ISIS and “Failed State Wars”
In Syria and Iraq

Anthony H. Cordesman
acordesman@gmail.com
Meeting the Analytic and Policy Challenge
Key Failures in USG Efforts

1. Policy level comes to focus on spin, lack of objective analysis and transparency, compartmentation. Congress goes for partisan and member advantage.

2. Denial of complexity, net for net assessment. Focus on hostile forces rather than overall security situation.

3. Lack of meaningful integrated civil-military planning

4. Poor accounting and conditionality, lack of measures of effectiveness, focus on past waste rather than future needs and effectiveness.

5. Military reverts to focus on tactical success, short-term civil buy offs.

6. Focus on force generation rather than combat effectiveness. Rush in too late, leave too early; don’t provide combat advisors, erratic programs and funding, lack of conditionality

7. Civil side pursues illusions of progress, tries to reform everything, then reverts to project aid that often ignores security and fighting.

8. We lie when we say we’ll focus on letting them do it their way, helping them evolve their civil and security systems on their terms.

9. Efforts at improving fiscal management, counter corruption, rule of law, police reform reflect our goals and culture, do more harm than good

10. High rotation rates, new policies: Every year is the first year. Fail to develop and retain core expertise in economic planning, state politics, governance reform, and security reform.

11. Erratic swings in funding. Emphasis on budget execution rather than effectiveness

12. We “take note of lessons” after the crisis, fail to learn from the past.
Areas of ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State) Control, Operation, and Affiliation
ISIS Area of Operation

Absorbing Other Groups

ISIS “Provinces”

Countries where ISIS has declared provinces

Major ISIS Attacks and Arrests: 10.14 to 8.15

Iranian Influence

Lebanon  Hezbollah is considered Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. It follows Iranian leadership and acts in Iran’s interest.

Syria  Iran is a strong ally of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria and is active in Syrian command structures and on the ground through proxies, including Hezbollah.

Iraq  Iran has directed military offensives against ISIS in Iraq and provided arms and training to Iraq’s Shiite militias.

Bahrain  Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of backing opposition from the Shiite majority against the Sunni monarchy.

Yemen  Tehran has provided money and possibly arms to the Houthi movement, but does not seem to exert a strong influence over the group as it does with Hezbollah.

But, ISIS is Only One Threat, and Key ISIS Countries Face Many Equal or Great Challenges
Not Really a War Against ISIS (ISIL, Daesh, Islamic State)

- Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have long been “failed states” in terms of politics governance, economic development, demographic pressures, and security.
- Libya torn apart into two warring “governments,” many local factions, Islamists, and regional and ethnic differences.
- ISIS “Caliphate” is product of two sets of civil wars, growing out of Sunni and Al Qaida hostility to U.S. invasion of Iraq.
  - Rise after 2011 a product of major upheavals growing out of both internal problems and failed secularism.
  - Syria is divided into four main fighting factions: ISIS, Kurdish, Arab-Islamist, and pro-Assad factions. Impact of 250,000+ dead, 500,000+ injured, 4+ million refugees, 7+ million internally displaced persons, 60%+ cut in GDP
  - Iraq is divided in Sunni, Kurdish, Iraqi government and Shiite factions on the edge of civil conflict and with growing violence after 2010.
  - “Youth bulge” in very young populations creates further stress.
  - U.S. invasion of Iraq compound impact of Saddam’s blood coup in 1979, Iran-Iraq War, invasion of Kuwait, U.S. led invasion in 2003, fighting from 2004-2013 all have a legacy – as does Assad’s father suppression of Moslem Brotherhood.
  - Defeating or degrading ISIS with still leave violent Islamist extremists.
- Yemen scene of constant fighting and civil struggles since British leave Aden. Now is Houthi vs. Sana government struggle Massive population pressure, serious water and arable land issues, drug economy. Sunni vs. Shi’ite and north-south tensions. Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula, not ISIS, is dominant Sunni Islamist extremist faction.
The Four Threats That Drive Serious Terrorism and Insurgency (In Order of Priority)

1. **Host Country Government and Security Forces**: Authoritarianism, failure to cope with internal divisions, poor governance and corruption, failed economy development and equity, population pressure and youth bulge, repression and violence by internal security forces, traditional and corrupt military.

2. **The Overt “Threat”**: Moderate and peaceful beginnings shift to extreme and violent movements that feed on the civil-military divisions and failures of the host country governments.

3. **The U.S. Threat to the U.S.**: Relearn counterinsurgency yet again. Separate military (tactical) and civil (project-oriented development) efforts. Threat oriented and downplay Host Country problems. No meaningful overall civil-military plan or net assessment. Rapid rotations with limited expertise. Cycle of denial, flood resources, rush to generate Host country forces, then leave too soon. “Take note” of lessons, then ignore.

4. **Other Nations: Allied, Neutral, Hostile**: Allied limits to engagement, national caveats, demands; neutral interference for competing national interests, hostile action because anti-U.S., support overt threat, opposing national interests.
The Uncertain State of “Progress”

- Years of war have now gone on since 2011 with no meaningful estimates of impact and the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.
- Rising GDP in petro-economics may disguise deep structural problems, impact of population growth, income distribution problems. Etc.
- Poverty estimates often fail to address rising costs, impact of urbanization, etc.
- Security remains a key problem that often is not taken into account in economic and human development estimates.
- Rising sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional and other internal divisions often ignored.
- Unemployment data ignore productivity, disguised unemployment, career opportunities.
- Data on progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raise major questions about quality of data.
- Critical near term challenges in revenues, job creation, electric power, agriculture, and roads.
- Estimate of future opportunities for progress often ignore reality that states at war need time to recover. No major near-term development options until.
- Military and aid spending have often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
ISIS, Failed States, and the Broader Patterns of Terrorism
Eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Eleven per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.

Deaths from Terrorism: 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased ninefold since the year 2000.

Impact of Key Terrorist Groups: 2014

Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.

In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe.

Rising Lethality of Attacks

Between 1970 and 2014, there have been **176 occasions on which terrorist attacks killed more than 100 people** (excluding perpetrators), in a particular country on a particular day. This includes both isolated attacks, multiple attacks, and multi-part, coordinated attacks. The first such event took place in 1978, when an arson attack targeting the Cinema Rex Theater in Abadan, Iran killed more than 400 people. Since the Cinema Rex attack, and until 2013, 4.2 such mass-fatality terrorist events happened per year, on average. **In 2014, the number increased dramatically when 26 mass-fatality terrorist events took place in eight different countries: Afghanistan (1), Central African Republic (1), Iraq (9), Nigeria (9), Pakistan (1), South Sudan (1), Syria (3), and Ukraine (1).**

The occurrence of a series of attacks on a particular day that result in large numbers of casualties may or may not be indicative of explicit coordination among perpetrators. **Nearly half (11) of the 26 days in 2014 in which more than 100 victims were killed by terrorists in a single country involved the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as perpetrators. In Nigeria, all nine of the highly lethal days involved the perpetrator group Boko Haram. Other perpetrator groups responsible for attacks on these high-fatality days include the Taliban in Afghanistan, militia groups in the Central African Republic, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), al-Nusrah Front, and the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, both in Ukraine.**

Between 2000 and 2014, there were 83 days on which more than 100 people were killed by terrorist attacks in a single country. These attacks took place in 25 countries in North and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; however, they were especially concentrated in Iraq and Nigeria.

Although Western Europe has historically experienced thousands of terrorist attacks, **highly lethal attacks like the recent events in Paris are extremely unusual. The deadliest terrorist attacks in Western Europe between 2000 and 2014 took place in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004 when assailants attacked six different transportation targets with explosives. Four of the devices detonated, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,800.**

The recent attacks in Paris reportedly involved both explosives and firearms. These two types of weapons are those most commonly used in terrorist attacks worldwide.

Between 2000 and 2014, explosives were used in 58 percent of all terrorist attacks, and firearms were used in 34 percent of all terrorist attacks. However both firearms and explosives were used much more rarely—in less than 4 percent of all attacks.

Attacks that involved firearms were somewhat more deadly than those involving explosives, causing 3.1 fatalities on average (including perpetrator deaths), compared to 2.4.

Despite the potential for explosives to cause mass casualties in certain cases, they were also more frequently used in attacks that are non-lethal (57%), either because they targeted only property or were unsuccessful at causing human casualties.

In comparison, 24 percent of all attacks involving only firearms worldwide between 2000 and 2014 were non-lethal.

Attacks that involved both explosives and firearms caused, on average, 6.8 deaths per attack. This rate of lethality is 2.8 times that of all attacks overall, and attacks involving explosives. It is 2.2 times the average lethality of attacks involving firearms.
Like the recent attacks in Paris, some of the highly lethal terrorist attacks described above were carried out as part of coordinated events in which perpetrators execute multiple attacks simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, typically in a single country or city. Between 2000 and 2014, 14 percent of all terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide were conducted in coordination with other attacks.

On average, individual attacks that were carried out as part of a coordinated event were slightly more deadly, causing 2.84 total fatalities on average, compared to isolated attacks, which caused 2.35 total fatalities on average. The average number of perpetrator fatalities among attacks that were part of a coordinated event were slightly higher as well—0.39 perpetrator deaths per attack, compared to 0.33 for isolated attacks.

More than 10,000 coordinated terrorist attacks took place in 104 countries between 2000 and 2014. Much like terrorism in general, these attacks were concentrated among a small number of countries. More than half of all coordinated attacks (54%) took place in Iraq, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Afghanistan.

Among countries that experienced more than 50 attacks between 2000 and 2014, France had the highest proportion of attacks that were carried out as part of multi-part, coordinated events, with 40 percent. The majority of these (87%) were carried out in Corsica by separatists including the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), causing property damage but no deaths and few injuries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>% Coordinated Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Perpetrator Fatalities</th>
<th>Victim Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4,592</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Terrorism Database

Like the recent attacks in Paris, some of the highly lethal terrorist attacks described above were carried out as part of coordinated events in which perpetrators execute multiple attacks simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, typically in a single country or city. Between 2000 and 2014, 14 percent of all terrorist attacks that occurred worldwide were conducted in coordination with other attacks.
The perpetrator of the attack was unidentified for 40 percent of all coordinated terrorist attacks that took place worldwide between 2000 and 2014. The remaining 60 percent were disproportionately carried out by a relatively small number of perpetrator groups.

While the recent attack in Paris shares similarities with the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, India, the perpetrator group in that attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is not among the most frequent perpetrators of coordinated attacks.

In contrast, ISIL, under its current incarnation, carried out more than 750 coordinated attacks during this time period—specifically in 2013 and 2014. However, this is a conservative assessment because the Global Terrorism Database records the names of perpetrator organizations at the time of the attack.

Thus, it is important to note that al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), ISIL’s predecessor, carried out at least 400 coordinated attacks as well. Also, 25 coordinated attacks were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), another identity previously assumed by ISIL, and several other coordinated attacks were carried out by provinces of the Islamic State, including the Sinai Province and the Tripoli Province.

Other organizations that have carried out more than a hundred coordinated attacks include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Communist Party of India- Maoist and unaffiliated Maoists in India, al-Shabaab primarily in Somalia and Kenya, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, Fulani militants in Nigeria and the Central African Republic, and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In addition, at least 50 coordinated attacks between 2000 and 2014 were carried out by individuals who reportedly were not affiliated with a particular terrorist organization or group. These attacks took place in 10 countries; however, 30 of them (60%) occurred in the United States and were carried out in pursuit of a wide variety of ideological goals. Eighteen of the attacks were part of a series in which a single perpetrator motivated by anti-government sentiment planted pipe bombs in mailboxes in five U.S. states.
Key Perpetrators: 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Fatalities</th>
<th>Total Injuries</th>
<th>Hostages Taken</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>6286</td>
<td>1752</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the Levant (ISIL)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>3492</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1022</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6644</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoists/Communist Party</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of India–Maoist</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Among these five perpetrator groups, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL (6.46 people killed per attack), the Taliban (4.07), and Boko Haram (16.86) were higher than the global average (2.57) in 2014. The average lethality of attacks carried out by al-Shabaab (2.46) was slightly lower than the global average. Attacks carried out by Maoist perpetrators in India were by far the least deadly and the least likely to be deadly, causing 0.63 deaths per attack.

- All five of the most active groups markedly increased the number of hostages taken in 2014; however, the increases in hostage-takings by ISIL and Boko Haram were exceptionally large. Attacks carried out by these two groups in 2014 involved more than 4,300 hostages, 50% of all hostages taken in terrorist attacks worldwide in which the perpetrator group was identified.

- Boko Haram also increased its use of suicide tactics in 2014, carrying out 31 suicide attacks, compared to three in 2013.

Although terrorist attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 60% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria), and 78% of all fatalities due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria).

Given the limitations of media coverage in Syria, the data presented here are conservative estimates of terrorism in Syria. Consistent with START’s practice of including in the GTD only those attacks that have been verified by at least one well-regarded source, these statistics represent those incidents that were reported by independent news outlets. Globally aggregated statistics do not represent uniform patterns worldwide. They are produced by diverse trends in violence and heavily influenced by events in several key locations. The statistical profiles in Table 2 illustrate many of these dynamics.

**Attacks:** Large increases in Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that also experienced high numbers of attacks in 2013, comprise more than one-third (37%) of the 35% increase in total attacks worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Fatalities:** Large increases in Nigeria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three countries that also experienced high numbers of fatalities due to terrorist attacks in 2013, comprise more than two-thirds (72%) of the 81% increase in total fatalities worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. Also, approximately one-quarter (26%) of the increase in total fatalities was attributable to increases in perpetrator fatalities, which were especially prevalent in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria.

**Injuries:** The total number of injuries due to terrorist attacks increased slightly (6%) in 2014. This was largely a product of various regional trends, including a 376% increase in injuries in Nigeria in 2014, and a 44% decrease in injuries in Pakistan in 2014 compared to 2013.

**Hostages:** Several countries observed large increases in the number of hostages taken in terrorist attacks in 2014. However, the largest increases took place in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria, comprising more than two-thirds (68%) of the 201% increase in hostages worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. This considerable increase in the total number of hostages taken by perpetrators of terrorist attacks is a result of a large increase in the number of attacks that involved any hostages as well as a large increase in the number of attacks that involved more than 100 hostages.

Four of the five countries that experienced the most terrorist attacks in 2014 were the same as those that experienced the most terrorism in 2013. The one exception was the Philippines, which experienced a 24% decline in attacks, and ranked 10th among countries with the most terrorism in 2014. Nigeria, which ranked 7th among countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2013, experienced a 114% increase in attacks and a 308% increase in fatalities in 2014.

Losing Touch with Reality: UNDP Human Development Trends

War has No Impact?

Ranking in total of 187 countries in 2014

Libya: 55th
Syria: 118th
Iraq: 120th
Yemen: 154th

Correlation is Not Causation, But:

- Many forms of correlation cover only small part of factors involved.
- Many key factors like ideology and religion do not lend themselves to reliable quantification.
- Polling very uncertain if pushed beyond limits.
- Political and social scientists, economists, often choose heavily biased “sets” of variables focusing on their own areas of interest.
- Nation-wide data disguises key sectarian, ethnic, regional, and local differences.
- **But**, Some key population and economic trends clearly do have *some* impact:
  - Massive population pressure (More than 5 times larger since 1950)
  - Youth “bulge” and link to unemployment.
  - Low per capita income and poor income distribution.
  - Failed secularism in the form of poor governance by every measure.
- “Worst case” or failed countries in MENA area do have some important things in common.
Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism

The higher the ranking, the better the country

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.

The Economist Threat to Counterinsurgency Economics

1. The economic factors that divided and sometimes shattered a nation are largely ignored.

2. The specific economic forces driving given factions, areas, and terrorist-insurgency threats are not measured or taken into account. (Sects, ethnic groups, regional tensions, conflict/war zones, IDP-refugee impacts, etc.)

3. Reliance on classic national wide metrics for developed nations at peace: GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation, debt, Balance of Payments, etc..

4. Fail to address major uncertainties, limits to data.

5. Focus on classic nation-wide development as if war and causes of war did not exist, and need to reconstruct and construct basic services and functions did not exist.

6. Economic aid becomes project aid without valid national analysis and plans. Fails to alter dominant military focus on fighting, conflict termination, departure, (possibly short-term stability) and not national stability.

7. Largely ignore demographic pressures, youth needs, corruption costs and impacts, critical problems in governance and budget planning and execution.

8. Live in “now”, rather than economic history, examine best-case, not real futures.


10. Focus on getting money and spending, not auditing use of money and measuring effectiveness.
## GDP Per Capita by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CIA GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
<th>World Bank GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
<th>IMF GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>51,400</td>
<td>45,479</td>
<td>51,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>10,530</td>
<td>10,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>16,392</td>
<td>17,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>14,469</td>
<td>14,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>82,024</td>
<td>71,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>16,600</td>
<td>15,591</td>
<td>15,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>43,351</td>
<td>28,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>102,100</td>
<td>146,178</td>
<td>143,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>52,800</td>
<td>51,924</td>
<td>52,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>11,125</td>
<td>11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>66,009</td>
<td>64,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>3,959</td>
<td>3,774</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “Youth Bulge”
(Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

An extremely young population and massive numbers of young men and women desperate for careers, jobs, marriage, a home, and a family. The CIA estimates that an extraordinary 36.7% of Iraq’s population is 0-14 years of age, and 19.6% is 15-24 years of age, and Iraq is nearly 70% urbanized. Its economy, politics, and social tensions will be under acute population pressure for at least another two decades.

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008): The Threat From POAYMs

Source: IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, October 2010, p. 38
Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050
(In Millions)

Country | 1950 | 2015 | Increase
---|---|---|---
Libya | 960,000 | 6,410,000 | X 6.7
Syria | 3,500,000 | 22,900,000 | X 6.5
Iraq | 5,160,000 | 33,300,000 | X 6.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.85</td>
<td>33.57</td>
<td>42.63</td>
<td>54.91</td>
<td>65.16</td>
<td>80.47</td>
<td>96.26</td>
<td>111.06</td>
<td>125.24</td>
<td>137.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>28.99</td>
<td>39.71</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>68.63</td>
<td>76.92</td>
<td>86.54</td>
<td>93.46</td>
<td>97.69</td>
<td>100.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>18.14</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>29.67</td>
<td>36.89</td>
<td>43.83</td>
<td>50.46</td>
<td>56.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>8.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>25.73</td>
<td>29.82</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>37.25</td>
<td>40.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>10.53</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>12.28</td>
<td>12.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>12.42</td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td>23.21</td>
<td>29.88</td>
<td>35.66</td>
<td>41.14</td>
<td>46.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
Key Islamic Partners Affecting MENA Security

- **Bahrain** (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf),
- **Egypt** (Critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),
- **Jordan** (ally deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),
- **Kuwait** (provides air bases and land warfare facilities),
- **Lebanon** (US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),
- **Morocco** (key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),
- **Oman** (ally and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),
- **Qatar** (locate main U.S. airbase in the Gulf, and member of the coalition against ISIS),
- **Saudi Arabia** (main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism),
- **Turkey** (which is a long-standing NATO ally)
- **UAE** (key military partner to U.S. air and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, provides bases US allies like Britain and France).
Saudi, UAE, GCC Influence

Countries Fighting ISIL in Iraq

Conflicting Threat and Allied Interests
(*Other nations too have vital security interests*)

• **Iran**: Expanding regional influence, role in Syria and Iraq, Challenge to U.S.
• **Russia**: Ukraine, basing, regional influence, support of Assad, U.S. is destabilizing region, Putin’s desire to reassert Russia.
• **Lebanon**: Hezbollah, Shi’ite Alignments, ties to Iran, refugees.
• **Iraq**: Shiite-dominated government with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions, distrust of reliance on U.S.
• **Kurds**: Wide mix of factions and interests in Syria, Iraq, Turkey (Iran?), refugees
• **Israel**: Focus on Palestinians, Iran and nuclear, own security.
• **Turkey**: Erdogan’s ambitions, Kurdish issue(s), focus on Assad, higher tolerance of Islamist movements, own security, refugees.
• **Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait**: Focus on Assad in Syria matches focus on ISIS, support Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Iran in Gulf a primary threat, uncertain trust in U.S.
• **Bahrain**: Focus on tensions with own Shi’ites (Base 5th fleet in the Gulf)
• **Egypt**: Internal struggles, uncertain trust in U.S., Sinai unrest.
• **Jordan**: Major internal security concerns, border threats, uncertain trust in U.S., Palestinian issue, refugees.
• **Europe**: Ukraine, refugees, no common interest in region, focus on domestic needs, limit defense spending and military efforts.
Rise of ISIL and Areas of Occupation in both Iraq and Syria
Maneuverable Terrain in Syria and Iraq

Kurds in the Middle East

This map shows only the main areas of settlement of Kurds in the Middle East.

Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State’s aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.

A gun battle erupted last week between Syrian fighters and foreigners in Abu Kamal after the Syrians refused an order by a Kuwaiti commander to travel to Iraq to reinforce the front lines in Tikrit.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted between a group of mostly Chechens and local Iraqi supporters of the Islamic State who felt they were being abandoned when the foreigners decided to head back to Syria.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Hasakah Province.

DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015

ISIS Relies on Extortion and Taxation

The Islamic State takes in more than $1 million per day in extortion and taxation. Salaries of Iraqi government employees are taxed up to 50 percent, adding up to at least $300 million last year; companies may have their contracts and revenue taxed up to 20 percent. As other revenue streams have stalled, like banks and oil, the Islamic State has adjusted these rates to make taxation a larger portion of its income.

Oil revenue has fallen to about $2 million per week, but the group is not dependent on oil income. Much of the production is used for its own fuel. Past oil sales show that the Islamic State was already selling oil at deep discounts that fluctuated among local markets — for instance, selling oil for less in Kirkuk than in Mosul.

The largest expenditure is salaries, which is estimated to be between $3 million and $10 million every month. The Islamic State also invests in police-state institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation, but provides relatively few services.

The group avoids investment in infrastructure because it can be an easy target for attacks, and the territory it holds can change quickly. The group minimizes costs by looting military equipment, appropriating land and infrastructure, and paying relatively low salaries. The group also limits its vulnerability by shifting operations, transitioning between expanding its territory and fueling terrorist activity. The Islamic State’s loss of ground in Tikrit last month, for example, has not stopped it from launching attacks in other parts of Iraq and Syria and taking the Iraqi city of Ramadi this weekend.

Syria and Iraq Air Campaign
Air Campaign Starts in Iraq: 8.2014

American fighter jets and drones attacked 68 targets in northern Iraq in the first week and a half of airstrikes, according to the U.S. Central Command.

**Mount Sinjar**
Thousands of Yazidi refugees were trapped on the mountain after fleeing Islamist fighters. Targets included:
- 3 ARMED VEHICLES
- 1 ARMOURED VEHICLE
- 3 TRUCKS
- 4 CHECKPOINTS
- 5 PERSONNEL CARRIERS
- 1 HUMVEE
- 1 MORTAR POSITION

**Mosul Dam**
American strikes allowed Kurdish fighters to regain the dam, which they lost two weeks ago. Targets included:
- 19 ARMED VEHICLES
- 2 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
- 9 FIGHTING POSITIONS
- 2 I.E.D.s
- 7 HUMVEES
- 1 ARMOURED VEHICLE
- 3 CHECKPOINTS
- 2 PERSONNEL CARRIERS

**Erbil**
 Strikes in this area helped repel militants approaching the regional capital. Targets included:
- 7 ARMED VEHICLES
- 7 VEHICLES
- 1 MINE-RESISTANT VEHICLE
- 1 MOBILE ARTILLERY
- 2 MORTAR POSITIONS

Note: Strikes were not reported comprehensively day by day, so some may be missing from daily tallies.

Air Campaign Moves to Syria: 8-10.2014

Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, Day-by-Day

Source: Based on Defense Department statements

Air Campaign: 6-7.2015

The air campaign led by the United States against the Islamic State reached a new peak of 38 strikes on July 4. Raqqa, ISIS' de facto capital, was hit 18 times. In mid-June, airstrikes helped Kurdish forces seize Tal Abyad from the Islamic State.

Source: Based on Defense Department statements

Coalition Air Effort in Iraq and Syria as of 31 August 2015

### Operation Inherent Resolve

#### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>15,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>4,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>6,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>50,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>10,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>62,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only

- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

POC: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown in Iraq and Syria, as of November 30, 2015

Air strikes in Iraq and Syria

- Iraq: 5,401
- Syria: 2,761

Figures are up to 30 November 2015

Source: US Central Command

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of November 30, 2015

Confirmed air strikes up to 30 Nov 2015

IRAQ 5,401  SYRIA 2,761

IS control  IS free to operate

Kurdistan Government-administered

100 km  50 miles

Note: Strikes have not been mapped when the precise location was not given or was unclear.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US Central Command

Air Campaign: New Patterns in Air Strikes 30 September - 15 November

Air Strikes in Syria by Country as of October 8, 2015

US-led coalition air strikes in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated number launched by each country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Airwars.org (data up to 22 November 2015)

Targets Damaged.Destroyed as of November 13, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Inherent Resolve Targets Damaged.Destroyed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments. Current as of 13 November 2015.
Source: CENTCOM CCCI

Some data are under investigation as a result of challenges by USCENTCOM intelligence experts.

Coalition Air Effort in Iraq and Syria as of 31 October 2015

### Operation Inherent Resolve

#### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td>17,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Sorties with at least one weapon release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>8,064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,758</td>
<td>2,381</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Operation Inherent Resolve

#### Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties

|          | 2,164 | 8,012 |

#### Airlift and Airdrop Sorties

|          | 1,992 | 8,260 |

#### Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*

|          | 14,555 | 64,700 |

#### Airlift Passengers*

|          | 9,900 | 39,100 |

#### Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)

|          | 1,417,900 | 0 |

#### Tanker Sorties

|          | 4,828 | 12,723 |

#### Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)

|          | 282 | 774 |

#### Aircraft Refuelings

|          | 28,956 | 80,367 |

* Iraq only

Comparative Air Strikes in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan as of 31 August 2015

There were more U.S.-coalition airstrikes in Syria and Iraq in the past year than during more than five years of the Afghan war.

From January 2010 to Aug. 31, 2015, there have been 20,237 weapons released over Afghanistan, according to U.S. military data. From August 2014 to August 2015, there have been 22,478 weapons released over Syria and Iraq, mostly by U.S. aircraft.

Every month this year, the airstrikes have far exceeded that of any month of the Afghan war since January 2010.

According to the U.S. military, as of mid-August, fighting the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has cost U.S. taxpayers $3.7 billion, an average of $9.9 million a day, since the air war began last year.

Of course, the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been winding down, which explains the decrease in airstrikes.

Syria: Russian airstrikes focus on other Rebel Forces: September 30 - October 30, 2015

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=map&gs=true&search=query&th=150c1d4650dc1ce8&siml=150c1d4650dc1ce8; 1.11.2015
High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

ISIS Oil Fields Targeted By U.S. Air Strikes – 11.2015

Foreign Volunteers

(No reliable estimates exist, and most are dated and only include ISIS. U.S. estimates as of September 2015 put total for ISIS at a nominal 30,000)
Origin of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included
Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook
NYT Estimate of Foreign Fighters: 5/2015

MENA: 7,500-10,000
FSU: 1,300-2,000
W. Europe: 2,260-2,460
Other: 1,730
Total: 12,790 – 16,190

# Wikipedia Estimate of Foreign Fighters: 9/2015

**Number of nationals fighting for ISIL**  
[edit]

**Note** List does not include nationals of Iraq and Syria (except for nationals of Iraqi Kurdistan).

**Note** According to jihadist ideologues, 90% of its fighters in Iraq are Iraqi and 70% of its fighters in Syria are Syrian.[19]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7,000[54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2,400–5,000[51][54]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,400[55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,500–2,000[57]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,500[56][58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>500–1,500[59][60]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,200[58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>600[56]–1,000[50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>900[58]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>600[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>500–600[66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>360[56]–600[61]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Kurdistan</td>
<td>85–600[62]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>514[63]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>500[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>500[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>440[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>360[56][64]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>330[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>300[58][65]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>100–300[66]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>250[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>250[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>200–250[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>100[56]–200[67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>200[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>200[68][69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>200[70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>190[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>150–180[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>100–150[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>100–150[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>140[71]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>110[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>100[56]–130[72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>100[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>100[49][56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>50–100[73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>50–100[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>90[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>80[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>70–80[74]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50–70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>50–70[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>50[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>50[75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>50[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>40–50[76]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>40[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6[56]–40[77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>30[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20–30[78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>18–20[79][80]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>15[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>15[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>12[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>12[81]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>12[56]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9[82]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6–8[83]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>7[14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2[84]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>2[85]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2[86]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1[87]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1[88]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1[89]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wikipedia Estimate of Groups affiliated to ISIS/ISIL: 9/2015

- **Algeria:** Wilayah Algeria formed from Jund al-Khilafah after it pledged allegiance to ISIL. Wilayah Barqa formed from the Shura Council of Islamic Youth
- **Libya:** Some militants formerly associated with Ansar al-Sharia in Libya also pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Egypt:** Wilayah Sinai formed from the majority of the membership of Ansar Bait al-Maqdis
- **Yemen:** Wilayah Sanaa formed from a faction of Ansar al-Sharia who pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Pakistan and Afghanistan:** Wilayah Khorasan formed from the allegiance of militants from groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including Jundallah, Tehreek-e-Khilafat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and dissident commanders formerly associated with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
- Northeastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon: Wilayah Gharb Afriqiya formed from Boko Haram pledging allegiance to ISIL.
- **Chechnya and Dagestan:** Wilayah Qawqaz formed from dissident militants of the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya and Dagestan who switched their allegiance to ISIL.
- **Palestinian:** Militants of the group Army of the Islamic State (Palestinian Territories) pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Philippines, Malaysia:** Militants of the group Abu Sayyaf pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Saudi Arabia:** Unidentified militants in Saudi Arabia – designated as provinces of ISIL.
- **Jordan:** Militants of the group Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad (Jordan) pledged allegiance to ISIL.
- **Lebanon:** Militants of the group Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade pledged allegiance to ISIL
- **Maldives:** The group Islamic State of the Maldives pledged allegiance to ISIL in July 2014.

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as Turkey. Tunisia has the greatest number of departing foreign fighters of any country in the world.

http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf, p. 46.
Among countries where Muslims are not in the majority, Russia and Western Europe have the highest numbers of fighters known to have travelled to Iraq and Syria.


NOTE: Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country, to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed, or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.
Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013 to 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from the Middle East and North Africa. Western countries include Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.

![Graph showing data on foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria from 2013 to 2015.](http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report_0_0.pdf)

The total number of foreign fighters believed to have joined armed groups in Iraq and Syria more than doubled from December 2013 to October 2015. Figures are cumulative totals. Numbers are estimates only based on IEP calculations from a variety of sources.


The Refugee, IDP, and Humanitarian Impact
Nearly 60 million people are displaced around the world because of conflict and persecution, the largest number ever recorded by the United Nations. About 14 million of those fled in 2014.
Massive Impact of Syria and Iraq Conflicts

By June 2015, the number of refugees in Syria alone had risen to 3.98 million, and the number of IDPs was 7.6 to 7.8 million = 11.6 to 11.8 million out of a population of 18 million.

Note: Recent African conflicts include Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Nigeria. Chart does not include 5.1 million Palestinians covered under a U.N. mandate.

Source: Office of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

In 2014, just 126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries, the lowest number for 31 years.
Syria
Demographic Pressures on Syria

Syria Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>22,900,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Syria

Transparency International ranks so corrupt is 159th worst of 175 countries rated in 2014.

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

The Pre-War Ethnic Sectarian Nightmare in the Levant

This map shows only the main areas of settlement of religious and sectarian groups. The Syrian population is very heterogeneous in terms of religious and sectarian affiliation, especially in urban centers.
Syria: Ethnic and Linguistic Groups: March 2011


This map shows only the main areas of settlement of ethnic and linguistic groups. The Syrian population is very heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and linguistic affiliation, especially in urban centers.
Syria: Topography and Regional Divisions

Damascus: Satellite Image

Rise in Terrorism in Syria

Key Elements of Syria’s Four Main Fighting Factions

1. **ISIS:**
Claim 200,000. Probably 44,000-60,000 core fighters with some 30,000 volunteers. Mostly captured Syrian and Iraqi weapons supplied by U.S. and Russia. Some armor, modern ATGMs and Manpads.

2. **Assad and Allied Forces:**
Remnants of Syrian armed forces – Cut from 300,000 in Army to some 125,000-176,000, major active land and air weapons strength unclear but may retain up to 3,000 tanks, 2,500 field artillery pieces, 500 MLRS, 1,000 mortars and some 2,000 ground fire-capable anti-aircraft guns. Active fixed wing air strength may be down to 200-215, rotary wing unknown, but more than 30 attack helicopters.

**Russian fighters,** attack helicopters, SAMs (SA-22, MRLs (?), and advisors at forward combat unit level.

Also **Alawite Militias, National Defense Forces** paramilitary units with 30,000-60,000 partly trained fighters; at least 6 military groups; **Hezbollah forces; 6,000-7,000 Iranian “volunteers and IRGC forces.**

3. **Kurdish Forces:**
Include **Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)** (claim 65,000), Jabhat al-Akrad (7,000) Kurdistan Workers’ Party; and Islamist elements. No reliable estimates, but some 20,000-35,000 possible. Largely U.S. supplied arms and small arms. Some Special Forces trainers.

4. **Rebel and Independent Forces:**
Many small armed groups, increasingly Islamist and non-secular. 25,000-35,000 full and part time fighters. No central command and differ by area. Main groups are:

**Aleppo Province:** more moderate Fatah Halab
Operations Room excludes hard-line groups. Ansar al-Shariah Operations Room, formed as a response to Fatah Halab, works with Al Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

**Central Syria around Idlib, Latakia and Hama:** largest group is **Army of Conquest** or Jaish al-Fatah, an alliance of Islamist factions, including the Nusra Front which is an Al Qaeda’s affiliate/ Ahrar al-Sham is another large group. Also are more moderate rebel factions, some of which have received covert arms support from CIA, Arab Gulf states, others.

**Damascus region:** Army of Islam, a group with financial backing from Saudi Arabia, has declared war on Russia. It is one of several armed groups that form the East Gouta Council.

**Southeast:** Southern Front coalition of small armed groups like the New Syrian Force that have U.S. aid and support a secular government.
Syrian Terrorism Deaths: I

Syrian Terrorism Deaths: II

The continual impact of terrorism in Syria is a direct result of the Syrian civil war. There were no recorded acts of terrorism in the two years prior to the civil war commencing in 2011. In 2014 there were 1,690 deaths compared to 600 in 2012. Most of the deaths in Syria are accounted for as battlefield deaths.

The present-day civil war in Syria began in March of 2011 as protests against President Bashar-al-Assad’s government. These protests were similar to the various democratic uprisings occurring throughout the Arab region since December 2010, known as the Arab Spring. In several of the Arab Spring nations, the uprisings led to the toppling of some authoritarian leaders, but in the case of Syria the Assad regime aggressively responded to the demonstrations, which unwound into civil war. From its inception, the core of the opposition has been the Free Syrian Army, with many other groups entering the war and establishing themselves as opposition forces, including Islamist rebel groups such as ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.

It is estimated that over 200,000 people have been killed in the civil war. The majority of these deaths are classified as a result of conventional warfare rather than acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a tactic by some of the rebel forces to bring about a political, economic, religious, or social goal rather than purely military objectives.

As of September 2015, there are 4.1 million Syrian refugees and 6.5 million people displaced within Syria. Many have fled to nearby countries, with a growing number fleeing to Europe, underlining the worldwide spill-over effects of the Syrian civil war.

A quarter of terrorist attacks in Syria are from unknown perpetrators. The biggest terrorist group in Syria is ISIL who killed 615 people, or 36 per cent. The second biggest group, the Sunni and al-Qa’ida linked al-Nusra Front, claimed responsibility for 27 per cent of deaths or 461 people.

Whilst there were terrorist attacks in 76 cities in 2014, over half of all attacks occurred in just four cities. Damascus, the capital and second largest city in Syria, had 37 attacks which resulted in 63 deaths. Homs recorded the most fatalities with 345, representing 20 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in Syria.

Palmyra, an area 215 kilometres north-east of Damascus, had 310 deaths. Palmyra has also seen many sites of historical significance destroyed by ISIL, including the Temple of Bel which was nearly 2000 years old. The largest city of Aleppo had 23 attacks which resulted in 193 deaths. Kobani in northern Syria near the border with Turkey had 34 attacks resulting in 71 deaths.

Most deaths from terrorism in Syria have been from bombings. Bombings can be extremely deadly. There were two bombings in 2014 which killed more than 50 people and at least 19 bombings that killed ten or more people. Private citizens are the target of 53 per cent of attacks, with 475 people being killed. There were at least 30 different kidnapping incidents which resulted in 382 deaths. This includes two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, who were kidnapped in Syria and murdered by ISIL in late 2014.

Key Factional Fighting in 2015

Russia has bases and advisers in several government-controlled locations. It has mainly targeted rebels in areas where the government had been losing ground.

Rebels in areas targeted by Russian airstrikes have used antitank missiles made in the United States.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah have been advising and shoring up pro-Assad forces since 2012.

Most rebel groups supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are in western Syria.

Sources: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas and Hezbollah incidents); Institute for the Study of War (Russian ground positions); Carter Center (rebel front lines)

Multiple Wars in Syria

Interactive Conflicts and Tensions:
Conflict in Iraq, US and Arab Gulf vs. Iran, Kurds vs. Turkey, US vs. Russia, Refugee crisis in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq; Hezbollah vs. Other factions in Lebanon, Syrian Border with Israel

New U.S. Strategy in Syria

- Shift away from Iraq first strategy, which is “tactically stalemated,” to more active role in Syria.
- Step up air strikes in support of moderate forces.
- Downplay or abandon major formal training efforts (5,000 a year, 15,000 total) of New Syrian Army/Syrian Arab Coalition forces by U.S. military advisors.
- Focus on CIA and forward Special Forces efforts to support Kurdish and Arab Sunni forces. Provide more ammo. Light weapons.
- Work with Arab Gulf states, Turkey, Jordan to support other more moderate rebel forces. Help expedite flow of ammo and weapons.
- In the north, work with Syrian Kurds (20,000-25,000) and U.S. CIA-Special Forces-Qatar-Saudi trained Arab volunteers (3,000-5,000) to move on ISIS and advance toward Raqqa. Provide them with far more air support.
- In south, use rebels trained in Jordan to funnel more ammo and weapons, support advances on ISIS.
- Role of existing three U.S.-backed factions of Free Syrian Army -- Liwa Suqour al-Jabal rebel and others -- in area now under Russian air attack unclear.

Source:
Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2014

Rebel groups held areas throughout Syria, while the Islamic State controlled territory mostly in the northwest.

Source: 10W - Institute for the study of war, SCHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, CENTCOM - US Central Command, Agathocle de Syracuse - Understanding modern conflicts, Pietervanoostaeyst - Musings on Arabian, Islamism, History and current affairs

Moderate Rebels: Rebels who have been identified as “moderate” by the U.S.-led coalition and are being supported by the coalition through ongoing airstrikes against ISIS in Syria (e.g. FSA, Syrian Revolutionaries Front).

Mixed Rebels: Rebels who are being perceived as moderate but are also working alongside hardline groups (e.g. Jabhat al-Nusra). In some cases they coexist without interacting and in other cases they clash.

Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2014 to 10/2015

Rebel groups held areas throughout Syria, while the Islamic State controlled territory mostly in the northwest.

The Islamic State rapidly gained territory in 2014, establishing governance in Raqqa and controlling the Euphrates River to Iraq.

Kurdish groups pushed the Islamic State out of some northern regions. Rebel forces gained control of some areas in Idlib province.

Shifting Areas of Control in Syria: 1/2015

The Islamic State rapidly gained territory in 2014, establishing governance in Raqqa and controlling the Euphrates River to Iraq.

This detailed Syria map shows what territory ISIS is truly fighting for, Business Insider, June 30, 2015: http://www.businessinsider.com/map-of-syria-shows-what-isis-is-truly-fighting-for-2015-6#ixzz3kOBnu5GO
Zones of Control in Syria

ISW Estimate

September 2, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/ISW/14fd9c79b69ce51

Posture of Syrian Regime and Allies: September 14, 2015

KEY
- Regime Control
- Hezbollah Presence
- Jabhat al Nusra Control
- Rebel Control
- ISIS Control
- ISIS, JN, Rebel Control
- YPG (Syrian Kurds) Control

Regime Positions
- Besieged
- Isolated
- Airbase

Foreign Positions
- Iran and Proxies
- Russia

KNOWN IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC) OR PROXY POSITION

A - Nubl and Zahra
B - Bashiqa and Handarat
C - Neyrab Airbase / Aleppo Airport
D - As Safia Defense Factories
E - Fu'ah and Kefraya
F - Latakia City
G - Joreen
H - Tel al-Nasiriya
I - Kinnah
J - Hama Military Airport
K - Brigade 47 and Tel Qartal
L - Tartous City
M - Homs City
N - Qusayr
O - Yabroud
P - Zabadani
Q - Jameya
R - Mezze District and Airbase
S - Sayyida Zeinab District
T - Damascus International Airport
U - Amal Farms
V - Nabi al-Fawwar
W - Saranayn
X - Izraa
Y - Dera'a Municipal Stadium
Z - Qamishli Airport

KNOWN RUSSIAN POSITION

1 - Port of Latakia
2 - Bassel al-Assad Airport
3 - Tartous Naval Facility
4 - Sirnafah
5 - Homs City
6 - Damascus International Airport
Zones of Control in Syria

UCA Estimate

September 2, 2015

Source: Institute for United Conflict Analysis
s://pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/2000px-syria15.png
Local Force Postures in Syria:

NYT Map 1/10/2015

Local Force Postures in Syria:

Reuters Map 4/10/2015

Areas of Control in Western Syria:

New York Times Map 5/10/2015


Source: IHS Conflict Monitor (control areas as of Oct. 5)
By The New York Times
Military Situation on the Turkish Border: ISW Estimate
September 14, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
Control of Turkish–Syrian border: October 9. 2015

Syrian Kurds and Tensions with Syrian Arabs

Amnesty International visited 14 towns and villages in the Kurdish controlled areas of northern Syria. In ten of these villages, they found the local population had either had their homes demolished or faced either forced displacement as a group or targeted displacement.

Abuse: • Village demolished • Forced displacement • Targeted displacement

Villages were visited in July and August 2015

Source: Amnesty International; control area provided by Janes

Kurdish Expansion in Syria

Kobani has been the focal point of the U.S.-Kurdish battle with ISIS. American airstrikes have hit more than 1,000 targets there, almost half of all their strikes in Syria, helping the Kurds push back ISIS in the north.

Syrian Attitudes About the Fighting: July 2015

A recent survey of 1,365 Syrians from all 14 governorates of the country found some surprising attitudes.

Consider this: A fifth of those interviewed said the Islamic State -- the brutal Islamist group known for its beheadings, that rules over large swaths of Syria and Iraq -- is a positive influence on the country.

And 82 percent said that they believe the Islamic State was created by the United States and its allies.

The Syria survey was conducted by ORB International, a U.K.-based market research firm, from June 10 to July 2. The poll has a margin of error of +/-3 percentage points.

The majority of Syrians interviewed said they believe that the situation is worsening, and only 21 percent said they preferred their life today than when Syria was fully controlled by Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Nearly half of Syrians surveyed said they opposed U.S.-coalition airstrikes, and nearly 80 percent said that the war has gotten worse because of the influx of foreign fighters.

Yet there is also sense of hope: The majority of Syrians surveyed said a diplomatic solution was possible to end the war, and that Syrians can set aside their difference and live side by side again.

Source: ORB International

Syria: The Lights Go Out in Allepo: 3/2012-12/2014

Comparative Casualty per Month Estimate: 2011-2013

The opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that at least 82,000 people have been killed after two years of civil war in Syria. The number of casualties documented by opposition activist groups vary.

CASUALTIES BY MONTH
From select activist groups

Source: Reuters, https://www.google.com/search?q=trend+graphs+for+Syrian+casualties&tbm=isch&imgil=YGlffJlkis0M%253A%253Baacmvbd6LOjM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F%25252F6storiesfromthe7continents.blogspot.com%25252F2013_06_01_archive.html&source=iu&fir=YGlffJlkis0M%253A%253Baacmvbd6LOjM%252C&_biw=1491&_bih=976&ved=0CDAQyjdqFqoTCMejB9j1gMgCFUt3jigodOTALSg&ei=XQL8VYeBNcvmuQ554KzQBA&usg=__twkWLalmgNnRKRmq_WnWQeP81oQ%3D

First shipments of arms from Qatar, according to The New York Times:

'Significantly more and better weapons' start to be sent in by Gulf states and US, according to The Washington Post.

CIA begins to 'limit supplies of weapons...reaching rebel forces', according to The Times.

Gulf states and U.S. begin to 'sharply increase their military aid to Syria's opposition fighters', according to The New York Times.
Estimates of Human Cost of Syria War as of 9.9.2015

UNHCR Estimate of Human Costs: 9.2015

- 12.2 million People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria (6.2015)
- 7.6 million IDPs in Syria
- 5 million People Reached per Month by USG Assistance in Syria (USG 9.2015)
- 4.1 Million Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries
- 1.9 million Syrian Refugees in Turkey
- 1.1 million Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
- 628,887 Syrian Refugees in Jordan
- 248,503 Syrian Refugees in Iraq
- 132,375 Syrian Refugees in Egypt

- From October 2014 to August 2015, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR)—a United Kingdom-based human rights organization—documented more than 33,000 Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) air raids in Syria, including more than 18,000 barrel bomb attacks and more than 15,000 other aerial attacks, according to a mid-August report.

- During the same period, SOHR documented nearly 5,500 civilian deaths, including more than 1,100 children, and injuries to at least 30,000 civilians.

- Since the start of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, SOHR has documented the deaths of at least 240,000 people.

- On August 7, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution to create an investigative panel to hold chemical weapon users accountable for war crimes in Syria.

- In 2013, the UNSC mandated that the SARG dismantle and destroy its chemical weapon stockpile under international supervision. While the UNSC has repeatedly condemned chemical attacks as violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, chemical attacks on civilians continue to occur, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

- The newly adopted resolution will establish a UN–OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to gather and test evidence with the aim of identifying perpetrators of chemical attacks, confronting impunity for war crimes in Syria, and preventing future abuses.
UN OCHA Estimate of Human Cost of Syria War

In the absence of a political solution, human rights violations and abuses continue to occur in the context of widespread insecurity and in disregard of international law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law. Over 250,000 people have been killed and over one million injured. More than half of all Syrians have been forced to leave their homes, often multiple times, making Syria the largest displacement crisis globally. As of 31 July 2015, almost 1.2 million people have been internally displaced anticipating another million to be displaced by the end of the year in light of the growing humanitarian and protection needs of civilians.

Inside Syria today, 12.2 million people remain in need of humanitarian assistance – a twelve fold increase since 2011 - including more than 5.6 million children. 7.6 million people have been displaced by this conflict. An estimated 4.8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in hard to reach and besieged locations. Palestine refugees are particularly affected, with 560,000 in need of assistance and 64 per cent of registered Palestine refugees displaced, 280,000 internally and a further 80,000 abroad.

In addition, Syria’s development situation has regressed almost by four decades. Since the onset of the crisis in 2011, life expectancy is estimated to have shortened by almost 13 years (Q4, 2013) and school attendance dropped more than 50 per cent. Syria has also seen reversals in all 12 Millennium Development Goal indicators. The Syrian economy has contracted by an estimated 40 per cent since 2011, leading to the majority of Syrians losing their livelihoods. By the end of 2013, an estimated three in four Syrians were living in poverty, and 54 per cent were living in extreme poverty.

Humanitarian access to people in need in Syria remains constrained by shifting frontlines, administrative and bureaucratic hurdles, violence along access routes and general safety and security concerns, especially in areas under the control of terrorist groups listed in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2170 and 2178. It is increasingly difficult for Syrians to find safety, including by seeking asylum. These difficulties have resulted in a marked decline in the number of newly arriving registered refugees and in their ability to access international protection.


Source: EUROSTAT (latest update: 17 April 2015), Statistics Austria, and the UK Office for National Statistics (data available only for 2013). Map includes EU 27 as well as Switzerland and Norway. No data was available for Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, and Poland. In the cases of Germany, Ireland, and Portugal data was available on Syrian citizens but not on the Syrian-born population.

The map only includes the top 10 countries in the categories Syrian citizens and Syrian-born population.

Syrians in Neighboring Countries and Europe: End-September 2015

Asylum applications of Syrian Citizens: 2014


Camps for Syrian Refugees: April 2015
Registered Syrian Refugees as of August 31, 2015

Registered refugees: **4,088,078**

- **Turkey**: 1,938,000
- **Lebanon**: 1,113,941
- **Jordan**: 629,245
- **Iraq**: 249,463
- **Egypt**: 132,375
- **N Africa**: 24,055

Source: UNHCR, Reliefweb (figures up to 31 August 2015)
Aid to Syria in FY2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USD committed/contributed</th>
<th>USD pledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,185,184,990</td>
<td>770,478,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of unemarkeled funds by UN agencies</td>
<td>55,103,023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>41,299,765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2,985,322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12,839,220</td>
<td>33,183,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>113,122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>142,711,710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry-over (donors not specified)</td>
<td>239,006,284</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)</td>
<td>77,419,314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5,757,436</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>27,420,786</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>319,284,659</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15,841,220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11,932,882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>317,040,271</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>4,875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9,437,559</td>
<td>1,124,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14,805,703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>138,476,754</td>
<td>24,369,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>3,750,000</td>
<td>7,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>304,640,000</td>
<td>219,390,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>55,249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>43,573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>6,587,756</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various (details not yet provided)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total U.S. Aid FY2012-FY2015

**HUMANITARIAN FUNDING TO SYRIA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE FY 2012 – FY 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>$4,529,063,219</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID/OFDA</td>
<td>$866,283,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID/FPF</td>
<td>$1,550,694,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/PRM</td>
<td>$2,112,085,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Syria: UNICEF Gap- 55% Funded: June 2015:

People in Need
- 12.2 million inside Syria
- 4 million refugees
- 5.6 million children
- 2.1 million children

Syrian Children in Need
- Turkey 978,448
- Lebanon 625,077
- Iraq 103,636
- Jordan 325,259
- Egypt 57,716
- Other Countries 12,292

UNICEF Funding Requirements for SRP and 3RP in 2015
$ 903 million (US$)

2015 UNICEF Results

Water
In Syria, UNICEF is providing water treatment supplies that treat enough water to serve over 16.55 million people on a regular basis. UNICEF also provides targeted support to water systems:
- Syria 135% of target 3.5 million

In neighboring countries, 1,017,022 people have been provided with access to drinking and domestic water.
- Iraq 79% Target 123,948
- Lebanon 48% Target 592,614
- Jordan 35% Target 1,840,000

Child Protection
There are over 820,000 children targeted for psychosocial support services in 2015, to date 447,138 children have benefited from these services.
- Syria 56% Target 385,000
- Jordan 57% Target 203,264
- Lebanon 44% Target 140,000
- Turkey 51% Target 50,000
- Iraq 62% Target 39,044
- Egypt 54% Target 11,000

Education
In Syria, UNICEF supported access to formal education for 13,017 students through school rehabilitation, pre-fabricated classrooms and school bursaries.
- Syria 3% Target 365,500

In neighbouring countries, 344,186 refugee children have been supported to enroll in formal education.
- Turkey 55% Target 180,000
- Jordan 100% Target 87,150
- Lebanon 130% Target 130,000
- Iraq 90% Target 24,782
- Egypt 91% Target 14,500

Note: Education results remain pending the new school year from September.

Health
5,051,986 children vaccinated against polio as of Junel 2015.

There are over 20 million children targeted with polio vaccination in 2015, mainly through campaigns**.

Three campaigns have been conducted in Syria reaching 2,989,659 children under five with immunization and 2,062,327 children have been immunized between Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Nine campaigns have been conducted in the sub-region so far this year.

**Campaigns include NID and SNID.
The Russian Role in Syria
The Russian Build Up: 10/2015 - I

- Expanding Russian port facilities in naval base at Tartus and expanding an airfield south of Latakia into an air base.
- New construction at the Assad International Airport in Latakia, and soon after, satellite imagery confirmed the presence of Russian T-90 tanks, artillery and large transport aircraft at the airfield.
- Deployed 4 Su-30SM fighters, 12 Su-24M2 strike fighters, 6 Su-34 modern strike fighters, 12 Su-25 close support fighters, and Pchela-1T UAVs.
- Deployed 14 helicopters — Mi-24 Hind gunships and Mi-17 Hip transport helicopters
- Start air strikes on 30.9.15.
- Providing R-166-0.5 (ultra) high-frequency signals (HF/VHF) vehicles with jam-resistant voice and data communications which have been seen driving through Syria
- An unknown number of new artillery weapons, reportedly 152mm systems.
- Deploying six or more T-90 main battle tanks, 35 or more new BTR-82A/B wheeled AFVs with 30mm cannon turrets, and an unknown number of Russian Humvee equivalent
- Deploying prefabricated housing for up to 2,000.
- Deploying at least two unit sets of SA-22 land-based air defense systems.
- Possibly deploying 200 marines and housing for as many as 1,500 personnel at the airfield near the Assad family’s ancestral home.
The Russian Build Up: 10/2015 - II

Russian sea and air assets move into Syria
The Russian Defense Ministry last month announced the deployment of ships from its Black Sea Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to carry out military drills. Included were:

1 Cruiser (Moskva)

1 Destroyer (Smetlivy)

2 Frigates (Pytlivy and Ladny)

Russia has deployed a variety of military aircraft to Bassel al-Assad International Airport in Latakia, including:

4 Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers

12 Su-24 Fencer attack aircraft

12 Su-25 Frogfoot close-air-support aircraft

Other aircraft at the airport in Latakia:

4 Su-30 Flanker multi-role fighters

12+ Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Pentagon

Russian Facilities in Syria: 9/2015

Russian Posture in Syria: September 27, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1501e617821e292d?projector=1
Comparative Russian and U.S. Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 10/4/15

**Russian airstrikes, Sept. 30 to Oct. 4**
Russia has mostly attacked rebels fighting the government, not ISIS. Targets include some American-backed rebel groups and groups which the United States considers terrorist organizations.

**U.S. airstrikes, Sept. 25 to Oct. 4**
The United States has focused on ISIS and on supporting Kurdish forces. But Americans have also hit some targets that could benefit the Syrian government, like in Palmyra and Deir al-Zour.

Comparative Russian and U.S. Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 10/16/15

Source: Institute for the Study of War, US military. Locations may have multiple strikes

Russian Air Attacks in Syria - II

NYT Map 2/10/2015

High Confidence Locations of Russian and Coalition Air Strikes

Russia: Pro-Assad, Not Anti ISIS

NYT Map 1/10/2015

Source: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1508afcc7372b349
Syria: Continued Russian Focus on other Rebel Forces: November 11-29, 2015

Source: ISW, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=30f86d1605&view=pt&q=Map&qs=true&search=query&th=15163767, 3.12.15
Comparative Russian and U.S. Air Strikes in Syria: 9/30/15 to 2/12/15
Iraq
War, Tensions, and Crises in Iraq

**Internal Conflicts and Tensions:**
- ISIS vs. Iraqi central government, Kurds, Shi’ite militias, Sunni opposition factions, U.S. led coalition, Arab Gulf states and Jordan, Iran, Russia
- Sunni vs. Shiites
- Arabs vs. Kurds.
- Sunni vs. Sunni, Shiite vs. Shiite, Kurd vs. Kurd

**External Conflicts and Tensions:**
- Conflict in Syria
- US vs. Iran
- Arab Gulf and Jordan vs. Iran
- Kurds vs. Turkey
- US vs. Russia
Demographic Pressures on Iraq

### Iraq Total Population (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2045</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total Annual Births (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Annual Births (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2045</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Country Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,160,000</td>
<td>33,300,000</td>
<td>X 6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB), http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

Transparency International ranks so corrupt is 170th worst of 175 countries rated in 2014.

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.
Iraqi Governance

• Nominal democracy which is often really government by power broker.
• Near paralysis over ethnic and sectarian divisions since 2010 election. Maliki revives civil wear during 2011-2013
• Heritage of unworkable constitution, election process, dysfunctional legislature without real local representation and fiscal powers.
• Heritage of corruption, power brokering, indifference to security.
• Countercorruption efforts are generally top down failures relying on punishment, rather than adequate fiscal controls, plans, measures of effectiveness.
• Long legacy of “petroleum disease”:
  • 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings.
  • Inflated and costly government hiring and SOEs.
  • Unrealistic budgets, plans, forecast.
  • Failure in agricultural reform and productivity compound by subsidy problem.
  • Population pressure means per capita oil export revenues dropping real terms.
• Deeply divided and sometimes corrupt security services, including police and border police.
• Corrupt ministries, some times incapable of planning and executing budgets, no measures of effectiveness and few real world data.
The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about $730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the $824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about $380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from $87 billion in 2014 to $45.2 billion.

On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about out $2,186 in 2014 to $1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA’s March 2015 Short Term Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq’s per capita oil income in 2014 was $2,682, compared to $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, $25,362 for Kuwait, and $36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to $1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to $515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)

Failed U.S. Support of INSF – Pre-ISIS

- Officially disband Iraqi Army. Focus security on community policing (Order No. 2, May 23rd, 2003.)
- Start effort to rebuild Iraq security forces in 2005, but remain Shi’ite dominated. Funding, program structure erratic, problems with trainers, focus on force generation rather than quality.
- Broaden effort in 2005 with first real funds and support, but still emphasize police. Have to restructure all of National Police for being too Shi’ite
- Main Iraqi training effort gather momentum on 2006-2007, but bulk of forces is generated after major fighting is over.
- U.S. forces leave Iraqi cities in 2009.
- March 2010 election starts Maliki’s battle for power, effort to control all security forces, isolate and coop Sunni elements.
- U.S. combat forces, major military train and assist and police training effort effectively halt in late 2011. Only small OMC office left.
- Low level civil war, Maliki repression of opposition and Sunnis from 2011-2013. Iraqi forces gradually become political, corrupt, and ineffective.
Crisis-Driven U.S. Security Funding: Reacting After the Fact
(Obligations Lag Threat and Spending Lags 6-14 Months More)

Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Pulling Out More Quickly than Planned: U.S. Troop Levels Go from 45,000 to Zero in 3 Months

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011 p. 51,
Army Only 22 Percent of ISF When U.S. Leaves (10/10/2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Assigned Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>645,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counter-Terrorism Force: 4,200

Total: 929,103

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

Source: GOI, MOI IG, Information provided to SIGIR, 10/10/2011.
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - I


• ISIS and aligned forces attack on Samarra on 5 June 2014, seize Mosul on 10 June and Tikrit on 11 June. Iraqi government forces flee south on 13 June, and Kurdish forces took control of the oil hub of Kirkuk, more of disputed areas in north.

• Iraqi forces retake Ramadi but fighting continues in 2014 to spring 2015 until ISIS retakes Ramadi after Iraqi Army collapses on May 21, 2104.

• In the north and outskirt of Baghdad, Iraqi Army effectively collapses back into Shi’ite areas of Iraq, Shi’ite militias emerge as key stiffening, fighting force, but abuses of Sunni emerge from start.

• March-April 12, retake Tikrit with U.S. air support after Shi’ite militias withdrawn.

• 10 June 2014, U.S. reacts with train and assist mission after examination of Iraqi forces find them almost universally ineffective.
  • Starts at 450. Gradually builds up to 3,500 advisors (4,600+).
  • But does not deploy forward, Establishes centers in rear in Iraq and KRG areas. Some use of Canadian Special Forces forward.
  • Problems in moving weapons, ammo, support from U.S. to Iraq, Baghdad to combat units.
  • U.S. plans for National Guard with Sunni and Kurdish forces at Provincial level make little progress.

Source: 12/3/20

15
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - II

- 29 June 2014, ISIS says is changing name to Islamic State, and declares 'Caliphate' including Syria and Iraq and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Caliph and leader of all Muslims.
- Begin Coalition Air Campaign in August 2014 – nine months after first ISIS advance.
- 14-15 August, Maliki leaves, Abadi becomes Prime Minister.
- February-June 2015, false announcements of effort to liberate Mosul.
- U.S. concludes Iraqi armed forces critically weak, Focuses on creating two effective brigades, liberation of Ramadi.
- 13 July 2015, two-front Iraqi offensive starts in Anbar province. Iraqi security forces seek to retake after collapsing and losing city in May. U.S. begins air strikes against ISIS positions in Ramadi.
- June 2015 onwards: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Shi’ite militias continue operations to cordon off Fallujah and secure lines of communication. Fallujah has now been partly under ISIS control since January 2014.
- Mid-July 2015: Iraqi pilots today land the 1st squadron of Iraqi F-16s in Iraq.
- September 2015: Russian build-up begins in Syria.
- October 2015: Effort to liberate Ramadi still going on. Iraqi forces do not penetrate ISIS barrier of IEDs, suicide bombers.
- October 2015: Abadi announces joint Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian-Russian intelligence effort. Says would welcome Russian and more Iranian sorties because U.S. effort too weak.
- October 2015: U.S. seems to shift away from Iraq first strategy to support of Syrian Kurdish and Arab attacks on ISIS.

Source: 12/3/2015
Cost of U.S. Operations in Inherent Resolve

- Cost: As of Sep. 15, 2015, the total cost of operations related to ISIL since kinetic operations started on Aug. 8, 2014, is $4 billion and the average daily cost is $10 million for 404 days of operations.

Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Cost Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Expense (# of Days)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Flying OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Ship OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$2.9</td>
<td>$2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.9</td>
<td>$1.3</td>
<td>$1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.5</td>
<td>$7.0</td>
<td>$6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$1.1</td>
<td>$1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$1.6</td>
<td>$1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
<td>$5.1</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Pay</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munitions</td>
<td>$0.7</td>
<td>$2.6</td>
<td>$2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>$10.5</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extrapolated Total Cost ($M):
- By Expense
  - Daily Flying OPTEMPO: $1,977 (49%)
  - Daily Ship OPTEMPO: $23 (1%)
  - Munitions: $954 (24%)
  - Mission Support: $1,083 (27%)
- Total: $4,037 (100%)

- By Service
  - Army: $538 (13%)
  - Navy: $555 (14%)
  - Air Force: $2,632 (65%)
  - SOCOM: $313 (8%)
- Total: $4,037 (100%)

By Category
- Logistics Support: $417 (10%)
- Operational Support: $605 (15%)
- ISR: $37 (1%)
- OPTEMPO: $1,999 (50%)
- Military Pay: $24 (1%)
- Munitions: $954 (24%)
- Total: $4,037 (100%)

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Source: http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve, 21.10.15
Kurdish forces in Syria are operating against ISIL lines of communication that extend from the group’s de facto capital of Raqqa to Mosul in Iraq and on to Irbil, he said. These operations will “make life difficult for ISIL,” the general said, and the Kurds have taken back “a not insignificant amount of ground from ISIL.”

The coalition against ISIL inside Iraq is growing. “The number of Sunni that have been trained and armed is about 6,000 in Anbar province, and they want to grow to about 8,500,”

On the police side of the ledger, the government was looking for 16,000 Sunni to volunteer, and they are now at around 11,000 to 12,000.

The U.S. has, however, cut the number of Iraqi divisions it is concentrating on training from 10 to 8 for the near term.

“Operations in Beiji were absolutely encouraging, because just a week ago, we heard [the Iraqi security forces] were going to start doing things, and they have had some pretty good success,” the general said.

“They are now holding ground and securing the area,” he continued, “so that was, I thought, fairly positive. My perspective was always that we would support the Iraqis where we could have operational or strategic consequences.”

Part of that is seeing success and reinforcing it, the general said.

So, for example, if the Iraqis have a realistic plan for clearing Ramadi and a realistic plan for securing the city once ISIL is pushed out, then the United States will look at what unique capabilities it can bring to help the Iraqis, the chairman said.

Command and Control

But not all is brightness and light, he acknowledged, noting that Iraqi leaders must concentrate of command and control. The government needs to appoint a military leader with command for the overall military effort in the country – including the Iraqi security forces, the Kurdish peshmerga forces, the tribes and the police, and Iraqi leaders will sit down tomorrow to discuss appointing just such a person, Dunford said.

Having one person to talk to who can speak with authority about the campaign will make it easier for the coalition to provide support to all, he said.

Common Operational Picture

The command and control solution is to have a “common operational picture of Iraq in one commander, who on
behalf of the Iraqis can talk to the coalition about ‘Where do we go?’” the general said. “Success in this business is about being able to anticipate, and you can only anticipate if you really have a common understanding, common objectives, common sense of time and space.”

More still needs to be done with the Sunni tribes, Dunford said. “It’s a physical manifestation of the government’s promise to be inclusive,” he told reporters.

Outside factors also complicate the campaign, the chairman said. The conflict in Yemen complicates what is happening in Iraq and Syria, he explained, and Iran’s funding of proxies and surrogates complicates and already complicated picture. Russia’s involvement has added yet another layer of complexity, he said. “And you have to talk about the Shiaa/Sunni dynamic in the region, as well,” he added.

Kurdish training effort

About 300 coalition service members from Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary work at the Kurdish Training Coordination Center here. The effort there is under Italian command.

The effort trains peshmerga fighters in a modified infantry basic course. “We currently have 4,200 peshmerga in training,” said a senior coalition officer speaking on background. The officer briefed reporters traveling with Dunford.

Essentially, the effort works like this: peshmerga units come off of the front line with ISIL here, and then they get a few days of rest and relaxation before entering training. They train together as a unit for five or six weeks, before re-entering the battlefield against ISIL.

“We are able to tailor the training to the units,” the officer said. Units fighting ISIL near Mosul have different requirements than those in Kirkuk, the officer noted.

The time off the line allows the peshmerga to reinforce skills they need, understand the capabilities of new weapons systems that are entering the peshmerga system, and to work together as a unit.

Marksmanship, counter-ground tactics, combat medicine, and maneuvering as a unit are just a few of the military skills the peshmerga soldiers are being taught here. They also learn to be forward observers.

Training Paying Off

There are three training areas, and the command could train up to 5,000 peshmerga personnel at a time.

The front line against ISIL is only 60 kilometers from Irbil. “There are many changes” in the 45-minute drive to the front, said the officer. The coalition soldiers work with peshmerga leaders before they come to training to understand what the unit needs, and afterward, they re-enter the line to find new, more effective ways to deliver the training.
Improvised explosive devices cause most of the peshmerga casualties – roughly 80 to 85 percent – and coalition personnel are working constantly to teach tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to counter this threat, the officer said.

The officer said the peshmerga are a brave, dedicated and coherent force.

“They are the front line,” he said. “What is happening up here is working. It takes time to build this kind of capacity -- especially as a coalition. I think we are picking up speed and I think it is being reflected on the front line, as well.”
Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

Iraq Terrorism Deaths: 1

Source: Vision of Humanity.

Global Terrorism Index Report, 2014

Iraq Terrorism Deaths: II

In 2014 Iraq had the most deaths from terrorism ever recorded for a country. There were a total of 9,929 deaths, representing a 55 per cent increase from the previous year. Iraq has ranked as the country most impacted by terrorism for every year since 2004.

The catalyst for the rise in terrorism in Iraq had been the US-led invasion in 2003. From 1998 to 2002 there were 65 deaths from terrorism in Iraq. With the commencement of the Iraq war in 2004 there were nearly five times as many deaths than in the previous five years.

There have been two distinct periods where terrorism has jumped in Iraq. The first occurred in 2007 with the US troop surge when 6,100 deaths were reported, an increase of 39 per cent from the previous year. Deaths then fell by 56 per cent in the following year to be below the levels in 2006.

The second increase began in 2013 and has continued through to 2015 fuelled by increasing sectarian violence and the activities of ISIL. 2014 continued the deteriorating trend from 2013 when terrorist deaths jumped by 166 per cent to 6,397.

In 2013 ISIL was responsible for 77 per cent of deaths from claimed terrorist attacks which resulted in 1,310 deaths. In 2014 this increased to 95 per cent of claimed attacks with 5,436 deaths. ISIL mainly targets private citizens using explosions.

ISIL has undergone some changes in tactics by dramatically increasing its number of kidnappings. ISIL claimed responsibility for 101 separate kidnappings in 2014, up from 13 in 2013. The targets of kidnapping by ISIL are private citizens 44 per cent of the time, followed by police 25 per cent and journalists 15 per cent.

As well as being a terrorist group, ISIL is also involved in the Syrian civil war where it engages in combat with forces loyal to Assad, the al-Nusra front, Kurdish forces and the international coalition against ISIL. This means that ISIL is responsible for more deaths than just from terrorism but also battle deaths and other related deaths that occur in the context of conflict. These conflict deaths have not been included in the GTI.

This data is based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports.

Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)
These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports.

Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/).
Baghdad, 1 August 2015 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total number of 1,332 Iraqis were killed (including civilians, civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar) and another 2,108 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in July*.

The number of civilians killed is 844 (including 27 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar), and the number of civilians injured is 1,616 (including 38 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar).

A further 488 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (including Peshmerga, SWAT and militias fighting alongside the Iraqi Army / Not including casualties from Anbar Operations) were killed and 492 were injured.

Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 1,091 civilian casualties (335 killed, 756 injured). Diyala suffered 170 killed and 284 injured, Salahadin 64 killed and 74 injured, Ninewa 101 killed and 28 injured, and Kirkuk 26 killed and 11 injured.

According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the Governorate suffered a total of 600 civilian casualties (147 killed and 453 injured).

“Since last summer’s onslaught by terrorists of the so-called ISIL, Iraq has been living through one of the most difficult phases in its modern history”, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Jan Kubis said. “Resolute action about Daesh and its ideology, equality and cooperation of all Iraqi components as true patriots in these efforts is needed to put an end to this tragic situation. The human cost of the conflict and the suffering of the people is enormous and profoundly worrying”, the SRSG underscored.

CAVEATS: In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas. Figures for casualties from Anbar Governorate are provided by the Health Directorate and are noted below. Casualty figures obtained from the Anbar Health Directorate might not fully reflect the real number of casualties in those areas due to the increased volatility of the situation on the ground and the disruption of services. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2015</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2015</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>1313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2015</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2015</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2014</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2014</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>1604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>1198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>1179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2013</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>1185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>2109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2013</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>2191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>1306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015

UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded 2013-2015

Note: The MOH collects data from the MOI and MOD on ISF casualties and adds it to its own tally of Iraqi civilian deaths. The IAU figures are “collated from various sources around the country.”

The UN does not guarantee the accuracy of the information. Iraq Body Count states that its data is drawn from media reports, official GOI reports, NGO data, and reviews of Iraqi hospital and morgue figures. As of April 17, Iraq Body Count was still finalizing its March death toll of 320.

Iraq Population Density (UN OCHA) 7/2014

Iraqi Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions in late 2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
### Key Iraqi Insurgent Groups: 7.2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>BAATHIST</th>
<th>Active in:</th>
<th>ISIS relationship:</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naqshbandia Order/J.R.T.N.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diwala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>Established in 2007, the group's reputed leader was a high-ranking deputy in Saddam Hussein's regime. The group is believed to have initially assisted ISIS in its push south from Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1920 Revolution Brigades</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diwala, Anbar</td>
<td>Fighting in some areas</td>
<td>Formed by disaffected Iraqi Army officers who were left without jobs after the Americans dissolved the military in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Army of Iraq</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Diwala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
<td>Periodic fighting</td>
<td>ISIS has targeted family members of the leadership of this group, which has long had a presence in Diwala and has been involved in past sectarian battles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujahedeen Army</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td></td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>A nationalist Islamist group that advocates overthrowing the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata’ib al-Mustapha</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Diwala</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Muhammad</strong></td>
<td>SALAFIST</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata’ib Tawrat al-Ashreen</strong></td>
<td>ANTI-GOVERNMENT SUNNI TRIBE</td>
<td>Diwala, Salahuddin</td>
<td>Truce</td>
<td>Sunni tribes opposed to the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna</strong></td>
<td>ISLAMIST JIHADIST</td>
<td>Diwala</td>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>An Al Qaeda-affiliated group that has led a number of deadly attacks in Iraq over the years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kobani: 9.2014

Iraq: River War Approaches to Baghdad: 10.2014

Haditha  Sept. 6 to 15
Iraqi soldiers, supported by local Sunni tribes and U.S. airstrikes, fought ISIS militants and succeeded in driving them from the Haditha Dam and nearby towns.

Hit  Oct. 2 to 7
ISIS began an offensive to take control of Hit. Within days, ISIS militants controlled large parts of the city and the nearby town of Kubaysa, besieged the local police station and threatened a major air base nearby.

Ramadi  Sept. 19 to Oct. 12
Ramadi is the center of the tribal resistance against ISIS in Anbar Province and the home of Ahmed Abu Risha, a prominent anti-ISIS leader. ISIS has repeatedly attacked the area and killed the provincial chief of police on Oct. 12.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Iraq: ISIS Fighting in March 2015

1. Government forces and allied militias continued to battle ISIS militants in Tikrit.
2. At the same time, ISIS fighters were mounting a fierce assault on Ramadi.
3. Kurdish and Sunni tribal fighters advanced on ISIS territory from the northern city of Kirkuk.
4. Residents of Hawija said that ISIS executed some of its own fighters for trying to flee as the group came under attack from Kurdish forces.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

ISIS Takes Ramadi: May 15-18, 2015

**Final Days Assault**
A sandstorm forces the American-led airstrike campaign to pause, giving the group time to carry out 10 car bombings followed by a wave of ground attacks that overwhelms the Iraqi forces.

Source: Institute for the Study of War

**Iraqi Security Forces Retreat**
Within days, Iraqi security forces flee, and Islamic State fighters take control of key government facilities.

South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. "Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time," said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.
In about a week, a coalition of Kurdish militias and Syrian rebels seized two strategic towns controlled by the Islamic State near the border with Turkey. The latest advance led to the capture of Ain Issa, a town that is only 30 miles from the Islamic State’s stronghold, Raqqa.

Anbar and Ramadi Area:
7.2015

Turkish Border Area: 7.2015

Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

September 11, 2015

Ground Gains in Syria: 9/21 to 10.27.2015

1. Aleppo

Government forces have made gains south and east of the city, as they build strategic depth around their Al-Safira stronghold and push closer to Rasin al-Aboud, an important air base that ISIS has surrounded for more than a year. Employing an often-used strategy, ISIS launched a counterattack in the north to draw government fighters away from the air base and gained some territory in the process.

2. Key Supply Routes

ISIS has gained control of a long stretch of road north of Ithriya. The road remains highly contested because it is the only overland route for supplying government fighters around Aleppo.

3. Between Idlib and Hama

Rebel and government forces continue to fight for territory along the front lines between Idlib and Hama. Small areas changed hands in October, but the government has yet to make significant advances.

Iraq: Areas of Control:
30.10.15

Source: ISW,
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/maps/150ba0ba79db7707; 30.10.2015

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and “Popular Mobilization” recaptured the Baiji Oil Refinery on October 21 following operations to recapture Baiji city on October 14. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi then visited Baiji city on October 23, marking the city’s full recapture. ISW is thus upgrading Baiji and the Baiji Oil Refinery from Contested to ISF-held locations. PUK Peshmerga have also maintained limited gains in villages in southern Kirkuk near Taza and Daquq as part of anti-ISIS operations that began on September 12. ISIS has not launched substantive counter-attacks against the Peshmerga in these areas, and they remain under Peshmerga control. ISW has thus expanded the Populated areas under PUK Peshmerga control in southern Kirkuk.
Sinjar Road Campaign: Map

Incremental Gains Against ISIS: 11.2015

The U.S. is arming Syrian Arab fighters who will join Kurdish combatants to attack Raqqa.

Iraqi forces and Shiite militias, aided by U.S. airstrikes, retook the Baiji oil refinery from ISIS on Friday after contesting it for more than a year.

Iraqi forces have encircled Ramadi, which is defended by 600 to 1,000 militants, with the support of U.S. airstrikes and the Iraqi air force.

The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in /fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq After KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2014-2015
Has become an area of Kurdish as well as Kurdish-Arab tension. Commander of the Yezidi Sinjar Protection Forces Haydar Qassem Sheshou was arrested on April 5th, 2015, by a special police force affiliated with Barzani and KDP under the pretext of being linked to the Popular Mobilization militias. These groups were accused of committing violent operations in areas liberated from ISIS, which prompted the PUK Central Council to condemn the arrest and hint that the Democratic Party wanted to hand Sinjar over to ISIS.

Is an area of critical energy value: EIA estimates 17% of Iraq oil reserves are in the north of Iraq, near Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin. Control over rights to reserves is a source of controversy between the ethnic Kurds and other groups in the area. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region contained 4 billion barrels of proved reserves. KRG’s estimate is much higher because it is a resource estimate that includes unproved resources. The KRG recently increased its oil resource estimate from 45 billion barrels to 60 billion barrels although this has not been independently verified and this number likely includes at least some resources in disputed areas—especially Kirkuk.

After skirmishes between ISIL and KRG forces around the Kirkuk and Bai Hassan fields, the KRG took over operations at the Avana Dome, a part of the Kirkuk field, and Bai Hassan in July 2014. Shortly after, KRG restarted commercial production at those fields, which allowed the KRG to increase oil flows through its newly built pipeline that connects to Ceyhan (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Iraq’s Northern Oil Company continued to produce about 120,000 bbl/d from the Kirkuk’s Baba Dome, of which 30,000 bbl/d was sent to the Kirkuk refinery. The remainder of the oil production was reinjected into oil fields associated with natural gas to keep natural gas production flowing for power generation.

A December 2014 deal reached between Baghdad and the KRG has allowed Kirkuk crude to be transported via the KRG pipeline to Ceyhan, providing Baghdad with a commercial outlet for its northern production (see section on Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad). Fighting around Kirkuk city continues to take place, making nearby fields vulnerable to supply disruption.
Energy Vulnerability in Iraq

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq’s Long History of Export Instability

Iraq's total petroleum and other liquids production and consumption

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
Iraq Still Had World’s Second Largest Increase in Supply in 2014

Despite some supply disruptions and security threats, Iraq was the second-leading contributor to global oil supply growth in 2014, behind only the United States. Iraq accounted for almost 60% of production growth among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although this growth was more than offset by production declines in other OPEC countries. Iraq’s crude oil production, which averaged almost 3.4 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2014, was 330,000 bbl/d above 2013 levels, despite the heightened security threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and disrupted production in northern Iraq.

Iraq crude oil production, 2012-14 million barrels per day

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, Iraq Country Analysis Brief

ISIL attacks in northern Iraq in early June 2014 reduced northern Iraqi production and refinery operations (not including the Iraqi Kurdistan Region). These attacks did not affect southern production and exports, which accounted for 65% of Iraq’s total crude oil exports in 2014. ISIL did not significantly affect production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, although fighting came very close to fields produced under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—the Khurmala Dome and Shaukan. Some oil companies were forced to abandon exploration projects, which could delay future development.

Iraq’s crude oil production fell to its lowest monthly levels for the year during July and August following the start of the ISIL offensive. From August to December, Iraq’s production grew by almost 600,000 bbl/d, reflecting increased output from fields in southern Iraq and in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region following infrastructure expansions and a partial recovery in northern Kirkuk production. In December, Iraq’s crude oil production reached 3.75 million bbl/d, the highest amount on record.