment of intelligence officers, export controls, asset-disposal procedures, legislative access to defense-spending records, intermingling of military and business interests, payroll- and personnel-tracking processes, and anticorruption training and monitoring.

For the ISF to continue to develop as an effective partner to the coalition—one capable of consolidating recent battlefield gains—the challenge of corruption within the military needs to be addressed.
The Kurdish Issue in Iraq
The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015

The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in /fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Kurdish+Zone+in+Iraq&tbm=isch&imgil=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%253B3CqUyiw100%253B3https%253A%252F%252Fmons.wikimedia.org%252F252F%252F%252FAtlas_of_Iraqi_Kurdistan&source=iu&pf=m&fir=wyCRcvHsINaCaM%253A%253C3CqUyiw100%253B252C_bbiw=1358&bih=995&usg=__dggzfCyYx195k1YOQwnkW3AKc%3D&ved=0CCKQyjdgFQoTCMbNyuUPtnsCFYGMIAodWW0G8g&ei=vQILVxsBYGZ0gTZ2pmQDw#imgrc=wyCRcvHsINaC%3A%26usg=__dggzfCyYx195k1YOQwnkW3AKc%3D
Has become an area of Kurdish as well as Kurdish-Arab tension. Commander of the Yezidi Sinjar Protection Forces Haydar Qassem Sheshou was arrested on April 5th, 2015, by a special police force affiliated with Barzani and KDP under the pretext of being linked to the Popular Mobilization militias. These groups were accused of committing violent operations in areas liberated from ISIS, which prompted the PUK Central Council to condemn the arrest and hint that the Democratic Party wanted to hand Sinjar over to ISIS.

Is an area of critical energy value: EIA estimates 17% of Iraq oil reserves are in the north of Iraq, near Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin. Control over rights to reserves is a source of controversy between the ethnic Kurds and other groups in the area. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region contained 4 billion barrels of proved reserves. KRG’s estimate is much higher because it is a resource estimate that includes unproved resources. The KRG recently increased its oil resource estimate from 45 billion barrels to 60 billion barrels although this has not been independently verified and this number likely includes at least some resources in disputed areas—especially Kirkuk.

After skirmishes between ISIL and KRG forces around the Kirkuk and Bai Hassan fields, the KRG took over operations at the Avana Dome, a part of the Kirkuk field, and Bai Hassan in July 2014. Shortly after, KRG restarted commercial production at those fields, which allowed the KRG to increase oil flows through its newly built pipeline that connects to Ceyhan (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Iraq’s Northern Oil Company continued to produce about 120,000 bbl/d from the Kirkuk’s Baba Dome, of which 30,000 bbl/d was sent to the Kirkuk refinery. The remainder of the oil production was reinjected into oil fields associated with natural gas to keep natural gas production flowing for power generation.

A December 2014 deal reached between Baghdad and the KRG has allowed Kirkuk crude to be transported via the KRG pipeline to Ceyhan, providing Baghdad with a commercial outlet for its northern production (see section on Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad). Fighting around Kirkuk city continues to take place, making nearby fields vulnerable to supply disruption.

Source: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, “Kurdistan in Iraq: An escalating conflict,” September 2nd, 2015, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#inbox/14f8dd839ca07ee1, and http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ.
Governance, Economic, and Humanitarian Impacts in Iraq
**Iraq: Evolution of the Crisis**
*(as of 31 December 2015)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January 2014</th>
<th>About 85,000 people displaced due to fighting in Anbar.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>Continued fighting increases number of displaced to about 140,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Conflict related displacements increase to 1.2 million. This includes 650,000 people from Mosul and Tikrit and 550,000 people from Anbar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>Attack on Sinjar and Zummer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>Violence in northern Iraq pushes the number of displaced Iraqis to 1.8 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2015</td>
<td>Displacement increases to about 2.2 million due to insecurity and conflict in central and northern regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Intense fighting centered in Falluja and Ramadi in Anbar increases the number of displaced people to 380,000.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Fall of Mosul.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>July 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>Military operations trigger displacement in Tikrit, but also allows for return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Fall of Ramadi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>Military operations in Anbar trigger displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>Nearly 3.2 million people have been displaced from their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Heavy rains and floods affect more than 84,000 displaced people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>Military operation to retake Ramadi.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Demographic Pressures on Iraq

Iraq Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,160,000</td>
<td>33,300,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (millions)</th>
<th>Population Growth Rate (percent)</th>
<th>Total Annual Births (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2035</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2045</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
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Iraqi Governance

• Nominal democracy which is often really government by power broker.
• Near paralysis over ethnic and sectarian divisions since 2010 election. Maliki revives civil wear during 2011-2013
• Heritage of unworkable constitution, election process, dysfunctional legislature without real local representation and fiscal powers.
• Heritage of corruption, power brokering, indifference to security.
• Countercorruption efforts are generally top down failures relying on punishment, rather than adequate fiscal controls, plans, measures of effectiveness.
• Long legacy of “petroleum disease”:
  • 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings.
  • Inflated and costly government hiring and SOEs.
  • Unrealistic budgets, plans, forecast.
  • Failure in agricultural reform and productivity compound by subsidy problem.
  • Population pressure means per capita oil export revenues dropping real terms.
• Deeply divided and sometimes corrupt security services, including police and border police.
• Corrupt ministries, some times incapable of planning and executing budgets, no measures of effectiveness and few real world data.
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues

The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org

Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.


Transparency International ranks so corrupt is 170th worst of 175 countries rated in 2014.
# Governance in Last Full Year of Saddam vs. Modern Iraq:

Still Dismal

| Indicator | Country | Year | Percentile Rank (0 to 100)
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<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about $730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the $824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about $380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from $87 billion in 2014 to $45.2 billion.

On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about $2,186 in 2014 to $1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA’s March 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq’s per capita oil income in 2014 was $2,682, compared to $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, $25,362 for Kuwait, and $36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to $1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to $515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)
Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

Iraq – Terrorist Incidents

Iraq - Fatalities

Iraq Terrorism Deaths: I

[Image showing data on Iraq terrorism deaths, incidents, property damage, dead, injured, increase in deaths since 2000, attacks by target, and deaths by group.]

In 2014 Iraq had the most deaths from terrorism ever recorded for a country. There were a total of 9,929 deaths, representing a 55 per cent increase from the previous year. Iraq has ranked as the country most impacted by terrorism for every year since 2004.

The catalyst for the rise in terrorism in Iraq had been the US-led invasion in 2003. From 1998 to 2002 there were 65 deaths from terrorism in Iraq. With the commencement of the Iraq war in 2004 there were nearly five times as many deaths than in the previous five years.

There have been two distinct periods where terrorism has jumped in Iraq. The first occurred in 2007 with the US troop surge when 6,100 deaths were reported, an increase of 39 per cent from the previous year. Deaths then fell by 56 per cent in the following year to be below the levels in 2006.

The second increase began in 2013 and has continued through to 2015 fuelled by increasing sectarian violence and the activities of ISIL. 2014 continued the deteriorating trend from 2013 when terrorist deaths jumped by 166 per cent to 6,397.

In 2013 ISIL was responsible for 77 per cent of deaths from claimed terrorist attacks which resulted in 1,310 deaths. In 2014 this increased to 95 per cent of claimed attacks with 5,436 deaths. ISIL mainly targets private citizens using explosions.

ISIL has undergone some changes in tactics by dramatically increasing its number of kidnappings. ISIL claimed responsibility for 101 separate kidnappings in 2014, up from 13 in 2013. The targets of kidnapping by ISIL are private citizens 44 per cent of the time, followed by police 25 per cent and journalists 15 per cent.

As well as being a terrorist group, ISIL is also involved in the Syrian civil war where it engages in combat with forces loyal to Assad, the al-Nusra front, Kurdish forces and the international coalition against ISIL. This means that ISIL is responsible for more deaths than just from terrorism but also battle deaths and other related deaths that occur in the context of conflict. These conflict deaths have not been included in the GTI.
This data is based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)
UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015

Baghdad, 1 January 2016 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total of 980 Iraqis were killed and another 1,244 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in December 2015*.

The number of civilians killed was 506 (including 18 federal police, Sahwa civil defence, Personal Security Details, facilities protection police and fire department), and the number of civilians injured was 867 (including 41 federal police, Sahwa civil defence, Personal Security Details, facilities protection police and fire department).

A further 474 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (including Peshmerga, SWAT and militias fighting alongside the Iraqi Army) were killed and 377 were injured. “The year 2015 has seen thousands of Iraqis killed and injured as a result of conflict and terrorism.

This is unacceptable,” said the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Ján Kubiš. “The Iraqi people have every right to live in peace and tranquility. The United Nations continues to deplore this continuing loss of life,” he added.

Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 1048 civilian casualties (261 killed, 787 injured, Ninewa 68 killed and 17 injured, while Salahadin 12 killed and 30 injured, Kirkuk 24 killed and 06 injured and Diyala had 10 killed and 06 injured.

According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, in December 2015 the Governorate suffered a total of 139 civilian casualties (124 killed and 15 injured). Anbar casualty figures are until 29 December 2015, inclusive.

The total number of Civilian Casualties (killed and injured) for 2015 (including Police and including Anbar[1]) in the entire 2015 was 22,370 (7,515 killed and 14,855 injured).

*CAVEATS: In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas. Figures for casualties from Anbar Governorate are provided by the Health Directorate and are noted below. Casualty figures obtained from the Anbar Health Directorate might not fully reflect the real number of casualties in those areas due to the increased volatility of the situation on the ground and the disruption of services. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum.

[1] UNAMI/HRO did not obtain the casualty figures from the Anbar Health Department for October and November 2015

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**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
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</table>

UNAMI/OHCHR on Civilian Casualties: 19 January 2016

BAGHDAD/. There are also reports of the murder of child soldiers who fled fighting on the frontlines in Anbar. Information received and verified suggests that between 800 and 900 children in Mosul had been abducted by ISIL for religious education and military training.

“ISIL continued to subject women and children to sexual violence, particularly in the form of sexual slavery,” the report states. The report also documented alleged violations and abuses of international human rights and international humanitarian law by the Iraqi Security Forces and associated forces, including militia and tribal forces, popular mobilization units, and Peshmerga.

Concerning reports have been received of unlawful killings and abductions perpetrated by some elements associated with pro-Government forces. “Some of these incidents may have been reprisals against persons perceived to support or be associated with ISIL,” the report states. “Moreover, as civilians move around the country, fleeing violence, they have continued to face Government restrictions on their ability to access safe areas. Once they reach such areas, some have experienced arbitrary arrest in raids by security forces and others have been forcibly expelled. The conduct of pro-Government forces’ operations raises concern that they are carried out without taking all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects.”

The discovery of a number of mass graves is documented in the report, including in areas regained by the Government from ISIL control, as well as mass graves from the time of Saddam Hussein. One of the mass graves uncovered reportedly contains 377 corpses, including women and children apparently killed during the 1991 Shi’a uprisings against Saddam Hussein in the east of Basra.

GENEVA (19 January 2016) – A UN report released today details the severe and extensive impact on civilians of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, with at least 18,802 civilians killed and another 36,245 wounded between 1 January 2014 and 31 October 2015. Another 3.2 million people have become internally displaced since January 2014, including more than a million children of school age.

Of the total number of casualties, at least 3,855 civilians were killed and 7,056 wounded between 1 May and 31 October last year – the period covered by the report, although the actual figures could be much higher than those documented. About half of these deaths took place in Baghdad.

The report, compiled by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), is based largely on testimony obtained directly from the victims, survivors or witnesses of violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law, including interviews with internally displaced people.

“The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering. The so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL) continues to commit systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law. These acts may, in some instances, amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide,” the report states. “During the reporting period, ISIL killed and abducted scores of civilians, often in a targeted manner. Victims include those perceived to be opposed to ISIL ideology and rule; persons affiliated with the Government, such as former Iraqi security forces (ISF), police officers, former public officials and electoral workers; professionals, such as doctors and lawyers; journalists; and tribal and religious leaders. Others have been abducted and/or killed on the pretext of aiding or providing information to Government security forces.

Many have been subjected to adjudication by ISIL self-appointed courts which, in addition to ordering the murder of countless people, have imposed grim punishments such as stoning and amputations.” The report details numerous examples of killings by ISIL in gruesome public spectacles, including by shooting, beheading, bulldozing, burning alive and throwing off the top of buildings.

Note: The MOH collects data from the MOI and MOD on ISF casualties and adds it to its own tally of Iraqi civilian deaths. The IAU figures are “collated from various sources around the country.”

The UN does not guarantee the accuracy of the information. Iraq Body Count states that its data is drawn from media reports, official GOI reports, NGO data, and reviews of Iraqi hospital and morgue figures. As of April 17, Iraq Body Count was still finalizing its March death toll of 320.

Energy Vulnerability in Iraq

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq’s Long History of Export Instability

Iraq's total petroleum and other liquids production and consumption

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015

Iraq Still Had World’s Second Largest Increase in Supply in 2014

Despite some supply disruptions and security threats, Iraq was the second-leading contributor to global oil supply growth in 2014, behind only the United States. Iraq accounted for almost 60% of production growth among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although this growth was more than offset by production declines in other OPEC countries. Iraq’s crude oil production, which averaged almost 3.4 million barrels per day (bb/d) in 2014, was 330,000 bb/d above 2013 levels, despite the heightened security threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and disrupted production in northern Iraq.

ISIL, attacks in northern Iraq in early June 2014 reduced northern Iraqi production and refinery operations (not including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region). These attacks did not affect southern production and exports, which accounted for 65% of Iraq’s total crude oil exports in 2014. ISIL did not significantly affect production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, although fighting came very close to fields produced under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—the Khurmala Dome and Shaikan. Some oil companies were forced to abandon exploration projects, which could delay future development.

Iraq’s crude oil production fell to its lowest monthly levels for the year during July and August following the start of the ISIL offensive. From August to December, Iraq’s production grew by almost 600,000 bb/d, reflecting increased output from fields in southern Iraq and in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region following infrastructure expansions and a partial recovery in northern Kirkuk production. In December, Iraq’s crude oil production reached 3.79 million bb/d, the highest amount on record.

Source:
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19911
Key Dams in Iraq

Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Families</th>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>528,601</td>
<td>3,171,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **IDPs by location of displacement**
  - High concentration
  - Low concentration
  - Locations

**Sources:** Thematic data: IOM DTM as of 2015/08/04. Administrative data: OCHA CCC. This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

**Notes:**
1. Location is defined as a sub-district (e.g., 4th official administrative division) or a village for rural areas or a neighborhood for urban areas (e.g., 5th official administrative division). IOM DTM aims to provide precise population data; however, limited access and other operational constraints on the ground can limit information-gathering activities.
2. Individuals are estimated by multiplying total families by 5, the average size of an Iraq family.

Baghdad governorate hosts the second largest IDP population (17% or 538,632 individuals). The majority of this population is originally from Anbar governorate (52%), while a smaller portion (7%) are originally from Baghdad governorate. IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (18%). September 2014-March 2015 (31%) and after April 2015 (28%). The vast majority (91%) is hosted in private settings.

Anbar governorate hosts the largest IDP population (18% or 584,364 individuals) and reports a very high rate of intra-governorate displacement; 97% of IDPs are originally from the same governorate. These IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (44%) and after April 2015 (38%). The majority is housed in private settings (81%), out which 72% in host families and 9% in rented houses, while a smaller portion (19%) is in critical shelters. Finally, Anbar governorate hosts 13% of the total returnees (39,358 individuals).

Kirkuk governorate hosts the fourth largest displaced population (13% or 399,660 individuals). IDPs in Kirkuk are mainly from Salah al-Din (36%), Anbar (10%) and from within Kirkuk (19%). They were displaced mainly in June-July 2014 (29%) and September 2014-March 2015 (27%). The majority of IDPs (55%) are in rented houses, critical shelters (14%) and camps (2%). Furthermore, Kirkuk hosts 2% of the total returnee population (4,548 individuals).

**DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX**

**IDP LOCATIONS & POPULATION**

**IRAQ IDP CRISIS - JANUARY 2014 TO 30 JULY 2015**

IOM's DTM aims to monitor displacement and provide accurate data about the IDP population in Iraq. Data are collected through IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RART), composed of 140 staff deployed throughout the entire Iraqi territory. Data is gathered using an extensive network of over 1,300 key informants. From the start of January 2014 through 30 July 2015, the DTM identified 3,171,606 internally displaced individuals (528,601 families).
Iraq: IDP Status (as of October 2015)
Iraq: Humanitarian Response
(as of October 2015)

In October, a total of 68 partners reported a response in 254 different locations; the number of people reached by protection monitoring team continues to increase with more than 49,000 people reached; over 500,000 people have assisted with food. In 2015, by the end of October, the health cluster partners have also supported more than 1.1 million people with access to primary health care; over 100,000 women and girls were accessing women safe spaces; over 250,000 people have been assisted with permanent sanitation facilities and over 450,000 children have been provided access to rehabilitated schools.

More than 8 million people across Iraq - nearly a quarter of the population - are in need of humanitarian assistance. About 3.2 million people have been internally displaced since January 2014, according to the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix. To respond to the growing needs, the Government of Iraq and the United Nations launched a revised and prioritized Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in June 2015 seeking US$498 million to provide life-saving assistance and protection to 5.6 million people. Although money is coming in, the humanitarian needs outpace available resources. This is taking a toll on response capacity and the ability to reach the most vulnerable people.

As per the reported activities, the humanitarian response has been heavily focused in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq - However, the operation has been re-balanced to Baghdad, and is now expanding its access and response across all of Iraq. Since January 2015, partners have reported a response in a total of 558 out of more than 3,000 settlements hosting IDP.
The humanitarian situation in Iraq has continued to worsen and the ongoing conflict is having profound humanitarian consequences. Nearly a third of Iraq’s population – 10 million people – will require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2016. This includes 3.2 million people who have fled their homes since January 2014, about 470,000 returnees, and nearly 250,000 refugees. Humanitarian partners are requesting US$861 million in the 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan to help ensure that the most vulnerable people receive the assistance they need.

In December, the battle to retake Ramadi in Anbar Governorate intensified and the humanitarian situation remains critical. People from Ramadi are being relocated to Habbaniyah Tourist City by authorities, where humanitarian partners are providing emergency response to people in need. In another concerning development, about 1,800 people east of Mount Sinjar along the border with Al-Ayadiyah Sub-district in Ninewa Governorate remain stranded between military front lines and continue to be denied access to safer territories.
Iraq: Funding Status (Humanitarian Response Plan)
US Aid to Iraq FY2015 and FY2016 as of 12/31/2015

U.S. government financial commitments to the current Syria and Iraq complex crises have totaled approximately $5.13 billion. About 88% of these funds have been focused on responding to the Syria complex crisis, which predates the current humanitarian situation in Iraq by 2 years.

From October 1, 2014, to December 31, 2015, USAID and DoS obligated nearly $1.64 billion in humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria complex crisis. Over that period, USAID and DoS disbursed $1.33 billion to related programs and activities. During the first quarter of FY 2016, OFDA, FFP, and PRM disbursed a total of $194.2 million.