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Introduction

The data on the patterns of violence in Iraq are uncertain at best, and so are the data on many of the factors that have generated that violence. There are, however, enough data to gain some insights into how the current fighting compares with fighting from the U.S. invasion to the withdrawal of U.S. combat force at the end of 2011, to illustrate the different patterns in casualties, and to show the importance of some of the factors that have driven the fighting and the growing divisions within Iraq.

This analysis draws on a number of sources to portray the trend data in graphic form and map the patterns in the fighting from 2003 to the present. It also shows some of the key sectarian, ethnic, demographic, and economic forces that have helped shape the fighting.

One needs to be careful about confusing correlation with causation, but some key factors that have helped shaped the violence in Iraq are clear. In other cases, the sheer complexity of the different factors involved is a warning against putting too much emphasis on any single cause or pattern, assuming that national trends can explain local or regional patterns, or seeing the conflict in terms of single threat. Complexity and uncertainty are not easy to deal with, but they are often the reality.
The Base of Instability
The Factors that Drive Iraqi Instability

Decades of Growing Problems in Giving Iraq Stability

One way to turn the past into a continuing future is to forget it, and both Iraqis and Americans seem to have little desire to understand the extent to which Iraq’s security and stability problems began decades before the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the departure of U.S. troops.

Iraq never had the kind of governance that helped it effectively exploit its potential for development or meet the needs of the accelerating growth of its population after 1950. The bloody end of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 was followed by decades of equally bloody political infighting between largely Sunni Arab Iraqi factions, and a shift to a focus on state industry and military competition with Iran that systematically distorted the Iraqi economy and limited Iraqi development on a national level.

While many Iraqis remain in denial of the scale of the discrimination against religiously active Shi’ites and the scale of the problems with Iraq’s Kurds, these were a key factor of Iraq’s development from 1958 through the late 1970s and a civil war with the Kurds that began in 1961 and lasted at various levels through the first half of the 1970s. These struggles culminated in Saddam Hussein’s ruthless purge of all rivals in 1979, and the creation of a ruthlessly repressive dictatorship that was built of a Sunni Arab minority power base, and lasted until the U.S. led invasion in 2003.

The fall of the Shah in Iran and the resulting unrest in world oil markets gave Iraq a brief burst of wealth in 1979, must of which was wasted on further distorting the economy by unproductive investments in the state sector. In 1980, however, Saddam Hussein tried to take advantage of the revolutionary turmoil in Iran to invade and annex key oil rich areas in Iran’s southwest under the guise that its Arab population had called for such aid.

By 1984, the Iraqi invasion had virtually bankrupted Iraq, forced mass conscription, halted development, and sharply reduced the quality of education and most government services. Iraq became dependent on Saudi and Kuwaiti loans and aid in oil exports, and it entered a period of continuing internal fighting and crisis that still continues. It never had a period after 1980 in which its civil government services and education sector fully recovered. One over-ambitious economic plan after another faded into unimplemented archives, and civil governance became less effective.

From 1980 to the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1998, major elements of Iraq’s Kurds again began to seek independence, and in 1986, Saddam began the bloody Anfal campaign that caused some 50,000-200,000 casualties. Significant elements of Iraq’s Shi’ite population came to support Iran and Saddam’s overthrow, and a Shi’ite armed opposition movement developed in the border areas and marshes in the south, leading to the ruthless suppression of any Shi’ite religious and political leaders that appeared to be a threat.
The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was followed by Iraq’s catastrophic defeat in 1991, and by major new Kurdish and Shi’ite uprisings. The Shi’ite uprisings were initially joined to Sunni protests, but came to have significant ties to Shi’ites in Iran and were put down relatively quickly in the south – followed by further repression of any Shi’ite challenge to the regime through 2003 and the quiet execution of several key religious figures.

This long history of growing Sunni and Shi’ite tension between the early 1980s and 2003 laid the groundwork for the creation of Iraq’s Shi’ite exile movements and ties to Iran, as well as the Shiite effort to dominate Iraq’s government after the U.S. invasion and both take revenge and ensure continued power through measures like De-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army, as well as establishing Shi’ite control over the security services and key elements of the once minority Sunni controlled structure of governance.

The outcome was different in the north. The U.S. led an effort that created a Kurdish security zone during 2003-2005, and laid the groundwork for the creation of a Kurdish Regional Government in spite of the infighting between the two leading Kurdish political factions – the KDP and PUK – and a civil war between them during the mid-1990s that lasted until 1997. The result was the creation of an unstable and corrupt Kurdish enclave that became the Kurdish Regional Government, and was able to take control of significant amounts of disputed territory after the U.S. invasion in 2003, as well as more territory in Ninewa and Kirkuk during the fighting against ISIS in 2014.

Iraqi development was sharply limited and distorted from 1991-2003 by Saddam’s efforts to reinforce his own power, and the impact of his efforts to disguise the growing destruction of the remaining elements of his weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. UN Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 that led to major economic sanctions before the fighting in 1991, and, even stronger sanctions after the fighting in 1991 as part of Resolution 687 which called for the removal of Iraq’s capability to produce and use weapons of mass destruction.

These sanctions came to affect all trade and financial resources except for medicine and some foodstuffs. They initially limited Iraqi oil exports and then led to UN controls over Iraq’s oil export income that Saddam succeeded in manipulating-- in part because of the corruption of a key UN Administrator. They put serious limits on all investment and development, and forced a process of food rationing and Iraqi attempts to increase agricultural output that further undercut Iraq’s development.

The U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam in 2003 under the assumption that Iraq did not need the U.S. to plan for stability operations, the restructuring of the Iraqi government and security forces, and that U.S. combat units could begin to withdraw 90 days after the fall of Saddam Hussein. A combination of this lack of planning and the sudden rise to power of inexperienced and deeply divided Shi’ite leaders, coupled to an awkward and unstable relationship with the KRG, helped keep Iraq from developing any form of stability and triggered a civil war between Shiite and Sunni that lasted from 2004 to 2010, and was then revived by Maliki’s actions during 2011-2013.
The gross over-centralization and authoritarianism enforced by Saddam Hussein through 2003 was followed by a series of elections, political crises, and half-formed, half implemented plans which failed to produce either stable governance or development, wasted most of the outside aid that was not consumed by the fighting, and proved unable to find any political solution to the need to integrate Sunnis into Iraq’s new power structure, the divisions between Kurd and Arab, or the effective allocation of Iraq’s oil export income.

Ambitious economic, budget, aid, and petroleum sector plans and projects often did little more than further distort Iraq’s economy, and anti-corruption efforts did little more than punish a few scapegoats while creating a government that became one of the most corrupt in the world.

If anything, the counter-corruption efforts created an Iraqi bureaucracy that was afraid to act at a point where constant shake ups in Ministers and its structure limited its ability to act. This, and the continuing fighting, blocked effective recovery, reform, and development of key elements of the Iraqi economy including basic service like electric power and the development of Iraqi petroleum sector and increases in its export revenues.

**Measuring the Underlying Forces**

The following charts can only begin to cover some of the underlying forces at work, and the scale of the problems in Iraq’s governance and economy that now contribute to its level of violence, ethnic and sectarian tensions, and poplar dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. They do, however, illustrate how close Iraq is to a failed state, the secular forces that divide it, and the full range of challenges that the Iraqi government must deal with – challenges that go far beyond ISIS and the current popular demonstrations over corruption and electric power that began in August 2015:

- **Iraq Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, August 2015) (p. 11):** The summary data in the CIA reporting on Iraq reveal a country with critical problems in terms of demographics, population pressure and a youth “bulge,” sectarian and ethnic divisions, hyperurbanization and the urban slums that come with it, a major mismatch between the large size of the agricultural labor force and its small share of the economy, high levels of direct unemployment, and a low-ranking per capita income. Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most corrupt countries in the world,

- **World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq (p. 12):** In spite of the many claims the U.S. and Iraqi government have made since 2003, the World Bank is almost certainly correct in estimating that little or no progress has been made in the overall quality of governance since the fall of Saddam Hussein. A combination of fighting, political power struggles, sectarian and ethnic tensions and conflict, poor security and a tenuous rule of law, poor execution of all of the major functions of government from the local to national level, and the failure to develop and implement effective budgets and development plans have left a track record at least as bad as Saddam’s authoritarianism and helped ensure a continuing state of civil conflict that has nothing to do with ISIS.
• **Provincial Governance: Dissatisfaction with Basic Services as a Potential Cause of Civil Unrest by Province:** (p. 13)

These problems existed long before ISIS became strong enough to invade and shaped a public perception of failed governance and secularism at the time of transition in 2011.

• **World Bank Overview of Iraq in 2015 (p. 14):** The World Bank’s assessment of the Iraqi economy in 2015 reflects both deep structural weaknesses and the growing impact of the current level of violence – much of which is affected by ISIS, but which has been matched by equal or greater levels of crisis, sanctions, and violence during most of the period between 1980 and 2015.

• As the CIA notes, the Iraqi economy has been grossly distorted by its reliance on petroleum income which has been subject to massive corruption and mismanagement in an economy which has been unable to execute any consistent form of development plan since 1979, and where, “Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides more than 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. Oil exports in 2014 remained relatively flat at 2.4 million barrels per day on average, despite new production coming online at the West Qurna 2 and Badrah oilfields, because repeated attacks on the Iraq-Turkey pipeline reduced export capacity. During the second half of 2014, government revenues decreased as global oil prices fell by more than 30%.

• **World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Iraq in 2015: 156th worst of 185 Countries (p. 15):** the current fighting in Iraq has made its problems in creating climate for effective economic development even worse, but Iraq has not developed meaningful plans for modernizing its overall agricultural sector since the fall of the monarchy, and its large state sector has become one of the least productive and most overstaffed in the developing world.

• **IMF Summary Data on Iraqi Economy in 2013-2015 (p. 16):** The IMF macroeconomic estimates for Iraq in 2014-2016 reveal a steady deterioration in Iraq’s position, confirming the World Bank’s estimate.

• The CIA estimates that during this period, military expenditures – which do not include the police and other major security expenditures– rose from 2.88% of the GP in 2012 to 3.27% in 2013, 2.88% in 2012, 2.4% in 2013, and 8.7% in 2014 – imposing a major burden on Government spending and the economy.

• **UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Iraq in 2015 (p. 17):** Iraq is the 120th worst of 187 Countries (p. ) It is unclear that the UNDP estimates really take account of the seriousness of the fighting, but still rank Iraq as one of the worst performing countries in the world.

• **The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth (p. 18):** EIA reporting shows both that Iraq faces a major crisis because of the decline in oil export revenues as well as because of the fighting, and that Iraq’s large population ensures that it is not a “wealthy oil state” in per capita terms. World Bank reporting shows that Iraq has consistently done a poor job of using and distributing
• its petroleum income, and of allocating all income in its budget – a problem compounded by acute corruption and a badly oversized state sector.

• **Demographic Pressures on Iraq (p. 19):** Iraq faces massive population pressures, compounded by a major youth bulge, low real job creation and employment rates, and poor income distribution. Its population rose from 5.2 million in 1950 to 11.1 million in 1975, and 22.7 million in 2000, and 33.3 million in 2015. It will rise to 40.4 million in 2025, and 56.3 million in 2050. Jobs of any kind, and earnings sufficient to support marriage, housing, and family are critical problems for Iraqi youth – compounded by violence, instability, and deteriorating education.

• The CIA estimates that this population was 69.5% urbanized in 2015 and that the rate of urbanization was growing at some 3% a year. The key urban centers were Baghdad 6.643 million; Mosul 1.694 million; Erbil 1.166 million; Basra 1.019 million; As Sulaymaniyah 1.004 million; Najaf 889,000 (2015). These cities alone had a total population of over 12 million or one-third of the total population in 2015.

• The birthrate was nearly 3% annually, and the median age was only 21.5 years – with 40.25% at the ages 0-14 years, and 19% more in the age range of 15-24. Some 332,000 men and 322,000 women reached adulthood and need jobs in 2015, some 6% of a total labor force of some 9.3 million in a society with a direct unemployment rate of at least 16% and at least a quarter below the poverty line.

• **Iraq Population Density (UNOCHA) (p. 20):** A map of Iraq’s population density is critical to understanding the real world nature of the gains ISIS has made in the West, the impact of hyperurbanization centered around Baghdad, and the fact that the following maps showing sectarian and ethnic distribution and patterns in violence disguise how small a portion of Iraq’s population is in the the west, how well Sunnis and Shi’ites are mixed in urban areas and some eastern provinces, and how large a portion of the population is located in areas disputed by Arabs, the Kurds – as well as Turkmens and other minorities.

• **Sectarian Divisions in Iraq (p. 21):** This map provides a crude picture of the sectarian and ethnic distribution of the population in Iraq in 2003. No accurate maps exist, and no census data are available to make such estimates. Maps do not reflect the concentration of mixed populations in urban or rural areas. Iraqis often ignore the vast uncertainties involved in such maps and numerical estimates and make claims that have no valid historical or statistical basis. Some outside estimates of the options for some form of federalism make the same mistake, as do some estimates of the target of violence by sect. Later maps also show a growing pattern of segregation and division by sect and ethnicity from 2003 on that grew much worse for Sunnis over time, and presented major problems for Sunni IDPs after the rise of ISIS at the end of 2013.
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• **Massive Losses in Minority Populations Before the Rise of ISIS (p. 25):** Civil conflict since 2003 has led to the massive migration of smaller minorities outside the country. No clear figures exist for the impact of ISIS, but the USG estimate that by mid-2011, the ongoing civil conflict had drive some 70% of Iraq’s seven key minorities out of the country – further polarizing the country between Sunni and Shi’ite and Arab and Kurd.

• **The Broader Kurdish problem (p. 26):** Just as Iraq’s sectarian mix cannot be divorced from the sectarian tension in Syria and the fact the rest of the major Arab states are largely Sunni while Iran is Shi’ite, the Kurdish involves Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian Kurds, and has been a key factor affecting the violence in Iraq, as well as the region.

• **The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015 (p. 27):** The Kurdish Regional Government has expanded far beyond clear Kurdish-dominated areas since 2003, and made major gains in the fighting against ISI, including key petroleum fields around Kirkuk – creating further sources of tension and civil conflict.

• **Energy Vulnerability in Iraq (p. 28):** Petroleum resources and water have been key sources of conflict since 2003, as have energy pipelines and export routes. Iraq has not been able to export oil through Syria since the Iran-Iraq War, has not Arabia since 1990, lost access to its main pipeline through Turkey in the fighting against ISIS in 2014, now has only a limited northern pipeline capacity through areas controlled by the KRG, and must rely on vulnerable offshore loading points in the gulf for its main source of petroleum exports.

**Key Areas that Cannot be Quantified**

The above metrics cannot reflect the impact of religious and Islamic extremism, or the impact of Iraq’s ongoing political, sectarian, and ethnic struggles – including key shifts like De-Baathification and disbanding the regular Iraq Army after it was defeated in 2003. As noted earlier, many of the demographic data are uncertain, and so are many key economic data and trends.

No accurate estimate exists on income distribution, actual allocations and impact of government budget expenditures, problems in the productivity of given sectors, disguised or indirect unemployment, actual income per capita by region and class vs. gross PPP estimates, job creation and satisfaction for youth, segregation by sect and ethnicity, poverty levels and levels by region and sect/ethnicity, levels of corruption and their impacts, political and social impact of population growth and hyperurbanization, political and economic impact of inflation and currency instability, impact of the cost of housing and marriage on youth, the dynamics of Iraq’s consistent failure to fund effective development, and many other aspects of Iraq’s base of instability.

Unfortunately, most classic often metrics do little to explain the full range of forces that cause and sustain conflict.
Iraq Country Profile: (CIA World Factbook, August 2015)

- **Population**: 32,585,692 (July 2014 est.)
- **Youth Bulge: 56.3%**: 0-14 years: 36.7% (male 6,093,069/female 5,878,590); 15-24 years: 19.6% (male 3,237,212/female 3,142,202)
- **Entering Labor Force Annually**: male: 332,194; female: 322,010 (2010 est.)
- **Ethnic Divisions**: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkman, Assyrian, or other 5%
- **Sectarian Divisions**: Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8% (cut 50% since 2003), Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1
- **Urbanization**: 69.4% (3.01% per year)
- **GDP vs. Labor Force**: agriculture: 3.3%, industry: 64.5%, services: 32.2% (2014 est.) versus agriculture: 21.6%, industry: 18.7%, services: 59.8% (2008 est.)
- **GDP**: $505.4B (PPP 2014) $232.2B (2014 Official Exchange Rate)
- **Per Capita Income**: $14,100 (2014 in $2013) (109th in the world)
- **Budget**: revenues: $101.4 billion; expenditures: $94.58 billion (2014 est.)
- **Taxes & Other Revenues**: 43.6% of GDP
- **Exports vs. Imports**: $94.43 billion (84% crude oil) vs. $62.34 billion
- **Direct Unemployment**: 16% (2012)
- **Poverty Level**: 25% (2008)
- **Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking**: 170th worst of 175 countries
World Bank Rankings of Failed Governance in Iraq

Transparency International Rates 170th most corrupt of 175 countries in 2014.

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.
Provincial Governance: Dissatisfaction with Basic Services as a Potential Cause of Civil Unrest by Province

Note: Rankings are from U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Stability Development Roadmap, an assessment model that analyzes public opinion about several areas of concern, including basic services, to estimate the potential for civil unrest resulting from these perceptions.


Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, July 30, 2011, p. 94
Insecurity and violence have escalated in Northern Iraq but the situation in Baghdad and the south is improving. The June 2014 advances by ISIS have thrown parts of Iraq into violent chaos and instability. ISIS controls nearly one third of Iraq's territory including major cities such as Mosul, Tel Afar and Fallujah. According to Iraq Body Count, 17,073 civilians were killed in 2014. 1.5 million people have been displaced since the fighting erupted. Regional dynamics have exacerbated an already complex environment. The Syrian conflict has resulted in the flow of refugees and armed groups in and out of the country. Escalating violence in Iraq is threatening the development of non-oil economic activity in much of the country. The interruption in the supply lines and the distribution systems had serious impacts on the private sector disrupting the move of merchandise between the northern regions and the rest of the country.

Iraqi lawmakers approved a new government on September 8, 2014, amid an unprecedented security crisis. Iraq's new Prime Minister has a challenging task to unify a deeply divided country. On November 13, 2014, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached a formal agreement to end years long oil export and budget disputes between the two parties and on January 29, Iraq's parliament approved the 2015 budget of 119 trillion Iraqi Dinars (US$105 billion). The budget assumes oil export prices of US$56, average oil exports of 3.3 mbpd, and the implementation of austerity measures. As financing in 2015 will be limited, it is expected that the government deficit will widen further to 11% of GDP. While these unfavorable prospects are unfolding, the government has the opportunity to push further in systematically rationalizing expenditures, for example by reducing subsidies, particularly in the electricity sector; streamlining public employment; phasing out transfers to state-owned enterprises; and prioritizing investment projects.

Iraq’s economy suffers from structural weaknesses. The public sector is very large even by regional standards, government and state-owned enterprises employ approximately half of the labor force, but the quality of public services has been weak. The non-oil sector represents only 46% of the economy and services. Construction, transport, and a small agricultural sector are highly dependent on government spending and thus on oil revenues. Unemployment is high. Demographic pressure is strong, with 41% of the population under 15 years. The labor force needs training on basic skills. The business environment is weak. Poor governance, inconsistent regulations, and security issues keep Iraq at low ratings of global rankings for doing business.

The economy remains extremely vulnerable to the country’s ongoing security problems, which impede investment and inhibit private economic activity. Furthermore, high dependence on the oil sector is making the economy more vulnerable to declining oil prices. The non-oil sector represents only 46% of the economy and services. Non-oil growth has deteriorated since the start of the conflict due to the destruction of infrastructure, impeded access to fuel and electricity, low business confidence, and disruption in trade. Non-oil GDP growth declined by 5.2% in 2014. In 2015, real GDP growth is projected to decline by 1% due to lower oil prices and the impact of the conflict.

The prevailing insecurity has seriously hampered trade and investment, and disrupted northern oil exports for most of 2014. Due to the regional conflict, the economy contracted by 0.5% in 2014, from 4.2% growth in 2013, despite better than expected oil exports from the south (Basra). Economic diversification remains a challenge for the Iraqi government to promote income-creating opportunities for the majority of the Iraqi population.

The 2012 household survey indicates that Iraq’s headcount poverty was reduced by about 4 percentage points during 2007-12, and national poverty fell from 23.6% in 2007, to 19.8% in 2012. However, poverty reduction has been spatially uneven. In Baghdad, by far the most populous governorate in the nation, poverty did not change significantly, while in the (KRG), poverty declined, albeit at a small rate. In contrast, poverty increased sharply in five governorates – Nineveh in the north and Qadisiya, Thi Qar, Missan and Muthanna in the south.

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Iraq in 2015: 156th worst of 185 Countries

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### Rankings - Distance to Frontier

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<td>Getting Electricity</td>
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<td>Registering Property</td>
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<td>Getting Credit</td>
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<td>Resolving Insolvency</td>
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### IMF Summary Data on Iraqi Economy in 2013-2015

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<tr>
<td>Volume of exports of goods and services</td>
<td>Percent change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Percent of total labor force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>34.776</td>
<td>35.871</td>
<td>36.977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government revenue</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.575</td>
<td>40.485</td>
<td>40.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government total expenditure</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.412</td>
<td>43.452</td>
<td>50.928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government net debt</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>General government gross debt</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.103</td>
<td>37.022</td>
<td>55.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>U.S. dollars</td>
<td>Billions</td>
<td>3.052</td>
<td>-7.748</td>
<td>-16.636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.313</td>
<td>-3.504</td>
<td>-9.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IMF,
UNDP Ranking of Human Development Indicators in Iraq in 2015: 120th worst of 187 Countries

The Myth of Iraqi Oil Wealth

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that, excluding Iran, members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned about $730 billion in net oil export revenues (unadjusted for inflation) in 2014. This represents an 11% decline from the $824 billion earned in 2013, largely because of the decline in average annual crude oil prices, and to a lesser extent from decreases in the amount of OPEC net oil exports. This was the lowest earnings for the group since 2010.

For 2015, EIA projects that OPEC net oil export revenues (excluding Iran) could fall further to about $380 billion in 2015 (unadjusted for inflation) as a result of the much lower annual crude oil prices expected in 2015, a 48% drop from 2014.

For Iraq – assuming no military problems, this means a drop from $87 billion in 2014 to $45.2 billion.

On a per capita basis, OPEC (excluding Iran) net oil export earnings are expected to decline by half from about $2,186 in 2014 to $1,114 in 2015. OPEC net oil export revenues in 2015 are based on projections of global oil prices and OPEC production levels from EIA’s March 2015 ShortTerm Energy Outlook (STEO).

Iraq’s per capita oil income in 2014 was $2,682, compared to $7,900 for Saudi Arabia, $25,362 for Kuwait, and $36,013 for Qatar. If EIA is right, it will drop to $1,368 in 2015.

EIA does estimate that OPEC revenues will rebound to $515 billion in 2016, with the expected rebound in crude oil prices. (+36%)
U.S. Census Bureau seems roughly correct in estimating that Iraq’s population grew from only 5.16 million in 1950 to 13.23 million in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War began, and to 18.14 million in 1990 when Saddam invaded Kuwait, and was 29.67 million in 2010 as the U.S. phased out its presence. Even assuming a declining birthrate, this population pressure is estimated to continue for at least several decades in the future and

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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
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<td>43.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
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<td>56.3</td>
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<td>Population Growth Rate (percent)</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Annual Births (millions)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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Sectarian Divisions in Iraq

# Massive Losses in Minority Populations Before the Rise of ISIS

## Population Estimates and Descriptions of Minority Communities in Iraq, 2003 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Community</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>Predominantly Assyrian, Chaldean, Armenian, and Syriac; most live in or around the Kurdistan Region; a small number of Armenians live in Basrah.</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
<td>400,000 to 600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>Descendants of Ottoman Empire-era soldiers and traders, about 60% of Turkmen are Sunni Muslim and the rest are Shia.</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabaeans</td>
<td>Gnostics who follow John the Baptist. Sabaeans do not accept converts and must live near a river to observe religious rites; concentrated in southern Iraq.</td>
<td>60,000 to 70,000</td>
<td>5,000 to 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazidis</td>
<td>Ancient group with religious traditions drawn from Zoroastrianism, Manicheism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism; Yazidis do not accept converts or marry outside the faith; concentrated around Sinjar Mountain west of Mosul.</td>
<td>600,000 to 700,000</td>
<td>Less than 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaks</td>
<td>Most identify as Shia and the rest as Sunni, but do not observe all pillars of Islam and draw religious traditions from Yazidis and Sufism. Shabaks have lived along the Ninewa Plains since 1502.</td>
<td>400,000 to 500,000</td>
<td>200,000 to 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feyli Kurds</td>
<td>Ethnically Kurdish Shia, the Feyli live mainly in Diyala province along the Iranian border, in Baghdad, and in Iran. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, they were stripped of Iraqi citizenship.</td>
<td>1 million to 1.5 million</td>
<td>100,000 to 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakas</td>
<td>Kurds who speak their own dialect, Kakas draw religious traditions from Yazidis, Zoroastrianism, and Shia Islam. They live primarily in Kirkuk and Mosul.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>60,000 to 70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Some population estimates were obtained from community leaders who met with the Minority Rights Group International; others were taken from SIGIR interviews with community leaders and U.S. government reports.

The “Kurdish Problem:” April 7, 2015
The Kurdish Problem in Iraq before KRG Gains in fighting with ISIS in 2013-2015

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p 89
Energy Vulnerability in Iraq

http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ
The Broader Patterns in Iraqi Violence: 2003-2015
The Broader Patterns in the Iraqi Violence: 2003-2015

Policymakers and analysts sometimes forget that Iraq has been in a constant state of war or crisis since 1980, that conflict between Arab and Kurd has occurred regularly since Iraq was formed as a state, and that the beginning of the modern conflict between Iraqi Sunni and Iraqi Shi’ite began when Iran went on the counteroffensive in the Iran-Iraq War in 1982, and led to the formation of armed Shiite exile movements, pockets of armed Shi’ite resistance in the South from 1982 to the Shi’ite uprising after Iraq’s defeat in the first Gulf War, and constant regime repression of Shi’ite opposition in Iraq from 1990-2003.

The charts in this section focus on the civil war that followed. This war was directed in part against the U.S. and other occupying powers, but it was also a continuing conflict between Sunni and Shi’ite, and one which continued to threaten to lead to fighting between Arab and Kurd. This conflict peaked in 2006 and 2007, but never halted. U.S. and other allied force left at a point where it was at a lower level, but the power struggle over the outcome of the 2010 election led Prime Minister Maliki to shift to a Shi’ite-dominated and corrupt form of governance that involve steadily rising violence from 2012 onwards, and which alienated enough of Iraq’s Sunnis to make western Iraq highly vulnerable to attacks by ISIS in 2013 and early 2014.

Understanding the Metrics of Violence

The metrics involved are uncertain, particularly in absolute numbers – although many of the trends seem valid. They are a clear warning not to focus on ISIS as the major threat in Iraq. The need to create a stable structure that can deal with broader range of challenges described in the previous section, and create a political and economic structure that can reduce Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic challenges is the critical goal, and any defeat or weakening of ISIS is simply one means to this end.

The two key metrics used in this section and throughout much of the rest of this report are the trends in civilian casualties and in incidents of violence. These seem to be the best data available that reflect the overall level of violence rather than the loss of combatant forces, although the chronologies of major violent incidents present in SIGAR, Iraqi Body County, Institute for the study of War, and other sources often provide useful insights – as do official maps of where incidents occurred.

As the first chart in this section shows, there are major uncertainties in the estimates of both civilian killed and wounded. The same is true, however, of efforts to count incidents as a measure of violence. These are described in brief for each type of metric in the charts and maps that follow, but the reader should be aware of several key limitations:

• No accurate official record consists of killed, and local power struggles and feuds cannot be separated from the broader sources of violence.
• Wounded and injured are even more uncertain as many smaller wounds were never reported. As a result, the broad trends in wounded/injured provide some useful insights, but the history of past wars and counts of local incidents indicates the actual ratios of wounded to killed were probably between 3:1 and 5:1, and are not reflected within any realism in any source.

• Reporting by military and security forces often focused on combatant casualties, and on tactical encounters and major acts of terrorism or violence. The overall level of violence, particularly terrorist or insurgent violence directed at intimidating or controlling the civil population on a day-to-day basis was never properly reported – a consistent failing in U.S. military reporting in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition reporting on civilians killed in air strikes and tactical clashes was particularly erratic, and official reporting on the civilian casualties from air strikes sharply undercounted the real total.

• Polls during different periods of the fighting showed that many Iraqi civilians perceived the most serious forms of violence they faced as coming from security measures that threatened them day-to-day, extortion and intimidation by both government and various militia and insurgent forces, and the impact of the constant threat violence the safety of families, jobs, and businesses – compounded in many cases by the threat posed by other sects and pressure to move and give up homes and businesses.

• From 2003 onwards, all major sources reporting on violence choose not to compile statistics showing the cause and target of violence by sect or ethnicity although this was clearly the driving factor behind most violence. The unstated causes was generally the fear that any such public reporting would stimulate more such violence and make the situation worse.

• Data on violence by area and governorate (province) was erratic and makes it impossible to clearly show trends by area.

• No effort was made to track where refugees and internally displaced persons came from, motives for moving, and destination until the ISIS war began in 2013. Local movements and segregation by sect and ethnicity were only track sporadically, and many of the data remain classified.

Key Trends and Data: 2003-2015

The following charts still help set the stage for the fighting from 2003-2010, the Maliki provoked civil filing from 2011-2013, and the rise of ISIS from 2013 to the present, but the “fog of analysis” is always at least equally to the fog of war.

• **Conflicting Estimates of Civilian Casualties: 2003-2011 (p. 29):** This chart shows a Wikipedia summary of just how different the estimates are by some major sources. It is important to note, however, that it calls estimate using extremely uncertain sampling methods – some of which had clear political motivation – as ”scientific.” In reality, the counts made on the basis of official reporting or using media sources have proved to be far more accurate simply because the high end estimates clearly did not reflect the actual level of violence as the gross casualty levels became clearer over time.

One key insight is that there is no direct correlation at any given period between the number of incidents and the number killed, just as later data show there is no correlation between killed and wounded/injured.

Another, however, is that the violence never stopped and the extent to which the civil war rose again after the departure of U.S. forces under Maliki and before ISIS invaded. As Iraqi government reporting on the resources for the government’s loss of Mosul has shown Maliki’s corruption and search for personal loyalty in the Iraqi security forces, and his alienation of Iraq’s Sunnis after the 2010 election, created the conditions that made quick ISIS gains possible in later 2013 and early 2014.

U.S. Official Estimates of Security Incidents and Civilian Fatalities: 2004-2011 (p. 34): These U.S. estimates broadly correlate with the IBC trends, but still show significant differences in both trend and absolute numbers. They also reflect the fact that the U.S shifted to use higher Iraqi government estimates over time. The drop in incidents and casualties at the end of 2011 is difficult to explain, and may reflect cuts in the U.S. collection and analytic effort. It does not seem to track with other estimates, with the SIGAR estimates of combat casualties, or the estimates of incidents and civilian casualties made in later SIGAR reports.

Sectarian Division of Baghdad: 2003-2009 (p. 35): This map provides an illustrative picture of the degree to which sectarian fighting and tension changed a key urban area before ISIS became a challenge. Similar data are not available on a national level, but it is clear that sectarian fighting made major demographic changes in Iraq during this period that have continued through 2015.

Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013 (p. 36): This series of maps shows how serious the level of Sunni-driven violence was before ISIS invaded, and that the level of sectarian violence continued after 2011, and rose sharply in the east in 2012 and 2013 as a result of Maliki’s actions. Unfortunately, such reporting is limited, and no similar maps or data seem to exist on the trends in abuses and fighting instigated by the Iraqi security forces, or Shi’ite attacks on Sunnis.

Rival Sunni Groups in Iraq (p. 37): This table highlights the fact that a range of Sunni armed groups operated in Iraq before the ISIS invasion in late 2013.

### Killed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimated violent deaths</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Family Health Survey</td>
<td>151,000 violent deaths</td>
<td>March 2003 to June 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancet survey</td>
<td>601,027 violent deaths out of 654,965 excess deaths</td>
<td>March 2003 to June 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Research Business survey</td>
<td>1,033,000 deaths as a result of the conflict</td>
<td>March 2003 to August 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLOS Medicine Survey</td>
<td>Approximately 500,000 deaths in Iraq as direct or indirect result of the war.</td>
<td>March 2003 to June, 2011</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Body counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Documented deaths from violence</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
<td>110,600 violent deaths</td>
<td>March 2003 to April 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Body Count project</td>
<td>112,667–123,264 civilian deaths from violence, 174,000 civilian and combatant deaths</td>
<td>March 2003 to March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classified Iraq War Logs</td>
<td>109,032 deaths including 66,081 civilian deaths</td>
<td>January 2004 to December 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Injured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Human Rights Ministry</td>
<td>The Human Rights Ministry of the Iraqi government recorded 250,000 Iraqi injuries between 2003 and 2012.[67] The ministry had earlier reported that 147,195 injuries were recorded for the period 2004–2006.[68]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Government</td>
<td>Iraqi Government: spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh reported that 239,133 Iraqi injuries were recorded by the government between 2004 and 2011.[69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq war logs</td>
<td>Classified US military documents released by WikiLeaks in October 2010, recorded 176,382 injuries, including 99,163 civilian injuries between January 2004 and December 2009.[70]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Body Count</td>
<td>The Iraq Body Count project reported that there were at least 20,000 civilian injuries in the earliest months of the war between March and July 2003.[71] A follow up report noted that at least 42,500 civilians were reported wounded in the first two years of the war between March 2003 and March 2005.[72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
<td>The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that there were 36,685 Iraqi injuries during the year 2006.[73]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Health Ministry</td>
<td>The Health Ministry of the Iraqi government reported that 36,659 Iraqi injuries had occurred during the year 2007, based on statistics derived from official Iraqi health departments’ records. Baghdad had the highest number of injuries (18,335), followed by Nineveh (6,217), Basra (1,387) and Kirkuk (855).[74]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This data is based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/)
Iraq: Annual Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence, 2003–12

Total documented civilian deaths since 2003 from violence are estimated at about 123,000 people. While violent attacks and the loss of lives have dropped significantly in recent years—from their peak of about 29,000 annual deaths in 2006 to about 5,000 deaths in 2012—the country still lacks security and stability.

World Bank, Republic of Iraq Public Expenditure Review • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0294-2, p. 4

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<th>Year</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

These data are based on 40,405 database entries from the beginning of the war to 30 Jun 2014, and on monthly preliminary data from that date onwards. Preliminary data is shown in grey when applicable, and is based on approximate daily totals in the Recent Events section prior to full analysis. The full analysis extracts details such as the names or demographic details of individuals killed, the weapons that killed them and location amongst other details. The current range contains 15,856–16,589 deaths (11%–10%, a portion which may rise or fall over time) based on single-sourced reports. Graphs are based on the higher number in our totals. Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence.

Source: Iraq Body Count: [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/).

Note: Data not audited. Totals for December 2011 include data through December 6. “U.S. Surge” denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq.
Sectarian Division of Baghdad: 2003-2009

**2003: Before the Invasion**

Before the American invasion, Baghdad's major sectarian groups lived mostly side by side in mixed neighborhoods. The city's Shiite and Sunni populations were roughly equal, according to Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor and Middle East expert.

- **Kadhimiya**, a historically Shiite neighborhood, is home to a sacred Shiite shrine.
- **Adhamiya**, a historically Sunni neighborhood, contains the Abu Hanifa Mosque, a Sunni landmark.
- **The Green Zone** became the heavily fortified center of American operations during the occupation.
- **Sadr City** was the center of the insurgent Mahdi Army, led by the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.

**2009: Violence Fuels Segregation**

Sectarian violence exploded in 2006. Families living in areas where another sect was predominant were threatened with violence if they did not move. By 2009 Shiites were a majority, with Sunnis reduced to about 10 percent to 15 percent of the population.

- **Huriya** was transformed in 2006 when the Mahdi Army pushed out hundreds of families in a brutal spasm of sectarian cleansing.
- **More than 8,000 displaced families relocated to Amiriya**, the neighborhood where the Sunni Awakening began in Baghdad.
- **Adhamiya**, a Sunni island in Shiite east Baghdad, was walled and restricted along with other neighborhoods in 2007 for security.
- **Neighborhoods east of the Tigris River** are generally more densely populated than areas to the west.
Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013

Attacks That Could Be Attributed to ISIS

2004
51 attacks

2005
58 attacks

2006
5 attacks

2007
56 attacks

2008
62 attacks

2009
76 attacks

2010
86 attacks

2011
34 attacks

2012
603 attacks

2013
419 attacks

2004-05 The group emerges as “Al Qaeda in Iraq” following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Its goal is to provoke a civil war.

2006-07 The group’s February 2006 bombing of one of Iraq’s most revered Shiite shrines ignites sectarian violence across the country. After merging with several other Sunni insurgent groups, it changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.

2008-10 I.S.I. claims responsibility for more than 200 attacks, many in densely populated areas around Baghdad.

2011-12 The group is relatively quiet for most of 2011, but re-emerges after American troops withdraw from Iraq.

2013 Seeing new opportunities for growth, I.S.I. enters Syria’s civil war and changes its name to reflect a new aim of establishing an Islamic religious state spanning Iraq and Syria. Its success in Syria bleeds over the border to Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Rival Sunni Groups in Iraq</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naqshbandia Order/J.R.T.N.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BAATHIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> ● Fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established in 2007, the group’s reputed leader was a high-ranking deputy in Saddam Hussein’s regime. The group is believed to have initially assisted ISIS in its push south from Mosul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1920 Revolution Brigades</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BAATHIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala, Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> ● Fighting in some areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed by disaffected Iraqi Army officers who were left without jobs after the Americans dissolved the military in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Army of Iraq</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALAFIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> ● Periodic fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS has targeted family members of the leadership of this group, which has long had a presence in Diyala and has been involved in past sectarian battles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mujahedeen Army</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALAFIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> Truce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A nationalist Islamist group that advocates overthrowing the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata'ib al-Mustapha</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALAFIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> Truce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Muhammad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALAFIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic militants who fight against the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Khata'ib Tawrat al-Ashreen</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTI-GOVERNMENT SUNNI TRIBE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala, Salahuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> Truce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni tribes opposed to the Iraqi government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunna</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISLAMIST/JIHADIST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active in:</strong> Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISIS relationship:</strong> ● Fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Al Qaeda-affiliated group that has led a number of deadly attacks in Iraq over the years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Combatant Forces: 2003-2015
Trends in Combatant Casualties

It is important to stress that combatant casualties are an important measure of the course of the fighting, and present some of the same uncertainties as estimates of civilian casualties—particularly for insurgent or enemy forces. They also, however, can be grossly misleading if they are used as a measure of the trends broader in violence and if tactical events are confused with the patterns in an insurgency—where control of the civilian population is far more critical—or in civil wars where much of the violence may be directed towards civilians.

- **Estimates of Combatant Deaths in Iraq – 2003-2014 (p.40):** This chart provides a rough indication of some of the problems in counting combatants. It is important to stress that credible assessments casualties among n y mix of non-state actors, terrorists, and insurgent have a high degree of uncertainty. As is the case with estimates of civilian casualties, the failure to make sure estimates explicitly is the rule rather than the exception, and a major fault in the credibility and integrity of most official public reporting—including virtually all U.S reporting.

- **ICasualties Count of Iraqi Civilians vs. Combatants Killed in Iraq: 2005-2011 (p. 41):** This chart illustrates how little correlation there often is between combatant casualties and the overall level of violence in insurgencies, civil wars, and conflicts involving non-state actors. This was certainly true in Iraq.

- **Coalition Casualties in Iraq: 2003-2011 (p. 42):** This chart provides a similar estimate of Coalition Casualties. If these figures are compared to any of the estimates of civilian casualties in the previous, it is again clear that they do not illustrate the level of violence in Iraq even during the period when U.S. and allied forced dominated the fighting.
Estimates of Combatant Deaths in Iraq – 2003-2014

Deaths among Iraqi military and among insurgent groups such as ISIS have increased dramatically in 2014, in relation to previous years. Besides a clear increase in total numbers, 2014 has also seen for the first time a sharp divergence in reported totals of combatant deaths between some of the common sources that have been used to track casualties in the conflict for many years. Some of these sources include the daily tracking by Agence-France Presse (AFP), official statistics released by Iraqi government ministries, and aggregated media reports. In past years, numbers from these sources have varied, with some higher or lower than others for any given time period or category of casualties, but have usually not been very far apart. 2014 has seen a wide gulf emerge in the totals for combatant deaths, with totals from AFP and official statistics suggesting roughly 4,000-5,000 combatants killed during the year, while aggregated media reports on the other hand, with each report of combatant deaths taken at face value, suggesting totals of roughly 30,000.

It is not possible for us to say at present what number in this range is correct or most credible, in part because IBC has not analyzed the reporting on combatants in as much detail as we do with civilians, but also due to considerable uncertainty with the reliability of some of the reports. The lower range of 4-5,000 is likely too low due to limitations in information gathering. On the other hand, we think that a face value total of approximately 30,000 derived from aggregated media reports is likely too high.

Many of the media reports that make up this total rely either on military sources in the field providing numbers for ISIS/insurgent deaths, or on ISIS/insurgent sources providing numbers for military deaths. At the same time, it is clear from many of these reports that the numbers reported are often not precise “body counts” tied directly to specific incidents or specific victims, as is typically the case with civilian deaths, but rather are rough estimates of how many enemy fighters were killed in a particular operation, or over a given time-frame. These estimates generally originate from parties with an interest in advancing the perception that they are making significant gains over their enemy, and may therefore be prone to exaggeration.

For such reasons, the most that can currently be said is that reporting on combatant deaths during 2014 ranges from about 4,000 to 30,000. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two numbers, but neither can be ruled out at present.

Total deaths in 2014 (civilian and combatant) and cumulative total since 2003

Combining the 17,000 civilian deaths recorded by IBC with the above wide range of combatant deaths of 4,000-30,000, suggests a total of between 21,000 and 47,000 people have been killed in war-related violence in Iraq during 2014, making it one of the three worst years of the conflict that began nearly twelve years ago.

1 For a discussion of these figures and how they were derived, see IBC’s original version of this table.

Total cumulative reported deaths for the entire period 2003-2014 passed 200,000 during 2014, and presently stand at 206,000 using the more conservative end of the range for combatant deaths in 2014. Over 150,000 (around 75%) of these were civilian. 1

Iraq Body Count 2003-2014 150,772
Iraq War Logs new 'Civilian' and comparable 'Host Nation' remaining 2004-2009 - central estimate 9,720
Iraqi combatants killed March-May 2003 4,895
Insurgents killed June-December 2003 597
Insurgents killed May 2004 652
Insurgents & Iraqi soldiers killed March 2009 59 Insurgents & Iraqi soldiers killed March 2010–2014 7,948
TOTAL IRAQI 200,717 US & Coalition military killed 2003–2014 4,807
US & Coalition foreign contractors killed 2003–2014 468
TOTAL 205,992

Source: Iraq Body Count: https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

Casualties states: This is not a complete list, nor can we verify these totals. This is simply a compilation of deaths reported by news agencies. Actual totals for Iraqi deaths are much higher than the numbers recorded on this site.

Deaths Since April 28, 2005 (Shiite-led government announced):
Police/Mil: 8321
Civilians: 50253
Total: 58574

Deaths Since February 22, 2006 (Al Askari Mosque bombing):
Police/Mil: 6023
Civilians: 44145
Total: 50168

Sources: Icasualties, casualties.org/Iraq/ByYear.aspx; accessed 15.12.11
Coalition Casualties in Iraq: 2003-2011

Sources: Icasualties, casualties.org/Iraq/ByYear.aspx; accessed 3.9.11
The Changing Patterns of Violence: 2003-2009
The Changing Patterns of Violence: 2003-2009

There is no clear way to divide the major periods in the fighting in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. In broad terms, however, the fighting was dominated by U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents between 2003 and 2009, although Shi’ite militias and forces also played a role as did the growing strength of Iraqi government security forces and Kurdish Pesh Merga forces. From the 2010 election to late 2013, the fighting gradually became a struggle between the Iraqi government forces—increasingly shaped by Prime Minister Maliki to assert his own control and reflect Shi’ite interests—and the growing Sunni resistance shown earlier on page 37. The third period—which still continues—began in late 2013 when small convoy of ISIS forces invaded Iraq from Syria in December 2013, expanded its control to take Mosul in June 2014 and started that new round of conflict that still continues. (ISIS changed its name from Al Qaida in Iraq in April 2013.

- **Weekly Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 - August 28, 2009 (p. 47)** shows how intense the fighting became at the tactical level through 2007, but that it was steadily declining in the period before the 2010 election and power struggle over its results.

- **Iraqi Security Incidents and Casualties: 2004-2009 (p. 48)** shows the broad level of correlation between the previous data on incidents and civilian casualties, and the lack of correlation with combatant and contractor casualties.

- **Civilian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009 (p. 49)** provides an official U.S. estimate of the trend in civilian casualties during the peak period of the fighting during this period and shows the level of correlation to the number of incidents in the period chart.

- **Ethno-Sectarian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009 (p. 50)** provides one of the few unclassified U.S. attempts to tie the patterns in violence to the broader sectarian and ethnic causes of such violence. The data are highly questionable, however, and seem to massively undercount the level of such deaths outside the Baghdad area.

- **Iraqi Security Patterns by Region: 2004-2009 (p. 51)** shows how the fighting gradually limited the level of violence in given areas, and the impact of the rise of the Sunni “Sons of Iraq” in defeating Al Qaida and other Sunni extremist forces in areas like Anbar in the West during this period. It helps illustrate why Maliki’s lack of support for such Sunni forces had such a negative impact in the years that followed.

- **Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad: 2006 -2009 (p. 52)** shows the pattern of largely Sunni vs. Shi’ite violence in Baghdad, and the serious of such fighting during the peak periods of violence in this phase of conflict.
• **Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008 (p. 53)** shows the geography of Al Qaida and supporting Sunni force operations. It also shows the familiarity that some key ISIS cadres who had been in AQI before it became ISIS had in operations in Iraq from December 2013 on.

• **Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008 (p. 54)** illustrates the degree to which Coalition and Iraqi government forces also faced Shi’ite threats. Many of which did occur in areas outside the center of sectarian fighting between Iraqis.

• **Iraq - IED Incident Trends – Coalition Force (p. 55):** shows the critical role of IEDs in shaping the insurgent attacks on Coalition combatant forces during this period. IEDs were not part of the major threat to civilians or a key part of the overall level of violence.
Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 42
Civilian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraqi Security Patterns by Region: 2004-2009

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province:

- 2004
- 2005
- 2006
- 2007
- 2008
- 2009

Security Incidents, by Type:
- Found and Cleared Bombs: 22%
- Detonated Bombs: 25%
- Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-air Attacks: 15%
- Attacks against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations: 15%
- Sniper, Ambush, and Other Small Arms Attacks: 21%
- Unspecified: 15%

Cumulative Fatalities:
- Coalition Military (Non-U.S.): 223
- Contractors: 1,026
- U.S. Military: 3,859
- Iraqi Security Forces: 8,015

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. .42
Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad: 2006 - 2009

Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 05-Sep-06; weekly beginning 01-May-06
Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008

Winter 2006-2007

Fall 2008

Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

Iraq - IED Incident Trends – Coalition Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Type</th>
<th>Jun-07</th>
<th>Jun-08</th>
<th>Jun-09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED Incidents</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks (no CF casualties)</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Attacks</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF KIA</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF WIA</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incident counts based on preliminary data for June 2009
Violence at End-2009-Early 2010

There is no clear way to divide the major periods in the fighting in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. In broad terms, however, the fighting was dominated by U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents between 2003 and 2009, although Shi’ite militias and forces also played a role as did the growing strength of Iraqi government security forces and Kurdish Pesh Merga forces. From the 2010 election to late 2013, the fighting gradually became a struggle between the Iraqi government forces—increasingly shaped by Prime Minister Maliki to assert his own control and reflect Shi’ite interests—and the growing Sunni resistance shown earlier on page 37. The third period—which still continues—began in late 2013 when small convoy of ISIS forces invaded Iraq from Syria in December 2013, expanded its control to take Mosul in June 2014 and started that new round of conflict that still continues. (ISIS changed its name from Al Qaida in Iraq in April 2013.

- **Key Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: (p. 58)** and **Location of Sunni and Shi’ite Insurgent Capability: August 2009 (p. 59)** show that significant threats and areas of concern remained at the end of this period in spite of the drop in the intensity of the fighting and violence.

- **Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Attacks and Incidents Late (p. 60)** shows the patterns in attacks and incidents in late 2009 at the end of the surge.

- **Iraqi Security Patterns: 10/21/09 to 1/13/10 (p. 61)** provides a snapshot of the major violent incidents still going on at the end of the surge.

- **Attacks Per Month by Type in Baghdad: 2009 (p. 61) and Iraqi Casualties by Type in Baghdad: 2009 (p. 62)** shows the continuing intensity of the violence in the Baghdad area, many of which were sectarian and not directed at the U.S.
Key Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: February 2009
Location of Sunni and Shi’ite Insurgent Capability: August 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Attacks and Incidents Late 2009

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p.5
Iraqi Security Patterns: 10/21/09 to 1/13/10

October 2009

Wednesday, October 14: 9 Iraqis killed and 56 wounded during armed attacks in Baghdad and bombings in Kerbala.

Friday, October 16: 14 Iraqis killed and 80 wounded during an attack on a mosque in Telafar.

Sunday, October 25: 132 Iraqis killed and at least 500 wounded in explosions outside of the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad Provincial Council headquarters building.

Saturday, October 31: 23 Iraqis wounded during attacks in Baghdad and Mosul.

November 2009

Wednesday, November 4: More than 20 Iraqis injured during a series of explosions in Baghdad.

Thursday, November 5: 2 Iraqis killed and 20 wounded during attacks in Mosul, Ramadi, and Hilla.

Monday, November 16: 24 Iraqis killed during attacks in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Abu Ghraib.

Wednesday, November 25: Approximately 50 Iraqis wounded in bombings in Kerbala and Baghdad.

January 2010

Wednesday, January 20: Approximately 36 Iraqis injured during an attack in Mosul.

Saturday, January 2: 2 Iraqis killed and 24 wounded in attacks in Mosul and Baghdad.

Thursday, January 14: Approximately 27 Iraqis killed and 111 wounded in a series of bombings in Najaf.

Wednesday, January 20: Approximately 36 Iraqis injured during an attack in Mosul.
Attacks Per Month By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Source: Senior Iraqi official
Iraqi Casualties By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Source: Senior Iraqi official
Levels of National Unity and the Impact of the March 2010 Election
Levels of National Unity and the Impact of the March 2010 Election

The results of the March 2010 election left Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki without a clear mandate, and his primary rival – Ayad Allawi – without sufficient votes to form a government. The resulting power struggle between them pushed Maliki into an increasing effort to take control over the security services, turn the government in a group of loyalists, sideline Allawi, and push leading Sunnis out of office – often through false accusations and show trials.

It gave Iran new leverage over the Iraqi government, and was a factor in Iraqi refusals to grant the U.S. the kind of status of forces agreement that would have allowed it to retain some troops. It also increased tensions broadly at a sectarian and ethnic level.

- Levels of National Unity and the Impact of the March 2010 Election (p. 67), Election Results (p. 68), Iraqi Governance: The Problem of the Cabinet and National Leadership (p. 69), and Iraq: Delays in Forming a New Government (p. 70) provide a briefing picture of some of the tensions the 2010 election created. In practice, however, it pushed Maliki into a major struggle to block efforts to include Allawi into a unity government, and a series of ongoing power struggles to both eliminate his rivals and uses his Shi’ite power base to control the country.

- Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges (p. 71) highlights a USCENTCOM estimate of the sectarian and ethnic divide in Iraq at this time.

- U.S. Estimate of Major Threats to Iraq at End 2011 (p. 72) shows a U.S. briefing slide highlighting U.S. perceptions of the instability of Iraq and the threat of future civil conflicts.


- Iraqi Views of Security and Travel by Province, July 2009 (p. 74) shows that Iraqis saw an improvement in local security but still saw the country as broadly unstable.

- Iraq: Trends in National Unity in 2010 (p. 75) shows the mixed trends in national unity by province at the beginning of 2010.

- Iraq-Kurd Disputed Territory: USCENTCOM Estimate (p. 76) and Ongoing Political Issues between the GOI and KRG: A Historical Perspective (p. 77) show how seriously the U.S. saw the risk of Arab-Kurdish tensions and clashes as being in period before the election.
• **Iraq: The Refugee and IDP Challenge in 2009 (p. 78)** shows impact of the fighting had displaced something like 10% of Iraqis outside their previous location or made them refugees outside their country.

• **Iraq: Key Challenges in 2010-2011 (p. 79)** lists the challenges the new Iraqi government had to meet to avoid a new round of fighting following the election and departure of U.S. forces – most of which the government was never able to address.
Levels of National Unity and the Impact of the March 2010 Election

Iraqi National Alliance
Key Members: SLIC and Muqtada al-Sadr

Iraqi National Movement
Key Members: Former PM Iyad Allawi and current VP Tariq al-Hashimi

The State of Law Coalition
Key Member: PM Nouri al-Maliki

Iraq’s Unity Alliance
Key Members: Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani and Sheikh Abu Risha

Kurdistani Alliance
Key Members: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party

Council of Representatives
325 Seats
Election Results

Strong nationalist, anti-incumbent vote, but still strong sectarian and ethnic character.

Maliki’s State of Law Party (89 seats and 27.4% of the vote),

Allawi’s Iraqiya (91 seats and 28% of the vote) and

Hakim-Jafaari-Sadr coalition in the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats and 21.5% of the vote).

- Sadrists get nearly 60% of the seats within the INA – approximately 39 seats versus 9 for Badr, 8 for ISCI, 1 for Jaafari, 6 for Fadhilla, and 5 for other candidates.

Kurdish vote shows considerable unity of PUK and KDP. (seats and % of vote.)

Iraq’s Unity Alliance (Bulani) is major loser.

Both MoD and MoI lose, as does head of Accountability Commission
**Iraqi Governance:**

**The Problem of the Cabinet and National Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Jalal TALABANI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Adil ABD AL-MAHDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President</td>
<td>Tariq al-HASHIMI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Nuri al-MALIKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Rafi al-ISSAWI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Rowsch Nuri SHAWAYS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Faruq ABD AL-QADIR Abd al-Rahman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Mahar Dilli al-HADITHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-MUFRIJI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement &amp; Migration</td>
<td>Abd al-Samad SULTAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Khudayr al-KHUZAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Karim Wahid al-HASAN</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
<td>Nermin OTHMAN</td>
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<td>Finance</td>
<td>Bayan Baqir JABR Sulagh al-Zubaydi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Hoshyar Mahmud ZEBARI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Salih Mahdi Mutlab al-HASAWI</td>
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<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>Abid Dhiyab al-UJAYLI</td>
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<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Wijdan Mikhail SALIM</td>
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<td>Industry &amp; Minerals</td>
<td>Fawzi al-HARIRI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Jawad Karim al-BULANI</td>
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<td>Justice</td>
<td>Dara NUR AL-DIN</td>
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<td>Labor &amp; Social Affairs</td>
<td>Mahmoud Muhammad Jawad al-RADI</td>
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<td>Municipalities &amp; Public Works</td>
<td>Riyadh GHARIB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>Hasayn al-SHahrastani</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
<td>Ali BABAN</td>
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<td>Amir Abd al-Jabar ISMAIL</td>
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<td>Latif RASHID</td>
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<td>Jasim Muhammad JAFAR</td>
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<td>Thamir Jafar al-ZUBAYDI</td>
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<td>State for Council of Representatives Affairs</td>
<td>Safa al-Din al-SAFI</td>
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<td>Muhammad Munajid al-DULAYMI</td>
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<td>State for National Dialogue</td>
<td>Akrar al-HAKIM</td>
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<td>State for National Security</td>
<td>Shirwan al-WAILI</td>
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<td>State for Provinces</td>
<td>Khulud Sami Izara al-MAJUN</td>
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<td>State for Tourism &amp; Antiquities</td>
<td>Qahtan Abbas al-JABBURI</td>
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<td>State for Women's Affairs (Acting)</td>
<td>Khulud Sami Izra al-MAJUN</td>
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<td>State Without Portfolio</td>
<td>Ali Muhammad AHMAD</td>
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<td>State Without Portfolio (Acting)</td>
<td>Hasan Radhi Kazim al-SARI</td>
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<td>State Without Portfolio</td>
<td>Muhammad Abbas al-UARYBI</td>
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<td>State Without Portfolio (Acting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governor, Central Bank of Iraq</td>
<td>Sinan Muhammad Ridha al-SHABIBI</td>
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Source: CIA
## Iraq: Delays in Forming a New Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Time Frame (in Days)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special needs voting and Election Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tally of results and preliminary results</td>
<td>4-7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complaints and adjudications: Provisional Results</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appeals and Certification of Results</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Session of Council of Republic ; negotiations for selection of Speaker (maximum of 30 days after certification)</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker elected</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Republic elects President and other members of the Presidential Council</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister nominated (maximum of 15 days)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister picks Council of Ministers. (maximum of 30 days)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister and Council of Ministers sworn in. (Presidential Council must designate new Prime Minister in</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraqi
Ethnic and
Sectarian
Divisions in late
2009

Sectarian Challenges
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

Ethnic Challenges
Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

Tribal Challenges
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
U.S. Estimate of Major Threats to Iraq at End 2011

Major Threats to Iraq

- Arab-Kurdish Issues
- Neo-"Baathists; SOI Issues
- Anti-AQI Tribal Success
- AQI/Insurgent & Shi’a Militias
- Intra-Shi’a Violence
- Shi’a Infighting Over Power/Resources
- Foreign Refugee/IDP Issues
- Lethal Aid, Training, Funding
- Foreign Fighter Flow

Map of Iraq showing the geographical locations and threats mentioned above.

1 person represents 100 deaths.
Iraqi Views of Security and Travel by Province: July 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraq: Trends in National Unity in 2010

Anbar: Moved Forward
There was greater power-sharing among political parties on Anbar’s Provincial Council, and the Sunni-dominated provincial government engaged constructively with the Shia-led central government.

Ninewa: Moved Backward
There was a series of high-profile attacks on minority groups. National unity remains unlikely without resolving the internally disputed boundaries and the status of Kurdish forces in Ninewa. Arab and Kurdish communities are divided along ethnosectarian lines.

Tameem: Moved Backward
The future status of Tameem province remains a major challenge to national unity. The three main ethnoreligious groups refused to make concessions on issues such as elections out of fear that any compromise could harm their future territorial claims in the province. The presence of security forces controlled by political parties remains a major concern.
Iraq-Kurd Disputed Territory: USCENTCOM Estimate

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Ongoing Political Issues between the GOI and KRG: A Historical Perspective

Five Issues Outstanding between the GOI and KRG:

- **Disputed Territories**: Both the GOI and KRG claim territory in several of Iraq's northern provinces, including Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Tameem.
- **Federal Hydrocarbons Law**: The KRG and GOI have not reached an agreement on a package of federal hydrocarbons laws, and fundamental differences remain over contracting and management of the oil.
- **Power-Sharing and Constitutional Reform**: At the heart of the constitutional reform debate is the GOI's desire to reinforce a strong central government and the KRG's push for decentralization. In 2008, a constitutional review committee recommended 50 changes to the Constitution, but efforts to implement the recommendations remain stalled.
- **Security**: In August 2009, GOI and KRG leadership laid preliminary groundwork for an interim security agreement, and joint patrols of Iraqi and Kurdish forces were established in Diyala. Efforts were underway to establish patrols in Salah Al-Din and Tameem. Attempts to establish similar joint patrols in Ninewa initially stalled, but went into effect in January 2010.
- **Foreign Policy**: The Iraqi Constitution gives the GOI power to formulate foreign, economic, and trade policies. However, the KRG has been developing independent economic and political ties with foreign countries, signing separate oil deals, and meeting separately with foreign heads of state.

Legislative Issues: Iraq's Constitution, ratified in 2005, governs the relationship between the GOI and the KRG, but disputes continue over legislative initiatives that affect both entities, including:

- **Article 23**, which governs property rights and prohibits the "ownership of property for the purposes of demographic change," a clause that is particularly relevant in provinces where boundaries are in dispute.
- **Article 140**, which requires the GOI to implement Article 58 of the Interim Transitional Administrative Law, passed in 2003. The law contained a formula for solving territorial disputes, including conducting a national census and holding a referendum on Tameem province. As of this quarter, no census or referendum had been scheduled.
- **Article 141**, which recognizes legislation enacted by the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP), provided it does not contradict the Iraqi Constitution. On June 24, 2009, the IKP passed a draft constitution for the Kurdistan Region that claimed territory in Tameem province, pending a referendum in the July 25, 2009, KRG elections. Members of the CoR objected to the draft, and the referendum was not included on the ballot.

Efforts To Resolve Issues Outstanding between the GOI and KRG:

- In September 2008, a 7-member committee was set up to recommend solutions for power sharing, voter rolls, and property violations that would pave the way for Tameem province to participate in provincial elections. The committee missed three self-imposed deadlines and handed the matter to the CoR on May 31, 2009.
- In November 2008, the CoR created five "leadership committees" to resolve the five outstanding issues between the KRG and GOI. The committee on disputed territories recommended dividing senior government posts in Tameem province, but negotiations broke down over power sharing at lower levels of government. All committees have since suspended their work.
- Since June 2009, GOI and KRG officials have participated in a high-level task force led by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to negotiate a solution to disputed territories and other outstanding issues.
Iraq: The Refugee and IDP Challenge in 2009

Iraq: Key Challenges in 2010-2011

Revitalize effort to develop effective the Iraqi security forces.

Resolve the problems left over from the fact that the 2009 budget expired without funding a wide range of projects, deal with the deficit problems in the 2010 budget, and put the 2011 budget on a more stable path.

Move towards an effective rule of civil law that adapts Iraq’s “confession-based” legal system; and find an effective balance between the judiciary and police.

Perform triage between the mix of Iraqi government projects and the results of US and other foreign aid efforts to ensure the best aid projects are effectively transferred and sustained.

Find some compromise between Arab and Kurd that at least buys time for a broad, negotiated political settlement.

Find ways to ease the tensions between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’ite that were exacerbated by the election campaign and new de-Ba’athification efforts.

Deal with the past failure to create effective programs to deal with internally displaced Iraqis and Iraqi refugees outside Iraq.

Move forward to ensure that the petroleum contracts signed in 2009 are fully supported by the new government.

Make similar reforms to provide incentives for private and foreign investment that are competitive with those offered by other Gulf states.

Define the practical relations Iraq will have with the United States as part of the Strategic Framework Agreement for both civil and military aid and relations before US forces fully withdraw, and in time to set clear goals for US aid funding to Iraq in the FY2012 budget.
The U.S. Withdrawal and Level of Iraqi Security Forces at End-2011
U.S. Withdrawal and Iraqi Security Forces at End-2011

The power struggles that led Maliki to become steadily more authoritarian, to seek personal power at the cost of tolerating corruption in the security forces as well as the government, to try to purge Sunni rivals, alienate Sunni support in western Iraq, and effectively alienate the Sons of Iraq coincided with a series of political events that meant the U.S. was unable to keep a cadre of combat forces in Iraq, and the U.S. phased out almost all forces by the end of 2011 except for a small military mission and let the police train and assist mission collapse.

- **Details of Iraq’s Loss of Deterrent and Defense Capability: 2003 vs. 2010 (p. 82)** shows that the 2002 war and disbanding Iraq’s forces had cut them from a force still superior to Iran in 2003 to one that had little or no external defense capability in 2010.

- **Iraqi and U.S. Security Forces: 2004-2/2010 (p. 83)** shows just how rushed the effort to create effective Iraqi military and police forces was, and the speed with which U.S. forces were withdrawn. While Maliki must take the blame for the corruption and near collapse of Iraq forces in 2013-2014 they had been generated far too quickly to be effective when U.S. forces left.

- **Iraqi Security Forces as of 10/10/2011 (p. 84)** shows something that has often been forgotten in the years since 2011: the majority of Iraqi security forces (614,800 out of 929,103) were low grade police with minimal training and arms, weak leadership, and high levels of corruption in granting positions and using funds. The actual army and Federal Police added up to less than 250,000 authorized, many of which were new units and/or recruits, and had their own leadership and corruption issues.

- **U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq: June-December 2011 (p. 85):** U.S. force levels had dropped to well below 50,000 by the beginning of 2011, left urban areas in June 2011, and have given up many bases. President Obama still had the option of retaining some U.S. forces in mid-2010, but the basic plan for major force cuts had been drafted in 2008 and major implementation had followed in 2009. After the March 2010 election, it is unclear that Maliki trusted the U.S. enough to want U.S. forces to stay, or that this had popular or Majlis support. In any case, U.S. forces left by the end of 2010.

- **U.S. Draw Down in Iraq: 2009-12/31/2011 (p. 86):** shows the massive scale of the U.S. draw down.

- **U.S. Contractor Levels in Iraq (p. 97):** shows rapid level of cuts in contractors.

- **Iraq: Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond (p. 88):** summarize the key challenges the Iraqi government then faced -- most of which were additional to those laid out in page 79.
Details of Iraq’s Loss of Deterrent and Defense Capability: 2003 vs. 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Force Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Manpower</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>8:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Manpower</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>19:10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>7:5</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAFVs</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>815</td>
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<td>APCs</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4:1</td>
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<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>9:10</td>
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<td>SP Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1:2</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRLs</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1:5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11:10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6:5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>191,957</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>2:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Failed U.S. Support of INSF – Pre-ISIS

- Officially disband Iraqi Army. Focus security on community policing (Order No. 2, May 23rd, 2003.)
- Start effort to rebuild Iraq security forces in 2005, but remain Shi’ite dominated. Funding, program structure erratic, problems with trainers, focus on force generation rather than quality.
- Broaden effort in 2005 with first real funds and support, but still emphasize police. Have to restructure all of National Police for being too Shi’ite
- Main Iraqi training effort gather momentum on 2006-2007, but bulk of forces is generated after major fighting is over.
- U.S. forces leave Iraqi cities in 2009.
- March 2010 election starts Maliki’s battle for power, effort to control all security forces, isolate and coop Sunni elements.
- U.S. combat forces, major military train and assist and police training effort effectively halt in late 2011. Only small OMC office left.
- Low level civil war, Maliki repression of opposition and Sunnis from 2011-2013. Iraqi forces gradually become political, corrupt, and ineffective.
Crisis-Driven U.S. Security Funding: Reacting After the Fact
(Obligations Lag Threat and Spending Lags 6-14 Months More)

Security Incidents: January 3, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Bulk of Iraqi Security Forces Deploy After Key Fighting

29% in Army

416,681 Total MOI

254,848 Total MoD
Pulling Out More Quickly than Planned: U.S. Troop Levels Go from 45,000 to Zero in 3 Months

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011 p. 51,

Sources: GAO, IRAQ DRAWDOWN Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, GAO 11-774, September 2011, p. 13
U.S. Contractor Levels in Iraq

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2011, p. 34,
## Iraqi Security Forces, as of 10/10/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Assigned Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total MOD</strong></td>
<td>279,103</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Interior</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>31,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total MOI</strong></td>
<td>645,800</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-Terrorism Force</strong></td>
<td>4,200</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>929,103</td>
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**Note:** Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

**Source:** GOI, MOI IG, Information provided to SIGIR, 10/10/2011.
## Iraq Today: A Negligible Military Power - I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Military Balance</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>GCC Totals</th>
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<tr>
<td>Force Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active Military Manpower (2014)</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>66,700</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>42,600</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>233,500</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>66,700</td>
<td>362,600</td>
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<td>Reserve Military Manpower (2014)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Manpower (2014)</td>
<td>11,260</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<td>71,200</td>
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<td>Army and National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,318</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>2,484</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>4,551</td>
<td>2,485</td>
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<td>Self-propelled Artillery</td>
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<td>252</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
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<td>138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>475</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
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<td>1,476</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>92+</td>
<td>294</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Air Force Active Manpower</td>
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<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
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<td>313</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>681</td>
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<td>AEW&amp;C, Intelligence, and AWACS Aircraft</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Tanks and Tanker/Transports (TKR)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA, ASW)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval and Coast Guard Active Manpower</td>
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<td>38,000</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Surface Ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates)</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Patrol Boats/Craft and Corvettes with Missiles</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 5, 2015, adapted from the IISS, *Military Balance 2015.*
Iraq Today: A Negligible Military Power - II

Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and Other Armored Vehicles

Armed and Unarmed Aircraft

Submersibles and Major Surface Ships

Armed and Unarmed Patrol Craft

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, September 5, 2015, adapted from the IISS, Military Balance 2015.
Iraq: Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond

Complete the constitutional and legal basis for Arab and Kurdish political accommodation; move towards truly “national” treatment of Sunni and Shi’ite.

Stable planning and funding of economic and infrastructure development.

Fully shift away from outside aid; create stable planning, spending, and control of budget without major deficits.

Creation of jobs for steadily growing population. Rise in per capita income from 160th to Gulf standards, better distribution of income.

Structural reform of agriculture

Long-term solutions to water problems.

Conversion-modernization-privatization of state industries.

Full legislation and liberalization to attract foreign and domestic investment.

Reconstruction and modernization of upstream and downstream petroleum sector; pipelines and Gulf facilities; stable Iraqi-foreign company partnership.

Make Ministries effective; revitalize health and education sectors.

Deal with foreign refugees and internally displaced persons.

Shift and downsizing of Iraqi military from counterinsurgency to deterrence and defence against foreign threats.

Shift of police and security forces from counterinsurgency to rule of law; checks on corruption and organization crime.

The grim aftermath of the 2010 election, and Prime Minister Maliki’s ability to retain office, was his systematic effort to take full control over the security services, abrogate his power sharing agreement with Allawi, eliminate or buyoff his rivals and any serious Sunni political opposition, reinforce his rule through favoritism and corruption, and suppress any popular opposition – including peace demonstrations by the Sunnis in western Iraq who were largely excluded from Iraq’s oil revenues, power, and the security forces.

The following charts reinforce the message of the previous World Bank data showing that Iraq’s economic position and governance deteriorated to levels equal to those of the worst periods under Saddam Hussein, and that corruption became even worse. They also show that the inevitable result was a steady rise in violence, sectarian conflict, tension with the Kurds, and abuse by Iraq’s security forces. Maliki’s steady shift toward Shi’ite rule and personal authoritarianism enable the recovery of elements of Al Qaida in Iraq. It coincided with a growing civil war in Syria, and laid the ground work for the rise of ISIS, the decay of already weak and incompetent security forces, and a level of popular Sunni hostility in Western Iraq that made it uniquely vulnerable to the ISIS invasion that began in December 2003.

Two Critical Weaknesses in the Data

The following metrics do show the rise in overall violence between 2010 and 2013 but they again reflect three critical weaknesses in the previous data and in U.S., international, and NGO reporting on virtually every insurgency and serious level of “terrorist” activity since Vietnam:

• First, they focus on direct, measurable levels of violent activity rather than the expansion or contraction of popular support for the government and government security forces, the level of government or opposition control and influence at the local level, and the level of the types of lesser violence inherent in kidnappings, extortion, establishing a rule of law, and ideological “purification” and rule of the population.

• Second, they are essentially one-side assessments, not net assessments, and they ignore the underlying reality behind virtually every such case that it is the government involved who corruption, misrule, and violent repression has been its own worst enemy and helped undermine the effectiveness of its security system.

• Third, they focus on violence, fighting and tactical outcomes, and the politics of conflict to the exclusion of the structure forces that have created the rise of terrorism or insurgency. They are essential “military” in character rather than civil-military assessments that examine the full range of forces and causes of the violence or fighting: corruption, poor governance, critical economic problems, failed rules of law, demographics, and sectarian and ethnic divisions.
This lack of net assessment and objectivity fundamentally skews both the narrative and metrics of almost all initial reporting on such conflicts, and often persists in efforts to provide histories and lessons – to the point where repeating past mistakes has become the rule and not the exception.

**The Metrics that Are Available**

That said, official reporting does provide some insights:

- **Key Sources of Political Violence in 2011 (p. 91)** highlights the fact that some USG reporting did focus on the continuing level of violence and potential threats in 2011, as the U.S. phased out its combat presence and most of its train and assist effort in Iraq.

- **Iraqi Casualties: 2008-2014 (p. 92)** shows the speed with which Maliki’s actions helped raise the level of civil violence in Iraq from 2011 onwards, and bring it back to the level that at exist in 2008. It is important to note that IS did not contributed meaningful to the level of violence until 2014, and these data do not reflect the lesser violence caused by growing repression by the Iraqi security forces.

- **UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2008-2012 (p. 94)** provides a detailed monthly break out of such violence which often did rise in direct proportion to both popular demonstrations and the actions of the Iraqi security forces.

- **UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2008-2012 (p.95)** shows these data in graphic form and the seasonal trends involved.

- **Major Bombings: 2003-2011 (p. 96)** provides a rough indication of the fact that one key form of violence rose back to 2004-2010 levels – an important indicator because U.S. and other Coalition forces were no longer present and such bombs are a key indicator of the level of sectarian violence.

These data are also important because they make it clear that ISIS is in many ways the symptom and not the disease. The rise in violence not only preceded ISIS, it empowered it. And, the deep structural or “base” causes described in the first section of this report not only continue to empower ISIS but ensure that Iraq will remain violent and unstable until they are addressed.
Key Sources of Political Violence in 2011

**Al Qaida in Iraq**: Since 2010, terrorist attacks have primarily targeted Iraqi security forces and government officials, but they have also been aimed at stirring ethnic tensions. AQI has been operating primarily in regions with majority Sunni Arab populations, particularly focusing its efforts in and around Baghdad and Ninewa, but appears unable to command territory or population centers. The degradation of AQI’s capacities is expected to continue under the pressure of an ISF now more capable of targeting, capturing, and detaining terrorists and disrupting their networks. However, according to DoS, AQI has adapted to the changing security conditions and remains capable of coordinated mass-casualty attacks and assassinations.

Other Sunni terrorist groups remain active as well. **Ansar al-Islam**, with both Kurd and Arab membership, operates in northern Iraq. The group has claimed responsibility for the second-largest number of Sunni terrorist attacks in Iraq (behind only AQI). Another group operating in northern and central Iraq, the Jayish **Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqqashbandi**, emphasizes what it claims to be the religious justifications for its attacks. Shia extremist groups—backed by Iranian funding, training, and weapons—also present a threat to Iraqi and U.S. military forces. DoS reported that attacks by these groups have decreased this year, but their Iranian-supported networks continued to operate throughout Iraq’s southern provinces.

Shia militias in Iraq, **Jayish al-Mahdi** (JAM) and its successor, the **Promised Day Brigade**. This is the militant arm of the Sadrist movement led by cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Since the militia’s inception in 2003, JAM has engaged in countless attacks on U.S. forces, Iraqi forces, and Sunni civilians. The group was responsible for some of the most gruesome sectarian violence in Iraq. Early in 2007, at the beginning of the U.S. military surge, al-Sadr ordered his followers to stand down, and shortly thereafter, he left for Iran. Following the military campaign in Basrah, Sadr City, and al-Amarah in the spring of 2008, al-Sadr disbanded his militia. Several months later, he announced the transition of his movement into a non-violent organization called the Munahidoon, but he maintained a small group of Iranian-supported militants called the Promised Day Brigade.

**Assaib Ahl al-Haq** (AAH, or League of the Righteous). Having emerged in 2006, AAH’s leader Qais Khazali, who broke with al-Sadr and was officially named the leader of the Iranian-backed AAH, Khazali’s fighters traveled to Iran for special training by the Revolutionary Guards and members of the Lebanese Hezbollah. They received four to six weeks of training in the camps in the use of mortars, rockets, sniper tactics, intelligence gathering, kidnapping operations, and explosively formed penetrators. AAH conducted attacks on Coalition forces from as early as the summer of 2006 and continues intermittently, also engaging in kidnappings and sectarian violence.

**Kata’ib Hezbullah** (KH, or the Hezbollah Brigades). Active in Iraq since 2007, KH operates mainly in Shia areas of Baghdad, such as Sadr City, and throughout southern Iraq. Like AAH and the Promise Day Brigade, it is supported by Iran. KH is independent from Muqtada al-Sadr and has operated separately since its inception, albeit with some cooperation and operational overlap. Since 2007, KH members have conducted multiple attacks against U.S. forces using rocket-propelled grenades and improvised rocket-assisted mortars. Since the beginning of 2011, the majority of Iranian-backed attacks have occurred in southern Iraq, with sporadic incidents taking place in northern provinces and in Baghdad. Toward the end of the quarter, Iran-sponsored attacks in northern provinces appeared to be subsiding, although USF-I officials reported that these networks still possess the capacity to conduct operations.
Rising Death Tolls in the Maliki, Pre-ISIS Period

Selected Major Attacks, 5/2013–7/2013

May 17
At least 23 killed, including 49 killed in car bombings near a Shia mosque in Baquba and 25 in bombings in Baghdad

May 20
At least 66 killed, including at least 48 in 10 bombings in Baghdad, 14 killed by a car bomb north of Baghdad in Balad, 14 killed in twin bombings at a restaurant and bus station in Basra, and at least 9 Shia worshippers killed by a car bomb in Hillah

May 27
At least 66 killed in a coordinated wave of car bombings in mostly Shia areas in 11 Baghdad neighborhoods

June 10
At least 61 killed and many more wounded in bombings across Iraq, including more than 20 killed in separate bombings in Mosul, 15 others in bombings in Diyala, and 11 more in Salah Al-Din

June 16
At least 49 killed and dozens wounded in multiple suicide and car bombings in 9 cities in northern, central, and southern Iraq; gunmen killed at least 4 pipeline guards and wounded 5 others near Mosul

June 23–25
As many as 127 killed and hundreds wounded by gunfire, improvised explosive devices, and bombings across Iraq; Baghdad sustained heavy casualties

July 2
At least 59 killed by gunfire, car bombings, and IEDs in 10 cities, including at least 34 in Baghdad in predominantly Shia areas

July 11
At least 59 killed in attacks in 10 cities

July 14
At least 66 killed and dozens wounded in bombings in 11 locations around Iraq, including the Grand Mustapha Mosque

July 20
As many as 80 killed in a wave of evening bombings coordinated to detour where Iraqis congregated to break their fast

July 29
As many as 60 killed in at least 18 bombings during morning rush hour in marketplaces and other populated areas in Baghdad, Kut,巴斯拉, and Samarra

July 30
IEDs, gunfire, and car bombings killed as many as 50 in coordinated attacks in 11 cities

Provinces Where Most Attacks Occurred

Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Nineve, Salah Al-Din, and Tameen: provinces were most frequently attacked.

SIGIR, Final Quarterly Report, September 9, 2013, p. 76,
Violence in Iraq resulted in more than 35,000 civilian casualties in the past year, making 2014 the bloodiest year in Iraq since the 2006-2007 sectarian tensions after the US-led invasion.

While the United Nations figures report 12,282 civilian deaths in Iraq, The Iraq Body Count, a non-profit that tracks violence in Iraq, reported civilian deaths roughly doubled from 2013 to 2014.

UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2008-2012

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Tot</th>
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<td>721</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>542</td>
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<td>297</td>
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<td>6787</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>296</td>
<td>196</td>
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<td>179</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>347</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>241</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>179</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>360</td>
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<td>398</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>3238</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Civilians wounded from armed violence and acts of terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>545</td>
<td>1306</td>
<td>655</td>
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In analyzing civilian casualties, UNAMI utilizes as wide a range of sources and types of information as possible, which are analyzed for reliability and credibility. Attempts are made to crosscheck and verify such information from other sources before conclusions are drawn and published. Sources include, for example, testimony of victims, victims’ relatives, witnesses, and evidence provided from health personnel, community elders, religious and civil leaders, local, governorate and central Government departments and officials, UN and other International Organizations, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and UNAMI Security Section (SSI), media reports, members of the international community, civil society, and NGOs. Where security does not permit direct access to the location of an incident, UNAMI relies on a range of techniques to gain information through reliable networks.

Every effort is made to ensure that data contained in UNAMI reports is as comprehensive as possible; however, the data presented is not exhaustive. Where UNAMI is not satisfied with the evidence concerning a particular incident it will not be reported. In some instances, investigations may take several weeks before conclusions can be made. This also means that conclusions concerning particular incidents or alleged violations may be adjusted as more information comes to hand and is analyzed. However, if information is equivocal, then conclusions will not be drawn until more satisfactory evidence is obtained, or the case will be closed without conclusion and it will not be included in statistical reporting or analysis. As information is updated, and conclusions and statistics are modified, this can result in slight differences in reporting of the same incident or variations in statistics reported by UNAMI over time.

In some incidents where civilian casualties are alleged, the status of the reported victim(s) as civilian is disputed or is equivocal. In such cases UNAMI is guided by all the information to hand, as well as the applicable standards of international humanitarian and human rights law in determining whether the victim should be classified as a civilian, as a person actively participating in hostilities, or as status unknown.

In light of the above-noted limitations in methodology, UNAMI does not claim that the information it provides is complete, and it may well be that UNAMI is under-reporting the extent, nature or seriousness of the effect of armed violence and acts of terrorism on the civilian population.


Note: The MOH collects data from the MOI and MOD on ISF casualties and adds it to its own tally of Iraqi civilian deaths. The IAU figures are “collated from various sources around the country.” The UN does not guarantee the accuracy of the information. Iraq Body Count states that its data is drawn from media reports, official GOI reports, NGO data, and reviews of Iraqi hospital and morgue figures. As of April 17, Iraq Body Count was still finalizing its March death toll of 320.

Major Bombings: 2003-2011

2003
2003 Jordanian embassy bombing in Baghdad
Canal Hotel bombing
Imam Ali Mosque bombing
27 October 2003 Baghdad bombings
2003 Nasiriyah bombing
2003 Karbala bombings

2004
2004 Irbil bombings
2004 Iraq Ashura bombings
21 April 2004 Basra bombings
24 June 2004 Mosul bombings
14 September 2004 Baghdad bombing
30 September 2004 Baghdad bombing
December 2004 Karbala and Najaf bombings
2004 Baqubah bombing
2004 Kufa shelling
2004 Forward Operating Base Marez bombing

2005
2005 Al Hillah bombing
2005 Musayyib bombing
17 August 2005 Baghdad bombings
14 September 2005 Baghdad bombing
2005 Khanaqin bombings

2006
5 January 2006 Iraq bombings [1]
22 February 2006 Al-Askari Mosque bombing
7 April Buratha Mosque bombing
1 July 2006 Sadr City bombing
23 November 2006 Sadr City bombings

2007
2007 Baghdad Mustansiriya University bombing
22 January 2007 Baghdad bombings
3 February 2007 Baghdad market bombing
12 February 2007 Baghdad bombings
18 February 2007 Baghdad bombings
2007 Al Hillah bombings
2007 Tal Afar bombings
29 March 2007 Baghdad bombings
2007 Iraqi Parliament bombing
Imam Hussein Mosque bombing
18 April 2007 Baghdad bombings
Imam Abbas mosque bombing
13 May 2007 Makhmoo bombing
Second bombing of Al-Askari Mosque
Al-Khilani Mosque bombing
2007 Amirli bombing
2007 Kirkuk bombings
26 July 2007 Baghdad market bombing
1 August 2007 Baghdad bombings
2007 Kahtaniya bombings
2007 Al Amarah bombings [2]

2008
1 February 2008 Baghdad bombings
2008 Balad bombing
6 March 2008 Baghdad bombing
2008 Karbala bombing
17 June 2008 Baghdad bombing
15 July 2008 Baquba bombings
12 September 2008 Dujail bombing
Abdullah restaurant bombing[3]

2009
2009 Baghdad police recruitment centre bombing
6 April 2009 Baghdad bombings
23 April 2009 Iraqi suicide attacks

2010
2010
25 January 2010 Baghdad bombings
1 February 2010 Baghdad bombing[4]
3 March 2010 Baqubah bombings
April 4, 2010 Baghdad bombings
6 April 2010 Baghdad bombings
April 2010 Baghdad bombings
10 May 2010 Iraq attacks
July 2010 Baghdad attacks
17 August 2010 Baghdad bombing
25 August 2010 Iraq bombings
19 September 2010 Baghdad bombings
October 2010 Baghdad church attack
2 November 2010 Baghdad bombings

2011
2011
January 2011 Baghdad shootings
January 2011 Iraq suicide attacks
24 January 2011 Iraq bombings
27 January 2011 Baghdad bombing
2011 Tikrit assault
2011 Al Hillah bombing
2011 Samarra bombing
2011 Al Diwaniyah bombing
2011 Taji bombings
15 August 2011 Iraq attacks
28 August 2011 Baghdad bombing
2011 Karbala bombing
October 2011 Baghdad bombings
2011 Basra bombings

The ISIS War : 2012-2015
The ISIS War: 2013-2015

There is a wide range of detailed official and NGO reporting on the “ISIS War” that has shaped the most violent aspects of the conflicts in Iraq since late 2013. It explains that tactical character of that fighting detail, and shows that the fighting in Iraq cannot be decoupled from the fighting in – and lack of stability in Syria or the broader regional tensions and violence between Sunni and Shi’ite. Islamic extremists and mainstream Muslims, and ethnic groups like the Kurds.

It is important to note, however, that much of this reporting continues to show how critical it is to look beyond ISIS and at the broader causes of violence in Iraq.

- **DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of April 2015 (p. 1010)** provides a U.S. Department of Defense summary of the course of the fighting through April 2015. This reporting is somewhat dishonest and designed for propaganda purposes in four ways: (i) it exaggerates ISIS gains in early 2014 by focusing on temporary lines of advance so it can claim that Iraqi forces push ISIS out of far more territory than they did, (ii) it shows large areas under ISIS control that are unpopulated empty desert, (iii) it does not show the present of other Islamist groups and fighters in Syria, and (iv) it was never revised in the summer of 2015 to show new ISIS and other Islamist extremist gains in Iraq and Syria.

- That said, it is is compared to the previous maps showing how Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian population is distributed, it is clear that ISIS is exploiting Sunni anger and dissatisfaction, that it has create a new form of Sunni Arab versus Kurd conflict, and increased Iraq’s divisions between Sunni and Shiite, rather than created them. ISIS is waging a sectarian war of religious extremism made possible only by the “base” divisions in Iraq that have grown steadily since the Iran-Iraq War and the U.S. led invasion in 2003.

- **UN: Iraqi Civilians Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015 (p. 101) and UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015 (p. 102):** Show UN estimates of the level of civilians killed and wounded before and after the ISIS invasion. It is striking that in spite of the large areas ISIS occupied, that the UN estimate of the overall level of civil violence from month to month indicates it was as bad under Maliki as it became one the ISIS war began.

- **IBC: Civilian Deaths - Maliki to ISIS: 2012-2014 – I (p. 103 )and IBC: Civilian Deaths - Maliki to ISIS: 2012-2014 – II (p. 104):** The Iraqi Body Count estimates of civilians killed are very different from the UN data and show a much sharper rise after the invasion of ISIS during 2012-2014 – although the IBC data for 2015 shown in p.32 show a drop in the first part of 2015. It is not possible to explain the difference, but the IBC count seems more likely to be correct.
IBC: Civilian Deaths Caused by Iraqi Government Forces: 2003-2015 (p. 105) provides one of the few public attempts to measure the impact of government forces on civil violence. There is no way to determine its accuracy, and it should be noted the governments tend to detain and imprison, use beatings and torture, or intimidate rather than kill. Direct comparisons of death rates and wounded can be misleading. So can the fact that non-lethal levels of insurgent violence and intimidation are often equally hard to measure.

Ethnic and Sectarian Zones: May 2015 (p. 106) shows more clearly just how much the ISIS War has been fought along the earlier lines of sectarian tension and violence in Iraq.

Expanded Area of Kurdish Control: August 2015 (p. 107) shows the extent to which Kurdish and Arab tension will be increased at some point by Kurdish gain in taking more territory in the fight against ISIS, including key petroleum resources in the Kirkuk area.

Islamic State Massacres (p. 108) warns that ISIS has presented a new threat in terms of large scale sectarian killings – a data cluster that helps indicate that the IBC estimate of casualties may be more correct than the UN one.

Militias in Iraq: 2014 (p. 109) and ISW Estimate of Sunni Insurgency Groups: 2014 (p. 110) provide two different NGO estimates shown that ISIs is only one of the non-state actors threatening future Iraqi stability and that other Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish armed groups remain a threat.

IDP Locations (p.), Iraq IDP Crisis, and Ramadi Crisis (pp. 111-113) show that the fighting has displaced large numbers of Sunnis, driving many into areas with no homes and jobs, and other into areas where serious Sunni and Shi’ite tensions already exist. These moves also compound the already critical difficulties in any form of “federalism” that attempts to divided Iraq along sectarian lines – an concept that ignores the fact Iraq is 70% urbanized and many Sunni and Shi’ite Iraqis live in mixed urban areas like Baghdad.

Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013 (p. 114) provides an estimate of the rise in terrorism before the ISIS invasion based on the data base used in the State Department’s annual report on terrorism. It implies a very steep rise under Maliki, but the State report has a long history of acute credibility problems in providing such data and while it is official, is dubious at best.

Major Terrorist Bombings in 2012-2015 (pp. 115-119) provides a Wikipedia chronology of bombings in Iraq. It does not show the source or target for many of the bombings listed, but this pattern of violence preceded ISIS, and while it increased in 2014, it is a further warning that Iraq’s problems still are far deeper and more serious than the reheat from ISIS alone.
DoD: Iraq and Syria: ISIL’s Reduced Operating Areas as of March 2015

Note: Our judgment as to which group has dominant influence over a particular city is based on a body of unclassified sources that we deem reliable.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August.

ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where they once could.

These areas translate into approximately 11,000-13,500 square kilometers (4,100-5,200 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could be higher or lower depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

With the exception of its withdrawal from ‘Ayn al ‘Arab and Tall Hamis, ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could.

These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles).

However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines.

ISIL’s area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged, with its gains in As Suwayda’i, Damascus Countryside, and Homs Provinces offset by losses in Halab and Al Hasakah Province.


Islamic State setbacks

Dissent, defections and reversals on the battlefield are steadily eroding the Islamic State’s aura of invincibility in Syria and Iraq, suggesting that the group is starting to fray from within as its many enemies step up their offensives on multiple fronts.

A gun battle erupted last week between Syrian fighters and foreigners in Abu Kamal after the Syrians refused an order by a Kuwaiti commander to travel to Iraq to reinforce the front lines in Tikrit.

In Ramadi, fighting erupted between a group of mostly Chechens and local Iraqi supporters of the Islamic State who felt they were being abandoned when the foreigners decided to head back to Syria.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, CIA World Factbook, LandScan

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-is-fraying-from-within/2015/03/08/0003a2e0-c276-11e4-a188-8e4971d37a8d_story.html
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - I

- ISIS and aligned forces attack on Samarra on 5 June 2014, seize Mosul on 10 June and Tikrit on 11 June. Iraqi government forces flee south on 13 June, and Kurdish forces took control of the oil hub of Kirkuk, more of disputed areas in north.
- Iraqi forces retake Ramadi but fighting continues in 2014 to spring 2015 until ISIS retakes Ramadi after Iraqi Army collapses on May 21, 2104.
- In the north and outskirt of Baghdad, Iraqi Army effectively collapses back into Shi’ite areas of Iraq, Shi’ite militias emerge as key stiffening, fighting force, but abuses of Sunni emerge from start.
- March-April 12, retake Tikrit with U.S. air support after Shi’ite militias withdrawn.
- 10 June 2014, U.S. reacts with train and assist mission after examination of Iraqi forces find them almost universally ineffective.
  - Starts at 450. Gradually builds up to 3,500 advisors (4,600+).
  - But does not deploy forward, Establishes centers in rear in Iraq and KRG areas. Some use of Canadian Special Forces forward.
  - Problems in moving weapons, ammo, support from U.S. to Iraq, Baghdad to combat units.
  - U.S. plans for National Guard with Sunni and Kurdish forces at Provincial level make little progress.

Source:
Chronology of U.S. Support of INSF – Post-ISIS - II

• 29 June 2014, ISIS says is changing name to Islamic State, and declares 'Caliphate' including Syria and Iraq and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is Caliph and leader of all Muslims
• Begin Coalition Air Campaign in August 2014 – nine months after first ISIS advance.
• 14-15 August, Maliki leaves, Abadi becomes Prime Minister.
• February-June 2015, false announcements of effort to liberate Mosul.
• U.S. concludes Iraqi armed forces critically weak, Focuses on creating two effective brigades, liberation of Ramadi.
• 13 July 2015, two-front Iraqi offensive starts in Anbar province. Iraqi security forces seek to retake after collapsing and losing city in May. U.S. begins air strikes airstrike against ISIS positions in Ramadi.
• June 2015 onwards: Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Shi’ite militias continue operations to cordon off Fallujah and secure lines of communication. Fallujah has now been partly under ISIS control since January 2014.
• Mid-July 2015: Iraqi pilots today land the 1st squadron of Iraqi F-16s in Iraq.
• September 2015: Russian build-up begins in Syria.
• October 2015: Effort to liberate Ramadi still going on. Iraqi forces do not penetrate ISIS barrier of IEDs, suicide bombers.
• October 2015: Abadi announces joint Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian-Russian intelligence effort. Says would welcome Russian and more Iranian sorties because U.S. effort too weak.
• October 2015: U.S. seems to shift away from Iraq first strategy to support of Syrian Kurdish and Arab attacks on ISIS

Source:
Baghdad, 1 August 2015 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total number of 1,332 Iraqis were killed (including civilians, civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar) and another 2,108 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict in July*.

The number of civilians killed is 844 (including 27 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar), and the number of civilians injured is 1,616 (including 38 civilian police and casualty figures in Anbar).

A further 488 members of the Iraqi Security Forces (including Peshmerga, SWAT and militias fighting alongside the Iraqi Army / Not including casualties from Anbar Operations) were killed and 492 were injured.

Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 1,091 civilian casualties (335 killed, 756 injured). Diyala suffered 170 killed and 284 injured, Salahadin 64 killed and 74 injured, Ninewa 101 killed and 28 injured, and Kirkuk 26 killed and 11 injured.

According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the Governorate suffered a total of 600 civilian casualties (147 killed and 453 injured).

“Since last summer’s onslaught by terrorists of the so-called ISIL, Iraq has been living through one of the most difficult phases in its modern history”, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Jan Kubis said. “Resolute action about Daesh and its ideology, equality and cooperation of all Iraqi components as true patriots in these efforts is needed to put an end to this tragic situation. The human cost of the conflict and the suffering of the people is enormous and profoundly worrying”, the SRSG underscored.

CAVEATS: In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties in conflict areas. Figures for casualties from Anbar Governorate are provided by the Health Directorate and are noted below. Casualty figures obtained from the Anbar Health Directorate might not fully reflect the real number of casualties in those areas due to the increased volatility of the situation on the ground and the disruption of services. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of large numbers of casualties along with unknown numbers of persons who have died from secondary effects of violence after having fled their homes due to exposure to the elements, lack of water, food, medicines and health care. For these reasons, the figures reported have to be considered as the absolute minimum.

UN: Iraqi Civilian Killed and Wounded: 2012-2015

While the post-invasion period in Iraq has never been free of conflict-related violence and associated civilian casualties, the years 2010-2012 saw a relative reduction in levels of violence, with annual civilian death tolls ranging from 4,116 to 4,622, and the monthly rate ranging from a low of 218 to a high of 529. (Those three years nonetheless saw more than 2,500 deadly bombing incidents, an average of two a day.) This relative stability ended in early-to-mid 2013, after which the death tolls have sometimes risen dramatically.

There has been no monthly civilian death toll lower than 900 since July 2013, with most being much higher: June (2,534), September (1,956) and October (1,796) being higher than any monthly toll since 2007 (and each in fact higher than the equivalent month in 2007). And as at the end of 2014, the monthly average for the second half of the year – that is, excluding the June peak – stands at over 1,500.

That June peak of 2,534 was the month that marked the beginning of the ISIS offensive. Actions by, and by others in reaction to, ISIS appear only to have worsened an existing trend in rising civilian casualties.

Source: Iraq Body Count: https://wwwIRAQBODYCOUNT.ORG/database/.
IBC: Civilian Deaths - Maliki to ISIS: 2012-2014 -II

Geographic distribution in 2014

The greatest number of deaths have been in Baghdad, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar provinces (governorates), which between them accounted for close to 80% of civilian deaths. Baghdad had the highest number of deaths, with 4,767 civilians recorded killed this year, while Anbar had over 3,600 civilians killed, half of them (1,748) by the Iraqi military in daily air strikes, primarily in and around Fallujah. In Salah al-Din and Ninewa civilian killings by ISIS have contributed significantly to the death toll. All four of these provinces have seen a marked increase in the number of deaths over 2013, with Baghdad almost doubling and the other three provinces more than doubling.

BAGHDAD: 4,767  
ANBAR: 3,623  
SALAH AL DIN: 2,550  
NINEWA: 2,367

Perpetrators: Deaths identified as caused by coalition or Iraqi airstrikes, and ISIS action.

Among the 17,049 civilians recorded killed, many deaths were attributable to the actions of specific armed groups while the perpetrators of many killings remain unknown. 1,748 civilians were reported killed by Iraqi military air strikes, while 4,325 were killed by ISIS. A further 10,858 civilians were reported killed by unidentified actors, where it has not been possible to establish which of the major actors, or possibly other, less well-identified groups, were involved. 118 civilians were reported killed by US-Coalition air strikes, the first time since 2011 that civilian deaths have been directly attributable to US-Coalition actions.

Total deaths in 2014 (civilian and combatant) and cumulative total since 2003

Combining the 17,000 civilian deaths recorded by IBC with the above wide range of combatant deaths of 4,000-30,000, suggests a total of between 21,000 and 47,000 people have been killed in war-related violence in Iraq during 2014, making it one of the three worst years of the conflict that began nearly twelve years ago.

1 For a discussion of these figures and how they were derived, see IBC's original version of this table.

Total cumulative reported deaths for the entire period 2003-2014 passed 200,000 during 2014, and presently stand at 206,000 using the more conservative end of the range for combatant deaths in 2014. Over 150,000 (around 75%) of these were civilian.


115

Ethnic and Sectarian Zones: May 2015

South Yemen was a separate country until 1990. The northwest, an area historically called Yemen, is mostly Shiite. The southeast, known as Hadramawt, is home to a mostly Sunni population. “Yemen and the Hadramawt have seldom been part of the same political entity in the past and have maintained separate identities for a long time,” said Michael Izady, a historian and cultural geographer who has mapped ethnicity and religion for Columbia University.

Zones of Control in Iraq

UCA Estimate

September 2, 2015
Zones of Control in Iraq

ISW Estimate

September 11, 2015

Source: Institute for the Study of War.
Iraq: Population Density versus Zones of Control: There are No Neat Ethnic and Sectarian Dividing Lines

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown by Location, as of September 15, 2015

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown in Iraq and Syria, as of September 17, 2015

Air strikes in Iraq and Syria

- Iraq 4,122
- Syria 2,362

Figures are up to 17 September 2015

Source: US Central Command

### Operation Inherent Resolve

#### Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties with at least one weapon release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>15,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Number of Weapons Released

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>5,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>1,686</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,592</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Operation Inherent Resolve

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>6,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift and Airdrop Sorties</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>6,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*</td>
<td>14,555</td>
<td>50,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Passengers*</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
<td>1,417,900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>10,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
<td>28,956</td>
<td>62,737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Iraq only

Air Campaign: Sorties Flown and Munitions Delivered as of August 7, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Description</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV's</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging Areas</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>3,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting Positions</td>
<td>2,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Targets</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,684</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may fluctuate based on battle damage assessments
Current as of 7 August 2015

Source: CENTCOM CCCI
Has become an area of Kurdish as well as Kurdish-Arab tension. Commander of the Yezidi Sinjar Protection Forces Haydar Qassem Sheshou was arrested on April 5th, 2015, by a special police force affiliated with Barzani and KDP under the pretext of being linked to the Popular Mobilization militias. These groups were accused of committing violent operations in areas liberated from ISIS, which prompted the PUK Central Council to condemn the arrest and hint that the Democratic Party wanted to hand Sinjar over to ISIS.

Is an area of critical energy value: EIA estimates 17% of Iraq oil reserves are in the north of Iraq, near Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin. Control over rights to reserves is a source of controversy between the ethnic Kurds and other groups in the area. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that the Iraqi Kurdistan Region contained 4 billion barrels of proved reserves. KRG’s estimate is much higher because it is a resource estimate that includes unproved resources. The KRG recently increased its oil resource estimate from 45 billion barrels to 60 billion barrels although this has not been independently verified and this number likely includes at least some resources in disputed areas—especially Kirkuk.

After skirmishes between ISIL and KRG forces around the Kirkuk and Bai Hassan fields, the KRG took over operations at the Avana Dome, a part of the Kirkuk field, and Bai Hassan in July 2014. Shortly after, KRG restarted commercial production at those fields, which allowed the KRG to increase oil flows through its newly built pipeline that connects to Ceyhan (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Iraq’s Northern Oil Company continued to produce about 120,000 bbl/d from the Kirkuk’s Baba Dome, of which 30,000 bbl/d was sent to the Kirkuk refinery. The remainder of the oil production was reinjected into oil fields associated with natural gas to keep natural gas production flowing for power generation.

A December 2014 deal reached between Baghdad and the KRG has allowed Kirkuk crude to be transported via the KRG pipeline to Ceyhan, providing Baghdad with a commercial outlet for its northern production (see section on Issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Baghdad). Fighting around Kirkuk city continues to take place, making nearby fields vulnerable to supply disruption.

Source: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, “Kurdistan in Iraq: An escalating conflict,” September 2nd, 2015, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?shva=1#inbox/14f8dd839ca07ee1, and http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=IRQ.
Islamic State Massacres

One of the most notorious was in Mosul, where 670 prisoners were killed after they were ordered to line up, kneel down, and then were met with open fire. Another mass killing that followed was to the south of Mosul in Camp Speicher, where 650-770 men were slain. The militant group posted graphic images of the killings on social media. Along with a steep rise in casualties, more than two million Iraqis were forced to flee from their homes in the last year. The last time close to these many Iraqis were uprooted from their homes was from 2006 to 2008, which led to about 1.7 displaced people.

Militias in Iraq: 2014

Asa’ib Ahlulhaq

Saraya Tali’a Al Khurasani

Kata’ib Sayed Al Shuhada’

Harakat Hizbullah Al Nujaba

Kata’eb Hizbullah

Saraya Al Salam

Failaq al Wa’ad Al Sadiq

Munadhamat Badr (Badr Organization) (Al Janah Al Askeri)

Liwa’a Ammar Bin Yaser

Liwa’a Asadullah Al Ghalib

Liwa’a Alyawm Al Maw’ood

Saraya Al Zahra’a

Liwa’a Thulfiqar

Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab

Saraya Ansarul Aqeedah

Liwa’a Al Muntadhar

Badr Al Majamee’ Al Khass’ah

Liwa’a Abul Fadl Al Abbas

Harakat Al Jihad Wal Bina’a

Saraya Al Difaa’ Al Sha’bi

Kata’eb Dir’ Al Shia

Hizbullah Al Tha’iroon

Kata’eb Al Tayar Al Risali

Saraya Ashuraa’

Kata’eb Malik Al Ashtar

Harakat Al Abdal

Harakatul Iraq Al Islamiyah - Kata’eb Al Imam Ali

Jaysh Al Mukhtar

Al Hashd Al Sha’bi

Jayshul Mahdi (Mahdi Army)

# ISW Estimate of Sunni Insurgency Groups: 2014

**IRAQI SUNNI INSURGENCY GROUP DESCRIPTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Logo</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Claimed Areas of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries, JRTN, and the Iraqi Baath Party | ![Logo](image) | Izzat al-Duri (and possibly others)         | Nationalist and secular           | • Hamrin system  
• Anbar  
• Baghdad Belts |
| 1920 Brigades                                                                    | ![Logo](image) | Harith al-Dhari is a major figure           | Islamist, jihadist                | • Hamrin system  
• Baghdad Belts |
| The Islamic Army in Iraq                                                          | ![Logo](image) | Ahmed al-Dabash (and possibly others)       | Islamist, Nationalist             | • Hamrin system  
• Anbar |
| Jaysh al-Mujahidin                                                               | ![Logo](image) | Haqi Ismael al-Shortani (and possibly others) | Salafist, Jihadist               | • Hamrin system  
• Anbar  
• Baghdad Belts |
| Ansar al-Islam                                                                   | ![Logo](image) | Warya Holori, also known as Abu Abdullah al-Shafei (Although recent artifacts mentioned the pseudonym Sheikh Abu Hashim al-Ibrahim) | Salafist, Jihadist               | • Hamrin system  
• Baghdad belts |
| Fallujah Military Council                                                        | ![Logo](image) | Unknown                                     | Combined                         | Fallujah |

The groups described above are those assessed to be active in some form in Iraq. We do not assess that the Council of Revolutionaries of the Tribes of Anbar is active beyond the statements of its leader, Ali Hatem.

### DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX

**IDP LOCATIONS & POPULATION**

**IRAQ IDP CRISIS - JANUARY 2014 TO 30 JULY 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>97,394</td>
<td>584,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>9,748</td>
<td>58,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>89,772</td>
<td>538,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>10,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>71,009</td>
<td>426,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>20,869</td>
<td>125,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>47,544</td>
<td>285,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>12,117</td>
<td>72,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>6,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>14,078</td>
<td>84,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>32,974</td>
<td>197,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadissiya</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>23,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah al-Din</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>24,961</td>
<td>149,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>27,374</td>
<td>164,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>9,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>5,509</td>
<td>33,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,331</strong></td>
<td><strong>528,601</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,171,806</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **High concentration**
- **Low concentration**

**Sources:** Thematic data: IOM DTM as of 2015/08/04. Administrative data: OCHA COD. This map is for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

**Additional Information:**

- Baghdad governorate hosts the second largest IDP population (17% or 584,364 individuals). The vast majority (91%) is hosted in private settings.
- Anbar governorate hosts the largest IDP population (18% or 584,364 individuals) and reports a very high rate of intra-governorate displacement; 97% of IDPs are originally from the same governorate. These IDPs were displaced mainly before June 2014 (46%) and after April 2015 (58%). The majority is hosted in private settings (81%), out of which 72% in host families and 9% in rented houses, while a smaller portion (19%) is in critical shelters. Finally, Anbar governorate hosts 12% of the total returnees (49,559 individuals).

**Kirkuk Governorate:**

- Hosts the fourth largest displaced population (13% or 399,660 individuals). IDPs in Kirkuk are mainly from Salah al-Din (36%), Anbar (30%), and from within Kirkuk (19%). They were displaced mainly in June-July 2014 (29%) and September 2014-March 2015 (27%). The majority of IDPs (59%) are in rented houses, critical shelters (14%) and camps (2%). Furthermore, Kirkuk hosts 2% of the total returnee population (4,548 individuals).
TOTAL FAMILIES: 22,184
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS: 133,114

SUMMARY
The DTM Emergency tracking system is a reactive tool aiming to provide real-time displacement estimates from the onset of any large to medium scale displacement events. Initial estimates are gathered through flow monitoring techniques by an array of sources from on-the-spot visits to transit sites or bottleneck areas along displacement routes and check points. Over time, further verification of data is applied as population figures are collected from the extensive network of key informants used within the wider DTM mechanism.

NUMBERS BY GOVERNORATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNORATE</th>
<th>TOTAL FAMILIES</th>
<th>TOTAL INDIVIDUALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>6,035</td>
<td>24,952</td>
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<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,292</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10,029</td>
<td>57,572</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
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<td>636</td>
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<td>Diyala</td>
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<td>Dhiyal</td>
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<td>805</td>
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<td>Kirkuk</td>
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<td>Missan</td>
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<td>Mithlaha</td>
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<td>450</td>
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<td>Najaf</td>
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<td>Ninawa</td>
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<td>Saladin</td>
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<td>1,296</td>
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<td>Tikrit</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,665</td>
<td>133,114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND

- 1 - 5
- 6 - 19
- 20 - 49
- 50 - 81
- 851 - 1,542
- 451 - 800
- 191 - 450
- 51 - 150
- 0 - 50

Rise of Iraqi Terrorism: 1970-2013

Iraq – Terrorist Incidents

Iraq - Fatalities

Major Terrorist Bombings in 2012

January
January 14 A bombing targeting Shiites in southern Iraq killed more than 50 people.[1]
January 27 A suicide bomber in Baghdad killed 33 people and wounded 65 others.[2]

February
February 23 A series of bombings killed 32 people in Baghdad.[3]

March
March 20 A series of explosions across Iraq killed 50 people and wounded 200 others.[4]

April
April 19 A series of bombings across Iraq killed 36 people and wounded 150 others.[5]

June
June 4 A suicide bomber killed 26 people and wounded 190 others in Baghdad.[6]

July
July 23 A wave of terrorist incidents killed at least 90 people and wounded twice as more.[7]

August
August 16 A series of bombings killed more than 90 people across Iraq.[8]

September
September 30 A series of terrorist bombings killed 26 people and wounded 94 others.[9]

November
November 17 A bombing killed 7 Shiites in Balad.[10]

January
January 3 A car bomb killed 20 Shiites and injured 50 others.[1]
January 17 Bombs killed 21 people across Iraq.[2]
January 22 Car bombs killed 17 people and injured dozens in Baghdad.[3]

February
February 3 Suicide bombers killed at least 15 people and injured 70 others in Kirkuk.[4]
February 8 Bombings targeted Shiite areas killing 33 people and wounding 100 others.[5]
February 17 Car bombs killed 37 people and wounded 130 others in Baghdad.[6]

March
March 17 A car bomb near Basra killed 10 people.[7]
March 19 Bombings in Baghdad killed 56 people and injured 200.[8]
March 29 Car bombs killed 23 people in Baghdad and Kirkuk.[9]

April
April 12 A series of bomb attacks killed at least 11 people and wounded 30 others.[10]
April 15 Bombs killed 33 people and wounded dozens across Iraq.[11]

May
May 15 Bombs killed 35 people across Iraq.[12]
May 20 A dozen car bombs across Iraq killed at least 84 people and wounded more than 200.[13]

June
June 8 Car bombs killed 5 people and wounded 20 others.[14]
June 10 Five car bombs killed 29 people and wounded 80 others in Mosul.[15]

July
July 14 A wave of terrorist bombings killed 34 people and wounded 126 others.[16]
July 20 A wave of car bombs killed 65 people across Iraq.[17]

August
August 6 Car bombs killed 36 people in and around Baghdad.[18]
August 10 A wave of terrorist incidents including car bombs killed 69 people across Iraq.[19]
August 25 Terrorist bombings across Iraq killed 46 people and wounded 80 others.[20]

September
September 13 A bomb placed in a mosque killed 30 people and injured 45 others.[21]
September 21 Suicide bombers killed 72 people and wounded 120 others at a Shiite funeral.[22]
September 29 A suicide bomber killed 40 people and wounded dozens in a Shiite town.[23]

October
October 7 A wave of terrorist bombings killed at least 38 people mainly in Baghdad.[24]
October 20 A suicide bombing killed 35 people and wounded 45 in Baghdad.[25]
October 27 A dozen terrorist incidents mainly car bombs killed 55 people.[26]

November
November 14 A wave of bombings targeting Shiites killed at least 41 people and wounded 80 others.[27]
November 21 A series of bombings across Iraq killed at least 45 people and wounded 54 others.[28]

December
December 25 Bombings targeting Christians in Baghdad killed 37 people and wounded 59 others.[29]

Source: Wikipedia,
Major Terrorist Bombings in 2014 - I

January
- January 2: A truck bomb killed 19 people in Baghdad.[1]
- January 5: 20 people were killed in a series of bombings targeting a Shite suburb.[2]
- January 15: 75 people were killed in a series of bombings in Baghdad and Baquba.[3]
- January 18: A series of car bombings killed 30 people in Anbar province.[4]
- January 30: Six suicide bombers entered an Iraqi ministry building and killed 24 people before security forces regained control.[5]

February
- February 10: 22 people were killed when a terrorist accidentally blew himself up while demonstrating how to use an explosive belt.[6]
- February 13: Two bombs killed 6 people and wounded 18 in Baghdad.[7]
- February 18: 33 people were killed in a wave of car bombs in Baghdad.[8]

March
- March 5: A series of terrorist incidents including car bombs killed 8 people and wounded 30 others.[9]
- March 9: At least 32 people were killed when a minibus packed with explosives exploded at a checkpoint in the city of Hilla.[10]
- March 27: Bombings killed 33 people in Baghdad.[11]

April
- April 9: Car bombs killed 24 people across Iraq.[12]
- April 20: Car bombs and a suicide bomber killed 9 people and injured 39 others.[13]
- April 28: A suicide bomber killed 25 people in Khanaqi.[14]

May
- May 13: A wave of car bombs targeting Shiites killed at least 34 people.[15]
- May 22: At least 24 Shia pilgrims were killed in three bombings in Baghdad.[14]
- May 27: A suicide bomber killed 17 people in Baghdad.[16]

June
- June 8: At least 18 people were killed in a bombing attacking the office of Jalal Talabani's Kurdish political party.[17]
- June 9: At least 30 people were killed in a double bombing targeting the offices of a Kurdish political party.[18]
- June 15: 9 people were killed and 20 wounded after an attack near Tahrir Square. Further bombs went off after nightfall killing 3 people.[19]
- June 25: A suicide bomber blew himself up outside a market in Baghdad killing 13 people and wounding 25[20]

July
- July 4: A suicide bomber detonated a vehicle at a security forces position north of Baghdad killing 15.[19]
- July 9: Three car bombs exploded in front of a court in Hilia killing five and wounding 17.[21]
- July 11: 28 people died following a suicide bombing in Kirkut.[22]
- July 23: A suicide bombing killed 33 people in Baghdad.[23]
- July 24: A car bomb killed 21 people in Baghdad.[24]

Major Terrorist Bombings in 2014-II

August
August 23: A series of bombings killed 35 people across Iraq.[25]
August 26: A car bomb killed 10 people in Baghdad.[26]
August 30: A suicide bomber killed 11 people in a town south of Baghdad.[27]
August 31: Two suicide bombers killed 10 people in Ramadi.[28]

September
September 1: A suicide bombing killed 37 people in western Iraq.[29]
September 4: A car bomb and a suicide bomber killed at least 20 people and injured dozens in Baghdad.[30]
September 8: A double suicide attack killed 9 people and injured 70 others in a town north of Baghdad.[31]
September 10: A wave of terrorist bombings killed at least 30 people in Baghdad.[32]
September 11: A wave of terrorist incidents killed at least 17 people and wounded 50.[33]
September 17: A suicide car bomb killed 7 people and destroyed a bridge in Ramadi.[34]
September 18: Two suicide bombings killed 13 people and injured 36 in Baghdad.[35]
September 19: A wave of bombings killed 28 people and injured dozens.[36]
September 27: A car bomb killed 10 people and wounded 24 others.[37]

October
October 4: ISIL attacked the town of Tarmiyah, located north of Baghdad, where[38] a roadside bomb targeted an Iraqi military convoy, killing at least five people.
October 7: A suicide bomber rammed a vehicle into houses used by Shiite militias near the city of Samarra, killing at least 17 people.[39]
October 9: A suicide attack killed 10 people in Baquba.[40]
October 12: A series of terrorist bombings in Baghdad including a suicide attack killed more than 50 people.[41] A wave of bombings in Baquba killed 31 people and wounded 70 others.[42]
October 14: A suicide attack in Baghdad killed 19 people and wounded 35 others.[43]
October 16: Three car bombs in Baghdad killed 16 people and wounded 48 others.[44]
October 18: A series of car bombs in Baghdad killed 24 people.[45]
October 19: A suicide bombing targeting Shiites in Baghdad killed 19 people and injured more than 2 dozens.[46]
October 20: A wave of bombings targeting Shiites killed more than 43 people.[47]
October 22: Two car bombs in Baghdad killed 16 people and wounded 65 others.[48]
October 25: A suicide bomber killed 8 Shiites and wounded 17 others near Baghdad.[49]
October 27: A similar attack killed 27 fighters and wounded 60 others.[50] Another bombing in Baghdad killed 14 people and wounded 23 others.[51]
October 31: A series of bombings killed 15 people near Baghdad.[52]

November
November 1: A series of terrorist bombings killed 24 people and wounded dozens in Baghdad.[53]
November 2: A series of bombings killed 34 Shiites in Baghdad.[54]
November 7: A suicide bomber killed a police general and wounded 9 policemen in Baiji.[55]
November 8: A series of car bombings killed 40 people and wounded dozens across Iraq.[56]
November 16: A series of bombings in Baghdad killed 5 people and wounded 20 others.[57]
November 19: A suicide attack in Erbil killed 6 people and wounded more than 20 others.[58]
November 23: A car bomb killed 7 people and wounded 16 others in a town south of Baghdad.[59]

December
December 4: A series of bombs killed 35 people in Baghdad and Kirkuk.[60]
December 7: A car bomb killed 7 police officers in northern Baghdad.[61]
December 24: A suicide bomber killed 26 people and wounded 56 others south of Baghdad.[62]

Major Terrorist Bombings in 2015

January
January 1: 15 members of the Jamilat tribe were executed after refusing to join ISIL.[1]

February-May
For the first half of 2015, bombings and other atrocities were a daily event, as the country was in a state of war.

May 14: In the darkness of the early hours of this morning, the Adhamiya district in Baghdad blazed brightly in hues of orange and red as it was engulfed in the flames of sectarian saboteurs and terrorists. By the Shia-majority government’s own claims, sectarian Shia militias and terrorists led by Shia clerics attacked the Sunni neighbourhood, setting alight homes, businesses, property and local government buildings. Security forces and personnel stood back and did nothing as 13 homes were burned to ashes.

June
June 23: Suicide bombing kills two soldiers, injures 8 others in southwest of Ramadi.[2]
June 27: ten people killed in a "routine" bombing.[3]