The Comparative Metrics of ISIS and “Failed State Wars” in Syria and Iraq

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Meeting the Analytic and Policy Challenges
Key Failures in USG Efforts

1. Policy level comes to focus on spin, lack of objective analysis and transparency, compartmentation. Congress goes for partisan and member advantage.

2. **Denial of complexity, net for net assessment.** Focus on hostile forces rather than overall security situation.

3. Lack of meaningful integrated civil-military planning

4. Poor accounting and conditionality, lack of measures of effectiveness, focus on past waste rather than future needs and effectiveness.

5. Military reverts to focus on tactical success, short-term civil buy offs.

6. Focus on force generation rather than combat effectiveness. Rush in too late, leave too early; don’t provide combat advisors, erratic programs and funding, lack of conditionality

7. Civil side pursues illusions of progress, tries to reform everything, then reverts to project aid that often ignores security and fighting.

8. We lie when we say we’ll focus on letting them do it their way, helping them evolve their civil and security systems on their terms.

9. Efforts at improving fiscal management, counter corruption, rule of law, police reform reflect our goals and culture, do more harm than good

10. High rotation rates, new policies: Every year is the first year. Fail to develop and retain core expertise in economic planning, state politics, governance reform, and security reform.

11. Erratic swings in funding. Emphasis on budget execution rather than effectiveness

12. We “take note of lessons” after the crisis, fail to learn from the past.
Areas of ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State) Control, Operation, and Affiliation
Absorbing Other Groups

Countries with groups that pledged allegiance to ISIS

ISIS “Provinces”

WP Estimate of Al Qaeda and Affiliates 5.2015
Missy Ryan and Hassan Morajea, "In Libya, the Islamic State’s black banner rises by the Mediterranean,” Washington Post, October 8, 2015,
ISW Estimate of ISIS Regional Role: 1.2016 - II

1. Tunisian authorities arrested cells with links to ISIS in Libya and Syria in Bizerte and Kairouan on January 27, demonstrating how support for ISIS in West Africa benefits ISIS's central organization in Iraq and Syria and its Libyan affiliates.

2. ISIS's Wilayat Tarabulus (Western Libya) launched an SVBIED against a police training facility in Zliten on January 7, killing over 60 in one of the largest attacks in Libyan history. ISIS launched the operation to distract armed groups in nearby Misrata while executing its campaign on Libya's oil facilities, thereby demonstrating its ability to coordinate attacks across multiple Libyan cities.

3. ISIS's Wilayat Barqa (Eastern Libya) launched a major campaign targeting large oil facilities east of the ISIS-held city of Sirte on January 4. The group initially launched an SVBIED and rockets on the al-Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals before deploying gunmen.

4. A suspected ISIS militant conducted an SVBIED attack in a tourist neighborhood in Istanbul, Turkey on January 12, killing 11 foreigners. Previous ISIS-linked attacks in Turkey had primarily struck government and Kurdish political targets. ISIS-linked operatives may increasingly shift to attacking popular tourist sites in order to inspire fear globally and harm Turkey economically.

5. ISIS claimed an unsuccessful attack on a bus of Israeli tourists at a hotel in Giza, central Egypt on January 7. The group claimed that the attack was in response to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's December 2015 call to "target the Jews everywhere."

6. ISIS's Wilayat Sinai claimed an IED attack against an armored police vehicle in al-Arish, Egypt killing two and wounding five on January 29. The group claimed five other IED attacks against security targets in January 2016.

7. ISIS's Wilayat Damascus claimed a suicide attack against a checkpoint near the Shi'a Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus on January 31, killing 71. The Sayyida Zeinab shrine is symbolically significant; as a target since it is one of Syria's holiest Shi'a sites, and strategically significant as Iraqi proxy groups are based in the vicinity of the shrine. The attack likely serves a dual purpose of militarily countering Iranian proxies in Syria and fueling sectarian tensions in the region.

8. ISIS's Wilayat Aden-Abyan (Southern Yemen) launched SVBIEDs against the Presidential Palace and a police checkpoint in Aden on January 28 and 29, reflecting intent to target the political and security structures of President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi's government.

9. ISIS's Wilayat Khorasan (Afghanistan-Pakistan) attacked the Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, eastern Afghanistan on January 13, in its first complex attack in an urban center.

10. ISIS claimed its first attack in Southeast Asia on January 14, a complex assault in a commercial district of Jakarta, Indonesia. Five attackers reportedly directed by an Indonesian ISIS member in Syria used SVBIEDs, small arms, and hand grenades to kill four and injure at least twenty. The attack cell and planner maintained links to militants in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, signaling the emergence of a growing pro-ISIS network in Southeast Asia.
Major ISIS Attacks and Arrests: 10.14 to 12.15


ISIL as a Transnational Threat, as of 12/2015

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has been reporting on the spread of ISIL based on its tracking of, among other things, social media and satellite imagery to provide a picture of ISIL’s spread of influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. ISW’s research shows that ISIL vets and enrolls local militant leaders to establish provinces, imposing brutal Sharia law where they take hold. With affiliates in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, ISIL inspired lone-wolf attacks have reached the West, including the killing of 14 Americans in San Bernardino, California, on December 2, 2015. These affiliates give the group “strategic resilience,” making their destruction essential to defeating ISIL in the long term.

Iranian Influence

Lebanon Hezbollah is considered Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran’s interest.

Syria Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

Iraq Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

Bahrain Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

Yemen Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.

ISIS is Only One Threat, and Key ISIS Countries Face Many Equal or Great Challenges
Not Really a War Against ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State)

- Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have long been “failed states” in terms of politics governance, economic development, demographic pressures, and security.
- Libya torn apart into two warring “governments,” many local factions, Islamists, and regional and ethnic differences.
- ISIS “Caliphate” is product of two sets of civil wars, growing out of Sunni and Al Qaeda hostility to U.S. invasion of Iraq.
  - Rise after 2011 a product of major upheavals growing out of both internal problems and failed secularism.
  - Syria is divided into four main fighting factions: ISIS, Kurdish, Arab-Islamist, and pro-Assad factions. Impact of 250,000+ dead, 500,000+ injured, 4+ million refugees, 7+ million internally displaced persons, 60%+ cut in GDP
  - Iraq is divided in Sunni, Kurdish, Iraqi government and Shiite factions on the edge of civil conflict and with growing violence after 2010.
  - “Youth bulge” in very young populations creates further stress.
  - U.S. invasion of Iraq compound impact of Saddam’s blood coup in 1979, Iran-Iraq War, invasion of Kuwait, U.S .led invasion in 2003, fighting from 2004-2013 all have a legacy – as does Assad’s father suppression of Moslem Brotherhood.
  - Defeating or degrading ISIS with still leave violent Islamist extremists.
- Yemen scene of constant fighting and civil struggles since British leave Aden. Now is Houthi vs. Sana government struggle Massive population pressure, serious water and arable land issues, drug economy. Sunni vs. Shi’ite and north-south tensions. Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, not ISIS, is dominant Sunni Islamist extremist faction.
The Four Threats That Drive Serious Terrorism and Insurgency (In Order of Priority)

• 1. **Host Country Government and Security Forces**: Authoritarianism, failure to cope with internal divisions, poor governance and corruption, failed economy development and equity, population pressure and youth bulge, repression and violence by internal security forces, traditional and corrupt military.

• 2. **The Overt “Threat”**: Moderate and peaceful beginnings shift to extreme and violent movements that feed on the civil-military divisions and failures of the host country governments.

• 3. **The U.S. Threat to the U.S.**: Relearn counterinsurgency yet again. Separate military (tactical) and civil (project-oriented development) efforts. Threat oriented and downplay Host Country problems. No meaningful overall civil-military plan or net assessment. Rapid rotations with limited expertise. Cycle of denial, flood resources, rush to generate Host country forces, then leave too soon. “Take note” of lessons, then ignore.

• 4. **Other Nations: Allied, Neutral, Hostile**: Allied limits to engagement, national caveats, demands; neutral interference for competing national interests, hostile action because anti-U.S., support overt threat, opposing national interests.
The Uncertain State of “Progress”

- Years of war have now gone on since 2011 with no meaningful estimates of impact and the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.
- Rising GDP in petro-economics may disguise deep structural problems, impact of population growth, income distribution problems. Etc.
- Poverty estimates often fail to address rising costs, impact of urbanization, etc.
- Security remains a key problem that often is not taken into account in economic and human development estimates.
- Rising sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional and other internal divisions often ignored.
- Unemployment data ignore productivity, disguised unemployment, career opportunities.
- Data on progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raise major questions about quality of data.
- Critical near term challenges in revenues, job creation, electric power, agriculture, and roads.
- Estimate of future opportunities for progress often ignore reality that states at war need time to recover. No major near-term development options until.
- Military and aid spending have often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
ISIS, Failed States, and the Broader Patterns of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Refugees
Eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Eleven per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.

Terrorist Attacks: 2000-2014

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.

Deaths from Terrorism: 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased ninefold since the year 2000.

Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.

Source: START GTD

Source: UCNP

NOTE: There were 53,948 battle-related deaths recorded between the Assad regime and Syrian insurgents which includes ISIL amongst other groups. This means the figures of battle-related deaths for ISIL are likely to be much higher.
Terrorism and Refugees: 2008-2014

In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe.

Between 1970 and 2014, there have been 176 occasions on which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people (excluding perpetrators), in a particular country on a particular day. This includes both isolated attacks, multiple attacks, and multi-part, coordinated attacks. The first such event took place in 1978, when an arson attack targeting the Cinema Rex Theater in Abadan, Iran killed more than 400 people. Since the Cinema Rex attack, and until 2013, 4.2 such mass-fatality terrorist events happened per year, on average. In 2014, the number increased dramatically when 26 mass-fatality terrorist events took place in eight different countries: Afghanistan (1), Central African Republic (1), Iraq (9), Nigeria (9), Pakistan (1), South Sudan (1), Syria (3), and Ukraine (1).

The occurrence of a series of attacks on a particular day that result in large numbers of casualties may or may not be indicative of explicit coordination among perpetrators. Nearly half (11) of the 26 days in 2014 in which more than 100 victims were killed by terrorists in a single country involved the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as perpetrators. In Nigeria, all nine of the highly lethal days involved the perpetrator group Boko Haram. Other perpetrator groups responsible for attacks on these high-lethality days include the Taliban in Afghanistan, militia groups in the Central African Republic, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), al-Nusrah Front, and the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, both in Ukraine.

Between 2000 and 2014, there were 83 days on which more than 100 people were killed by terrorist attacks in a single country. These attacks took place in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; however, they were especially concentrated in Iraq and Nigeria.

Although Western Europe has historically experienced thousands of terrorist attacks, highly lethal attacks like the recent events in Paris are extremely unusual. The deadliest terrorist attacks in Western Europe between 2000 and 2014 took place in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004 when assailants attacked six different transportation targets with explosives. Four of the devices detonated, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,800.
The recent attacks in Paris reportedly involved both explosives and firearms. These two types of weapons are those most commonly used in terrorist attacks worldwide.

Between 2000 and 2014, explosives were used in 58 percent of all terrorist attacks, and firearms were used in 34 percent of all terrorist attacks. However both firearms and explosives were used much more rarely—in less than 4 percent of all attacks.

Attacks that involved firearms were somewhat more deadly than those involving explosives, causing 3.1 fatalities on average (including perpetrator deaths), compared to 2.4.

Despite the potential for explosives to cause mass casualties in certain cases, they were also more frequently used in attacks that are non-lethal (57%), either because they targeted only property or were unsuccessful at causing human casualties.

In comparison, 24 percent of all attacks involving only firearms worldwide between 2000 and 2014 were non-lethal.

Attacks that involved both explosives and firearms caused, on average, 6.8 deaths per attack. This rate of lethality is 2.8 times that of all attacks overall, and attacks involving explosives. It is 2.2 times the average lethality of attacks involving firearms.
Coordinated Attacks: 2000-2014

Like the recent attacks in Paris, some of the highly lethal terrorist attacks described above were carried out as part of coordinated events in which perpetrators execute multiple attacks simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, typically in a single country or city. Between 2000 and 2014, 14 percent of all terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide were conducted in coordination with other attacks.

On average, individual attacks that were carried out as part of a coordinated event were slightly more deadly, causing 2.84 total fatalities on average, compared to isolated attacks, which caused 2.35 total fatalities on average. The average number of perpetrator fatalities among attacks that were part of a coordinated event were slightly higher as well—0.39 perpetrator deaths per attack, compared to 0.33 for isolated attacks.

More than 10,000 coordinated terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries between 2000 and 2014. Much like terrorism in general, these attacks were concentrated among a small number of countries. More than half of all coordinated attacks (54%) took place in Iraq, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.

Among countries that experienced more than 50 attacks between 2000 and 2014, France had the highest proportion of attacks that were carried out as part of multi-part, coordinated events, with 40 percent. The majority of these (87%) were carried out in Corsica by separatists including the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), causing property damage but no deaths and few injuries.

Source: Global Terrorism Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>% Coordinated Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Perpetrator Fatalities</th>
<th>Victim Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4,592</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The perpetrator of the attack was unidentified for 40 percent of all coordinated terrorist attacks that took place worldwide between 2000 and 2014. The remaining 60 percent were disproportionately carried out by a relatively small number of perpetrator groups.

While the recent attack in Paris shares similarities with the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India, the perpetrator group in that attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is not among the most frequent perpetrators of coordinated attacks.

In contrast, ISIL, under its current incarnation, carried out more than 750 coordinated attacks during this time period—specifically in 2013 and 2014. However, this is a conservative assessment because the Global Terrorism Database records the names of perpetrator organizations at the time of the attack.

Thus, it is important to note that al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), ISIL’s predecessor, carried out at least 400 coordinated attacks as well. Also, 25 coordinated attacks were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another identity previously assumed by ISIL, and several other coordinated attacks were carried out by provinces of the Islamic State, including the Sinai Province and the Tripoli Province.

Other organizations that have carried out more than a hundred coordinated attacks include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Communist Party of India-Maoist and unaffiliated Maoists in India, al-Shabaab primarily in Somalia and Kenya, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, Fulani militants in Nigeria and the Central African Republic, and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In addition, at least 50 coordinated attacks between 2000 and 2014 were carried out by individuals who reportedly were not affiliated with a particular terrorist organization or group. These attacks took place in 10 countries; however, 30 of them (60%) occurred in the United States and were carried out in pursuit of a wide variety of ideological goals. Eighteen of the attacks were part of a series in which a single perpetrator motivated by anti-government sentiment planted pipe bombs in mailboxes in five U.S. states.
Key Perpetrators: 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Total Injuries</th>
<th>Hostages Taken</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>6286</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>5808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the Levant (ISIL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3492</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>3312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6644</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>1742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists/Communist Party</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of India–Maoist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among these five perpetrator groups, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL (6.46 people killed per attack), the Taliban (4.07), and Boko Haram (16.86) were higher than the global average (2.57) in 2014. The average lethality of attacks carried out by al-Shabaab (2.46) was slightly lower than the global average. Attacks carried out by Maoist perpetrators in India were by far the least deadly and the least likely to be deadly, causing 0.63 deaths per attack.

All five of the most active groups markedly increased the number of hostages taken in 2014; however, the increases in hostage-takings by ISIL and Boko Haram were exceptionally large. Attacks carried out by these two groups in 2014 involved more than 4,300 hostages, 50% of all hostages taken in terrorist attacks worldwide in which the perpetrator group was identified.

Boko Haram also increased its use of suicide tactics in 2014, carrying out 31 suicide attacks, compared to three in 2013.

Although terrorist attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 60% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria), and 78% of all fatalities due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria).

Given the limitations of media coverage in Syria, the data presented here are conservative estimates of terrorism in Syria. Consistent with START’s practice of including in the GTD only those attacks that have been verified by at least one well-regarded source, these statistics represent those incidents reported by independent news outlets. Globally aggregated statistics do not represent uniform patterns worldwide. They are produced by diverse trends in violence and heavily influenced by events in several key locations. The statistical profiles in Table 2 illustrate many of these dynamics.

**Attacks:** Large increases in Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that also experienced high numbers of attacks in 2013, comprise more than one-third (37%) of the 35% increase in total attacks worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Fatalities:** Large increases in Nigeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three countries that also experienced high numbers of fatalities due to terrorist attacks in 2013, comprise more than two-thirds (72%) of the 81% increase in total fatalities worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. Also, approximately one-quarter (26%) of the increase in total fatalities was attributable to increases in perpetrator fatalities, which were especially prevalent in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria.

**Injuries:** The total number of injuries due to terrorist attacks increased slightly (6%) in 2014. This was largely a product of various regional trends, including a 376% increase in injuries in Nigeria in 2014, and a 44% decrease in injuries in Pakistan in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Hostages:** Several countries observed large increases in the number of hostages taken in terrorist attacks in 2014. However, the largest increases took place in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria, comprising more than two-thirds (68%) of the 201% increase in hostages worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. This considerable increase in the total number of hostages taken by perpetrators of terrorist attacks is a result of a large increase in the number of attacks that involved any hostages as well as a large increase in the number of attacks that involved more than 100 hostages.

Four of the five countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2014 were the same as those that experienced the most terrorism in 2013. The one exception was the Philippines, which experienced a 24% decline in attacks, and ranked 10th among countries with the most terrorism in 2014. Nigeria, which ranked 7th among countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2013, experienced a 114% increase in attacks and a 308% increase in fatalities in 2014.

**Key Countries by Location: 2013-2014**

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>2501</td>
<td>9929</td>
<td>6387</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>15137</td>
<td>14976</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>2658</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1757</td>
<td>2351</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>2837</td>
<td>5075</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>4505</td>
<td>3111</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>4699</td>
<td>3724</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>7512</td>
<td>1842</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>2246</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1298</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>13463</td>
<td>9964</td>
<td>32727</td>
<td>18066</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>34791</td>
<td>32880</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>9428</td>
<td>3137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** India, which was among the five countries with the most attacks in 2014, ranked 13th in terms of fatalities. Syria, which was among the five countries with the most fatalities in 2014, ranked 14th in terms of attacks.

The total number of refugees has increased significantly and consistently over the past four years. Starting from 10.4 million at the end of 2011, the number increased to 10.5 million in 2012, to 11.7 million in 2013, and finally to 14.4 million by the end of 2014. By mid-2015, it had reached an estimated 15.1 million, its highest level in 20 years. Within three and a half years, then, the global refugee population grew by 4.7 million persons – some 45 per cent.

The main contributing factor to this trend has been the war in the Syrian Arab Republic. Excluding that country, the increase from the end of 2011 to mid-2015 would have been only half a million refugees (+5%). Clearly, the devastating effect of the Syrian conflict is being felt far beyond its neighbouring countries.

The Syrian Arab Republic remained the largest source country of refugees, with a refugee population of 4.2 million by mid-2015. This figure has increased dramatically, rising from below 20,000 at the end of 2010. As such, starting in mid-2014, the Syrian Arab Republic replaced Afghanistan as the main source country of refugees worldwide, a rank Afghanistan had previously held for more than three decades. The Syrian refugee population grew by more than 300,000 people during the reporting period. The Afghan refugee population remained relatively stable at about 2.6 million.

Surrounding countries continue to be impacted heavily by the crisis, with the number of registered Syrians in Turkey (1.8 million), Lebanon (1.2 million), Jordan (628,800), Iraq (251,300), and Egypt (131,900) remaining high. Outside the immediate region, Germany was hosting 66,000 Syrian refugees at mid-2015, up from 41,000 six months earlier.

During the first half of the year, at least 4.2 million persons were newly displaced by conflict and violence within their countries, compared to 4.1 million in the corresponding period of 2014. Yemen reported the largest number of newly displaced persons (933,500), followed by Ukraine (559,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (558,000), Nigeria (378,500), Iraq (366,500), and Pakistan (309,200).

The number of newly displaced persons within the Syrian Arab Republic was not available for the first six months of 2015. However, with 7.6 million IDPs, the Syrian Arab Republic remained the country with the highest such number worldwide. Despite security concerns, UNHCR was able to assist an estimated 1.3 million of these individuals by mid-2015. According to the Government, 6.5 million individuals were registered as IDPs in Colombia at mid-year. Other countries where significant IDP populations were protected or assisted by UNHCR included Iraq (4.0 million), Sudan (2.3 million), Pakistan (1.6 million), South Sudan (1.5 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.5 million), Nigeria (1.4 million), and Ukraine (1.4 million). Afghanistan too has seen a surge in internal displacement of some 50 per cent compared to 18 months ago as conflict intensified, reaching a figure of 948,000 IDPs by mid-2015.

Correlation is Not Causation, But:

- Many forms of correlation cover only small part of factors involved.
- Many key factors like ideology and religion do not lend themselves to reliable quantification.
- Polling very uncertain if pushed beyond limits.
- Political and social scientists, economists, often choose heavily biased “sets” of variables focusing on their own areas of interest.
- Nation-wide data disguises key sectarian, ethnic, regional, and local differences.
- **But,** Some key population and economic trends clearly do have *some* impact:
  - Massive population pressure (More than 5 times larger since 1950)
  - Youth “bulge” and link to unemployment.
  - Low per capita income and poor income distribution.
  - Failed secularism in the form of poor governance by every measure.
- “Worst case” or failed countries in MENA area do have some important things in common.
Losing Touch with Reality: UNDP Human Development Trends

War has No Impact?

Ranking in total of 187 countries in 2014

Libya: 55th
Syria: 118th
Iraq: 120th
Yemen: 154th

Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism

Lower ranking = less effective government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gov. Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index "The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be."

The Economist Threat to Counterinsurgency Economics

1. The economic factors that divided and sometimes shattered a nation are largely ignored.

2. The specific economic forces driving given factions, areas, and terrorist-insurgency threats are not measured or taken into account. (Sects, ethnic groups, regional tensions, conflict/war zones, IDP-refugee impacts, etc.)

3. Reliance on classic national wide metrics for developed nations at peace: GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation, debt, Balance of Payments, etc..

4. Fail to address major uncertainties, limits to data.

5. Focus on classic nation-wide development as if war and causes of war did not exist, and need to reconstruct and construct basic services and functions did not exist.

6. Economic aid becomes project aid without valid national analysis and plans. Fails to alter dominant military focus on fighting, conflict termination, departure, (possibly short-term stability) and not national stability.

7. Largely ignore demographic pressures, youth needs, corruption costs and impacts, critical problems in governance and budget planning and execution.

8. Live in “now”, rather than economic history, examine best-case, not real futures.


10. Focus on getting money and spending, not auditing use of money and measuring effectiveness.
Gulf GDP Per Capita by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>17,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>15,057</td>
<td>17,303</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>15,113</td>
<td>17,572</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>4,694</td>
<td>5,048</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>5,443</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>5,443</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>52,300</td>
<td>54,630</td>
<td>55,904</td>
<td>55,904</td>
<td>55,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>54,400</td>
<td>54,630</td>
<td>55,904</td>
<td>55,904</td>
<td>54,630</td>
</tr>
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</table>

International Monetary Fund, [http://www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org)
The “Youth Bulge”
(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq’s population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008): The Threat From POAYMs

Source: IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, October 2010, p. 38
Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050
(In Millions)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>6,410,000</td>
<td>X 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>22,900,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,160,000</td>
<td>33,300,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

- **Bahrain** (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),
- **Egypt** (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),
- **Jordan** (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),
- **Kuwait** (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),
- **Lebanon** (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),
- **Morocco** (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),
- **Oman** (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),
- **Qatar** (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),
- **Saudi Arabia** (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism),
- **Turkey** (which is a long-standing NATO ally)
- **UAE** (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).
Saudi, UAE, GCC Influence

Countries Fighting ISIL in Iraq

Conflicting Threat and Allied Interests
*(Other nations too have vital security interests)*

- **Iran**: Expanding regional influence, role in Syria and Iraq, Challenge to U.S.
- **Russia**: Ukraine, basing, regional influence, support of Assad, U.S. is destabilizing region, Putin’s desire to reassert Russia.
- **Lebanon**: Hezbollah, Shi’ite Alignments, ties to Iran, refugees.
- **Iraq**: Shiite-dominated government with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions, distrust of reliance on U.S.
- **Kurds**: Wide mix of factions and interests in Syria, Iraq, Turkey (Iran?), refugees
- **Israel**: Focus on Palestinians, Iran and nuclear, own security.
- **Turkey**: Erdogan’s ambitions, Kurdish issue(s), focus on Assad, higher tolerance of Islamist movements, own security, refugees.
- **Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait**: Focus on Assad in Syria matches focus on ISIS, support Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Iran in Gulf a primary threat, uncertain trust in U.S.
- **Bahrain**: Focus on tensions with own Shi’ites (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf)
- **Egypt**: Internal struggles, uncertain trust in U.S., Sinai unrest.
- **Jordan**: Major internal security concerns, border threats, uncertain trust in U.S., Palestinian issue, refugees.
- **Europe**: Ukraine, refugees, no common interest in region, focus on domestic needs, limit defense spending and military efforts.
Terrain factors and Key Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions
Maneuverable Terrain in Syria and Iraq

Unpaved Road Nets in Syria and Iraq

Key Divisions by Islamic Sect

Key Shi’ite Areas in the Middle East

Shi’ite Population density is very different from geographic There are about three Shiites for every five Sunnis in the Middle East.

Iran and Iraq have mixed populations, but Shi’ite-dominated governments. All other Arab states and Turkey have Sunni-led governments.

Iran is home to about eight million Sunnis who make up about 11 percent of the population.

Most of the Shiites are in Iran, but they are also the majority in countries like Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Iraq, and are a significant political and military force in Lebanon and Syria.

Iraq is Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8%, Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1

Syria’s population is Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13% -- Alawites are not Shi’ites and have very different beliefs), Christian (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo)

Bahrain’s total population is Muslim 70.3%, Christian 14.5%, Hindu 9.8%, Buddhist 2.5%, Jewish 0.6%, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated 1.9%, other 0.2% (2010 est.) The native population is 60-70% Shi’ite.

Shiites are a significant minority in Saudi Arabia, making up 15% to 25% of residents. Conservative Wahhabi practices are followed by some 15% of Saudi Arab’s population as well as most native Qatars. The majority of Saudis and other Gulf Sunnis practice less conservative forms of Islam.

Yemen is Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha’i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.)

Turkey is some 99%, largely Sunni but with some scattered Shi’ites and other Islamic sects. Its ethnic structure is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.).

Pakistan is Muslim (official) 96.4% (Sunni 85-90%, Shia 10-15%), other (includes Christian and Hindu) 3.6% (2010 est.). Afghanistan is Muslim 99.7% (Sunni 84.7 - 89.7%, Shia 10 - 15%), other 0.3% (2009 est.)

Kurds in the Middle East

- Iran mixes Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baloch, Arab, Turkmen and Turkic tribes but the CIA does not estimate percentages.
- Iraq is Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%.
- Syria is Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%.
- Turkey is Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.).

This map shows only the main areas of settlement of Kurds in the Middle East.

The Rise and Decline (?) of ISIS: Comparative Views
Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State's aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.

A gun battle erupted last week between Syrian fighters and foreigners in Abu Kamal after the Syrians refused an order by a Kuwaiti commander to travel to Iraq to reinforce the front lines in Tikrit.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted between a group of mostly Chechens and local Iraqi supporters of the Islamic State who felt they were being abandoned when the foreigners decided to head back to Syria.
DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of March 2015

Note: Our judgment as to which group has dominant influence over a particular city is based on a body of unclassified sources that we deem reliable.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.

Source: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/ReducedOperatingAreas0315.pdf
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.

ISIS Position in October 2015 – NYT Estimate

The U.S. is arming Syrian Arab fighters who will join Kurdish combatants to attack Raqqa.

Iraqi forces have encircled Ramadi, which is defended by 600 to 1,000 militants, with the support of U.S. airstrikes and the Iraqi air force.

Iraqi forces and Shiite militias, aided by U.S. airstrikes, retook the Baiji oil refinery from ISIS on Friday after contesting it for more than a year.

Sources: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas); Satellite image by Landsat via Google Earth

**ISIS Relies on Extortion and Taxation**

The Islamic State takes in more than $1 million per day in extortion and taxation. Salaries of Iraqi government employees are taxed up to 50 percent, adding up to at least $300 million last year; companies may have their contracts and revenue taxed up to 20 percent. As other revenue streams have stalled, like banks and oil, the Islamic State has adjusted these rates to make taxation a larger portion of its income.

Oil revenue has fallen to about $2 million per week, but the group is not dependent on oil income. Much of the production is used for its own fuel. Past oil sales show that the Islamic State was already selling oil at deep discounts that fluctuated among local markets — for instance, selling oil for less in Kirkuk than in Mosul.

The largest expenditure is salaries, which is estimated to be between $3 million and $10 million every month. The Islamic State also invests in police-state institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation, but provides relatively few services.

The group avoids investment in infrastructure because it can be an easy target for attacks, and the territory it holds can change quickly. The group minimizes costs by looting military equipment, appropriating land and infrastructure, and paying relatively low salaries. The group also limits its vulnerability by shifting operations, transitioning between expanding its territory and fueling terrorist activity. The Islamic State’s loss of ground in Tikrit last month, for example, has not stopped it from launching attacks in other parts of Iraq and Syria and taking the Iraqi city of Ramadi this weekend.

ISIS Areas of Control: December 31, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command
Incremental Gains Against ISIS: 11.2015

Sources: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas); Satellite image by Landsat via Google Earth

The U.S. is arming Syrian Arab fighters who will join Kurdish combatants to attack Raqqa.

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Iraqi forces have encircled Ramadi, which is defended by 600 to 1,000 militants, with the support of U.S. airstrikes and the Iraqi air force.

In November, Kurdish and Yazidi fighters gained control of Sinjar, in Iraq, and of parts of a strategic road between Syria and Iraq. That has made it more difficult for Islamic State fighters to travel between the two countries, but the group still controls smaller roads in the region.
The Islamic State has lost 14 percent of the territory it held in January, according to an analysis by IHS, a defense research firm. Airstrikes and ground offensives have forced the group to withdraw from some areas, but it has also made new gains.

ISIS Gains and Losses in 2015: IHS Jane’s

The Islamic State’s most significant gains in 2015 came from their advance into western Syria via Palmyra, and the capture of Ramadi’s city centre. Both were achieved in a near simultaneous offensive in May 2015, but came at the expense of losing northern Syria to the Kurds.

The Islamic State redeployed fighters from its northern frontline with the Kurds in order to launch the offensives in Palmyra and Ramadi. This indicates that the Islamic State was overstretched, and also that holding Kurdish territory is considered to be of lesser importance than expelling the Syrian and Iraqi governments from traditionally Sunni land. In fact, geospatial analysis of IHS data shows that Islamic State activity outside areas it controls is heavily concentrated around Baghdad and Damascus, but much less so in Kurdish territory.

Syria’s Kurds are by far the biggest winners in 2015, expanding territory under their control by 186% to 15,800 km2. They have established control over nearly all of Syria’s traditionally Kurdish areas, and are the largest component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are being nurtured to form a key part of the US ground campaign against the Islamic State in 2016.

Kurdish Advances in the North in 2015

Islamic State had some of its most significant losses in northern Syria. Kurdish forces, backed by air support from the American-led coalition, regained control of some areas near the Turkish border. But the extremists’ grip on the major cities of Raqqa, in Syria, and Mosul, in Iraq, remains unchallenged. The group also still holds sections of the Syrian border with Turkey.

In November, Kurdish and Yazidi fighters gained control of Sinjar, in Iraq, and of parts of a strategic road between Syria and Iraq. That has made it more difficult for Islamic State fighters to travel between the two countries, but the group still controls smaller roads in the region.
NYT: ISIS Losses in Ramadi: 12.15

The Iraqi government is present in contested areas, but continues to face resistance.

The New York Times | Source: Institute for the Study of War

ISIS Grip on Raqqa and Mosul at End-2015

ISIS Gains and Losses in Southern Syria in 2015

A mix of Iraqi government forces and Shiite militias pushed the terrorist group out of Tikrit, in April, and Islamic State fighters are currently surrounded in Ramadi.

After months of trying to regain control of Ramadi, Iraqi security forces were finally able to surround it in early December. But government forces have yet to enter the city center, where urban combat is expected to stretch for months.
ISIS Grip on Raqqa and Mosul at End-2015

ISIS Bombings and Assassinations in 2015

ISIS Areas of control: December 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command

ISIS Areas of control: January 2016

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command

ISW Estimate of Zones of Control: February 9, 2016

CONTROL ZONE: An area where ISIS exerts physical/psychological pressure to assure that individuals/groups respond as directed.

ATTACK ZONE: An area where ISIS conducts offensive maneuvers.

SUPPORT ZONE: An area free of significant action against ISIS and which permits logistics and administrative support of ISIS’s forces.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/maps/1528fb7753f1b5ec,

U.S. Funding of the War in 2015

As of December 31, 2015, more than $11 billion had been provided for OIR and related U.S. programs and activities to counter ISIL since FY 2014. Most appropriations have funded DoD programs and operations to wage the military campaign under OIR.

Additional amounts attributable strictly to programs and operations across the nine lines of U.S. effort and multiple U.S. agencies have been difficult to isolate. However, billions of dollars support additional programs and operations to counter violent extremism, fight global terrorism, and support regional stabilization by directly addressing the threat posed by ISIL to the United States and beyond. This report presents details of funding by appropriation, account, and program where information from the agencies has been provided.

The FY 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (PL. 114-113), passed on December 18, 2015, continued funding for most counter-ISIL activities, including $715 million for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and $80 million for the security assistance activities of DoD’s Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, which facilitates equipment purchases for Iraq’s security forces. Although the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2016 authorized up to $531 million to create a new Syria Train and Equip Fund, PL. 114-113 did not enact funds for this 2-year standalone account. DoD reported that it intends to request reprogramming of up to $350 million for the program in FY 2016. Of these funds, it appears likely that some portion will be required for U.S. trainer and enabler costs not otherwise funded in service OCO requests.

Details of amounts appropriated and allocated for FY 2016 programs and activities have not been released, but DoD requested $5.3 billion for OIR programs and operations in FY 2016. Both PL. 114-113 and the FY 2016 NDAA impose numerous reporting requirements on the uses of train and equip funds. For details, see the sidebar discussion in this section.

The Administration identified an additional $1.82 billion in its FY 2016 request for foreign operations funding. Most of this amount is to be used to address the effects of the Syrian crisis on neighboring countries, including:

- $1 billion for Jordan to counter ISIL and mitigate Syria-related economic and security concerns
- $335 million to strengthen Iraq’s counterterrorism capabilities
- $211 million to assist Lebanon in meeting the needs of Syrian refugees and addressing the ISIL threat

According to the Congressional Research Service, the overall “Syria and Counter-ISIL” request is a 17% increase over FY 2014 funding for this purpose (FY 2015 funding data was not available).

DoD Funding

As of December 31, 2015, the United States had provided more than $11 billion for DoD programs and operations related to OIR and counter-ISIL activities since FY 2014, including:

- FY 2014—$281.7 million
- FY 2015—$5.78 billion
- FY 2016—$5.30 billion

The amounts for FY 2014 and FY 2015 reflect total obligations as of September 30, 2015, provided in the most current iteration of the Cost of War report, produced by the DoD Comptroller. The status of OIR funding lags the Lead IG reporting period by at least three months. The total for FY 2016 reflects the amount requested by DoD. Details of amounts appropriated and allocated should be available in the next quarterly report. However, as Figure 1 shows, obligations of FY 2015 appropriations exceed the $5.10 billion amount enacted by Congress last year.

The Cost of War report captures the incremental cost of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs) up to and above planned deployment activity. The total funds obligated as of September 30, 2015, do not include reimbursement for the full cost of munitions required for the air campaign that has been waged since August 2014. According to the DoD Comptroller, those obligations and disbursements are recorded one to two years after the munitions have been expended, as part of end-of-year reimbursement requests. Thus, the final cost of OIR programs and activities funded by FY 2015 appropriations will not be known for many months.

Source: Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly report to Congress, January 2016, pp. 29
BBC/ISW
Estimate of Zones of Control at Cessation of Hostilities: 1 March 2016

Source: BBC,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35642639,
Syria and Iraq Air Campaign
Air Campaign Starts in Iraq: 8.2014

American fighter jets and drones attacked 68 targets in northern Iraq in the first week and a half of airstrikes, according to the U.S. Central Command. RELATED ARTICLE »

Mount Sinjar
Thousands of Yazidi refugees were trapped on the mountain after fleeing Islamist fighters. Targets included:
- 3 ARMED VEHICLES
- 1 ARMORED VEHICLE
- 3 TRUCKS
- 4 CHECKPOINTS
- 5 PERSONNEL CARRIERS
- 1 HUMVEE
- 1 MORTAR POSITION

Mosul Dam
American strikes allowed Kurdish fighters to regain the dam, which they lost two weeks ago. Targets included:
- 19 ARMED VEHICLES
- 2 ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS
- 9 FIGHTING POSITIONS
- 2 I.E.D.S
- 7 HUMVEES
- 1 ARMORED VEHICLE
- 3 CHECKPOINTS
- 2 PERSONNEL CARRIERS

Erbil
 Strikes in this area helped repel militants approaching the regional capital. Targets included:
- 7 ARMED VEHICLES
- 7 VEHICLES
- 1 MINE-RESISTANT VEHICLE
- 1 MOBILE ARTILLERY
- 2 MORTAR POSITIONS

Note: Strikes were not reported comprehensively day by day, so some may be missing from daily tallies.

Air Campaign: 6-7.2015

The air campaign led by the United States against the Islamic State reached a new peak of 38 strikes on July 4. Raqqa, ISIS' de facto capital, was hit 18 times. In mid-June, airstrikes helped Kurdish forces seize Tal Abyad from the Islamic State.

### Coalition Air Effort in Iraq and Syria as of 31 August 2015

#### Operation Inherent Resolve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction</th>
<th>Number of Weapons Released</th>
<th>Less Activity</th>
<th>More Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>15,211</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Sorties with at least one weapon release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>4,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

* Iraq only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>6,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>50,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>10,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>62,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of November 30, 2015

Confirmed air strikes up to 30 Nov 2015

IRAK 5,401    SYRIA 2,761

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command

Note: Strikes have not been mapped when the precise location was not given or was unclear.

## Targets Damaged/Destroyed as of November 13, 2015

### Operation Inherent Resolve

**Targets Damaged/Destroyed***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV’s</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>4,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>4,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>5,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,075</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments

Current as of 13 November 2015

Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Some data are under investigation as a result of challenges by USCENTCOM intelligence experts

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve), as of 30 September 2015
## Coalition Air Effort in Iraq and Syria as of 31 October 2015

### Operation Inherent Resolve

#### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td>2,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17,592</td>
<td>8,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>269</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>6,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,758</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>8,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>8,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>64,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>39,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>12,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>80,367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only

There were more U.S.-coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq in the past year than during more than five years of the Afghan war.

From January 2010 to Aug. 31, 2015, there have been 20,237 weapons released over Afghanistan, according to U.S. military data.

From August 2014 to August 2015, there have been 22,478 weapons released over Syria and Iraq, mostly by U.S. aircraft.

Every month this year, the airstrikes have far exceeded that of any month of the Afghan war since January 2010.

According to the U.S. military, as of mid-August, fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has cost U.S. taxpayers $3.7 billion, an average of $9.9 million a day, since the air war began last year.

Of course, the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been winding down, which explains the decrease in airstrikes.
Syrian activists have documented more than 70 airstrikes on Raqqa in the five days after the Paris attacks, compared with about 50 during the first two weeks of November. French warplanes have pounded the city, the Islamic State’s stronghold, and Russia has targeted it in retaliation for the downing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt. It is unclear how much ISIS was affected by the recent strikes, however.
ISIS Oil Fields Targeted By U.S. Air Strikes – 11.2015

Financial Times Map of ISIS-Controlled Oil Fields, February 2016

As of 3:59 p.m. EST Jan. 10, the U.S. and coalition have conducted a total of 9,560 strikes (6,341 Iraq / 3,219 Syria).

U.S. has conducted 7,390 strikes in Iraq and Syria (4,361 Iraq / 3,029 Syria)

Rest of Coalition has conducted 2,170 strikes in Iraq and Syria (1,980 Iraq /190 Syria)

The countries that have participated in the strikes include:

In Iraq: (1) Australia, (2) Belgium, (3) Canada, (4) Denmark, (5) France, (6) Jordan, (7) The Netherlands, and (8) UK

In Syria: (1) Australia, (2) Bahrain, (3) Canada, (4) France, (5) Jordan, (6) Saudi Arabia, (7) Turkey (8) UAE and (9) UK

As of Jan. 9, U.S. and partner nation aircraft have flown an estimated 64,172 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria.
As of 15 December, the total cost of the operation here in Iraq and Syria thus far has been $5.53 billion. That works out to $11 million per day.

So far in the air campaign, we have flown 65,492 sorties, and we have conducted 9,782 airstrikes.

That breaks down to 6,516 in Iraq, and 3,266 strikes in Syria.

Since the beginning of May, coalition strikes have killed approximately 95 senior and mid-level ISIL leaders.

We have provided basic combat training for 16,715 personnel, and we have put thousands more through various specialized training programs.
Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of January 20, 2016


Confirmed air strikes up to 20 Jan 2016
IRAQ 6,288 SYRIA 3,104

IS control
IS free to operate
Kurdistan Government-administered

100 km 50 miles

Note: Strikes have not been mapped when the precise location was not given or was unclear.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command
Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of February 23, 2016

**Targets Damaged.Destroyed as of January 10, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Inherent Resolve Targets Damaged/Destroyed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments. Current as of 9 December 2015. Source: CENTCOM CCCI.

Some data are under investigation as a result of challenges by USCENTCOM intelligence experts.

Targets Damaged/Destroyed as of February 9, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV’s</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>1,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>5,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>6,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>6,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,501</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments  
Current as of 09 February 2016  
Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve), 18.2.16.
## Air strikes and ISIS Leaders

### High-value ISIL Fighters Killed by Coalition Strikes in 12/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rawand Dilsher Taher</td>
<td>external operations; handled money and equipment</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Ahmed Ali al-Wais (AKA Abu Wadhah)</td>
<td>&quot;Emir&quot; of Kirkuk province</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Anas</td>
<td>IED cell leader</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunis Khalash (AKA Abu Jawdat)</td>
<td>Deputy Financial Emir</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mithaq Najim</td>
<td>Deputy &quot;Emir&quot; of Kirkuk province; trained FTFs</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>12/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siful Haque Sujan</td>
<td>computer systems engineer; external operations; educated in the U.K.; hacker; specialized in anti-surveillance technology and weapons development</td>
<td>Raqqah, Syria</td>
<td>12/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akram Muhammad Sa'ad Faris (AKA Akram Aabu)</td>
<td>commander/executioner</td>
<td>Tellafar, Iraq</td>
<td>12/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charaffe al-Mouadan</td>
<td>external operations; Paris attacks cell leader</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>12/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Kader Hakim</td>
<td>external operations; forgery specialist; veteran fighter; linked to Paris attacks network</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashin al-Hayali</td>
<td>external operations</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>12/27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The US-led coalition has launched more than 6,800 air strikes against IS targets in Iraq since its campaign began on 8 August 2014. The UK launched its first air strikes in Iraq on 30 September 2014.

In neighbouring Syria, the US, along with Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has also carried out more than 3,300 attacks on IS-held areas since 22 September 2014.
US-led coalition air strikes in Iraq

Estimated number launched by each country

- Denmark
- Australia
- Canada
- Netherlands
- France
- UK
- US

Source: Airwars.org (data to 17 Jan 2016)
As of January 31, 2016, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on August 8, 2014, is $6.2 billion and the average daily cost is $11.5 million for 542 days of operations.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Daily Cost</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>$12.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source:
- [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve) - 29.2.16.
ISIS Financing
U.S. Official Estimate of ISIS Financing - I

ISIL’s control of territory has enabled it to amass greater economic strength than other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. ISIL’s extortion of and taxation on the local population, its production and sale of oil and gas, its looting and illicit sale of cultural antiquities, and other methods (including foreign donations and kidnapping for ransom) have funded its military machine for years. These activities generated over a billion dollars in 2015.

For the distribution of ISIL’s estimated $1.18 billion revenue for 2015, by source. According to Under Secretary of the Treasury Adam Szubin, ISIL’s finances are now vulnerable in several areas. These weaknesses include limited access to the international financial system, reliance on vulnerable oil supplies to generate revenue, dependence on middlemen to move money to ISIL affiliates, and the hostility it faces from the population it extorts for taxes.

Administering ISIL’s Conquered Territories About three-fourths of ISIL’s budget supports its armed forces, either directly or indirectly, making countering ISIL’s finances an integral part of the coalition strategy. According to seized financial records in one province, about 44% of expenditures pay the salaries of ISIL’s fighters, another 10% pay its “Islamic Police,” and 20% supports ISIL military bases.

In addition to running its military forces, ISIL established a relatively significant administrative governing structure for the territories it seized from the Iraqi and Syrian governments. Following the takeover of Raqqah in 2013, ISIL’s nascent bureaucratic structures expanded in scope, including the establishment of Islamic Services Committees to oversee the existing local councils that administer basic public services (such as healthcare and education). This enabled ISIL to retain at least some capable technocrats while installing its own loyalists at the top of the bureaucratic structure.

Lacking an experienced workforce trained in public services, such as staffing schools, paving roads, and providing electricity to businesses and residences, ISIL has relied on forcing former government workers to return to their old jobs. The penalty for those in the public workforce who elect not to work for ISIL can be severe, including the confiscation of personal effects and property, or worse. Through early 2015, the GOI continued to pay the salaries of public servants forced to work for ISIL’s healthcare administration.

ISIL’s administrative apparatus enables it to generate revenue through taxation, fines, and the collection of fees for everything from sales of goods to the collection of garbage. For example, in Anbar province, fines can be assessed for selling electronic cigarettes (10,000 Iraqi dinars), owning “smoking goods” (confiscation of the offender’s automobile and 15 days imprisonment), and using a taxi to transport cigarettes (250,000 Iraqi dinars). In Syria’s Deir ez-Zor province, ISIL collected $1.8 million in taxes during a 12-month period from personal wealth, wheat, camels, and fruit.

As standalone revenue sources, the numbers are not significant, but when combined and added to ISIL’s lucrative oil-smuggling efforts, its extortion and kidnapping rackets, and its sale of stolen antiquities, the organization’s financial resources are enough to support the basic administrative structures of a state-like entity.

According to seized ISIL documents, a sample of monthly revenue streams from Deir ez-Zor, for example, showed that ISIL’s income consisted primarily of:

• confiscations of homes and goods from people who have fled, died, or been imprisoned (44.7%)
• oil and gas (27.7%)
• taxes (23.7%)
• electricity sales (3.9%)

Although in no way comprehensive, these documents illustrate the relatively diversified nature of ISIL’s various revenue sources. Although ISIL’s access to the international financial system is limited, it relies significantly on hawala networks to move money. These networks rely on the trust and connections among the transactional parties—a level of privacy that presents a significant obstacle for U.S. and allied financial-intelligence groups.

**ISIL’s Estimated Revenue for 2015, by Source ($ Millions)**

- Extortion, Taxes, Stolen Goods $600
- Pillaged Antiquities $100
- Sale of Oil and Oil Products $480
- Total $1,180

**ISIL Oil Sales in Syria: Price and Production Estimates, by Field, as of 11/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oilfield</th>
<th>Price per Barrel Post-liberation</th>
<th>Production [BPD]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Tanak</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11,000-12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Omar</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6,000-9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Jabseh</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2,500-3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Tabqa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,500-1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Kharata</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shoula</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>650-800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deiro</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>600-1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Taim</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>400-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Rashid</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200-300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ISIL’s Revenue Sources OIL PRODUCTION AND SALES**

Crude oil is second only to taxation and extortion as a source of income for ISIL. In Syria, ISIL took control of approximately 160 operational oil wells. In December 2015, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew estimated that ISIL was bringing in an estimated $40 million per month, or $480 million annually, in oil revenue. Nearly three-fourths of ISIL’s Syrian oil revenues come from Deir Ez-Zor province, where five oilfields account for approximately 60% of ISIL’s total oil output. According to Treasury, ISIL oilfield workers have developed innovative methods of gathering, processing, and selling oil. ISIL-controlled oil operations likely involve hundreds of skilled workers trained in financial management, accounting, engineering, and other technical skills. There is also a general workforce of about 1,600 people used to expedite construction, maintenance, and repairs of its facilities. This new information leads Treasury to believe that oilfield workers are salaried employees.
U.S. Official Estimate of ISIS Financing - III

Prior to ISIL control, oil production at Syrian’s main fields ran between 400,000 and 500,000 barrels per day. In October 2015, with ISIL at the helm, the estimated production dropped to an estimated 34,000–40,000 BPD. ISIL’s lack of technical expertise, coalition airstrikes, and the general chaos of war have caused significant production drops. However, the impetus to buy oil, and related hydrocarbon products, from ISIL persists. Recent estimates of ISIL sales suggest that oil is sold at the wellhead for between $20 and $45 per barrel, often allowing purchasers to obtain oil at below market price.

ISIL profits from selling oil to residents in the territories it controls and from the sale of crude directly to independent traders or middlemen, who sell it elsewhere, including to the Syrian government. These middlemen pay a tithe for the opportunity to buy oil without being taxed; otherwise, they are taxed per barrel.

ISIL is reportedly using natural gas plants in Syria to bottle propane, and is distributing these bottles to its fighters or the local population for free or at a discount as a means to win local support. According to Treasury, ISIL also sells natural gas to the Asad regime. The Syrian government is struggling to mitigate persistent gas shortages, and ISIL does not have enough consumers in its territory. Selling its gas to the Asad regime allows ISIL to operate its plants and produce propane, while the Syrian government fulfills some of its needs. Treasury reported that this arrangement probably deters military attacks against ISIL in areas that would otherwise disrupt this supply.

ISIL PILLAGING OF HERITAGE SITES

ISIL pillages heritage sites to enforce its ideology and to extract saleable archaeological and ethnological material which it markets as art, antiquities, and collectibles. U.S.-government data shows that the percentage of declared antiquities from the Syria and Iraq imported into the United States increased about 23% from 2010 to 2014, suggesting previously unavailable items from Iraq and Syria have begun to appear on the market. Declared U.S. imports of such items from Iraq alone rose 412% over the same time period.

Although it is impossible to determine the true provenance of these items, the sudden increase in items available coincides with the increased instability and armed conflict in Iraq and Syria. ISIL organizes and monetizes this criminal enterprise through a variety of means. Among them, ISIL mandates that looters first obtain licenses, for which they must pay a fee; taxes sales of such goods at 20%–50% of the sale price; confiscates goods from unauthorized looters and resells them directly; and profits from the sale of items, such as metal detectors, that make the exploitation of these sites easier for all involved.

The small size of many of the objects makes them difficult for customs officials to detect. According to the International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime in Ankara, Turkish officials have seized 6,800 items (mostly coins) of dubious provenance since 2011, but many others have likely slipped through and now reside in private collections.

ISIL’S OTHER SOURCES OF REVENUE

ISIL also earns money in a number of other ways, including:

- Donations. ISIL received an estimated $40 million from wealthy donors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait in 2013 and 2014 alone.

Agricultural products. ISIL has taken control of as much as $200 million in wheat from Iraqi silos alone. It also controls significant swaths of fertile farmland spanning across the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys, which have historically produced half of Syria’s annual wheat crop, about a third of Iraq’s annual wheat crop, and almost 40% of Iraq’s barley.
U.S. Official Estimate of ISIS Financing - III

- Kidnapping and Ransoms. In 2014, Treasury estimated that ISIL took in about $20 million in ransom payments. Other estimates for this activity are around $6 million a day. But ISIL’s demands are often unrealistic and go unmet, leading to unfortunate consequences for the hostages. Recent examples include ISIL demanding: $100,000,000 for the release of journalist James Foley, who was beheaded when payment was not forthcoming, and demanding $200,000,000 from the Government of Japan for hostage Haruna Yukawa, who was also beheaded when no payment was made. Sometimes, though, the tactic yields payment. For example, the family of a Syrian Christian held for 5 months with dozens of other ISIL captives eventually paid $80,000 for his release.

- Sales of stolen consumer products. ISIL members also loot the homes and businesses of those who have fled or perished during its reign of terror.

- Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). FTFs contribute to financing ISIL operations, largely by transporting hard currency on their person as they make their way to ISIL-controlled lands. More significantly, foreign supporters of ISIL who may not travel to Iraq or Syria also help fund ISIL. For example, according to the UN Security Council, relatives of an Australian FTF who was fighting in Syria sent him more than $15 million via a money-transfer business that his relatives controlled.
Financial Times Map of ISIS Oil Trade, February 2016

Foreign Volunteers

(No reliable estimates exist, and most are dated and only include ISIS. U.S. estimates as of September 2015 put total for ISIS at a nominal 30,000)
U.S. Official Estimate Foreign Fighters - 1

FTFs continue to reach ISIL-controlled territory, although it remains impossible to accurately assess their number, origins, affiliations, or identities. These FTFs continue to travel undetected through the relatively small portion of the Turkey-Syria border still controlled by ISIL (about 98 km). Ongoing diplomatic efforts seek to work with Turkey to increase security of that border, and the U.S.-led coalition is active on a variety of fronts to prevent, detect, and deter such individuals from joining ISIL. Along with interagency colleagues this quarter, DoS has signed two agreements to share information on known or suspected terrorists. DoS also worked with DHS this quarter to improve visa screening by implementing enhanced questionnaires on persons applying for visa-free travel through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program. The additional questions are intended to help U.S. security agencies in screening potential FTFs who may seek to exploit the Visa Waiver Program.

FTF Origins and Force Strength

As reported in Lead IG’s September 2015 OIR report, the House Committee on Homeland Security estimated that approximately 25,000 FTFs had traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIL, as of last September (about 5,000 of them Tunisian nationals). A somewhat more recent report, published in December by the New York-based consultancy The Soufan Group draws on data compiled by the UN and other sources to place the number of FTFs slightly higher, at between 27,000 and 31,000. The Soufan Group noted that the profile of the approximately 150 U.S. citizens who have successfully traveled to Iraq and Syria is diverse, with no predominant geographical region or ethnicity.

The Soufan Group also concluded the following:

• FTFs from Russia and Central Asia have increased an estimated 300% since June 2014.
• Regionally, Saudi Arabia (2,500), Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000) are estimated to have produced the most FTFs.
• Personal-recruitment pitches made by ISIL members or sympathizers are often just as compelling as social-media appeals, especially in extremist hotbeds, such as the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and Arab-immigrant enclaves in France and Belgium. The French government estimated that, as of October, 1,700 FTFs had traveled from France to fight for ISIL.
• The western Balkans are increasingly serving as a transit hub for FTFs seeking to join ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In November, the New America Foundation released a report on 474 FTFs from 25 Western countries (defined as select countries in Europe and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand). Of the 474 FTFs included in the study, 83 were U.S. citizens.

Closing the Land Route From Turkey

According to DoS, the Government of Turkey has made noteworthy progress in implementing a “no entry list” and turning back or detaining suspected FTFs. The Turkish government detained 5,900 individuals attempting to cross the Syrian border illegally in the last quarter, and continues to institute its $100 million program to enhance physical security measures along the border. It also plays a key role in U.S. diplomatic efforts by co-chairing the working group to counter the flow of FTFs. DoS continues to work with Turkey as well as other partners in Europe, in the region, and globally, to address foreign fighters through greater information sharing and improved border security.

With respect to closing the roughly 98-kilometer segment of the Turkey-Syria border that remains largely under ISIL control, Special Presidential Envoy McGurk described the continuing diplomatic engagement. He stated that “We have seen the Turks take some significant steps in terms of setting up defensive perimeters, more patrols. Much harder for ISIL to get resources into this very critical area.” In early December, President Obama stated that he has had “repeated conversations with [Turkish] President [Tayyip] Erdogan about the need to close the border between Turkey and Syria.” President Obama noted that, despite “serious progress on that front . . . there are still some gaps.” ISIL continues to exploit this 98-kilometer stretch as a transit point for FTFs and for fuel sales.

President Obama also noted the danger posed by FTFs returning from the fight, and stressed, “If you’ve got foreign fighters coming in that are getting not only ideologically hardened but battle-hardened and then they’re returning to their home countries, they are likely candidates for engaging in the kind of terrorist attacks that [took place in Paris].” In an October press briefing, CJTF-OIR’s spokesman cited several reasons why this gap is difficult to close, including the fortified nature of ISIL’s fixed defenses, the rough terrain, and the overall nature of the fight, that he characterized as trench warfare, “reminiscent of . . . early 20th century warfare.”

Recent Military Gains in Northern Syria

This quarter, U.S. airstrikes supported several successful ground operations by anti-ISIL Syrian forces in the northern part of the country. The following tactical gains eliminated ISIL’s presence from several key towns that were frequented by FTFs as they made their way into ISIL’s heartland, including:

• situated just west of the Iraqi border, al-Hawl, constraining ISIL’s ability to reinforce its fighters
• in northwest Syria, defensive operations conducted to prevent ISIL from reaching the border town of Bab al-Salam
• Tel Abyad, severing ISIL’s sole remaining supply line between Turkey and Raqqah

All of these battles adversely affected potential FTFs’ ability to reach core ISIL territories, but it is impossible to quantify these effects or measure their broader strategic impact. The fight appears likely to grow only more complex. With Ankara opposing the movement of Syrian-Kurdish YPG units west of the Euphrates River, Syrian Arab opposition units—and not Kurdish ones—will be necessary to carry the fight south toward Raqqah, the two primary components of the SDF will face major challenges in the months ahead.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html

TOTAL: 21,632

Note: Figures of fighters from Western Europe are from the ISCR high estimate category. All other numbers are from the Soufan Group. Per-country fighter estimates determined from a date range of December 2013 to the second half of 2014.

Since Oct. 2014 ICSR report:
Country from which citizens or residents have reportedly gone to fight.

Total fighters
Additional fighters

Small numbers of fighters are also reported to have come from Bangladesh, Chile, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore and Trinidad and Tobago. These countries are not shown because they are off the map.
Guesstimate of Fighter’s Origin

Origin of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

KEY
Number of foreign fighters*
3,000 1,500 500 100

Source: ICSR
*Upper estimates used

Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

NYT Estimate of Foreign Fighters: 5/2015

North Africa and Middle East

The largest share of foreign fighters counted in the study came from Tunisia, a country with one of the more stable post-Arab Spring governments. Saudi Arabia’s share is also large, but recent government crackdowns have stanch the flow of fighters.

Former Soviet States

Decades of officially sanctioned religious persecution, ethnic conflicts and Islamic radicalization are key reasons for the flow of fighters from post-Soviet states, according to Peter Neumann, director of the I.C.S.R. Many fighters have combat experience from decades of war in the Caucasus.

Western Europe

The war in Syria has drawn young Europeans, many of whom have used cheap flights to Turkey as a route to Syria. Mr. Neumann noted that some small European countries like Belgium produce a remarkable number of fighters in relation to their population.

Other regions

American law enforcement officials have focused not only on monitoring social media networks more aggressively, but also on educating state and local authorities about ways to identify potential travelers.

Source: Country of origin data from Peter Neumann, King’s College London; the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence

LOW END OF ESTIMATE RANGE

MENA: 7,500-10,000  FSU: 1,300-2,000
W. Europe: 2,260-2,460  Other: 1,730
Total: 12,790 – 16,190

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2,400–5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Iraqi Kurdistan</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>100–130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>50–100</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>50–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).

Note: According to jihadist ideologues, 90% of its fighters in Iraq are Iraqi and 70% of its fighters in Syria are Syrian.[19]

Wikipedia Estimate of Groups affiliated to ISIS/ISIL: 9/2015

- **Algeria:** Wilayat Algeria formed from Jund al-Khilafah after it pledged allegiance to ISIL. Wilayat Barqa formed from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth
- **Libya:** Some militants formerly associated with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya also pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Egypt:** Wilayat Sinai formed from the majority of the membership of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis
- **Yemen:** Wilayat Sanaa formed from a faction of Ansar al-Sharia who pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Pakistan and Afghanistan:** Wilayat Khorasan formed from the allegiance of militants from groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Jundallah, Tehreek-e-Khilafat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and dissident commanders formerly associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
- **Northeastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon:** Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya formed from Boko Haram pledging allegiance to ISIL.
- **Chechnya and Dagestan:** Wilayat Qawqaz formed from dissident militants of the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya and Dagestan who switched their allegiance to ISIL.
- **Palestinian:** Militants of the group Army of the Islamic State (Palestinian Territories) pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Philippines, Malaysia:** Militants of the group Abu Sayyaf pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Unidentified militants in Saudi Arabia – designated as provinces of ISIL.
- **Jordan:** Militants of the group Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad (Jordan) pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Lebanon:** Militants of the group Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Maldives:** The group Islamic State of the Maldives pledged allegiance to ISIL in July 2014.

Uncertain Foreign Fighter Numbers: 2014 to 2015 - I

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as Turkey. Tunisia has the greatest number of departing foreign fighters of any country in the world.

MEMBER STATES, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

- Bahrain
- United Arab Emirates
- Qatar
- Afghanistan
- Somalia
- Kuwait
- Albania
- Sudan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Yemen
- Malaysia
- Indonesia
- Maldives
- Algeria
- Kazakhstan
- Turkmenistan
- Tajikistan
- Uzbekistan
- Pakistan
- Libya
- Egypt
- Lebanon
- Turkey
- Morocco
- Jordan
- Saudi Arabia
- Tunisia

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.
Among countries where Muslims are not in the majority, Russia and Western Europe have the highest numbers of fighters known to have travelled to Iraq and Syria.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.

NOTE: Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country, to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.

REST OF THE WORLD

- Conservative estimate, ICSR, as of mid-2014
- High-end estimate, ICSR, as of mid-2014
- Highest reported estimate, alternative sources, through October 2015
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013 to 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from the Middle East and North Africa. Western countries include Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.

- Highest reported estimate, alternative sources, through October 2015
- High-end estimate, ICSR, as of mid-2014
- Conservative estimate, ICSR, as of mid-2014

The total number of foreign fighters believed to have joined armed groups in Iraq and Syria more than doubled from December 2013 to October 2015. Figures are cumulative totals. Numbers are estimates only based on IEP calculations from a variety of sources.

Continuing Flow of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria:
June 2014 to December 2015

The estimated number of foreign fighters who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other extremist groups has increased to at least 27,000 from 12,000 in the past 18 months, according to a report by The Soufan Group, a private geopolitical risk assessment company. The most foreign fighters come from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Russia, according to the analysis.

Sources: The Soufan Group

Note: Data showing the estimated number of fighters for some countries in 2014 did not change or was unavailable.

Refugee, IDP, and Humanitarian Impact
As of 17 December 2015

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is managed by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), receives voluntary contributions year-round from United Nations Member States and Observers, regional governments, private sector, foundations and individuals.

956,456 arrivals (refugees & migrants) in Europe via the Mediterranean in 2015

801,919 in Greece
3,845 in Spain
150,317 in Italy
106 in Malta
3,695 deaths in the Mediterranean in 2015 (as of 16 December 2015)

Syria Crisis

Fighting continues across Syria taking a heavy toll on civilians and increasing displacement and humanitarian needs. As of 30 November, over 1.5 million people have been internally displaced in 2015 alone, many of them having been displaced multiple times, while hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring countries and beyond. Humanitarian access remains limited to the estimated 4.8 million people in hard to reach and besieged areas.

Key figures (inside Syria)

13.5 M people in need
6.5 M IDPs
4.6 M in hard to reach and besieged areas

Migration to Europe by sea

With few opportunities to enter Europe by regular means, thousands of people are taking to dangerous sea routes as they flee conflict, poverty and persecution.

Nearly 60 million people are displaced around the world because of conflict and persecution, the largest number ever recorded by the United Nations. About 14 million of those fled in 2014.
Massive Impact of Syria and Iraq Conflicts

By June 2015, the number of refugees in Syria alone had risen to 3.98 million, and the number of IDPs was 7.6 to 7.8 million = 11.6 to 11.8 million out of a population of 18 million.
In 2014, just 126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries, the lowest number for 31 years.

Conflict Dynamics in Syria
Population Density in Syria

Population Density in the Greater Levantine
The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Levant

Syria: Religious and Ethnic Groups: March 2011


This map shows only the main areas of settlement of religious and sectarian groups. The Syrian population is very heterogeneous in terms of religious and sectarian affiliation, especially in urban centers.
Syria: Topography and Regional Divisions

Syria: Physiography
Damascus: Satellite Image

Multiple Wars in Syria

Interactive Conflicts and Tensions:
Conflict in Iraq, US and Arab Gulf vs. Iran, Kurds vs. Turkey, US vs. Russia, Refugee crisis in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq; Hezbollah vs. Other factions in Lebanon, Syrian Border with Israel

Key Elements of Syria’s Four Main Fighting Factions

1. **ISIS:**
Claim 200,000. Probably 44,000-60,000 core fighters with some 30,000 volunteers. Mostly captured Syrian and Iraqi weapons supplied by U.S. and Russia. Some armor, modern ATGMs and Manpads.

2. **Assad and Allied Forces:**
Remnants of Syrian armed forces – Cut from 300,000 in Army to some 125,000-176,000, major active land and air weapons strength unclear but may retain up to 3,000 tanks, 2,500 field artillery pieces, 500 MLRS, 1,000 mortars and some 2,000 ground fire-capable anti-aircraft guns. Active fixed wing air strength may be down to 200-215, rotary wing unknown, but more than 30 attack helicopters. 

**Russian fighters,** attack helicopters, SAMs (SA-22, MRLs (??), and advisors at forward combat unit level.

Also **Alawite Militias, National Defense Forces** paramilitary units with 30,000-60,000 partly trained fighters; at least 6 military groups; **Hezbollah forces; 6,000-7,000 Iranian “volunteers and IRGC forces.**

3. **Kurdish Forces:**
Include **Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)** (claim 65,000), Jabhat al-Akrad (7,000) Kurdistan Workers’ Party: and Islamist elements. No reliable estimates, but some 20,000-35,000 possible. Largely U.S. supplied arms and small arms. Some Special Forces trainers.

4. **Rebel and Independent Forces:**
Many small armed groups, increasingly Islamist and non-secular. 25,000-35,000 full and part time fighters. No central command and differ by area. Main groups are:

**Aleppo Province:** more moderate Fatah Halab Operations Room excludes hard-line groups. Ansar al-Shariah Operations Room, formed as a response to Fatah Halab, works with Al Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

**Central Syria around Idlib, Latakia and Hama:** largest group is **Army of Conquest** or Jaish al-Fatah, an alliance of Islamist factions, including the Nusra Front which is an Al Qaeda’s affiliate/ Ahrar al-Sham is another large group. Also are more moderate rebel factions, some of which have received covert arms support from CIA, Arab Gulf states, others.

**Damascus region:** Army of Islam, a group with financial backing from Saudi Arabia, has declared war on Russia. It is one of several armed groups that form the East Gouta Council.

**Southeast:** Southern Front coalition of small armed groups like the New Syrian Force that have U.S. aid and support a secular government.

Key Factional Fighting in 2015

**Russia** has bases and advisers in several government-controlled locations. It has mainly targeted rebels in areas where the government had been losing ground.

Rebels in areas targeted by Russian airstrikes have used antitank missiles made in the **United States**.

Iran’s **Revolutionary Guards Corps** and **Hezbollah** have been advising and shoring up pro-Assad forces since 2012.

Most rebel groups supported by the **United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey** are in western Syria.

Sources: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas and Hezbollah incidents); Institute for the Study of War (Russian ground positions); Carter Center (rebel front lines)

# Belligerents in Syria: Late November 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belligerents</th>
<th>Units involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aerial combat</strong></td>
<td><strong>Military of ISIL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Russia | Falcons of Mount Zawiya Brigade[8]
| Syria | Tajammu al-izzah[39]
| **Ground forces** | 13th Division[40] |
| Syria | al-Nusra Front[12] |
| Hezbollah | al-Nusra Front[12] |
| Iran |  Ahrar ash-Sham[12] |
| **Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant** | Jaysh al-islam[41] |
| Iraq | Ajnad al-Sham[49] |
| **Islamic Army of Conquest** | **Russian Armed Forces:** |
| | Russian Aerospace Forces[12] |
| | Russian Navy[29] |
| | Black Sea Fleet |
| | Caspian Flotilla[20] |
| | Main Intel. Directorate of the Gen. Staff of the Armed F. of the RF |
| | o.g. Spetznaz |
| | **Syrian Armed Forces:** |
| | Syrian Army[12] |
| | Syrian Air Force[91] |
| | National Defence Forces[32] |
| | **Iranian Armed Forces:** |
| | IRGC |
| | Quds Force |
| | IRGC Ground Forces |
| | Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) [33][34] |
| | **Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias** |
| | IRGC |
| | IRGC Ground Forces |
| | Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) [33][34] |

**Strength**

- **Russia:**
  - 4,000 personnel[43]
  - **Naval ships**
    - 3 Buyan-M class corvettes[44]
    - 1 Gepard-class frigate[44]
    - 1 Vahnya-class intelligence ship
    - 1 Improved Kilo-class submarine[45]
    - 1 Slava-class cruise[46]
  - **Strategic bombers**
    - 14 Tu-22M[47]
    - 6 Tu-95MSM[47]
    - 5 Tu-160[47]
  - **Tactical bombers**
    - 12 Su-24M2[48]
    - 6 Su-34[48]
  - **Attack bombers**
    - 12 Su-25SM[43]
  - **Fighter aircraft**
    - 4 Su-30SM[52]
  - **Reconnaissance aircraft**
    - Il-20M1
  - **Attack helicopter**
    - 12 Mi-24P[51]
  - **Utility helicopter**
    - 4 Mi-8MTV-5
  - **Ground equipment**
    - 3 SA-22 SAM[52]
  - **Other anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons**, including S-400[54]
- **Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant:**
  - From 30,000 to 100,000 fighters
  - (disputed)[51]
  - **Islamic Front:**
    - 40,000[52]
    - 70,000[53]
- **al-Nusra Front:**
  - 10,000[54]
  - Ahrar ash-Sham:
    - 10,000–20,000[56]
  - **Free Syrian Army:**
    - Between 45,000 and 60,000 fighters

**Source:**
The Complex Mix of Belligerents in Syria: Early January 2016 - I

### Syrian government and allies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Involved since</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Armed Forces</td>
<td>Bashar al-Assad</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>Approximately 178,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Syrian Resistance</td>
<td>Miqra' Ural</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Pro-government Marxist militia.</td>
<td>Socialism; Marxism-Leninism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba'ath Brigades</td>
<td>Bashar al-Assad</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,000[110]</td>
<td>Pro-government counter-insurgency militia.</td>
<td>Ba'athism; Secularism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Nationalist Guard</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,000[118]</td>
<td>Pan-Arabic group from various Arab Countries.</td>
<td>Secularism; Pan-Arabism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Shia Militias:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Involved since</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Hassan Nasrallah</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,000[109]</td>
<td>Militant group based in Lebanon.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas</td>
<td>Abu Ajeed</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>10,000[112]</td>
<td>Shia Syrian militant group formed due to desecration of shrines, heritage sites and place of worship by the rebels. It is Active around Damascus.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq</td>
<td>Akram al-Kaabi</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>An offshoot of Iraqi Shia insurgent group. It is active around Aleppo.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kata'ib Hezbollah</td>
<td>Ketab al-Hasba</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>An Iraqi Shia militia.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badr Organization</td>
<td>Arshad bin al-Hasra</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>An Iraqi Shia militia.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>An Iraqi Shia militia.</td>
<td>Shia Islamism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Syrian opposition and allies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Involved since</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Militias:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union</td>
<td>Muhammad Abu al-Fatih</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>15,000[102]</td>
<td>Merges of Damascus area rebel groups[102]</td>
<td>Sunni Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sham Legion</td>
<td>Mondher Saras</td>
<td>10 March 2014</td>
<td>170,000[72]</td>
<td>Alliance of 19 different groups[103]</td>
<td>Islamic democracy[72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity and Development Front</td>
<td>Khali al-Hammad</td>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>13,000[114]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sunni Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Mujahdeen</td>
<td>Khalid al-Hammad</td>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>&lt;5,000[104]</td>
<td>Coalition of Aleppo area Muslim rebel groups formed to fight ISIS.</td>
<td>Sunni Islamism[107]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Al-Qaeda network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Involved since</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nusra Front</td>
<td>Abu Mohammad al-Golani</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>7,000[106]-15,000[202]</td>
<td>Designated by the US as a terrorist group. Pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda.</td>
<td>Salafist jihadiism; Islamic fundamentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabhat Ansar al-Din</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 July 2014[117]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance of independent jihadi groups[117][201]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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### Syrian opposition and allies

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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Army of Mujahedeen</td>
<td></td>
<td>January 2014[195]</td>
<td>=5,000[196]</td>
<td>Coalition of Aleppo area Islamist rebels formed to fight ISIL.</td>
<td>Sunni Islamism[197]</td>
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</table>

The Complex Mix of Combat Forces in Syria: Early January 2016

Source: Wikipedia[1][2]


New U.S. Strategy in Syria

• Shift away from Iraq first strategy, which is “tactically stalemated,” to more active role in Syria.

• Step up air strikes in support of moderate forces.

• Downplay or abandon major formal training efforts (5,000 a year, 15,000 total) of New Syrian Army/Syrian Arab Coalition forces by U.S. military advisors.

• Focus on CIA and forward Special Forces efforts to support Kurdish and Arab Sunni forces. Provide more ammo. Light weapons.

• Work with Arab Gulf states, Turkey, Jordan to support other more moderate rebel forces. Help expedite flow of ammo and weapons.

• In the north, work with Syrian Kurds (20,000-25,000) and U.S. CIA-Special Forces-Qatar-Saudi trained Arab volunteers (3,000-5,000) to move on ISIS and advance toward Raqqa. Provide them with far more air support.

• In south, use rebels trained in Jordan to funnel more ammo and weapons, support advances on ISIS.

• Role of existing three U.S.-backed factions of Free Syrian Army -- Liwa Suqour al-Jabal rebel and others -- in area now under Russian air attack unclear.

Source:
Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2014

Rebel groups held areas throughout Syria, while the Islamic State controlled territory mostly in the northwest.

Syria: Control of Territory: January 2014

Syria: Major Clashes: January 2014 - January 2015

Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2014 to 10/2015

Rebel groups held areas throughout Syria, while the Islamic State controlled territory mostly in the northwest.

The Islamic State rapidly gained territory in 2014, establishing governance in Raqqa and controlling the Euphrates River to Iraq.

Kurdish groups pushed the Islamic State out of some northern regions. Rebel forces gained control of some areas in Idlib province.

Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2015

The Islamic State rapidly gained territory in 2014, establishing governance in Raqqa and controlling the Euphrates River to Iraq.

This detailed Syria map shows what territory ISIS is truly fighting for, Business Insider, June 30, 2015:
http://www.businessinsider.com/map-of-syria-shows-what-isis-is-truly-fighting-for-2015-6#ixzz3kOBnu5GO
Zones of Control in Syria

ISW Estimate

September 2, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/ISW/14fd9c79b69ce51
Zones of Control in Syria

UCA Estimate

September 2, 2015

Source: Institute for United Conflict Analysis
s://pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/2000px-syria15.png
Local Force Postures in Syria:

NYT Map 1/10/2015

Russia has bases and advisers in several government-controlled locations. It has mainly targeted rebels in areas where the government had been losing ground.

Rebels in areas targeted by Russian airstrikes have used antitank missiles made in the United States.

Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah have been advising and shoring up pro-Assad forces since 2012.

Most rebel groups supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are in western Syria.

Local Force Postures in Syria:

Reuters Map 4/10/2015

Areas of Control in Western Syria:

New York Times Map 5/10/2015

Source:

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas as of Oct. 5)
By The New York Times
Broader View of Zones of Control in Syria 10.15

Rebel groups made major gains in this area this year.

The government lost Palmyra to ISIS in May.

Wikipedia Estimate of Location of Combat Forces in Syria

As of January 24, 2016

Military Situation on the Turkish Border: ISW Estimate
September 14, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
Control of Turkish–Syrian border: October 9. 2015

Turkey - Syria border crossings

Border status on 9 October 2015:  
- Open
- Restricted
- Closed

Groups controlling Syrian side:
- Syrian government
- Free Syrian Army (FSA)
- Islamic Front
- al-Nusra Front
- Kurdish YPG militia
- Islamic State

Source: Ocha

Ground Gains in Syria: 9/21 to 10.27.2015

1. Aleppo

Government forces have made gains south and east of the city, as they build strategic depth around their Al-Safira stronghold and push closer to Rasin al-Aboud, an important air base that ISIS has surrounded for more than a year. Employing an often-used strategy, ISIS launched a counterattack in the north to draw government fighters away from the air base and gained some territory in the process.

2. Key Supply Routes

ISIS has gained control of a long stretch of road north of Ithriya. The road remains highly contested because it is the only overland route for supplying government fighters around Aleppo.

3. Between Idlib and Hama

Rebel and government forces continue to fight for territory along the front lines between Idlib and Hama. Small areas changed hands in October, but the government has yet to make significant advances.
Locations of Counter ISIL Activity in Northeast Syria

Source: Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly report to Congress, January 2016, pp. 29
Kurdish Expansion in Syria

Kobani has been the focal point of the U.S.-Kurdish battle with ISIS. American airstrikes have hit more than 1,000 targets there, almost half of all their strikes in Syria, helping the Kurds push back ISIS in the north.
Amnesty International visited 14 towns and villages in the Kurdish controlled areas of northern Syria. In ten of these villages, they found the local population had either had their homes demolished or faced either forced displacement as a group or targeted displacement.

**Abuse:**
- **Red Circle:** Village demolished
- **Blue Circle:** Forced displacement
- **Yellow Circle:** Targeted displacement

Buffer Zone Guesstimate

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, Hurriyet Daily News

THE WASHINGTON POST
BBC/ISW Estimate of Zones of Control: 2.2016

Source: ISW

The Campaign for Latakia Province:
September 30, 2015 - February 5, 2016

NYT Estimate of Growing Intensity of War: February 2016

The Nusra Front is embedded in rebel-controlled areas. It recently became more active in parts of Aleppo as rebels welcomed their help against the government.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group that is allied with Iran, fights alongside Syrian government forces and other Iranian-backed militias. Although its initial priority was to protect supply routes to Lebanon, Hezbollah has increased its presence near the Aleppo and Latakia fronts.

Russian airstrike have been key to the Syrian government’s rapid advances in both Aleppo and Latakia as it has bombarded insurgent areas primarily in the northwestern provinces. In one week, Russia conducted hundreds of airstrikes around the country.

Source: IHS Conflict Monitor. Nusra Front and Hezbollah presence data are based on reports of activity attributed to those groups.
Air War in Syria January 19-February 2, 2016

UK, Russian and US-led strikes in Syria

US-led coalition air strikes

UK
- 19 Jan - 2 Feb 2016
- 3 Dec 2015 - 18 Jan 2016

Other coalition forces
- 28 Jan - 3 Feb 2016
- 30 Sep 2015 - 27 Jan 2016

Russian air & cruise missile strikes
- 26 Jan - 1 Feb 2016
- 30 Sep 2015 - 25 Jan 2016

The Campaign for Aleppo:
September 30, 2015 - February 5, 2016

ISW,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/152b232cf353b332.
ISW Estimate of Situation Around Aleppo February 13, 2016

Estimate of Situation Around Aleppo February 1, 2016

The rebels (in green) are clearly losing ground to the government (in tan). ISIS (in black) is also losing territory, while the Kurds (in yellow) are taking advantage of real weakness to seize some of their nearby territory:

Miladvisor, Mahmoud Ayad
Estimate of Situation Around Aleppo
February 15, 2016

The rebels (in green) are clearly losing ground to the government (in tan). ISIS (in black) is also losing territory, while the Kurds (in yellow) are taking advantage of real weakness to seize some of their nearby territory:


Heavy Russian airstrikes have helped Syrian government forces and Iran-backed militias seize strategic territory from rebel groups in Aleppo and areas north of the city this month. In Latakia province, government forces, again backed by Russian airstrikes, are advancing closer to the city of Jisr al-Shoughour.
Horowitz and the Levantine Group Estimate of Assad Regime Gains and Offensives


Air Strikes and the Growing Russian Role in Syria
The Russian Build Up: 10/2015 - I

• Expanding Russian port facilities in naval base at Tartus and expanding an airfield south of Latakia into an air base.
• New construction at the Assad International Airport in Latakia, and soon after, satellite imagery confirmed the presence of Russian T-90 tanks, artillery and large transport aircraft at the airfield.
• Deployed 4 Su-30SM fighters, 12 Su-24M2 strike fighters, 6 Su-34 modern strike fighters, 12 Su-25 close support fighters, and Pchela-1T UAVs.
• Deployed 14 helicopters — Mi-24 Hind gunships and Mi-17 Hip transport helicopters
• Start air strikes on 30.9.15.
• Providing R-166-0.5 (ultra) high-frequency signals (HF/VHF) vehicles with jam-resistant voice and data communications which have been seen driving through Syria
• An unknown number of new artillery weapons, reportedly 152mm systems.
• Deploying six or more T-90 main battle tanks, 35 or more new BTR-82A/B wheeled AFVs with 30mm cannon turrets, and an unknown number of Russian Humvee equivalent
• Deploying prefabricated housing for up to 2,000.
• Deploying at least two unit sets of SA-22 land-based air defense systems.
• Possibly deploying 200 marines and housing for as many as 1,500 personnel at the airfield near the Assad family’s ancestral home.
The Russian Build Up: 10/2015 - II

**Russian sea and air assets move into Syria**

The Russian Defense Ministry last month announced the deployment of ships from its Black Sea Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to carry out military drills. Included were:

1. **Cruiser** (Moskva)

2. **Destroyer** (Smetlivy)

3. **2 Frigates** (Pytlivy and Ladny)

Russia has deployed a variety of military aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia, including:

- **4 Su-34** Fullback fighter-bombers
- **12 Su-24** Fencer attack aircraft
- **12 Su-25** Frogfoot close-air-support aircraft

Other aircraft at the airport in Latakia:

- **4 Su-30** Flanker multi-role fighters
- **12+ Mi-24** Hind attack helicopters

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Pentagon

Russian Facilities in Syria: 9/2015

Russian Posture in Syria: September 27, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1501e617821e292d?projector=1
Comparative Russian and U.S. Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 10/4/15

**Russian airstrikes, Sept. 30 to Oct. 4**
Russia has mostly attacked rebels fighting the government, not ISIS. Targets include some American-backed rebel groups and groups which the United States considers terrorist organizations.

**U.S. airstrikes, Sept. 25 to Oct. 4**
The United States has focused on ISIS and on supporting Kurdish forces. But Americans have also hit some targets that could benefit the Syrian government, like in Palmyra and Deir al-Zour.

Comparative Russian and U.S. Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 10/16/15

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US military. Locations may have multiple strikes

Air Strikes on ISIS Oil Fields: 12.11.15
Russian Air Attacks in Syria - II

NYT Map 2/10/2015

## High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

**Russian and Coalition airstrike locations in Syria**

**September 30–October 12, 2015**

**Airstrikes:** 🌟 Russian  🌐 Coalition

Note: Only high-confidence airstrikes shown. Most airstrike locations have been hit multiple times. Coalition aircraft also conducted numerous airstrikes in Iraq.


Source: Institute for the Study of War

Russia: Pro-Assad, Not Anti ISIS

NYT Map 1/10/2015

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1508afcc7372b349
Syria: Continued Russian Focus on other Rebel Forces: November 11-29, 2015

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=Map&qs=true&search=query&th=15163767, 3.12.15
Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes 3-20 December

Russian Air Strikes in Syria:

9/11/15-25/11/15


Note: U.S. air strikes are marked on the nearest identified town in the report. Russian air strike locations are from reports corroborated by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks. Markers does not represent strike frequency.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; U.S. Central Command.
Comparative Russian and U.S. Coalition Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 14/1/16

Russia has also uses Tu-22, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers and cruise missiles.

In early December, 2015, Russian Tu-160 Blackjack Bombers fly long range missions Around Europe to attack targets in Syria

Source: BBC, Telegraph

Russian Tsar’grad TV Estimate of Military Activity in Syria: 10/11/2015 to 30/10/15
Expanding Russian Air Action in Mid to late November 2015 – Wikipedia Estimate

On 17 November 2015, in the wake of the Russian jet crash over Sinai and the Paris attacks, according to the Russian defence minister's public report to the president of Russia Vladimir Putin, Russia employed the Russia-based Tu-160, Tu-95MSM, and Tu-22M3 long range strategic bombers firing air-launched cruise missiles to hit what he claimed were the IS targets in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor as well as targets in the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib.[144][145]

The Russian minister of defence said that, pursuant to Putin's orders, the Russian aviation grouping that at the time comprised more than 50 aircraft was intensifying their campaign.[146] Besides, Putin said he had issued orders for the Moskva cruiser that had been in eastern Mediterranean since the start of the Russian operations to "work as with an ally",[142][144][147] with the French naval group led by flagship Charles De Gaulle that had been on its way to eastern Mediterranean since early November.[148]

The following day, according to the Russian Defence ministry, strikes by long-range bombers firing cruise missiles in the same areas in Syria continued.[149][150] The mass cruise missile strikes carried out against ISIS in Deir Ezzor province on 20 November resulted in the death of more than 600 militants according to the ministry.[151]

A Russian Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft was shot down by a Turkish Air Force F-16 on 24 November 2015.[152][153] According to Turkey's claims presented to the UN Security council, two planes, whose nationalities were unknown to them at the time, violated Turkish airspace over the Yayladaği province up to 1.36 miles for 17 seconds.[154] The planes were given 10 warnings within the span of 5 minutes to change their course.

According to Turkey, the planes disregarded the warnings and were subsequently fired upon by Turkish F-16s patrolling the area. After the Turkish fire, one of the planes left Turkish airspace and the other crashed into Syrian territory.[154] The Russian Ministry of Defense denied that any of their planes had violated Turkey's airspace, claiming they had been flying south of the Yayladaği province.[155]

Russia also announced it would deploy additional air defense weapons in the area and accompany its bombers with fighter jets.[156] The incident followed over month-long tensions over alleged repeated violations of Turkish airspace by Russian military jets — over nine times in October,[157] one of which Russia admitted[158] — and Turkish declaration from 17 October that it will "with no hesitation" shoot down any airplanes violating its airspace.[159]

On 26 November 2015, deployment of S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems was reported by Russia's official news media,[54] to Latakia and on board the Russian cruiser Moskva.[160]

On 29 November 2015, Russian aircraft were reported to have struck targets in the Syrian Idlib province, including the town of Ariha that had been captured by the Army of Conquest 6 months prior, causing multiple casualties on the ground.[161][162] Other targets hit included the Turkistan Islamic Party's office in Jisr al-Shughur and a relief office of Ahrar ash-Sham group in the town of Saraqib.[163] Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_military_intervention_in_the_Syrian_Civil_War
Russian Strength in Syria in late November 2015 – Wikipedia Estimate

- **4,000 personnel**[^43]

- **Naval ships**
  - 3 Buyan-M class corvettes[^44]
  - 1 Gepard-class frigate[^44]
  - 1 Vishnya-class intelligence ship
  - 1 Improved Kilo-class submarine[^45]
  - 1 Slava-class cruiser[^46]

- **Strategic bombers**
  - 14 Tu-22M3[^47]
  - 6 Tu-95MSM[^47]
  - 5 Tu-160[^47]

- **Tactical bombers**
  - 12 Su-24M2
  - 6 Su-34[^48]

- **Attack bombers**
  - 12 Su-25SM[^49]

- **Fighter aircraft**
  - 4 Su-30SM[^50]

- **Reconnaissance aircraft**
  - Il-20M1

- **Attack helicopter**
  - 12 Mi-24[^51]

- **Utility helicopter**
  - 4 Mi-8MTV-5

- **Ground equipment**
  - 3 SA-22 SAM[^52]
  - Other anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons[^53], including S-400

- 3–4 dead (1–2 non-combat)[^66][^67]
  - 1 Su-24M2 shot down[^68]
  - 1 Mi-8 destroyed[^1]
Russian Strength in Syria in mid December 2015 – WINEPEstimate - I

• Russian Air Force has deployed over thirty sophisticated attack aircraft to launch strikes and support Syrian army ground offensives from Hmeimim, a west coast air base adjacent to Bassel al-Assad International Airport near Latakia.

• Key air-to-ground strike package consists of ten to twelve each of the Sukhoi Su-25SM and the Su-24M -- the former known for its close air support capacity and the latter for its precision bombing effects. These aircraft, while dated, are easier to repair, have proven reliable in air-to-ground combat, and fit the mission requirements for Syria.

• Four or so Su-30SMs add a significant air-to-air capability and bolster precision strikes. They have most likely been escorting bombers since Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 on November 24.

• Moscow appears to be testing performance more modern Su-34 fighter bombers, reportedly six total in Syria. The Su-34 is eventual replacement for Su-24; brought online in Russia over the past two years, it is seeing combat for the first time in Syria. It possesses both an air-to-air capability with a range of over thirty miles and a precision bombing capability with up to six KAB-500 smart bombs, similar to the American Paveway GBU-12 laser-guided bomb.

• The Il-20 electronic warfare/surveillance plane is in country, tasked with intelligence collection. Russian drones are reportedly there for the same purpose, like the one shot down over Turkey in October. In addition to these fixed-wing aircraft, an estimated twenty or more Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 command-and-control/transport helicopters have been deployed.

• While it is difficult to determine total personnel numbers with precision, the British-based Royal United Services Institute assessed in November that between 1,200 and 1,350 Russian Air Force personnel are currently in Syria supporting air operations, including pilots, navigators, maintainers, air traffic controllers, airfield managers, weather monitors, and intelligence officers. Adding the naval and land units directly involved in the Syria campaign would triple this figure to approximately 3,500.

• According to widely cited figures released by IHS Jane's in October, the entire war effort -- including maritime, ground, and air activities -- will cost Russia approximately $1 billion per year, excluding potential aircraft losses. Some estimates now triple that figure. Moreover, Moscow has deployed extra missile-defense assets since the Jane's report, including S-400 systems that require numerous additional vehicles and personnel.

• Compared to the Kremlin's overall 2015 defense budget, estimated at $50 billion (3.1 trillion rubles) by the Moscow Times, the cost of the Syrian adventure does not seem extraordinary. Yet that budget is already under considerable pressure; it was originally set at 3.3 trillion rubles until a recession hit and the ruble collapsed. The cut came at a time when Moscow was forecasting pay raises, greater modernization efforts to meet its 2020 rearmament objectives, and larger "snap" training exercises as a deterrent message. The 2016 defense budget does not look any stronger.

Source: WINEP, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=map%20&search=query&th=15198f3498df07d8&siml=15198f3498df07d8
Russian Strength in Syria in mid December 2015 – WINEP Estimate - II

- Several sources have reported that Moscow may deploy another fifty or more combat planes to Syria in the near future. Maintaining air operations for three dozen highly employed attack aircraft in an expeditionary environment is an extensive effort, and the burden will only increase as more aircraft arrive. According to a USA Today article citing U.S. Defense Department and Air Force officials, almost one-third of Russia's aircraft in Syria were grounded at any given time within weeks of commencing operations, whether due to local climate (which differs greatly from Russia's) or the lack of readily available parts. In comparison, USAF combat aircraft readiness rates hover above 80 percent on average.

- Recent activity at al-Shayrat Air Base, about twenty miles southeast of Homs, indicates that it is being populated by Russian equipment and fortified, and that its runway is being upgraded, possibly to support fixed-wing aircraft. Although some Russian forces are reportedly using Syrian bases at Hama and Tiyas for helicopter and ground support operations, having a second fixed-wing air base fully at their disposal would offer redundancy should Hmeimim encounter operational obstacles, and increase response time to targets of opportunity. Yet moving supplies from Tartus port and Latakia to al-Shayrat would mean passing closer to rebel elements and not far from territory controlled by the Islamic State, increasing the potential for interruptions.

- In terms of costs, adding a second base to increase combat runs could easily double the current price of Moscow's campaign. It could also mean increasing the number of Russian personnel to approximately six or seven thousand if Syrian or Iranian forces cannot adequately defend al-Shayrat and its supply route -- which is unlikely because they are already heavily engaged as the campaign's ground offensive component. Moreover, Russian personnel and aircraft will eventually require replacement, further bumping up the operational costs.

- As tensions continue to simmer between Russia and Turkey, the Kremlin is no doubt keenly aware that the naval route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea to resupply Latakia and Tartus is a logistics chokepoint. The straits through which Russian ships transit are governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, but there are differing interpretations regarding when and how Turkey could intervene to safeguard its national interests. Direct intervention would be quite provocative and dangerous, so Ankara would probably not attempt to stop Russian vessels. Yet delaying them could send a message, and hamper a steady sea resupply to Syria that involves dozens of commercial cargo and military landing ships every month. Such a delay would increase demand on the air bridge and other sea supply lanes.

- Meanwhile, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that approximately two dozen long-range bombers traveled thousands of miles to strike Syrian targets in mid-November and again this month. The Tu-22M Backfire was the most prevalent, but other bombers were also involved, including the Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack, each employing a mix of guided and nonguided munitions as well as cruise missiles. Additionally, the firing of twenty-six Kalibr-class cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea in October certainly captured the attention of regional stakeholders. And earlier this month, a Russian Rostov-on-Don-class submarine launched Kalibr missiles from the Mediterranean for the first time.

- These long-range strikes indicate that Russia has the ability to periodically alleviate the burden on its Syria-based aircraft and munitions depot if necessary. Munitions will be a determining expenditure, costing approximately $750,000 a day for Syria-based strikes alone. Yet the long-range option comes with its own costs: each 3M14E ship-launched cruise missile runs from $1.2 to $1.5 million, which likely makes it an occasional option only. Should Russia have to conduct extensive long-range attacks, the operational expense would increase exponentially.
Second Russian Air Base?

- Improve main runway and 3 Km back up runway?
- 45 aircraft shelters?
- 12 more Sukhoi Su-30SM or Su-27SM3
- Rise to 100-120 combat aircraft in country?
- S-21 and S-400 SAM defenses?
- More Mi-24 Hind? KA-52 and Mi-28 helicopters?
- 24 tube TOS-1 MRL on ground with thermobaric warhead?

Russia’s introduction of the S-400 Triumf weapons system in Syria near Latakia, confirmed by CJTF-OIR officials on December 2, poses additional risk to U.S. and coalition forces in the airspace over the battlefield in Syria. The S-400 is a mobile surface-to-air defense missile system with long-range strike capability of about 400 kilometers. See Figure 4 for key cities and airspace positions in full range of the missiles.

In December, CJTF-OIR reported that Russia’s SA-17 air-defense radar system is located in Aleppo, but its location was not influencing coalition airstrikes.

CJTF-OIR officials repeatedly denied that the deployment of these advanced systems had any effect on the U.S. air mission.

DoD reported that, over a 27-day span during December 5–31, the coalition conducted 172 airstrikes in Syria (6.37 per day). The month prior, during November 7–27, it conducted 185 strikes (8.01 per day).
Maximum S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage

Putin ordered S-400 missiles to Syria after Turkish F-16 aircraft shot down a Russian Su-24 on November 24, 2015.

Nominal Maximum range of 428 kilometers

Estimates of maximum real world range differ: 250 to 400 kilometers

High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces: September 30-October 30, 2015

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&g=map&gs=true&search=query&th=150c1d4650dc1ce8&siml=150c1d4650dc1ce8; 1.11.2015
Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes 30 September- 15 November

Source:
Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes

September 30 to December 2

Russia has also uses Tu-22, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers and cruise missiles.

In early December, 2015, Russian Tu-160 Blackjack Bombers fly long range missions around Europe to attack targets in Syria.

Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes
December 3 to February 23rd

UK, Russian and US-led strikes in Syria

US-led coalition air strikes
- **UK**: 3 Feb-23 Feb 2016, 3 Dec 2015-2 Feb 2016
- **Other coalition forces**: 4 Feb-23 Feb 2016, 30 Sept 2015-3 Feb 2016

Russian air & cruise missile strikes
- 26 Jan-16 Feb 2016
- 30 Sep 2015-25 Jan 2016

Source:
Air Campaign: Russian Strikes 3-12 December 2015

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=m ap&search=query&th=1519d5e23e23d399&siml=1519d5e23e23d399
Air Campaign: Russian Strikes 7-17 December 2015

High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official government statements reported through credible channels and documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible.

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Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=mmap&search=query&th=1519d5e23e23d399&siml=1519d5e23e23d399
Air Campaign: Russian Strikes 18-27 December 2015

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Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.

Source: ISW, http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/rendere?ca=c511c55f-b16b-4a0f-85ca-0ddf36cd8188&c=7d155a90-40d5-11e3-80e2-d4ae526edc76&ch=7e7a8fe0-40d5-11e3-81e2-d4ae526edc76
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Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/15211e137d31fcd5
Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/152704fd1e0b8f4
Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces:

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/152959ada b85bd13
Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces:

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/152a80a15ea2a1a9
Syria:
Russian air strikes
Still focus on other Rebel Forces:

Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes December 3 to February 23rd

Human Rights Watch documented that cluster munitions were used on at least 20 occasions since Syria and Russia began their joint offensive on September 30. Human Rights Watch collected detailed information about attacks in nine locations that have killed at least 35 civilians, including five women and 17 children, and injured dozens. Two attacks hit camps for the displaced. For the other attacks, Human Rights Watch obtained visual confirmation of the cluster munition used and a second source confirmed the attack. The cluster munitions used in Syria recently that Human Rights Watch was able to confirm were manufactured in the former Soviet Union or Russia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery method</th>
<th>Carrier type</th>
<th>Submunition type</th>
<th>Number of submunitions per carrier</th>
<th>Number of attacks documented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground-launched</td>
<td>9M27K/9M27K1 rocket (BM-27 Uragan)</td>
<td>9N210/9N235</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-launched</td>
<td>9M58K rocket (BM-30 Smerch)</td>
<td>9N235</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-launched</td>
<td>308 projectile</td>
<td>O-10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground-launched</td>
<td>9M79-series Toshka ballistic missile</td>
<td>9N24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb</td>
<td>AO-2.5 RT/RTM</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb</td>
<td>ShOAB-0.5</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb</td>
<td>SPBE</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Human Rights Watch Charges that Russia is Using Cluster Munitions - II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Visual confirmation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 4</td>
<td>Kafr Halab, Aleppo</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with SPBE submunitions</td>
<td>Photo: submunitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video: mid-air dispersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 7</td>
<td>Ma’asar, Idlib</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.5RT submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video: bomb and submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 7</td>
<td>Kafr Zita, Hama</td>
<td>9M55K rocket with 9N235 submunitions</td>
<td>Video: smoke trails or rocket launch and impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video: sound of impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo: rocket remnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9</td>
<td>Al-Naqeeb, Idlib</td>
<td>9M55K rocket with 9N235 submunitions</td>
<td>Photo: cargo section and submunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video: asmo, rocket remnants and submunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video: impact, camp and wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 13</td>
<td>Shatil az-Ziyarah</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.9RTM submunitions</td>
<td>Video: collected submunitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22</td>
<td>Hayyan, Aleppo</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with SPBE submunitions</td>
<td>Video: bomb and submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 24</td>
<td>Hayyan, Aleppo</td>
<td>RBK-500 with AO-2.9RT submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunitions and submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Photo: submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>Younsyah, Idlib</td>
<td>9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile</td>
<td>Photos on file with HRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 10</td>
<td>Kriddah, Idlib</td>
<td>9M27K-series rocket with 9N2016/9N235 submunitions</td>
<td>Photos on file with HRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 20</td>
<td>Al Bawabiyah, Aleppo</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with 9N216/9N235 submunitions</td>
<td>Photo: bomb and submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23</td>
<td>Al Lataminah, Hama</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.5RT submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 28</td>
<td>Al Lataminah, Hama</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with 9N2016/9N235 submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3</td>
<td>Al-Najeeb, Idlib</td>
<td>SMT6-series Tochka ballistic missile</td>
<td>Photo: missile remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>Douma, Damascus</td>
<td>309 cluster munition projectile with C-10 submunitions</td>
<td>Photo: unexploded remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14</td>
<td>Marej district, Aleppo city</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.5RT submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunition remnants</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 14</td>
<td>Ma’arat al-Nu’man, Idlib</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.5RT submunitions</td>
<td>Photo: bomb and submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 14</td>
<td>Douma, Damascus</td>
<td>RBK-500 bomb with AO-2.5RT submunitions</td>
<td>Video: submunition remnants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governance, Economic, and Humanitarian Impacts in Syria
Demographic Pressures on Syria

Syria Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>22,900,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth Rate (percent)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Annual Births (millions)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Syria - I

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org
Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

Violence

Transparency International ranks so corrupt is 159th worst of 175 countries rated in 2014.
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Syria - II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentile Rank (0 to 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability and Absence of</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence/Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Quality</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimates of Human Cost of Syria War as of 9.9.2015

UNHCR Estimate of Human Costs: 9.2015

- 12.2 million People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria (6.2015)
- 7.6 million IDPs in Syria
- 5 million People Reached per Month by USG Assistance in Syria (USG 9.2015)
- 4.1 Million Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries
- 1.9 million Syrian Refugees in Turkey
- 1.1 million Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
- 628,887 Syrian Refugees in Jordan
- 248,503 Syrian Refugees in Iraq
- 132,375 Syrian Refugees in Egypt

- From October 2014 to August 2015, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)—a United Kingdom-based human rights organization—documented more than 33,000 Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) air raids in Syria, including more than 18,000 barrel bomb attacks and more than 15,000 other aerial attacks, according to a mid-August report
- During the same period, SOHR documented nearly 5,500 civilian deaths, including more than 1,100 children, and injuries to at least 30,000 civilians
- Since the start of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, SOHR has documented the deaths of at least 240,000 people.

- On August 7, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution to create an investigative panel to hold chemical weapon users accountable for war crimes in Syria.
- In 2013, the UNSC mandated that the SARG dismantle and destroy its chemical weapon stockpile under international supervision. While the UNSC has repeatedly condemned chemical attacks as violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, chemical attacks on civilians continue to occur, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
- The newly adopted resolution will establish a UN–OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to gather and test evidence with the aim of identifying perpetrators of chemical attacks, confronting impunity for war crimes in Syria, and preventing future abuses.
A recent survey of 1,365 Syrians from all 14 governorates of the country found some surprising attitudes.

Consider this: A fifth of those interviewed said the Islamic State -- the brutal Islamist group known for its beheadings, that rules over large swaths of Syria and Iraq -- is a positive influence on the country.

And 82 percent said that they believe the Islamic State was created by the United States and its allies.

The Syria survey was conducted by ORB International, a U.K.-based market research firm, from June 10 to July 2. The poll has a margin of error of +/-3 percentage points.

The majority of Syrians interviewed said they believe that the situation is worsening, and only 21 percent said they preferred their life today than when Syria was fully controlled by Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Nearly half of Syrians surveyed said they opposed U.S.-coalition airstrikes, and nearly 80 percent said that the war has gotten worse because of the influx of foreign fighters.

Yet there is also sense of hope: The majority of Syrians surveyed said a diplomatic solution was possible to end the war, and that Syrians can set aside their difference and live side by side again.
Rise in Terrorism in Syria

Syrian Terrorism Deaths: I

- GTI Rank: 5
- GTI Score: 8.108

Attacks by Target:
- Private citizens & property
- Business
- Military, militia or terrorist groups
- Religious
- Other

Deaths by Group:
- Unknown
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
- Al-Nusra Front
- Other

Incidents: 232
Property Damage: 301
Dead: 1,698
Injured: 1,473

Increase in deaths since 2000:
2000: 0
2014: +1,698

Syrian Terrorism Deaths: II

The continual impact of terrorism in Syria is a direct result of the Syrian civil war. There were no recorded acts of terrorism in the two years prior to the civil war commencing in 2011. In 2014 there were 1,690 deaths compared to 600 in 2012. Most of the deaths in Syria are accounted for as battlefield deaths.

The present-day civil war in Syria began in March of 2011 as protests against President Bashar-al-Assad’s government. These protests were similar to the various democratic uprisings occurring throughout the Arab region since December 2010, known as the Arab Spring. In several of the Arab Spring nations, the uprisings led to the toppling of some authoritarian leaders, but in the case of Syria the Assad regime aggressively responded to the demonstrations, which unwound into civil war. From its inception, the core of the opposition has been the Free Syrian Army, with many other groups entering the war and establishing themselves as opposition forces, including Islamist rebel groups such as ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.

It is estimated that over 200,000 people have been killed in the civil war. The majority of these deaths are classified as a result of conventional warfare rather than acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a tactic by some of the rebel forces to bring about a political, economic, religious, or social goal rather than purely military objectives.

As of September 2015, there are 4.1 million Syrian refugees and 6.5 million people displaced within Syria. Many have fled to nearby countries, with a growing number fleeing to Europe, underlining the worldwide spill-over effects of the Syrian civil war.

A quarter of terrorist attacks in Syria are from unknown perpetrators. The biggest terrorist group in Syria is ISIL who killed 615 people, or 36 per cent. The second biggest group, the Sunni and al-Qa’ida linked al-Nusra Front, claimed responsibility for 27 per cent of deaths or 461 people.

Whilst there were terrorist attacks in 76 cities in 2014, over half of all attacks occurred in just four cities. Damascus, the capital and second largest city in Syria, had 37 attacks which resulted in 63 deaths. Homs recorded the most fatalities with 345, representing 20 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in Syria.

Palmyra, an area 215 kilometres north-east of Damascus, had 310 deaths. Palmyra has also seen many sites of historical significance destroyed by ISIL, including the Temple of Bel which was nearly 2000 years old. The largest city of Aleppo had 23 attacks which resulted in 193 deaths. Kobani in northern Syria near the border with Turkey had 34 attacks resulting in 71 deaths.

Most deaths from terrorism in Syria have been from bombings. Bombings can be extremely deadly. There were two bombings in 2014 which killed more than 50 people and at least 19 bombings that killed ten or more people. Private citizens are the target of 53 per cent of attacks, with 475 people being killed. There were at least 30 different kidnapping incidents which resulted in 382 deaths. This includes two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, who were kidnapped in Syria and murdered by ISIL in late 2014.


Syria conflict death toll
Documented killings per month

United Nations estimated total (Aug 2015)
250,000

Sources: Violations Documentation Center, Syrian Shuhada, Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syrian Center for Statistics and Research

Comparative Casualty per Month Estimate: 2011-2013

The opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that at least 82,000 people have been killed after two years of civil war in Syria. The number of casualties documented by opposition activist groups vary.

Source: Reuters, https://www.google.com/search?q=trend+graphs+for+Syrian+casualties&tbm=isch&imgil=YGlffJlki6As0M%253A%253Baacmvd6LOjVI%253Bhttp%252553A%25252F%25252F6storiesfromthe7continents.blogspot.com%25252F2013_06_01_archive.html&source=iu&pf=m&fir=YGlffJlki6As0M%253A%253Baacmvd6LOjVI%253Bhttp%2553A%25252F%25252F6storiesfromthe7continents.blogspot.com%252F2013_06_01_archive.html&ved=0CDAQyjdcFQoTCMej89jSgCFUtjigodOTALs&ei=XQL8VYeBNcvmuQ554KzQBA&usg=__twkWLalimgNnRKRmq_WnWQeP81oQ%3D#.imgrc=Zmg7LcF3w0oiOM%3A&usg=_twkWLalimgNnRKRmq_WnWQeP81oQ%3D

- First shipments of arms from Qatar, according to The New York Times
- 'Significantly more and better weapons' start to be sent in by Gulf states and US, according to The Washington Post.
- CIA begins to 'limit supplies of weapons ... reaching rebel forces', according to The Times.
- Gulf states and U.S. begin to 'sharply increase their military aid to Syria's opposition fighters', according to The New York Times.
Syrian Observatory of Human Rights Casualty Estimate of 28.2.2016 - I

More than 370,000 people are thought to be killed since the rise of Syrian revolution

February 23, 2016 Comments Off on More than 370,000 people are thought to be killed since the rise of Syrian revolution

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has documented death of 271,138 persons since the rise of the Syrian revolution in Mars 18th 2015 the date of the first person killed in Daraa countryside, until February 22nd 2016. The casualties are as follows:

Civilians: 122,997 civilians, including:

- 13,597 children
- 8,760 female over the age of 18
- 43,891 Rebel and Islamic fighters

Defected soldiers and officers: 2,561

Regime soldiers and officers: 55,042

Combatants from Popular Defense Committees, al-Ba’eth battalions, National Defense Forces, al Shabiha, pro-regime informers and the “Syrian resistance to liberate the Sanjak of Alexandretta”: 37,966

Militiamen from Hezbollah guerrilla: 1,025

Pro-regime Shia militiamen from Arab and Asian nationalities, Al Quds Al Filastini Brigade and other pro-regime militiamen from different Arab nationalities: 38,09

Arab, European, Asian, American and Australian and many other nationalities of fighters fighting with ISIS, al-Nusra Front, Junoud al-Sham battalion, Jund Al-Aqsa battalion, Jund al-Sham organization, al-Khadra’a Battalion, the Islamic Turkestan Party, Junud al-Sham al-Shishan and the Islamic movements: 44,254

Unidentified dead people documented by photos and videos: 3,484

It is worth noting that the numbers do not include the fate of over 20,000 of missing detainees people inside regime prisons and thousands of others who disappeared during the raids and massacres by the regime forces and the militiamen loyal to them.

These statistics do not include also the more than 5,000 abductees from the civilians and fighters inside ISIS jails from Deir Ezzor tribes who were kidnapped from their areas.

This statistics also do not include the fate of more than 1500 fighters from the rebel and Islamic factions, the “Islamic State” organization, Jabhat Al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Levant), YPG and local fighters loyal to these parties who were kidnapped during the clashes between these parties.

We also would like to refer that this statistics also do not include the fate of more than 6000 captured and missing person from the regime forces and the militiamen loyal to them, nor the fate of about 2000 kidnapped person by the rebel and Islamic factions, the “Islamic State” organization or Jabhat Al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Levant) on charge of cooperating with the regime forces.

The statistics also do not include hundreds of non-Syrian Kurdish fighters who were killed fighting with YPG in Syria.

We in the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates the real number of casualties from the rebel battalions, the Islamic battalions, Junud al-Sham, The Turkestan Islamic Party, the “Islamic state” organization, Jund al-Sham, Al-Nusra Front, Jund al-Aqsa organization, al-Umma Brigade, al-Battar battalion, al-Mohajereen and al-Ansar army, and the regime forces and militiamen loyal to them of Syrian, Arab and Asian nationalities to be approximately 95000 more than the documented numbers, due to the extreme discretion by all parties about the human losses caused by the conflict and due to the difficulty of communication in Syria.
In the absence of a political solution, human rights violations and abuses continue to occur in the context of widespread insecurity and in disregard of international law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law. Over 250,000 people have been killed and over one million injured. More than half of all Syrians have been forced to leave their homes, often multiple times, making Syria the largest displacement crisis globally. As of 31 July 2015, almost 1.2 million people have been internally displaced anticipating another million to be displaced by the end of the year in light of the growing humanitarian and protection needs of civilians.

Inside Syria today, 12.2 million people remain in need of humanitarian assistance – a twelve fold increase since 2011 - including more than 5.6 million children. 7.6 million people have been displaced by this conflict. An estimated 4.8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in hard to reach and besieged locations. Palestine refugees are particularly affected, with 560,000 in need of assistance and 64 per cent of registered Palestine refugees displaced, 280,000 internally and a further 80,000 abroad.

In addition, Syria's development situation has regressed almost by four decades. Since the onset of the crisis in 2011, life expectancy is estimated to have shortened by almost 13 years (Q4, 2013) and school attendance dropped more than 50 per cent. Syria has also seen reversals in all 12 Millennium Development Goal indicators. The Syrian economy has contracted by an estimated 40 per cent since 2011, leading to the majority of Syrians losing their livelihoods. By the end of 2013, an estimated three in four Syrians were living in poverty, and 54 per cent were living in extreme poverty.

Humanitarian access to people in need in Syria remains constrained by shifting frontlines, administrative and bureaucratic hurdles, violence along access routes and general safety and security concerns, especially in areas under the control of terrorist groups listed in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2170 and 2178. It is increasingly difficult for Syrians to find safety, including by seeking asylum. These difficulties have resulted in a marked decline in the number of newly arriving registered refugees and in their ability to access international protection.
Status of Syrian Crisis: OCHA December 2015

13.5M People in need of humanitarian assistance

4.3M People who fled the country

6.6M People internally displaced by violence

Data source: OCHA (as of Dec 2015).

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is managed by United Nations Ofce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), receives voluntary contributions year-round from United Nations Member States and Observers, regional governments, private sector, foundations and individuals.

Source: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SYR_CERF_20151217.pdf
Syrian Crisis Humanitarian Funding Requirements in 2015

## Syrian Crisis Humanitarian Donors and Spending in 2015

### Top 20 Donors (SRP and 3RP) 2015 (million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>3RP</th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>703.9</td>
<td>314.5</td>
<td>546.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>254.3</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>394.8</td>
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<td>European Commission</td>
<td>273.9</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>55.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private (Individuals &amp; organisations)</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)</td>
<td>46.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various (details not yet provided)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allocation of unmarked funds by UN agencies</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>55.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carry-over (donors not specified)</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>122.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3RP is total Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-2016

### Syria Strategic Response Plan (SRP 2015) by Sector (million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Funded</th>
<th>Unmet</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>574.7</td>
<td>643.3</td>
<td>1,218</td>
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<tr>
<td>NON-FOOD ITEMS (NFIs) AND SHELTER</td>
<td>145.3</td>
<td>494.2</td>
<td>639.5</td>
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<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>111.2</td>
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<td>EDUCATION</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROTECTION</td>
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<td>79.3</td>
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<td>EARLY RECOVERY AND LIVELIHOODS</td>
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<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETC</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLUSTER NOT YET SPECIFIED</td>
<td>188.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Feedback: Regional Office for the Syria Crisis (ocharosyr@un.org)
Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 31 December 2015)

4,390,439 Registered Syrian refugees
(including 26,772 refugees registered in other countries in North Africa)

13.5 million People in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria

6,563,462 Internally Displaced Persons**

Legend
- Country capital
- Governorate capital
- International boundary
- Armistice demarcation line (1949)
- Boundary of former mandate Palestine
- UNDOF area of operation
- Hard to reach areas*
- Refugee camps
- Population in need in Syria per governorate (UN estimate)
- Border crossing open
- Border crossing closed
- Border crossing specifically open or restricted
- Border crossing under UNSC Resolutions 2165 and 2191

*Hard-to-reach area: An area that is not regularly accessible to humanitarian actors for the purposes of sustained humanitarian programming as a result of denial of access, including the need to negotiate access on an ad hoc basis, or due to restrictions such as active conflict, multiple security checkpoints, or failure of the authorities to provide timely approval.

** 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview

The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Syria: The Lights Go Out in Aleppo: 3/2012-12/2014

Humanitarian reach to a sub-district does not necessarily imply full geographical coverage. The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Creation date: 23 December 2015 | Source: NFI & Shelter Sector from within Syria | Website: Syria.unocha.org | www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/syria
Syria: UNICEF January 2016

In response to persisting severe water shortages in Aleppo, UNICEF continued to truck 10,000 m3 of water per day, reaching 700,000 people, while continuing to develop alternative water supply modalities.

In September, Jordanian schools nationwide reopened to welcome approximately 143,000 new and returning Syrian students, a 10% increase from last year. UNICEF’s ongoing nationwide Learning for All campaign with 13 partners is encouraging families to enroll children in school where possible, and pursue other learning opportunities (including Makanis) where it is not.

In Iraq, two new pre-fab schools in Gawelan and Domiz 2 have been completed in time for the start of the new academic year. Through its partner War Child, UNICEF conducted Back to School campaigns in both Domiz 1 and 2 with approximately 13,000 individuals attending.

In Lebanon, UNICEF has equipped a new well in Majdel Anjar in Bekaa. Majdel Anjar is a large locality near the El Masna border crossing. The locality is home to over 15,000 Lebanese inhabitants and 17,000 Syrian refugees.

Two UNICEF teams were deployed to assess the situation of women and children in transit in Izmir, Istanbul and Edirne – the majority of whom are Syrians. A mobile CFS was deployed to serve 100 children a day on the move in Izmir, and was deployed in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) as part of UNICEF’s commitment to providing rapid child protection services in the border areas.

In Syria

5,600,000
# of children affected

12,184,000
# of people affected

(HNO, 2014)

Outside Syria

2,073,905
# of registered refugee children and children awaiting registration

4,180,631
# of registered refugees and persons awaiting registration

(UNHCR, 9 October 2015)

Syria Appeal 2015*

US$ 279 million

Regional Appeal 2015*

US$ 624 million

https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs01
US Aid to Syria FY2015 and FY2016 as of 12/31/2015

U.S. government financial commitments to the current Syria and Iraq complex crises have totaled approximately $5.13 billion. About 88% of these funds have been focused on responding to the Syria complex crisis, which predates the current humanitarian situation in Iraq by 2 years.

From October 1, 2014, to December 31, 2015, USAID and DoS obligated nearly $1.64 billion in humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria complex crisis. Over that period, USAID and DoS disbursed $1.33 billion to related programs and activities. During the first quarter of FY 2016, OFDA, FFP, and PRM disbursed a total of $194.2 million.

Syria: USAID Estimate of Situation, January 2016

The Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) and the Government of the Russian Federation (GoRF) began coordinating airstrikes across Syria on September 30. The UN reports that SARG and GoRF airstrikes, in addition to ground offensives, have displaced thousands of Syrians, including approximately 80,000 people in northern Syria’s Hamah and Idlib governorates in October. During an October 22 UN Security Council meeting, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Samantha Power condemned GoRF involvement, noting that GoRF actions are worsening humanitarian conditions in Syria.

Relief organizations in Syria and neighboring countries have prepared for the potential spread of cholera from Iraq, following the declaration of a confirmed outbreak in 16 of the 18 Iraqi governorates in mid-September. The Health and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) clusters—which coordinate humanitarian health and WASH activities, respectively, and comprise UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant stakeholders—have procured a contingency supply of cholera treatment centers, trained health and WASH staff, and distributed chlorine tablets in preparation for a potential outbreak. Health organizations expect Syrian vulnerability to cholera to decline during the winter months.

U.S. Government (USG) partners plan to assist nearly 970,000 vulnerable people inside Syria to prepare for the winter season and mitigate cold weather-related risks during the 2015/2016 winter season. Partners are distributing winter relief items, including blankets, fuel, warm clothing, and shelter supplies to displaced populations across Syria, as well as to Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.

Parties to the conflict continue to use siege as a tactic of war in Syria, where the UN estimates that approximately 393,700 people were living under siege as of late October. An estimated 200,000 people were besieged by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in areas of Dayr az Zawr Governorate, a decrease from the approximately 228,000 people reported in September, while some 12,500 people were besieged by opposition groups, including Al Nusra Front, in the towns of Al Fu’ah and Kafrayya, Idlib. Approximately 181,200 people were besieged by the SARG in various locations in Rif Damascus Governorate’s Eastern Ghouta region and the cities of Al Zabadani and Darayya in Rif Damascus—representing a nearly 10 percent increase in the population besieged by the SARG since May. Overall, the SARG is accountable for 12 of 15 UN-identified besieged towns, 10 of which are located in Eastern Ghouta.

Heightened insecurity and active fighting, including GoRF airstrikes that began on September 30, continue to displace people and kill civilians throughout Syria. The conflict displaced nearly 131,400 people from and within Aleppo, Hamah, and Idlib governorates between early October and mid-November, while thousands of others fled fighting in Al Hasakah, Damascus, Dar’a, Latakia, and Rif Damascus governorates. The UN reports that the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the estimated 13.5 million people in need remains extremely challenging due to ongoing conflict and deliberate access constraints and obstructions imposed by parties to the conflict, including onerous administrative processes.

https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs01

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Although many agencies are unable to serve populations located within close proximity to the fighting, humanitarian agencies, including USAID partners, have scaled up relief activities in response to the new displacement. By the end of November, relief agencies had distributed more than 9,000 tents to newly arrived internally displaced persons (IDPs) at IDP camps in Aleppo and Idlib. Between November 6 and 19, Food Security and Livelihood Cluster members, including USAID/FFP partners, delivered approximately 18,000 food baskets and 100 metric tons of bread, reaching nearly 13,500 households in Aleppo and Idlib. In addition, health organizations are providing health care services via nine mobile clinics and emergency trauma care via 90 medical facilities in Aleppo, Hamah, and Idlib.

Increased violence impeded IDP access to services and hindered the delivery of some humanitarian assistance in areas of Al Hasakah, Ar Raqqah, Aleppo, Dar’a, Dayr az Zawr, Hamah, Homs, and Rif Damascus governorates during October, the UN reports. The UN World Food Program (WFP), for instance, was unable to deliver emergency food assistance to approximately 220,000 people in need in Aleppo, an estimated 720,000 people in need in nearly all of Ar Raqqah and Dayr az Zawr, and areas of Al Hasakah, Aleppo, Hamah, and Homs.

In October, aerial bombardment and fighting intensified in the opposition-held Eastern Ghouta region of Rif Damascus and areas surrounding the capital city of Damascus, according to the UN. In Eastern Ghouta’s town of Douma, the SARG and its allies conducted airstrikes on the town, hitting civilian infrastructure, including health care facilities and public markets, causing the deaths of at least 75 people and injuring more than 200 people, the UN reports. Additionally, airstrikes targeted the Eastern Ghouta towns of Dayr al-Assad, Erbeen, Hamouria, Harasta, Kafr Batna, Madira, Sajba, and Zamalka, resulting in nearly 30 deaths in mid-October. Further, SARG barrel bombs struck the town of Marj and temporarily displaced an estimated 1,400 households across Eastern Ghouta and severely damaged infrastructure in the town during the same reporting period.

In late October, USAID/FFP partner WFP released the results of a food security assessment conducted inside Syria, which surveyed 19,000 households in all governorates except Ar Raqqah and Dayr az Zawr between May and June 2015. Results of the survey indicate that approximately 6.3 million people are food-insecure. The survey found a high prevalence of food insecurity in Aleppo, Al Hasakah, Al Qunayrirah, and Hamah, where more than 45 percent of the population were food-insecure. However, the severity of food insecurity varied across the surveyed governorates. While the assessment identified 164 critical sub-districts where at least 20 percent of people were experiencing food insecurity, in 20 of those sub-districts, 80 percent of the populations were food-insecure. The assessment results also reveal that nearly 40 percent of IDPs and returnees in settlements and unfinished buildings are food-insecure, compared to an estimated 30 percent of people residing in host communities. Additionally, the WFP survey results indicate that more than 60 percent of Syrians are employing negative coping mechanisms, such as begging, child labor, and accumulating debt to meet basic food needs.

Following the declaration of a confirmed cholera outbreak in Iraq in mid-September, locally based relief agencies have prepared for the potential spread of the disease to Syria, given the geographical proximity to Iraq and the cyclical movement of people between the two countries. However, no cholera cases had been confirmed in Syria as of December 4, and health organizations expect the population’s vulnerability to cholera to decline during the winter months. From November 19–24, a USAID/OFDA partner and other Health Cluster members conducted a training of trainers for nearly additional 70 participants in the city of Sanliurfa, Turkey; participants are now equipped to train other health care workers inside Syria on cholera preparedness and isolation and treatment procedures. Health Cluster members have also pre-positions more than 3,300 cholera rapid diagnostics tests (RDTs) in all governorates except Rif Damascus.

Further, WASH Cluster members continue assessing cholera contingency stocks—including bulk chlorine, household water purification tablets, and soap—available in Aleppo, Dayr az Zawr, and Idlib, and have distributed up to 3,000 kilograms of chlorine to treat drinking water in northern Syria.

https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16/fs
Airstrikes on civilian infrastructure in northern Syria, including health facilities, have intensified since the commencement of GoRF aerial support to the SARG in late September. In October, alleged SARG and GoRF airstrikes accounted for attacks on USG-supported health facilities in northern and southern Syria. In addition, a recent study attributed more than 70 percent of security incidents and approximately 77 percent of civilian casualties in Syria to the SARG. The NGO Physicians for Human Rights has documented at least 90 attacks on medical facilities between January and November, marking 2015 as the year with the most recorded health facility attacks in Syria to date.

The UN released the 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) on October 19, which identified 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria. The HNO also identified 6.5 million IDPs in Syria, 1.3 million people who are hosting IDPs, and nearly 4.5 million people living in hard-to-reach locations, including 360,000 people in besieged areas. Priority humanitarian needs for 2016 include emergency food assistance, health care, shelter, and WASH assistance. Of the 13.5 million people in need, at least 8.7 million people are unable to fully meet basic food needs and have adopted negative coping strategies, according to the HNO. Further, approximately 70 percent of people in Syria lack regular access to safe drinking water, and an estimated 5.3 million people are in need of safe shelter.

To respond to large-scale displacement since the end of September, the UN allocated $10 million to emergency response activities in Syria from the Humanitarian Pooled Fund (HPF)—a multi-donor, country-based pooled fund whose objective is to enable humanitarian assistance in Syria. The funds will address the needs of approximately 400,000 conflict-affected people in Aleppo, Hamah, and Idlib, including more than 123,800 recently displaced people, according to the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster. Syrian NGOs received an estimated 80 percent of the allocation to deliver life-saving food, health, shelter, and WASH assistance. HPF funding also prioritized the provision of 6,000 tents to protect newly displaced households from harsh winter conditions; distribution of emergency food items, including ready-to-eat meals; and support to mobile health clinics and ambulances, according to the UN.

According to the HNO, 2.6 million displaced and vulnerable Syrians are in need of assistance in preparation for winter conditions. USAID/OFDA plans to provide winterization assistance to nearly 970,000 Syrians for the 2015/2016 winter season. In October, USAID/OFDA partners began distributing blankets, clothing, fuel, mattresses, plastic sheeting, and other relief items to help vulnerable communities prepare for the impending winter and mitigate cold-weather related risks. Partners are also providing shelter support, such as sealing kits and tarps, for approximately 15,300 people in northern Syria. USAID/OFDA partners operating in southern Syria are delivering winter relief items—including sleeping mats, thermal blankets, and winter clothing—to more than 274,000 people in Al Qunaytirah, As Suwayda’, Damascus, Dar’a, and Rif Damascus. Additionally, with support from State/PRM, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) aims to reach approximately 220,000 IDPs in Syria with winter assistance, including thermal blankets, plastic tarpaulin, stoves, kerosene containers, and seasonally appropriate clothing.

USG partner the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) launched its winterization response plan in October, which aims to distribute blankets, heaters, and winterization kits to more than 1 million Syrian children throughout Syria. UNICEF plans to introduce a voucher program in December that will enable families to access seasonally appropriate relief items through local markets in five Syrian governorates. UNICEF also continues winter preparedness efforts in neighboring countries and the region. While UNICEF’s regional winter preparedness strategy differs slightly by country, the primary focus is to provide vulnerable children and households with cash assistance, electronic vouchers, and weather-appropriate clothing kits.
Syria: USAID Estimate of Regional Aid, January 2016 - I

Iraq
With USG support, UNHCR initiated the procurement, transport, and warehouse storage of essential winter items in July and August 2015 to ensure that all relief commodities were ready for distribution to Syrian refugees residing in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) beginning in November. From November 2015 to February 2016, heating fuel will be available to vulnerable Syrian families living inside and outside of IKR refugee camps through vouchers or the direct distribution of 100 liters of kerosene per household per month. As part of UNHCR's winter programming, vulnerable households will also receive a monthly cash supplement of $250 between November and February. UNHCR and implementing partners have identified beneficiaries based on vulnerability criteria in adherence to guidelines supported by the Cash Assistance Working Group in Iraq.

Jordan
The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKJ) Ministry of Interior (MoI) is allowing refugees to use a UNHCR statement of address when applying for their MoI service card, bypassing the previous requirement that refugees needed a certified lease agreement or have their landlord present to receive the card. As of October 15, the MoI had issued approximately 222,300 Syrian MoI service cards; of this total, more than 204,000 are Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. The verification exercise requires all Syrians, both refugees and non-refugees, residing outside of camps to register with the GoHKJ and obtain new documents that permit access to GoHKJ-provided services such as education and health care. With financial support from the USG, the E.U., and Germany, camp managers officially opened two newly built school complexes in the Za’atri refugee camp in northern Jordan on October 27, bringing the total number of schools in Za’atri to 24. The schools will reduce overcrowding in classrooms and improve the overall quality of learning among Syrian refugee children attending formal schools. In October, approximately 143,000 Syrian students accessed formal education in camp and host community settings in Jordan. With USG support, UNHCR is providing cash assistance to nearly 39,000 families, or approximately 150,000 refugees in Jordan to help meet critical needs during the winter season. To date in 2015, UNHCR has delivered $35.1 million to more than 27,400 refugee families living in Jordanian urban areas.

Lebanon
Results from the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASYR)—a collaborative assessment undertaken in May and June and released in October—UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP confirm that the food security of refugees in Lebanon has significantly worsened since the previous assessment in 2014. Moderate food insecurity doubled, affecting one quarter of households, while the proportion of food-secure households fell from 25 percent to 11 percent. Findings from the assessment also indicate that the use of negative coping strategies has more than doubled among refugee households during the past year, increasing from 28 percent in 2014 to 61 percent in 2015. Further, an estimated 70 percent of refugee households are living below the national poverty line, compared to 50 percent in 2014, according to the survey. Recent funding from donors, however, will increase food voucher values for refugees from more than $13 to nearly $22 per person per month beginning in November and lasting through January 2016 at current funding levels. On November 12, the Kuwait Red Crescent Society (KRCS) launched an aid campaign to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon in coordination with the Lebanese Red Cross. According to the head of the KRCS delegation to Lebanon, KRCS has distributed emergency food assistance and hygiene kits to nearly 350 Syrian refugee households in in Akkar District in northern Lebanon. The campaign will cover the needs of more than 7,000 Syrian refugee households for one month and will provide additional aid for refugees this winter.

With USG support, UNICEF has helped establish a new water distribution network in Majdel Anjar village in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, where more than 17,000 Syrian refugees and 15,000 Lebanese people reside. Additionally, by installing a new 7,200-feet water-supply line in the town of Jeb Janine, Bekaa Valley, UNICEF is ensuring the transmission of approximately 3 million liters of water per day and improving access to safe drinking water for local populations, including more than 8,000 Syrian refugees and 5,600 Lebanese people.

https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy16 fs01
Turkey
On November 16, the UK announced that it plans to contribute up to $419 million in bilateral assistance to Turkey during the next two years to assist with the Syrian conflict and resultant refugee crisis. The new funding will likely target humanitarian projects; support schools, hospitals, and housing for Syrian refugees; and assist communities hosting refugees. The new UK announcement builds upon existing funding through the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which has provided approximately $52 million for humanitarian projects in Turkey since the beginning of the Syrian complex emergency.

In collaboration with the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), WFP continues to assess the vulnerability of the refugee population residing outside of camps in Turkey in an effort to channel assistance to those most in need. WFP plans to maintain its off-camp program, which has supported more than 25,000 Syrians to date in 2015, through the end of the year. The program aims to reach up to 45,000 Syrian households in total by the end of 2015.

According to WFP, in refugee camp settings, TRCS, Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), and WFP have worked together to provide Syrian refugees with sufficient food assistance to enable the refugees to cover their food requirements. The number of refugees in camps assisted by voucher support from WFP and AFAD is limited to approximately 150,000 individuals in 11 camps. AFAD covers the entirety of the voucher amount to the population of the remaining 14 camps.
## Aid to Syria in FY2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USD committed/contributed</th>
<th>USD pledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,347,337,789</td>
<td>382,866,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of funds from Red Cross / Red Crescent</td>
<td>408,303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of unmarked funds by UN agencies</td>
<td>110,443,873</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>41,299,705</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9,871,730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>53,167,473</td>
<td>5,202,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>113,122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>172,808,312</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Carry-over (donors not specified)</td>
<td>238,006,284</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)</td>
<td>77,419,314</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>21,030</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5,874,499</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>783,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>488,118,445</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32,837,856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>594,863,117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>24,828</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>328,947</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>14,526,231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>23,681,349</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>139,779,390</td>
<td>23,360,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>10,550,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>313,456,347</td>
<td>215,390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>111,366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>43,573</td>
<td>56,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7,532,589</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO SYRIA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

**FY 2012 – FY 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID/OFFDA</td>
<td>$866,283,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/FFP</td>
<td>$1,550,694,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/PRM</td>
<td>$2,112,085,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total U.S. Government (USG) Assistance to the Syria Humanitarian Response**

$4,529,063,219


Asylum applications of Syrian Citizens: 2014


Syrian Refugee and IDB Crisis: March 1, 2015

Total Syrian refugees: 3,824,641
Total IDPs in Syria: 7,600,000

1,622,839 Syrian refugees in Turkey
1,175,171 IDPs in Syria
242,468 Syrian refugees in Iraq
623,447 Syrian refugees in Jordan
136,661 Syrian refugees in Egypt
24,055 Syrian refugees in North Africa

Copyright, European Union, 2015. Map created by EC-JRC. The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the European Union.
Camps for Syrian Refugees: April 2015

This map only depicts official camps for Syrian refugees and does not make reference to informal tent camps set up by refugees without shelter.

Registered Syrian Refugees as of August 31, 2015

Registered refugees: 4,088,078

Turkey: 1,938,000
Lebanon: 1,113,941
Jordan: 629,245
Iraq: 249,463
Egypt: 132,375
N Africa: 24,055

Source: UNHCR, Reliefweb (figures up to 31 August 2015)
Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe: End-October 2015

Sixty countries are represented at the conference, including 30 world leaders. They are aiming to help the 4.6 million refugees and 13.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria.

The pledges included $2.6bn from Germany, $1.7bn from the UK, $1bn from France and $925m from the US. Australia, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Japan, the UAE, Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, Denmark and Finland also committed funds...the EU would commit €3bn this year and intended to "maintain this level of financing" for 2017 and beyond. He said the European Investment Bank would also "play its part", offering to lend as much as €23bn "for the whole of the Middle East and North Africa".

The $9bn being sought on Thursday is made up of a UN appeal for $7.7bn and about $1.3bn requested by regional host governments. Part of the reason for the record request is the underfunding of previous appeals. Only 43% of the $2.9bn pledged to the UN's 2015 appeal has so far been funded. Delegates from Turkey - which hosts the largest number of refugees, 2.5 million - Jordan and Lebanon said their societies would need long-term support in order to adapt to the influx from Syria.

Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe: 19 January 2016

Conflict Dynamics in Iraq
War, Tensions, and Crises in Iraq

**Internal Conflicts and Tensions:**
- ISIS vs. Iraqi central government, Kurds, Shi’ite militias, Sunni opposition factions, U.S. led coalition, Arab Gulf states and Jordan, Iran, Russia
- Sunni vs. Shiites
- Arabs vs. Kurds.
- Sunni vs. Sunni, Shiite vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Kurd

**External Conflicts and Tensions:**
- Conflict in Syria
- US vs. Iran
- Arab Gulf and Jordan vs. Iran
- Kurds vs. Turkey
- US vs. Russia
Failed U.S. Support of INSF – Pre-ISIS

- Officially disband Iraqi Army. Focus security on community policing (Order No. 2, May 23rd, 2003.)
- Start effort to rebuild Iraq security forces in 2005, but remain Shi’ite dominated. Funding, program structure erratic, problems with trainers, focus on force generation rather than quality.
- Broaden effort in 2005 with first real funds and support, but still emphasize police. Have to restructure all of National Police for being too Shi’ite
- Main Iraqi training effort gather momentum on 2006-2007, but bulk of forces is generated after major fighting is over.
- U.S. forces leave Iraqi cities in 2009.
- March 2010 election starts Maliki’s battle for power, effort to control all security forces, isolate and coop Sunni elements.
- U.S. combat forces, major military train and assist and police training effort effectively halt in late 2011. Only small OMC office left.
- Low level civil war, Maliki repression of opposition and Sunnis from 2011-2013. Iraqi forces gradually become political, corrupt, and ineffective.
Crisis-Driven U.S. Security Funding: Reacting After the Fact
(Obligations Lag Threat and Spending Lags 6-14 Months More)


262
Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Bulk of Iraqi Security Forces Deploy After Key Fighting

29% in Army

416,681 Total MOI

254,848 Total MoD
Pulling Out More Quickly than Planned: U.S. Troop Levels Go from 45,000 to Zero in 3 Months

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011 p. 51,

Note: “Assigned” is defined as all DoD servicemembers deployed to Iraq, whether currently in Iraq or not. This number does not reflect servicemembers on rest and recuperation leave or on temporary duty outside of Iraq. “Boots on Ground” is defined as all DoD servicemembers deployed to Iraq minus those on rest and recuperation leave or on temporary duty outside of Iraq and servicemembers in Iraq who are assigned to a newly arrived unit conducting Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority with a departing unit.
Army Only 22 Percent of ISF When U.S. Leaves (10/10/2011)

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AS OF 10/10/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>Assigned Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>645,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Force</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>929,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

Source: GOI, MOI IG, Information provided to SIGIR, 10/10/2011.
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - I

- ISIS and aligned forces attack on Samarra on 5 June 2014, seize Mosul on 10 June and Tikrit on 11 June. Iraqi government forces flee south on 13 June, and Kurdish forces took control of the oil hub of Kirkuk, more of disputed areas in north.
- Iraqi forces retake Ramadi but fighting continues in 2014 to spring 2015 until ISIS retakes Ramadi after Iraqi Army collapses on May 21, 2104.
- In the north and outskirt of Baghdad, Iraqi Army effectively collapses back into Shi’ite areas of Iraq, Shi’ite militias emerge as key stiffening, fighting force, but abuses of Sunni emerge from start.
- March-April 12, retake Tikrit with U.S. air support after Shi’ite militias withdrawn.
- 10 June 2014, U.S. reacts with train and assist mission after examination of Iraqi forces find them almost universally ineffective.
  - Starts at 450. Gradually builds up to 3,500 advisors (4,600+).
  - But does not deploy forward, Establishes centers in rear in Iraq and KRG areas. Some use of Canadian Special Forces forward.
  - Problems in moving weapons, ammo, support from U.S. to Iraq, Baghdad to combat units.
  - U.S. plans for National Guard with Sunni and Kurdish forces at Provincial level make little progress.
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - II

• 29 June 2014, ISIS says is changing name to Islamic State, and declares 'Caliphate' including Syria and Iraq and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Caliph and leader of all Muslims
• Begin Coalition Air Campaign in August 2014 – nine months after first ISIS advance.
• 14-15 August, Maliki leaves, Abadi becomes Prime Minister.
• February-June 2015, false announcements of effort to liberate Mosul.
• U.S. concludes Iraqi armed forces critically weak, Focuses on creating two effective brigades, liberation of Ramadi.
• 13 July 2015, two-front Iraqi offensive starts in Anbar province. Iraqi security forces seek to retake after collapsing and losing city in May. U.S. begins air strikes airstrike against ISIS positions in Ramadi.
• June 2015 onwards: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Shi’ite militias continue operations to cordon off Fallujah and secure lines of communication. Fallujah has now been partly under ISIS control since January 2014.
• Mid-July 2015: Iraqi pilots today land the 1st squadron of Iraqi F-16s in Iraq.
• September 2015: Russian build-up begins in Syria.
• October 2015: Effort to liberate Ramadi still going on. Iraqi forces do not penetrate ISIS barrier of IEDs, suicide bombers.
• October 2015: Abadi announces joint Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian-Russian intelligence effort. Says would welcome Russian and more Iranian sorties because U.S. effort too weak.
• October 2015: U.S. seems to shift away from Iraq first strategy to support of Syrian Kurdish and Arab attacks on ISIS

Source:
Cost of U.S. Operations in Inherent Resolve

- Cost: As of Sep. 15, 2015, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on Aug. 8, 2014, is $4 billion and the average daily cost is $10 million for 404 days of operations.

### Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Cost Report

#### Average Daily Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Expense</strong> (# of Days)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$2.9</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):</th>
<th>Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 15 Sep 2015)</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Expense</strong></td>
<td>404</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$1,977</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$23</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$954</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1,083</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,037</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### By Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total:</th>
<th>404</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$538</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$555</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2,632</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$313</td>
<td>8%</td>
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#### By Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
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<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$605</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$37</td>
<td>1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$1,999</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$24</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$954</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Source: [http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve](http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve), 21.10.15
U.S. Support of Iraqi Forces: 20.10.15 - I

- Kurdish forces in Syria are operating against ISIL lines of communication that extend from the group’s de facto capital of Raqqa to Mosul in Iraq and on to Irbil, he said. These operations will “make life difficult for ISIL,” the general said, and the Kurds have taken back “a not insignificant amount of ground from ISIL.”
- The coalition against ISIL inside Iraq is growing. “The number of Sunni that have been trained and armed is about 6,000 in Anbar province, and they want to grow to about 8,500,”
- On the police side of the ledger, the government was looking for 16,000 Sunni to volunteer, and they are now at around 11,000 to 12,000.
- The U.S. has, however, cut the number of Iraqi divisions it is concentrating on training from 10 to 8 for the near term.
- “Operations in Beiji were absolutely encouraging, because just a week ago, we heard [the Iraqi security forces] were going to start doing things, and they have had some pretty good success,” the general said.
- “They are now holding ground and securing the area,” he continued, “so that was, I thought, fairly positive. My perspective was always that we would support the Iraqis where we could have operational or strategic consequences.”
- Part of that is seeing success and reinforcing it, the general said.
- So, for example, if the Iraqis have a realistic plan for clearing Ramadi and a realistic plan for securing the city once ISIL is pushed out, then the United States will look at what unique capabilities it can bring to help the Iraqis, the chairman said.

Command and Control
- But not all is brightness and light, he acknowledged, noting that Iraqi leaders must concentrate on command and control. The government needs to appoint a military leader with command for the overall military effort in the country – including the Iraqi security forces, the Kurdish peshmerga forces, the tribes and the police, and Iraqi leaders will sit down tomorrow to discuss appointing just such a person, Dunford said.
- Having one person to talk to who can speak with authority about the campaign will make it easier for the coalition to provide support to all, he said.

Common Operational Picture
- The command and control solution is to have a “common operational picture of Iraq in one commander, who on

U.S. Support of Iraqi Forces: 20.10.15 - II

- behalf of the Iraqis can talk to the coalition about ‘Where do we go?’” the general said. “Success in this business is about being able to anticipate, and you can only anticipate if you really have a common understanding, common objectives, common sense of time and space.”
- More still needs to be done with the Sunni tribes, Dunford said. “It’s a physical manifestation of the government’s promise to be inclusive,” he told reporters.
- Outside factors also complicate the campaign, the chairman said. The conflict in Yemen complicates what is happening in Iraq and Syria, he explained, and Iran’s funding of proxies and surrogates complicates and already complicated picture. Russia’s involvement has added yet another layer of complexity, he said. “And you have to talk about the Shiia/Sunni dynamic in the region, as well,” he added.

**Kurdish training effort**

- About 300 coalition service members from Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary work at the Kurdish Training Coordination Center here. The effort there is under Italian command.
- The effort trains peshmerga fighters in a modified infantry basic course. “We currently have 4,200 peshmerga in training,” said a senior coalition officer speaking on background. The officer briefed reporters traveling with Dunford.
- Essentially, the effort works like this: peshmerga units come off of the front line with ISIL here, and then they get a few days of rest and relaxation before entering training. They train together as a unit for five or six weeks, before re-entering the battlefield against ISIL.
- “We are able to tailor the training to the units,” the officer said. Units fighting ISIL near Mosul have different requirements than those in Kirkuk, the officer noted.
- The time off the line allows the peshmerga to reinforce skills they need, understand the capabilities of new weapons systems that are entering the peshmerga system, and to work together as a unit.
- Marksmanship, counter-ground tactics, combat medicine, and maneuvering as a unit are just a few of the military skills the peshmerga soldiers are being taught here. They also learn to be forward observers.

**Training Paying Off**

- There are three training areas, and the command could train up to 5,000 peshmerga personnel at a time.
- The front line against ISIL is only 60 kilometers from Irbil. “There are many changes” in the 45-minute drive to the front, said the officer. The coalition soldiers work with peshmerga leaders before they come to training to understand what the unit needs, and afterward, they re-enter the line to find new, more effective ways to deliver the training.

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1508c9602b60246a
U.S. Support of Iraqi Forces: 20.10.15 - III

- Improvised explosive devices cause most of the peshmerga casualties – roughly 80 to 85 percent – and coalition personnel are working constantly to teach tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to counter this threat, the officer said.
- The officer said the peshmerga are a brave, dedicated and coherent force.
- “They are the front line,” he said. “What is happening up here is working. It takes time to build this kind of capacity -- especially as a coalition. I think we are picking up speed and I think it is being reflected on the front line, as well.”

Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014

Iraqi Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions in late 2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
# Key Iraqi Insurgent Groups: 7.2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Active In</th>
<th>ISIS Relationship</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naqshbandia Order/J.R.T.N.</strong></td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>● Fighting</td>
<td>Established in 2007, the group's reputed leader was a high-ranking deputy in Saddam Hussein's regime. The group is believed to have initially assisted ISIS in its push south from Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1920 Revolution Brigades</strong></td>
<td>Diyala, Anbar</td>
<td>● Fighting</td>
<td>Formed by disaffected Iraqi Army officers who were left without jobs after the Americans dissolved the military in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Army of Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
<td>● Periodic fighting</td>
<td>ISIS has targeted family members of the leadership of this group, which has long had a presence in Diyala and has been involved in past sectarian battles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujahedeen Army</strong></td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>A nationalist Islamist group that advocates overthrowing the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata‘ib al-Mustapha</strong></td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata‘ib Tawrat al-Ashreen</strong></td>
<td>Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Sunni tribes opposed to the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna</strong></td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>● Fighting</td>
<td>An Al Qaeda-affiliated group that has led a number of deadly attacks in Iraq over the years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kobani: 9.2014

Source: Satellite image by DigitalGlobe, via Google Earth

Iraq: River War Approaches to Baghdad: 10.2014

**Haditha**  Sept. 6 to 15
Iraqi soldiers, supported by local Sunni tribes and U.S. airstrikes, fought ISIS militants and succeeded in driving them from the Haditha Dam and nearby towns.

**Hit**  Oct. 2 to 7
ISIS began an offensive to take control of Hit. Within days, ISIS militants controlled large parts of the city and the nearby town of Kubaysa, besieged the local police station and threatened a major air base nearby.

**Ramadi**  Sept. 19 to Oct. 12
Ramadi is the center of the tribal resistance against ISIS in Anbar Province and the home of Ahmed Abu Risha, a prominent anti-ISIS leader. ISIS has repeatedly attacked the area and killed the provincial chief of police on Oct. 12.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Fighting in March 2015

1. Government forces and allied militias continued to battle ISIS militants in Tikrit.
2. At the same time, ISIS fighters were mounting a fierce assault on Ramadi.
3. Kurdish and Sunni tribal fighters advanced on ISIS territory from the northern city of Kirkuk.
4. Residents of Hawija said that ISIS executed some of its own fighters for trying to flee as the group came under attack from Kurdish forces.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Takes Palmyra: May 21, 2015

ISIS Takes Ramadi: May 15-18, 2015

Final Days Assault
A sandstorm forces the American-led airstrike campaign to pause, giving the group time to carry out 10 car bombings followed by a wave of ground attacks that overwhels the Iraqi forces.

Iraqi Security Forces Retreat
Within days, Iraqi security forces flee, and Islamic State fighters take control of key government facilities.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. "Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time," said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.
In about a week, a coalition of Kurdish militias and Syrian rebels seized two strategic towns controlled by the Islamic State near the border with Turkey. The latest advance led to the capture of Ain Issa, a town that is only 30 miles from the Islamic State’s stronghold, Raqqa.

ISIS Counterattacks: 6.30.15

Anbar and Ramadi Area: 7.2015

Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

September 11, 2015

Iraq: Areas of Control: 30.10.15

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/maps/150ba0ba79db7707; 30.10.2015

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and “Popular Mobilization” recaptured the Baiji Oil Refinery on October 21 following operations to recapture Baiji city on October 14. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi then visited Baiji city on October 23, marking the city’s full recapture. ISW is thus upgrading Baiji and the Baiji Oil Refinery from Contested to ISF-held locations. PUK Peshmerga have also maintained limited gains in villages in southern Kirkuk near Taza and Daqiq as part of anti-ISIS operations that began on September 12. ISIS has not launched substantive counter-attacks against the Peshmerga in these areas, and they remain under Peshmerga control. ISW has thus expanded the Populated areas under PUK Peshmerga control in southern Kirkuk.
Sinjar
Road
Campaign
: Map

Sinjar Road Campaign: Satellite Photo

Sinjar City Campaign Satellite Photo

Post Paris Attacks Air Strikes on Raqqa: 20.11.15

CONTROL MAP OF RAMADI, NOV 11, 2015

Key Infrastructure and Important Locations
1. Albu Faraj Bridge
2. Palestine Bridge
3. Ramadi Barrage
4. Warrar Dam
5. Qassim Bridge
6. Anbar Operations
7. Government Complex
8. Anbar Factory
9. Glass Factory
10. Ramadi Train Station
11. Grand Mosque
12. Downtown Ramadi
13. ISIS Control
14. Contested, ISF present
15. ISF / Tribal Fighter control
16. Contested

Forms of Key
- CTS: Counter-Terrorism Service
- ISF: Unidentified Iraqi Security Forces
- EB: Emergency Battalions
- FP: Federal Police
- ERB: Emergency Response Brigades
- IP: Iraqi Police
- Tribal Fighters
- CTS Golden Division
- Mechanized Infantry
- Regiment
- UNK: Unknown Brigade Number

Areas circled in yellow indicate areas whose status has recently changed as a result of the most recent advances by the ISF north of Ramadi on November 1. Numbers and letters in yellow indicate key infrastructure and buildings. Habaniya is the primary base for Anbar Operations Command in the vicinity of Ramadi and is located east of Ramadi.

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&search=inbox&th=150f89f8e0d0d1e3&siml=150f89f8e0d0d1e3, 11.11.15
The Iraqi government continues to advance in contested areas, but resistance remains to the north and east.

Source: Institute for the Study of War
CONTROL MAP OF RAMADI, DEC 22, 2015

Areas circled in yellow indicate areas whose status has recently changed as a result of the most recent advances. Numbers and letters in yellow indicate key infrastructure and buildings. Habaniya is the primary base for Anbar Operations Command in the vicinity of Ramadi and is located east of Ramadi.

Content by: Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team
Graphics by: Patrick Martin

Liberating Ramadi: 22 December 2015

Source: Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly report to Congress, January 2016, pp. 37
Zones Around Mosul 2.2016

Sultan Abdullah lies on the front line between the Kurdish peshmerga and the Islamic State.

Airpower and Victory in Ramadi
(Excerpt from brief by Col Steve Warren, 12/29/2015)

Q: Hey, Steve, I wonder if you can give an estimate when Ramadi will be completely cleared? General Milley, the Army chief, was over there last week. He was told by Iraqi generals, they expected it to be completely cleared by mid-January. I wonder if you agree with that assessment.

And also, talk a bit about the importance of U.S. airstrikes here in Ramadi. There was an Iraqi officer quoted as saying, 80 percent of the effort in Ramadi was due to American airstrikes.

COL. WARREN: Well, I would agree that probably 80 percent of the effort -- I would agree with that Iraqi officer who said that 80 percent of the effort in Ramadi was due to coalition airstrikes. I think that is a fair assessment.

We don't kind of keep those numbers. That is really just more instinct and feel. But I would not argue with that.

The airstrikes have been significant. We believe that over the last six months, in the over 600 strikes, which translates to over 2,500 kinetic events, 2,500 different targets that destroyed, you know, 70 VBIED truck bombs, almost 300 other enemy vehicles, nearly 800 structures, 400 various types of weapons. This is significant. And this is what really facilitated or enabled the Iraqi forces to move in.

And this is how modern warfare is, by the way. This is no different than the way any army should fight. It's using that air power as the force multiplier that it is.

How long will it take them to clear the rest of Ramadi? Too soon to tell, Tom. There are still -- so clearing is -- there is really -- there are two steps, right? Number one, eliminate the remaining enemy. Number two, reduce the obstacles, right, these IEDs, the booby-traps, you know, the entire houses that have been rigged to blow. This is going to take a while, because any house could be rigged to blow.

So as the Iraqi forces are trying to dismantle these various booby-traps, they still have to be on the lookout for the remaining bands of ISIL fighters who are out to harass them. So, it will be a process. I'm not going to put a time on it, Tom, because it will be wrong.

But it will take some time, I will tell you that much.
COL. WARREN: Well, I think the Iraqi army’s willingness to fight is pretty well displayed on this Ramadi map, right? I mean, having seized Camp Warrar, having cleared Tamim -- al-Tamim neighborhood; having seized the Palestine bridge; seized the Anbar Operations Center, the Zangora checkpoint, and now moving into downtown Ramadi.

So I think their actions speak louder than any words that I could produce here. But keep in mind, all of this is done in conjunction with -- with this devastating air power that we're able to deliver, you know, across the breadth and depth of this battlefield.

Iraqi forces have worked well together. The CTS, the Counter-Terror Service, have been in the lead in most of -- in fact, most of these fights. The 10th Iraqi Division has the northern sector up there by the Anbar operations command -- the yellow circle on your Ramadi map. That was all 10th Division. The rest of it was kind of a mix of counterterror service and Iraqi army conventional forces.

Yeah, there's been no notable issues of these forces working together.

...We've enrolled about 8,000 Sunni tribal fighters in the TMF program. Of those, we've trained about 5,000 of them. The way this training works is that they come into a training location where Iraqi security forces provide the direct training. And those Iraqi security forces are overseen by American forces. So it's American forces providing guidance, advice and assistance to Iraqi army trainers who are training Sunni tribal fighters.

The training consists of some training in a garrison environment. The Sunni tribal fighters are then moved to the front line, if you well, where they cycle through the battlefield for a period of time, usually one to two weeks. They then come off the front lines, return back to the training site, to finalize their training, to figure out what they learned while they were on the front line.

When that’s complete, we now have a trained Sunni tribal fighter who will be used primarily as part of the holding and stabilization force. So they are beginning to cycle through -- well, they're really at the planning phase now -- of getting these tribal fighters cycled into downtown Ramadi where they will -- they will form the bedrock of the holding force in Ramadi.

The Sunni tribal fighters, they cycle through, you know, small groups for shorter periods of time. They were not, frankly, a significant player in the seizure of Ramadi. They will be significant players in the stabilization and the holding of Ramadi, but up until now, their -- their presence while, you know, every man counts, every rifle matter, they have not had a large -- simply not a large enough presence to really to make much of a difference.

...What the Iraqi army that collapsed in 2014 was a counterinsurgency army. They were not prepared and they were not trained and they were not ready for a conventional fight, the conventional assault that ISIL brought to Mosul and beyond.

So, the last year has been a process every constructing, rebuilding, and refitting the Iraqi army. So now, they are outfitted with modern American equipment, modern conventional training, and of course, supported by devastating air power.

But what are some exact examples of this combined arms training? Well, number one and I think, probably the most notable, is the river crossing. You know, the Interim 14th Combat Bridging Company came here to Iraq to train the Iraqi Bridging Battalion of how to do bridging operations. This is a complex operation. This is grown-up work here. This is advanced warfare.

There were no Shia militias involved in this operation for Ramadi. Primarily, we see the Shia militia really operate more in the Tigris River Valley. There were some in the Euphrates River Valley as well. But primarily, their focus has been in the Tigris River Valley.

And the Ramadi fight in particular, has been an exclusively an Iraqi army and a CTS fight. In Fallujah, it's primarily Iraqi army -- primarily Iraqi army. The vast majority, Iraqi army, but maybe not completely. But it is in the Tigris River Valley where we see the PMF operating.
Q: You talked about some of the specialized equipment that was used by the Iraqis. They were trained by the U.S. Could you talk about that in -- as it was used to try to get at the IEDs? And was it the same -- was it the same U.S. unit? I think it's the 814th that helped them with that portable bridge across the canal?

Also colonel, was -- were you running into -- in Ramadi, the tunnel complexes that have been evident in -- in other locations? And lastly, part of the specialized equipment -- did they -- did they have use of line charges to get rid of some of the IEDs?

COL. WARREN: Yeah. So, of the specialized equipment, two are most notable. Number one is the line charges. The Iraqi security forces did fire a MICLIC flying charge several days ago as they tried to breach the southern defensive belt that ISIL had set up. So it was a successful execution of the MICLIC.

And the other I think notable piece of unusual equipment are armored bulldozers. We sent about 21 armored bulldozers forward for the Iraqi security forces to use. They use these armored bulldozers to do two things: one, often to push -- to try to push minefields or improvised explosive devices out of the way. But much more importantly though, they use them to rapidly built up berms on the sides of an advancing unit. Because this enemy likes to try and bring truck bombs or we call them VBIEDs, around and into the flanks of attacking forces. So what -- in a great combined arms maneuver, using mobility, using engineering assets to generate mobility, tanks will provide security. So they will look down the streets and shoot at anything that moves while the armored bulldozers build up berms on either side of the road which will prevent these truck bombs from coming in and striking flanks. And they will advance that way with armor -- you know, tanks, M1s and others, bringing protection and then the armored bulldozers providing the mobility.

In this case, counter mobility, by erecting berms, constructing berms on either side of the road to prevent VBIEDs from attacking into the flanks. We did see some tunnels. We destroyed many of them. Again, used to not really significant effect, obviously, because the Iraqis were able to come in and seize the government complex.

The tunnel will continue to be a problem as the Iraqis will go through the process of patrolling and clearing these neighborhoods. They will have to be on the lookout for these tunnels. These are areas where the enemy can hide and like ambushes.

These are areas where the enemy can move around and reposition if there is a confrontation or small firefight. So the tunnels continue to be something that the Iraqis need to keep their eye on. Our pilots and our targeters have done -- they've learned a lot about tunnels and how to identify them from the air. And so we strike them whenever we see them as well.

...Yeah, so, you know, the overall strength of the ISIL fighting force, we still estimate somewhere to be between 20 and 30,000. They have a robust recruiting program -- that has been acknowledged. And so, this is something that we have to deal with
Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

November 25, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Blobby%20map%2025%20Nov%202015%20high%20%28004%29_13.png
Iraq: Areas of Control: 9.2.16

Air Strikes in Iraq as of January 17, 2016

US-led coalition air strikes in Iraq
Estimated number launched by each country

Source: Airwars.org (data to 17 Jan 2016)
Iraqi Popular Perceptions

Funded by the U.S. government since 2010, the National Democratic Institute has commissioned the firm of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research to poll Iraqi citizens on a wide array of issues affecting security and development in Iraq. The survey covering August to September 2015 shows that an all-time low of 26% of Iraqis polled view Iraq as heading in the “right direction,” down from a peak of 48% in spring 2012. Security was cited by 48% of respondents as one of the two top issues confronting the GOI—down from 61% in September 2014 (arguably, at the height of the ISIL threat), indicating some improvement in the public’s view of the ISF’s performance. Other problems cited as top priorities for the GOI were mitigating corruption (43%) and improving public services (37%).

Security Issues
The poll’s results showed widespread support for counter-ISIL efforts, including relatively strong backing for the employment of PMFs on the battlefield.

- 78% of respondents from western Iraq felt that security there was getting worse.
- 60% of all Iraqis viewed the Iraqi Army as “represent[ing] all Iraqis.” Only 29% of Sunnis and 14% of Kurds agreed, versus 90% of Shia.
- 0% of Kurds and just 4% of Sunnis polled trusted the PMFs alone to ensure their security, versus 30% of Shia; however, 66% of all Iraqis polled trusted a combination of the ISF and PMFs to safeguard them.
- 81% of all Iraqis polled supported the use of PMFs against ISIL.
- 52% of Sunnis viewed the PMFs as important to their security, while 100% of Shia and 5% of Kurds polled felt the same.

The GOI’s Performance
On matters indirectly linked to security, the poll found:

- 69% of respondents still preferred democracy over all other forms of government.
- 65% approved of the Prime Minister’s job performance, while only 13% approved of the parliament’s performance.
- 58% of Sunnis responded in the affirmative when asked whether they wanted to continue “in the direction” the Prime Minister is taking Iraq.
- The Prime Minister’s favorability rating was 54% overall (75% among Shia, 39% among Sunni Arabs, and 5% among Kurds).
- 85% of respondents from the KRG categorized the GOI as unresponsive to their needs, though 70% also said the same of the KRG.
- 88% of Kurds, 61% of Sunnis, and 46% of Shia said sectarianism was getting worse.

U.S. Estimate of Iraqi Army Limitations

The ISF continues to face the challenge of combatting corruption by preventing, detecting, and deterring the waste, fraud, and abuse of public funds. A report issued in early December by Transparency International details deep-rooted corruption within Iraq’s military institutions, placing “it in the highest risk category for corruption in the [defense] and security sector . . . with the highest risk sector[s] being Operations.”

The report also identifies the following problems:

• ghost soldiers
• leaking of intelligence by corrupt ISF officials
• ISF extortion of civilians
• diversion by senior officials of approximately $380 million intended for ISF salaries in 2015
• inadequate parliamentary oversight
• poorly vetted key appointments
• inadequate defense procurement processes

More specifically, Transparency International gave Iraq’s security institutions the lowest possible rating in several sub-categories. These included maintaining public trust, defense-acquisition processes, links to organized crime, the recruitment of intelligence officers, export controls, asset-disposal procedures, legislative access to defense-spending records, intermingling of military and business interests, payroll- and personnel-tracking processes, and anticorruption training and monitoring.

For the ISF to continue to develop as an effective partner to the coalition—one capable of consolidating recent battlefield gains—the challenge of corruption within the military needs to be addressed.
The Kurdish Issue in Iraq
The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015

The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p 89
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq
After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015

Source:
https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+Kurdis+Zone+in+Iraq&tbm=isc&imgrl=wyCRcvHslNaCaM%253A%253B3CruUIuw100rKM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fmons.wikimedia.org%25252F52Fwik%25252F52Fatlas_of_Iraqi_Kurdistan%5fsource=iu&pf=0&fir=wyCRcvHslNaCaM%25252C3CruUIuw100rKM%25252C_&biw=1358&bih=995&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1OUQwtkW3AK4c%3D&ved=0CCKQyjdgFQoTCMbNyuPtnsgCFYGMLaodWWG8g&ei=vOILVsByoZGZ0T2zpmQDw#imgrc=wyCRcvHslNaCaM%3A&usg=__dgkzFcIYx195k1OUQwnkW3AK4c%3D
Has become an area of Kurdish as well as Kurdish-Arab tension. Commander of the Yezidi Sinjar Protection Forces Haydar Qassem Sheshou was arrested on April 5th, 2015, by a special police force affiliated with Barzani and KDP under the pretext of being linked to the Popular Mobilization militias. These groups were accused of committing violent operations in areas liberated from ISIS, which prompted the PUK Central Council to condemn the arrest and hint that the Democratic Party wanted to hand Sinjar over to ISIS.

Is an area of critical energy value: EIA estimates 17% of Iraq’s oil reserves are in the north of Iraq, near Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin. Control over rights to reserves is a source of controversy between the ethnic Kurds and other groups in the area. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region contained 4 billion barrels of proved reserves. KRG’s estimate is much higher because it is a resource estimate that includes unproved resources. The KRG recently increased its oil resource estimate from 45 billion barrels to 60 billion barrels although this has not been independently verified and this number likely includes at least some resources in disputed areas—especially Kirkuk.

After skirmishes between ISIL and KRG forces around the Kirkuk and Bai Hassan fields, the KRG took over operations at the Ava na Dome, a part of the Kirkuk field, and Bai Hassan in July 2014. Shortly after, KRG restarted commercial production at those fields, which allowed the KRG to increase oil flows through its newly built pipeline that connects to Ceyhan (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Iraq’s Northern Oil Company continued to produce about 120,000 bbl/d from the Kirkuk’s Baba Dome, of which 30,000 bbl/d was sent to the Kirkuk refinery. The remainder of the oil production was reinjected into oil fields associated with natural gas to keep natural gas production flowing for power generation.

A December 2014 deal reached between Baghdad and the KRG has allowed Kirkuk crude to be transported via the KRG pipeline to Ceyhan, providing Baghdad with a commercial outlet for its northern production (see section on Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad). Fighting around Kirkuk city continues to take place, making nearby fields vulnerable to supply disruption.

Source: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, “Kurdistan in Iraq: An escalating conflict,” September 2nd, 2015, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#inbox/14f8dd839ca07ee1, and http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ.
Governance, Economic, and Humanitarian Impacts in Iraq
Iraq: Evolution of the Crisis
(as of 31 December 2015)
Demographic Pressures on Iraq

Iraq Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Increase</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Population Growth Rate (percent)</th>
<th>Total Annual Births (millions)</th>
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<td>0.9%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2045</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi Governance

- Nominal democracy which is often really government by power broker.
- Near paralysis over ethnic and sectarian divisions since 2010 election. Maliki revives civil wear during 2011-2013
- Heritage of unworkable constitution, election process, dysfunctional legislature without real local representation and fiscal powers.
- Heritage of corruption, power brokering, indifference to security.
- Countercorruption efforts are generally top down failures relying on punishment, rather than adequate fiscal controls, plans, measures of effectiveness.
- Long legacy of “petroleum disease”:
  - 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings.
  - Inflated and costly government hiring and SOEs.
  - Unrealistic budgets, plans, forecast.
  - Failure in agricultural reform and productivity compound by subsidy problem.
  - Population pressure means per capita oil export revenues dropping real terms.
- Deeply divided and sometimes corrupt security services, including police and border police.
- Corrupt ministries, some times incapable of planning and executing budgets, no measures of effectiveness and few real world data.
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org

Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

Governance in Last Full Year of Saddam vs. Modern Iraq: Still Dismal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentile Rank (0 to 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice and Accountability</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>Control of Corruption</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about $730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the $824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about $380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from $87 billion in 2014 to $45.2 billion.

On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about out $2,186 in 2014 to $1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA's March 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq's per capita oil income in 2014 was $2,682, compared to $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, $25,362 for Kuwait, and $36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to $1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to $515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)

Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

Iraq Terrorism Deaths: I


Iraq Terrorism Deaths: II

In 2014 Iraq had the most deaths from terrorism ever recorded for a country. There were a total of 9,929 deaths, representing a 55 per cent increase from the previous year. Iraq has ranked as the country most impacted by terrorism for every year since 2004.

The catalyst for the rise in terrorism in Iraq had been the US-led invasion in 2003. From 1998 to 2002 there were 65 deaths from terrorism in Iraq. With the commencement of the Iraq war in 2004 there were nearly five times as many deaths than in the previous five years.

There have been two distinct periods where terrorism has jumped in Iraq. The first occurred in 2007 with the US troop surge when 6,100 deaths were reported, an increase of 39 per cent from the previous year. Deaths then fell by 56 per cent in the following year to be below the levels in 2006.

The second increase began in 2013 and has continued through to 2015 fuelled by increasing sectarian violence and the activities of ISIL. 2014 continued the deteriorating trend from 2013 when terrorist deaths jumped by 166 per cent to 6,397.

In 2013 ISIL was responsible for 77 per cent of deaths from claimed terrorist attacks which resulted in 1,310 deaths. In 2014 this increased to 95 per cent of claimed attacks with 5,436 deaths. ISIL mainly targets private citizens using explosions.

ISIL has undergone some changes in tactics by dramatically increasing its number of kidnappings. ISIL claimed responsibility for 101 separate kidnappings in 2014, up from 13 in 2013. The targets of kidnapping by ISIL are private citizens 44 per cent of the time, followed by police 25 per cent and journalists 15 per cent.

As well as being a terrorist group, ISIL is also involved in the Syrian civil war where it engages in combat with forces loyal to Assad, the al-Nusra front, Kurdish forces and the international coalition against ISIL. This means that ISIL is responsible for more deaths than just from terrorism but also battle deaths and other related deaths that occur in the context of conflict. These conflict deaths have not been included in the GTI.

This data is based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)

143,334 – 162,577 Further analysis may add 10,000 civilian deaths.

These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports.

Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

**UN: Iraqi Civilians Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015**

#### Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Killed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>506</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>489</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2015</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>535</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>729</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>611</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2015</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2014</td>
<td>936</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>856</td>
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<td>September 2014</td>
<td>854</td>
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<td>August 2014</td>
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<td>June 2014</td>
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<td>May 2014</td>
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<td>April 2014</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>564</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>618</td>
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<td>November 2013</td>
<td>565</td>
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<td>October 2013</td>
<td>852</td>
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<td>September 2013</td>
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<td>August 2013</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>928</td>
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<td>December 2012</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baghdad, 1 January 2016 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total of 980 Iraqis were killed and another 1,244 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in December 2015*.

The number of civilians killed was 506 (including 18 federal police, Sahwa civil defence, Personal Security Details, facilities protection police and fire department), and the number of civilians injured was 867 (including 41 federal police, Sahwa civil defence, Personal Security Details, facilities protection police and fire department).

A further 474 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (including Peshmerga, SWAT and militias fighting alongside the Iraqi Army) were killed and 377 were injured. “The year 2015 has seen thousands of Iraqis killed and injured as a result of conflict and terrorism.

This is unacceptable,” said the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Ján Kubiš. “The Iraqi people have every right to live in peace and tranquility. The United Nations continues to deplore this continuing loss of life,” he added.

Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 1048 civilian casualties (261 killed, 787 injured, Ninewa 68 killed and 17 injured, while Salahadin 12 killed and 30 injured, Kirkuk 24 killed and 06 injured and Diyala had 10 killed and 06 injured.

According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, in December 2015 the Governorate suffered a total of 139 civilian casualties (124 killed and 15 injured). Anbar casualty figures are until 29 December 2015, inclusive.

The total number of Civilian Casualties (killed and injured) for 2015 (including Police and including Anbar[1]) in the entire 2015 was 22,370 (7,515 killed and 14,855 injured).

*CAVEATS: In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas. Figures for casualties from Anbar Governorate are provided by the Health Directorate and are noted below. Casualty figures obtained from the Anbar Health Directorate might not fully reflect the real number of casualties in those areas due to the increased volatility of the situation on the ground and the disruption of services. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum.

[1] UNAMI/HRO did not obtain the casualty figures from the Anbar Health Department for October and November 2015.

UNAMI/OHCHR on Civilian Casualties: 19 January 2016

BAGHDAD/. There are also reports of the murder of child soldiers who fled fighting on the frontlines in Anbar. Information received and verified suggests that between 800 and 900 children in Mosul had been abducted by ISIL for religious education and military training.

“ISIL continued to subject women and children to sexual violence, particularly in the form of sexual slavery,” the report states. The report also documented alleged violations and abuses of international human rights and international humanitarian law by the Iraqi Security Forces and associated forces, including militia and tribal forces, popular mobilization units, and Peshmerga.

Concerning reports have been received of unlawful killings and abductions perpetrated by some elements associated with pro-Government forces. “Some of these incidents may have been reprisals against persons perceived to support or be associated with ISIL,” the report states. “Moreover, as civilians move around the country, fleeing violence, they have continued to face Government restrictions on their ability to access safe areas. Once they reach such areas, some have experienced arbitrary arrest in raids by security forces and others have been forcibly expelled. The conduct of pro-Government forces’ operations raises concern that they are carried out without taking all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects.”

The discovery of a number of mass graves is documented in the report, including in areas regained by the Government from ISIL control, as well as mass graves from the time of Saddam Hussein. One of the mass graves uncovered reportedly contains 377 corpses, including women and children apparently killed during the 1991 Shi’a uprisings against Saddam Hussein in the east of Basra. GENEVA (19 January 2016) – A UN report released today details the severe and extensive impact on civilians of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, with at least 18,802 civilians killed and another 36,245 wounded between 1 January 2014 and 31 October 2015. Another 3.2 million people have become internally displaced since January 2014, including more than a million children of school age.

Of the total number of casualties, at least 3,855 civilians were killed and 7,056 wounded between 1 May and 31 October last year – the period covered by the report, although the actual figures could be much higher than those documented. About half of these deaths took place in Baghdad.

The report, compiled by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), is based largely on testimony obtained directly from the victims, survivors or witnesses of violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law, including interviews with internally displaced people.

“The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering. The so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL) continues to commit systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law. These acts may, in some instances, amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide,” the report states. “During the reporting period, ISIL killed and abducted scores of civilians, often in a targeted manner. Victims include those perceived to be opposed to ISIL ideology and rule; persons affiliated with the Government, such as former Iraqi security forces (ISF), police officers, former public officials and electoral workers; professionals, such as doctors and lawyers; journalists; and tribal and religious leaders. Others have been abducted and/or killed on the pretext of aiding or providing information to Government security forces.

Many have been subjected to adjudication by ISIL self-appointed courts which, in addition to ordering the murder of countless people, have imposed grim punishments such as stoning and amputations.” The report details numerous examples of killings by ISIL in gruesome public spectacles, including by shooting, beheading, bulldozing, burning alive and throwing off the top of buildings.


Note: The MOH collects data from the MOI and MOD on ISF casualties and adds it to its own tally of Iraqi civilian deaths. The IAU figures are “collated from various sources around the country.”
The UN does not guarantee the accuracy of the information. Iraq Body Count states that its data is drawn from media reports, official GOI reports, NGO data, and reviews of Iraqi hospital and morgue figures. As of April 17, Iraq Body Count was still finalizing its March death toll of 320.

Energy Vulnerability in Iraq

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq’s Long History of Export Instability

Iraq's total petroleum and other liquids production and consumption

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015

Iraq Still Had World’s Second Largest Increase in Supply in 2014

Despite some supply disruptions and security threats, Iraq was the second-leading contributor to global oil supply growth in 2014, behind only the United States. Iraq accounted for almost 60% of production growth among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although this growth was more than offset by production declines in other OPEC countries. Iraq’s crude oil production, which averaged almost 3.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2014, was 330,000 bbl/d above 2013 levels, despite the heightened security threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and disrupted production in northern Iraq.

ISIL attacks in northern Iraq in early June 2014 reduced northern Iraqi production and refinery operations (not including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region). These attacks did not affect southern production and exports, which accounted for 65% of Iraq’s total crude oil exports in 2014. ISIL did not significantly affect production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, although fighting came very close to fields produced under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—the Khurmala Dome and Shaikhan. Some oil companies were forced to abandon exploration projects, which could delay future development.

Iraq’s crude oil production fell to its lowest monthly levels for the year during July and August following the start of the ISIL offensive. From August to December, Iraq’s production grew by almost 600,000 bbl/d, reflecting increased output from fields in southern Iraq and in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region following infrastructure expansions and a partial recovery in northern Kirkuk production. In December, Iraq’s crude oil production reached 3.79 million bbl/d, the highest amount on record.
Key Dams in Iraq

### DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX

**IDP LOCATIONS & POPULATION**

**IRAQ IDP CRISIS - JANUARY 2014 TO 30 JULY 2015**

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#### NUMBER OF FAMILIES BY GOVERNORATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Locations $^1$</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals $^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>97,394</td>
<td>584,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>58,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>89,772</td>
<td>338,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>10,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>71,009</td>
<td>426,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
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<td>20,869</td>
<td>125,214</td>
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<td>47,544</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>5,509</td>
<td>33,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,331</td>
<td>528,601</td>
<td>3,171,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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#### LEGEND

- **High concentration**
- **Low concentration**
- **Locations**

---

Dahuk governorate hosts the third largest IDP population (13% or 426,054 individuals), of whom 99% are from Nineawa. The majority of IDPs (83%) were displaced in August 2014, while no IDPs hosted in the governorate were displaced after September 2014. In terms of shelter arrangements, Dahuk hosts 9% of the total IDP population housed in camps (144,768 individuals), corresponding to 34% of the IDP population in Dahuk. Instead, about 29% are housed in critical shelter arrangements, and only 37% are in private settings.

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Baghdad governorate hosts the second largest IDP population (17% or 358,632 individuals). The majority of this population is originally from Anbar governorate (85%), while a smaller portion (7%) are originally from Baghdad governorate. IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (18%), September 2014-March 2015 (31%) and after April 2015 (28%). The vast majority (91%) is hosted in private settings.

Anbar governorate hosts the largest IDP population (18% or 584,364 individuals) and reports a very high rate of intra-governorate displacement; 97% of IDPs are originally from the same governorate. These IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (46%) and after April 2015 (38%). The majority is housed in private settings (81%), out of which 72% in host families and 9% in rented houses, while a smaller portion (19%) is in critical shelters. Finally, Anbar governorate hosts 13% of the total returnees (39,558 individuals).

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### Sources

Thematic data: IOM DTM as of 2015/08/04. Administrative data: OCHA CCOD. This map is for illustrative purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page @iraqdtm@iom.int

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1. Location is defined as an area including a district (e.g. official administrative division) or a village for rural areas or a neighborhood for urban areas (e.g. 9th official administrative division). IOM DTM aims to provide precise population data; however, limited access and other operational constraints on the ground can limit information gathering activities.

2. Total individuals are estimated by multiplying total families by 6, the average size of an Iraqi family.
Iraq: IDP Status (as of October 2015)
Iraq: Humanitarian Response  
(as of October 2015)

In October, a total of 68 partners reported a response in 254 different locations; the number of people reached by protection monitoring team continues to increase with more than 49,000 people reached; over 500,000 people have assisted with food. In 2015, by the end of October, the health cluster partners have also supported more then 1.1 million people with access to primary health cares; over 100,000 women and girls were accessing women safe spaces; over 250,000 people have been assisted with permanent sanitation facilities and over 450,000 children have been provided access to rehabilitated schools.

More than 8 million people across Iraq - nearly a quarter of the population - are in need of humanitarian assistance. About 3.2 million people have been internally displaced since January 2014, according to the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix. To respond to the growing needs, the Government of Iraq and the United Nations launched a revised and prioritized Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in June 2015 seeking US$498 million to provide life-saving assistance and protection to 5.6 million people. Although money is coming in, the humanitarian needs outpace available resources. This is taking a toll on response capacity and the ability to reach the most vulnerable people.

As per the reported activities, the humanitarian response has been heavily focused in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq - However, the operation has been re-balanced to Baghdad, and is now expanding its access and response across all of Iraq. Since January 2015, partners have reported a response in a total of 558 out of more than 3,000 settlements hosting IDPs.
The humanitarian situation in Iraq has continued to worsen and the ongoing conflict is having profound humanitarian consequences. Nearly a third of Iraq’s population – 10 million people – will require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2016. This includes 3.2 million people who have fled their homes since January 2014, about 470,000 returnees, and nearly 250,000 refugees. Humanitarian partners are requesting US$861 million in the 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan to help ensure that the most vulnerable people receive the assistance they need.

In December, the battle to retake Ramadi in Anbar Governorate intensified and the humanitarian situation remains critical. People from Ramadi are being relocated to Habbaniyah Tourist City by authorities, where humanitarian partners are providing emergency response to people in need. In another concerning development, about 1,800 people east of Mount Sinjar along the border with Al-Ayadiyah Sub-district in Ninewa Governorate remain stranded between military front lines and continue to be denied access to safer territories.
Iraq: Funding Status (Humanitarian Response Plan)

Iraq 2015 HRP

HRP Funding

Source: fts.unocha.org

US Aid to Iraq FY2015 and FY2016 as of 12/31/2015

**UN Appeals and Funding Received for the Syria and Iraq Crises, as of 12/31/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Response Plan</th>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015 Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
<td>$2.7 billion (63% of request)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Syria Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
<td>$2.8 billion</td>
<td>$1.2 billion (43% of request)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
<td>$704 million</td>
<td>$518 million (74% of request)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Status of Cumulative FY 2015 and FY 2016 U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Funds for the Iraq Complex Crisis, as of 12/31/2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>227.8</td>
<td>187.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325.9</td>
<td>219.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Whereas PRM only reported disbursements of funds obligated from FY 2015 forward, USAID reported disbursements of funds obligated at any prior point. As a result, USAID reported disbursements may exceed obligations because disbursements may have been made against obligations from a prior fiscal year. Data on disbursements can provide valuable information about how much money has been spent on activities as well as the amounts of funding that remain available for expenditure. Provided a letter of credit from the U.S. government, however, humanitarian assistance implementing partners may accrue expenses before drawing down on agency funds. For this reason, expenditures on humanitarian assistance activities sometimes exceed disbursements.

**Sources:** USAID, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/21/2016; DoS, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/11/2016.

U.S. government financial commitments to the current Syria and Iraq complex crises have totaled approximately $5.13 billion. About 88% of these funds have been focused on responding to the Syria complex crisis, which predates the current humanitarian situation in Iraq by 2 years.

From October 1, 2014, to December 31, 2015, USAID and DoS obligated nearly $1.64 billion in humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria complex crisis. Over that period, USAID and DoS disbursed $1.33 billion to related programs and activities. During the first quarter of FY 2016, OFDA, FFP, and PRM disbursed a total of $194.2 million.