

# The Arab-U.S. Strategic Partnership and the Changing Security Balance in the Gulf

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*Joint and Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State Actors, and Outside Powers*

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*Request for comments:*

This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at [acordesman@gmail.com](mailto:acordesman@gmail.com).

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## ***1. The Security Balance: The Changing Balance of the Gulf Forces and Regional Threats***

The security balance in the Gulf has changed radically in character over the last decade. What was once primarily a conventional military balance, shaped largely by the threats posed by state actors like Iran and Iraq, has changed into a complex mix of conventional capabilities, irregular and asymmetric warfare capabilities, missile forces, the possible creation of nuclear forces, internal conflicts and insurgencies, extremist or terrorist movements, and internal security threats. Non-state actors have become as important as governments. The causes of conflict have also changed radically to include violent religious extremism, sectarian and ethnic tensions, as well as the political upheavals and violence caused by problems in governance, economics, and internal stability.

### **The Impact of Non-State Actors**

The tensions between Iran and the Arab Gulf states still dominate the conventional military balance in the region, but the end result is a much broader and far more complex security balance. Iran's search for nuclear weapons has made Israel a more active part of the Gulf military balance – at least to the extent it has a nuclear and missile dimension. The U.S. had maintained and increased its commitments to the Arab state in the Gulf, and now heads a new coalition that is seeking to degrade and destroy the efforts of a new non-state actor – the Islamic State in the Levant and Syria (ISIL) – to create a “Caliphate” in Syria and Iraq.

Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, -- and surrounding states like Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen – must now deal with problems and threats that go far beyond conventional military conflict. In fact, three powers that once played a key role in shaping the conventional balance – Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – must now deal with civil conflicts and fighting with shifting mixes of non-state actors that make it impossible to assess their conventional forces as any form of cohesive fighting force.

Scenarios are not predictable, and neither are the key elements of force that might be used. ISIL has shown that non-state actors can quickly evolve from relatively small extremist movements to “Caliphates” that claim to be protostates. At the same time, the Iraqi government has shown the wrong kind of leadership can transform a state actor and its military forces into little more than a façade regardless of their strength in manpower, equipment, supplies, and form training.

The fact that the Islamic State in the Levant and Iraq (ISIL) – also known as the Islamic State, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham (Da'ish), or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) -- has a major presence in both Iraq and Syria -- as well as the shifting role of Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey – has made it harder to define the geographic lines for assessing the Gulf balance. The same is true of various Shi'ite military and paramilitary groups like the Hezbollah, various Shi'ite militias in Lebanon, and the Houthi and other Zaidi Shi'ite militias in Yemen, as well as Sunni extremist and militia groups ranging from Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and the Al Nusra front in Syria, to moderate Sunni tribal fighting groups in Iraq.

The flow of outside volunteers and money to extremist groups, and the role of state actors in supporting various militias, extremist groups and insurgents also cut across state and regional boundaries. Shi'ite actors like Iran's Al Quds Force, the Hezbollah, and Shi'ite militias represent one element of these changes. A wide range of Sunni “jihadist” or violent actors like ISIL and Al Nusra Front – some of which fight each other—play a growing role. So do non-Arab ethnic groups

like the Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish Kurds while both Islamic and other minorities have – in contrast – increasingly become the targets of non-state actors.

### **Civil, Political, Economic, and Population Pressures**

Civil, political, economic, and population pressures have also become critical factors changing the security balance. The political upheavals since 2011 have confirmed the long standing warnings in Arab development reports that population growth, weak and corrupt governance, poor economic development, and major career barriers to one of the youngest populations in the world were creating a structural crisis with explosive potential to affect internal security.

These same forces interact with trends hyper urbanization, massive shifts in media and communications, and failed secularism to help empower the emergence of new sectarian, ethnic, regional, and tribal tensions, and give force and momentum to both growing divisions between Sunni, Shi'ite, and other sects and violent religious extremism. The threat from within is often more important than the threat from without, although the impact of international terrorism, links between non-state actors, and state-driven interference in other states by groups like the Iranian Al Quds force makes any distinction between internal and external security uncertain at best.

The end result is that terrorism and insurgency are only the most visible signs of activity in what essentially are “failed state wars” in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (and Libya and Somalia outside the Gulf region). Deeper sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions and conflicts underlie the violence caused by religious extremism, along with a far wider range of political, social, economic, and demographic pressures, and failed governance. The balance is not only driven by ideology and mixes of violent state and non-state actors but underlying civil forces that must be addressed to bring any lasting hope of stability.

These changes in the political and security landscape of Middle East have had profound effects on relationships between Gulf, other Middle Eastern states and external powers. This is most certainly true of the relationship between the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council states and the United States.

On the one hand, they have created forces that create a new range of reasons for military cooperation, like the U.S.-led coalition attacking the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and U.S. and Saudi cooperation in trying to deal with the growing instability in Yemen. On the other hand, given the U.S. and individual GCC states have often differed over how to best deal with the political upheavals that have occurred since 2011. These include policy towards internal political conflicts, especially in countries such as Bahrain and Egypt. They involve differences over how to deal with the internal tensions and fighting in Syria and Iraq, the implications of U.S. negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, and the impact of the U.S.’ “pivot to Asia” and growing U.S. self-reliance on domestic petroleum productions. The Arab Gulf states need U.S. security support more than ever before, but many in the Arab Gulf question U.S. security commitments.

At the same time, the Arab states face serious problems in dealing with each other. They need integration, interoperability, and cooperation more than ever before. However, the tensions between Arab Gulf states present serious problems in moving forward, and the need to create a far more functional GCC is making slow progress. Some of the need for change was recognized at the 35<sup>th</sup> GCC Summit in December of 2014, which called for more unified command efforts, and an integrated regional police and naval force.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, however, the precedents are not good. The Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in May 1981, and there have been many previous Ministerial declarations of the need to make such progress. None have yet been properly transformed into effective action.

### **Changes in the Strength of Conventional Military Forces**

The conventional balance is continuing to change in important ways. The basic statistics that shape the Gulf military balance are shown in **Figure I.1**. If one compares these force levels to those of the past, the present forces of the Arab Gulf states have improved strikingly over the last few decades as the GCC states have made massive investments in improved land, air, and naval weaponry. In contrast, Iran has been unable to compete in terms of both investment and access to advanced foreign systems. Iraq has never recovered from its massive losses of conventional arms during the U.S. led invasion in 2003, and has suffered further losses as a result of its defeats by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Syria has lost a significant amount of its inventory because of its civil war, and has not been able to compete in military technology. Yemen's military forces have been deeply divided by internal fighting among its Sunni power brokers, have not been able to keep up with the Houthi rebels, and have faced a growing threat from Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

The U.S. continues to play a major role in the Gulf region, and Britain and France continue to project forces into the Arab Gulf states, and U.S. power projection capabilities make it the dominant military power in the region. As the final chapter in this net assessment shows, the U.S. is the major suppliers of military technology and arms to the Arab Gulf states, and its strategic guidance gives the same priority to the region as to Asia and Europe.

This U.S. strategic partnership with the Gulf has a major impact on every aspect of the Gulf military balance. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and each of the GCC states is linked to different degrees to U.S. capabilities along with key U.S. allies with power regional projection capabilities like Britain and France. Iraq has links to Iran, but is still partnered with the U.S. Iran, Syria, and Yemen are now effectively on their own, and Iran has both been unable to import arms and technology from the West since the fall of the Shah and faced growing isolation because of the UN sanctions on arms sales created by its search for nuclear weapons.

### **The Growing Roles of Neighboring States**

Neighboring states also play a growing role in shaping the conventional balance. The forces of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey are not part of traditional assessments of the Gulf balance, but they have already shown they can play a major role in some scenarios. Jordan already plays a critical role in securing the "western flank" of the Gulf. This helps explain why key figures like King Abdullah of Jordan have repeatedly called for the creation of a broader Arab alliance, and why Egypt and the rulers of the Arab Gulf states supported Nabil Al Arabi, the head of the Arab League, in calling for an Arab Army to contain the threat of ISIL at the League's meeting in March 2015.<sup>2</sup>

Lebanon's armed forces have improved some aspects of their weaponry but the country remains divided and the Hezbollah constitutes a separate force that plays a role in Syria's civil war, and has ties to Iran. Israel's primary concerns are Iran's missile forces, potential nuclear forces, and role in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza – along with the rocket/missile/asymmetric warfare threat from the Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, as well as non-state actors in Syria. The forces of neighboring states are summarized in **Figure I.2**, and key Arab powers like Egypt and Jordan have

made improvements in its conventional forces, although they have faced more serious resource limitations than the wealthy Arab Gulf states.

At the same time, the strategic focus of both the Gulf States and relevant outside powers has also changed. They not only see arising threats from non-state actors, but a change in the role of Iran. The Arab Gulf states, U.S., Britain, and France still shape their defense plans to meet the conventional threat from Iran, but they now see the Iranian threat as a much broader mix of conventional and asymmetric air/sea/missile forces in the Gulf. They focus on Iran's efforts to expand its influence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and through Hamas in Gaza. Some other security threats, like Yemen, present a mix of threats that have caused Saudi Arabia to form its own coalition of both Arab Gulf states and outside powers.

The changes affect national security spending and investment. The GCC states, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan are all making major investments in conventional arms, but the past focus on the Arab-Israeli balance has largely been replaced by an Egyptian and Jordanian focus on internal security, the threats posed by Arab non-state actors, and the crises in Libya and Iraq/Syria. Iraq and Syria focus on internal divisions and the threat posed by ISIL.

### ***Recent Procurements and Arms Orders***

Like the Gulf countries that are described in detail throughout this analysis, the Levantine, Turkish and Egyptian powers are continuing to make important changes in their forces. The recent change in each country's forces include:

#### **Jordan<sup>3</sup>**

- Order of 35 Meter Coastal Patrol Boats at a cost of \$80 million in March 2015 from the United States.
- Order of M31 Unitary Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems at a cost of \$192 million from the United States in March of 2015.
- Jordan has ordered one UH-60M VIP Blackhawk helicopter at a cost of \$21 million from the United States in May 2015.
- Possible Chinese sale of AVIC Wing Loong UAV to Jordan. This is very speculative.<sup>4</sup>

Order of more tube launched, optically-tracked, wireless guided (TOW) missiles from Raytheon in April 2015. **Egypt<sup>5</sup>**

- In March of 2015, the hold the U.S. government placed on weapons sales to Egypt by American companies was lifted. This allowed the transfer of 12 F-16 aircraft, 20 Harpoon missiles, and up to 125 M1A1 Abrams tank kits.<sup>6</sup>
- Russia and Egypt discussed the transfer of warplanes and missiles to Egypt, but no deal was signed as of February 2015.
- Order of 24 Dassault Rafale fighter jets and FREMM multipurpose frigates.
- Egypt bought 46 MiG-29 multirole fighters from Russia in the spring of 2015.
- Purchase of 18 drones from China. Reportedly the ASN-209.

#### **Lebanon<sup>7</sup>**

- Ordered 6 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft, 8 PT6A-68A Turboprop engines, 8 ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispensing Systems, 2000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems, 8 AN/AAR-60 Missile Launch Detection Systems, non-SAASM Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Initial Navigation Systems (EGIs), along with supporting and replacement equipment and training personnel from the U.S. at a cost of \$462 million (June 2015).

- Ordered AGM-114 Hellfire II Missiles and equipment for \$146 million from the U.S. in June 2015.
- Ordered one AC-208B Cessna from the U.S. at a cost of \$26.1 million in May 2015
- Received its first of a “massive” shipment of weapons missiles from France in April 2015. The arms acquisition is worth \$3 billion and completely funded by Saudi Arabia. The first shipment is said to be anti-tank missiles. This agreement also provides 24 CAESAR 155mm self-propelled artillery systems to Lebanon.
- Ordered anti-tank Kornet missiles, long range multiple rocket launchers and spare parts from Russia, however, the EU sanctions on Russia has seemingly disrupted this transfer.

### **Israel<sup>8</sup>**

- Ordered Joint Direct Attack Munition Tail Kits from the U.S. at a cost of \$1.879 billion in May 2015
- Acquired four Patriot missile batteries (PAC-2 batteries) from France in May 2015.
- Ordered “kits” for its Namer (Leopard) heavy troop carrier for a cost of \$310 million in May 2015.
- Ordered parts, components, and materials used in the propulsion systems for two F-35 Lightning II Joint Fighter Aircraft, ordered in April 2015.
- Germany approved the export of the fifth of six dolphin class submarines to Israel in 2015. This was a part of a \$530 million arms acquisitions deal.

### **Turkey<sup>9</sup>**

- In June, Lockheed Martin was awarded a \$920 million dollar contract to manufacture 94 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for various allies, including 2 for Turkey.
- United Technologies Corps was awarded a \$156.9 million contract to procure long lead-time components, parts, materials in support of the propulsion systems for the F-35
- Turkey signed an arms acquisition agreement with Spanish Navantia for the construction of a \$1.2 billion landing platform dock (LPD) delivered to Turkey by 2021.
- Turkey has been accused of sending arms to rebel Islamist groups in Syria.<sup>10</sup>
- In May 2015, Turkey acquired approval from the U.S. State Department for the sale of MK 15 Phalanx CIWS (close in weapons system) upgrades valued at \$310 million.
- Turkey’s indigenous submarine construction is believed to be starting soon.
- In May 2015, Russia announced that it seeks to expand deliveries of military equipment to Turkey, namely transport helicopters.
- Turkey seems to be relying more on its indigenous defense industry than on those of the West.

### **Syria**

Arms transfers into the Syria are difficult to track due to the ongoing conflict. The porous borders make the transport of arms to rebel groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qaeda affiliates, and pro-Assad forces, relatively easy. Additionally, Syria’s traditional arms suppliers want to keep transfers secret due to the threat of international sanctions if their activities were discovered.

- Russia canceled a contract with the Assad government in August 2014 for S-300s.<sup>11</sup>
- It is alleged that Turkey has been sending arms to Syrian rebels to use against al-Assad<sup>12</sup>
- Rosoboronexport has consistently denied that it continues to send offensive arms to the Assad government. Instead, it claims to send spare and repair parts and air defense systems. It also claims that any deliveries made were agreed to before the conflict began.
- It is well known that the Assad regime receives military support from Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah.

## **Technology and the Balance**

The conventional military balance in the Gulf is also being altered by broader changes in military forces. These include radical changes in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities. Ever since the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, the U.S. has steadily increased its real and near real-time intelligence coverage and battle management and targeting capabilities in the region – capabilities tied to precision air and cruise missile strike capabilities and the ability to manage every aspect of joint warfare. Battle management has become a mix of “C4I” – command, control, secure and digital communications, computer, and intelligence capabilities and command centers and new command facilities – adding BM or battle management to an acronym like C4I. The overall mix of C4I/BM and IS&R in any given country – and that links countries together – is reshaping the nature of deterrence and warfighting at every level. It is also a key reason why the capability to wage cyber warfare has become a key aspect of the Gulf military balance.

Precision-guided weapons are steadily increasing in accuracy, lethality, and range. This change ranges from short-range battlefield systems to long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as long-range air strike systems like the Storm Shadow. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs) are also altering the force mix in both conventional and irregular warfare. Coupled to the near-real time targeting capability and command flexibility offered by new IS&R and C4I/BM systems, this is creating capabilities for joint warfare of many different kinds and giving practical meaning to the concepts of a “revolution in military affairs” that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.

These changes are all affecting assessments of the balance of power in ways that counts of conventional Gulf forces, manpower, weapons, and equipment can only partially reveal. They have also made comparative national security spending and access to arms transfers and imports of military technology steadily more important. The Arab Gulf powers have had more money and access to advanced technology, but many have bought far more than they have properly integrated into their force structures, and trained and exercise to use. The GCC has failed to emerge as a fully functional alliance in terms of doctrine, force structure, interoperability, and integration. It has made relatively little progress in developing integrated, real world mission capabilities of its own. This lack of real world integration and interoperability severely weakens the conventional and irregular warfare capability of each GCC member, and limits their individual and collective capability to take practical advantage of their superior access to military technology and weapons.

Iran, in contrast, has had to improvise an uncertain mix of capabilities and rely far more on its own limited industrial base and lower-grade imports. Even before the upheavals that triggered a major civil war in 2011, Syria faced resource limits that meant it largely failed to modernize its capabilities beyond the levels common in the early 1990s and sometimes the levels it had in 1982. Iraq has been shattered by the impact of its defeats in 1991, the U.S. involved in 2003 and the fighting that followed, and by new defeats by ISIL in 2014. It has only recovered very limited conventional capability. Yemen has never seriously competed in military modernization, and has steadily lost conventional military capability since 2011 as its civil war intensified. Yemen's capabilities remain primitive.

## **The Shifting Nuclear, Rocket/Missile, and Missile Defense Balance**

Long-range missiles and rockets have also become a key part of the balance. Iran is seeking to develop precision-guided missiles that could deliver significant lethality against point targets ranging from military facilities to critical infrastructure like power plants, desalination plants, and



petroleum facilities. Several GCC states are acquiring long-range, air delivered precision-guided missiles like the Storm Shadow, and most of the GCC states are developing advanced missile defenses – defense Israel already has and is steadily improving. The air balance is becoming an air-missile balance coupled to the balance of both surface-to-air missile defenses and point and wide area missile defenses.

At the same time, Israel's long-standing nuclear monopoly is now threatened by Iran's nuclear programs and potentially by a range of Arab nuclear power programs. It is still unclear whether Iran will continue to actively pursue a nuclear weapons program, and what form and timing will be involved. At the same time, it is unclear how Israel will react and whether it will attempt some form of military action if P5+1 efforts to reach some form of arms control agreement with Iran fail.

It is equally unclear how Israel will attempt to change its nuclear forces, targeting, and doctrine. While Israel probably has a mature mix of nuclear-armed aircraft and missiles with both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear warheads, no reliable unclassified estimate exists of these forces. It is also possible that Saudi Arabia will choose to update the long-range missile force it has bought from China, and seek nuclear warheads from Pakistan.

### **A Growing Emphasis on Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare**

Iran has been forced to take the lead in improving its unconventional and irregular warfare capabilities. It has lacked the resources to match the military build-up and modernization in the Arab Gulf states, U.S., Britain, and France. At the same time, the severe restrictions outside powers have placed on the sales of modern arms and military technology have done much to cripple the modernization and expansion of Iran's conventional forces. As the following chapters show, the growing gap in conventional warfighting capability has led Iran to prepare for very different kinds of warfare and makes predicting the nature of key scenarios and their outcome steadily more difficult.

Iran's steady build-up of an air-sea-missile mix of asymmetric and conventional forces is a key development. Iran has developed a capability to threaten shipping and the flow of petroleum using a wide mix of anti-ship missile forces, marine and naval special forces, guided missile patrol boats, mine warfare vessels and smart mines, submarines and midget submarines. These forces can act independently in limited wars, or in combination with Iran's ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, and major combat ships, as well as land warfare or support from allied countries and non-state actors. These forces can fight low-level and sporadic wars of attrition or directly threaten to "close the Gulf" to the flow of oil, gas, and product exports. Iran has already found that these forces do act as a deterrent and possible source of intimidation and leverage in dealing with its Gulf neighbors. They also potentially offset the weaknesses in Iran's military modernization and conventional forces.

Iran, however, is only one factor shaping the growing emphasis on irregular warfare. The emergence of non-state actors and the support of such movements by outside states has interacted with major political upheavals in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and the emergence of radical, violent Islamic extremist movements. These include a number of key Sunni "Jihadist" movements like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al Nusra Front, and Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. They also include Alawite-led militia movements in Syria, the Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a mix of Shi'ite militias in Iraq. Some have direct or indirect state sponsorship, and

some fight alongside the forces of states like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Just as one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, non-state actors can be actors for other states.

These shifts make it increasingly likely that any serious future conflict in the region will mix conventional and asymmetric/irregular warfare. Virtually every major military power has the ability to mix such capabilities, and will do so in any given scenario where that offers it advantages. Most future conflicts seem likely to have some ethnic or sectarian dimension, and involve non-state actors and outside powers wherever possible.

They also ensure that the military balance is becoming a mix of different kinds of military balances whose deterrent and warfighting character is becoming steadily more scenario specific. They also make it likely that the outcome of many scenarios will not be determined by the structure and total size of each actor's order of battle. The mix of forces that actually become engaged will be shaped on an opportunistic basis as a result of a given the scenario – with political considerations playing a major role in how each side assembles its forces, escalates, or seek conflict termination.

### **The Rising role of Internal Security Forces: Non-State Actors, Terrorism, Civil War, and Insurgency**

Non-state actors often have ties to given countries, but are not proxies for given states. They have become a major independent factor at the national, regional, and international levels. They also generally have a unique mix of politics and ideology. The ideological tensions and divisions that once emerged out of Pan Arabism have been replaced with a radically different threat: Islamic extremism and tensions between Sunnis, Shi'ites, other Islamic sects, and religious minorities.

These shifts are exemplified by the expanding role of the Hezbollah, Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Shi'ite militias in Iraq; and by the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other extremist movements like the Al Nusra Front and the Khorasan Group. Some like the Hezbollah and Shi'ite militias may have ties to a state but act with considerable independence. Collectively, they make up a whole new set of forces shaping the balance in a major civil war in Syria, in Iraq's uncertain stability and unity, the conflict and internal divisions in Yemen, and new internal tension in Lebanon.

As a result, non-state actors are now involved in a spectrum of internal and regional conflict involving a wide range of terrorist activity by state and non-state actors. It also involves insurgency and civil war, and conflict where the religious or ideological dimension can be as important as the size of the military forces involved. The role of foreign volunteers has also come to play a critical role in this aspect of the changed security balance, as have the international networking capability of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIL.

Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are currently the main centers of such threats in the Gulf region, but this is only part of the story. Saudi Arabia has made major improvements and increases in its internal security and counterterrorism forces, and they played a key role in driving the leadership and key operations of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) into Yemen, as well as cooperating with the internal security forces of the UAE in aiding the government of Bahrain. All of the other GCC states have strengthened their internal security forces, as have Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon.

The end result has been that most of the states in the region have made major increases in their internal security and paramilitary forces, and altered the training and equipment of at least some of their regular forces to deal with the threat of terrorism, sabotage, or insurgency. In a number of cases, the increase in internal security and counter-terrorism forces has placed a critical role in

preserving internal security, and led to significant changes in the overall structure and mix of regular and internal security forces.

At the same time, the growing role of such non-state actors has led to other new elements of the balance within states like the expansion of Iranian influence through tools like the Al Quds Force and its intelligence service – the MOIS – which are linked to non-state actors like the Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi'ite militias, and Hamas, and new covert groups in the Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Information, intelligence services, and royal courts in several of the GCC states.

### **The Civil Side of Security**

A final changing dimension in the regional security balance is the need of every Gulf and regional state to reinforce the civil side of security. As the political upheavals since 2011 have shown, the religious, ideological, governance, and economic side of security provided to be as – or more – important in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen as the military balance or the capability of internal security forces.

A few nations like Saudi Arabia have attempted to address these issues through major new civil spending programs. It is, however, far harder to measure, particularly in nations where open political dissent is severely restricted. Some analyses, like the World Bank governance indicators and the Arab development reports of the UNDP did provide extensive warning as to just how serious these tensions and pressure were becoming, but they did not provide any clear warning as to timing or the nature of what would happen.

The civil causes of instability and violence are critical uncertainties shaping the security and stability of the region that need far more examination in the future, along with the impact of stronger internal security measures in winning popular support from key elements of society, or alienating it through excessive measures.

### **The Unchanging Strategic Importance of the Gulf Region**

All of these shifts need to be kept in a broader strategic context. The increase in petroleum and alternative fuels outside the Gulf has not changed its vital strategic importance to the global and U.S. economy. It has reduced the Gulf's share of total global petroleum output, but the Middle East still produced 32.2% of the world total in 2013, amounting to 28.358 billion barrels per day (bbl/d).<sup>13</sup> The GCC members (excluding Bahrain) produced 23.9% of the world's total oil in 2013, amounting to 21.234 billion bbl/d, while Iran's production amounted to another 4% of the global total, or 3.558 billion bbl/d.<sup>14</sup>

From a strategic viewpoint, the flow of oil and gas tanker traffic out of the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz remains the world's most important energy chokepoint. The EIA also reported in November 2014 that an average of 167 million barrels worth of oil a day passed through the Strait of Hormuz, and that,<sup>15</sup>

The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint because of its daily oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in 2013. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013 were about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil.

EIA estimates that more than 85% of the crude oil that moved through this chokepoint went to Asian markets, based on data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker tracking service. Japan, India, South Korea, and China are the largest destinations for oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Qatar exported about 3.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013, according to BP's Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.<sup>7</sup> This volume accounts for

more than 30% of global LNG trade. Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through the Strait of Hormuz.

At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait of Hormuz is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons.

As **Map I.1** shows, the Gulf also remains the world's most important energy chokepoint, and **Map 2.2** shows that when the Gulf is viewed in terms of its broader strategic geography, there are only a limited number of functioning pipelines that provide alternative export routes – most of which are currently operating to their present capacity or under serious military threat.

The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency (EIA) reported in November 2014 that,<sup>16</sup>

Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d (see Table 2).

Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56-inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity.

Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil.

The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d.

Other pipelines are currently unavailable as bypass options. Saudi Arabia also has two additional pipelines that run parallel to the Petroline system and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but neither of the pipelines currently has the ability to transport additional volumes of oil if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.

The 1.65 million bbl/d, 48-inch Iraqi Pipeline in Saudi Arabia (IPSA), which runs parallel to the Petroline from pump station #3 (there are 11 pumping stations along the Petroline) to the port of Mu'ajjiz, just south of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, was built in 1989 to carry 1.65 million bbl/d of crude oil from [Iraq](#) to the Red Sea. The pipeline closed indefinitely following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In June 2001, Saudi Arabia seized ownership of IPSA and converted it to transport natural gas to power plants. Saudi Arabia has not announced plans to convert the pipeline back to transport crude oil.

Other pipelines, such as the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE) running from Qaisumah in Saudi Arabia to Sidon in Lebanon, or a strategic oil pipeline between Iraq and [Turkey](#), have been out of service for years because of war damage, disuse, or political disagreements. These pipelines would require extensive renovation before they can transport oil. Relatively small quantities, several hundred thousand barrels per day at most, could also be transported by truck if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.

Turmoil in Yemen has added to these problems. The EIA reported in April 2015 that,<sup>17</sup>

While Yemen is not a major oil-producing country, its coast borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. This strait is a strategic route for Persian Gulf oil, natural gas, and petroleum product shipments to Europe and North America, as well as European and

North African oil exports to Asia. Although the strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, tankers passing through must use two 2-mile-wide shipping channels.

Trade in crude oil and petroleum products transiting the Bab el-Mandeb has increased steadily in recent years, growing from 2.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2010 to almost 4.7 million bbl/d in 2014. From 2013 to 2014, trade grew by more than 20%, with an increase of more than 200,000 bbl/d in crude oil exports from Iraq to Europe contributing to higher northbound traffic.

### **Assessing the Impact of a Major Conflict in the Gulf**

The unclassified U.S. official assessments of the impact of major energy interruptions have not kept current with these shifts in direct and indirect strategic dependence, and the risks of a major war in the Gulf. They are badly out of date and need to focus on the broader impact of such a conflict on the global economy as well as on oil and gas supply and price effects.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) conducted public studies of the impact of major energy interruptions in 2011 and 2014, although they did not examine the risk of a major war in the Gulf region, or the broader economic consequences of energy interruptions on world trade and the global economy. As a result, the IEA issued the following warnings:<sup>18</sup>

- Although the oil delivery system has changed dramatically since the oil shocks of the 1970s, there is still a high risk of a supply disruption that could have great economic consequences for IEA member countries.
- Capacity constraints, both in production and refining, have increased the potential of supply falling short of demand. Given this delicate balance of supply and demand, even a disruption of relatively small volume can have a significant impact on the market.
- Global demand growth exacerbates market tightness, further re-enforcing the need for investment in capacity expansion.
- Uncertain investment climates in some producer countries, often described as an aspect of “resource nationalism”, may also hamper the development of future supply streams.
- Geopolitical tensions and terrorism create uncertainty as to the continuous availability of supply. This “risk premium” adds to the volatility of an already tense market, where available oil supplies are increasingly concentrated in fewer countries.
- Natural disasters, such as extreme weather conditions, can disrupt the supply/demand balance, cutting off supply or causing demand to spike.
- ...the unexpected event!

Gulf petroleum exports play a critical role in providing energy to key global economies like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as in limiting the global price of oil, gas, and petroleum products. They also affect the global price of oil and petroleum products regardless of where they come from, and the health of a global economy where every business and job in the U.S. is steadily becoming more dependent on the flow of imports and exports. Some 15.2 million barrels a day of the 17 million barrels a day oil flowing out of the Strait of Hormuz travel through the Strait of Malacca to support the economies of key exporters to the U.S. and other significant amounts go to India.

### **U.S. Strategic Dependence on the Flow of Gulf Exports**

Changes in U.S. energy supplies are altering the nature of U.S. strategic dependence on its partnership with the Arab Gulf states, but are not reducing the need for such a partnership. The U.S. has sharply reduced its dependence on direct petroleum imports, but the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Agency (EIA) reported in early 2015 that the U.S. still imported

27% of its petroleum in 2014.<sup>19</sup> Its *Annual Energy Outlook* for 2015 still calculated that the U.S. would remain dependent on imports for some of its liquid fuels – which are critical to the transport sector – through 2040.<sup>20</sup> The 2015 EIA projections of U.S. imports did reflect the possibility of a far lower dependence on imports, a greater possibility of a possible U.S. shift to crude exports, and a far wider range of uncertainty in every aspect of the future U.S. strategic dependence on direct imports of crude oil and liquid fuels. The EIA summarized these trends as follows:<sup>21</sup>

U.S. crude oil production from tight formations leads the growth in total U.S. crude oil production in all the AEO2015 cases. In the Reference case, lower levels of domestic consumption of liquid fuels and higher levels of domestic production of crude oil push the net import share of crude oil and petroleum products supplied down from 33% in 2013 to 17% in 2040.

In the High Oil Price and High Oil and Gas Resource cases, growth in tight oil production results in significantly higher levels of total U.S. crude oil production than in the Reference case. Crude oil production in the High Oil and Gas Resource case increases to 16.6 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2040, compared with a peak of 10.6 million bbl/d in 2020 in the Reference case. In the High Oil Price case, production reaches a high of 13.0 million bbl/d in 2026, and then declines to 9.9 million bbl/d in 2040 as a result of earlier resource development. In the Low Oil Price case, U.S. crude oil production totals 7.1 million bbl/d in 2040.

The United States becomes a net petroleum exporter in 2021 in both the High Oil Price and High Oil and Gas Resource cases. With lower levels of domestic production and higher domestic consumption in the Low Oil Price case, the net import share of total liquid fuels supply increases to 36% of total domestic supply in 2040.

At the same time, the EIA still projected a reference case where the U.S. still seemed likely to remain dependent on crude oil imports, albeit at levels where such dependence could be as low as 17% in 2040 - roughly half the level of dependence estimated in 2013. At the same time, the U.S. was projected to be able to export gasoline and petroleum products by 2021, and the EIA analysis of future direct dependence warned that estimates were becoming steadily more uncertain with the mix of technologies, market scenarios, and uncertainties.

There is no such uncertainty regarding another critical aspect of U.S. dependence on the stable flow of Gulf energy exports at market prices. The U.S. must pay world prices for energy. Even in a partial recovery year like 2010, the global economy depended on the predictable flow of 45 million barrels a day of crude oil imports, 23.75 million barrels of refined products, and 1.6 trillion cubic feet of gas. Any major interruption in the flow of energy exports raises world market prices, and the U.S. economy must pay such prices regardless of where the interruption occurs. There is ample historical evidence as to just how quickly oil prices can change in a crisis, and past price rises would have been much sharper if the U.S. had not acted to reassure and support its Gulf allies, or what would have happened if the conflicts that began in 2011 had spread throughout the region and sustained or even increased peak oil prices.

More directly, the U.S. already is critically dependent on indirect imports of petroleum in the form of manufactured and industrial goods. The CIA *World Factbook* estimates that U.S. had a \$16.72 trillion economy in 2014. The data on U.S. imports and exports lag a year, but total U.S. exports were \$1.575 trillion in 2013, or roughly 9% of the U.S. GDP while U.S. imports were \$2,273 trillion in 2013, or roughly 14% of the U.S. GDP.

In 2013, at a time when U.S. direct dependence on energy imports was far higher than it was projected for the future, the CIA estimated that energy imports only accounted for 8.2% of total U.S. imports – or \$186 billion. In contrast, 24.7% of total U.S. imports were industrial supplies (\$622 billion), 30.4% were capital goods (\$691 billion), and 31.8% (\$723 billion) were consumer goods -- for total of 86.9% of all U.S. imports (\$1,975 billion).

These percentages all highlight the importance the stable flow of global trade, since much of the U.S. manufacturing center and high technology activity is now dependent on the steady flow of imported elements and components. As a result, U.S. growth and health of the U.S. economy, and of American jobs, is critically dependent on the flow of imports of industrial supplies and capital goods.

All of these U.S. imports are, however, critically dependent on the flow of Gulf and MENA petroleum exports to the states that provide such exports of industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer good to the U.S. As a result, they become indirect imports of petroleum. China, Korea, Japan and other key exporters to the U.S. are critically dependent on Gulf energy exports. These nations that accounted for over 33% of all U.S. imports – a percentage of U.S. trade roughly four times larger than direct U.S. import dependence on petroleum imports in 2013.

These conclusions are supported by the data on foreign dependence on Gulf and MENA oil that International Energy Agency provided in its report on *Energy Supply Security 2014, Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014*.<sup>22</sup> They are further reinforced by data that BP has issued on interregional trade movements. The *BP Statistical Review of Energy for 2014* reports that the “Middle East” – which consists almost totally of Gulf oil exports in BP reporting – exported a total of 19.4 million barrels a day of oil in 2013. Out of this total,<sup>23</sup>

- 2.0 MMBD went to the U.S. out of total imports of 9.8 MMBD.
- 2.1 MMB went to Europe out of total imports of 12.6 MMBD.
- 3.1 MMD went to China out of total imports of 6.9 MMBD.
- 2.5 MMD went to India out of total imports of 4.1 MMBD.
- 3.3 MMD went to India out of total imports of 4.5 MMBD.
- 1.1 MMD went to Singapore out of total imports of 3.0 MMBD.
- 4.6 MMD went to the rest of Asia out of total imports of 7.5 MMBD.

Taken together, these data indicate a level of continuing U.S. strategic dependence on indirect imports that goes far beyond the uncertain future U.S. need for direct petroleum imports. These data also indicate a critical need for the U.S. to reappraise how it assesses strategic dependence and its vital national security interests. Almost none of the official estimates of U.S. import dependence – past, current- or future – take indirect imports into consideration.

### **The Data Used for Measuring the Changing Nature of the Security Balance**

Finally, this analysis does not attempt to examine every possible scenario, although it does touch on many. These have been analyzed in other Burke Chair studies focusing on Iran and Iraq. It is rather an attempt to provide a survey of the key trends and forces that shape various aspects of the regional balance, and that form the building blocks that could shape future conflicts, and the patterns of deterrence, warfighting, escalation, and conflict termination that might be involved.

It is also an attempt to highlight some of the areas where adequate data are lacking. Unclassified sources do a far better job of providing data on major weapons platforms than they do in providing any meaningful ability IS&R, C4I, mission profiles, and ordnance. The data on asymmetric forces are limited, as are the data on internal security forces. Little data are available on the holdings of non-state actors aside from total manning. No reliable data are available on Israel's nuclear forces and much of the key data on missile systems is uncertain or unreliable.

There is a clear need for governments to provide better data and metrics on key changes. The current flow of declassified and official data is not adequate to properly upgrade the analysis of the region



**Figure I.1: Gulf Military Forces – Part One**

Category	Yemen	Iraq	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
<b>Total Active Manpower (1,000s)</b>	66.7	177.6	523	368.1	8.2	15.5	42.6	11.8	227	63
<b>Total Reserve Manpower (1,000s)</b>			350	23.7		23.7				
<b>Land Forces</b>										
Active Manpower (1,000s)	60	100	450	281.5	6	11	25	8.5	175	56
Reserve Manpower (1,000s)			350	0						
Main Battle Tanks	880	270+	1663+	1691	180	293	117	30	600	471
Armored Fighting Vehicles				0						
Self-Propelled Artillery	25	48	292+	645	82	106	24	28	224	181
Towed artillery	310	60	2030+	299	36		108	12	50	93
Multiple Rocket Launchers	249	3	1476+	209	9	27		6	60	107
Mortars	642	950	5000	898	24	78	101	45	437	213
Surface to Surface Missile Launchers	28		30	6						6
<b>Naval Forces</b>										
Active Navy Manpower (1,000s)	1.7	3.6	33	24.7	0.7	2	4.2	1.8	13.5	2.5
Active Marine Manpower (1,000s)		1.5	7.6	3					3	
Reserve Manpower				0						
Submarines			3	0						
Submersibles			26	12			2			10
Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes			6	27	3		5		11	8
Missile Patrol Boats			54	15		8				7
Other Patrol Boats	21	26	108	86	6	10	4	4	56	6
Patrol Craft	1	6	14	37	4	2	7	7	9	8
Hovercraft			8	0						
Amphibious Ships	1		17	2			1			1
Landing Craft	3		3	51	9		5	1	8	28
Support Ships	2		50	33	2	1	6	2	17	5
Armed Naval Helicopter			13	28					28	

**Figure I.1: Gulf Military Forces – Part Two**

Air Forces	Yemen	Iraq	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Active Manpower (1,000s)	3	5	18	35	1.5	2.5	5	1.5	20	4.5
Reserve Manpower (1,000s)				0						
Total Combat Aircraft	75	11	334	655	39	66	44	18	313	175
Fighters	10		184+	93	12				81	
Fighter/Ground Attack	65	8	110	405	21	39	15	12	180	138
Reconnaissance		10	6	21					14	7
AWACS & Airborne Early Warning				9					7	2
Intelligence				2					2	
Maritime Patrol and Surveillance	2		5	0						
Transport	13	32	117	149	10	5	17	12	56	49
Tankers			3	24		3			18	3
Armed and Attack Helicopters	19		2	130	28	29	15	21		37
<b>Air Defense Forces</b>										
Active Manpower (1,000s)	2	4	12	16					16	
Reserve Manpower (1,000s)				0						
Anti-Missile Defense Launchers			some	0		some			some	some
<b>Heavy Surface to Air Missile Forces</b>										
Units	some		16 bn, 5 sqn	140+ bty, 6+bn, 2+ sqn	some	16-17 bty	2 sqn	some	123 bty	6 bn
Launchers	some		529+	1818+	13+	some	some	some	1805	some
Missiles	some		some	302+	91	136+	some	75	some	some
Short Range Missiles (SHORADS)	some		18+	some	some	some	some	some	some	some
Man Portable Missiles (MANPADs)	some	some	some	some	some	some	some	some	some	some

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure I.2: Key Outside Forces – Part One**

Category	Egypt	Israel	Lebanon	Jordan	Turkey	Syria*
<b>Total Active Manpower (1000s)</b>	438.5	176.5	60	100.5	510.6	178
<b>Total Reserve Manpower (1000s)</b>	479	465		65	378.7	
<b>Land Forces</b>						
Active Manpower (1000s)	310	133	56.6	74	402	110
Reserve Manpower (1000s)	375	400		60	258.7	
Main Battle Tanks	2540	500	324	752	2504	some
Armored Fighting Vehicles						
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles	390		16	452	650	some
Self-Propelled Artillery	492	250		568	1118	some
Towed artillery	962	447	201	100	760+	some
Multiple Rocket Launchers	450	30	11	14	146+	some
Mortars	2564	250	275	759	5813+	some
Surface to Surface Missile Launchers	42	7				
<b>Naval Forces</b>						
Active Navy Manpower (1000s)	18.5	9.8	1.8	0.5	45.5	5
Active Marine Manpower (1000s)					3.1	
Reserve Manpower (1000s)	14	10			55	
Submarines	4	3			14	
Submersibles		20				
Destroyers/Frigates/Corvettes	10	3			24	2
Missile Patrol Boats	21				6	22
Other Patrol Boats	96	42	12	7	11	8
Patrol Craft	18	10	1		38	
Hovercraft						
Amphibious Ships	3				4	3
Landing Craft	9	3	2		49	
Support Ships	32	3			79	2
Armed Naval Helicopter	15				29	10

**Figure I.2: Key Outside Forces – Part Two**

<b>Air Forces</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>Jordan</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>Syria*</b>
Active Manpower (1000s)	30	34	1.6	12	60	17.5
Reserve Manpower (1000s)	20	55			65	
Total Combat Aircraft	569	440	9	75	335	277
Fighters	62	143		29	53	75
Fighter/Ground Attack	310	251	4	38	282	185
Reconnaissance	6	6	3		38	
AWACS & Airborne Early Warning	7	4			3	
Intelligence	2	4				
Maritime Patrol and Surveillance		3				
Transport	64	59		20	87	23
Tankers		11			7	
Armed and Attack Helicopters	45	84	9	25		54
<b>Air Defense Forces</b>						
Active Manpower (1,000s)	80					
Reserve Manpower (1,000s)	70					
Anti-Missile Defense Launchers	some	some		some	some	
<b>Heavy Surface to Air Missile Forces</b>						
Units	5 div	32 bty		16-17 bty	6+ sqn	4 div, 3 reg
Launchers	72+	24+		some	some	some
Missiles	702+	some		930+	some	some
Short Range Missiles (SHORADS)	some	some		some	some	some
Man Portable Missiles (MANPADs)	some	some	some	some	some	some

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.


\* According to *The Military Balance 2015*, IISS, “ongoing attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equipment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much remains available for operations”.

## Map I.1: Gulf Energy Facilities and the Broader Geography of the Gulf Region



Source: DOE/EIA, November 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3>.

## Map I.1: The Global Strategic Importance of Gulf Oil Exports



All estimates in million barrels per day. Includes crude oil and petroleum products. Based on 2013 data.

Source: DOE/EIA, November 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3>.

## ***II. Military Expenditures***

There are no reliable comparative estimates of international military and security expenditures. NATO comes close in trying to make fully comparable estimates using a standard definition, but some NATO members still do not comply fully with NATO's definitions and requirements, and most nations outside NATO use very different definitions of what to include in making public reports on their national security expenditures.

Some deliberately misstate their spending, and either fail to properly report their full procurement spending or use special pricing for the state-driven expenditures in their national security sector. UN reporting is erratic at best, and no meaningful official source of comparable data has existed since the U.S. government ceased to provide declassified estimates after it cancelled its World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report.

Most of the expenditure data now available from NGOs focus on expenditures in national military budgets, rather than include matching data on internal security expenditures – although some countries do include extensive paramilitary forces in such budgets. This failure to provide full estimates of national security spending has become steadily more important as nations increase spending on counter-terrorism and other internal security spending.

### **The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) Estimates**

There are two major NGOs that do, however, provide broadly useful estimates of military expenditures, however, and whose data provide at least a rough indication of the trends in spending on both conventional and asymmetric military forces in the Gulf. The first is the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS),

- **Figure II.1** compares the IISS estimates of military expenditures of each GCC member during 1997-2012, along with those of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.
- **Figure II.2** shows how the IISS estimates of total military expenditures of the GCC contrast to those of Iran. It is clear that the GCC, as a whole, spends far more than Iran on its military. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia alone spent about 5.5 times more than Iran on its military and the United Arab Emirates spent almost twice as much as Iran during this period. And, as a whole, the GCC combined spent just over 9 times more than Iran on its military.

### **The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Estimates**

The second is the Stockholm Institute of Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

- **Figure II.3** compares the SIPRI estimates of military expenditures of each GCC member during 1997-2012, along with those of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.
- **Figure II.4** shows how the SIPRI estimates of total military expenditures of the GCC contrast to those of Iran. It is clear that the GCC, as a whole, spends far more than Iran on its military.

A comparison of **Figure II.1** and **Figure II.3** shows that the IISS and SIPRI estimates are usually very similar or identical but the some differences do occur. There is no way to explain the differences, and neither the IISS nor SIPRI fully explain the source or definition of their data. In broad terms, however, the Arab lead over Iran is just as clear. Saudi Arabia spends some 4-5 times as much as Iran, and the UAE alone has outspent Iran since 2007. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE – the two Arab Gulf states with the most modern Arab Gulf military forces are combined – they have consistently spent more than six times as much as Iran.

As might be expected, **Figure II.4** shows almost the same Arab Gulf and GCC lead over Iran as **Figure II.2**.

- **Figure II.5** compares the SIPRI estimates of military expenditures of each GCC member during 1997-2012, along with those of Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran in constant 2011 \$U.S. dollars. It shows that the Arab Gulf lead over Iran is not changed significantly when an attempt is made to compare spending over time in constant dollars.
- **Figure II.6** shows how the SIPRI estimates of total military expenditures of the GCC contrast to those of Iran in constant \$2011 dollars. Once again, it is clear that the GCC, as a whole, spends far more than Iran on its military.

### **Military Spending as a Percent of GDP and Comparative GDP**

- **Figure II.7** compares IMF estimates of military expenditures of each GCC member as a percent of its total economy or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 1997-2012, along with those of Iraq, Yemen, and Iran.
- **Figure II.8** compares IMF estimates of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 1997-2012, along with those of Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. This provides an estimate of the total resources each state can draw upon in sizing its national security expenditures.

There are surprisingly wide differences in the estimate of GDP from different sources, and particularly when the estimates of international institutions are compared to national estimates. Other sources do not, however, alter the broad trends reflected **Figure II.7** and **Figure II.8**. The Arab Gulf states have vastly larger cumulative economic resources to draw upon, and all major sources agree that they have much smaller native populations to support. This gives them a major structural advantage over Iran in sizing their national security efforts, and one they clearly take advantage of.

The percentages of gross domestic product (GDP) each country spends on defense are shown in **Figure II.7**. They provide another indicator of the forces driving the military balance. It is important to note, however, that showing such percentage is only a measure of effort in terms of the burden defense spending places on a given national economy. It does not account for the different size of such economies, it does not indicate the impact of outside factors like sanctions, and it does not show the size the resulting expenditures.

For example, **Figure II.7** shows that the IMF estimates that Oman spent 16.36% of its GDP on its military in in 2012 —the highest of any GCC and Gulf state. However, the data in **Figure II.1** show that Oman's total expenditures were only \$12.334 billion, the third highest of the Gulf States, and significantly less than Saudi Arabia's \$56.498 billion.

### **Iran's Structural Limits in Spending on National Security**

The limits to Iran's military expenditures have been more a matter of necessity than intent, and this necessity has been as much a result of international pressure and sanctions as the limits imposed by Iran's GDP and its need to support a large native population. Unlike the GCC states, Iran has been subject to slowly growing and now crippling sanctions, leading to a devalued currency, significant reductions in oil exports, trade disruptions, higher inflation, and a shrinking economy, some problems other Gulf States are not facing.<sup>24</sup>

The impact of sanctions on Iran seems to be reflected by the fact that the trend line data in **Figure II.7** suggest that the percentage of Iran's GDP spent on its military has been decreasing, and **Figure II.8** shows that Iran's GDP decreased after stronger sanctions were applied in 2011.



In contrast, both GDP of the Arab states continued to increase through 2014, and this limited the extent to which they had to increase the burden on their economies to pay for defense. **Figure II.1 and Figure II.3** show that nearly all of the GCC states increased funding for their military from 2010 onwards, some quite significantly.

It is scarcely surprising that the GCC collectively spends more on their military than Iran. Saudi Arabia, alone, spent nearly \$56.5 billion on its military in 2012, compared to Iran's \$10.6 billion. Collectively, the GCC nearly spent an overwhelming \$98.5 billion on their militaries, outspending Iran nearly 10:1. This spending superiority allows the GCC to invest in newer technology, weaponry and defense acquisitions.

### **U.S. Military Spending and the Gulf Military Balance**

Comparisons that focus on the Arab Gulf states and Iran ignore the fact that outside powers also play a major role in the regional military balance. Egypt and Jordan are coming to play a more direct role, Britain and France maintain a presence in the region, and the U.S. is actively involved in a military campaign in Iraq and has deployed naval forces to support the Saudi-led coalition operating in Yemen.


There is no way to estimate the portion of the military spending of such outside states that should be included in any assessment of the total resources affecting the balance. It is clear, however, that the Arab Gulf states can benefit from a vastly greater pool of resources than is apparent from either a comparison of their national defense spending or their arms imports.

- **Figure II.9** shows the level of U.S. military spending in FY2016 dollars. This buys a massive mix of air-sea-land power projection capabilities, and even though the U.S. now plans to cap military spending after major cuts following the end of the major fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is worth pointing out that the total U.S. spending for FY2016 is likely to be well over 30 times that of Iran, and can support U.S. power projection capabilities indefinitely into the future.
- **Figure II.10** shows that the U.S. Department of Defense will spend \$69.8 billion on research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in FY2016, and \$107.7 billion on procurement. This means the U.S. will spend more than 4 times as much on R&D alone as Iran will on its entire defense budget, and can spend 6 times as much on procurement. The end result allows the Arab Gulf states to draw upon a vastly larger U.S. R&D and production base than Iran, take advantage of U.S. economies of scale, and do so at minimal risk since they only have to buy mature U.S. programs -- and can buy from competing sources if the U.S. does not meet their needs -- while Iran must take serious risks in attempt to develop and produce its own designs.

There is no doubt that the Arab Gulf states would make far more effective use of their resources and these opportunities if they were able to achieve a higher degree of standardization, integration, interoperability.

Iran has also been innovative in using its resources to acquire missiles, build-up its asymmetric warfare capabilities in the Gulf, and use money, advisors, and arms transfers to win influence elsewhere in the region. Iran however, has internal divisions and problems with corruption and waste that limit the effectiveness of its military spending; and compete to some extent with the problems growing out of the lack of real-world unity in the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab forces.

**Figure II.1: IISS Estimate of Gulf State Military Spending in Current \$U.S. Dollars, 1997-2014**




Source: Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from HIS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

Country	1997	2001	2004	2007	2010	2013
Bahrain	290	335	479	589	776	1236
Oman	1976	2423	2974	4326	4895	9246
UAE	3336	5798	6816	8460	17505	13433
Saudi Arabia	18127	21027	20910	35465	45245	67020
Kuwait	2455	2686	3447	4119	4329	4338
Qatar	1439	1881	772	1562	1877	3728
Iraq	2063	1549	614	1942	3581	16897
Iran	3550	15385	5335	8239	9478	14786
Yemen	397	540	735	1050	1830	1849

Measured in Current \$US Millions

Source: Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from HIS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure II.2: IISS Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GCC) Military Spending in Current \$U.S. Dollars, 1997-2014**




Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from HIS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

Country	1997	2001	2004	2007	2010	2013
Iran	3550	15385	5335	8239	9478	14786
GCC	27623	34150	35398	54521	74627	99001

Measured in Current \$US Millions

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors

**Figure II.3: SIPRI Estimates of Gulf Military Spending in \$U.S. Current Millions, 1997-2014**




Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

Country	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012	2014
Bahrain	323	358	517	574	828	1182	1433
Kuwait	2454	2697	3131	3598	4209	5942	#N/A
Oman	1976	2103	2626	4030	4490	12334	9623
Qatar	N/A	N/A	785	1066	1948	#N/A	#N/A
Saudi Arabia	18127	19964	18747	29581	41267	56498	80762
UAE	3336	5876	5835	7165	13836	19024	22755
Iran	4642	8340	3717	8751	12585	12719	#N/A
Iraq	N/A	N/A	N/A	1236	2968	6055	9516
Yemen	397	474	807	822	1421	1619	1715
Jordan	444	529	612	702	1404	1246	1268
Egypt	2509	3124	2384	2953	4017	4558	4961

Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

**Figure II.2: SIPRI Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GCC) Military Spending in Current \$U.S. Millions, 1997-2014**




Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

Country	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012	2014
GCC	#N/A	#N/A	31640	46014	66579	#N/A	#N/A
Iran	4642	8340	3717	8751	12585	12719	#N/A

Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

**Figure II.5: SIPRI Estimates of Gulf State Military Spending in Constant 2011 \$U.S. Millions, 1997-2014**




Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

Country	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012	2014
Bahrain	377	428	618	641	841	1150	1319
Kuwait	4197	4442	4855	4999	4782	5856	N/A
Oman	2742	2926	3687	5343	4822	11985	8985
Qatar	N/A	N/A	1263	1320	1938	N/A	N/A
Saudi Arabia	24313	27551	25951	39600	46004	54913	73717
UAE	6034	10075	9170	9238	14080	18898	21877
Iran	5952	6644	9277	16776	15535	11453	#N/A
Iraq	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	1827	3231	5688	8381
Jordan	731	835	916	924	1539	1190	1114
Egypt	3847	4464	5227	5050	4597	4343	4584
Yemen	983	1218	1691	1327	1744	1384	1150

Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database)  
Measured in \$US Millions

**Figure II.6: SIPRI Estimate of Iranian vs. Arab Gulf State (GCC) Military Spending in Constant 2011 \$U.S. Millions, 1997-2014**




Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database); Breaks delineate incomplete data/unknown data

Measured in 2011 \$US Millions

Country	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012	2014
GCC	#N/A	#N/A	45543	61140	72467	#N/A	#N/A
Iran	5952	6644	9277	16776	15535	11453	#N/A


Source: Graphs Generated using data from [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database); Breaks delineate incomplete data/unknown data

Measured in 2011 \$US Millions

**Figure II.7: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP for the Gulf States**

Sources: (2014) Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 114:1, 297-354, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2014.871884>; IMF Data, World Economic Outlook Database October 2014.



**Figure II.8: Gulf States' Gross Domestic Product**


Source: IMF Data, World Economic Outlook Database October 2014  
Measured in \$US Billions

Country	1997	2000	2003	2006	2009	2012
Bahrain	7.316	9.061	11.072	18.501	22.933	30.66
Iran	106.351	96.44	137.435	241.697	360.625	398.03
Iraq	N/A	N/A	N/A	65.144	111.66	216.044
Kuwait	30.35	37.721	47.844	101.559	105.974	174.077
Oman	15.232	18.91	20.896	36.142	46.714	75.433
Qatar	11.298	17.76	23.534	60.882	97.798	189.945
Saudi Arabia	170.878	194.808	221.47	376.398	429.098	733.956
UAE	76.202	103.893	124.346	222.117	253.547	372.314
Yemen	6.838	9.679	11.778	19.063	25.13*	35.401*

Source: IMF Data, World Economic Outlook Database October 2014  
Measure din \$US Billions

\*Estimated

**Figure II.9: U.S. Military Spending: 1950- 2020 in Constant \$ U.S. FY2016 Dollars**



Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/CFO), *Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request*, Department of Defense, February 2015, p.26.

**Figure II.10: President's FY2016 U.S. Baseline Defense Budget Request in Billions of \$U.S. Current Dollars**

By Appropriation Title	FY 2015	FY 2016	Dollar Change
Military Personnel	135.0	136.7	+1.8
Operation and Maintenance	195.4	209.8	+14.5
Procurement	93.6	107.7	+14.1
RDT&E	63.5	69.8	+6.3
Military Construction/Family Housing	6.6	8.4	+1.9
Other	2.1	1.8	-0.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>496.1</b>	<b>534.3</b>	<b>+38.2</b>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

By Military Department	FY 2015	FY 2016	Dollar Change
Army	119.5	126.5	+7.0
Navy	149.2	161.0	+11.8
Air Force	136.9	152.9	+16.0
Defense Wide	90.6	94.0	+3.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>496.1</b>	<b>534.3</b>	<b>+38.2</b>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

**Base Budget Request: \$534.3 Billion**

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/CFO), *Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request*, Department of Defense, February 2015, p.4

### ***III. Arms Imports***

As is the case with military expenditures, the GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon – and to a lesser extent Iraq – have had a major advantage over Iran in importing arms and military technology ever since the fall of the Shah. Since 1980, the U.S. and other Western states have sought to block or limit transfers of key arms and technology to Iran – including munitions, modernization kits, spare parts, and advanced dual-use technology. Russia and China have also shown restraint in exporting advanced arms, and UN sanctions have further restricted Iran's options.

Iran has attempted to counter by setting up a large mix of covert purchasing networks during the Iran-Iraq War, bought from third nations with fewer restrictions, and bought on the black market. It only had limited success, however, even in paying a premium price while the Arab states had open access at market prices. Similarly, Iran made some successful efforts to improve its industrial base, but these had limited success and involved massive investment costs and severe diseconomies of scale.

These trends can be measured in two key ways. One is to estimate the total value of the arms deliveries and new arms orders being provided to each Gulf state. The other is to analyze reports on the actual transfer of arms and key military technologies. Both methods are useful, but both also present significant problems in the reliability of the data provided.

#### **A Lack of Reliable Official Data on Total Arms Transfer Expenditures**

There are no current and *reliable* metrics on the overall trends in arms transfer expenditures. Only one country has provided extensive official data on global sales in the past, and its reporting has been cut back and now has substantial gaps. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) once published a much more comprehensive assessments called *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer (WMEAT)*, but publication became erratic and the last version seems to have been published on-line in 2012. (<http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2012/>), and only covered the period from 1999 to 2009.

The U.S. Congressional Research Service did publish a declassified intelligence estimate called *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations*, after WMEAT was cancelled. This report did not provide anything like the same detail as WMEAT, but it did provide a detailed break out of total arms transfers and orders for each MENA country. The CRS has not published an update to this report since August 2012, and the last report covered the 2004-2011 period. Even so, the totals are still useful in showing the scale of the Arab Gulf advantage over Iran.

- **Figures III.1 to III.2** show the trends from 2004-2011 in terms of both new orders and actual deliveries. They show that the GCC states has a massive advantage over Iran in actual arms deliveries of 80:1 in 2008-2011 and 25:1 in 2004-2007.
- **Figures III.3 to III.4** show that that the GCC states advantage over Iran in new arms orders was of 252:1 in 2008-2011 and 15:1 in 2004-2007. This ensures that the GCC states will have a massive advantage over Iran in the near term.

As has been touched upon earlier, this Arab Gulf state advantage in importing weapons and military technology has been partially offset by the lack of standardized, and to some extent interoperability in GCC and allied forces that come from each country buying a different mix of weapons and equipment from different suppliers, as well as from the lack of standardization in doctrine, training, supply, and logistics.

At the same time, the GCC states do benefit from access to outside training facilities, military experience, and access to advanced U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities and command, control, communications, computer, and battle management capabilities (C4I/BM). They also do not face technological risk since they can choose between proven systems while any Iranian produced systems that are not exact copies of foreign systems mean Iran must assume the risk of problems in performance, delivery delays, and cost escalation.

### ***Commercial and Media Reporting***

Various commercial services and defense media also report arms sales, but such reporting is extremely erratic and often is little more than a summary of manufacturer publicity reporting. The reporting by IHS Jane's is a partial exception.

### ***NGO Reporting: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute***

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Arms Transfer Database seems to represent the most accurate outside NGO assessment, but any NGO faces significant cost issues and data collection limits relative to U.S. intelligence. It is not surprising therefore that the SIPRI numbers are sometimes very different from the U.S. numbers and they consistently are substantially smaller, although they exhibit the same basic trends.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Arms Transfer Database calculates arms transfers using SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in U.S.\$ millions at constant 1990 U.S. dollars. As a result, the numbers are not comparable with the CRS estimates. They do, however, show very similar trends in relative effort.

- **Figure III.6** shows the level of arms transfers between 1997 and 2014. The Arab Gulf states in the GC have had a massive lead over Iran in arms imports. The gap is so great in given periods that the GCC states lead Iran by 6.9:1 during 1997-2007, 10.4:1 in 2004-2008, 33.1:1 in 2009-2013, and 27.5:1 in 2007-2014,
- **Figure III.7** shows transfers by both source and recipient country between 2004 and 2008. The Arab Gulf states had a clear advantage in terms of both total spending and access to modern U.S. and European arms. Even though SIPRI seems to sharply underestimate the Saudi total, Saudi Arabia's imports alone were twice as large as Iran's, and the UAE's were more than seven times larger.
- **Figure III.8** reflects that same sharp build up in arms imports during 2009-2014 reflected in the IISS data during 2009-2014. The gap between Iran and the Arab Gulf states did, however, widened sharply. Saudi Arabia's arms imports were more than 18 times larger than Iran's. The UAE's imports were 16 times larger.

These figures give the GCC massive advantage over an extended period in both the quantity and quality of arms transfers.

Once again, the driving factors shaping the Arab Gulf advantage in arms imports is that the Arab Gulf states are not limited by sanctions, and they have a far larger economic base to draw upon and can spend far more without burdening their civil economies. This allows the GCC states --as well as Arab states like Jordan and Egypt that receive extensive U.S. aid -- to take full advantage of international arms sales and arms transfer agreements in buying upgrades and purchasing of more advanced arms.

In contrast, Iran doesn't have access to many of the markets it needs to obtain replacement parts for its weaponry and armor that originally came from the West. Sanctions have forced Iran to reverse engineer parts—and in some cases, entire weapons---to maintain its military force. This has forced Iran to try to find “work around” to keep its equipment running, make uncertain

procurements and modernization efforts, try to produce parts of uncertain quality at high costs, and purchase from an expensive black market in order to find vital parts for its military. It has led Iran to create a larger military industrial base, but at an extremely high unit cost because of the lack of scale, and to attempt efforts that were too advanced for its industrial base to fully support.

### **Actual Weapons and Military Technology Transfers**

The data on actual weapons transfers are sometimes contradictory and often have significant gaps. Nevertheless, enough useful data are available to provide a further indication of the advantage the Arab Gulf states have had over Iran. If one looks at a range of sources, one can also obtain considerable insight into which services have modernized most quickly, and how each regional state is modernizing its forces.

The CRS issues a regular set of reports on each major Gulf state, some of which provide considerable detail on U.S. arms transfers. For example, a report by Christopher M. Blanchard indicates that Saudi Arabia ordered \$90.435 billion in major new arms transfers from the U.S. alone between October 2010 and October 2014. These arms sales are shown in **Figure III.8**, and include some of the most modern weapons in U.S. inventory.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, the CRS reports that UAE – which has some of the most effective armed forces in the Gulf – has also placed substantial orders for U.S. weapons and technology. Kenneth Katzman provided the following list of major arms orders and summary of their impact:<sup>26</sup>

From 2007 to 2010, the UAE agreed to acquire more U.S. defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales program—\$10.4 billion worth—than any other country in the world except Saudi Arabia. Until 2008, the most significant buy was the March 2000 purchase of 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) and the HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile), a deal exceeding \$8 billion...Defense industry sources say that the equipment and capabilities on the F-16s sold to the UAE were highly sophisticated. Earlier, in September 2006, the United States sold UAE High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs), valued at about \$750 million.

Among recent major sales:

- In March 2009, the UAE signed agreements with Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. to buy \$3 billion worth of military transport aircraft (C-17 and C-130, respectively).
- On November 4, 2010, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of two potential sales: \$140 million worth of ATACMs and associated support; and a possible \$5 billion worth of AH-64 Apache helicopters
- (30 helicopters, remanufactured to Block III configuration).<sup>15</sup>
- On November 30, 2011, DSCA notified (transmittal number 10-56) a potential sale of 4,900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) kits with an estimated value of \$304 million. The widespread perception was that the munitions could potentially be used to strike hard targets, such as nuclear facilities in Iran, although there are no indications the UAE would conduct such a strike on its own. The United States previously sold the UAE JDAM kits worth \$326 million in January 3, 2008.
- On April 25, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, visiting UAE, reportedly finalized a sale to UAE of an additional 25-30 F-16 aircraft and associated “standoff” air-to-ground munitions. The sale was in conjunction with similar weapons sales to Israel and Saudi Arabia, and which Secretary Hagel and other officials clearly indicated were intended to signal U.S. and partner resolve to Iran.<sup>16</sup> The agreement came about one week after President Obama met visiting Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh Mohammad at the White House on April 16, 2013. A related possible sale was notified on January 24, 2014, for equipment upgrades to the F-16 being purchased, with an estimated value of \$270 million.

- On October 15, 2013, DSCA (transmittal no. 13-48) notified a potential sale of numerous precision-guided missiles for its F-16 fleet, including 20 of the advanced ATM-84 SLAM-ER Telemetry missile and 5,000 GBU-39/B “bunker buster” bombs. (The sale of the SLAM-ER would represent the first sale of that weapon to a Gulf state.) The principal contractors will be Boeing and Raytheon, and the estimated cost of the munitions is \$4 billion.
- Press reports say the UAE and other Gulf states are interested in purchasing the advanced F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter” if and when the United States approves it for sale to the Gulf states. The UAE is said to also be evaluating the French-made Rafale and the Boeing F/A-18, but has reportedly ruled out purchasing the British-made Typhoon.
- *Possible Drone Sale?* At the IDEX defense show in February 2013, the UAE reportedly agreed to a commercial sale, worth about \$200 million, for Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), although the system apparently would be unarmed and for surveillance only. Still, Defense Department officials say they have not completed formulating a policy for the sale of such equipment to the Gulf states and it is possible that the deal might not be permitted by DOD.

The UAE is pivotal to the U.S. effort to forge a Gulf-wide missile defense network because the UAE has ordered the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD), the first sale ever of that sophisticated missile defense system. A sale of THAAD equipment was first announced September 9, 2008, valued at about \$7 billion. However, subsequent negotiations altered the purchase somewhat; on November 2, 2012, DSCA notified Congress of a potential sale to the UAE of additional THAAD equipment: 9 launchers, 48 missiles, and associated equipment with total estimated value of \$1.135 billion.<sup>19</sup> In September 2013, the Defense Department awarded a \$3.9 billion contract to Lockheed Martin for about 300 THAAD missiles, of which about 192 would be exported to the UAE—suggesting the UAE purchase has increased since the November 2012 DSCA notification.<sup>20</sup> Also on November 5, 2012, DSCA announced the first sale of the THAAD to neighboring Qatar.

Among significant other recent missile defense sales to the UAE are the advanced Patriot antimissile systems (PAC-3, up to \$9 billion value, announced December 4, 2007). Also announced on September 9, 2008, were sales to UAE of vehicle mounted “Stinger” anti-aircraft systems (\$737 million value).

Kuwait has not attempted to create forces on the scale of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but its purchases have still been significant. Since its liberation in 1991, the CRS reports that Kuwait’s major purchases from the U.S. include:<sup>27</sup>

- 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of \$1.9 billion in 1993. Delivery was completed in 1998.
- A 1992 sale of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about \$800 million. Delivery was completed by 1998. Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war.
- A 1992 sale of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft.
- A September 2002 sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at about \$940 million.
- A December 4, 2007, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification to Congress reported a sale to Kuwait of 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles and upgrades, valued at about \$1.3 billion.
- On September 9, 2008, DSCA notified a sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and services, with a total value of \$178 million.
- On August 11, 2010, the Administration notified Congress of another potential Patriot-related sale—of 209 Patriot “Guidance Enhanced Missile-T” (GEM-T) missiles valued at \$900 million. The prime contractor for that system is Raytheon.
- On February 27, 2012, the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of 80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER missiles, and associated parts and support, with an estimated value of \$105 million. The sale, if completed, would help Kuwait modernize its fighter aircraft and enhance interoperability with U.S. aircraft.

- On July 20, 2012, the Administration notified a potential sale of 60 Patriot Advanced Capability (“PAC-3”) missiles and 20 Patriot launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total value of the sale could reach \$4.2 billion. On December 31, 2013, DoD said Lockheed Martin would deliver 14 of the missiles and seven launcher modification kits by June 30, 2016.
- On April 17, 2013, DSCA notified a potential sale to Kuwait of one C-17 cargo aircraft and associated equipment, with an estimated total cost of \$371 million.
- On December 4, 2013, DSCA notified a possible sale to Kuwait of technical support to its U.S.-made F-18s for an estimated cost of about \$150 million.
- Kuwait is said to be considering adding more FA-18 aircraft, although it is evaluating and might instead order the Rafale or the Typhoon. The latter two combat aircraft are made by European manufacturers.

Oman has bought many of its arms from the UK, but the CRS reports it has also has made some major purchases from the U.S.:<sup>28</sup>

- *F-16s*: In October 2001, Oman purchased (with its own funds) 12 U.S.-made F-16 C/D aircraft from new production. Along with associated weapons (Harpoon and AIM missiles), a podded reconnaissance system, and training, the sale was valued at about \$825 million; deliveries were completed in 2006. Oman made the purchase in part to keep pace with its Gulf neighbors, including UAE and Bahrain that had bought F-16s. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress on August 4, 2010, of a potential sale to Oman of up to 18 additional F-16s and associated equipment and support. The sale could be worth up to \$3.5 billion to the main manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.<sup>11</sup> Oman signed a contract with Lockheed Martin for 12 of the aircraft in December 2011, and with a contract for an additional six still possible. The twelve are to be delivered through 2014. On December 11, 2012, DSCA notified a sale of weapons systems for the F-16, including 27 AMRAAMs, 162 GBU laser-guided bombs, and other weaponry and equipment, with a total estimated value of about \$117 million.
- In July 2006, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Oman bought the JAVELIN anti-tank system, at a cost of about \$48 million.
- In November 2010, DSCA notified Congress of a possible sale of up to \$76 million worth of countermeasures equipment and training to protect the C-130J that Oman is buying from Lockheed Martin under a June 2009 commercial contract. The prime manufacturer of the equipment is Northrop Grumman. Another possible sale of countermeasures equipment—in this case for Oman’s aircraft that fly Sultan Qaboos—was notified on May 15, 2013.
- On October 19, 2011, DSCA notified Congress of a potential sale to Oman of AVENGER fire units, Stinger missiles, and Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles (AMRAAMs)—all of which are to help Oman develop a layered air defense system. The total value of the potential sale, including associated equipment and training, is about \$1.25 billion.
- On June 13, 2012, DSCA notified a sale of various types of AIM “Sidewinder” air-to-air missiles to modernize Oman’s F-16 fleet and enhance its interoperability with U.S. forces.
- On May 21, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Oman reportedly in part to help finalize a sale to Oman of ground-based air defense systems made by Raytheon. The equipment has an estimated value of \$2.1 billion. DSCA has not, to date, made a notification to Congress about the potential sale

Qatar has made French purchases, but has also bought some advanced arms from the U.S. The CRS reports that the proposed U.S. sales during 2012-2013 included:<sup>29</sup>

- UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters, \$1,112 million, June 13, 2012
- MH-60R and MH-60S SEAHAWK Helicopters, \$2,500 million, June 26, 2012
- AH-64D APACHE Block III Longbow Helicopters; Related Missiles, \$3,000 million, July 12, 2012
- HELLFIRE Missiles \$137 million, July 12, 2012
- Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units, \$6,500 million, November 5, 2012



- PATRIOT Configuration-3 Missile Fire Units and Missiles \$9,900, million, November 7, 2012
- M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS); M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Rockets; M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Rockets, \$406 million, December 24, 2012
- Javelin Guided Missiles, \$122 million, March 28, 2013
- Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems, \$110 million, May 15, 2013
- C-17 Globemaster III Equipment and Support, \$35 million, June 27, 2013
- A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar, \$1,100 million, July 29, 2013.

Bahrain is a major strategic partner of the United States because it provides key naval and air base facilities, but the CRS reports that:<sup>30</sup>

its total government budget is only about \$6 billion per year, “allowing modest amounts of national funds to be used for purchases of major combat systems. About 85% of Bahrain’s defense equipment is of U.S.-origin.

- In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 U.S.-made F-16Cs from new production, worth about \$390 million. It later purchased 12 more of the system, bringing its F-16 fleet to 22. In 1999 and 2009, the United States sold Bahrain Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) to arm the F-16s.
- An August 2000 sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs, a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired from a multiple rocket launcher), valued at about \$70 million, included an agreement for joint U.S.-Bahraini control of the weapon. That arrangement was reached in part to allay U.S. congressional concerns about possible U.S. promotion of missile proliferation in the region.
- In 2007, the United States sold Bahrain several hundred “Javelin” anti-armor missiles worth up to \$42 million; 9 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters worth up to \$252 million; and 6 Bell search and recovery helicopters, valued at about \$160 million.

Section 581 of the FY1990 foreign operations appropriation act (P.L. 101-167) made Bahrain the only Gulf state eligible to receive the Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile, and the United States has sold Bahrain about 70 Stingers since 1990. (This authorization has been repeated in subsequent legislation. Once again, the reliability and completeness of such lists of arms transfers varies sharply by country and source. At the same time, they still provide a tangible picture of both the scale of the qualitative improvements to Arab Gulf forces and the level of U.S. strategic commitment to the Arab Gulf states. As the previous Figures have shown, Britain and France have also made major sales, again giving the Arab Gulf states a major edge in weapons quality and military technology over Iran.

### **NGO Efforts to Summarize Major Weapons Transfers**

The IISS and SIPRI also make efforts to assess major arms transfers, and these efforts cover all of the countries providing arms and military technology to Gulf states – not just the U.S. Both highlight the advantage the Arab Gulf states have over Iran in access to modern arms.

**Figure III.9** shows the IISS reporting on recent arms transfers to key Gulf countries reported in various editions of its annual *Military Balance* since 2013, as well as some transfers reported by other sources. These data sometimes include sales or transfers that are reported by manufacturers before the final contract is signed or do not materialize for other reasons, but give a broad indication of the impact of outside technology transfer on the balance. The coverage is limited, but still provides useful insights into the trends in the region.


**Figure III.10** uses the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database to show arms transfers during 2000-2015 – the period that flags the most modern arms transfers and agreements affecting the regional balance. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database attempts to provide information on “all transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. It seeks to “address a range of questions, including:

- Who are the suppliers and recipients of major conventional weapons?
- What weapons have been exported or imported by specific suppliers or recipients?
- How have the relationships between different suppliers and recipients changed over time?
- Where do countries in conflict get their weapons from?
- How do states implement their export control regulations?
- Where are potentially destabilizing build ups of weapons occurring?
- What is the relationship between access to natural resources and arms transfers?”

Using these data in these two Figures to assess the impact of given transfers on military modernization and capability requires considerable military and technical expertise to determine the comparative value of given transfers, and careful research to compare the data with other sources. SIPRI is correct noting, however, that while comparing estimated spending on arms transfers makes comparisons of levels of effort simple, it does not provide a clear picture of trends in deterrence and warfighting capability or the nature of the military balance.

It is also important to note that an analysis of the data shown in **Figure III.10** can be greatly expanded by using the full SIPRI computer data base on arms transfers, and searching by type of weapon or by expanding the data in **Figure III.10** to cover the entire period from 1980 – the end of the Iran-Iraq War – to 2015. While the resulting data are complex, they provide a good way to trace the broader patterns in Gulf military modernization. It also highlights the advantages the Arab Gulf states have had over Iran in detail, and the leading role that Saudi Arabia and the UAE play in Arab military Gulf military modernization.

**Figure III.1 CRS: The Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011**



Source: Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011*, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012, pp. 58, 59. "0" represents any value below \$50 million.

**Figure III.2: CRS: The Arms Delivery Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011**


Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Total
<b>2004-2007</b>							
Bahrain	200	0	0	100	0	0	300
Iran	0	500	200	0	0	200	900
Iraq	200	100	0	100	300	100	800
Kuwait	1,500	0	0	0	0	0	1,500
Oman	700	0	0	300	0	0	1,000
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	4,300	0	200	9,900	100	100	14,600
UAE	600	200	0	4,000	400	0	5,200
Yemen	0	400	0	0	100	100	600
<b>GCC Total</b>	<b>7,300</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>14,300</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>22,600</b>

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Total
<b>2008-2011</b>							
Bahrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	200	0	0	0	0	200
Iraq	2,600	300	0	300	100	100	3,400
Kuwait	1,300	100	100	0	0	0	1,500
Oman	200	0	0	500	0	0	700
Qatar	0	0	0	200	0	0	200
Saudi Arabia	5,900	0	700	3,300	300	0	10,200
UAE	2,000	300	100	600	300	0	3,300
Yemen	0	100	0	0	200	100	400
<b>GCC Total</b>	<b>9,400</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>4,600</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>15,900</b>

Notes: 0=data less than \$50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011*, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012. pp. 58, 59. "0" represents any value below \$50 million.

**Figure III.3: CRS: The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011**

Source: Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011*, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012. pp. 58, 59. "0" represents any value below \$50 million.

**Figure III.4: CRS: The New Arms Order Gap: Iran vs. GCC 2004-2011**

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Total
<b>2004-2007</b>							
Bahrain	400	0	0	100	0	0	500
Iran	0	1,600	300	0	100	100	2,100
Iraq	1,100	100	100	200	600	200	2,300
Kuwait	1,000	0	0	0	0	0	1,000
Oman	100	0	0	2,100	0	0	2,200
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	100	100
Saudi Arabia	5,000	0	800	16,900	800	100	23,600
UAE	1,400	300	100	1,100	200	0	3,100
Yemen	0	200	0	0	100	100	400


Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European	All Other European	All Others	Total
<b>2008-2011</b>							
Bahrain	400	0	0	0	0	0	400
Iran	0	100	0	0	100	100	300
Iraq	4,800	300	0	500	900	200	6,700
Kuwait	2,500	700	0	0	0	0	3,200
Oman	1,500	0	0	200	0	0	1,700
Qatar	200	0	0	800	0	0	1,000
Saudi Arabia	45,600	0	0	5,300	1,100	100	52,100
UAE	14,300	100	0	1,600	1,100	100	17,200
Yemen	0	100	0	0	300	100	500

Notes: 0=data less than \$50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011*, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012. pp. 58, 59. "0" represents any value below \$50 million.

**Figure III.5: Gulf Arms Transfer Agreements in Millions of U.S. Dollars (SIPRI): 1997-2014**



Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in U.S.\$ millions in constant 1990 U.S. dollars

Source: Graphs Generated using data from: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>

**Figure III.6: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Transfer Agreements: 2004-2008 in \$U.S. Millions**

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European*	All Other European	All Others	Total
2004-2008							
Algeria	0	2486	61	44	34	96	2721
Bahrain	94	0	0	60	31	0	185
Egypt	2183	305	179	37	164	252	3120
Iran	0	699	215	0	0	83	997
Iraq	519	190	0	10	269	227	1215
Israel	4565	0	0	81	0	0	4646
Jordan	235	0	8	89	170	81	583
Kuwait	289	0	0	14	89	NA	392
Lebanon	1	0	0	3	0	3	7
Libya	0	39	0	7	0	0	46
Morocco	20	150	289	0	23	NA	482
Oman	531	0	0	56	0	19	606
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	1029	0	33	857	72	66	2057
Syria	0	90	20	0	0	346	456
Tunisia	5	0	0	168	0	0	173
U.A.E	3782	0	0	3161	89	50	7082
Yemen	8	478	0	70	110	49	715

Source: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>

Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in U.S.\$ millions in constant 1990 U.S. dollars



**Figure III.7: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Transfer Agreements 2009-2014 in \$U.S. Millions**

Recipient Country	U.S.	Russia	China	Major West European*	All Other European	All Others	Total
<b>2009-2014</b>							
Algeria	22	4027	86	473	56	5	4669
Bahrain	143	0	0	28	29	14	214
Egypt	1237	911	73	83	286	49	2639
Iran	0	129	281	0	0	0	410
Iraq	1950	512	20	129	200	36	2847
Israel	399	0	0	789	0	14	1202
Jordan	183	224	0	1	429	35	872
Kuwait	691	101	0	49	1	0	842
Lebanon	83	0	0	2	9	80	174
Libya	0	61	0	39	1	12	113
Morocco	1001	0	0	1424	511	508	3444
Oman	543	0	0	615	283	3	1444
Qatar	710	0	0	182	11	4	907
Saudi Arabia	2732	0	33	2852	1551	279	7447
Syria	0	1314	0	0	0	245	1559
Tunisia	90	0	0	0	0	0	90
U.A.E	4039	670	0	942	692	221	6564
Yemen	16	90	0	0	11	255	372
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>13839</b>	<b>8039</b>	<b>493</b>	<b>7608</b>	<b>4070</b>	<b>1760</b>	<b>35809</b>

Source: <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>

Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in U.S.\$ millions in constant 1990 U.S. dollars

### Figure III.8: CRS Estimate of Major U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia: October 2010 to October 2014

October 2010 to October 2014, \$ billion

Formal Notification Date	System	Recipient Force	Estimated Cost
October 2010	F-15 Sales, Upgrades, Weaponry and Training	RSAF	\$29.400
October 2010	APACHE, BLACKHAWK, AH-6i, and MD-530F Helicopters	SANG	\$25.600
October 2010	APACHE Longbow Helicopters	RSLF	\$3.300
October 2010	APACHE Longbow Helicopters	Royal Guard	\$2.200
November 2010	JAVELIN Missiles and Launch Units	—	\$0.071
May 2011	Night Vision and Thermal Weapons Sights	RSLF	\$0.330
June 2011	CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons	RSAF	\$0.355
June 2011	Light Armored Vehicles	—	\$0.263
June 2011	Light Armored Vehicles	SANG	\$0.350
September 2011	Howitzers, Fire Finder Radar, Ammunition, HMMWVs	—	\$0.886
October 2011	Up-Armored HMMWVs	RSLF	\$0.033
December 2011	PATRIOT Systems Engineering Services	—	\$0.120
August 2012	RSF Follow-on Support	RSF	\$0.850
August 2012	Link-16 Systems and ISR Equipment and Training	RSF	\$0.257
November 2012	C-130J-30 Aircraft and KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft	RSF	\$6.700
November 2012	RSLF Parts, Equipment, and Support	RSLF	\$0.300
November 2012	PATRIOT (PAC-2) Missiles Recertification	RSADF	\$0.130
June 2013	SANG Modernization Program Extension	SANG	\$4.000
July 2013	Mark V Patrol Boats	RSNF	\$1.200
August 2013	RSF Follow-on Support	RSF	\$1.200
October 2013	U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) Program Support Services	MOD	\$0.090
October 2013	SLAM-ER, JSOW, Harpoon Block II, GBU-39/B Munitions	RSF	\$6.800
November 2013	C4I System Upgrades and Maintenance	RSNF	\$1.100
December 2013	TOW 2A and 2B Missiles	RSLF	\$0.170
December 2013	TOW 2A and 2B RF Missiles	SANG	\$0.900
April 2014	Facilities Security Forces- Training and Advisory Group (FSF-TAG) Support Services	MOI	\$0.080
August 2014	AWACS Modernization	RSF	\$2.000
October 2014	Patriot Air Defense System with PAC-3 enhancement	—	\$1.750
<b>Total</b>			<b>\$90.435</b>

**Source:** U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Measured In \$US Billions

**Notes:** Includes proposed sales to Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF), Royal Guard, Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF), Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Ministry of Defense (MOD). Dashes indicate unspecified recipient force in DSCA public notice

Source: Christopher M. Blanchard, "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, RL33533, January 23, 2015, p. 10.

## Figure III.9: ISS Estimate of Selected U.S. and Non U.S. Arms Sales in the Gulf

### Kuwait

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Mk V	PBF	10	U.S.\$461m	U.S.	USMI	2009	n/k	For navy. Final delivery due in 2013.
KC-130J	Tkr ac	3	U.S.\$245m	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2010	2013	Deliveries to be complete in early 2014.
<i>Patriot PAC-3</i>	SAM Upgrade	72	U.S.\$263m	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2013	2015	Upgrade of existing PAC-2 Launchers

### Bahrain

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Date	Notes
Arma 6x6	APC(W)	60-80	U.S.\$63.2m	TUK	Otokar	2011	2012	For national guard. Follow-on order to initial 2010 contract.

### Qatar

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
MRTP 34	PBF	3	n/k	TURK	Yonka-Onuk Shipyard	2012	n/k	-
MRTP 16	PBF	3	n/k	TURK	Yonka-Onuk Shipyard	2012	n/k	-
AW139	MRH Hel	3	n/k	ITA	Finmeccanica (Agusta Westland)	2011	n/k	-
<i>Leopard 2A7</i>	MBT	62	See notes	GER	KMW	2013	2015	Part of €1.89bn (U.S.\$2.47bn) contract incl 24

								PzH 2000
<i>PzH 2000</i>	Arty (155mm SP)	24	See notes	GER	KMW	2013	2015	Part of €1.89bn (U.S.\$2. 47bn) contract incl 62 <i>Leopard 2A7</i>
<i>B737 AEW</i>	AEW&C ac	3	R6.6bn (U.S.\$1.8b n	U.S.	Boeing	2014	n.k.	Part of U.S.\$23 bn package
<i>A330 MRTT</i>	Tkr/Tpt	2	See notes	Int'l	Airbus Group (Airbus Defense & Space)	2014	n.k.	Part of U.S.\$23 bn package
<i>AH-64E Apache Guardian</i>	Atk hel	24	R8.9bn (U.S.\$2.4b n	U.S.	Boeing	2014	n.k.	Part of U.S.\$23 bn package
<i>Patriot PAC-3</i>	SAM upgrade	n.k.	U.S.\$1.7bn	U.S.	Raytheon	2014	n.k.	Part of U.S.\$23 bn package

## Oman

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Date	Notes
Al-Shamikh class	FFG	3	U.S.\$785m	UK	BAE Systems	2007	2012	Project Khareef. Delivery delayed.
Fearless class	PCO	4	U.S.\$880m	SGP	ST Engineering	2012	2015	-
Rodman 101	PB	3	U.S.\$15.5m	ESP	Rodman Polyships	2012	2013	For costal police.
C-130J-30 <i>Hercules</i>	Tpt ac	2	n/k	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2010	2013	Delivery due in 2013 and 2014.
C-295	Tpt ac	8	n/k	Int'l	EADS	2012	2013	For air force. 5 in tpt and 3 in MP configuration.
NH90TTH	Tpt Hel	20	n/k	Int'l	NH Industries	2004	2010	10 delivered by mid-2012.
<i>Al-Ofouq- class</i>	PCO	4	U.S.\$880m	SGP	ST Engineering	2012	2015	First three vessels launched 2014; awaiting commissioning

F-16C/D	FGAac	12	n.k	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2011	2014	First delivered 2014	four Jul
NH90TTH	Med tpt hel	20	n.k	FRA/GER/ITA/NLD	NH Industries	2004	2010	Deliveries ongoing	
Eurofighter Typhoon	FGAac	12	See notes	GER/ITA/ESP/UK	Eurofighter GmbH (BAE Systems)	2013	2017	Part of UK£2.5bn (U.S.\$4bn) deal including eight <i>Hawk</i> Mk 128. Nine single-seat and three twin seat.	
C-295M	Lt tpt ac	8	n.k	Int'l	Airbus Group (Airbus Defense & Space)	2012	2013	For air force. Five in tpt and three in MP configuration. First delivered 2013.	

## Saudi Arabia

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
LAV II	APC (W)	724	U.S.\$2.2bn	CAN	General Dynamics (GDLS)	2009	2011	For national guard.
CAESAR	Arty (155mm SP)	132	n/k	FRA	Nexter	2006	2010	For national guard. 100 delivered 2010–11. Additional order for 32 signed in 2012 for delivery by end-2014.
Patriot PAC3	AD system upgrade	n/k	U.S.\$1.7bn	U.S.	Raytheon	2011	n/k	Including ground-systems, training, package and support equipment
Eurofighter Typhoon	FGA ac	72	U.S.\$8.9bn	Int'l	Eurofighter GmbH	2005	2008	Project Salam. First 24 delivered by Sept 2011. Original plan to final assemble remaining 48 in SAU dropped.
Saab <i>Erieye</i>	2000 AEW&C ac	1	U.S.\$670m	SWE	Saab	2010	n.k.	-

A330 MRTT	Tkr/Tpt ac	6	U.S.\$600m	FRA	EADS	2008	2011	Delivery in progress.
F-15E <i>Strike Eagle</i>	FGA ac	84	U.S.\$11.4bn	U.S.	Boeing	2012	2015	F-15SA variant. Part of a package incl F-15S upgrades, AH-64 and AH-6i helicopters that could total U.S.\$24bn.
F-15S <i>Eagle</i>	FGA ac upg	68	n/k	U.S.	Boeing	2012	n/k	Upgrade to F-15SA standard. Part of a package incl F-15S upgrades, AH-64 and AH-6i helicopters that could total U.S.\$24bn
UH-60M <i>Black Hawk</i>	Tpt Hel	24	n/k	U.S.	Sikorsky	2012	n/k	For national guard.
MD530F	MRH Hel	12	U.S.\$40.7m	U.S.	MD Helicopters	2012	2013	All to be delivered in 2013
A330 MRTT	Tkr/Tpt	6	U.S.\$600m	FRA	Airbus Group (Airbus Defense & Space)	2008	2011	Includes additional three ac ordered July 2009; fourth ac delivered Apr 2014
KC-130J <i>Hercules</i>	Tkr ac	2	U.S.\$180m	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2013	n.k	Initial two ac pending agreement of larger order
AH-64E <i>Apache Guardian</i>	Atk hel	48	U.S.\$450m	U.S.	Boeing	2013	2014	
AH-6I <i>Little Bird</i>	MRH hel	24	n.k	U.S.	Boeing	2014	n.k.	For National Guard

## UAE

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
<i>Patriot Advanced AD System</i>	AD System	10 fire units, 172 msl	U.S.\$3.3bn	U.S.	Raytheon	2008	2012	To replace HAWK.

<i>Capability</i> (PAC) 3									First bty delivered 2012.
<i>Agrab</i> ( <i>Scorpion</i> ) 120mm MMS	Arty (120mm SP Mor)	72	U.S.\$214m	RSA/SGP/UAE /UK	IGG	2011	n/k		
<i>Agrab</i> ( <i>Scorpion</i> ) MMS	120mm SP Mor	48	U.S.\$106m	RSA/SGP/UAE /UK	IGG	2007	n/k		Delivery status unclear
<i>Abu Dhabi</i> - class	FFGHM	1	n.k.	ITA	Fincantieri	2009	2012		Delivery scheduled for late 2012.
<i>Baynunah</i> - class	FSGHM	6	U.S.\$820m	FRA/UAE	ADSB	2003	2011		Fourth vessel launched Feb 2012. Delivery expected to be complete by 2014.
<i>Ganthoot</i> - class	FS	2	U.S.\$117m	ITA	Fincantieri	2009	2012		Both vessels launched 2012. Delivery scheduled for late 2012/earl y 2013.
<i>Ghannatha</i> II-class	PBFG	12	AED935m	SWE/UAE	Swedeship Marine/ADSB	2009	n/k		3 to be built in Sweden; remaining 9 in UAE. First UAE- built vessel launched in Jul 2012.
<i>Al Saber</i> - class	PB	12	U.S.\$34.6 m	UAE	ADSB	2009	2011		For coast guard.
MRTTP16	PB	34	AED460m	TUR/UAE	Tonca-Onuk Shipyard/ADS B	2009	2010		First 12 to be built in Turkey; remaining 22 in UAE. 20 delivered by Aug 2012.
Saab 340 <i>Erieye</i>	AEW&C ac	2	U.S.\$234m	SWE	Saab	2009	2011		First delivered Apr 2011.

A330 MRTT	Tkr/Tpt ac	3	n.k.	Int'l	EADS	2008	2012	First delivered 2012; other 2 due by end-2012. Order for 2 more possible.
C-17 Globemaster	Tpt ac	2	n.k.	U.S.	Boeing	2010	2012	-
C-130 Hercules	Tpt ac	12	AED5.9bn	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2009	n.k.	-
PC-21	Trg ac	25	U.S.\$492.4m	CHE	Pilatus	2009	2011	First aircraft flew in 2011. Deliveries underway
UH-60M Black Hawk	Tpt Hel	26	n.k.	U.S.	Sikorsky	2008	2010	16 delivered by end 2011; up to 23 to be upgraded with Battle Hawk kits.
UH-60M Black Hawk	Tpt Hel	14	U.S.\$171m	U.S.	Sikorsky	2009	n.k.	To be delivered by end of 2012.
Falcon Eye	ISR Satellite	2	€800m (U.S.\$1.1bn)	Int'l	Airbus Group/Thales	2013	2017	First satellite due to launch in 2017; second 2018
Agrab Mk2 (Scorpion) MMS	Arty (120mm SP Mor)	72	U.S.\$214m	RSA/SGP/UAE /UK	IGG	2011	2014	Deliveries ongoing
Baymunah-class	FSGHM	6	AED 3bn (U.S.\$820m)	FRA/UAE	ADSB	2003	2006	First of class built in FRA, others in UAE
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)	SAM	12	n.k	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2011	2015	Two Batteries



<i>Patriot PAC-3</i>	SAM	42	U.S.\$3.3bn	U.S.	Raytheon	2008	2012	To replace HAWK. First bty delivered 2012
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## Iran

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Date	Notes
<i>Mowj-class</i>	FSGM	5	n.k	Iran	IRIN	2004	2010	Second vessel in sea trials at Bandar Anzali 2014. Third launched at Bandar Abbas.

## Iraq

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Date	Notes
BTR-4	APC (W)	420	U.S.\$2.5bn	UKR	Khariv Morozov	2010	2011	Contract value includes 6 An-32 tpt ac.
Swiftships 35m	PB	15	U.S.\$181m	U.S.	Swiftships	2009	2012	For navy.
F-16C/D <i>Fighting Falcon</i> Block 52	FGA ac	18	U.S.\$3bn	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2011	n.k.	Initial order for 18 in 2011, with additional 18 ordered 2012. 24 C and 12 D models. Delivery to be completed in 2018
Beech 350ER <i>King Air</i>	Tpt ac	6	U.S.\$10.5m	U.S.	Hawker Beechcraft	2008	2010	-
C-130J <i>Super Hercules</i>	Tpt ac	4	U.S.\$292.8m	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2009	2012	Delivery to begin in 2012 and continue through 2013.
C-130J-30 <i>Super Hercules</i>	Tpt ac	6	U.S.\$433.1m	U.S.	Lockheed Martin	2009	2012	First delivered late 2012.
AN-32	Tpt ac	6	U.S.\$2.5bn	UKR	Antonov ASTC/Aviant	2010	2011	Delivery delayed
Lasta-95	Trg ac	20	U.S.\$230m	SER	UTVA	2007	2010	Option for further 16
EC635	Tpt Hel	24	U.S.\$490m	FRA	Eurocopter	2009	n.k.	Cost incl. training and maintenance. First delivery reported mid-2011

Bell 407	Tpt Hel	27	U.S.\$60.3	U.S.	Bell	2009	n.k.	For army, AR-407 configuration. FMS contract
MT-LB	APC (T)	500	EUR150m	BLG	Terem	2012	n/k	
<i>Al Basra</i> -class	PCC	2	U.S.\$86m	U.S.	River Hawk Fast Sea Frames	2010	2012	Delivery scheduled for late 2012.
FA-50	FGA ac	24	U.S.\$1.1bn	ROK	KAI	2013	2016	Deliveries to occur 2016-17
Mi-28NE <i>Havok</i>	Atk Hel	15	n.k	RUS	Rostvertol	2012	2014	First batch of three delivered Oct. 2014
Mi-35M <i>Hind</i>	Atk Hel	28	n.k	RUS	Rostvertol	2013	2013	Third batch of four delivered Sep 2014
<i>96K6</i> Pantsir- <i>SI</i>	AD	n.k	n.k	RUS	KBP Instrument Design Bureau	2012	2014	Total number on order unclear. Deliveries underway

Source: IISS Military Balance 2013 to 2015, and selected reporting by IHS Jane's

### Figure III.10: SIPRI Estimate of Arms Sales in the Gulf: 2000 to 4.2015

Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2000 to 2014

**Note:** The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL [http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at\\_data.html](http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

**Source:** SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

**Information generated:** 21 April 2015

#### Bahrain

Supplier (S)/ Licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
S: France	20	Black Scorpion	APC/APV	2009	2011-2014	20	Probably assembled in Bahrain; Bahraini designation probably Faisal
	17	MM-40 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	2009	2010	17	Designation uncertain (reported as missiles)
Russia	100	9M133 Kornet/AT-14	Anti-tank missile	2014			Kornet-EM version
United Kingdom	1	BAe-146	Transport aircraft	2001	2001	1	\$25 m deal; Avro RJ-85 version
	3	T-67 Firefly	Trainer aircraft	2002	2003	3	T-67M260 version
	6	Hawk-100	Trainer/combat aircraft	2003	2006	6	Hawk-129 version; possibly option on 6 more
United States	10	F-16C	FGA aircraft	1998	2000	10	\$303 m 'Peace Crown-2' deal; F-16 Block-40 version; option on more not used
	10	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	1999	2001	-10	
	26	AIM-120B AMRAAM	BVRAAM	1999	2002	26	\$110 m deal
	38	M-901 ITV	Tank destroyer	1999	2000	38	Second-hand; aid
	270	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2000	2001-2002	270	BGM-71E TOW-2A and/or BGM-71F TOW-2B version (possibly incl or only practice TOW-2A missiles)
	19	M-113	APC	-2000	2001	19	Second-hand; aid; M-113A2 version
	30	MGM-140A ATACMS	SSM	2000	2002	30	\$20 m deal
	12	Bell-209/AH-1F Cobra	Combat helicopter	2001	2005-2007	-12	Second-hand

11	RIM-66B Standard-1MR	SAM	2002	2002-2003	-11	Second-hand; aid
105	M-113	APC	2003	2005	-105	Second-hand; aid; M-113A2 version
20	M-109A5 155mm	Self-propelled gun	-2004	2005	20	Possibly Second-hand
1	TPS-59	Air search radar	2004	2007	1	\$44 m deal; AN/TPS-59(V)3 version
1	King Air	Light transport ac	2005	2006	1	King Air-350; incl for MP
180	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	-2006	2007-2008	-180	\$42 m deal (incl 60 launchers)
8	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2007	2010	8	UH-60M version; incl for CSAR
100	M-113	APC	2009	2010	100	Second-hand; M-113A2 version
25	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	-2010	2013-2014	-25	AIM-120C-7 version
30	MGM-140B ATACMS	SSM	2011	2013	-30	\$70 m deal; ATACMS Block-1A version

## Egypt

Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
L: China	80	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	1999	2001-2005	80	\$345 m deal; K-8E version; 70 assembled from kits in Egypt
	18	ASN209	UAV	2010	2012-2014	18	
Finland	16	155-GH-52 155mm	Towed gun	1999	2000-2004	16	\$17-21 m deal; incl assembly in Egypt; Egyptian designation 155 EH-52 or E52
France	4	Gowind Combat	Frigate	2014			EUR1 b deal incl option on 2 more; incl 3 produced in Egypt
Germany (FRG)	. .	Fahd	APC	1978	1986-2014	1270	Developed for assembly/product ion in Egypt; incl Fahd-240/30; IFV version
	60	Terrier LAU	APV	2000	2002-2013	60	Produced in Egypt as Kader-120
United States	24	M-109/SP-122	Self-propelled gun	1999	2000	24	\$27 m deal; designed for Egypt with Egyptian gun
	100	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	1999	2002-2003	100	\$564 m deal
	100	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2001	2004-2005	100	\$590 m deal
	125	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2003	2005-2008	125	
	21	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	2004	2007	21	

	125	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2008	2009-2013	125	
	125	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2011			
	6	Swiftships-35	Patrol craft	2014			
S: Austria	4	Camcopter S-100	UAV	2001	2002	4	Financed by U.S. 'FMF' aid
	108	M-60A1 Patton-2	Tank	2001	2002	108	Second-hand; \$27 m deal
China	40	K-8 Karakorum-8	Trainer/combat ac	2004	2007-2010	40	K-8E version; assembled from kits in Egypt
							Second-hand; Osa-2 version; Finnish designation
Finland	4	Project-205/Osa	FAC	2006	2006	4	Tuima; possibly for spare parts only
							Designation uncertain; possibly Second-hand
France	16	Super-530F	BVRAAM	1998	1998-2000	16	For 3 Ambassador-4 corvettes from USA; possibly from U.S. production line
	3	MRR-3D	Air search radar	2006	2013	2	For 1 Ambassador-4 corvette from USA
	1	MRR-3D	Air search radar	2010			For police
	20	Sherpa	APV	2011	2012	20	
	96	Sherpa	APV	2012	2013	96	
	1	FREMM	Frigate	2014			Selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
		MICA	BVRAAM	2014			For Gowind frigates
	30	MM-40-3 Exocet	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2014			For Gowind frigates
	24	Rafale	FGA aircraft	2014			Selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
Germany (FRG)	74	G-115	Trainer aircraft	2000	2000-2002	74	G-115EG version
	5	Combattante-2	FAC	2002	2002-2003	5	Second-hand Type-148 or Tiger; EUR18 m deal
	1	Lueneburg	Support ship	2002	2003	1	Second-hand
	1	Westerwald	Support ship	2002	2003	1	Second-hand
	12	MTU-595	Diesel engine	2006	2013-2014	4	For 3 Ambassador-4 corvettes from USA
	4	MTU-595	Diesel engine	2010			For 1 Ambassador-4 corvette from USA
	2	Type-209/1500	Submarine	2012			Delivery probably from 2016
	2	Type-209/1500	Submarine	2014			

Italy	3	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	2006	2013	2	For 3 Ambassador-4 corvettes from USA; bought via USA
	2	AW139	Helicopter	2011	2012	2	\$38 m deal; for SAR; from U.S. production line
	1	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	2011			For 1 Ambassador-4 corvette from USA; bought via USA
	4	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	2014			For 4 Gowind frigates from France
Netherlands	237	AIFV	IFV	2004	2006-2008	237	Second-hand; YPR-765-PRI version
	105	AIFV-APC	APC	2004	2006-2007	105	Second-hand; YPR-765 version; incl 48 YPR-765-PRMR mortar tractor version
	90	AIFV-TOW	Tank destroyer	2004	2007	90	Second-hand; YPR-765-PRV version
	48	MO-120-RT 120mm	Mortar	2004	2006	48	Second-hand; for use with YPR-765 PRMR (AIFV) mortar tractors
	555	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2006	2007	-555	Second-hand; for use with YPR-765/AIFV armored vehicles
	3	Scout	Sea search radar	2006	2013	2	For 3 Ambassador-4 corvettes from USA
	3	STING	Fire control radar	2006	2013	2	For 3 Ambassador-4 corvettes from USA
	1	Scout	Sea search radar	2010			For 1 Ambassador-4 corvette from USA
	1	STING	Fire control radar	2010			For 1 Ambassador-4 corvette from USA
Russia	10	S-125 Pechora-2M	SAM system	1999	2002-2006	10	Egyptian SA-3 SAMS rebuilt to Pechora M2 version; no. could be 20
	100	9M338/SA-15	SAM	2005	2005	100	
	100	9M338/SA-15	SAM	2005	2011	100	
	4	Tor-M1/SA-15	Mobile SAM system	2005	2005	4	
	4	Tor-M1/SA-15	Mobile SAM system	2005	2011	4	Possibly Tor-M2 version
	1	9K37 Buk-1M/SA-11	SAM system	2006	2007	1	

	100	9M317/SA-17 Grizzly	SAM	2006	2007	100	For Buk-1M (SA-11) SAM system
	20	S-125 Pechora-2M	SAM system	2006	2010-2011	20	Egyptian S-125 (SA-3) SAM systems rebuilt to Pechora M2 version
	600	Igla-S/SA-24	Portable SAM	2007	2009-2010	600	For modernization of ZSU-23 SPAAG to ZSU-23-4M4
	10	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2008	2010-2011	10	\$150-200 m deal; armed Mi-17V-5 version
	14	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2009	2012-2013	14	\$100 m deal; armed Mi-17V-5 version
	1	Buk-M2/SA-17	SAM system	2012	2014	1	Possibly Egyptian Buk-M1-2 (SA-11) SAM system rebuilt to Buk-M2
		9M83M/SA-23B	SAM	2014			
		S-300VM/SA-23	SAM system	2014			\$500m deal; status uncertain
Spain	3	C-295	Transport aircraft	2010	2011	3	Possibly incl 1 for government VIP transport
	3	C-295	Transport aircraft	2012	2013	3	
	6	C-295	Transport aircraft	2013	2013-2014	6	
	12	PW100	Turboprop/turboshaft	2013	2013-2014	12	For 6 C-295 transport aircraft from Spain
	8	C-295	Transport aircraft	2014			Delivery 2015
Ukraine	3	An-74/Coaler-B	Transport aircraft	2004	2005-2010	3	\$34 m deal; An-74TK-200A version; incl for VIP transport
United States	5000	AIM-9J/P Sidewinder	SRAAM	1984	1986-2000	5000	AIM-9P3 and AIM-9P4 version; assembled from kits in Egypt
	2372	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	1996	1998-2001	2372	\$59 m deal; BGM-71E TOW-2A version
	21	F-16C	FGA aircraft	1996	1999-2000	21	'Peace Vector-5' deal; aid
	8	I-HAWK	SAM system	1996	1998-2001	8	Second-hand; \$206 m deal; modernized before delivery
	180	MIM-23B HAWK	SAM	1996	1998-2001	180	Second-hand
	-32	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1997	2000-2001	32	\$51 m deal; AGM-84 version for F-16 combat aircraft
	50	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	1998	2000-2002	50	\$198 m deal; assembled from kits in Egypt
	-42	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1998	2000-2002	42	

5	APS-145	AEW radar	1999	2005-2008	5	Part of \$138 m deal (not incl \$36 m for installation); for modernization of 5 E-2C AEW&C aircraft to Hawkeye-2000
24	F-16C	FGA aircraft	1999	2001-2002	24	\$1.2 b 'Peace Vector-6' (incl \$100 m for engines); F-16 Block- 40 version incl 12 F-16D
40	M-48 Chaparral	Mobile SAM system	1999	2000	40	Second-hand
1072	MIM-72C Chaparral	SAM	1999	2000	1072	Second-hand; MIM-72E version; aid
80	TFE-731	Turbofan	1999	2001-2005	80	For 80 K-8E trainer aircraft from China
5	TPS-59	Air search radar	1999	2002-2003	5	\$59 m deal; Egyptian AN/TPS-59M/34 rebuilt to AN/TPS-59(V)3
15	AAQ-13 LANTIRN	Combat ac radar	2000	2001	15	Part \$71 m deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
15	AAQ-14 LANTIRN	Aircraft EO system	2000	2001	15	Part of \$71 m deal; AAQ-19 Sharpshooter version; for F-16 combat aircraft
35	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2000	2003-2006	35	Egyptian AH-64A rebuilt to AH-64D
25	Avenger	Mobile AD system	2000	2001	25	\$25 m deal
600	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	2000	2001	600	For Avenger SAM systems; FIM-92C version
60	M-48 Chaparral	Mobile SAM system	2000	2000	60	Second-hand; \$7 m deal
34	M-60A3 Patton-2	Tank	2000	2001-2002	34	Second-hand; aid
6	TPQ-36 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	2000	2002-2003	6	\$27 m deal (part of \$50 m deal); AN/TPQ-36(V)9 version
1	E-2C Hawkeye	AEW&C aircraft	2001	2003	1	Second-hand; \$25 m aid; modernized to Hawkeye-2000 before delivery
30	M-113	APC	2001	2001-2002	30	Part of \$354 m deal; M-577A2 CP version; 'FMF' aid
254	M-113	APC	2001	2003-2006	254	Second-hand; aid; M-113A2 version; incl 15 M-577A2 CP version and 7 M-981 artillery CP version



26	M-270 MLRS 227mm	Self-propelled MRL	2001	2003-2005	26	Part of \$354 m deal; 'FMF' aid
13	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	2001	2003-2004	13	\$73 m deal; assembled from kits in Egypt
3	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	2001	2002	3	Part of \$354 m deal (financed with U.S. 'FMF' aid); assembled from kits in Egypt
4	Mk-15 Phalanx	CIWS	2001	2004-2006	4	Second-hand; \$32 m deal; modernized to Phalanx Block-1B before delivery
22	RIM-66B Standard-1MR	SAM	2001	2001	22	Second-hand; aid
6	SPS-48	Air search radar	2001	2005-2006	6	\$143 m deal; AN/SPS-48E version
414	AIM-9L/M Sidewinder	SRAAM	2003	2005-2006	414	\$38 m deal; AIM-9M-2 version
260	AVDS-1790	Diesel engine	2003	2004-2009	260	For modernization of T-54 tanks to Ramses-2 version
100	HMMWV Up-Armored	APV	2003	2004	100	Part of \$109 m deal; M-1114 version
201	M-109A1 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2003	2004-2006	201	Second-hand; \$44 m deal; M-109A2 and M-109A3 versions
25	RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2003			RGM-84L-4 version; land-attack capability removed before delivery after Israeli pressure; for Ambassador-3 FAC
3	C-130H Hercules	Transport aircraft	2004	2004	3	Second-hand and/or Italian aircraft sold back to U.S. producer and sold to Egypt; \$31 m deal
12	M-270 MLRS 227mm	Self-propelled MRL	2004	2005	12	
50	Paveway	Guided bomb	2004	2005	50	Paveway-2 version
40	TFE-731	Turbofan	2004	2007-2010	40	
200	M-109A5 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2005	2005-2008	200	Second-hand but modernized before delivery; \$181 m deal
2	Osprey	Minehunter	-2005	2007	2	Second-hand; lease

139	RIM-116A RAM	SAM	2005	2013-2014	74	Part of \$25 m deal; for Ambassador-4 corvettes; RIM-116B Block-1A version
3	Ambassador-4	Corvette	2006	2013	2	\$1 b deal
25	Avenger	Mobile AD system	2006	2008	25	\$50 m deal
600	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	2006	2007-2008	600	For Avenger SAM systems; FIM-92C version
2028	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2008	2008	2028	TOW-2A version
1	E-2C Hawkeye	AEW&C aircraft	2008	2010	1	Second-hand; \$38 m deal; modernized to Hawkeye-2000 before delivery
2	Swiftships-93	Patrol craft	2008	2010	2	
6928	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2009	2009-2012	6928	\$319 m deal; TOW-2A version
164	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	2009	2012	164	
10	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2010	2014	10	
1	Ambassador-4	Corvette	2010			\$165 m deal
1	DB-110	Aircraft recce system	2010	2013	1	\$11 m deal; for use on F-16C Block-52 combat aircraft
20	F-16C Block-50/52	FGA aircraft	2010	2013	8	Part of \$3.2 b 'Peace Vector-7' deal; F-16C Block-52 version; incl 4 F-16D
2	LFATS	ASW sonar	2010	2013	2	\$25 m deal; for modernization of frigates
12	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2011	2013	4	For F-16C Block-50 combat aircraft
2	Beech-1900 SIGINT	SIGINT aircraft	2011	2012	2	\$24 m deal; second-hand transport aircraft rebuilt to SIGINT aircraft
4	Swiftships-93	Patrol craft	2011	2014	4	\$20 m deal; assembled in Egypt from kits
13	M-88	ARV	2013	2014	13	Second-hand; aid; M-88A1 version
200	MIM-72C Chaparral	SAM	2014	2014	200	Second-hand; aid; MIM-72E version

**Iran**

**Supplier  
(S)/  
Licensor**

**No.  
ordered**

**Weapon**

**Designation**

**Year  
Ordered**

**Year(s)  
Delivered**

**No.  
Delivered**

**Description**

L: China	C-802/CSS-N-8	Anti-ship missile	1992	1994-2012	380	Incl for Hudong (Thondor), new-produced and modernized Combattante-2, (Kaman) FAC and coast defense systems; possibly incl air-launched version; Iranian designation Tondar or Noor; status since 2010 uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)
	1100 QW-1 Vanguard	Portable SAM	1993	1996-2006	1100	Iranian designation Misagh-1
	150 Type-86	APC	1996	1997-2011	150	Iranian designation Boraq; incl IFV, anti-tank, mortar-carrier
						and command versions
	.. FL-6	Anti-ship missile	-1998	1999-2014	255	Developed or copied by China from Italian Sea Killer
						(Marte-2) anti-ship missile supplied by Iran to China; Iranian
						designation Fajr-e Darya; incl for SH-3D helicopters; status
						since 2010 uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)
..	TL-10/FL-8	Anti-ship missile	2002	2004-2014	160	TL-10A and possibly TL-10B version; status since 2010
						uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)
50	C-704	Anti-ship missile	2003	2010-2011	50	Developed for Iran; Iranian designation Nasr-1
..	C-801/CSS-N-4	Anti-ship missile	2004	2006-2014	45	Iranian designation Kosar and/or Sagheb; incl submarine-launched version status since 2010 uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)
..	QW-11	Portable SAM	-2005	2006-2014	625	Iranian designation Misagh-2; status since 2010 uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)
Russia	9M111 Fagot/AT-4	Anti-tank missile	-1991	1993-2014	4950	For BMP-2 and Boraq IFV

	413	BMP-2	IFV	1991	1993-2001	413	1500 ordered but probably only 413 delivered; 82 delivered
							direct, rest assembled in Iran; Iranian designation possibly BMT-2
	422	T-72M1	Tank	-1991	1993-2001	422	T-72S1 version; 1000 ordered but probably only 422 delivered; 122 delivered direct, rest assembled in Iran
	..	9M14M/AT-3	Anti-tank missile	1995	1996-2014	4450	Iranian designation RAAD; incl I-RAAD version
	100	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	1997	1998-2002	100	Iranian designation Shafie D-301 and/or HM-40
		9M113 Konkurs/AT-5	Anti-tank missile	1998	1999-2014	2800	Iranian designation probably Towsan-1
S: China	3	JY-14	Air search radar	1996	1999-2001	3	
	40	C-701/FL-8	Anti-ship missile	1998	2001-2004	40	For China Cat FAC; C-701T and possibly C-701R version; possibly assembled/produced in Iran as Noor, Kosar or Fajr-e Darya
	6	Crotale	SAM system	1998	1999-2004	6	HQ-7 (FM-80) version; possibly incl production in Iran as Shahab Thaqeb
	250	R-440 Crotale	SAM	1998	1999-2004	250	HQ-7 (FM-80) version; possibly produced in Iran as Shahab Thaqeb
	9	China Cat	FAC	2000	2001-2004	9	Incl 4 modified version (without anti-ship missiles)
Russia	200	V-46	Diesel engine	1993	1993-2000	200	For modernization of T-54, T-55 and Type-59 tanks to T-72Z; V-46-6 version; supplier uncertain
	5	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1998	2000	5	For SAR
	500	9M114 Shturm/AT-6	Anti-tank missile	1999	2000-2003	500	For Mi-171Sh helicopters; possibly incl AT-9 version
	130	BMP-2 turret	IFV turret	-1999	2000-2012	130	For Boraq IFV produced in Iran (based on WZ-501 APC from China); possibly assembled or produced in Iran; status from 2010 uncertain (due to UN arms embargo)

	22	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	1999	2000-2001	22	Incl some for SAR; Mi-171Sh version
	20	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2001	2002-2003	20	\$150 m deal; Mi-171Sh version
	40	R-60/AA-8	SRAAM	2003	2006	40	For Su-25 combat aircraft; designation uncertain
	6	Su-25/Frogfoot-A	Ground attack ac	2003	2006	6	Su-25T version; incl 3 Su-25UBK; for Revolutionary Guard
	750	9M338/SA-15	SAM	2005	2006-2007	750	For Tor-M1 (SA-15) SAM systems
	29	Tor-M1/SA-15	Mobile SAM system	2005	2006-2007	29	\$700m deal (part of \$1 b deal); incl for protection of Iranian nuclear plant
	2	1L119 Nebo	Air search radar	2007	2010	2	
	2	Kasta-2E2	Air search radar	2010	2013	2	
	2	1L222 Avtobaza	Air search system	-2011	2011	-2	
Ukraine	12	An-74/Coaler-B	Transport aircraft	1997	1998-2002	12	\$133 m deal; incl 8 An-74T-200 and 4 An-74TK-200 version
	6	Kh-55/AS-15 Kent ALCM		-2000	2001	6	Second-hand; illegal deal (with documents giving Russia as recipient)

## Iraq

Supplier	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
S: China	5	Predator	Patrol craft	2002	2004	5	Funded by U.S. aid
Czech Republic	50	BMP-1	IFV	2014			Second-hand; delivery from 2015
	11	L-159A ALCA	FGA aircraft	2014			\$200 m deal; originally produced for Czech Republic but declared surplus and not used; selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
	2	L-159A ALCA	FGA aircraft	2014			Second-hand; part of \$200 m deal; selected but not yet

							ordered by end-2014
	2	L-159B	Trainer/combat ac	2014			Second-hand; part of \$200 m deal; selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
	50	T-72	Tank	2014			Second-hand; delivery from 2015
France	6	SA-342 Gazelle	Light helicopter	2009	2010	6	Second-hand; armed version EUR360 m deal; armed
Germany (FRG)	24	EC135	Light helicopter	2009	2011-2012	24	EC-635 version; ordered via France
	5	Dingo-2	APC	2014	2014	5	Second-hand; for Kurdish Regional Government to use against ISIL.
	500	MILAN	Anti-tank missile	2014	2014	500	Second-hand; for Kurdish Regional Government to use against ISIL.
Hungary	77	T-72M1	Tank	2004	2005	77	Second-hand; aid (\$3.4-5 m overhaul financed by USA)
	66	BTR-80	APC	2005	2007	66	Second-hand (but modernized to BTR-80UP in Ukraine before delivery); part of \$30 m deal; ordered via Polish company
	4	VT-55A	ARV	-2005	2005	4	Second-hand; aid
Italy	2	Assad	Corvette	1981			Handed over unfinished to Iraq 1986 but delivery embargoed 1990 (after Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) until order renegotiated 2014 (incl modification of ships) (4 more ordered but confiscated by Italy after 1990 and sold to Malaysia)
	4	Diciotti	Patrol craft	2006	2009	4	EUR80 m deal

Poland	600	Dzik	APV	2005	2005-2007	600	\$80 m or \$180 m deal; Dzik-3 version
Russia	10	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2005	2006	10	\$65 m deal; ordered via Polish company; Mi-17V-5 version; incl 1 for VIP transport
	18	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2006	2007-2008	18	Mi-17 version; ordered via USA and Polish company
	22	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2007	2010-2011	22	BUMAR \$80 m deal; Mi-171 version; ordered via UAE and USA; modified in \$245 m deal to armed version in UAE with U.S. equipment
	-48	96K9 Pantsyr-S1	Mobile AD system	-2012	2014	8	\$2.3 b deal (part of \$4.2-5 b deal)
	-500	Igla-S/SA-24	Portable SAM	-2012	2014	100	For portable and Dzhigit vehicle-mounted launchers
	15	Mi-28N/Havoc	Combat helicopter	-2012	2014	3	Part of \$4.2-5 b deal; Mi-28NE version
	2000	9M114 Shturm/AT-6	Anti-tank missile	2013	2013-2014	750	For Mi-35M and probably Mi-28 combat helicopters
	1200	9M311/SA-19	SAM	2013	2014	200	For Pantsyr AD systems
	28	Mi-35M/Hind-E	Combat helicopter	2013	2013-2014	12	
	300	9M133 Kornet/AT-14	Anti-tank missile	-2014	2014	300	
	2	Mi-8MT/Mi-17/Hip-H	Helicopter	2014	2014	2	
	5	Su-25/Frogfoot-A	Ground attack ac	2014	2014	5	Second-hand; for use against ISIL.
	10	TOS-1	Self-propelled MRL	2014	2014	10	Probably second-hand
Ukraine	13	BRDM-2	Reconnaissance AV	-2005	2006	13	Second-hand; aid
	66	BREM-1	ARV	2005	2006-2010	66	Second-hand; \$37 m deal; ordered via USA; incl some BTS-5B version
	32	BTR-80	APC	2005	2006-2007	32	Second-hand; part of \$30 m deal; ordered via Polish company;

							BTR-80UP version; delivery 2006-2007
	110	BMP-1	IFV	-2006	2007	110	Second-hand
	22	BREM-1	ARV	2006	2010	-22	Second-hand; \$11.6 m deal; ordered via USA
	2	AI-20	Turboprop	2009	2012	2	AI-20D-5 version; spares for An-32 transport aircraft
	6	An-32/Cline	Transport aircraft	2009	2011-2012	6	\$99 m deal; An-32B version; option on 4 more not used
	270	BTR-4	IFV	2009	2011-2013	89	Part of \$427-458 m deal; status uncertain after delivery of 60 (incl APC version; rest possibly cancelled)
	150	BTR-4K	APC	2009	2011-2013	33	Part of \$427-458 m deal; incl BTR-4K and BTR-4KSh command post, BMM-4S ambulance and BREM-4 ARV version; status uncertain after delivery of 60 (incl IFV version; rest possibly cancelled)
	2700	R-2	Anti-tank missile	2009	2011-2013	900	For BTR-4E IFV
United Kingdom	72	Shorland	APV	2004	2005	72	Second-hand but modernized before delivery; aid
	60	AT-105 Saxon	APC	2006	2007	60	Second-hand
United States	44	6V-53	Diesel engine	2004	2006	44	For 44 Talha APC from Pakistan
	43	ASV-150/M-1117	APC	2004	2004-2005	43	\$50 m deal; incl 2 CP version
	19	ASV-150/M-1117	APC	2004	2005	19	
	3	C-130E Hercules	Transport aircraft	-2004	2005	3	Second-hand; aid
	7	Comp Air-7SL	Light aircraft	2004	2004	7	Financed by UAE; assembled from kits in UAE



16	Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2	Helicopter	2005	2007	16	Iraqi UH-1H rebuilt to Huey-2 Including 3 AC-208B armed version Second-hand; aid; M-1114 version \$180 m deal; Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAV) or Badger version \$7.8m deal; Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAV) version Second-hand; aid
11	Cessna-208 Caravan	Light transport ac	2005	2007-2009	11	
8500	HMMWV Up-Armored	APV	2005	2006-2009	8500	
378	Cougar	APC	2006	2006-2007	-378	
20	Cougar	APC	2006	2007	-20	
50	M-113	APC	-2006	2006-2007	50	
1	TPS-77	Air search radar	-2006	2009	1	Incl 10 Second-hand OH-58C and 10 second-hand Bell-206B version; aid Option on 6 more Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAV) version Part of \$132 m deal Part of \$160 m deal; King Air-350ER version For AC-208B (Cessna-208) aircraft For Bell-407 helicopters
20	Bell-206/OH-58	Light helicopter	2007	2008-2009	20	
12	Cessna-172/T-41	Trainer/light ac	2007	2007-2009	12	
27	Cougar	APC	2007	2008	27	
5	ISR King Air-350	AGS aircraft	2007	2008	-5	
1	King Air	Light transport ac	2007	2007	1	
20	AGM-114A HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2008	2009	20	M-1151 and M-1152 version
200	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2008	2012-2013	200	
122	ASV-150/M-1117	APC	2008	2008-2009	122	
64	HMMWV Up-Armored	APV	-2008	2010	64	
5	ISR King Air-350	AGS aircraft	2008	2010-2011	5	
565	K-6 120mm	Mortar	2008	2009-2012	565	
1	King Air	Light transport ac	2008	2010	1	M-120 version King Air-350ER version Probably Second-hand; incl 12 M-577A2 Command Post version Second-hand M-1A1 rebuilt to M-1A1AIM version; option on 140 more
20	M-113	APC	-2008	2010	20	
140	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	-2008	2010-2012	140	

8	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	-2008	2010	8	\$60 m deal; armed version;
24	Bell-407	Light helicopter	2009	2012-2013	24	option on 26 more
3	Bell-407	Light helicopter	2009	2010	3	\$6.9 m deal; T- 407 trainer version
6	C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2009	2012-2013	6	\$293 m deal
109	Cougar	APC	2009	2010	109	\$59 m deal; Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAV) version Part of \$257 m deal; T-6A version
15	PC-9	Trainer aircraft	2009	2009-2010	15	
9	Swiftships- 35	Patrol craft	2009	2010-2012	9	\$181 m deal
2	AMP-137	OPV	2010	2012	2	\$70 m deal
80	ASV- 150/M-1117	APC	2010	2011-2013	80	\$85 m deal; incl 8 command post version
3	Bell-407	Light helicopter	-2010	2011	3	
44	M-109A5 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2010	2011	44	Second-hand
834	M-113	APC	2010	2011-2013	834	Second-hand; M-113A2 version; modernized before delivery; incl command post, mortar-carrier, ambulance and other versions
120	M-198 155mm	Towed gun	2010	2011-2013	120	Second-hand; aid Second-hand but modernized before delivery; aid; M-88A1 version
21	M-88	ARV	2010	2011	21	ILAV version
9	Cougar	APC	2011	2012	9	Part of \$3 b deal; F-16C Block-52 or F- 16IQ version; incl 6 F-16D; delivery 2014- 2015
18	F-16C Block-50/52	FGA aircraft	2011	2014	3	\$42 m deal; option on 3 more
3	Swiftships- 35	Patrol craft	2011	2013	3	\$26 m deal; designation uncertain
1	TPS-77	Air search radar	2011	2013	1	\$32 m deal; delivery by 2015
20	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2012			AN/APG- 68(V)9
4	APG-68	Combat ac radar	2012			

8	Avenger	Mobile AD system	-2012	2013-2014	8	version; spares for F-16 combat aircraft Part of \$105 m deal; 'ISFF' aid \$71 m deal; for use on F-16 combat aircraft; delivery probably by 2018
4	DB-110	Aircraft recce system	2012			For Avenger SAM systems
200	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	2012	2013-2014	200	
8	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	2012	2014	8	\$32 m deal
175	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	-2013	2013-2014	175	
18	F-16C Block-50/52	FGA aircraft	2013			\$830 m deal; F-16C Block-52 or F-16IQ version; delivery by 2017
24	F404	Turbofan	2013			For 24 T-50 trainer/combat aircraft from South Korea
24	F404	Turbofan	2013			For 24 T-50 trainer/combat aircraft from South Korea
13	MPQ-64	Air search radar	-2013	2013-2014	13	
10	ScanEagle	UAV	2013	2014	10	
5000	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2014			AGM-114K, AGM-114N and AGM-114R versions
1500	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2014	2014	1500	Aid against ISIL
16	Bell-407	Light helicopter	2014			Delivery 2015
17	Caiman	APC	2014	2014	10	Second-hand; aid for Iraqi Government and Kurdish Regional Government against ISIL.
250	Caiman	APC	2014	2014	125	Second-hand; aid; delivery 2014-2015
50	HMMWV Up-Armored	APV	2014			Second-hand; aid; delivery 2015
1	King Air	Light transport ac	2014			\$7.9 m deal; King Air-350ER version; delivery 2015
6	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2014			Second-hand; aid; delivery 2015
8	M-88A2 HERCULES	ARV	2014			Second-hand; aid; delivery 2015

**Jordan**

<b>Supplier (S)/ Licensor (L)</b>	<b>No. ordered</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>Year Ordered</b>	<b>Year (s) Delivered</b>	<b>No. Delivered</b>	<b>Description</b>
Austria	2	Camcopter S-100	UAV	2010	2011	2	
China	150	W-86 120MM	Mortar	2004	2005	150	
France	1	Mirage F-1E	FGA aircraft	2005	2006	1	Probably Second-hand
Germany (FRG)	6	EC135	Light helicopter	2003	2003-2004	6	EC-635T-1 version; for border patrol
	4	EC135	Light helicopter	-2006	2006-2007	-4	EC-635T-1 version; for border patrol and VIP transport
Italy	20	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2012	2012	20	Second-hand
	24	Centauro	AFSV	2014			Second-hand
Netherlands	6	F-16C	FGA aircraft	2007	2009	6	Second-hand; 'Peace Falcon- 4' deal; F- 16BM (F-16D) version
	220	AIFV	IFV	2010	2011-2013	220	Second-hand
	221	AIFV-APC	APC	2010	2011-2013	221	Second-hand; incl YPR-806 ARV version
	121	M-109A1 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2010	2011-2012	121	Second-hand; M-109A2 version
	69	M-113	APC	2010	2012-2013	69	Second-hand; M-577 command post version
	52	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	-2013			Second-hand; delivery probably 2015/2016
	15	F-16C	FGA aircraft	-2013			Second-hand; F-16AM version; incl 2 F-16BM version; delivery 2015- 2016
	15	Flycatcher Mk-2	Fire control radar	2013	2014	15	Second-hand; part of EUR21 m deal
	60	Gepard	SPAAG	2013	2014	15	Second-hand; part of EUR21 m deal; delivery 2014- 2016
	5	PiPz-1	AEV	2013	2014	2	Second-hand; part of EUR21 m deal
Poland	1	M-28 Skytruck	Light transport ac	2013	2014	1	Option on 3 more
Russia	100	Igla/SA-18	Portable SAM	2000	2001	100	
	1800	Igla-S/SA-24	Portable SAM	2007	2009-2012	1800	For use with 182 Dzhigit launchers on light vehicles

Spain	2000	9M133 Kornet/AT-14	Anti-tank missile	2008	2009-2010	2000	Deal incl also 200 launchers
	2	C-295	Transport aircraft	2003	2003-2004	2	\$45 m deal
	1	Mirage F-1E	FGA aircraft	2005	2006	1	Second-hand; Mirage F-1DDA version; Jordanian designation Mirage F-1DJ
	2	CN-235	Transport aircraft	-2009	2014	2	Second-hand; modified to ground attack aircraft in USA before delivery
Ukraine	50	BTR-94	IFV	1999	1999-2000	-50	\$6.5 m deal
	3	An-32/Cline	Transport aircraft	-2006	2008	3	
United Kingdom	-288	Challenger	Tank	1999	1999-2003	-288	Second-hand; Jordanian designation Al Hussein
	19	Chieftain/ARV	ARV	-1999	2004	19	Second-hand; part of 'Al Hussein' deal for Challenger tanks
	16	T-67 Firefly	Trainer aircraft	2001	2002	16	T-67M260 version
	104	Challenger	Tank	2002	2003-2004	104	Second-hand; aid (partly as reward for Jordanian support in 2003 war against Iraq); Jordanian designation Al Hussein
United States	20	Phaser	Diesel engine	2002	2003-2004	20	For modernization of some 20 Spartan APC
	12	AT-105 Saxon	APC	2009	2010	12	Second-hand
	9	Bell-209/AH-1F Cobra	Combat helicopter	1998	2000-2001	9	Second-hand; aid
	50	M-106	Self-propelled mortar	1999	2000	50	Second-hand; aid
	23	M-901 ITV	Tank destroyer	1999	2000-2001	23	Second-hand; aid
	132	6V-53	Diesel engine	-2000	2004-2005	132	For modernization of 132 M-113A1 APC to M-113A2 Mk-1J
	270	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2000	2001-2002	270	BGM-71E TOW-2A and/or BGM-71F TOW-2B version (possibly incl or only practice TOW-2A missiles)
	2	SA-2-37/RG-8 Condor	Reconnaissance ac	-2000	2001	2	

562	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2001	2002-2003	562	BGM-71E TOW-2A version
116	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2001	2004	116	\$12 m deal (incl 30 launchers)
400	BGM-71F TOW-2B	Anti-tank missile	2002	2003-2004	400	Part of \$52 m deal (for 1689 TOW-2A/TOW-2B for 5 countries)
1	TPS-77	Air search radar	2002	2004	1	\$22 m deal
20	F100	Turbofan	2003	2003	20	Second-hand; spares for F-16 combat aircraft
17	F-16(ADF)	FGA aircraft	2003	2003-2007	17	Second-hand; 'Peace Falcon-2' or 'Jordan-2' deal; incl 1 F-16B; aid (partly as reward for Jordanian support in 2003 war against Iraq)
17	APG-66	Combat ac radar	2004	2007-2009	17	Part of \$87 m deal; for modernization of 17 Jordanian F-16ADF combat aircraft to F-16AM in Turkey
47	M-113	APC	2004	2004	47	Second-hand; aid; incl 5 M-577A2 command post version
8	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2004	2007	8	\$220 m deal; UH-60L version
1000	6V-53	Diesel engine	-2005	2005-2014	876	For modernization of about 1000 M-113 APC to M-113A2 Mk-1J
50	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2005	2007-2008	50	\$39 m deal
6	MD-500E	Light helicopter	-2007	2008	6	Armed MD-530F version
85	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2009	2013-2014	85	Possibly \$131 m deal; AIM-120C-7 version
5	Cessna-208 Caravan	Light transport ac	2009	2009-2011	5	Incl 4 Caravan ISR surveillance version
3	C-130E Hercules	Transport aircraft	-2010	2011-2012	3	Second-hand; aid
432	GMLRS	Guided rocket	2010	2012-2014	432	For HIMARS MRL
12	M-142 HIMARS	Self-propelled MRL	2010	2012	12	\$27 m deal
35	Cougar	APC	2012	2013	35	Second-hand; aid

22	M-88	ARV	2012	2013	22	Second hand; aid; M-88A1 version
5	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2013			\$16.5 m deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
92	Cougar	APC	2013	2014	-92	Second-hand; aid
100	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2013	2014	100	Javelin Block-1 version
50	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	-2014	2014	50	AGM-114K and/or AGM-114M version; for CN-235 ground attack aircraft
100	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2014			Probably for AT-802U combat aircraft
10	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2014	2014	10	Javelin Block-1 version
						GBU-58 Paveway-2 version; for AT-802U combat aircraft; selected but probably not yet ordered by end-2014
100	Paveway	Guided bomb	2014			
8	R-44	Light helicopter	2014	2014	4	For training
100	WGU-59 APKWS	ASM	2014			

**Kuwait**

<b>Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)</b>	<b>No. ordered</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>Year Ordered</b>	<b>Year (s) Delivered</b>	<b>No. Delivered</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>S: Austria</b>	20	M-14	Diesel engine	2008	2009	20	For 20 VBL APV from France
	40	Pandur	IFV	2010	2013-2014	40	
	40	Pandur	APC	2010	2013-2014	40	
China	27	PCZ-45	ALV	1998	2000-2001	27	Part of \$187 m deal
	27	PLZ-45 155mm	Self-propelled gun	1998	2000-2001	27	Part of \$187 m deal
							Part of \$187 m deal; ZCY-45 and ZCL-45
	4	Type-85	APC	1998	2000-2001	4	command post use with PLZ-45 self-propelled guns
	1	W-653/Type-653	ARV	1998	2000	1	Part of \$187 m deal
	24	PCZ-45	ALV	2001	2002-2003	24	Part of \$200 m deal
	24	PLZ-45 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2001	2002-2003	24	Part of \$200 m deal
	4	Type-85	APC	2001	2002-2003	4	Part of \$200 m deal; ZCY-45 and ZCL-45

							command post
	1	W-653/Type-653	ARV	2001	2003	1	versions for use with PLZ-45 self- propelled guns Part of \$200 m deal \$475 m 'Garoh' deal; Kuwaiti designation Um Almaradim; also designated Combattante -1; replacing ships lost during 1990- 1991 Gulf War
France	8	P-37BRL	FAC	1995	1999-2000	8	For police
	2	AS365/AS565 Panther	Helicopter	2002	2005	2	VBL Mk-2 version
	20	VBL	APV	2008	2009	20	For 8 P- 37BRL (Combattant e-1 or Um Almaradim) FAC from France For 27 PLZ- 45 self propelled guns and 27 PCV-45 ALV from China, from Chinese production line
Germany (FRG)	16	MTU-538	Diesel engine	1995	1999-2000	16	For 24 PLZ- 45 self propelled guns and 24 PCV-45 ALV from China; from Chinese production line
	54	BF-12L413	Diesel engine	1998	2000-2001	54	For National Guard; Condor-2 version Part of \$65 m deal; Aspide-2000 SAM version; for Skyguard AD systems BMP-3M version
	48	BF-12L413	Diesel engine	2001	2002-2003	48	
	8	Condor	APC	2003	2004	8	
Italy	250	Aspide	BVRAAM/SAM	2007	2008-2013	250	
Russia	70	BMP-3	IFV	2009	2010-2011	70	



Switzerland	5	Skyguard	AD system	2001	2001	5	Amount version; ordered via and partly produced in Egypt
			Skyguard	AD system	2014		
United Kingdom	8	Seaspray	MP aircraft radar	1995	1999-2000	8	For 8 P-37BRL (Combattant e-1 or Um Almaradim) FAC from France \$89 m deal; Sea Skua SL version; for 8 PB-37BRL FAC
	80	Sea Skua	Anti-ship missile	1997	2000	80	For Desert Chameleon IFV from USA
	10	RMTS	IFV turret	2007	2010-2011	10	Part of \$868 m deal (part of larger \$2.1 b deal);
United States	188	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2002	2007	188	AGM-114K3 version; for AH-64D helicopters
	96	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2002	2007	96	Part of \$868 m deal (part of larger \$2.1 b deal);
	21	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	2002	2003	21	AGM-114L3 version; for AH-64D helicopters
	16	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2003	2007	16	AGM-84 version
	8	APG-78 Longbow	Combat heli radar	2003	2007	5	Part of \$868 m deal (incl \$213 m for airframes and \$46 m for Longbow radars; part of \$2.1 b deal); sold on condition to be used for defensive operations only
	1	TPS-63	Air search radar	2003	2005	1	Part of \$46 m deal; for 8 AH-64D combat helicopters
	20	Desert Chameleon	IFV	2007	2010-2011	20	\$84-113 m deal; LASS version (on aerostat)
	1418	BGM-71F TOW-2B	Anti-tank missile	2008	2010-2012	1418	For police

2127	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2008	2009-2011	2127	TOW-2A version Possibly \$178 m deal; AIM-120C-7 version
120	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2009	2010-2014	120	
51	JDAM	Guided bomb	2009	2011	51	
3	KC-130J Hercules	Tanker/transport ac	2009	2014	3	\$245 m deal (part of \$1.1 b deal incl support)
10	Pegasus	Patrol craft	2009	2011-2013	10	
40	LAV-25 turret	IFV turret	2010	2013-2014	40	For Pandur IFV from Austria
1	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	2011	2014	1	
209	MIM-104C PAC-2	SAM	2011	2014	100	MIM-104E GEM-T version
1	Patriot	SAM system	2012			
300	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2013			
80	AIM-9X Sidewinder	SRAAM	2013	2014	20	\$40 m deal; AIM-9X Block-2 version; delivery by 2015
1	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	2013	2014	1	
-160	MIM-104F PAC-3	ABM	2013			
1	AIM-9X Sidewinder	SRAAM	2014			AIM-9X Block-2 version
2	Patriot PAC-3	SAM/ABM system	2014			\$655 m deal

**Oman**

<b>Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)</b>	<b>No. ordered</b>	<b>Weapon</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>Year Ordered</b>	<b>Year (s) Delivered</b>	<b>No. Delivered</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>L:</b> United Kingdom	88	Piranha	APC	2000	2001-2003	88	Incl production of some components in Oman; incl ARV, CP, 81mm mortar carrier, ambulance, and artillery observation version
<b>S:</b> China	6	Type-90 122mm	Self-propelled MRL	-2001	2002	6	
	50	WZ-551	APC	2003	2003	50	WZ-551B version; incl CP and ambulance version
Denmark	4	Terma-9000	MP aircraft radar	-2012			For 4 C-295MPA MP aircraft from Spain
France	230	Mistral	Portable SAM	2000	2001-2003	230	For use with ALBI launcher on VBL armored vehicles; Mistral-2 version
	81	VBL	APV	2000	2001-2004	81	Incl some with ALBI Mistral SAM launcher
	20	NH-90 TTH	Helicopter	2004	2010-2014	20	EUR600-800 m deal; incl for SAR

	3	AS-350/AS-550 Fennec	Light helicopter	-2005	2006	3	
	50	MM-40-3 Exocet	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2006	2013-2014	50	For Al Shamikh (Khareef) frigates
	6	2R2M 120MM	Mortar	2007	2009	6	For 6 VAB APC
	2	A-321	Transport aircraft	2007	2009	2	A-320 version; incl for VIP transport
	60	MICA	BVRAAM	-2007	2013-2014	60	For VL-MICA-M SAM system on 3 Al Shamikh (Khareef) frigates
	50	MICA	BVRAAM	2009	2012	50	For MICA SAM system
	1	VL-MICA	SAM system	2009	2012	1	
Germany (FRG)	6	MTU-8000	Diesel engine	2007	2013-2014	6	For 3 Al Shamikh (Khareef) frigates from UK
Italy	2	SHORAR-2D	Air search radar	2000	2001	2	Part of MCP surveillance systems for use with Mistral SAM; sold via France
	3	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	-2007	2013-2014	3	For 3 Al Shamikh frigates from UK
	6	Centauro	AFSV	2008	2010	6	Version with 120mm gun
	3	Centauro	AFSV	2009	2011	3	Version with 120mm gun
Netherlands	3	SMART	Air search radar	2007	2013-2014	3	SMART-S Mk-2 version for 3 Al Shamikh (Khareef) frigates from UK
	3	STING	Fire control radar	2007	2013-2014	3	For 3 Al Shamikh (Khareef) frigates from UK
	4	STIR	Fire control radar	2012			STIR-1.2 Mk-2 version for 4 Fearless-75 OPV from Singapore
	4	Variant	Air/sea search radar	2012			For 4 Fearless-75 OPV from Singapore
Spain	4	C-295	Transport aircraft	2012	2013-2014	-4	
	4	C-295MPA	MP aircraft	2012			Delivery from 2015
	2	S763-LANZA	Air search radar	2014			
Switzerland	12	PC-9	Trainer aircraft	1999	2000-2001	12	PC-9(M) version
United Kingdom	20	Challenger-2	Tank	1997	2000	20	\$172 m deal; Challenger-2 (Oman) Phase-2 version
	2	Martello	Air search radar	1999	2000-2001	2	Martello S-743D version
	16	Super Lynx-300	Helicopter	2002	2004-2005	16	Super Lynx-300/Lynx Mk-120 version
	3	Al Shamikh	Frigate	2007	2013-2014	3	\$700 m 'Khareef' programme
	8	Hawk-100	Trainer/combatac	2012			Part of GBP2.5 b (\$4 b) deal; Hawk-166 (Hawk AJT) version; delivery 2017
	12	Typhoon Tranche-3	FGA aircraft	2012			Part of GBP2.5 b (\$4 b) deal; delivery 2017
United States	88	6V-53	Diesel engine	2000	2001-2003	88	For 88 Piranha APC from UK; 6V-53T version

60	Cummins-6V	Diesel engine	2000	2001-2003	60	6BTA-5.9 version; for modernization of 60 Scorpion tanks and Spartan APC; ordered via UK
32	T-800	Turboshaft	2000	2004-2005	32	For 16 Super Lynx-300 helicopters from UK
562	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2001	2002-2003	562	BGM-71E TOW-2A version
14	AAQ-13 LANTIRN	Combat ac radar	2002	2005-2008	14	Part of \$1.1 b deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
14	AAQ-14 LANTIRN	Aircraft EO system	2002	2005-2008	14	Part of \$1.1 b deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
80	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	-2002	2006	80	Part of \$1.1 b deal; AGM-65D and AGM-65E version; for F-16C combat aircraft
50	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2002	2006	50	Part of \$1.1 b deal; for F-16C combat aircraft
100	AIM-9L/M Sidewinder	SRAAM	2002	2006	100	Part of \$1.1 b deal; AIM-9M-8/9 version; for F-16C combat aircraft
12	F-16C Block-50/52	FGA aircraft	2002	2005-2008	12	\$224 m deal (part of \$1.1 b deal); F-16C Block-50 version
7	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2003	2006	7	For F-16 combat aircraft; Pantera version
84	JDAM	Guided bomb	2003	2006	84	
20	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	2003	2006	20	\$22 m deal (part of \$1.1 b deal); AGM-84D version; for F-16C combat aircraft
50	CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	2004	2006-2007	50	Incl CBU-105 version
100	Paveway	Guided bomb	2004	2005	100	
100	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	-2005	2009	100	
100	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	-2008	2010	100	\$11 m deal
1	C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2009	2012	1	
2	C-130J Hercules	Transport aircraft	2010	2013-2014	2	
12	F-16C Block-50/52	FGA aircraft	2011	2014	12	\$600m deal; F-16C Block-50 version; incl 2 F-16D version
12	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2012	2014	12	\$23 m deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
3	APG-68	Combat ac radar	2012	2014	3	AN/APG-68(V)9 version; spares for F-16 combat aircraft
4	DB-110	Aircraft recce system	2012	2014	4	\$34 m deal; for F-16 combat aircraft
290	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2013			AIM-120C-7 version for NASAMS SAM system from Norway
27	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2013	2014	27	AIM-120C-7 version
50	AIM-9X Sidewinder	SRAAM	2013	2014	50	\$29m deal; AIM-9X Block-2 version

18	Avenger	Mobile AD system	2013			Part of \$2.1 b deal
100	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2013	2014	100	Javelin Block-1 version
266	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	2013			For Avenger SAM systems
1	MPQ-64	Air search radar	2013			Part of \$2.1 b deal; for NASAMS SAM system from Norway
	BGM-71F TOW-2B	Anti-tank missile	2014			TOW-2-RF version

**Qatar**

Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
L: Netherlands	6	Stan Patrol-5009	Patrol craft	2014			
S: France	50	Apache	ASM	1994	1999-2003	50	For Mirage-2000-5 combat aircraft; Black Pearl version
	500	Eryx	Anti-tank missile	1999	1999-2000	500	Recipient uncertain (could be other GCC country)
	2	Master	Air search radar	2005	2007	2	Master-M and Master-T versions
	35	Mistral	Portable SAM	2009	2010-2013	35	
	70	MM-40-3 Exocet	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2010	2012-2013	70	For Barzan (Vita) FAC
	22	HIGUARD	APC	2011	2012-2013	22	For internal security force
	10	Sherpa	APV	2011	2012-2013	10	For internal security force
		MILAN	Anti-tank missile	2012			MILAN-ER version
Germany (FRG)	62	Leopard-2A6	Tank	2013			Part of EUR1.9 b deal; Leopard-2A7 version; delivery 2015-2018
	24	PzH-2000 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2013			Part of EUR1.9 b deal; delivery 2015-2018
Italy	16	AW139	Helicopter	2008	2009-2012	16	EUR260 m deal (incl 2 more for government VIP transport)
		Kronos	Air search radar	2014			QAR1.7 b (\$467 m) deal
Spain	2	A-330 MRTT	Tanker/transport ac	2014			QAR2.5 b (\$687 m) deal; selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
Switzerland	24	PC-21	Trainer aircraft	2012	2014	6	CHF600 m (\$607 m) deal; delivery 2014-2016
United States	4	C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2008	2011	4	\$394 m deal
	2	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	2008	2009	2	\$400 m deal
	2	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	-2010	2012	2	
		AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2014			

24	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2014	QAR8.9 b (\$2.4 b) deal
3	Boeing-737 AEW&C	AEW&C aircraft	2014	QAT6.6 b (\$1.8 b) deal
-500	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2014	\$150 m deal
-248	MIM-104C PAC-2	SAM	2014	MIM-104E GEM-T version
-778	MIM-104F PAC-3	ABM	2014	
10	Patriot PAC-3	SAM/ABM system	2014	QAT27.5 b (\$7.6 b) deal; delivery by 2019

## Saudi Arabia

Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
L: United Kingdom	50	MSTAR	Ground surv radar	1997	1998-2000	50	Assembled from kits in Saudi Arabia
S: Austria	37	M12 120mm	Mortar	2008	2010	37	
China	20	DF-21A/CSS-5	IRBM	2007			Status uncertain
	54	PLZ-45 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2007	2008-2009	54	
Finland	36	NEMO 120mm	Mortar turret	2011	2012-2013	36	EUR100 m deal; for 36 Piranha (LAV-2) mortar carriers from Canada; delivery 2012-2013
France	3	F-3000S	Frigate	1994	2002-2004	3	Part of \$3.4 b 'Sawari-2' deal (offsets 35%); also designated Modified La Fayette; Saudi designation Al Riyadh
	50	MM-40 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	1994	2000-2005	50	For F-3000S (Al Riyadh) frigates; MM-40 Block-2 version
	12	AS-532U2 Cougar	Helicopter	1996	1998-2001	12	\$508 m 'Al Fahd'; armed AS-532A2 CSAR version
	75	ASTER-15 SAAM	SAM	1997	2002-2004	75	For F-3000S (Al Riyadh) frigates
	40	F17 550mm	AS/ASW torpedo	1997	2002-2004	40	For F-3000S (Al Riyadh) frigates
	30	VLRA TPK-BL	APC	2005	2006-2007	30	Possibly for police
	6	AS565M Panther	Helicopter	2006	2010-2011	6	
	80	CAESAR 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2006	2010-2011	80	For National Guard
	1000	Mistral	Portable SAM	2006	2007-2010	1000	EUR500 m deal; for National Guard
	25	2R2M 120MM	Mortar	2007	2009-2010	25	For M-113 mortar carrier; for National Guard

	30	Damocles	Aircraft EO system	2007	2009-2014	30	For Tornado and Typhoon combat aircraft; possibly incl assembly or production of components in Saudi Arabia
	20	CAESAR 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2009	2011	20	For National Guard
	73	Aravis	APC	2011	2013-2014	73	For National Guard
	1000	BONUS-2	Guided shell	2011	2012-2013	1000	
	32	CAESAR 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2011	2013-2014	32	EUR169 m deal; assembled from kits in Saudi Arabia
	20	Ground Master-60	Air search radar	2011	2013-2014	6	Part of IMGP command/control systems for use with MPCV SAM system
	800	Mistral	Portable SAM	2011	2013-2014	460	Mistral-2 version for MPCV SAM systems
	49	MPCV	Mobile AD system	2011	2013-2014	29	For National Guard
	191	Aravis	APC	2012	2014	120	For National Guard
	100	MILAN	Anti-tank missile	2013	2014	100	For use on M-ATV armored vehicles
	130	Mistral	Portable SAM	2013			For Simbad RC system on 2 Boraida support ships
Germany (FRG)	100	Deutz V-10	Diesel engine	1995	1998-2005	100	For 100 AF-40-8-1 APC produced in Saudi Arabia
	80	OM-366	Diesel engine	2006	2010-2011	80	For 80 CAESAR self-propelled guns from France
	54	BF-12L413	Diesel engine	-2007	2008-2009	54	For 54 PLZ-45 self propelled guns from China; from Chinese production line
	1400	IRIS-T	SRAAM	2009	2010-2014	1400	For Tornado and Typhoon combat aircraft
	20	OM-366	Diesel engine	2009	2011	20	For 20 CAESAR self-propelled guns from France
	10	Luna	UAV	2010	2011-2012	10	
	32	OM-366	Diesel engine	2011	2013-2014	32	For 32 CAESAR self-propelled guns from France
	73	OM-924	Diesel engine	2011	2013-2014	73	For 73 Aravis APC from France
	191	OM-924	Diesel engine	2012	2014	150	For 191 Aravis APC from France
	33	FPB-41	Patrol craft	2014			Designation uncertain (reported as 'patrol boats')
Italy	3	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	1994	2002-2004	3	For 3 F-3000S (Al Riyadh) frigates from France
	16	Bell-412	Helicopter	2001	2002	16	\$150 m deal; AB-412 version
	5	Falco	UAV	2011	2012	5	Lease

Netherlands	225	SQUIRE	Ground surv radar	2009	2011-2014	175	Sold via French company (part of 'Miksa' deal); for border security
Spain	3	A-330 MRTT	Tanker/transport ac	2008	2011-2012	-3	
	3	A-330 MRTT	Tanker/transport ac	2009	2014	1	Delivery 2014-2016
Sweden	-200	RBS-56B Bill-2	Anti-tank missile	2005	2010-2011	-200	Possibly second-hand
	2	Saab-2000 AEW	AEW&C aircraft	2010	2014	2	SEK4.5 b (\$670 m) deal; second-hand Saab-2000 transport aircraft modified to AEW aircraft
Switzerland	-18	Skyguard	Fire control radar	-2006	2009-2011	18	For use with 35mm AA guns
	55	PC-21	Trainer aircraft	2012	2014	20	Part of GBP1.6 b deal; ordered via UK company; delivery 2014-2016
United Kingdom	73	AMS 120mm	Mortar turret	1996	2000	73	\$57 m deal (incl ammunition from Belgium); for 73 Piranha/LAV AFSVs delivered from Canada
	100	Paveway	Guided bomb	1999	2000	100	Second-hand; Paveway-3 version
	261	Tactica	APC	-2006	2008-2009	261	For National Guard; incl from Belgian production line
	72	Typhoon	FGA aircraft	2007	2009-2014	45	GBP4.4 b deal (part of up to GBP20 b 'Project Salam'); Typhoon F-2 (Typhoon Tranche-2) version
	3	Air refuel system	Air refuel system	2008	2011-2012	3	For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain
	1000	Brimstone	ASM	-2008	2011-2014	1000	For Tornado combat aircraft
	3	Air refuel system	Air refuel system	2009	2014	1	For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain
	350	Storm Shadow/SCALP	ASM	2009	2011-2013	350	For modernized Tornado combat aircraft
	22	Hawk-100	Trainer/combat ac	2012			Part of GBP1.6 b deal; Hawk AJT version; delivery from 2016
	2400	Paveway	Guided bomb	2013			GBP150 m (\$250 m) deal; Paveway-4 version; for Typhoon and modernized Tornado combat aircraft; delivery 2015
	..	Storm Shadow/SCALP	ASM	2013			For Tornado and/or Typhoon combat aircraft
	..	Meteor	BVRAAM	2014			For Typhoon combat aircraft



United States	1748	6V-53	Diesel engine	-1990	1991-2004	1748	6V-53T version for 1748 Piranha (LAV) APC from Canada and Switzerland
	523	M-113A3	APC	1997	2003-2006	523	\$413 m deal; Saudi M-113 rebuilt to M-113A3
	2	RE-3	SIGINT aircraft	1998	2004	2	Saudi KE-3A tanker aircraft rebuilt to RE-3 ELINT/SIGINT aircraft
	500	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2000	2003-2006	-500	\$475 m deal; for F-15 combat aircraft
	1827	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2000	2001-2002	-1827	Part of \$416 m deal; BGM-71E TOW-2A version; for National Guard
	27	M-60A3 Patton-2	Tank	-2000	2001	27	Second-hand
	105	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	2001	2002-2003	-105	\$21 m deal; 98 AGM-65D and 7 AGM-65G version
	16	Bell-412	Helicopter	2001	2002-2003	16	Bell-412SA or Bell-412RSAF version; from Canadian production line
	562	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2001	2002-2003	562	BGM-71E TOW-2A version
	48	M-109A5 155mm	Self-propelled gun	2001	2002-2004	48	Probably Second-hand
	1	RE-3	SIGINT aircraft	-2004	2007	1	Second-hand E-8B AGS aircraft rebuilt to RE-3
	75	AIM-9L/M Sidewinder	SRAAM	2005	2006	75	Part of \$17 m deal; AIM-9M version
	75	AIM-9L/M Sidewinder	SRAAM	2005	2007	75	Part of \$17 m deal
	4	Cessna-550 Citation-2	Light transport ac	2005	2005-2006	4	
	132	6V-53	Diesel engine	2006	2006-2009	132	6V-53T version for 132 Piranha (LAV) APC from Canada
	10	6V-53	Diesel engine	2006	2007	10	6V-53T version for 10 ACV-S APC from Turkey
	14	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2006	2008	14	AIM-120C-5 version
	100	LAV-25 turret	IFV turret	2006	2006-2009	100	For Piranha (LAV-25) IFV from Canada
	65	F110	Turbofan	2007	2008-2009	65	\$300 m deal; F-110-GE-129C version; for modernization of F-15S combat aircraft
	16	S-92/H-92 Superhawk	Helicopter	2007	2008-2010	16	For police; incl for civilian police use
	350	6V-53	Diesel engine	2008	2008-2010	350	6V-53T version for 300 M-113A300 APC from Turkey
	12	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2008	2011	12	Incl 11 Saudi AH-64A rebuilt to AH-64D version
	6	CF-6/F-103	Turbofan	2008	2011-2012	6	For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain

91	F110	Turbofan	2008	2009-2010	91	Part of \$750 m deal; F-110-GE-129C version; for modernization of F-15S combat aircraft
900	JDAM	Guided bomb	2008	2010-2011	900	
59	M-1A1 Abrams	Tank	2008	2012-2014	59	Second-hand but modernized to M-1A2S before delivery
22	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2008	2010-2011	-22	\$286 m deal
724	6V-53	Diesel engine	2009	2011-2014	620	6V-53T version for 724 Piranha (LAV) APC from Canada
14	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2009	2010	14	\$40 m deal; for F-15S combat aircraft
12	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	-2009	2014	12	
150	AIM-9X Sidewinder	SRAAM	2009	2010	150	
6	CF-6/F-103	Turbofan	2009	2014	2	For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain
72	ETS	Anti-tank AV turret	2009	2011-2013	72	ETS Mk-2 version; for 72 Piranha (LAV-AT) tank destroyers from Canada
2	ISR King Air-350	AGS aircraft	2009	2011	2	
264	LAV-25 turret	IFV turret	2009	2011-2014	220	For 264 Piranha (LAV-25) IFV from Canada
18	M-198 155mm	Towed gun	2009	2010	18	Second-hand
100	Paveway	Guided bomb	2009	2010-2011	100	GBU-10 and GBU-12 Paveway-2 versions
9	Schweizer-330	Light helicopter	2009	2009	9	S-434 version
312	6V-53	Diesel engine	2010	2010-2013	312	6V-53T version for 312 M-113A300 APC from Turkey
21	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2010	2011-2012	21	\$40-42 m deal
2742	BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2010	2011-2013	2742	\$177 m deal; BGM-71E TOW-2A version; for National Guard
13	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2010	2012-2013	13	Saudi UH-60A rebuilt to UH-60L
3	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2010	2011	3	S-70i version; from Polish production line; for police
200	6V-53	Diesel engine	2011	2013-2014	200	6V-53T version for 200 M-113A300 APC from Turkey
155	6V-53	Diesel engine	2011			6V-53T version for 155 Piranha (LAV) APC from Canada
193	AAQ-13 LANTIRN	Combat ac radar	2011			For F-15SA combat aircraft
2592	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2011	2013-2014	-2592	AGM-114R version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; for National Guard

600	AGM-88 HARM	ARM	2011			AGM-88B version
24	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2011	2014	14	AH-64E version; delivery 2014-2015
300	AIM-9X Sidewinder	SRAAM	-2011	2012-2014	150	AIM-9X Block-2 version
84	F-15SG	FGA aircraft	2011			Part of \$29 b deal; F-15SA version; delivery 2015-2019
70	F-15SG	FGA aircraft	2011			Part of \$29 b deal; Saudi F-15S rebuilt to F-15SA
1000	JDAM	Guided bomb	2011			GBU-31B version
21	Patriot PAC-3	SAM/ABM system	2011	2014	4	\$1.7 b deal; Saudi Patriot SAM systems rebuilt to Patriot-3 version
3100	Paveway	Guided bomb	-2011	2013-2014	1500	Incl 1100 GBU-24 Paveway-3 and 2000 Dual Mode Paveway
2	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2011	2012	2	\$27 m deal
12	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2011	2013-2014	12	Saudi UH-60A rebuilt to UH-60L
158	AAQ-33 Sniper	Aircraft EO system	2012			For F-15SA combat aircraft
12	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2012			AH-64E version; for National Guard; delivery from 2015
10	DB-110	Aircraft recce system	2012	2014	4	\$183 m deal; for F-15SA combat aircraft
25	F110	Turbofan	2012			Spares for F-15SA combat aircraft
4	ISR King Air-350	AGS aircraft	2012			
9	King Air	Light transport ac	2012	2013-2014	9	King Air-350 version
1	King Air	Light transport ac	2012	2013	1	Second-hand but probably modernized before delivery; King Air-350 version
12	MD-500E	Light helicopter	2012	2013	12	\$41 m deal; MD-530F version; for National Guard
400	RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2012			AGM-84L version
24	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2012	2014	12	For National Guard; UH-60M version
650	AGM-84H SLAM-ER	ASM	2013			For F-15SA combat aircraft; selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
500	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2013			AIM-120C-7 version
1300	CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	2013			CBU-105D/B version; delivery by 2015
2	KC-130J Hercules	Tanker/transport ac	2013			\$181 m deal; delivery by 2016
300	M-ATV	APV	2013	2014	300	
25	SR-22	Light aircraft	2013	2013	25	Ordered via UK company (as part of GBP1.6 b deal); for training

		AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2014			
973		AGM-154 JSOW	ASM	2014			JSOW-C Block-3 version
24		AH-6S	Combat helicopter	2014	2014	-12	\$235 m deal; AH-6i version; for National Guard; delivery by 2016
4941		BGM-71F TOW-2B	Anti-tank missile	2014			Incl 4194 for National Guard
10747		BGM-71 TOW	Anti-tank missile	2014			BGM-71 TOW-2A and TOW-2A-RF versions; incl 9740 for National Guard; delivery 2015-2017 For modernized
202		MIM-104F PAC-3	ABM	2014			Patriot SAM systems; selected but probably not yet ordered by end-2014

**UAE**

Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)	No. ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
L: Austria	60	Camcopter S-100	UAV	2006	2006-2010	60	Incl production of components in UAE; UAE designation Al Saber
France	4	Baynunah	Corvette	2003	2011-2014	4	\$500-545 m 'Project Baynunah' (incl \$205 m for French shipyard); 3 assembled in UAE
	2	Baynunah	Corvette	2005			AED1 b (\$272 m) deal; part of 'Project Baynunah'
Netherlands	2	FOPV-850	Corvette	2014			AED1 b (\$272 m) deal; for coast guard; with hulls from Romanian production line fitted out in Abu Dhabi
Sweden	4	L-22	Landing craft	2004	2006-2007	4	
	12	Ghannatha	FAC	2009	2013-2014	12	Part of AED930 m (\$252 m) deal; incl 9 produced in UAE; UAE designation Al Bazam
Ukraine	24	BTR-3U Guardian	IFV	2002	2003	24	Assembled from kits in UAE (incl fitting of FRG engine and U.S. transmission)
S: Denmark	6	SCANTER-2001	Sea search radar	2004	2011-2014	4	For 6 Baynunah corvettes from France
Finland	5	AMV	APC	2008	2008-2010	-5	From Polish production line
	6	NEMO 120mm	Mortar turret	2009	2013-2014	-6	For modification of 6 Ghannatha transport craft to fire support craft
France	390	Leclerc	Tank	1993	1994-2006	-390	Part of \$3.4 b deal (offsets 60%); incl 2 Driver Training Tank version
	28	Leclerc DNG	ARV	1993	1997-2004	28	Part of \$3.4 b deal (offsets 60%)

18	Leclerc EPG	AEV	1993	2008-2010	18	Part of \$3.4 b deal (offsets 60%); originally ordered as ARV but order changed to AEV
7	AS565S Panther	ASW helicopter	1995	1999-2004	7	\$230 m deal; AS-565SB version; for Abu Dhabi
60	AS-15TT	Anti-ship missile	1997	1999-2000	60	For AS-565SB helicopters; for Abu Dhabi
30	AS-15TT	Anti-ship missile	1997	2001-2002	30	For AS-565SB helicopters; for Dubai
4	AS565S Panther	ASW helicopter	1997	2001-2002	4	AS-565SB version; for Dubai
500	MICA	BVRAAM	1998	2003-2007	500	For Mirage-2000-9 combat aircraft
62	Mirage-2000-5 Mk-2	FGA aircraft	1998	2003-2007	62	\$3.4 b 'Bader-21' deal; ordered after USA refused sale of F-16 combat aircraft with long-range ASM capability; Mirage-2000-9 version; incl 32 UAE Mirage-2000 rebuilt to Mirage-2000-9
500	R-550 Magic-2	SRAAM	1998	2003-2007	500	For Mirage 2000-9 combat aircraft
600	Storm Shadow/SCALP	ASM	1998	2003-2008	600	Black Shaheen version (with reduced range to conform to 300km MTCR limits); for Mirage-2000-9 combat aircraft
14	AS-350/AS-550 Fennec	Light helicopter	1999	2001-2002	14	FFR165 m (\$27 m) deal; for Dubai; incl for training; AS-350B3 version
15	AS-550C2 Fennec	Combat helicopter	2000	2002-2005	15	AS-550C3 version
30	AM-39 Exocet	Anti-ship missile	2002	2003	30	
24	VBL	APV	2003	2004	24	
62	Damocles	Aircraft EO system	2004	2005-2007	62	For Mirage-2000-9 combat aircraft
150	MM-40-3 Exocet	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2006	2010-2014	91	Part of EUR400 m deal; for Baynunah corvettes and probably For Abu Dhabi frigate and Falaj-2 corvettes
1	CAPTAS VDS	ASW sonar	-2009	2013	1	For 1 Abu Dhabi frigate from Italy; CAPTAS Nano or CAPTAS Mk-2 version
2	Ocean Master	MP aircraft radar	2009	2012	2	For modification of 2 Dash-8 transport aircraft to MP aircraft in Canada
1	UMS-4110	ASW sonar	2009	2013	1	For 1 Abu Dhabi frigate from Italy

	20	MICA	BVRAAM	2011	2013	20	VL-MICA SAM version; For Falaj-2 corvettes
	17	Ground Master-200	Air search radar	2013			\$396 m deal
	2	Helios-2	Recce satellite	-2013			EUR700 m deal; Pleiades version
Germany (FRG)	436	MTU-883	Diesel engine	1993	1994-2010	436	For 390 Leclerc tanks and 46 Leclerc ARV from France
	24	BF6M	Diesel engine	2002	2003	24	For 24 BTR-3U IFV from Ukraine; engines fitted in UAE
	85	BF6M	Diesel engine	2003	2004-2005	85	For modernization of 85 M-109L-47 self-propelled guns; BF-6M-1015CP version
	24	MTU-595	Diesel engine	2003	2011-2014	16	For 6 Baynunah corvettes from France
	32	Tpz-1 Fuchs	APC	2005	2007-2009	32	EUR160 m (\$205 m) deal; Fuchs-2 version; incl 16 NBC and 8 biological warfare reconnaissance and 8 command post version
	2	Frankenthal/Type-332	MCM ship	2006	2006	2	Second-hand
	3	COBRA	Arty locating radar	2009	2010	3	
	24	MTU-2000	Diesel engine	2009	2013-2014	24	For 12 Ghannatha FAC from Sweden
	4	MTU-4000	Diesel engine	2010	2013	4	For 2 Falaj-2 corvettes from Italy
	2	Rmah	Support ship	2011	2014	2	Possibly incl for minelaying
Italy	6	Super Rapid 76mm	Naval gun	-2003	2012-2014	4	For 6 Baynunah corvettes from France
	6	Orion RTN-25X	Fire control radar	2004	2011-2014	4	For 6 Baynunah corvettes from France
	25	A244 324mm	ASW torpedo	2005	2006	25	EUR12 m deal; A-244S version
	6	AW139	Helicopter	2005	2007	-6	Part of \$83-84 m deal (incl 2 more for government VIP transport); for SAR
	1	Abu Dhabi	Frigate	2009	2013	1	AED430 m (\$117 m) deal; option on 1 more
	100	Marte-2	Anti-ship missile	2009	2013-2014	100	Marte-2/N version; for 12 Ghannatha FAC
	2	Falaj-2	Corvette	2010	2013	2	Option on 2 more

	2	P-180MPA	MP aircraft	2012				Avanti-2 version; for modification to MP aircraft in UAE (with systems from Sweden and USA)
Netherlands	10	Scout	Sea search radar	1996	1997-2001	-10		For modernization of 2 Kortenaer frigates, 6 TNC-45 FAC and 2 other ships
Romania	10	SA-330 Puma	Helicopter	2001	2006-2007	-10		Part of \$125 m deal (incl modernization of 15 UAE SA-330); probably second-hand, bought by Romanian company IAR and modernized before delivery; IAR-330SM version; for Abu Dhabi
Russia	402	BMP-3	IFV	1994	1994-2000	402		For Dubai
	50	96K9 Pantsyr-S1	Mobile AD system	2000	2009-2013	50		\$720-800 m deal (incl development partly funded by UAE); first delivery delayed from 2003 to 2009
	1000	9M311/SA-19	SAM	2000	2009-2013	1000		For 96K9 Pantsyr-S1 AD systems
Spain	3	A-330 MRTT	Tanker/transport ac	2008	2013	3		EUR730 m deal
Sweden	6	Giraffe AMB	Air search radar	2004	2011-2014	4		For 6 Baynunah corvettes from France
	7	APID-55	UAV	2006	2008-2009	7		
	2	Saab-340AEW	AEW&C aircraft	2009	2010-2011	2		Second-hand S-100B version modernized to S-100D before delivery; SEK1.5 b (\$234 m) deal; interim order until new AEW aircraft chosen
Switzerland	25	PC-21	Trainer aircraft	2009	2011-2012	25		Part of CHF520 m (\$515 m) deal
United Kingdom	1	Learjet-35/36	Light transport ac	2000	2001	1		Second-hand; for target-towing; Learjet-35A version
	1	Learjet-35/36	Light transport ac	2004	2004	1		Second-hand; Learjet-35A version
	3	Air refuel system	Air refuel system	2008	2013	3		For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain
	6	Trent	Turbofan	2008	2013	6		For 3 A-330 MRTT tanker/transport aircraft from Spain; Trent-772B version
United States	136	6V-53	Diesel engine	1997	1999-2000	-136		For 136 AIFV (ACV-350) APC from Turkey; 6V-53TA version
	1673	Paveway	Guided bomb	1998	1999-2004	1673		Incl GBU-10 and GBU-12 Paveway-2 and GBU-24 Paveway-3

24	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	1998	1998-2001	24	RGM-84G-4 version for Kortenaer (Abu Dhabi) frigates
80	F-16E	FGA aircraft	2000	2004-2008	80	\$5 b deal (incl \$400 m for engines; \$3 b advance payments incl for development of avionics and radar; part of \$6.8 b deal) incl 25 F-16F
159	AGM-88 HARM	ARM	2001	2006-2007	159	For F-16E combat aircraft; AGM-88C version
2	C-130H-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2001	2001-2002	2	Second-hand; L-100-30 version; modernized in UK before delivery
49	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2002	2005	49	AGM-114M3 version; for AH-64D helicopters
240	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2002	2005	240	AGM-114L3 version; for AH-64D helicopters
1163	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	2002	2003-2007	1163	For F-16E combat aircraft; incl AGM-65G version
267	AIM-9L/M Sidewinder	SRAAM	2002	2004-2006	267	AIM-9M version; for F-16E combat aircraft
491	AIM-120B AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2003	2004-2007	491	For F-16E combat aircraft
202	JDAM	Guided bomb	2003	2006	202	
12	RGM-84 Harpoon	Anti-ship missile	2003	2005	12	\$40 m deal; AGM-84 version for F-16E combat aircraft
50	Paveway	Guided bomb	2004	2005	50	Paveway-3 version
8	Cessna-208 Caravan	Light transport ac	2005	2005-2007	8	Cessna-208B version
16	T55-L	Turboshaft	2005	2006-2010	16	From Italian production line; T-55-L-712E version; for modernization of 8 CH-47C helicopters
237	RIM-162 ESSM	SAM	2006	2011-2014	125	Possibly \$245 m deal; for Baynunah corvettes
30	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	2007	2008-2009	30	Part of \$1.5 b deal; UAE AH-64A rebuilt to AH-64D Longbow version
30	APG-78 Longbow	Combat heli radar	2007	2008-2009	30	For AH-64D combat helicopters
100	CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	2007	2008-2009	100	CBU-105 version
4	Dash-8	Transport aircraft	2007	2007	4	Second-hand; for conversion to maritime patrol aircraft



200	RIM-116A RAM	SAM	2007	2011-2014	150	For Baynunah corvettes; RIM-116B version
10	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2007	2008	10	S-70A version
4	CH-47F Chinook	Helicopter	2008	2010	4	
1000	FGM-148 Javelin	Anti-tank missile	2008	2009-2010	1000	
1560	GMLRS	Guided rocket	2008	2011-2012	1560	Part of \$752 m deal; for use with HIMARS MRL
300	JDAM	Guided bomb	2008	2011-2012	300	
20	M-142 HIMARS	Self-propelled MRL	2008	2011	-20	
216	MIM-104C PAC-2	SAM	2008	2012-2014	216	Patriot GEM-T version
292	MIM-104F PAC-3	ABM	2008	2012-2014	292	
9	Patriot PAC-3	SAM/ABM system	2008	2012-2014	9	
938	Paveway	Guided bomb	2008	2010-2013	938	Incl 450 GBU-24 Paveway-3 and 488 GBU-12 Paveway-2
10	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2008	2009-2010	10	
390	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	2009	2012-2013	390	AGM-114N version
224	AIM-120C AMRAAM	BVRAAM	2009	2013-2014	224	Part of \$326 m deal; AIM-120C-7 version
6	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	2009	2011-2012	6	
14	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2009	2012-2013	14	\$209 m deal; UH-60M armed version
500	AGM-65 Maverick	ASM	2010	2011-2013	500	\$170 m deal; AGM-65D and AGM-65G version
24	AT-802U	Ground attack ac	2010	2010-2014	24	
250	CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	2010	2011-2012	250	
1	F-16E	FGA aircraft	2010	2012	1	
26	S-70/UH-60L	Helicopter	2010	2011-2012	26	Armed UH-60M version
12	CH-47F Chinook	Helicopter	2011	2012-2014	10	Delivery probably 2012-2015
6	DB-110	Aircraft recce system	2011	2013	-6	\$81 m deal

50	M-ATV	APV	2011	2011	50	\$27 m deal
100	MGM-140B ATACMS	SSM	2011	2013	100	ATACMS Block-1A version
2	THAAD	ABM system	2011			\$2.5 b deal; delivery possibly by 2016 or 2018
750	M-ATV	APV	-2012	2013	750	AED1.4 b (\$380 m) deal
2	RDR-1700	MP aircraft radar	2012			RDR-1700G(v)2 version for 2 P-180MPA MP aircraft from Italy
96	THAAD missile	ABM missile	2012			
300	AGM-84H SLAM-ER	ASM	2013			Selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
30	Bell-407	Light helicopter	2013	2014	8	Armed version; delivery 2014-2016
2000	Talon	ASM	2013			\$117 m deal; or AH-64D combat helicopters
24	Archangel-BPA	Ground attack ac	2014			Assembled in UAE; delivery 2015-2016
2	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport ac	2014			Selected but not yet ordered by end-2014
30	F-16E	FGA aircraft	2014			F-16E Block-61 version; selected but possibly not yet ordered by end-2014
5000	GBU-39 SDB	Guided bomb	2014			
	JDAM	Guided bomb	2014			
10	RQ-1 Predator	UAV	2014			AED722 m (\$200 m) deal; Predator XP version

## Yemen

Supplier (S)/Licensor (L)	No. Ordered	Weapon	Designation	Year Ordered	Year (s) Delivered	No. Delivered	Description
S: Czech Republic	132	T-55AM-2	Tank	1999	2000-2002	132	Second-hand; incl some T-54 tanks; possibly modernized before delivery
	12	Z-142/Z-242L	Trainer aircraft	2001	2002	12	Z-242L version
	15	OT-90	APC	-2010	2010	15	Second-hand
	5	OT-90	APC	-2012	2013	5	Second-hand; designation uncertain (reported as 'armored combat vehicles')

Italy	14	Argos-73	Air/sea search radar	2006	2007-2008	14	Part of EUR20m (USD26 m) deal; designation uncertain
Poland	3	Deba	Landing craft	1999	2001	3	Part of \$50 m deal; Yemeni designation Dhaffar
	1	Project-771/Polnocny	Landing ship	1999	2002	1	Part of \$50 m deal; NS-722 version; Yemeni designation Bilquis
Russia	39	T-72B	Tank	1999	2000-2001	39	Second-hand but modernized before delivery
	14	MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F	FGA aircraft	2001	2002	14	\$300-437 m deal; delivered as MiG-29S and modified 2003-2005 to MiG-29SMT; probably incl 2 MiG-29UBT
	100	R-27/AA-10	BVRAAM	2001	2002	100	For MiG-29SMT combat aircraft
	176	R-73/AA-11	SRAAM	2001	2002-2005	176	For MiG-29SMT combat aircraft
	50	Kh-29/AS-14 Kedge	ASM	2003	2004-2005	50	For MiG-29SMT combat aircraft
	60	Kh-31A1/AS-17	Anti-ship missile/ARM	2003	2003-2005	60	For MiG-29SMT combat aircraft
	6	MiG-29SMT/Fulcrum-F	FGA aircraft	2003	2004-2005	6	Incl 2 MiG-29UBT version
	100	RVV-AE/AA-12 Adder	BVRAAM	2003	2004-2005	100	For MiG-29SMT combat aircraft
	180	BMP-2	IFV	2004	2004-2005	180	BMP-2D version; no. could be 188
	100	BTR-80A	IFV	2009	2010	100	\$40 m deal
Spain	1	CN-235	Transport aircraft	2011	2013	1	Financed by USA
Ukraine	100	BMP-2	IFV	2002	2003-2004	100	Probably second-hand
	32	T-72	Tank	2002	2003	32	Second-hand
	14	L-39C Albatros	Trainer aircraft	2004	2005-2006	14	Second-hand
	12	Su-22/Fitter-H/J/K	FGA aircraft	2005	2006-2007	12	Second-hand
	6	D-30 122mm	Towed gun	2011	2011	6	Second-hand
United States	32	M-113	APC	2005	2006	32	Second-hand; aid
	18	Cougar	APC	2007	2008	18	Yemeni designation YLAV
	4	Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2	Helicopter	2010	2011	4	\$27 m aid; Second-hand UH-1H rebuilt to UH-1H-2

2	CT-7	Turboprop	2011	2013	2	For 1 CN-235 transport aircraft from Spain Cessna-208B-ISR surveillance version or AC-208B armed version; aid Designation uncertain (possibly King Air-350 SPYDR version); delivery 2015
2	Cessna-208 Caravan	Light transport ac	2012	2013	2	
4	ISR King Air-350	AGS aircraft	2014			

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Data Base, [http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade\\_register.php](http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php)

## ***IV. Ground Forces***

Comparisons of unit strength, manpower, and major weapons still provide a good capsule picture of the effectiveness of the conventional forces in given states. Like the comparisons of the other key elements of military power that follow, however, comparisons of conventional land forces need to be kept in careful perspective. They describe the total pool of military resources for only one element of military power –land forces—in a world where joint warfare is becoming the rule rather than the exception. They do not provide a valid way of measuring counterterrorism or counter insurgency capability, and they do not portray readiness and the quality of leadership, exercise, and training.

All of the Gulf states also have one thing in common. None create standardized land force unit structures and orders of battle. Individual units vary sharply in their force mix, leadership, readiness, and exercise training and performance. Moreover, no Gulf state has recent extensive experience in actual combat beyond limited border clashes. Iran has not fought any significant combat since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, although Iranian advisors have been present in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Iraq's forces had serious combat experience in the Iran-Iraq War, the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, in countering the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, and in counterinsurgency in 2006-2009. The elements with extensive combat experience, however, were either disbanded in 2003, deprived of much of their leadership during Maliki's effort to use the army to control the country in 2011-2013, and suffered shattering defeats in late 2013 and 2014.

The Arab Gulf states' only serious modern combat experience occurred during the war to liberate Kuwait in 1990-1991, although Saudi forces are fighting Houthi rebels. They have low overall standard of readiness, although some elements in each country are effective. It also seems likely that only selected elements of Gulf land forces will be involved in any given conflict, and will generally operate in combination with air, sea, and missile power. It is equally likely that the land balance in real world conflicts will be heavily shaped by both non-state actors and internal security and paramilitary police forces – forces where reporting is sometimes missing and often dated or wrong in unclassified sources.

### **Scenario Considerations**

The waters of Gulf and deserts form major barriers to the movement of land forces, and channel potential land threats from Iran and Yemen to the Iraqi, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Omani borders. As a result, many of the potential scenarios involving inter-state conflicts in the Gulf region are likely to be dominated by air missile and sea combat rather than land warfare. At the same time, even air-sea scenarios may involve the use of marines, Guards, or other land units, and asymmetric or irregular warfare involving non-state actors is likely to be dominated by land warfare.

Iran might rely on its ground forces for defense in depth, and try to use a land offensive against Iraq, Kuwait, or the Saudi border to offset the U.S. and Arab Gulf advantage in air and sea power. It might use land forces to try to dominate Iraq, create a threat along the Saudi border, or to drive across the Shat al Arab and seize Kuwait. The civil war in Yemen led to Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2009 and again in May 2015. Land forces can also play an advisory and assist role in conflicts involving other states. The Iranian Al Quads

force has played such role in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Saudi, UAE, and Jordanian forces have played such a role in supporting Syrian rebels.

In contrast, land forces have become deeply involved in conflicts with non-state actors, counterterrorism, and civil wars. ISIL, Syrian civil war, and crisis in Iraq have involved Iraqi and Syrian forces in civil conflicts, and several of the Arab Gulf states in land combat training and assist and air missions. The civil war in Yemen has led to limited Saudi intervention, and could further broaden the threat from Iran. Elements of Saudi Army, National Guard, and Ministry of Interior forces have been deeply involved in fighting the terrorist threat from groups like al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula since 2003. Instability in Bahrain has forced the Army and internal security forces to play a role in stabilizing the country, and led to Saudi and UAE intervention. All of the Arab Gulf states have had to prepare their forces for internal security and counterterrorism missions.

*There is no one center of gravity to use in judging the capability of Gulf land forces, or any other element of Gulf military power and if a dominant threat is to emerge, there is no way to predict it at this time.*

The force mixes, geography, and training patterns in the region also shape how the land balance affects given scenarios in other ways:

- Iran is superior in mass, but not weapons quality. It is over-reliant on aging and worn armor, towed artillery.
- Iran has limited ability to project and sustain armored forces.
- Iran cannot provide *effective, survivable air cover, and survivable naval escorts and defense.*
- The key GCC area of vulnerability too an Iranian land attack – unless Iran can prepare by redeploying and staging in Iraq -- is through Iraq to Kuwait: the “Kuwaiti hinge.” Much depends on level of Iraqi ties to Iran.
- Iran does not practice large-scale forced entry with amphibious forces, but significant capability for small raids and can quickly ferry substantial forces if invited in.
- Iranian IRGC, marines, special forces do have significant raid capability in Gulf and near coastal areas. Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
- Iran does have a significant capability for covert operations, sabotage, and covert or proxy attacks on U.S.-allied military facilities.

Other scenarios involve complex and unpredictable mixes of conventional land forces, irregular or asymmetric land forces, militias, and hostile non-state actors. The conventional balance of power may prove largely irrelevant and actual war fighting/deterrent capabilities will be further influenced by the role of air and missile power. Ideology, religion, and internal sectarian, ethnic, and tribal differences can play a critical role under such conditions.

Moreover, indigenous land, sea, and air forces are only part of the balance. The role of the U.S. power projection forces, and those of other outside powers like Britain and France, may be equally important in an actual case, as is the way in which regional powers that are

not directly involved contribute money, weapons, advisors, and political support. The ability to add foreign non-state actors like the Hezbollah, or embed key elements of train and assist forces like the Iranian Al Quds forces has made a major difference in recent fighting.

It is equally critical to understand that the Gulf land balance cannot be assessed in terms of the forces actually in the region. No meaningful assessment of the Gulf balance cannot ignore the potential scale of the air, sea, and land forces that the U.S. and nations like Britain and France can project or reinforce into the region on relatively short notice.

More generally, large-scale warfighting capability is a critical test of deterrence and the ability to maintain regional stability, but it is only one. Politics, ideology, religion, and alliances/strategic partnerships are also critical. The growing role of asymmetric forces and non-state actors is also making the use of irregular war, proxies, and low-level wars of attrition steadily more important. Just as war is an extension of diplomacy by other means, there are many potential combinations of politics and ideology that can be extensions of war by other means.

### **The Other Elements of Land Force Power**

The force numbers that follow do help provide a picture of the total capabilities of the land forces of each state in the region, illustrate the diversity in the force structures of given statement, and show how manning and equipment both vary and relate to unit force structures.

As is the case with every aspect of the military balance in the Gulf, however, static, quantifiable measures of force strength do not compare many critical elements of combat capability. In broad terms, the other – less tangible – aspects of military capability that can play a critical role in real world scenarios include

- Training and exercise experience in land combat and joint warfare at unit and full-scale combat level.
- Combat experience.
- Readiness.
- Sustainability.
- Motivation and morale.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. (IS&R)
- Targeting and smart munitions capabilities.
- Command, control, communications, computer, and battle management capabilities (C4I/BM)
- Political leadership and unity.
- Interoperability and common doctrine, training, and leadership for allied forces.

The latter two “intangibles” are particularly important. The GCC has never achieved anything like its potential in developing effective integration and interoperability of Arab Gulf land forces or any other element of member state military forces. It has never been able to create effective common training and exercise activity, although outside powers like the U.S. have helped. The GCC has never bridged over a long history of national rivalries to use its mass purchasing power to reduce costs, or create common facilities to

reduce unit costs and achieve economies of scale. These problems are particularly important in the case of GCC land forces because they are scattered throughout the southern Gulf, slow to assemble and then maneuver, and would face serious problems in terms of sustainability, common combat and service support, and coordinating C4I/BM and IS&R activity.

At the same time, Iran has never fully solved the problems in dividing its land forces between the regular Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and in integrating other paramilitary elements into a coherent approach to defense in depth. Iraq's land forces are now deeply divided between a Shi'ite led regular army, paramilitary police elements, Shi'ite militias, Sunni tribal forces (and potentially a Sunni national guard), and the Kurdish Pesh Merga.

These problems compound a long-standing failure in every Gulf country to create uniform standards for land and other forces. Gulf orders of battle have units that range from high quality to near incapacity, and other have military politics that means these differences between units are never properly addressed. Corruption is often a problem, and so is promotion by ideology, sect, ethnicity, family, tribe, and political connection.

### **Land Forces Personnel**

**Figure IV.1** shows that Iran has some 325,000 active soldiers, with 350,000 in reserve, plus some 100,000 additional Revolutionary Guards in its land forces. This is far more than the total for the GCC countries—which collectively have 169,400 active military with 23,700 in reserve, plus 38,500 National and Royal Guard forces.

Iran also has a striking advantage in paramilitary manpower. If anything, however, **Figure IV.1** understates the level of Iran's efforts. Its Basij Resistance Force is not shown, but has been expanded since 2003 to provide defense in depth against a foreign invader, and now has an alleged nominal strength of over 1,000,000 men.

Iran's active and reserve forces are largely conscript. The GCC state forces are largely professional, long-service forces. At the same time, a significant number are foreign, and native promotion and leadership is sometimes a matter of birth or family status. Force loyalty and cohesion might be an issue for all GCC services, but could present special challenges if some GCC land forces came under severe stress in combat.

### **Force Structures and Orders of Battle**

**Figure IV.2** shows the very different force structures of each of the Gulf states. **Parts One and Two of Figure IV.2** also illustrate the lack of standardization within the Arab Gulf forces in summary form, although these differences do understate the seriousness of the problems involved. There is no common combat doctrine, or realistic large-scale exercise activity.

### ***Iranian Land Forces***

Iran's large and young population of nearly 81 million, use of some 250,000 conscripts, and relatively low labor costs allow it to maintain the largest land forces in the Gulf. Its land forces have an important internal security role as well as a military one, and still reflect the separation of its 350,000-man regular Army and its 100,000+ Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) forces that came out of the revolution that toppled the Shah and the Iran-



Iraq War. Iran is reported to have an army reserve with a nominal strength of 350,000. It consists of former actives, but has little refresher training, limited capability, and would require extensive call up training to be effective except for a limited number of more active elements.

Iran also has some 40,000-60,000 active paramilitary border and security troops, and a set of local forces called the Basij – with an active nominal strength of some 30,000 to 90,000 that receives some military this reserve is one with very limited training and armament and is suited only for internal security purposes and low-grade irregular warfare for local defense in depth.

Iran's forces are still organized primarily for defense, reflecting both the trauma of the Iran-Iraq War and the past fear of a U.S. invasion or military action between 2003 and 2009. Its armored has an awkward mix of aging and different types and is distributed in inadequate numbers to too many units. The army does, however, have maneuver ready elements in a total force that the IISS reports has four armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, four infantry divisions, a commando division (the 23<sup>rd</sup>), a special forces brigade, airborne brigade, and 4-5 artillery groups. IHS Jane's reports that the Iranian army has at least seven independent armored brigades, 13 infantry brigades and 16 mechanized brigades.

The Army now emphasizes brigade-sized operations and is seeking to make its brigade more mobile and capable of quick reaction missions. Its total forces have extensive combat support elements, but limited service support elements are a generally not structured for sustained offensive maneuver and to project combat forces outside Iran. The Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) has, however, improved in capability in recent years. C4I and battle management capabilities are moderate to good. Electronic intelligence and secure communications still present problems, but are improving.

Their joint land-air warfare capability is seriously limited by the quality, readiness, and survivability of the Iranian Air Force and IRGC air branch. Land force mobile air defenses are weak against Arab Gulf and U.S. standoff munitions, and **Chapter VII** describes why Iran's air forces would have serious problems in providing air cover and air support.

Its IRGC forces have some 31 small provincial corps, and the IISS reports that each has an independent brigade and a nominal force of 10 Basij militia battalions.<sup>31</sup> Its forces consist largely of small to moderate-size independent brigades and battalion-sized elements that are relatively lightly armed and designed for defense in depth. IHS Jane's reports that they do have some armored brigades like the 60th "Ammar Yasir" Armored Brigade, 21st "Imam Reza" Armored Brigade, 7th "Vali Asr" Division in Khuzestan, And 8th "Najaf Ashraf" Armored "Division", as well as some heavier artillery groups.<sup>32</sup> These forces have come to play an increasing internal security role over the last eight years.

Key elements of Iran's forces are still deployed to defend Iran's borders, and others to provide defense in depth. Active forces cover each of Iran's borders, are present in each province as provincial defense and internal security forces, and secure the capital in Tehran. They are also strong enough, however, so that Army and IRGC land forces in western Iran to put major pressure on Iraq with little or no warning, deploy through Iraq against Kuwait or potentially through Iraq to the Saudi border. There are also elements like its 92nd

Armored Division and Special Forces that designed to project power and conduct asymmetric warfare outside Iran

Various sources like the IHS Jane's' *Sentinel* Series, the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) annual editions of its *Military Balance* disagree in detail over the exact manning and equipment holdings of each service in each Gulf country, and all of the numbers available on such data for Iran and other countries in the analysis should be regarded as having some degree of uncertainty.<sup>33</sup>

The IISS figures seem broadly accurate as of 2014, however, and it estimates that Iran's Army and IRGC have 1,663+ main battle tanks, 725 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 640 armored personnel carriers (APC), 292+ self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 2,030+ towed artillery weapons, 1,476+ multiple rocket launchers, 5,000 mortars, and 50 attack helicopters. These are moderate holdings for its total force structure and manpower, low in OAFVs and APCs, and very heavy in towed artillery and MRLs is a result of its defensive experience in the Iran-Iraq War.

As is discussed in more detail shortly, Iran's land forces also suffer from a reliance on equipment that dates back to the time of the Shah, consists of low to moderate imports that had to be imported because of a lack of access to high quality systems for political reasons or because of sanctions, or consists of Iranian designs of uncertain quality. These limits to Iran's present mix of major land force weapons are shown in more detail in **Figure IV.5**.

While they are not shown in **Figure IV.2** because most are not active forces and most are only equipped for internal security purposes, Iran's Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) potentially add some 300,000 men (only a maximum of 90,000 of which seem to be active enough to have limited effectiveness) to the defense in depth provided by the Army and IRGC. The Basij is organized into Corps and regional battalions that Iran does call up and exercise, but its actual effectiveness remains highly uncertain.

The IRGC also has a special force designed to help organize, train, equipment and support outside forces like the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'ite militias called the Al Quds Force. It has proved to have some of the most effective train and assist capabilities in the region, and the Arab Gulf states are only beginning to match its capabilities and their efforts only began to show some real effectiveness and coordination in the spring of 2015. Jordan has, however, provided more effective outside efforts for some years.

### ***Iraqi Land Forces***

Iraq's force structure has never recovered from its defeats in past wars, the fighting between 2003 and 2011, and its shattering defeats by ISIL in late 2013 and early 2014. Before the ISIL attacks in late 2013 and the disintegration of the northwest corps of the Iraqi forces, Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) estimated that the Iraqi National Army possessed 260,000 troops, but it is important to note these estimates were reported long before ISIL's destabilizing attacks and the dissolution and desertion of many Iraqi units.<sup>34</sup>

Iraq does not have a standing army, or air force, and navy, in the normal sense. Its military is rather a work in progress, and one where mixes of Kurdish Pesh Merga, Shiite militias, and Sunni factions present serious uncertainties as to the prospects for national unity.

The IISS reports nominal forces with some 100,000 men and one armored division, four mechanized divisions, two motorized infantry divisions, two light infantry divisions, a commando division, and two independent infantry brigades. In spite of their titles, these were regimental/brigade and battalion-sized forces even before the near disintegration of the Army when it first came under major ISIL attack.

The IISS warns its estimates for 2014 are uncertain – and it is clear that Army lost substantial equipment in fighting ISIL, some of which was captured by ISIL. It does still report, however, that estimates that Iraq's Army has 270+ main battle tanks (100+ M1A1s), 313 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), surviving elements of holding of over 1,500 armored personnel carriers (APC), 48+ self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons (some modern 155mm), 60+ towed artillery weapons, 3+ multiple rocket launchers, and 950+ mortars. The Iraqi Army is reported to have surviving elements of three attack helicopter squadrons: one forming with Mi-28NE Havocs, one with Mi-35M Hind, and one with Bell T407; EC635. It is seeking AH-64s.

Outside advisors report that maintenance and sustainability, combat and service support, and rear area logistic support generally range from poor to terrible with a few elite unit exceptions. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense and higher command staff are reported to have critical elements that are “a corrupt and ineffective mess.”

**Figure IV.6** shows that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 fundamentally changed the Gulf balance, and the totals for Iraq in 2014 in **Figure IV.6** do not reflect the impact ISIL had in defeating and weakening Iraqi forces in late 2013 and during the course of 2014. The future recovery of Iraq forces, Iraq's ability to defeat ISIL, and Iran's future levels of influence in Iraq will have a critical impact on the real-world balance of land and other forces in the Gulf. Similarly, much depends on the future stability, alignments, and role that Syria, Egypt, and Jordan will play.

Iraq does still has some effective smaller land force elements and up to 30,000 men in units with some degree of effectiveness, but its current overall order of battle is largely an exercise in chaos while the U.S. and other allies' attempts to help the Iraqi central government create an effective forces of 9 to 12 brigades out of the mess left by Maliki and defeats by ISIL, help the Pesh Merga become more effective while preserving Iraq's unity, and find some way to create a Sunni National Guard that will assure Iraq's Sunnis that they can have a secure future in a united Iraq.

At present, the Army must rely heavily on Shia militias – which have committed serious human rights abuse and atrocities -- and Kurdish Pesh Merga forces. The Iraqi armed forces face both internal and external tensions between its largely Shi'ite forces and Arab Sunni and Kurdish forces and populations, and the situation is further complicated by rival Iranian trans and assist efforts and forward-deployed advisors to both the Army and Shi'ite militias. Jordan is the only Arab state providing meaningful training and support.

There are many reports that Iraq is working to rebuild losses suffered by its land forces at the hands of ISIL. In early 2015, *Defense News* reported that, “Iraq requested to buy from the United States 1,000 M1151A1 up-armored Humvees, 1,000 M2 .50 caliber machine guns, and 1,000 MK-19 40mm grenade launchers with universal mounts, commercial radios, communication equipment and spare parts and training estimated at \$579 million, according to the U.S. Defense and Security Cooperation Agency.

In the same month Iraq also requested the sale of 175 full track M1A1 Abrams tanks with the upgraded 120mm gun, 15 M88A2 improved tank recovery vehicles, 175 .50 caliber M2 machine guns, communication systems and ammunition valued at \$2.4 billion”.<sup>35</sup> Additionally, the Iraqi Defense Ministry has requested 500 four-wheel drive military vehicles to replace those lost to ISIL.

This rebuilding, however, is uncertain. The abandonment of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Iraqi forces that suddenly retreated when ISIL captured Ramadi in May 2015. Ramadi led to U.S. led airstrikes to destroy the machinery to prevent its use by ISIL. *Foreign Policy* reported on May 26, 2015 that:

“the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq lit up dozens of armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery pieces in and around Ramadi over the weekend, destroying what we assume is millions of dollars worth of old American military equipment. Iraqi forces left hundreds of U.S.-supplied vehicles behind when they “drove” out of Ramadi, but were not “driven out,” in the words of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey. And now most of them are melted hunks of metal. On Friday, U.S. Central Command announced that airstrikes near Ramadi destroyed “five ISIL armored vehicles, two ISIL tanks, two ISIL vehicles, an ISIL armored personnel carrier... five abandoned tanks, two abandoned armored personnel carriers and two abandoned armored vehicles.”<sup>36</sup>

In June 2015, PM Abadi disclosed that Iraqi forces lost 2,300 Humvees to ISIL when they retreated from Mosul in June 2014. Abadi told Iraq state television that his army “did not have the capability to arm everyone, because we lost in the collapse of Mosul a lot of weapons and ammunition. We cannot replace HMMWVs we lose in battles. We lost 2,300 HMMWVs in Mosul alone. Besides, we are still losing HMMWVs because of the continuation of the fighting.”<sup>37</sup>

### *Yemeni Land Forces*

Yemen’s army and military forces have been so disrupted by civil war, and by the Saudi bombing campaign that began in April 2015, that any estimate is now impossible. The figures shown in the following **Figures** are pre-crisis, pre-civil war data. The situation is complicated by both Houthi and AQAP military gains, the division of the Army into faction loyal to the former dictator Saleh and his son and to President Hadi, and Hadi’s efforts to reorganize the army to make it more loyal.

IHS Jane’s reports that Hadi abolished the First Armored Division and the Republican Guard (RG), and put their forces into Yemen’s Strategic Reserve Forces, while making Saleh’s son – General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh -- ambassador to the UAE –steps that downgraded and isolated Zaidi (Zaidiyyah) Shi’ite elements in the Army before the major Houthi offensive, and helped make Shi’ite elements of the military turn to the Houthi and other Shi’ite Zaidi militias. (The CIA estimates that Yemen is 35% Shi’ite and 65% Sunni.)

The IISS estimate of the strength of the Yemeni land forces before the collapse of the government and armed forces was roughly 60,000 men organized into 7 regional commands – although IHS Jane’s indicates the total could be much higher.<sup>38</sup> They had a total of 12 armored brigades (all brigades were large battalions-size), 11 mechanized brigades, 22 infantry brigades, 5 mountain infantry brigades, an airborne brigade, 3 commando brigades, three artillery brigades, a surface-to- surface missile brigade, and 2 air defense battalions. The Ministry of Interior had some 50,000 internal security forces and there were 20,000 tribal levies.

There was a new Presidential Protection force (1-2 armored “brigades” and 1-2 special forces “brigades”). IHS Jane’s reports that there was also a strategic Reserve Forces, a new Missile Defense Command, and a new Special Operations Command, under the direct control of the president.<sup>39</sup> There were some elite elements with U.S. training, but overall readiness, training, and sustainability was poor to mediocre.

The Army’s equipment included 880 main battle tanks (100+ M1A1s), 330 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 258 armored personnel carriers (APC), 25 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons (some modern 155mm), 310 towed artillery weapons, 294 multiple rocket launchers, and 642 mortars. Like all of the large Gulf forces it had extensive holdings of anti-tank guided weapons, MANPADS, and other light air defense weapons. Its surface-to-surface rockets and missiles included 12 FROG-7; 10 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka); and 6 Scud-B (with 33 missiles) launchers. Much of the army equipment is old and worn, and its operational capability and sustainability were uncertain before the collapse of the central government. Additionally, “military equipment is at times not used for its designed purpose—i.e., fighting elements identified with al-Qaeda—rather serves the Yemeni government in its struggle against its political rivals, as in the warfare against the Houthis.”<sup>40</sup> Though dated, this point is still relevant today. Much of the Yemeni military is designed to fight an insurgency, not a war against itself.

The Army had some effective units until the Houthi advance, but also had key elements tied to Saleh and senior officers that were allied to the Houthi and to Zaidi elements in the army. While its forces should have concentrated on Houthi in the north and Al Qaeda-elements in the south, many remained static in regional areas or were involved in politics in the capital in Sanaa. There are no reliable data on what survived at the end of April 2015, the loyalty of given army elements, and how much equipment and supplies fell into Houthi, AQAP, and other non-state forces.

The future stability and unity of Yemen will have a major impact on how Saudi Arabia and Oman will need to deploy and allocate their forces. The effective collapse of Yemen as a unified state, that takeover of the western part of the country by the Houthi, and the possibility this will lead to expanding Iranian influence and/or become a more serious sanctuary for extremist forces like Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula could have a serious impact on the future balance.

### *Arab Gulf Land forces*

Each Arab Gulf state in the GCC currently pursues its own approach to creating land forces, and the nominal effort to create a Gulf rapid reaction forces is both very limited in size and of uncertain effectiveness.

**Saudi Arabia** has the largest ground force in the Arab Gulf forces, and they are equipped with modern and highly capable weapons. Its land forces is expanding and estimates of its size differ – with experts like Nawaf Obaid citing major force expansion plans. They have not had major combat experience in recent years, but had extensive combat experience in the First Gulf War in 1991, have fought in various small counterterrorism actions since 2003, and have been sporadically engaged on the Yemeni border since 2009.

Exercise performance has improved steadily in recent years, and particularly since 2011. Saudi Arabia has also acquired more recent combat experience. In March of 2015, it began

to lead a coalition of ten Arab states against the Houthis in Yemen, with the goal of returning the control of the government to Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi's control, after the Houthis took control of much of Yemen. According to Nawaf Obaid, this coalition has allowed the Saudi Arabian military to improve and manage its command and control system.<sup>41</sup>

The IISS estimates that the Saudi Army has some 75,000 men, and that its forces include 4 armored brigades, 5 mechanized brigades, 1 Royal Guard regiment, 1 airborne brigade with 2 airborne battalions and 3 special force companies. It also has an Aviation command with an attack helicopter brigade and a transport brigade, and an artillery brigade with 5 artillery battalions, 2 multiple rocket launcher battalions, and one missile battalion. However, according to *A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine*, the Saudi Arabian Army actually had between 200,000 and 225,000 combat ready personnel in 2011-2012.<sup>42</sup> This same report also identifies Saudi Arabia as having one more special forces brigade, two mechanized brigades, two infantry brigades, and two security brigades.<sup>43</sup>

This IISS manpower estimate – if accurate -- is too low to effectively cover all of Saudi Arabia's border, use all of Saudi Arabia's major weapons, and properly man its forces. This has helped lead to unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan for additional manpower in early 2014, even before the Houthi crisis in Yemen. It also presents problems given claims Saudi Arabia deployed some 30,000 men to the Iraqi border as ISIL advanced in Iraq, and then 150,000 to cover the border with Yemen in April 2015.

The IISS also estimates that the Saudi Army's equipment includes 600 main battle tanks (200 M1A2/A2S and 400 M-60A3s), with 173 more M1A2/A2S and 145 AMX-30s in storage. It has 1,080 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 1,423 armored personnel carriers (APC), 224 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 50 towed artillery weapons, 60 multiple rocket launchers, 642 mortars, 15 AH-64D/E attack helicopters, and extensive holdings of anti-tank guided missiles, light air defense weapons, and transport helicopters. The Army relies on outside contractors for some maintenance and this could present sustainment problems in maneuver warfare.

Saudi Arabia's other land forces include a National Guard, with an estimated 75,000 actives and 25,000 tribal levies. The IISS estimate that it has 4-5 mechanized brigades, 5 infantry brigades, 3 special security battalions, a ceremonial cavalry squadron, and various combat support elements. It does not have heavy armor, but does have 648 LAV-25 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 808 LAV and Commando armored personnel carriers (APC), 132 155mm self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 108 towed artillery weapons, 119 mortars, and extensive holding of anti-tank guided missiles, and 160 AA weapons. Plans have been discussed for years to upgrade its armor and heavy weapons, but have not been implemented. According to the IISS, Saudi Arabia deploys 1,000 men to help provide internal security in Bahrain.

Once again, such figures are uncertain. According to Nawad Obaid, the Saudi National Guard had between 100,000-125,000 combat ready personnel, had an unknown number of main battle tanks, but 2,000 to 2,500 armored personnel carriers and 2,500 to 3,000 armored infantry fighting vehicles in 2011-2012, though the models are not specified.<sup>44</sup>

There is also a Royal Guard regiment that reports directly to the King.

The Saudi Ministry of Interior has extensive internal security and counterterrorism forces that operate effectively in counterterrorism missions with the Army and National Guard. The IISS reports that the Ministry of Interior has an expanding 9,000 man Facilities Security Force. There is a 500-man special security force, a 10,500 man Border Guard and a 4,500 man Coastguard. Another report states that in 2011-2012, Saudi Arabia had a 35,000 Facilities Security Force, a 10,000-man special security force, and a combined Border Guard and Coastguard of 40,000 men.<sup>45</sup>

Saudi Arabia is so large that faces major challenges in covering each of its borders with its current mix of Army and National Guard forces – although its National guard and Ministry of interior have proved effective in counterterrorism missions, Its land forces are still organized defensively in military cities to defend the Kingdom's borders with Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan, although the Army is organizing to improve its capability to redeploy within Saudi territory and project maneuver forces beyond the GCC.

There are four major military cities and deployment complexes: King Khalid Military City (KKMC) near Hafr al-Batin and covering Iraq, the potential support of Kuwait, and any sudden major thrust from Iran. King Faisal Military City (KFMC), in the Tabuk area in the West, King Abd al-Aziz Military City (KAAMC) in the area around Khamis Mushayt and near the Yemeni border, and a still developing military city at Jizan, on the Red Sea, near Yemen that will include an air and naval base. The Army is seeking to improve its maintenance and sustainability capabilities, but still has problems with both.

The Saudi Army is backed by a National Guard that has elements deployed throughout the country and which has received steadily better combat equipment and training, as well as by paramilitary elements of the Ministry of Interior forces. These forces lack heavy armor and artillery strength, but can provide significant additional defense in depth, read area security, and internal security capability. The Ministry of Interior forces can also provide additional defense in depth, read area security, and internal security capability.

**The UAE** has an army that the IISS reports has 44,000 men. The IISS and IHS Jane's differ in detail but report that the UAE has 2 armored brigades, 2-3 mechanized brigades, 1-2 light infantry brigades, and an artillery brigade with 3 self-propelled artillery regiments. Its forces have been divided in the past into elements held by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with some security elements in Sharjah, but it seems to have centralized a more effective Ministry of Defense in Abu Dhabi, better integrated its forces, and created a unified Special Force command. It is considering transforming one brigade into a rapid intervention force.

IHS Jane's reports, however, that, "However, despite progress towards the creation of an integrated force, there still remain three essentially separate military organizations in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah. These emirates still retain a measure of independent control over their armed forces, making total peacetime integration unlikely for the near future. On mobilization, the Dubai Army would become integrated with the Federal Armed Forces."<sup>46</sup>

The IISS estimates that the UAE's equipment includes 421 main battle tanks (340 LeClerc, 36 OF-40, 45 AMX-30), 586 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 1,552 armored personnel carriers (APC), 181 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 93 towed artillery weapons, 107+ multiple rocket launchers, 213 mortars, and 6 Scud B missile launchers with up to 20 missiles. Equipment modernization and standardization has been erratic, and

its forces are largely French supplied, which limits interoperability with Saudi forces. It is steadily seeking to improve readiness, maintenance and logistics

The UAE also has a 12,000 man Presidential Guard Command with a mechanized brigade, a reconnaissance squadron, and an amphibious marine battalion. The force has 50 LeClerc tanks, 200 BMP-3 OAFVs, 90 APCs, and anti-tank guided missile forces.

The actual manning of all the UAE land forces is uncertain and may not meet the goals. They have received less funding for modernization and readiness than the UAE's other services set in these manpower data, which often seem to reflect authorized rather than actual strength. The UAE force also seems to have some foreign personnel, but are still rated as effective by Gulf standards by outside experts.

The UAE puts more emphasis on joint warfare than many of the other Gulf forces. It has a Joint Aviation Command with 30 AH-64D/E helicopters, 7 AS332 ASW helicopters, light transport aircraft, and transport helicopters. It also has land-based air defense forces with 2 IHAWK and PAC-3 surface-to-air missile brigades, and Crotale, Pantsir, and Rapier SHORADs, and Mistral naval SHORADs, and Javelin and Igla (SA-18) MANPADS.

The UAE is placing a high priority on creating a more effective mix of both armored combat and the projection of light infantry forces. It is well equipped, although with limited regard to interoperability and maintenance needs, and – like Saudi Arabia – developing a growing attack helicopter capability. It is reported to be developing a rapid intervention brigade, and to have created a stronger central Ministry of Defense and unified force structure to overcome the past divisions of part of its forces into structures tied to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah. Outside experts feel its recent military exercises reflect significant improvements in readiness and capability.

**Kuwait** has a relatively small 11,000-man force, with a low grade and largely unready 23,700-man reserve. It has, however, greatly improved the training and exercise performance of its land forces since 1991, and has significantly modernized its forces since the Liberation. The UK and U.S. have both provided advanced training, and carried out joint exercises in Kuwait.

The IISS reports that it now has three small armored brigades, three to four small mechanized infantry brigades, a commando group, and an artillery brigade. IHS Jane's reports that its major combat units include the "the 35th Armored Brigade (known as Al Shaheed or Martyrs Brigade); the 15th Armored Brigade (known as Mubarak Brigade); the 26th Mechanized Brigade (known as the Al Soor Brigade); 94th Mechanized Brigade (known as the Al Yarmouk Brigade); the 6th Brigade and the 25th Commando Group (also known as the 25th Commando Brigade).<sup>47</sup> It is seeking to develop more advanced special forces capabilities.

The IISS estimates that the Kuwaiti Army's equipment includes 293 main battle tanks (218 M1A2 Abrams, and 75 M-84s with 75 more in storage, 174 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 206 armored personnel carriers (APC), 246 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 108 towed artillery weapons, 101 mortars, and holdings of anti-tank guided weapons and light air defense systems. Its Air Force has 16 AH-64D and 13 SA342 attack helicopters and significant numbers of transport helicopters.



Its key missions are to delay an Iraqi or Iranian attack for 48 hours – long enough for outside reinforcements to arrive and outside air power to begin to be effective. It has modern armor and a mix of Chinese self-propelled artillery and 300mm Smerch long-range 9A52 multiple rocket launchers. Readiness and training are moderate. IHS Jane's reports that its brigades are normally kept at only 80% manning or lower and require mobilization to reach full strength,

**Oman's** land forces once were the most effective land force in the Arab Gulf because of their experience in fighting in the Dhofar rebellion. Today they are more of a static defensive and internal security force. The IISS estimates that Oman now has a 25,000-man Army, with one armored brigade, two light mechanized infantry brigades, and a small Musandam Security Force. IHS Jane's estimates that the force has 31,400 men.

The Omani army is less well equipped by Saudi and UAE standards, but outside experts feel they are relatively effective in using their armor and artillery. The IISS estimates that the Omani Army's equipment includes 117 Challenger and M-60 main battle tanks, 432 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 260 armored personnel carriers (APC), 106 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 27 multiple rocket launchers, 78 mortars, and extensive holdings of anti-tank guided weapons and light air defense weapons.

The IISS estimates that there are 5,000 more men in a lightly equipped Royal Guard Brigade with 9-18 OAFVs, 73 APCs, 6 MRLs, ATGMs, and MANPADS, plus 6,400 men in a Royal Household force with two special forces regiments, 4,000 men in a light Tribal Home Guard, and a Police Air Wing. IHS Jane's estimates that there are 6,000 Royal Guard troops, 4,000 Tribal Home Guard (Firqat), and some 2,000 foreign personnel serving with the Omani Military.<sup>48</sup>

**Qatar** has a small Army and Emiri Guard with some elite battalion and company-sized elements, but with less than a brigade's worth of armor by U.S. standards, and best suited to internal and border security. The IISS estimates that it has 8,500 men with an armored brigade, three mechanized battalions, and a Royal Guard Brigade. IHS Jane's reports there are three Special Force-type units under army command: Oil Well Guard Units; a Static Guards Regiment; and a Border Guards Regiment. Other security elements are stationed around critical facilities throughout the country.<sup>49</sup>

The Qatari Army's equipment includes 30 aging AMX-30 battle tanks, 230 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 190 armored personnel carriers (APC), 28 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 12 towed artillery weapons, 6+ multiple rocket launchers, 45 mortars, and holdings of anti-tank guided weapons.

Qatar has provided training to elements of Libyan and Syrian rebel forces.

**Bahrain's** Army and National Guard forces are limited, and are now focused on internal security. They have been relatively well trained and equipped for their mission of defending the island's security, and Iran has only limited capability to carry out forced entry amphibious operations. The Army has 6,000 men with one small armored brigade, one light mechanized brigade and an Emiri guard battalion.

The IISS estimates that the Bahraini Army's equipment includes 180 M-60A3 main battle tanks, 25 other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 200 armored personnel carriers (APC), 82 self-propelled (SP) artillery weapons, 36 towed artillery weapons, 9 multiple rocket

launchers, 24 mortars, and holdings of anti-tank guided weapons and IHawk, Crotale, and Stinger air defense weapons.

It also reports that there are 11,260 men in paramilitary forces. These include 9,000 police with APCs and helicopters, and 2,000 men in a National Guard with three battalions equipped with APCs, plus 300 men in a coastguard.

### **Maneuver and Power Projection**

**Map IV.1** shows the extent to which the Gulf acts as a water barrier to land operations and maneuvers. Iran must either use amphibious capabilities it currently lacks to strike across the Gulf, thrust its forces into and through Iraq, and then go into Saudi Arabia to the West or into Kuwait. **Map IV.2** shows that the “Kuwaiti hinge” in the upper Gulf is the only short land attack route to the southern Gulf, and Iranian forces would then have to cross a water barrier in the Shatt al Arab.

Iranian, Iraqi, and Arab Gulf forces are not well organized to project ground forces in offensive wars of maneuver. Iran does have some elite armored and mechanized divisions and brigades, but its overall force structure has never fully recovered from its defeats in the last phase of the Iran-Iraq War, or been able to acquire the modern land weapons that Iranian plans called for in the first wars after the Iran-Iraq War ended.

As noted earlier, much of Iran’s force structure is designed for defense in depth, and to operate with support from nearby facilities in the rear. Power projection is generally exercises in limited missions best suited to irregular warfare, air support exercises are idealized and unrealistic as to Iran’s capabilities and the survivability of its airpower, and Iran’s pool of modern armor, self-propelled artillery, land-based air defenses, and combat and service support equipment has many limitations.

Arab Gulf combat and service support forces are even more diverse than their combat units, and often fall short of what is needed for maneuver combat away from a their major operating base. Equipment standardization is poor and interoperability is limited. In many cases, member countries of the GCC have put more emphasis on improving cooperation with national internal security forces than cooperation with other member states.

At the same time, **Map IV.1** shows the problem that Arab Gulf forces face in terms of consolidating their strength. GCC ground forces have limited ability to cooperate and deploy as a united force, and only poor to mediocre joint training and readiness for large-scale operations. Geography is also a factor. Bahrain is an island and rapid movement away from the island is difficult. Qatar and the UAE are at significant maneuver and sustainability distance from Kuwait and the Saudi border. Saudi land forces are designed to operate near the military cites that house and base most Saudi forces. Efforts to create integrated Gulf land forces are largely symbolic and do not seem to have realistic plans to either support the vulnerable areas around Kuwait or the Saudi border with Iraq.

**Map IV.1: The Geographic Barriers to Gulf Land Force Operations**

Source: CIA



## Armor

The GCC spends far more on every branch of its on its military than Iran, and Saudi Arabia and UAE land forces have much better quality military equipment as well as better and more modern rotary and fixed wing aircraft to provide support in air-land combat.

Main battle tanks are a case in point. **Figure IV.3** shows that the GCC states have more main battle tanks, and other armor, than Iran. The GCC collectively has the capability to operate over 800 more MBTs than Iran. Other armored vehicles, include Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs), Reconnaissance Vehicles (RECCE), Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), and Personnel Protective Vehicles (PPVs). According to IISS Jane's, Iran's MBT arsenal relies on 150 Zulfiqar, 480 T-72Zs, 150 M60A1s, 75 T-62's, 100 *Chieftain* Mk3/Mk5s, 540 T54/T-55/Type-59/*Safir*-74s, and 168 M47/M48s.<sup>50</sup>

**Figure IV.4** shows that the main armor in GCC ground forces is more modern than Iran's. More broadly, most of the GCC models of both tanks and other armored weapons are Western made and of a higher quality than those in Iranian inventory. Due to sanctions and other political constraints, Iran also does not have easy access to the markets it needs to obtain replacement parts for its weaponry and armor originating from the West.

Many of Iran's tanks and other major weapons are decades old and some had extensive wear during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has been forced to reverse engineer parts—and in some cases, entire tanks---to maintain its military force, causing operability problems for the Iranians, and forcing it to turn to an expensive black market to find vital parts for its military.

The bulk of Iran's modern armor relies on Soviet era designs and equipment that they have upgraded, like their T72Zs, and their T54/T55s. Many of its western made MBTs are nearly 40 years out of date. Iranians has been forced to upgrade and maintain them, locally, and this raises questions about both their operational effectiveness, and their sustainability in maneuver warfare.

At the same time, **Figure IV.4** illustrates the broader lack of standardization and attendant interoperability and sustainability problems inherent in the national differences between the forces of the GCC states. The GCC's heavy armor relies heavily on M60As and their variations. Of the nine different battle tanks used by the GCC states, four of them originate from the U.S. (M1A2/A2s, M60A3S, M60A1, and the M60A3) and all but one originate from Western powers (the M-84 was originally produced in Yugoslavia, then Croatia after Yugoslavia was dissolved). Furthermore, upgrades to GCC armor is done by the supplier, meaning that the challenges Iran faces in maintaining its armor are not experienced by the GCC.

## Artillery Numbers vs. Artillery Quality

Iran's ground forces do, however, have some advantages. Iran's forces have extensive experience in defending the country as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has also steadily improved its defense in depth since 2003 as a reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Its Army, IRGC, and Basij forces are now organized to conduct asymmetric wars and wars of attrition in reaction to any invasion of Iran, as well as operations in areas near to its borders.

As **Figure IV.4** show, Iran's massive numbers of towed artillery and artillery rockets also give it massive advantage in sheer artillery firepower – albeit largely in terms of defensive mass fires – rather than precision. Iran's artillery does, however, have limited numbers of self-propelled artillery weapons – and its training exercises show it has limited maneuver skills and uncertainly sustainability. Iran is, however, acquiring drones for targeting purposes, and does seem to be improving its fire control systems.

### **The Air-Land Battle**

The **Figures** that cover the capabilities of Gulf land forces disguise a critical aspect of actual deterrent and war fighting capability. Almost all modern land combat between states and involving the organized forces of non-state actors is air-land combat, and heavily dependent on airborne manned and unmanned IS&R platforms, close air support, deep strike, and interdiction bombing. As **Chapter VII** shows, the GCC states have a significant advantage in fixed and rotary wing strike capability, and in modern land-based air defense capability. The GCC also have an advantage in airlift and air mobility.

As **Chapter XIII** shows, the GCC also has the advantage that the United States can project massive amounts of tactical airpower by Gulf standards within a matter of days. Deploying seapower takes time, and deploying U.S. heavy land combat units that do not have prepositioned equipment can take weeks to months, depending on the threat. The combination of U.S. precision strike, stealth, IS&R, and C4I/BM capabilities, however, is not determined by what the U.S. deploys forward at any given time, but by what the U.S. can project in days. This allows the U.S. and GCC to rapidly change both the air-land and air-sea-missile balance in ways that no comparison of the forces currently deployed in the Gulf can indicate.


It should be noted, however, that the political dimension of any conflict between GCC states and non-state actors within its population, or outside non-state actors that become embedded in its population – particularly in urban areas – present a very different challenges. Combat dominated by its political dimensions, and the need to protect civilian populations and avoid alienating them, can place severe limits on air targeting and strike capability as well as land operations, particularly in urban and built-up areas.

### **The Future Roles of Syria, Egypt and Jordan**

The Gulf balance is also changing because of the developments in neighboring states. The security of Iraq and the Gulf cannot be separated from the conflict in Syria and the role ISIL, al Nusra Front, the Khorasan Group, and other non-state actors play in Gulf security. Iraq can never be secure or stable as long as it faces a major threat or constant instability on its Western border.

Egypt and Jordan are not yet major actors in the Gulf balance, but both are now playing a growing role in supporting the Arab Gulf. At the same time, Jordanian stability is critical to securing the Western flank of the Gulf, as is the stability of Egypt – which no supports Saudi Arab in Yemen and plays a key role in allowing the U.S. to project power into the Gulf region.

**Figure IV.1: Total Army and Land Manpower of Gulf States—Active, Reserve, and Paramilitary Manpower**



\*Kuwait's Reserves include all branches of their military. Their actual ground reserve manpower is lower, but by how much is not available to IISS. Also, Iran's 1,000,000 man Basij Resistance force is not included because it would skew the balance of forces.


Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Police/Law enforcement	N/A		40	10.9			0.4		10.5	
Other (Tribal Guard/levies, Facilities Security Forces, Special Security Forces)	N/A	20		18.5			4		14.5	
Guards (Royal, Presidential)					2	66	5		75	12
IRGC			125							
Reserve			350	23.7		23.7				
Active Army & National Guard	193.4	60	450	271.5	8	11	25	8.5	175	44

Measured in Thousands of Men

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure IV.2: National Differences in the Land Force Structure of the Gulf States – Part One**




Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.



**Figure IV.2: National Differences in the Land Force Structure of the Gulf States – Part Two**

Units (Size & Type)	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
SF Company							1		
Independent Infantry Company						1			
SF Unit					1				
SF Battalion (SF Bn)				1					
Commando Battalion (Cdo Bn)					1				
Guard Battalion (Gd Bn)				1	1				
Airborne Battalion (AB Bn)						1			
Infantry Battalion (Inf Bn)								3	
Security Brigade (SY Bde)		5							
Airborne Brigade (AB Bde)		3	1				1	1	
SF Brigade (SF Bde)	2	1	1						
Commando Brigade (Cdo Bde)			6						
Infantry Brigade (Inf Bde)	2	27	12	1		1	1		2
Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Mech Bde)		11	16		3		3	5	2
Armored Brigade (Armd Bde)		14	7	1	3	1		4	2
Commando Division (Cdo Div)	1		1						
Infantry Division (Inf Div)	1								
Motor Division (Mot Div)	2								
Mechanised Division (Mech Div)	4								
Armored Division (Armd Div)	1								

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.


**Figure IV.3: Main Battle Tanks and Other Armored Vehicle Strength**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure IV.4: Main Battle Tank Suppliers By Operating Country and Production Years**

Recipient Country/Country Group	Type of Main Battle Tank	Years of Production	Country of Production
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE	AMX-30	1966-Present	France
Iran	<i>Chieftain</i>	1946-1979 (Iran); 1946-2012 (World)	United Kingdom
Oman,	CR2 <i>Challenger</i>	1990-2000	United Kingdom
Saudi Arabia,	M1A2/A2S <i>Abrams</i>	1980-Present	United States of America
Iran Oman,	M60A1	1961-1979 (Iran); 1961-1997 (World)	United States of America
Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia	M60A3/A3S	1961-1997	United States of America
Kuwait	M-84	1985-Present	Yugoslavia, Croatia
UAE	OF-40 Mk2 <i>Lion</i>	1981-Present	Italy
Iran	T-62	1961-1980	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Iran	T54/T55/Type 59/ <i>Safir-74s</i>	1947-1979 (Iran) 1947-Present (World)*	United States of America Iran
Iran	<i>Zulfiqar</i>	1996-Present	Iran
UAE	340 <i>Leclerc</i>	1995-2007	France

\*Iran has modified the T54/T55/Type 59 MBT and renamed it the *Safir-74S*, which it produces locally through the Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure IV.5: Total Artillery, Rockets, and Mortars**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Self-propelled Artillery	48	25	292	645	82	106	24	28	224	181
Towed Artillery	138	310	2,030	299	36	0	108	12	50	93
Multiple Rocket Launchers	0	294	1,476	209	9	27	0	6	60	107
Mortars	1,200	642	5,000	840	24	78	101	45	437	155


Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

### Figure IV.6: Iran's Reliance on Aging and Mediocre/Obsolescent Land Weapons

**MBT** 1,663+: 150 M60A1;  
 100 *Chieftain* Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/*Safir*-74; 168  
 M47/M48 (**480 T-72Z? 75+ T-62? 150 Zulfiqar?**)  
**LT TK** 80+: 80 *Scorpion*;  
**RECCE** 35 EE-9 *Cascavel*  
**AIFV** 610: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111  
**APC (T)** 340+: 200 M113; BMT-2 *Cobra*  
**APC (W)** 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; *Rakhsh*  
**SP** 292+: **155mm** 150+: 150 M109;; **175mm**  
 22 M107; **203mm** 30 M110  
**TOWED** 2,030+; **105mm** 150: 130 M101A1;; **155mm** 205: 120  
 GHN-45; 70 M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; **203mm** 20 M115  
**AIRCRAFT** • 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27 *Friendship*; 4 *Turbo Commander* 690 **PAX** 1 *Falcon*  
 20  
**ATK** 50 AH-1J *Cobra*  
**TPT** 173: **Heavy** 20 CH-47C *Chinook*; **Medium** 25 Mi-171;  
**Light** 128: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell 206 *Jet Ranger*  
 (AB-206); 50 Bell 214  
**MANPAD** 9K36 *Strela*-3 (SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K32 *Strela*-2 (SA-7 *Grail*)‡; **SP** 180: **23mm**  
 100 ZSU-23-4; **57mm** 80 ZSU-57-2

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure IV.7: The Impact of the U.S. Invasion and Islamic State on the Iran-Iraq Balance – Part One**



	Main Battle Tanks		Combat Aircraft	
	2003	2014	2003	2014
Iraq	2,200	336	316	3
Iran	1,565	1,663	283	334

Source: Based *The Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003 and 2015, and material from IHS Jane's, as adjusted by the authors.

### Figure IV.7: The Impact of the U.S. Invasion and Islamic State on the Iran-Iraq Balance – Part Two

Category	2003			2014		
	Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio	Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio
Active Manpower	424000	513000	4:5	271400	523000	1:2
Reserve Manpower	650000	350000	19:10	0	350000	NA
Main Battle Tanks	2200	1565	7:5	336	1663	1:5
AIFVs	1300	815	8:5	188	610	1:3
APCs	2400	590	4:1	3688	640	6:1
Towed Artillery	1900	2085	9:10	138	2030	1:20
Self-Propelled Artillery	150	310	1:2	48	292	1:6
Multiple Rocket Launchers	200	889	1:5	some	1476	NA
Combat Aircraft	316	283	11:10	3	334	1:100
Attack Helicopters	100	85	6:5	0	50	NA
Major SAM Launchers	225	205	11:10		529	NA

Source: Based *The Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003 and 2015, and material from IHS Jane's, as adjusted by the authors.

## ***V. Naval Forces***

As is the case with land, air, and missile forces seapower is only one dimension of the balance of military forces. Naval power in the Gulf is, however, of critical importance to the Arab Gulf states, Iran, and Iraq; and to the many other economies outside the Gulf that depend on the stable flow of Middle Eastern oil exports.

All of the Gulf States are dependent on both the stable flow of exports for a key part of their income, the Gulf states are equally dependent on the steady flow of shipping to Gulf ports. Outside economies -- especially those in Asia -- are dependent on petroleum exports from the Gulf, and would suffer from the global increase in petroleum prices that would come from any major interruption in the flow of Gulf exports. Sustained naval conflict would have a major impact on the entire global economy.

### **Seapower, Scenarios, and Joint Sea-Air-Missile Warfare**

The spectrum of conflicts involving naval forces can range from low level naval clashes - - and low level, asymmetric wars of attrition -- to major sea-air-missile conflicts. At its lowest levels, a naval conflict could take the form of limited raids by sea, or a low level war of attrition that only involved naval or seaborne attacks. Even this kind of war, however, would almost certainly include significant land-based IS&R activity and the use of maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs.

Any significant level of warfare that affected the flow of shipping as well as the security of Gulf facilities, ports, and offshore petroleum installations -- as well as defense and deterrence against amphibious raids and attacks -- is likely to involve joint air-sea warfare. It will produce a scenario-specific mix of sea, air, and missile power, and may well include marines, naval guards or some element of land forces.

In most cases involving a significant conflict, such a war would also involve land-based airpower and mixes of land-based and satellite IS&R and C4I/BM capabilities which are likely to play a critical role. Ports, offshore facilities, islands, key petroleum facilities, and key infrastructure facilities like desalination plants could also become targets for sea, air, and missile operations.

Iran has repeatedly made it clear in recent years that it can pose a major threat to the economic dynamics and seaborne trade within the region by attacking shipping and the flow of energy exports through the Gulf. These issues have already been discussed in **Chapter I**, but **Map V.1** serves as a reminder of the fact that the flow of Gulf energy exports is critical to the global economy, and particularly to the major industrial states of Asia and nations like the United States that are dependent on their manufactured exports.

The U.S. Energy Information Agency reported in November 2014 that,<sup>51</sup>

In 2013, total world petroleum and other liquids production was about 90.1 million barrels per day (bbl/d). EIA estimates that about 63% of this amount (56.5 million bbl/d) traveled via seaborne trade. Oil tankers accounted for 30% of the world's shipping by deadweight tonnage in 2013, according to data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

International energy markets depend on reliable transport routes. Blocking a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs and world energy prices. Chokepoints also leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft from pirates, terrorist attacks, shipping accidents that can lead to disastrous oil spills, and political unrest in the form of wars or hostilities.



... Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint because of its daily oil flow of 17 million barrels per day in 2013. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013 were about 30% of all seaborne-traded oil.

EIA estimates that more than 85% of the crude oil that moved through this chokepoint went to Asian markets, based on data from Lloyd's List Intelligence tanker tracking service. Japan, India, South Korea, and China are the largest destinations for oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Qatar exported about 3.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz in 2013, according to BP's Statistical Review of World Energy 2014. This volume accounts for more than 30% of global LNG trade.

Similar work by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicates that these shipments will be even more important in the future.<sup>52</sup>

The Strait of Hormuz is of particular strategic importance in assessing the vulnerability of this flow of energy because it creates such a narrow passage between the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and because the decades of turmoil and conflict elsewhere in the Middle East have meant there are so few pipeline alternatives,<sup>53</sup>

At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles wide, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait of Hormuz is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons.

Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Persian Gulf and have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2013, the total available unused pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was approximately 4.3 million bbl/d.

Saudi Arabia has the 746-mile Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate (installed) capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56-inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d, and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch increased Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, but this is only achievable if the system operates at its full nameplate capacity. Saudi Arabia also operates the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d. However, this pipeline is currently running at capacity and cannot move any additional oil.

The UAE operates the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (1.5 million bbl/d) that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline can transport more than half of UAE's total net oil exports. The government plans to increase this capacity in the near future to 1.8 million bbl/d.

While the capacity of such pipelines will increase marginally in the future, the strategic importance of this increase will be offset by the fact that the estimated increases in Gulf oil exports will exceed the new pipeline capacity and the pipeline ports on the Indian Ocean will be well within the range of potential Iranian attacks

The strategic importance and vulnerability of Gulf oil exports has been compounded by growing instability in Yemen and the risk that Iran's navy and air force might acquire facilities there and be able to play a growing role in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. An April 2015 report by EIA, following the collapse of the Yemeni government, reported:<sup>54</sup>

While Yemen is not a major oil-producing country, its coast borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. This strait is a strategic route for Persian Gulf oil, natural gas, and petroleum product shipments to Europe and North America, as well as European and North African oil exports to Asia. Although the strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, tankers passing through must use two 2-mile-wide shipping channels.

Trade in crude oil and petroleum products transiting the Bab el-Mandeb has increased steadily in recent years, growing from 2.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2010 to almost 4.7 million bbl/d in 2014. From 2013 to 2014, trade grew by more than 20%, with an increase of more than 200,000 bbl/d in crude oil exports from Iraq to Europe contributing to higher northbound traffic.

Record-level exports of crude oil and petroleum products (particularly distillate fuel oil) from Russia to Asia contributed the most to higher southbound traffic through the strait, somewhat offset by declines in exports of petroleum products from Europe and exports of crude oil from Libya. About 30% of Bab el-Mandeb's southbound traffic also passed through the Suez Canal or the Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline.

Increased instability around the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers in the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or the Sumed Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets through the Suez Canal and then on to the Bab el-Mandeb. As the security situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate, the United States has heightened maritime security in the area, and has announced its intention to work with Gulf Cooperation Council partners to ensure the continued flow of commerce through the strait.

These risks are not theoretical. The Tanker War (1984-1987) provides a historical example of the threat Iran poses to international shipping in the Gulf. During its war with Iraq, Iran sought to prevent Iraq from selling its oil by blocking Iraq's exports via the Shatt-al-Arab waterway—a small estuary along the disputed border between Iran and Iraq just upstream of the Gulf. In retaliation, Iraq responded by using air fighters to attack oil tankers it thought were traveling to Iranian ports in hopes of driving Iran to the negotiation table. However, this plan backfired and Iran retaliated by shelling an Indian freighter (April 1984), a Kuwaiti tanker (May 1984), and a Saudi Arabian tanker (May 1984).

These attacks involved Iran's use of long-range anti-ship missiles, patrol boat attacks, and naval mines. As Iraq escalated attacks on tankers heading to Iran, Iran escalated its attacks. When the tanker war finally involved the United States with the sinking of the USS Stark (May 17, 1987) by the Iraqis, the U.S. began increasing its presence in the Gulf, reflagging and escorting ships. As a result, Iran adapted its naval strategy "refraining from attacking the United States naval force directly..."<sup>55</sup>

Instead, Iran began mining the Gulf and using its naval forces asymmetrically via "hit-and-run attacks by small patrol boats, and periodic stop-and-search operations."<sup>56</sup> When Iran hit a Kuwaiti tanker with a Chinese made Silkworm missile in 1987, and when the USS Samuel B. Roberts hit a sea mine in 1988, the United States responded by sinking two Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf used to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping, as well as an Iranian frigate, the Sahand (Operation Nimble Archer and Operation Praying Mantis). Despite escalated military action, however, Iran's exports of oil never faced a major interruption.


**Map V.2 to Map V.5** show that many Gulf petroleum facilities and ports are vulnerable to combinations of sea, air, and missile power, particularly in the area near the Strait of Hormuz. Land combat may also be involved. At high levels of escalation, Iran might try to use its ground forces to offset the GCC and the U.S. advantage in air and sea power. It

might use them to try to dominate Iraq, to create a threat along the Saudi border, or to drive across the Shat al Arab and seize Kuwait. It might also seek to use support of non-state actors in countries like Yemen to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and the GCC states. Iran could also exploit its ability to use foreign non-state actors like the Hezbollah, or embed key elements of “train and assist forces” like the Iranian Al Quds Force.

Such scenarios could involve complex and unpredictable mixes of conventional forces, irregular or asymmetric forces, militias, and hostile non-state actors. The conventional balance of power might well to be prove largely irrelevant, and most serious levels of actual war fighting or deterrence are likely to be shaped by the combined impact of seapower, airpower, and missile power. Ideology, religion, and internal sectarian, ethnic, and tribal differences can play a critical role under such conditions.


As is the case, with land, air, and missile forces, the role of U.S. naval and other power projection forces, and those of other outside powers like Britain and France are likely to be equally important. This is particularly true in any scenarios that involve large-scale combat or that pose a significant threat to the smooth flow of oil exports. Other powers might contribute money, weapons, advisors, and political support.

## Map V.1: The Critical Importance of the Gulf Region as a Strategic Chokepoint (IN MMBD)



Estimated volumes of crude oil and petroleum products transported through world chokepoints, 2009-13

million barrels per day



Source: Adapted from EIA, world Transit Energy Chokepoints, November 10, 2014, p. 2, [http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World\\_Oil\\_Transit\\_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf](http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf), and “Oil trade off Yemen coast grew by 20% to 4.7 million barrels per day in 2014,” *Today in Energy*, April 23, 2015, <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20932>

**Map V.2: Gulf Oil Fields and Target Areas**

Source: EIA, "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," DOE, November 2014, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3>

### **Map V.3: Seapower and the Strait of Hormuz**

**280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.**

**Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median**

**Threats include:**


- **Anti-ship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.**
- **Iranian long-range land-based anti-ship missiles near Strait.**
- **Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes,**
- **Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.**
- **Covert as well as overt sensors.**

Source: [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/hormuz\\_80.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg); DOE/EIA, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, February 2011,

### Map V.4: Saudi Energy Infrastructure: A Gulf-Red Sea Targeting Case Study



Source: EIA, "Saudi Arabia, Country Analysis Brief," DOE, September 10, 2014, p. 11

**Map V.5. : Key Gulf Ports and Harbors**

Source: Source: U.S. NGA



## **The Other Elements of Seapower**

Comparisons of naval manpower, force structure, and force strength still matter. As is the case with every element of military power, however, the more easily quantifiable measures of naval force strength do not compare many critical elements of real world seapower and combat capability.

- Training and large scale, realistic naval and joint warfare combat exercise performance.
- Combat experience and actual time at sea.
- Readiness.
- Sustainability, endurance, and replenishment capability.
- Motivation and morale.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability (IS&R).
- Targeting and smart munitions capabilities.
- Command, control, communications, computer, and battle management capabilities (C4I/BM).
- Political leadership and unity.
- Interoperability and common doctrine, training, and leadership for allied forces.

## **Force Structure and Mission Capability**

The effective use of seapower presents special challenges to each of the Gulf navies in different ways:

### ***Iranian Navy***

As is the case with land forces various sources differ in detail. The IISS reports that Iran's naval forces are the largest in the Gulf and have some 18,000 actives, with 3 submarines, 1 Iranian-made submarine in trials, 18 submersibles with two torpedo tubes each, 3 submarine delivery vehicles, 6 missile corvettes with C-802s and CSS-N-8s, 14 Khaman-class missile patrol frigates with C-802s, 8 fast missile patrol boats with CS-701s and CS-704s, more than 40 other patrol boats, 3 semi-submersible patrol boats, numerous small patrol boats, 5 mine countermeasure vessels, 13 landing ships, 11 landing craft and 47 logistic and support ships. The Navy also has 2,600 Marines, and a Naval Aviation branch with 2,600 men, 3 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, 16 transports, 10 ASW helicopters, and 3 mine counter measure helicopters.

Iran also has naval branch of the IRGC with 15,000 assigned to the naval branch and a 5,000 man marine brigade. It is reported to have some 46 missile patrol boats with C-701s and C-802s, and some 60 other patrol boats.

Iran's Navy and the naval branch of its Revolutionary Guards are the only regional naval forces with meaningful combat experience. Even that experience is limited, however, and consists largely of taking losses during the Iran-Iraq War and the "Tanker War" with losses to the U.S. in 1987-1988. Iran has, however, since attempted to develop an effective large-scale exercise effort for joint sea-air warfare and develop a significant capability for asymmetric warfare.

The naval balance is also affected by the fact that Iran is the only Gulf Navy to have a separate naval air branch, the GCC states have never developed an integrated maritime patrol aircraft, UAV, and sensor capability, and that even those GCC Air Forces that have a significant naval surveillance capability – like the Saudi AWACS – do not give the mission proper emphasis. This might not matter if – as seems likely -- the U.S. deployed such capabilities, but even then, GCC navies would often lack the C4I/BM capability and level of interoperability to make proper use of U.S. capabilities. In general, a force cannot fight in ways it does not properly practice, exercise, and prepare for in peacetime.

As the Velayat 91 Exercise Iran held in late 2012 and early 2013 demonstrated, Iran has increasingly attempted to project naval power into the Indian Ocean area, the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and Mediterranean. Velayat 91 was also an exercise where Iran deployed three frigates: the Sabalan, Jamaran, and Alborz, as well as one of its Kilo-Class submarines. This demonstrated Iran's continuing ability to deploy its larger surface ships, although all three had been purchased while the Shah was still in power. Like most of Iran's major surface ships, they have aged to the point of obsolescence, although like most of Iran's major surface ships, they had major upgrades including the replacement of their Sea Killer missiles with Chinese-made C-802s, fitting two sets of triple 12.75 inch torpedo tubes, machine guns and 81- mm mortars. Their remaining limits are illustrated by the fact their Sea Cat anti-aircraft missiles had to be replaced with an ineffective 20mm AA.

U.S. and other experts make mixed assessments of these exercises. They feel Iran's exercises show that Iran's Navy still has significant limitations, and often exaggerates the scale and nature of its exercises, as well as the success of some weapons tests. They indicate that the Navy has significant readiness problems, often has to rely on outdated equipment and uncertain modernization efforts, and lacks the air capabilities to sustain an effective air sea operation in the face of the Arab Gulf, U.S., and allied air combat capabilities – although Iran's extensive anti-ship missile capabilities compensate in part for its limited air capabilities.

At the same time, experts also feel that Iran's exercises also sometimes show considerable flexibility and ability to adapt and innovate. Iran has also tailored its exercise and readiness activity to confront the GCC states, U.S., and other allies with a naval, air, and missile threat to “close the Gulf” to the flow of shipping. They also feel that the Iranian Navy has demonstrated the ability to put its forces into action at sea, albeit with sustainability problems. Both the Iranian Navy and Naval Branch of the Revolutionary Guards are seen as moderately effective forces by regional standards.

### ***The Role of the Naval Branch of Iran's IRGC -- the IRGCN***

Iran is unique in having a separate naval force in the naval branch of the IRGC -- or IRGCN. This force now makes up an important part of Iran's naval manpower, plays a major role in Iran's operations in the Gulf, and continues to grow. The IISS estimates that the IRGCN had more than 20,000 men, including some 5,000 marines in 2013. These figures do not include elements of the Army's special forces, which have one Special Forces Brigade, a Commando Division with three brigades, and six independent commando brigades as well as an air borne brigade.

The IRGCN is organized to present asymmetric threats. It has exercised the capability to support a battle of attrition, and focused, limited clashes throughout the Gulf that would not cripple Iran's own sea lines of communication (SLOCs) or necessarily provoke major U.S. reprisals. It regularly practices rapid dispersals out of its normal bases, the use of concealment and camouflage, and hit and run attacks. According to one expert source, these now include specially built, high speed boats that have a low radar profile and are filled with high explosive for the equivalent of suicide attacks.

According to IHS Jane's, it is equipped with 10 Houdong missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles, large numbers of small Boghammar and other patrol craft. According to one Iranian naval officer, it now has more than 300 ships and boats. It has bases on islands and coastal areas in the Gulf, such as Siri Island, Farsi, Halileh, Abu Musa, Khorramshahr, Larak, and Bandar Abbas.<sup>57</sup> The IRGCN continues to expand and increase its mine warfare capability, as well as modernize its older surface ships. The IRGCN also controls Iran's coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 'Seersucker' land-based anti-ship missile units. IHS Jane's estimates that these are deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.<sup>58</sup>

Elements of Iran's Army also showed that they could play an active combat role in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, and sometimes play a role in exercises involved naval forces or simulated targets in the Gulf. They also do not include the Iranian Al Quds Forces – a separate force within the IRGC that -- along with the MOIS – could infiltrate maritime and port targets, or indoctrinate and train native saboteurs. It should be stressed that maritime conflict does not have to involve maritime targets. It can involve raids on islands, offshore facilities, and ship seizures using small craft.

### ***Iraqi Navy***

Iraq only has a 58-kilometer coastline and relatively shallow coastal waters, forcing it the share a waterway with Kuwait and to export most of its oil from offshore moorings. Most of Iraq's navy was destroyed in the First Gulf War in 1990-1991, and Iraq now has only has token naval forces, and cannot challenge Iran in local waters. Its naval forces are suited for securing commercial traffic, but do not represent a meaningful combat force.

The IISS reports that Iraq's naval forces now have 3,600 actives and a brigade of 1,500 marines with two battalions. It reports that its ships include 2 ocean-going patrol boats, 2 coastal patrol boats, 20 small patrol boats, 6 river patrol boats and two offshore support vessels. IHS Jane's reports Iraq's Navy has 26 Defender-class craft; 15 30-35 meter patrol craft; 4 390-ton Fateh-class patrol ships; 2 55-60 m offshore support vessels (OSVs) and numerous small craft. There is also a small 500-man coast guard in the Ministry of Interior that is largely an anti-smuggling force.<sup>59</sup>

The 35 meter patrol boats make up a larger naval aid program including training, guns, ammunition, infrastructure, and training.<sup>60</sup> Swiftships Shipbuilding, based out of Morgan City, Louisiana in the U.S., was awarded an \$18 million contract to provide patrol boats for Iraq's Navy.<sup>61</sup> The added ships will aid the Iraqi Navy in patrolling and securing its southern border, and protect its oil infrastructure. According to Defense industry Daily, "Armament will includes the 30mm MSI deck gun system forward, a .50 cal machine gun aft on the 01 level, and 7.62 machine guns on the bridge wings."<sup>62</sup>

The Iraq Navy is best equipped to defend Iraq's two offshore oil-delivery platforms" of al-Basra and Khor al-Amaya, and passage through its Khawr Abd Allah (KAA) estuary and its critical maritime infrastructure against terrorist attacks. It also has reached an agreement with Kuwait to cooperate in securing the Khawr Abd Allah waterway.

### *Yemeni Navy*

The Yemeni Navy has not suffered from the internal conflicts as the Army and Air force, and had not been the target of major Saudi bombing as of early May 2015. It is unclear, however, that it presently has any combat effectiveness – given the lack of any coherent government or political structure in Yemen.

The IISS reports that Yemen's naval forces had some 2,600 actives before the collapse of its central government in the spring of 2015. IHS Jane's reports 1,700, including 500 naval infantry and the operators of two land-based SS-C-3 antiship missile batteries at Perim Island covering the Bab el-Mandab. It has 1 ocean-going missile patrol boat, although it is unclear it was armed with operational SS-N-2Cs, 6 fast patrol boats, 15 other patrol boats, with 3 equipped with firing racks for C-801s, 2 ocean-going minesweepers, 1 landing ship, 3 landing craft, and 2 logistic and support ships. It also has a 1,200 man Coastal Authority with 4 fast patrol boats and 13 small patrol boats.

Outside navies had attempted to help the Yemeni Navy before the collapse of the central government because of the rise of piracy in the 1990s, and had set up a ship tracking system for the navy and coast guard. IHS Jane's and outside experts report that Yemeni Navy readiness was poor even before the Houthi advance, and that many older vessels were inoperable or need extensive repair, which meant that one of its ocean-going missile patrol boats and other boats were inoperable. Some 10 more modern Austal fast patrol craft were believed to be operable. The Navies main headquarters and port at Hoddeiah may, however, be under Houthi control. .

### *Arab Gulf Navies*

The main challenge the Arab Gulf navies now face is dealing with lower level conflicts and the threat of asymmetric warfare, and the initial phases of any sudden escalation to a major sea-air-missile conflict. Any naval conflict in the Gulf that threatened the flow of world energy exports would almost certainly trigger a massive and immediate U.S. sea and air response. The resulting mix of Arab Gulf and U.S. forces could almost certainly counter the Iranian naval threat in a matter of days or weeks. At the same time, the Arab Gulf states cannot simply turn responsibility over to the U.S., or cannot ignore the leverage that it gives Iran and its deterrent impact. The Arab Gulf Navies also have problems of their own.

No Arab Gulf Navy has significant combat experience in naval warfare or joint warfare involving naval forces. Outside experts do feel, however, that the joint exercises held by the U.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet and other outside navies – and broader USCENTCOM-led joint warfare exercises -- are helping to improve the professionalism of Gulf navies. They also feel that the UAE is steadily improving its naval and joint warfare capability, as well as naval proficiency and readiness.

Outside experts also praise individual elements of each of the GCC navies. They note, however, that most such navies are small, do not train and exercise at the levels needed, have limited joint warfare capabilities, and often spend only limited time at sea. Some

experts also feel that GCC navies tend to buy ships that are loaded with weapons and technology to the point where they will be difficult to fight, and one commented that many large GCC surface warfare ships have “more glitter than guts.”

The **Saudi Navy** is the largest Arab Gulf Navy. According to the IISS, it has 13,500-15,500 men and a 3,000-man marine force with one regiment of two battalions and equipped with 140 BMR-600P APCs. It has 3 missile destroyers, 4 missile frigates, 9 missile patrol boats, 56 other patrol boats, and 8 landing craft. A *Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine*, however, reports a total of 25,000-30,000 Saudi Arabian Navy personnel in 2011-2012. This same report identifies different Saudi force levels from the IISS data. It does not list how many destroyers Saudi Arabia had in 2001-2012, if any, but it reports 7-10 frigates, and a total of 50-75 patrol boats.<sup>63</sup>

According to IHS Jane's, the Saudi navy was divided into western and eastern fleets with the following ships in early 2015:<sup>64</sup>

***Red Sea (Western) Fleet***

- Three La Fayette Type F-3000S frigates
- Four Al-Madina-class frigates
- Two As-Siddiq-class fast attack craft (missile)
- One Addriyah-class (U.S. MSC-322) coastal minesweeper
- Halter-class patrol craft
- Simmoneau 51-class inshore patrol craft
- Two Durrance-class replenishment ships

***Gulf (Eastern) Fleet***

- Four Badr-class missile corvettes
- Seven As-Siddiq-class fast attack craft (missile)
- Three Addriyah-class (U.S. MSC 322) coastal minesweepers
- Three Al-Jawf-class (UK Sandown) coastal minesweepers
- Halter-class patrol craft
- Simmoneau 51 inshore patrol craft
- Four LCU 1610-class landing craft

The Saudi Navy also has a naval aviation element with 12 AS332B/F combat helicopters armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles and 34 maritime rescue and reconnaissance helicopters. Its air force operates E-3s with advanced maritime patrol and surveillance sensors. The Saudi Navy has never received the same resources as the other Saudi forces, and the Saudi Navy has lagged badly behind the Saudi Air Force in readiness and modernization.

The Saudi navy has excellent facilities and C4I capabilities, but the combat readiness of the Saudi fleet in the Gulf is estimated to be mediocre. Key aspects of maintenance and sustainment are by contract personnel. The readiness of the Saudi Red Sea fleet is estimated to be poor – a key issue given the growing instability in Yemen and the fact that the Saudi

Red Sea coast is 1,900 kilometers long and six times longer than its Gulf coast. ASW and some aspects of asymmetric warfare capability are limited.

Plans have existed for some years to improve Saudi naval capabilities but have never been properly executed. Saudi Arabia has badly needed to modernize its Gulf and Red Sea fleets for at least a decade, to fund higher readiness in its Gulf fleet, and raise the level of readiness in its Red Sea Fleet above a marginal level.

The Navy has three modern French La Fayette F3000 Stealth (F3000S) frigates, although one had to have extensive repairs after hitting a coral reef, but its other major surface ships and many of its other vessels are aging. They include four Madina-class (French F2000S) frigates armed with eight Otomat 2 launchers (160 kilometers) and four Badr-class (former U.S. Tacoma-class) missile corvettes. It is also one of the few Arab Gulf navies to recognize the importance of mine warfare, although its resources and capabilities are limited. It has 7 mine countermeasure vessels, but at least 4 have limited mission capability. It is also relatively well equipped for lasting operations at sea with 17 logistic and support ships.

There have been many reports that Saudi Arabia would act on Saudi Navy expansion plans (SNEP), including a \$20 billion purchase from the U.S. or major new buy from France, but these reports have not been followed by actions.<sup>65</sup> There has been no serious progress towards creating new fully interoperable Arab Gulf naval capabilities to meet key mission requirements, and a sporadic focus on “glitter factor” prestige buys like Aegis cruisers and submarines. There has also been a failure to develop adequate maritime patrol and naval surveillance capabilities on an integrated basis, and properly prepare for joint air-sea operations. Saudi Arabia does not seem to take proper advantage of the maritime patrol capabilities of its E-3 AWACS.

Saudi Arabia also has a 4,500-man Coast Guard with 6 fast patrol boats, 8 other patrol boats, and 8 landing craft, plus 4 logistic support ships.

**The UAE** is building up its naval forces to go from a coastal defense force to a more serious “blue water” force that can cover both its Gulf and Indian Ocean coasts and operate outside its immediate waters. According to the IISS, its Navy now has 2,500 men and a force of 8 missile corvettes armed with Exocet MM-40 anti-ship missiles, as well as eight missile fast attack craft armed with Exocet, 6 other patrol boats, 2 mine countermeasure ships, a landing ship, 10 swimmer delivery vehicles, and 28 landing craft. It has 5 logistic and support ships.

The UAE is considering further naval modernization, and creating a more capable marine battalion. It has, however, had problems in expanding to frigates in the past and like Saudi Arabia has expressed an interest in submarines when its priorities lie in countering Iranian asymmetric warfare capabilities like missile patrol boats, mines, and submersibles. It does have maritime patrol aircraft and ASW helicopters and outside experts feel it is effective for its size and that readiness is adequate to good.

The UAE Ministry of the Interior operates a Coast Guard with 1 large patrol boat, 58 small fast patrol boats, and 55 other patrol boats. These include a wide range of types and their readiness and effectiveness is unclear.

**Oman** is reported to have a relatively effective navy with 4,200 men and a 150-man royal yacht squadron. It has 3 missile frigates with MM-40 Exocets, 2 missile corvettes with MM-

40 Exocet, 3 other coast patrol craft, 4 patrol boats, 1 landing ship, and 5 landing craft plus 6 logistic and support ships. Its air force has SC.7 3M Skyvan maritime patrol aircraft, and it has a 400-man Police Coast Guard with 2 large patrol boats, 3 smaller fast patrol boats, and 27 small patrol boats.

Outside experts feel it has good readiness, and it is upgrading its patrol vessels and ESM capabilities. However, the Omani Navy has minimal mine warfare capability, lacks adequate maritime surveillance capability for the waters outside the Strait of Hormuz, and limited ASW capabilities except for the Agusta Westland Super Lynx helicopters operated by its air force. It is deploying three modern corvettes with some “stealth” features and helicopters and is giving it a major increase in effectiveness. It also has the procurement of new patrol boats under contract, which are needed to replace its four aging Dhofar-class fast attack craft. Oman is the one Arab Gulf power that conducts naval exercises with both Iran and U.S. and other Arab Gulf navies.

**Kuwait** has a small 2,700-man force including its Coast Guard. It is shaped to provide coastal defense and maritime security operations. Its most effective combat vessels include eight Um al-Maradim-class fast attack craft (French La Combattante-1 P-37BRL) equipped with Matra BAE Dynamics Sea Skua SL anti-ship missiles. It also has 10 coastal patrol boats and eight additional but aging Lurssen missile fast attack craft. It is seeking to replace them with high speed intruder-interceptor boats, and to develop some amphibious capability.

It exercises actively with U.S. and other GCC naval forces, and cooperates with Iraq in securing the narrow waterway between its islands and Iraq.

**Qatar** has a small 8,500 man navy equipped with 7 missile patrol ships armed with MM-40 Exocets, 3 fast attack craft, and 1 other patrol boat, plus one large landing craft and 2 logistic and support ships. There is a small coastal defense force with one battery of 3 quad launchers with MM-40 Exocet, and a small Coast Guard with 4 fast patrol boats and 8 other patrol boats. Its air force has 8 Commando Mk3 anti-surface warfare and ASW helicopters.

Outside experts feel its effectiveness and readiness is low to moderate for the defense of local waters and key elements of the force lack night vision and operating gear and suitable speed, but the exercise performance of its more capable elements is moderate to good. The Qatari Navy has limited amphibious lift and an aging force of Exocet coastal defense missiles. It is acquiring a new port and naval base, but needs upgrading to play a more serious role in the Gulf.

**Bahrain’s** small 700 man-navy is well armed for a force its size. It has 1 missile frigate with Harpoon, 2 missile corvettes with MM-40 Exocet, 4 missile patrol boats with MM-40 Exocet, 4 other patrol boats, 9 landing craft, and 12 logistic and support ships.

Outside experts feel it has good operational readiness and exercise performance for a force of its size and structure, but is primarily designed to operate with the forces of other countries or for the protection of local waters and missions like counterterrorism. Bahrain does benefit, however, from the fact the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet of the U.S. Navy is based and headquartered in Bahrain.

Bahrain's Ministry of the Interior also has a 260-man coast guard with 23 small fast patrol boats and 29 other patrol boats. This is too large an inventory for a force its size to operate effectively.

### Overall Surface Ship Strength

The individual Gulf navies have very different structures, and capabilities. Once again, however, the GCC navies have had a major advantage in their ability modernize and acquire advanced weapons and technology. Iran has attempted to compensate by creating a different force mix best suited for asymmetric or irregular warfare that emphasizes small patrol craft, submarines, and mine warfare force capability.

**Figure V.2** summarizes the overall ship strength of each Gulf navy. The Gulf navies have an advantage in modern surface warfare ships. Saudi Arabia alone has seven major surface ships, compared to Iran's four.<sup>66</sup> The GCC navies, however, have no submarines, about half the number of Iran's submersibles, and a limited number of mine hunters relative to Iran's mine forces.

**Figure V.3 and V.4** show that the Arab Gulf's destroyers, frigates, and cruisers not only outnumber Iran's forces of major surface combat ships, but also outperform Iran's and are relatively new. For example, Saudi Arabia's destroyers are only thirteen years old; Iran's 'destroyers' are thirty-four years old, but have been upgraded domestically ever since. However, what is unclear is whether Iran's upgrades are conducive to the ship, which is highly unlikely, and even if the upgrades are conducive, whether they improved on Iran's force deficiencies, mentioned above. Furthermore, the GCC has the ability to send their ships to their Western manufacturers for repairs and upgrades if and when needed.

In terms of firepower, the data on the armament of Iranian and GCC vessels shown in **Figure V.3** and **Figure V.4** indicate that Iran's ships are less well equipped with modern weaponry than those in the Arab Gulf. Furthermore, **Figure V.5** shows that Iran's fleet has many of the same age and capability problems as its land forces and air force. Most of Iran's major surface ships and frigates were commissioned in 1968—when the Shah was still ruler of Iran and friendly to the United States and the West. Iran's fleet has been affected by the impact of sanctions and Iran's international isolation. As a result, Iran has been forced to rely on domestic, Russian, and Chinese produced naval technology, to keep outdated vessels in service, and is one of the factors leading to their strategy. The GCC has not been hindered by such limitations.

This situation will change with time. Iran's most recent frigate, the Jamaran, was commissioned in 2010, and is the first of a class of four more modern ships. This class is based on Iran's aging Alvand Class (Vosper Mk 5) of light patrol frigates, which is a 1971 design, but it does have a relatively effective mix of weapons and modern sensors. These include Sikorsky SH-3 Sea Kings and shipboard sensors for ASW, and some reports indicate it has a close-in anti-submarine torpedo system with 30 km range, mounted in triple launchers on either side of its stern; four Noor or C-802 surface-to-surface anti-ship cruise missiles; four Fajr Surface to Air Missiles (reverse engineering of RIM-66/SM-1 Standard missiles) two 20 mm manned Oerlikon cannons and a 40 mm Fateh-40 auto-cannon for point-defense against incoming anti-ship missiles and aircraft; and a 76 mm Fajr-27 main gun. Most of Iran's missile patrol boats and craft are also more recent and based on more recent design plans.<sup>67</sup>



The Arab Gulf and Red Sea navies have limits of their own. **Figure V.6** shows the source country of GCC naval vessels. It provides a broad warning the GCC navies have the same lack of integration and interoperability as other Gulf forces. The same is true of much of their doctrine and training, and seapower-related aspects of their C4I/BM and IS&R capabilities

Overloading ships with combat systems is a potential weakness in Arab Gulf naval forces. For example, the Al Riyadh destroyer is equipped with 8 MM-40 Exocet Block II anti-ship missiles, 16 Vertical Launch System Aster SAMs, 4 single 533mm Anti-Submarine torpedo tubes with torpedoes, and a 100mm gun. The original LaFayette destroyer, from which Al Riyadh is designed, is only equipped with 8 MM-40 Exocet Block II anti-ship missiles, 1 100mm gun, 2 20mm F2 guns, and 1 Crotale CN2 CIWS.

Not only did the Saudi Royal Navy remove their close-in weapon system (CIWS)—which would counter Iran’s military strategy—they added more missile launchers and torpedoes, which add weight making maneuverability much more difficult. Pitted against small, maneuverable Iranian craft that depend on close combat by necessity, these destroyers could prove to be easy targets for the Iranian Navy. Saudi Arabia is not the only GCC navy to have done this to its destroyers, frigates, and smaller craft. The UAE has also added to their corvettes. The Mubarraz class corvette, based off the German Lurssen TNC-45, has an additional six SAM launchers, adding to the weight of the corvette making it much less maneuverable.

### Naval Manpower

**Figure V.1** shows the manpower strength of each Gulf Navy. Iran has by far the largest numbers – its sea forces manpower totals 35,600, compared with a total of 21,200 for the GCC states. Iran also has large marine forces and Iran is the only Gulf country with a dedicated naval aviation branch.

There is no reliable way to use unclassified data to break down the elements of Iranian naval strength by mission and function – or to assess manpower training and quality -- but Iran’s large naval and marine have been partly driven by Iran’s emphasis on asymmetric naval warfare, while the comparatively low totals for GCC states reflect the fact they have been driven by the fact that they have tended to rely on U.S. naval power and they have emphasize their airpower or seapower.

### Patrol Boats and Asymmetric/Irregular Warfare

**Figure V.7** highlights the differences between Iran’s holdings of patrol boats and craft, and those of GCC naval forces. It shows that Iran has created a large force of small ships that are easy to disperse and conceal, harder to detect when at sea, and can be used to swarm or attack larger ships with anti-ship missiles, guns or in suicide attack as expendable losses. Iran only possesses four frigates, or destroyers; yet maintains sixty-five smaller craft armed with Anti-ship Missiles (AShMs) and rocket launchers.

As is the case with its army and other services, the force mix in Iran’s Navy has to some extent been driven by necessity. Iran has had limited access to outside sources of modern surface combat ships, and weapons systems and sensors. The bulk of Iran’s frigates were commissioned in 1968—when the Shah was still ruler of Iran and friendly to the United States and the West. Iran has also been forced to maintain its older craft “without the ability

to send them to foreign ship repair yards or overhaul facilities.”<sup>68</sup> Their poor condition led the ONI to conclude that Iran’s navy has “significant” readiness problems.<sup>69</sup>

This helps explain why most of Iran’s missile boats are far more recent designs than its major surface ships and a 2012 report by *IHS Jane’s Defense* states that Iran has calculated that using “small, high-speed craft, with rocket launchers, torpedoes, and mines to ‘swarm’ around U.S. warships in maritime guerrilla ‘hit and run attacks’, while anti-ship missiles were launched from shore...” is the most effective way to counter larger U.S. sea craft, asymmetrically countering the U.S.’s overwhelming advantage in firepower and technology.<sup>70</sup>

At the same time, part of Iran’s preference for smaller combat vessels is due to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) when “the IRGCN’s (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp: Navy) small boat attacks established it as a legitimate entity and viable threat, and solidified the primacy of the IRGCN’s asymmetric tactics.”<sup>71</sup> In contrast, Iran had little success when its larger surface ships clashed with the United States, which possesses the most technologically advanced military in the world. Iran learned during the U.S. *Operation Praying Mantis* in 1988 that any sustained, classical engagement with the U.S. Navy would result in Iranian defeat.<sup>72</sup>

When the U.S. destroyed much of Iraq’s military in 1991, and then the invasion in 2003, Iran calculated that “its forces must be able to withstand such an initial attack in order to fight back.”<sup>73</sup> An incident that occurred in the Gulf between Iran and the UK Royal Navy in March 2007 provides an example of this aspect of Iran’s application of asymmetric strategy. On March 23, 2007 Iran’s navy surrounded 15 members of the Royal Navy and seized them at gunpoint while the Royal Navy personnel were inspecting a merchant ship, suspected of smuggling in the Shatt al-Arab waterway off the Iraq-Iran coast.

An asymmetric strategy also allows Iran to compensate for the limits on its airpower but rapidly and easily dispersing its forces relies on its long coast and favorable geography. **Figure V.8** shows that Iran has a wide range of bases it can use to disperse its forces and its smaller ships can conceal themselves near the shore in Gulf islands as well.

Iran’s reliance on smaller patrol boats and craft does, however, impose problems. They suffer from endurance, operating range, armor, and accuracy deficiencies and weaknesses. These weaknesses require Iran’s smaller craft to have close proximity to their targets, with little protection for their crew, as well as required operation close to shore or in shallow waters.<sup>74</sup> Iran can deploy its larger surface ships in the Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, and even the Mediterranean in peacetime, but they would be very vulnerable to U.S. aid, missile, and seapower in war.

### Threats to Shipping

As has been discussed earlier, the “Tanker War” (1984-1987) that took place in the broader context of the Iran-Iraq War provides a historical example of the threat Iran poses to international shipping in the Gulf. During its war with Iraq, Iran sought to prevent Iraq from selling its oil by blocking Iraq’s exports via the Shatt-al-Arab waterway—a small estuary along the disputed border between Iran and Iraq just upstream of the Gulf.

In retaliation, Iraq responded by using air fighters to attack oil tankers it thought were traveling to Iranian ports in hopes of driving Iran to the negotiation table. However, this

plan backfired and Iran retaliated by shelling an Indian freighter (April 1984), a Kuwaiti tanker (May 1984), and a Saudi Arabian tanker (May 1984). These attacks involved Iran's use of long-range anti-ship missiles. As Iraq escalated attacks on tankers heading to Iran, Iran escalated its attacks to include Kuwait tankers – hitting a Kuwaiti tanker with a Chinese made Silkworm missile in 1987.

This led to the U.S. “reflagging” Kuwait tankers as U.S. ships to guarantee their security. Iran initially responded with a strategy of “refraining from attacking the United States naval force directly...”<sup>75</sup> However, Iran continued to mine Gulf waters, conducted “hit-and-run attacks with small patrol boats, and carried out periodic stop-and-search operations.”<sup>76</sup> When the USS Samuel B. Roberts hit an Iranian mine in 1988, the United States responded by sinking two Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf that Iran used to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping, as well as an Iranian frigate, the Sahand (*Operation Nimble Archer* and *Operation Praying Mantis*). This forced Iran to halt its attacks on Gulf shipping before the “Tanker War” escalated further. There was no air or missile conflict, or set of retaliatory attacks on Iran's oil exports.

This Tanker War is still relevant because it shows that Iran will target shipping when its security is at stake. Additionally, Iran has steadily built up its capabilities for an asymmetric naval conflict. This has partly been an act of necessity because the limits on Iran's arms imports, but it has also occurred because it has involved relatively low costs and expendable Iranian forces whose very existence allows Iran to put at least indirect pressure on the Arab Gulf States and on international shipping. Iran knows from practical experience that private companies and outside powers do not put ships into harm's way without substantial incentives and some guarantee of effective protection. Even the most limited damage to a single commercial ship – or a credible threat -- could have a broad impact on the flow of tankers and Gulf imports.

While Iran's Navy suffered serious losses during the “Tanker War,” and the U.S. and Arab Gulf states have substantial retaliatory capabilities, Iran (especially the IRGC) might still calculate that it could carry out attacks sporadically and at low enough levels to carry out a war of attrition that would put continuing pressure on the Arab Gulf states without triggering major escalation and attacks on Iran. This might be particularly true if Iran calculated that it could obtain some degree of deniability by using submersibles and/or covert mine laying. It might also calculate that any limited Iranian naval losses would be acceptable, particularly if they involved smaller patrol boats and commercial vessels to lay mines.

More broadly, Iran might feel a much higher level of escalation involving Iran's anti-ship, and air-to-surface missiles, smart mines, and a serious air-seas conflict would demonstrate that cost of any broader military attack or invasion of Iran – either as a preemptive measure or response to any major attack on Iran – such as an attack on its nuclear facilities.

### **Submarines and Anti-Submarine Warfare**

Iran's focus on asymmetric warfare helps explain Iran's purchase of three Russian submarines, and large numbers of small submersibles. The ‘submarine balance’ now clearly favors Iran over the GCC at least in numbers, as **Figure V.9** illustrates. Only the UAE and Saudi Arabia possess small submersibles and they only possess a total of 12 swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), compared to Iran's 8 SDVs, 17 diesel-electric midget

submarines (SSW), 1 coastal submarine (SSC), and 3 large hunter-killer (SSK) *Taregh* (*Tareq*) class submarines. Iran's *Taregh* (*Tareq*) class submarines are the only major submarines in Gulf navies. They give Iran some capability to counter the U.S. surface presence in the Gulf, and a covert way to attack shipping and combat ships in the region without being as exposed to detection and attacks by airpower and anti-ship missiles.<sup>77</sup>

The *Tareghs* are Russian-made *Kilo* class submarines that Iran first acquired in the 1990s. They include the *Taregh-901*, *Noor-902*, and the *Yunes-903*. They were upgraded in 2006 by Russia and equipped with six single torpedo tubes.<sup>78</sup> According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) only two of the *Taregh* class submarines are operational at any one time, which some suggest may indicate Iran's inability to staff a fully competent submarine crew, their excessive caution for the preservation of their only heavily armed submarines, or the inability for three of their *Taregh* submarines to effectively maneuver and coordinate with one another in the shallow Gulf waters.<sup>79</sup>

A number of sources like the NTI report that the *Taregh's* utility in the Gulf is limited because they "require a depth of at least 164 feet and can therefore only access about one third of the Gulf."<sup>80</sup> The potential restrictions on submarine operations in the Gulf are shown in **Map V.5**, where the white areas in the Gulf provide a rough picture of the areas where submarines might find this kind of depth. It is unclear, however, that calculations based on operating criteria for conventional naval warfare would apply to Iran's use of submarines in the Gulf, where the risk of detection and anti-submarine warfare might be limited.

There are many asymmetric scenarios, however, where Iran might calculate that there would be enough depth to support covert operation and provide some degree of deniability. If such depth calculations are correct, however, the areas in the Gulf region where Iran *could* deploy such subs would be outside the Strait of Hormuz and along its coast between the end of the Mehran River and Bandar-e 'Abbas (Bandar Abbas), and in the center of the Gulf. What is equally important, if such depth calculations are correct, Iran *would not be able to properly* deploy and use its larger submarines effectively immediately along the coast of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Iran may, however, be able to expand the operational range of its submarines by arming them with new cruise missiles like the Russian Klub-S, which some sources indicate Russia may provide as part of the upgrade program begun in 2006. The Klub-S is reported to have a range of up to 300 kilometers, and Iran has said it will deploy missiles "designed to hit an adversary's surface ships, land targets, and submarines."<sup>81</sup> Missile armed *Taregh's* could both do a better job of supporting an Iranian asymmetric strategy and meet the goal of protecting Iran from amphibious invasion.

Iran also could deploy its submarines outside the Gulf, and use them to threaten or attack larger ships in a much wider operating areas. IHS Jane's reports that:<sup>82</sup>

"the Iranian Armed Forces journal, *Saff*, has reported that the Iranian naval doctrine of 1999 included a passage stating that, 'the navy must consider the Sea of Oman as its specific operational field for deployment of submarines in both offensive and defensive postures', and that Iranian doctrine called for the development of port facilities and "special logistics craft to support the seabound naval units". Iran has since expanded the range of both its surface forces and submarines, with limited deployments to the Mediterranean and south into the Indian Ocean.

IHS Jane's also reports that:<sup>83</sup>

“the port of Chabahar is being developed to serve this role, and Iran's Kilo-class submarines are likely to have finished transferring their operations there from Bandar Abbas well before the middle of this decade. This will reduce the U.S. ability to track and isolate the submarines in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is extending the 45-day endurance of its submarines by increasing the length of cruises (currently around 10 days per month), improving their reliability in the warm regional waters and getting technical assistance from Russia and India. The IRIN is also developing the capability to carry out covert replenishment at sea, using indigenously produced logistics and replenishment vessels.”

At present, no Arab Gulf Navy has more than limit capability for anti-submarine warfare, although several are improving the capability of their ships and helicopters. The U.S. Navy can, however, deploy large numbers of ASW forces and Britain and France could deploy and support limited numbers of effective ASW forces.

### Submersibles

Iran has invested in a range of smaller submarines and submersibles to complement its *Taregh* submarines. These include SSW (midget) submarines, specifically 16 *Qadir* (also *Ghadir*) and 1 *Nahang* midget submarines with 2 single 533mm torpedo tubes. These small submarines operate in shallow waters, giving them access to much of the Persian Gulf, and have additional uses: mine laying for anti-shipping operations and Special Forces insertion into enemy territory.

Iran also has 8 SDV (swimmer delivery vehicles) submarines it can use to support its coastal warfare operations. Not only do these SDVs lay mines and transport special operations forces, but they also have reconnaissance purposes.<sup>84</sup> Though Iran's SSW submarines theoretically have access to the majority of the Persian Gulf, what is unclear is their endurance and ability to travel across the Gulf and back. Iran's SDV submarines, however, are limited to coastal waters and lack the range to operate at distance even within the Gulf, but can be transported by Iran's other vessels.

As a result of Iran's submarine and submersible programs, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have discussed the acquisition of small to medium submarines as a counter to Iran's potential threats in the Gulf littoral waters.<sup>85</sup> According to IISS, Oman possesses 2 Mk 8 SDVs and the UAE has an estimated 10 SDV submarines—with no other details provided.<sup>86</sup> In both 2006 and 2013 Saudi Arabia was reported to be in negotiations with the German company, ThyssenKrupp, to buy 5 Type 209 submarines, “followed long-term by up to 25 submarines in a €12 billion (\$13.58 billion) deal.”<sup>87</sup> However, Thyssen Krupp and the Saudi Arabian government denied such a project existed.

According to IHS Jane's, the Saudi Navy wants to obtain a submarine in order to protect its sea-lanes.<sup>88</sup> Yet, IHS Jane's also suggests that the shallow waters of the Gulf may outweigh the incentives on acquiring subsurface capabilities, including interdiction.<sup>89</sup> Many naval experts also question whether Saudi Arabia and other GCC navies should acquire submarines rather than more anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities for their surface vessels, helicopters and patrol aircraft. They also question why GCC navies should seek to develop capabilities that the U.S. and other allied navies can provide, particularly when outside blue water navies have more limits in dealing with Iran's patrol boats and mine warfare capabilities. This may explain why the Saudi and UAE navies are currently investing in better ways to counter Iran's attack submarines and submersibles.<sup>90</sup>

## Mine Warfare

**Figure V.10** shows the number of dedicated mine warfare ships in Gulf navies. It is somewhat misleading, however, in that Iran can use almost any vessel to drop free floating mines, a capability it demonstrated during its “Tanker War” with the U.S. Navy in 1987-1988. GCC navies face the challenge of having to detect, sweep and/or destroy mines with a mix of dedicated sensors, mine hunters and sweepers, helicopters, and underwater swimmers. This is a far more challenging task – as recent U.S.-led exercises have shown – particularly given the complex currents in parts of the Gulf and the amount of concealing bottom clutter in many areas.

Naval mines can be used in a wide range of ways ranging from free floating, scattered mines that Iran could deny it had deliberately employed to the sophisticated laying of “smart” mines. Iran could use almost any ship – Navy, IRGC, or commercial – to try to limit the freedom of movement for U.S. and allied naval forces, block traffic into ports and petroleum facilities, and impede Gulf shipping traffic.

Ship captains have responded to monetary incentives (wartime shipping rates) to continue operating in a conflict zone.<sup>91</sup> However, they still required that mines be cleared to such an extent that captains are willing to take the risk. History does not provide solid conclusions as to how many mines must be cleared before shipping resumes. Regardless of how much shipping can be sustained through a conflict, markets will be tense and prices for goods flowing through the Strait will be elevated.

Iran has invested in both its own mine development and Chinese mines.<sup>92</sup> Iran has a stock of at least 2,000-3,000 naval mines – and some reports put the total as high as 20,000, including 5,000 bottom-influence and smart mines – as well as hundreds of vessels it could muster to lay them. In addition to the aforementioned combat vessels, Iran could use a wide range of other surface ships to mine a given portion of the Gulf (any surface ship can release mines).

Although the previous figures show the exact composition of Iran’s arsenal of mines is highly uncertain, Iran is thought to have increased its stocks of mines from some 1,500 at the time of the Iran-Iraq War to well over 6,000, be able to produce large numbers of cheap conventional mines, and have adapted and produced a range of smart mines. Its older mines are effective systems and at some \$6,000 a mine, are easy to disperse in large numbers with potentially devastating effective consequences for far more costly combat and commercial ships. According to various experts it has also acquired, reverse engineered, developed, and improved a range of “smart mines,” including bottom mines. It is preparing to lay them on both sides of the Strait, creating safe passages close to Iran’s shoreline through which its own and neutral (i.e. any Gulf state Iran chooses not to antagonize) tankers could sail

Iran is also believed to have significant stocks of more advanced “smart mines” equivalent to mines like the Russian MDM-6 and the rocket-propelled Chinese EM-52, as well as the Chinese MC-52, the EM-55, the EM-31, and the EM-11.

- MDM-6:
  - Type: Bottom
  - Warhead: 1,100 kg
  - Operational Depth: 12-120 m

- Fusing: Magnetic, acoustic, pressure  
Note: The MDM-6 is a sophisticated mine that detonates in response to magnetic, acoustic, or pressure influences within a radius of 50-60 meters, and it has an operating depth of approximately 12-120 meters. It is a moored mine that fires a torpedo-like warhead when it senses a ship, and the mine's warhead consists of 1,100 kg of high explosive. The MDM-6 can be laid by number of systems, including the 533 mm torpedo tubes of Iran's *Kilo*-class submarines, or from surface ships with the appropriate rail and stern ramps.<sup>93</sup>
- EM-52:
  - Type: Bottom, rising
  - Warhead: 300 kg
  - Operational Depth: 4.8-183 m
  - Fusing: Acoustic  
Note: This mine is guided in its "rocket" ascent phase. It can be deployed with a submarine's torpedo tubes. It is considered to be Iran's most potent mine, and, according to some reporting, may be able to pierce the keel of a U.S. aircraft carrier.<sup>94</sup>

Mines with capabilities like those of the EM-52 and the MDM-6, as well as any other similar "smart" mines in Iran's arsenal, may be capable of tracking multiple targets, and can be difficult to detect as they rest on or near the seafloor. In one case in 1982, a British minesweeper took six days to identify and neutralize one large smart mine in the Red Sea.<sup>95</sup> Even relatively unsophisticated "dumb" mines, however, present a threat to U.S. forces and Gulf shipping, as they are not easily detected or removed, and can be laid in large numbers by almost any ship that has the capacity to physically carry them.

For instance, an Iranian M-08 World War I-era mine nearly sank the USS Samuel B Roberts after the ship struck it on April 14, 1988.<sup>96</sup> Although the M-08 is an antiquated moored contact mine, it nearly sank an advanced U.S. naval ship that was caught off guard. Consequently, Iran's ability to lay a large number of mines in a short period of time remains a critical aspect to its stated capability to deny U.S. forces access to the Gulf, and impede or halt shipping through the Strait.

The Iranian Navy has adapted two *Hejaz* class LSTs for minelaying. It has two *Riazi*-class mine countermeasures boats, one *Shahroch* class minesweeper as a training ship in the Caspian, and two aging U.S.-supplied MS-292-class minesweepers. Iran can, however, use virtually any surface ship for minelaying, including the dhows that cross the Gulf as trading vessels. Iranian forces have even been reported disguising mines as tree branches, shipping boxes, or trash, and may be able to pierce the keel of a U.S. aircraft carrier.<sup>97, 98</sup>

The fact that Iran can lay mines in so many different ways over so wide an area presents major problems in terms of mine warfare for the U.S., its Gulf allies, and Britain and France. However, Iran still faces some limitations in mine laying. Iran's most advanced submarines, the *Taregh*-class, will have difficulty laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. These submarines have a minimum operating depth of 45 meters and the submarine itself is 25 meters high. Few places in the Strait are more than 80 meters deep. Laying mines in such an environment will require a highly trained and well-practiced crew.

There are limits to number of mines that Iran can lay per sortie. While larger surface vessels can lay many mines at once, smaller Iranian surface vessels will need to make several trips back to the shore in order to lay more mines. Many speedboats are only large enough to

carry one mine (usually a contact mine). Surveillance has shown that the largest can carry a maximum of four mines.

The initial mine laying will likely be Iran's most effective one as successive mining operations will likely face alert coalition forces. The U.S. now permanently deploys a force of four minesweepers and currently deploys an additional four minesweepers, an extensive ship-based force of minesweeping helicopters, and unmanned undersea vehicles. The Saudi Navy has four aging U.S. Navy MSC-322 (Addriyah-class) minesweepers, and three modern UK Sandown (Al Jawf-class) mine hunters, and several southern Gulf navies have minesweeping helicopters.

The U.S. and its Arab Gulf allies do, however, have relatively limited assets to deal with possible forms of mine laying over so wide and oceanographically complex a region. Any success is heavily dependent on the willingness of the U.S. and GCC states to act immediately if Iran is detected dispersing its mines, and/or arming various craft for actual mine warfare missions. This puts a heavy emphasis on preventive attacks versus mine warfare.

The U.S. made upgrading its mine warfare capabilities in the Gulf a key part of the new strategic guidance that it announced in January 2012, and the U.S. Navy has extensively planned for both mine warfare in the Gulf under current conditions and upgrading its forces and cooperation with its allies in the future. While these new capabilities are not yet in place, and it may be some time before they reach full effectiveness, the U.S. Navy will soon have a much higher capacity to detect and eliminate mines – particularly if it cooperates with European navies.

This helps explain why the U.S. announced in early 2012 that it would deploy a "mothership" (converted amphibious assault ship) to the Gulf to support mine warfare vessels and SOF. U.S. mine warfare capabilities will also improve steadily in other ways in the near future. As has been described earlier in this analysis, the U.S. has now made upgrading its mine warfare capabilities in the Gulf a key part of its strategy. It held joint exercises with the British, French, and Gulf navies in the fall of 2012, and it plans to upgrade its mine warfare forces and cooperation with allied mine forces in the future.

The U.S. Navy is also seeking to develop a more advanced capacity to detect and eliminate mines. It is moving away from a classic mine hunting and killing approach to one based on detailed mapping of the debris and objects on the bottom in key areas. This allows it to quickly detect changes and possible mines. It is deploying a family of unmanned submersible mine warfare vessels to detect and kill mines, and will replace the use of divers with unmanned systems designed to detect mines and then detonate mines on a proximity and contact basis. These will have the ability to counter the sensors on "smart" mines.

The potential effectiveness of these mines was driven home by the September 2012 IMCMEX. There were significant problems in removing the simulated mines from the seabed. A PBS report quotes a consultant and former Navy officer in claiming that the participants found only half their targets. The U.S. Navy disputes the use of "percent of mines found" as a suitable metric, with Navy spokesmen highlighting the efficient way navies from 30 nations cooperated in the exercise. They also point out that it was both an experiment and a learning process, and that in the real world the U.S. would have mapped the bottom of many key areas to enable it to locate any sudden appearance of a new mine,



and U.S. doctrine calls for constant surveillance of suspect ships and destroying them the moment they begin mine laying activity.

This result emphasized the difficulty of tracking and destroying mines even with a large task force under peacetime conditions. Performing this mission while under fire from anti-ship missiles and harassing attacks from Iranian speedboats only amplify the difficulty of mine clearing.<sup>99</sup> Mine warfare could give a significant edge to the strategic aggressor, and the U.S. has not yet learned how to negate Iran's lead. This weakness further underpins the logic of retaliation and escalation, as any American failure to counter Iranian mines in the event of war would force the U.S. to respond with other strikes.

Better U.S. and Arab Gulf cooperation will be critical in developing future counter-mine capability, as will their willingness to act decisively the moment any Iranian minelaying begins. More Gulf, British, and French mine hunting and sweeping resources are needed. Even the U.S. Navy has underfunded mine warfare efforts consistently in the past and has only begun revamping its mine detection capabilities. At present, the U.S. Navy can only deploy eight minesweepers in the Gulf, and only four are currently assigned full time. Helicopter minesweeping using MH-53 helicopters and towed sonar sleds have not proved as effective as previously expected.

It is also important to note world markets, shippers, and oil exporters will not judge the protection of tankers, other commercial vessels, and combat ships on the basis of the level of military action, only its actual success. The key measure of effectiveness will be the number of ships that are hit by mines. Moreover, even the threat of mining could have a major impact on shipping and the cost of imports and energy exports.

### **Iranian Asymmetric Warfare and Anti-ship Missile Capability**

Iran's anti-ship missile (AShM) arsenal represents both a key part of its version of an asymmetric anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, and its ability to threaten shipping and the flow of energy exports. Such strategies are particularly effective in the Persian Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman because of the relatively confined spaces of these bodies of water. The wide variety of platforms from which Iran can launch AShM's presents a "360 degree threat."<sup>100</sup> In addition to coastal, ship, and fixed wing platforms, Iran recently integrated AShM's onto helicopters and aims to develop submarine launched missiles.

Iran depends heavily on its coastal, island, and ship-borne anti-ship missile forces to make up for its lack of airpower and modern major surface vessels. Iran's Western-supplied missiles are now all beyond their shelf life, and their operational status is uncertain. Iranian forces are now equipped largely with land-based Chinese or Iranian made anti-ship missiles like the Ra'ad coastal defense missiles – some deployed near the Strait of Hormuz and some which Iran claims have terminal home capability or could be directed against naval targets by forward deployed aircraft or drones.

Iran's exercises using Surface vessels that can fire AShM's show they are a crucial part of its asymmetric warfare strategy. Part of this strategy calls for groups of small vessels to attack larger enemy vessels – and potential commercial shipping and oil and gas tankers. Although it is difficult to ascertain the current operational readiness of Iran's surface fleet,

a 2009 report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence stated that approximately half of the IRIN's missile-armed surface combatants were in "very poor material condition, limiting their readiness and operational endurance."<sup>101</sup> To make up for this, coast-launched AShM's can be used in conjunction with small-boat swarm attacks in order to saturate enemy vessel defenses. AShM's based on coastal platforms are small, mobile, and can be disguised as civilian vehicles, making destruction of these platforms difficult.<sup>102</sup>

### **Iran's Land-Based Anti-ship Missiles**

Iran can use a variation of the Chinese C-704 anti-ship missile called the Nasr (35 kilometer range), and normally sea-based missiles like the C-801, to attack ships from land launch sites. This allows it to attack ships and boats within range of its coastline and islands with minimal warning. Iran's primary land-based anti-ship missile, however, now seems to be the HY-2 also known as the C-201, SY-2, Seersucker, CSS-C-3 and "Silkworm." Iran is believed to deploy such near the Strait of Hormuz based on Abu Musa Island.<sup>103</sup> Iran acquired such systems from China during the Iran-Iraq War.

The PRC developed the HY-2 missile in stages out of the former Soviet Union's P-1P Termit. It replaced the Termit's early conical scanning radar seeker with a mono-pulse terminal guidance radar seeker.<sup>104</sup> Wikipedia also notes that the PRC developed the HY-1 a predecessor to the HY-2 for both land-basing and deployment on its larger destroyers, and then stretched the body of the HY-1 to create the HY-2:<sup>105</sup>

"The HY-2 is identical to the HY-1 but with a further stretched body. The missile features a round nose accommodating the radar seeker, a pair of mid-mounted delta wings on the middle section of missile body, and three tail control surfaces. The missile is powered by a liquid-fuel rocket motor, with a solid rocket booster attached under the missile fuselage.

The HY-2 is launched from land-based launcher and flies at an altitude of 1,000m during the initial stage of the flight. After the missile switched to the cruising mode, the flight altitude was reduced to 100~300m. During the final stage of the flight, the missile switched on its radar seeker and dives to an altitude of 8m until it hits the target. The single-shot hit probability is estimated to be 90%. Due to its oversized body, the HY-2 did not develop a ship-to-ship variant. The missile is obsolete and will be replaced by the YJ-8 series in the future.<sup>[2]</sup>

The HY-2 was widely exported to the [Middle East](#), and was the missile most associated with the *silkworm* nickname.

#### **Variants**

- HY-2: Basic variant radar-guidance land-to-ship missile \*developed from the HY-1 missile
- HY-2A: IR-guidance variant
- HY-2AII: Improved variant of the HY-2A
- HY-2B: Improved radar-guidance variant with a [monopulse radar](#) seeker replacing the original conical scanning radar
- HY-2BII: Improved variant of the HY-2B with a newly designed radar seeker
- C-201: Export designation for air-launched version.
- C-201W Extended-range variant powered by a turbojet engine replacing the original liquid-fuel rocket motor. Export only.

According to Wikipedia, its specifications are:

- Dimensions: Length: 7.48 m; Diameter: 0.76 m; Wingspan: 2.4 m

- Launch weight: 2,998 kg
- Warhead: 513 kg shaped charge high-explosive
- Propulsion: One liquid rocket engine and one solid rocket booster
- Speed: Mach 0.8
- Range: 200 km [\[3\]](#)
- Flight altitude: < 20m
- Guidance: Inertial + active conical scanning terminal guidance radar (HY-2); or inertial + [infrared homing](#) guidance (HY-2A); or inertial + monopulse active radar (HY-2B)
- Single-shot hit probability: 90%

It is not clear from unclassified literature how much Iran has modified its Silkworms. If Iran has had access to Chinese follow-on developments, the HY-2 could now have an improved engine, ranges extended well beyond 200 kilometers, it could be far less vulnerable to countermeasures, and able to fly longer at sea skimming heights.

The Ra'ad is a modified HY-2, while the Khalij Fars is an anti-ship ballistic missile variant of the Fateh-110 ballistic missile. All of these missiles can be launched from land and coastal platforms. Moreover, "systems mounted on truck trailers "could be easily disguised as civilian vehicles and relocated to make them harder to find and destroy during a conflict."<sup>106</sup>

Iran may, also be deploying much more advanced anti-ship missile both at land sites and on its ships. While earlier reports indicated that these might be Russian supplied "Sunburns," it now seems more likely that such missiles would be based on Chinese systems. China's Haiying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy has also reportedly developed an active radar homing, ramjet-powered supersonic land-to-ship missile called to C-301 or HY-3. It effectively is a totally a new missile. Wikipedia reports that: <sup>107</sup>

"The HY-3 is a large-size missile with a slim forward body and sharp nose, and a fatter rear half with four solid rocket boosters and two ramjet engines located aft of the missile body. There are a pair of front-canards on the front fuselage, four control surfaces on the rear fuselage, and four smaller stabilizing fins attached on the solid rocket boosters. The booster motors accelerate the missile to past Mach 1.8 and the kerosene-fuelled ramjet engines accelerate the missile to a cruise speed of Mach 2.0. Its range is variously reported as up to 130 km, and it can fly as low as 50 m in its terminal attack phase. The missile is programmed to dive from cruising altitude to under 30m before the active-radar terminal phase begins, then dive onto the target just prior to impact. The 3.5t missile is launched from a land-based launcher. Each firing unit consists of four launchers, a target acquisition radar, a fire-control unit, a power unit, and 8~12 missile reloading vehicle (each with one missile).

#### Specifications

- Length: 9.85m
- Diameter: 0.76 m
- Wingspan: 2.24 m
- Weight: 3,400 kg
- Warhead: 300~500 kg time-delayed semi-armor-piercing high-explosive

- Propulsion: Two side-mounted ramjet engines; four solid propellant boost motors
- Speed: Mach 2.5
- Range: 180 km [\[4\]](#)
- Flight altitude: 50 m
- Guidance: Inertial and terminal active radar

China is also reported to have developed a missile called the HY-4:<sup>108</sup>

The HY-4 development of the C-201 is a mid-range ground-, air-, and ship-launched cruise missile. Development of the C-201 HY-4 is believed to have started in the mid-1970s, replacing the C-201 HY-2 liquid propellant sustainer motor with a small turbojet engine, and adding a monopulse active radar seeker. Apart from the substitution of the turbojet engine, the overall configuration of the HY-4 variant of the C-201 missile is similar to the HY-2 variants of the C-201, with two delta wings and tri-form rudder and tail. The missile has a radar altimeter that allows the cruise height to be varied between 70 and 200 m altitude, followed by a steep dive onto the target. The air-launched version is designated as C-401.

#### Specifications

- Developer: China Sea Eagle Electro-Mechanical Technology Co.
- Length: 7.36 meters
- Diameter: 0.76 meters
- Wingspan: 2.4 meters
- Weight: 1,740 kg
- Speed: Mach 0.8 – 0.85
- Range: 300–500 km
- Cruising altitude: 8 meters
- Propulsion: one [turbojet](#) engine and one solid rocket booster

These latter two Chinese missile systems have specifications close to those of missiles that Iran's claims to be developing and sometimes to have deployed. It is not clear from the open literature whether Iran has been able to get technology transfers from China on such systems or on similar Russian systems like the "Sunburn," or deploy such systems but it claimed in 2011 and 2012 to be test firing new anti-ship missile some identified at the Ghadir as part of the Velayat 90 exercise which was intended to demonstrates Iran's ability to "close the Gulf." Iran then claimed in March 2015 to be producing a missile called the Noor or Ghadir (Qadar) with performance similar to the HY-3 and HY-4. Some open source reporting has said Iran has deployed such systems as both land and sea-based options, but other experts do not confirm such Iranian capabilities.<sup>109</sup>

Some Iranian officers have also claimed that Iran is creating ballistic missile capabilities to attack naval targets and has conducted test firings of some sea-launched missiles from land. Iran can also target some missiles remotely targeting by using the radars on its maritime patrol aircraft, and may be able to use drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for targeting purposes, as well as attack ships using Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs).

In any case, long-range anti-ship missiles have particular value in any naval conflict the Gulf. As noted earlier, the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches force all naval traffic to come well within the range of Iran land-based missiles and their targeting sensors, and Iran can easily shelter such missiles and rapidly deploy them to new locations, “popping up” its targeting sensors with minimal warning. It may also be able to remotely target such missiles with the radars on its aircraft, smaller ships and boats, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

It is unclear how much damage a missile strike would make to a large commercial vessel, but modern combat ships tend to be packed with weapons, electronics, etc. and a hit can often incapacitate a ship even if it is not threatened with sinking. A hit from such a missile on an oil tanker or a LNG ship could be far more serious. But much would depend on the precise point of impact.

### **Air Delivered Anti-Ship Missile Capability**

The capabilities of Iran’s air and sea-launched anti-ship missiles are summarized in **Figure V.11**. These missiles can be grouped into three broad categories, short range, mid-range, and long range. It should be stressed, however, that Iran can use combinations of different missiles firing from different mixes of land, air, and sea-based platforms, and using different sensors and missile behaviors to complicate both defense against its missiles and the problems inherent in attacking and suppressing the launch system. Iranian exercises sometimes use such tactics, but it seems likely that Iran will not exercise its most advanced tactics in ways that can be observed through outside intelligence collection if it can avoid doing so.

Iran possesses at least nine types of ASMs it can use as part of its sea-air-missile strategy. Each missile type has different uses depending on the intended ground/surface target, so it would be less likely for Iran to use some missiles over others on commercial shipping. The Sattar is an example of the type of missile that Iran could use to attack commercial shipping. The Sattar is a laser guided (SALH) missile that was developed locally and is suspected to be reverse engineered from the French AS30L, which is reported to have been delivered to Iran by Iraq in 1991 to avoid U.S. air strikes. Laser guidance systems require a laser beam to be pointed at a target that disperses radiation in a variety of directions. When the Sattar missile is fired or dropped near a target, it then detects the radiation and seeks out the target. The Sattar variations have a warhead with 55kilograms of high explosives.

The Sattar missile variations allegedly have a range of between 20km to 60km, meaning that an Iranian fighter could fire one of these missiles from its own air space. Iran would need to rely on forward observers to mark targets to use such missiles. This can be done in a number of ways. Iran could place laser designators on the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands to target larger ships that are forced to travel near the islands due to the shallow depth of the Gulf. Additionally, Iran could use its oil and gas platforms in the Gulf as types of forward operating bases for laser designators, similar to what they did during the Tanker War.

Iran also possesses an unknown number of AGM-65 Maverick missiles, both the original version, a remnant from the Shah’s military, and an upgraded, local version, the *Bina* (tr. Insightful).<sup>110</sup> This missile and its variations were developed for “air support, interdiction,

and defense suppression.”<sup>111</sup> While different versions of the missile have different guidance systems, it is unclear which variations Iran possesses.

The *Bina* has a laser guidance system, and functions similarly to the Sattar, however, it can be fired from ground launchers as well as air fighters. The *Bina* is alleged to have the capacity to strike “armored vehicles, tanks, and command and control buildings.”<sup>112</sup>

The Maverick-A and Maverick-B, in contrast, have an electro-optical television guidance system.<sup>113</sup> After its video circuitry is activated, “the scene viewed by the guidance system appears on a cockpit television screen. The pilot selects the target, centers cross hairs on it, locks on, [and] then launches the missile.”<sup>114</sup> The Maverick-B has a magnification capability, allowing it “to target smaller, distant targets.”<sup>115</sup> The Maverick-D has an infrared guidance system, providing the ability for pilots to fire on enemies in inclement weather and at night, and lock onto heat signatures.<sup>116</sup> The Maverick-E is also a laser guided missile, however, if it no longer detects laser radiation, the warhead does not explode, and the missile embarks on a ballistic path.

The Maverick-F shares an infrared guidance system with the Maverick-D, except that it has a 136kg warhead, unlike its predecessors that have a 57kg warhead.<sup>117</sup> The Maverick-G has software upgrades allowing it to track larger targets, and a penetrator warhead, allowing it to pierce armor (or very thick hulls) before exploding.<sup>118</sup> Finally, the Maverick H/J/K models all possess a charge-coupled device, increasing reliability and operational use in a darker war zone.<sup>119</sup>

While the targeting systems of the Maverick may vary, Iran’s possession of a missile with not only a range of 12 nautical miles, but also an eighty-five percent kill rating and fighters possibly stationed at Bandar Abbas affords Iran the capability to target any ship sailing through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s laser guided air-to-surface missiles also include the Soviet/Russian made AS (KH) family of missiles. The AS-10 Karen (KH-25) and its variations, are anti-radar missiles with a range of 10km-40km. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “The latest version of the KH-25 missile is the Kh-25MTP with a thermal-imaging guidance head.”<sup>120</sup> The AS-11 ‘Kilter’ (Kh-58) is an anti-radiation missile with an alleged 120km range. Its original purpose was to be used as the basic weapon system for the Su-24M aircraft.<sup>121</sup> It supposedly has an eighty percent hit probability.<sup>122</sup>

The AS-12 ‘Kegler’ (KH-27) is designed to break through air-defense systems to destroy radar stations. Its passive-radar head has two antennae “tuned to the radar frequencies of two most popular Western air defense systems: Hawk and Nike Hercules.”<sup>123</sup> It has a range of 40km. This missile is significant because it seems to be designed to combat Gulf missile defense—at least part of it. Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile defense uses the Hawk and Patriot Missile Systems.<sup>124</sup> The KH-27, with its passive radar allows it to avoid detection, and strike enemy radar stations at a 20-30 degree angle, improving the warhead’s effectiveness.<sup>125</sup> With radar systems out of commission in the Gulf, it would be much more difficult at countering Iranian threats to shipping and decreasing an already low response and reaction time by maritime vessels.

The AS-14 Kedge (KH-29) is “chiefly used against heavily reinforced targets.”<sup>126</sup> The warhead is 317 kg and the missile’s maximum range is comparatively shorter than Iran’s

other air-to-surface missiles: 10km.<sup>127</sup> Variations of this missile possess a semi-active laser homing guidance system (KH-29L), an optical homing device (KH-29T), and thermal-imaging capabilities.<sup>128</sup>

The AS-16 Kickback (KH-15) is a short-range attack missile, originally intended to break through air defenses.<sup>129</sup> Its anti-ship version has an inertial navigation system with a range of 300km, and “a millimetric-wave active-radar self-homing system for the final flight stage.”<sup>130</sup> During the second stage of flight, the missile can reach speeds of Mach 5.<sup>131</sup>

In addition, Iran has also acquired Chinese made air-to surface missiles. Specifically, Iran uses the Chinese made air-launched anti-ship missile, the YJ-6 (CAS-1)/C-601. While the missile is considered to be obsolete, it still poses a threat because of its widespread use.<sup>132</sup> In fact, “used against transports, tankers, amphibious ships and other targets without defensive systems, the missile is highly lethal.”<sup>133</sup> The missile can sink a 10,000-ton transport ship. The C-601 has a range of approximately 100km. The technical components of the C-601 are similar to the C-201/HY-2 (*Silkworm*) surface launched missile, which is designed to attack larger surface ships.<sup>134</sup>

### Sea-Based Anti-ship Missile Capability

Iranian ships make heavy use of the C-700 and C-800 series anti-ship missiles. These are systems Iran bought from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and now produces indigenously. They have replaced most Western-supplied missiles with these Chinese designs.

The Iranian Navy’s missile patrol boats include 13 operational 275-ton French-made *Combattante II* (*Kaman*-class) fast attack boats, with four currently under construction. These boats are reported to be armed with two to four C-802 Sardine anti-ship missiles, one 76-mm gun, and to have maximum speeds of 37.5 knots. According to *Jane’s Naval Guide*, nine of these are from the original French shipment during the early 1980s, while Iran has constructed another four with comparable equipment.

The *Kaman*-class fast attack boats were originally armed with four U.S. Harpoon missiles, but their Harpoons may no longer be operational. At least five had been successfully converted to launchers carrying two to four C-801/C-802s. Iran supplied the C-802s that Hezbollah successfully used against one of Israel’s most modern Sa’ar Class-5 missile ships during the fighting in 2006.

The terminology for the C-801 and C-802 series of missiles in Iranian naval forces is confusing and sources contradict each other as to the variant used on given Iranian platforms. Some sources refer to all of these missiles as part of the CSS-N-4/YJ-1 series.<sup>135</sup> Iran is now believed to have at least 100 C-801s and C-802s, and to be able to produce them and the C-700 series. One source notes that Iran may have imported up to 100 C-801s and eight launchers in 1987-1988 and built its arsenal to 200 by 1994. It since has developed the ability to produce the C-801 indigenously (under the designation “Tondar”).<sup>136</sup> Another source notes that Iran may have deployed its C-701 missiles at launching bases under construction at Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, Bushehr, and Bandar Khomeini.<sup>137</sup> It is also clear that Iran has refitted U.S. ships once equipped with Harpoon with the C-800 series.

The Chinese C-701 and C-704 missiles were used to develop the Kowsar and Nasr, respectively. In September 2013, Iran claimed to have produced a helicopter launched version of the Nasr missile and planned to produce a version that could be launched from fighter aircraft. A picture showing a Bell 206 with a modified Nasr missile attached to it was released alongside this statement.<sup>138</sup> The C-701 Kowsar is said to have land, sea, and air launch capabilities with the intent of sinking small and medium sized naval vessels.<sup>139</sup> At least two versions of this missile are alleged to be in production. One has a television seeker, requiring the pilot to lock onto a target via camera screen before firing; the other has an active radar seeker with an inertial guidance system, which locks onto an enemy radar signal when within range.<sup>140</sup> There are also allegations of a third variation possessing a laser-guided system.<sup>141</sup> The Kowsar is alleged to have a range of 20km. The C-704 Nasr has a 130kg warhead but only a 27-35km range, depending on whether it was launched from the surface or air. The C-801 was also imported from China in 1987-88, and is in Iranian service as the Tondar. According to IHS Jane's, Iranian F-4s began to test the use of an air-launched version called the C-801K against naval targets in June 1997.<sup>142</sup>

Iran's mid-range AShM's, include the C-802. There are important differences between Iran's C-801 missiles, C-802 missiles, and their derivatives. The 40-kilometer range of the C-801 is much shorter than the 120-kilometer range of the C-802. This is largely due to the different types of engines in each missile. Like the land-based variation of the *Silkworm*, Iran's C-802s have the potential to reach any ship in the Gulf, depending on where Iran stations its C-802s. Finally, the C-801 has a lower single-shot hit probability, about 75 percent; the C-802 is much more accurate, with an estimated hit probability of 98 percent.<sup>143</sup>

The C-802 has been used to attack shipping with considerable success. In 2006, Hezbollah launched a land-based C-802 -- which it obtained from Iran -- against the Israeli Navy's INS *Hanit* (Spear 5) when it was patrolling the Lebanese coast as a part of Israel's war against Hezbollah and Lebanon.<sup>144</sup> While the *Hanit* didn't sink, four crewmen died and the ship had to run on reserve power until it returned to port. It was later discovered that the *Hanit's* missile defense systems were not active, meaning that they had no way to detect or intercept this missile.<sup>145</sup> Hezbollah fired two missiles, however. The second missile struck and sank a Cambodian merchant ship.<sup>146</sup> The reason for Hezbollah's attack on the Cambodian ship remains unknown.

The *Noor* and *Ghadr* missiles are reported as some of the "newest" and most advanced missiles in Iran's anti-ship arsenal, and open source literature has considerable technical and operational speculation regarding the two anti-ship missiles. Various sources have also reported that missiles are deployed on Iran's frigates, corvettes, and fixed wing aircraft. Iran also claimed that the *Ghadr* (*Qader*) was deployed on its helicopters at the same time it made a similar claim about the Nasr. While the Mi-17 was specified as the platform for the *Noor*, no specific helicopter was given as the platform for the *Qader*.<sup>147</sup>

The *Noor* missiles are often said to be reverse-engineered, Iranian-made versions of the C-802 missile, but some sources claim the missile is a direct copy of the C-802, while others indicate that the missile is a completely new system.<sup>148</sup> Still others claim the *Noor* is a copy of the C-801.<sup>149</sup> There are other discrepancies in open source reporting. One discrepancy lies in the reports on size of its warhead. Most sources report the warhead to be 165kg, however, there are some reports that state the missile has up to a 230kg warhead,



and as low as an 18kg warhead, classifying it as an artillery rocket.<sup>150</sup> The range of the missile is 200km or less. In January 2013, Rear Admiral Amir Rastegari told Press TV that Iran had tested the Noor along with the Qader missile.<sup>151</sup> In that same interview, Rastegari also claimed the Noor missile was a surface-to-surface missile, not an anti-ship missile.<sup>152</sup>

The *Ghadr* or *Qader* missile is an anti-ship cruise missile that can be fired from land and from naval ships.<sup>153</sup> Its range is estimated between 1,300-2,000 kilometers. The Qader is also claimed to possess a “jam-resistant radar and a digital, programmable guidance system.”<sup>154</sup> This is said to allow the missile to defend against electronic warfare to hit its preprogrammed target, but the validity of such claims is uncertain. However, there is no reliable open source reporting its testing since the first claims made that it would join Iran’s missile arsenal in 2007, except for the previous claim by Admiral Rastegari.

The Ghadr is sometimes reported to be deployable on all of Iran’s naval “destroyers” and missile-launching warships. If true, this would mean that nearly every larger combat ship in Iran’s navy could have has the capability to use this missile. The measurements of the Ghadr, however, make it seem too large to fit on many of Iran’s naval vessels. It is 15.86 meters (52 feet) long, and weighs 19,000kg (41,888lbs., or 19 tons) according to one source.<sup>155</sup> In practice, only Iran’s frigates -- and perhaps its corvettes -- seem to be large enough to carry and fire the *Ghadr*. Its use would represent a level of escalation that would make it very difficult for Iran to avoid a major conflict with the United States.


Like the Noor, the Ghadr is the subject of open source technical debates. *Missile Threat* indicates that the *Ghadr* is a variant of the Shahab-3A, which is a copy of the North Korean No-dong missile.<sup>156</sup> The Institute for International and Strategic Studies reports that the *Ghadr* is a modified version of the North Korean No-dong missile.<sup>157</sup> Iran, however, claims the missile was “designed, constructed and mass produced by Iranian experts and engineers to be used against large battleships and aircraft carriers.”<sup>158</sup>

This confusion may be the deliberate result of Iranian reporting. Feeding competing open-source reports on Iran’s missiles and the over-inflation of Iran’s missile capabilities could be part of a deception campaign with the goal of opponents underestimating Iran. In doing so, Iran gains a conventional and strategic advantage in an armed conflict with the Gulf States or the United States. It is this slight advantage that allows Iran the potential to decide battle outcomes, and with them, establish control of the Gulf.

## Amphibious Warfare

Iran and the Arab Gulf states have a large number of amphibious craft. These holdings are shown in **Figure V.12**, and show that they could conduct small amphibious raids on coastal, island, and offshore facilities throughout the Gulf. These assets are not large enough, however, to mount a major amphibious invasion or attack, and Iran would confront major problems in using its amphibious assets unless it had a totally permissive environment or could establish some form of effective air cover.

Iran does, however, also have large ferries it could use to deploy significant infantry and armored forces across the Gulf if it had a permissive environment – something that would probably require a major coup in a Gulf country like Bahrain.


**Figure V.1: Naval, Coast Guard, and Marine Manpower**

Note: The figures for Iran include both the regular Navy and the Naval Branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is 20,000, some 5,000 of which are shown in the totals for Marines, the Iranian regular navy has 18,000 personnel plus 2,600 in Naval Aviation and 2,600 more marines .

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Coast Guard		1200		5000		500		incl. in Navy	4500	repor ted
IRGC Naval Marines			5000	0						
Navy Marines	1500		2600	3000					3000	
Naval Aviation			2600	0	incl. in navy				Incl. in Navy	
Naval Guards(Royal, Presidential, Revolutionary )			15000	250			250			
Navy Regulars	2100	1700	12800	21200	700	1500	4200	1800	10500	2500

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.2: Gulf Naval Vessels by Country**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.3: Iran's Surface Naval Forces**

Amount	Name/Class	Tonnage	Function	Arms	Manufacturer	Year Manufactured or Commissioned
1	<i>Jamaran</i> /UK Vosper Mk 5	1,500 tons	Frigate	2 twin launchers with C-802 AShM; 2 launchers with SM-1 SAM; 2 triple 324mm Mk 32 ASTT torpedo launchers	Iran	2010,
3	<i>Alvand</i> /UK Vosper Mk 5	1,100 tons	Frigate/Destroyer	2 twin launchers with C-802 AShM; 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT; 1 114mm gun	United Kingdom	1971
2	<i>Bayandor</i> /U.S. PF-103	900 tons	Missile Boat (Corvette)	2 twin launcher with C-802 AShM; 2 triple 324mm Mk 32 ASTT torpedo launchers; 1 76mm gun	United States	1963
6	<i>Zolfaghar</i> ( <i>Peykaap III/IPS-16</i> mod)	Approx. 15 tons	Missile Boat	2 single launchers with C-701, and C-704 AShMs	Iran	2010
25	<i>Peykaap II</i> (IPS-16)	15 tons	Missile Boat (Coastal Patrol Craft)	2 single launchers with C-701 AShM; 2 single 324mm Triple-Tube (TT) torpedo launcher	Iran (claimed); North Korea (suspected)	2002
5	<i>China Cat</i> /C-14	19 tons	Missile Boat (Fast Attack Craft)	2 twin launcher with C-701 Anti-Ship	China	2000

4	<i>China Cat/C-14</i>	19 tons	Missile Boat (Fast Attack Craft)	Missile (AShM) 2 single launcher with C-701 AShM	China	2000
14	<i>Kaman/FRA Combattante II</i>	234-265 tons	Missile Boat (Fast Attack Craft)	1-2 twin launcher with C-802 AShM; 1 76mm gun	France	1977
10	<i>Thondor/Type 021 (PRC Houdong)</i>	205 tons	Missile Boat (Fast Attack Craft)	2 twin launchers with C-802 AShM; 2 twin AK230 CIWS	China (Copy of Soviet Osa-I)	Unknown. Based on 1965 Soviet design.
3	<i>Taregh/RUS Type 877EKM</i>	<u>Surfaced:</u> 2,300-2,350 tons <u>Submerged:</u> 3,000-3,950 tons	Tactical/Attack Submarine	6 single 533mm TT	Russia	1982
1	<i>Fateh</i>	<u>Surfaced:</u> 527 tons <u>Submerged:</u> 593 tons	Tactical Submarine	4 torpedo tubes	Iran	2014
16	<i>Qadir (also, Ghadir)</i>	120 tons	Midget Submarine	2 single 533mm TT	Iran	2007
1	<i>Nahang</i>	350-400 tons	Midget Submarine	Mine laying capabilities; claimed to have AShMs <sup>159</sup>	Iran	2006
5	<i>Al Sabehat</i>	n.k.	Special Forces Delivery Vehicle	Mine-laying capacity	Iran	2000
2	<i>Hejaz</i>	614 tons, 2,274 tons fully loaded	Amphibious Landing Ship	Mine-laying capacity	Iran	1985 (re-classed in 2000)
2	MIG-S-5000	unknown	Commercial Amphibious Landing Ship	Mine-laying capacity	Iran	1985 (re-classed in 2000)

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.4: GCC's Surface Naval Forces**

Amount	Country of Ownership	Name/Class	Function	Arms	Manufacturer	Year Commissioned
3	Saudi Arabia	<i>Al Riyadh/La Fayette</i>	Destroyer	2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block II AShM; 2 8-cell VLS with <i>Aster</i> 15 SAM; 4 single 533mm ASTT with F17P HWT; 1 100mm gun	France	2002
4	Saudi Arabia	<i>Madina/F-2000</i>	Frigate	2 Quad launcher with <i>Otomat</i> Mk AShM; 1 octuple launcher with <i>Crotale</i> SAM; 4 single 533mm ASTT with F17P HWT; 1 100mm gun	France	1985/1986
1	Bahrain	<i>Sabha/U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry</i>	Frigate	1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM/RGM-84 C <i>Harpoon</i> AShM; 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT with Mk46 LWT;	United States	1996

				1 <i>Phalanx</i> Block 1B CIWS		
3	Oman	<i>Al-Shamikh</i>	Frigate	2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM;  2 sextuple launchers with VL MICA SAM;  2 DS 30M CIWS;  1 76mm gun	United Kingdom	2013
4	Saudi Arabia	<i>Badr/U.S. Tacoma</i>	Corvette	2 quad Mk140 launchers with RGM-84C <i>Harpoon</i> AShM;  2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT;  1 <i>Phalanx</i> CIWS;  1 76mm gun	United States	1981
9	Saudi Arabia	<i>Al Siddiq</i> /U.S. 58m	Armed Patrol Boat	2 twin Mk140 launchers with RGM-84C <i>Harpoon</i> AShM;  1 <i>Phalanx</i> CIWS;  1 76mm gun	United States	1980
2	Bahrain	<i>Al Manama</i> /GER 62m <i>Lurssen</i>	Corvette	2 twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	Germany	1987

					1 76mm gun		
4	Bahrain	<i>Ahmed Fateh</i> /GER Lurssen 45m	el Fast Attack Patrol Boat	2 twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	Germany	1984	
				1 76mm gun			
2	Bahrain	<i>Al Jarvin</i> /U.S. <i>Swift</i> FPB-20	Patrol Boat	n/a	United States		
2	Bahrain	<i>Al Riffa</i> /GER Lurssen 38mm	Patrol Boat	1 twin launcher with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM	Germany	1982	
1	Kuwait	<i>Al Sanbouk</i> /GER Lurssen TNC-45	Patrol Boat/ Missile Boat	2 twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	Germany	1984	
				1 76mm gun			
1	Kuwait	<i>Istiqlal</i> /GER Lurssen FPB-57	Fast Attack Patrol Boat	2 twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	Germany	2005	
				1 76mm gun			
10	Kuwait	<i>Al Nokatha</i> /U.S. Mk V <i>Pegasus</i>	Patrol Boat/Special Operations Craft	7.62mm Gatling gun; .50 caliber Machine Guns	United States of America	2012	
8	Kuwait	<i>Um Almaradim</i> /FRA P-37 BRL	Fast Attack Patrol Boat	2 twin launchers with <i>Sea Skua</i> AShM;	France	1998	
				1 sextuple launcher			
2	Oman	<i>Qahir Al Amwaj</i>	Corvette	2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	United Kingdom	1996	
				1 octuple launcher			



					with <i>Crotale</i> SAM;		
					1 76mm gun;		
					1 helicopter landing platform		
4	Oman	<i>Dhofar</i>	Armed Patrol Boat		2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM	United Kingdom	1982
4	Qatar	<i>Barzan/UK Vita</i>	Fast Attack Craft		2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM;	United Kingdom	1996, 1998
					1 sextuple launcher with <i>Mistral</i> SAM;		
					1 <i>Goalkeeper</i> CIWS;		
					1 76mm gun		
3	Qatar	<i>Damsah/FRA Combattante III</i>	Fast Attack Craft		2 quad launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM;	France	1982, 1983
					1 76mm gun		
3	UAE	<i>Baynunah</i>	Corvette		2 quadruple launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM;	France, UAE	2010, 2012
					1 8-cell Mk 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM;		
					1 21-cell MR49 GMLS with		

				RIM 116B SAM; 1 76mm Gun		
1	UAE	<i>Abu Dhabi</i>	Corvette	2 quadruple launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM; 1 76mm Gun	Italy	2011
2	UAE	<i>Muray Jib</i> /GER Lurssen 62m	Corvette	2 quadruple launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM; 1 76mm Gun; 1 octuple launcher with <i>Crotale</i> SAM; 1 <i>Goalkeeper</i> CIWS; 1 helicopter landing platform	Germany	1990, 1991
2	UAE	<i>Granthoot</i>	Corvette	2 quadruple launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM; 2 triple launchers	Italy	2012
2	UAE	<i>Mubarraaz</i> /GER Lurssen TNC-45m	Corvette	2 twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> AShM; 2 triple launchers with VL <i>Mica</i> SAM;	Germany	1990

					1	76mm gun;		
					1	helicopter landing platform		
6	UAE	<i>Ban Yas</i> /GER Lurssen TNC-45	Fast Attack Craft		2	twin launchers with MM-40 <i>Exocet</i> Block III AShM;	Germany	1980
7	UAE	<i>Al Bazam</i> / <i>Ghannatha</i> mod	Patrol Boat		4	single launchers with <i>Marte</i> Mk2/N AShM	Sweden	2012

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.5 Iranian Reliance on Aging/Mediocre Naval Systems****FSGM**

- **2 *Jamaran*** (UK Vosper Mk 5 with 2 twin launcher with CSS-N-4 *Sardine* anti-ship missile 2 launcher with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform)

**FSG 4**

- **3 *Alvand*** (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin 1 launcher with CSS-N-4 *Sardine* anti-ship missile, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun
- **1 *Bayandor*** (U.S. PF-103) with 2 twin launcher with C-802 anti-ship missile, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 76mm gun

**FS**

- **1 *Bayandor*** (U.S. PF-103) with 2 76mm gun

**PCFG**

- **13 *Kaman*** (FRA *Combattante II*) with 1–2 twin launcher with CSS-N-4 *Sardine* anti-ship missile

**MSI**

- **2 *Riazi*** (U.S. *Cape*)

**LSM**

- **3 *Farsi*** (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops)

**LST**


- **4 *Hengam*** each with up to 1 helicopter (capacity 9 tanks; 225 troops)

**LSL**


- **6 *Fouque***

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.6: Source of Armed Western Made Naval Ships by Manufacturer**



Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.7: Patrol Craft – Part One**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.7: Patrol Craft – Part Two**

	<b>Iraq</b>	<b>Yemen</b>	<b>Iran</b>	<b>GCC</b>	<b>Bahrain</b>	<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>Oman</b>	<b>Qatar</b>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>UAE</b>
Fast Guided Missile Patrol Craft (PCFG)			60	32	4	2	4	7	9	6
Fast Patrol Boat (PBF)		10	51	117	25	22	3	3	6	58
Patrol Boat (PB)	20	28	132	208	33	20	31	1	64	59
PTG			12	0						
Fast Guided Missile Patrol Boat (PBFG)			8	0						
Off-shore Patrol Craft (PCO)	2	1		2			2			
Coastal Patrol Craft (PCC)	4			3			3			
Riverine Patrol Boat (PBR)	6			0						
Patrol Boat with Guided Missiles (PBG)				8		8				
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missiles and CIWS Missiles or SAM (PCFGM)				2						2
Fast Patrol Craft with Guided Missiles (PCFG)				6						6
Fast Patrol Boat with Guided Missiles (PBFG)				7						7
Offshore Patrol Ship (over 1,500 Tons)				1						1


Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.8: Iranian Military Installations Inside and Outside the Gulf**

- Bandar-e Khomeini (30°25'41.42"N, 49° 4'50.18"E)
- **Bandar-e Mahshahr (30°29'43.62"N, 49°12'23.91"E)**
- Khorramshahr (30°26'2.71"N, 48°11'34.25"E)
- **Khark Island (29°14'48.01"N, 50°19'48.88"E)**
- **Bandar-e Bushehr (28°58'2.58"N, 50°51'50.74"E)**
- Asalouyeh (27°27'21.08"N, 52°38'15.55"E)
- **Bandar-e Abbas** (Naval base: 27° 8'35.79"N, 56°12'45.61"E; IRGCN missile boat base: 27° 8'30.91"N, 56°12'5.58"E; IRGCN torpedo & MLRS boat base: 27° 8'21.13"N, 56°11'53.28"E; Hovercraft base and nearby
- Naval air strip: 27° 9'15.68"N, 56° 9'49.97"E)
- Jask (25°40'40.90"N, 57°51'4.54"E)
- Bostanu (27° 2'58.22"N, 55°59'3.22"E)
- Chabahar
- IRGCN base. It is the farthest east of all of Iran's military port facilities.
- Qeshm (26°43'10.09"N, 55°58'30.94"E)
- Sirri Island (25°53'40.20"N, 54°33'7.82"E)
- Abu Musa (25°52'22.32"N, 55° 0'38.62"E)
- Occupied by Iran but claimed by the UAE. Suspected to house a small number of IRGCN forces. Also known to house HAWK SAMs and HY-2 "Silkworm" anti-ship missiles.
- Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (GT: 26°15'54.33"N , 55°19'27.75"E; LT: 26°14'26.08"N, 55° 9'21.18"E)

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.





**Figure V.9: The Submarine and Submersible Balance**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV)			8	12			2	0	0	10
Midget Submarine (SSW)	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coastal Submarine (SSC)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Attack Submarine with ASW Capability (SSK)	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Map V.5: Depth of the Gulf**

**Figure V.10: Mine Laying Capabilities**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Ocean Mine Hunter (MHC)				5					3	2
Ocean Mine Sweeper (MSO)		1		0						
Inshore Mine Sweeper (MSI)			2	0						
Coastal Mine Sweeper (MSC)			3	0						
Coastal Mine Countermeasures (MCC)				4					4	

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure V.11: Iran's Anti-ship Missiles**

Name/Classification	ASM or AShM AAM	Source	Description
Sattar-1/2/3/4	AAM	IHS Jane's	Indigenously developed, laser guided missile; traces history from French AS30L, supposedly received by Iran by Iraq to avoid U.S. air strikes in 1991; Cross between AGM-65 and AIM-54; Semi-active Laser homing seeker; 20-60km range; can be carried by F4/F5; Sattar-3: aka Asre-67; longer rocket engine, semi-active laser homing; rumored to have optical seeker; CEP under 10m; range of 30km
AGM-65 Maverick	AAM	IHS Jane's	Designed for close air support, interdiction and defense suppression mission. It provides stand-off capability and high probability of strike against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air defenses, ships, transportation equipment and fuel storage facilities. Maverick was used during Operation Desert Storm and, according to the Air Force, hit 85 percent of its targets.”  “The Maverick has a cylindrical body, and either a rounded glass nose for electro-optical imaging, or a zinc sulfide nose for imaging infrared. It has a delayed-fuse penetrator, a heavyweight warhead that penetrates the target with its kinetic energy before firing. The latter is very effective against large, hard targets.”  A-10, F-15E and F-16 aircraft carry Mavericks. Mavericks can be launched from high altitudes to tree-top level and can hit targets ranging from a distance of a few thousand feet to 13 nautical miles at medium altitude.
AS-10 ‘Karen’/KH25	AAM	IHS Jane's	“The Kh-25M missile is series produced in three versions, all using the same engine, autopilot, warhead, power supply, body with wings, and other components. Only the guidance heads are different. The Kh-25MP antiradar missile (Article 711, NATO's AS-12 Kegler) is similar to the Kh-27PS with an almost identical outer appearance. The Kh-25ML (Article 713, NATO's AS-10 Karen) has a 24N1 laser guidance head and thus the same one which the Kh-25 has. The Kh-25MR (Article 714, NATO's AS-10 Karen) has the guidance head in the nose section replaced by a deflector and a Delta radio command-guidance system in the tail section, just as in the earlier Kh-23M missile. The latest version of the Kh-25 missile is the Kh-25MTP with a thermal-imaging guidance head.”
AS-11 ‘Kilter’/KH-58	AAM	IHS Jane's	The AS-11 ‘Kilter’ is an anti-radiation missile with a range of 120 km. The Kh-58U missile (Article 112, alias D7) was built to replace the Kh-28, first of all for Su-24M aircraft, and was then used as basic weapon of MiG-25BM and other aircraft. Target indication and guidance head programming prior to the launch are done by either an on-board (Su-24M) "Fantazmagoria" [Phantasmagoria] set or a "Vyyuga"

AS-12 'Kegler'/KH-27	AAM	IHS Jane's	<p>[Snowstorm] set suspended in a container. The probability of hit within a 20 m radius around an operating radar station is 80 percent. The Kh-58 version was equipped with an active radar head.</p> <p>The passive-radar head of this missile was equipped with two antennas tuned to the radar frequencies of two most popular Western air defense systems: Hawk and Nike Hercules respectively to break through the enemy air defense system by destroying its radar stations. The missile was also equipped with an autopilot enabling it to perform the "hump" maneuver during the final flight stage so as to hit the target at a 20-30[DEG] angle and thus improve the effectiveness of warhead.</p>
AS-14 'Kedge'/KH-29	AAM	IHS Jane's	<p>It is used chiefly against heavily reinforced targets (almost half its weight is the warhead). The Kh-29L (Article 63) is an improved version of the Kh-29, with semiactive laser guidance. The Kh-29T (Article 64) has a television head with automatic optical homing to a distinguishable object indicated by the pilot in the cockpit. The Kh-29D version with a thermal-imaging head is also on the list of Russian export items. Maximum effective range 8-10km</p>
AS-16 'Kickback'/KH 15	AAM	IHS Jane's	<p>Its basic version is the Kh-15P (Article 115) antiradiation missile used for breaking through air defenses. Its Kh-15A anti-ship version (exhibited in Abu Dhabi 1993 as the Kh-15S) has an inertial navigation system for the initial flight stage and a millimetric-wave active-radar self-homing system for the final flight stage. During its initial flight stage the Kh-15 missile, using a solid-fuel, rises to an altitude of about 40,000 m, whereupon the target seeking radar turns on. Having been zeroed in on the target, the missile dives while accelerating to a speed of Mach 5. It has a range of 150km.</p>
Bina	AAM	IHS Jane's	<p>Upgraded AGM-65 Maverick with semi-active laser seeker fitted to nose; and the ability to be fired from air and from ground launchers.</p>
YJ-6 (CAS-1) /C-601	AShM	IHS Jane's	<p>The basic weapon is in most respects identical to the HY-2, with necessary modifications for air launch such as dorsal hard points. While the Styx family of cruise missiles is widely regarded to be obsolete today, and too large and slow to penetrate modern defenses on warships, the missile remains strategically important, due to its lethality and wide deployment. Used against transports, tankers, amphibious ships and other targets without defensive systems, the missile is highly lethal.</p> <p>The C-601 [Western designation KRAKEN] is China's first generation air-to-ship missile, and is generally similar to the C-201 HY-2 surface launched missile, apart from the deletion of the solid-rocket booster motor which is superfluous to this air-launched missile. Regardless of the control mode used after</p>

launch, once a missile is launched from an aircraft it will fly towards the target area based on a prearranged program, relying on the terminal guidance radar in the missile to seek the target. The terminal guidance head uses monopulse active radar which provides resistance to sea waves and various types of electronic jamming. The level flight altitude of the missile can be set at 500 meters, 70 meters or 50 meters, providing good low-altitude penetration capabilities. The missile can sink or seriously damage a 3,000 ton or higher class cruiser or a 10,000 ton class transport ship.

C-801/C-802

AshM

IHS  
Jane's

The C-801 missile is the second generation of anti-ship missiles developed by China and is carried on missile speedboats, submarines, escort boats, and destroyers, and is used to attack destroyers or escort boats. The terminal guidance radar with monopulse system possesses high anti-jamming capabilities. The high precision radio altimeter allows the missile to have minimum-altitude flight above the sea. It uses a semi-armor-piercing anti-personnel blast warhead which relies on the missile's kinetic energy to pierce the deck of a ship, penetrate into and explode in the ship's interior. During final design flight tests, one missile attacked and sank a target ship with displacement of 10,000 tons.

This multipurpose missile can with modification be loaded on various ships, aircraft and motor vehicles. Iran may have imported as many as 100 C-801s and eight launchers in 1987-88, and by 1994 it was claimed that Iran had about 200 C-801 missiles as well as the ability to produce the C-801 indigenously [under the designation "Tondar"]. The C-801 has a seventy-five single shot accuracy.

#### **C802:**

C802 shore-to-ship missile which employs a small turbojet engine in place of the original solid rocket engine, providing a three-fold increase in range to 120 km.

The C-802 (Ying-Ji-802; YJ-2) land attack and anti-ship cruise missile [Western designation SACCAD], is an improved version of the C-801 which employs a small turbojet engine in place of the original solid rocket engine. The YJ-2 (C-802) is externally similar to the YJ-1 but it is powered by a turbojet with paraffin-based fuel. The weight of the subsonic (0.9 Mach) Yingji-802 is reduced from 815 kilograms to 715 kilograms, but its range is increased from 42 kilometers to 120 kilometers. The 165 kg (363 lb.) warhead is just as powerful as the earlier version. Since the missile has a small radar reflectivity and is only about five to seven meters above the sea surface when it attacks the target, and since its guidance equipment has strong anti-jamming capability, target ships have a very low success rate in intercepting the missile. The hit probability of the Yingji-802 is estimated to be as high as 98 percent. The Yingji-802 can be launched from airplanes, ships, submarines and land-based vehicles, and is considered along with the U.S. "Harpoon" as among the best anti-ship missiles of the present-day world.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iran imported the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile from China. China suspended exports in 1996 in response to complaints by the United States.

Hizballah seriously damaged a Saar 5-class missile ship named the "Spear" that was helping to enforce Israel's blockade of Lebanon on 14 July 2006. Israel initially believed that an aerial drone armed with explosives hit the warship, but it became clear that Hizballah had used an Iranian-made C-802 cruise missile to strike the vessel. Another Hizballah radar-guided anti-ship missile hit and sank a nearby Cambodian merchant ship around the time the Spear was struck. Twelve Egyptian sailors were pulled from the water by passing ships.

The YJ-22 is a land-attack cruise missile development of the anti-ship C-802 with a 400km range, and possible GPS/TM guidance was said to be under development with an IOC expected after 2005, though as of 2011 the status of this program was unclear. This 135-kilometer range system would be the first Chinese cruise missile to incorporate GPS-assisted navigation. GPS-aided guidance could be augmented by terrain contour matching guidance. Some sources believe GPS aided navigation could result in cruise missiles like the YJ-22 to achieve accuracies of up to 10 meters.

RIM-66 Standard, AShM IHS  
SM1 MR Jane's

The SM-1 (MR) is a medium range defense weapon for Iran's *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class frigates (*Alvand* and *Jamaran*). The Standard Missile was produced in two major types, the SM-1 MR/SM-2 (medium range) and the SM-2 (extended range).

Qadar AShM IHS  
Jane's

Derivative of C802 with range of 200km designed to defeat large surface combatants. The Qader missile can be launched from surface naval platforms or from vehicles, in its coastal defense configuration. Following qualification tests carried out in August 2011 off the Straits of Hormuz, the first production lot of missiles was handed to the Iranian Navy and Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in September, 2011. The missile carried a smaller warhead 1/6 of the size of the full warhead, but, according to the IRGC commander, the missile succeeded to sink the target vessel. Iran claims the missile is capable of defeating large surface vessels and aircraft carriers.

On launch the Qader uses a solid rocket booster, accelerating the missile on its initial phase. Then, the missile's turbojet sustainer kicks in propelling the missile through its midcourse phase. The Qader is designated a 'cruise missile', for its long range (more than 200km). The weapon's jam-resistant radar and digital, programmable guidance system are claimed to be two of the enhancements introduced by the Iranians.

According the lead pilot, the Qader air-based missile can be used by the Iranian Air Force in future battles. The Qader has a high-precision striking capability and the Iranian defense

industries have mass-produced the powerful missile. The missile enjoys automatic digital pilot system, high-precision navigation systems, high-precision striking capability, anti-jamming radar systems and a rapid deployment capability.

Noor	AShM	IHS	Turbojet-powered C-802 (see above)
		Jane's	
C-704 Nasr	AShM	IHS	The Nasr is the Iranian version of the short-range, solid-fuel Chinese C-704 missile;

The C-704 entered service in 2006. This missile appears to be a half sized version of the U.S. Harpoon, but it is actually based on a Chinese copy of the 300 kg Maverick missile (the C-701), but made larger. China helped Iran set up a plant to assemble the C-704s in Iran, under license as the Nasr 1. The C-704 is a 400 kg (880 pound) missile with a 130 kg (286 pound) warhead and a range of 35 kilometers. It has a radar guidance system to guide it to the target, assuming it has been fired to the general area where the target is. This is a cruise missile, moving at 800 kilometers an hour, at an altitude of 15-20 meters (46-61 feet).

Back in March 2011 Israel intercepted a cargo ship off their coast on March 15th, and found six Chinese C-704 anti-ship missiles. The seized missiles were apparently Iranian built C-704s. The ship had been hired by Iran to take a cargo of weapons to Egypt where the weapons would be smuggled into Gaza for Iranian ally Hamas to use against Israel.

It was believed that there were at least 2 versions of the Nasr (C-704) missile in Iran. The first version had been called Nasr 1, and this started production in Iran in April 2010, with the final assembly and test of Chinese supplied sub-assemblies. An unconfirmed report stated that the solid propellant motors were made in Iran. A second version, known as Nasr 2 was believed to be in development in Iran. Iran was also believed to have received some C-704KD air-launched missiles from China, but it was not known if these missiles were fitted to fixed wing aircraft or helicopters.

The Nasr missiles were believed to have inertial guidance in the mid-course phase. Active radar, TV and IIR seeker versions had been displayed in China, and all 3 versions were assumed to have been sold to Iran. Nasr missiles were fitted with a 130 kg HE/SAP warhead. Solid propellant boost and sustainer motors were fitted, and the surface-to-surface missile had a minimum range of 5 kilometers and a maximum range of 27 kilometers. The air-launched version was believed to have a maximum range of 35 kilometers.

A TL-6 missile model had been seen fitted to a Chinese F-811M fighter, and it was believed that C-704 entered service in China in 2006. A coastal defense missile was flight tested in Iran in April 2006, with a range of 30 kilometers, and this could have been Nasr 1. A test of a Nasr 2 missile was reported by Iran in December 2008, launched from a ship against a target at a range of 30 kilometers. This was the first reference in Iran to a Nasr 2 version. It was believed that Chinese supplied C-704 missile systems could have entered service in Iran in 2008, but the Iranian built Nasr 1 production did not start until 2010.




C-701  
(Kowsar)      Kosar    AShM    IISS

It was said to be capable of being launched against ships from land, ship, or air and was designed with the geography of the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea in mind. The missile was said to be able to sink "small and medium-sized naval vessels" should it strike them.

This missile should not be confused with the Shahab-6 ballistic missile, which had also been referred to with the name Kosar/Kowsar. Kosar missiles had been reported to have been fitted to Iranian Peykaap II missile boats. It was test fired from these craft during exercises in 2006. During the same exercises a shore based, truck mounted variant was also tested.

There were at least 2 versions of the Kosar (derived from the Chinese C-701/TL-10), one with a TV seeker head (TV) and the other with an active radar seeker, with inertial guidance in the mid-course phase. The Chinese missiles were believed to have alternate designators, using TL-10A for the TV seeker version, and TL-10B for the active radar seeker (believed to be likely a Ka band, 35 GHz). One report suggested that a semi-active laser (SAL) version had also been developed in Iran. The Kosar had a length of 2.51 meters (TV) or 2.69 meters (R), a diameter of 0.18 meters, and a launch weight of 105 kilograms (TV) or 117 kilograms (R). The Kosar had a 29 kilogram HE/SAP warhead, a minimum range of 3 kilometers and a maximum range of 18 kilometers. The 3 exit nozzles of the solid propellant motor indicated a dual-mode boost and sustainer operation. The maximum cruise speed was believed to be Mach 0.8. The missiles were stored and launched from a square box section canister, with 2 canisters mounted on a rotating launch assembly on a wheeled 4x4 truck.

It was believed that the C-701 entered service in China in 1999, and that Kosar entered service in Iran in 2005. It was believed that the earlier Kosar missiles were assembled and tested in Iran, from Chinese supplied sub-assemblies. Kosar missiles were reported fitted to IPS-16 Modified Peykaap II patrol craft in 2008, with 2 missile canisters located in the stern of the craft. It was also possible that some Kosar missiles were ground-launched, and that some might be air-launched.

**Figure V.12: Landing Craft by Type and Country**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
Utility Air Cushion Craft (LCAC)				3					3	
Air Cushion Landing Craft (LCAC)				5					5	
Landing Craft Utility (LCU)		3	1	15	8	2	1		4	
Tank Landing Craft (LCT)				1			1			
Medium Landing Craft (LCM)				11			3	4	4	

Logistics Landing Ship (LSL)			6	0						
Medium Landing Ship (LSM)		1	3	0						
Tank Landing Ship (LST)			4	1			1			
Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP)				2	2					

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.



## ***VI. Air Forces***

Airpower plays a key role in most potential scenarios in the Gulf, even those involving relatively low-level land and sea conflict. It involves a wide range of different capabilities from precision strike to IS&R to strategic and tactical airlift. And, it involves rapid theater-wide strike and mobility, and is the area where outside powers like the U.S. can most rapidly deploy additional forces in to the Gulf area. As is the case with so many other aspects of the Gulf balance, the role of outside powers can be as important as the balance of local forces.

The impact of airpower in joint warfare has also changed radically with the steady increase in the range and precision of air-launched weapons, improvements in airborne and satellite targeting and other IS&R functions, and improvements in airborne command and control systems like the AWACS. Airpower and air combat technology once evolved more slowly in the Gulf than in European, Asian, and Arab-Israeli conflicts. In spite of large Iranian and Iraqi air forces and of surface-to-air missile forces, airpower still played a relatively limited role in the Iran-Iraq War, and one that had not evolved strikingly since the Korean and Vietnamese Wars. That situation has changed strikingly since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Changes in precision strike, beyond-visual range air-to-air combat and IS&R capabilities for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft made U.S., Arab Gulf, and allied airpower far more effective in the First Gulf War (1991). Changes in air tactics and technology had a major impact in containing Iraq during 1992-2002, in decisively defeating Iraq in 2003, in counterinsurgency combat in Iraq, 2004-2010, and then in Coalition strikes against ISIS in 2014-2015.

These changes have also made aircraft and air munitions performance steadily more important relative to aircraft numbers. At the same time -- as later chapters show -- airpower evolved to include a steadily widening range of capabilities for both air and joint warfare. Changes in land and sea-based ballistic and cruise missile forces, and the introduction of both unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) added further new dimensions to air warfare. Changes in I&SR and C4I/BM capabilities have continued to steadily improve targeting capability, the ability to manage complex coalition air and joint warfare operations, and task and re-task aircraft in flight.

Land and sea based surface-to-air and anti-missile defense systems also steadily evolved in capability, and came to play an even more important role in air and missile combat. Air defense in the broader sense now mixes advances in airborne control and warning, aircraft radar and avionics capabilities for both line of sight and beyond visual range air-to-air combat, and surface-to-air missile defenses in ways that continue to evolve as quickly as fixed and rotary wing air strike capabilities.

### **Airpower, Scenarios, and Joint Warfare**

As is the case with land, sea, and missile forces, airpower is only one dimension in the balance of Gulf military forces. A naval conflict could take the form of limited raids by sea, or a low level war of attrition that only involved naval or seaborne attacks, but even this kind of war would almost certainly include significant land-based IS&R activity and

the use of maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs. Any significant level of naval conflict that affected the flow of shipping as well as the security of Gulf facilities, ports, and offshore petroleum installations -- as well as defense and deterrence against amphibious raids and attacks -- is likely to involve joint air-sea warfare. It will produce a scenario-specific mix of sea, air, and missile power, and may well include marines, naval guards or some element of land forces.

**Map VI.1** highlights the air space that would be involved in a conflict between Iran and the Arab Gulf states. The spectrum of conflicts involving naval forces in the Gulf can range from low level naval clashes -- and low level, asymmetric wars of attrition -- to major sea-air-missile conflicts. There is no way to predict the level of escalation that would be involved in given scenarios. In most cases involving significant naval conflict, however, land-based airpower and mixes of land-based and satellite IS&R and C4I/BM capabilities are likely to play a critical role. Ports, offshore facilities, islands, key petroleum facilities, and key infrastructure facilities like desalination will also make attractive target bases for sea, air, and missile operations.

Land combat may also be involved. At high levels of escalation, Iran might try to use its ground forces to offset the GCC and the U.S. advantage in air and sea power. It might use them to try to dominate Iraq, to create a threat along the Saudi border, or to drive across the Shat al Arab and seize Kuwait. It might also seek to use support of non-state actors in countries like Yemen to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and the GCC states.

As the previous series of maps has shown, Iran has more strategic depth than most of the Gulf states in terms of air power. **Map VI.2** shows that many key urban targets are located a considerable distance from the Gulf and outside air space while many Arab Gulf states concentrate their critical targets along the Gulf coast, and Saudi Arabia and Oman are the only Arab Gulf states that have matching depth in terms of air space and air bases. Moreover, all of the Arab Gulf states except Oman have the special vulnerability of being dependent on the security of their desalination plants -- sources of water for which they have no immediate alternative.

At the same time, **Map VI.3** shows that Iran's key energy facilities do not have that strategic depth, and Arab Gulf and U.S. air and cruise missiles strike power can reach a wide range of critical Iranian targets, including oil export facilities that are critical to Iran. The EIA reports that,

- Pre-sanctions, Iran exported approximately 2.2 million bbl./d of crude oil. Iranian Heavy Crude Oil is Iran's largest crude export followed by Iranian Light. In 2011, Iran's net oil export revenues amounted to approximately \$95 billion. Oil exports provide half of Iran's government revenues, while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 percent of Iran's total exports.
- Kharg Island, the site of the vast majority of Iran's exports, has a crude storage capacity of 20.2 million barrels of oil and a loading capacity of 5 million bbl./d. Lavan Island is the second-largest terminal with capacity to store 5 million barrels and loading capacity of 200,000 bbl./d. Other important terminals include Kish Island, Abadan, Bandar Mahshar, and Neka (which helps facilitate imports from the Caspian region).
- Iran is the second-largest oil consuming country in the Middle East, second only to Saudi Arabia. Iranian domestic oil demand is mainly for diesel and gasoline. Total oil consumption was approximately 1.8 million bbl./d in 2010, about 10 percent higher than the year before. Iran has limited refinery capacity for the production of light fuels, and

consequently imports a sizeable share of its gasoline supply (Imports 300,000 bbl. of gasoline per day.). Iran's total refinery capacity in January 2011 was about 1.5 million bbl./d, with its nine refineries operated by the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC), a NIOC subsidiary.

- Refineries and gas distribution critical to economy. Are highly vulnerable.
  - Natural gas accounts for 54 percent of Iran's total domestic energy consumption.
- Key aspects of power grid, are highly vulnerable. Today's precision strike assets allow conventional strikes to knock out key, repairable links or create long-term incapacity. They have become "weapons of mass effectiveness."
  - EIA reports some power plants are running as low as 10 percent of their nameplate capacity as Iran's electricity infrastructure is largely in a state of dilapidation and rolling blackouts become endemic in summer months. The amount of generation lost in distribution is a central indicator of the disrepair of the electricity network, with upwards of 19 percent of total generation lost during transmission.
- Key road bridges, tunnels, overpasses, tunnels to limit logistic and transport movement.
- Rail system vulnerabilities.
- Limited and vulnerable air defense system with only one modern and very short-range air and cruise missile defense system. Will remain vulnerable to stealth, cruise missiles, and corridor suppression of enemy air defenses unless can get fully modern mix of radars, C4I/BM assets, and S-300/400 equivalent.
- Facilities for imports of food and product.
- Naval embargo presents issues in maritime law, but can halt all Iranian traffic, "inspect" all incoming shipping. In a conflict, can use smart mines to limit access all ports
- Halt all civil aviation traffic.

**Map VI.4** shows that Iran and the Gulf states have a wider range of military airbases to use for dispersal, longer range operations, and operations in Syria and Yemen -- even if one ignores commercial airports that are not used as military bases, and unoccupied or low-grade dispersal facilities.

The end result is that any scenarios where airpower is used could involve complex and unpredictable mixes of conventional forces, irregular or asymmetric forces, militias, and hostile non-state actors. The conventional balance of power might well prove to be largely irrelevant, and most serious levels of actual war fighting or deterrence are likely to be shaped by the combined impact of seapower, airpower, and missile power. Ideology, religion, and internal sectarian, ethnic, and tribal differences can play a critical role under such conditions.

As is the case, with land, air, and missile forces, the role of U.S. naval and other power projection forces, and those of other outside powers like Britain and France -- is likely to be equally important. This is particularly true in any scenarios that involve large-scale combat or that pose a significant threat to the smooth flow of oil exports. At the same time, other outside powers and non-state actors might contribute money, weapons, advisors, and political support. The ability to add foreign non-state actors like the Hezbollah, or embed key elements of "train and assist forces" like the Iranian Al Quds Force.

## Map VI.1: Key Operating Areas in Iranian and Arab Gulf Airspace



Source: Congressional Research Service & Wikipedia.

<https://www.google.com/search?q=CRS+Persian+Gulf&tbm=isch&imgil=9rA8kke>



**Map VI.2: Iran's "Strategic" Depth in Air Space**

Source: CIA

**Map VI.3: Iran's Vulnerable Petroleum Facilities**

Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency

**Map VI.4: Key Gulf Airbases**

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan

## **The Less Quantifiable Elements of Airpower**

Comparisons of air and air defense force manpower, force structure, and force strength do provide important insights in to the military balance, as do the assessments of surface-to-surface missile power that follow. Once again, however, the more easily quantifiable measures of force strength do not compare many critical elements of real world combat capability. In the case of airpower, these include:

- Training and large scale, realistic naval and joint warfare combat exercise performance.
- Combat experience, particularly in support of ground and naval forces, interdiction and deep strike and beyond visual range air combat.
- Readiness, particularly in terms of operational availability of aircraft, sortie rate generation capability and sustained generation capability.
- Sustainability of air combat assets.
- Combinations of avionics and precision strike systems, and realistic range and exercise training.
- Training, avionics and munitions for air-to-air combat, particularly all-weather (AWX) and beyond visual range (BVR) combat
- Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) training, avionics, and munitions.
- Anti-ship sensors, avionics, and munitions
- Real world capabilities for electronic intelligence (ELINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare (EW) capability.
- Real world secure communications and data link capability,
- Real world capability to provide airborne tanker and refueling capability.
- Real world capability to provide effective air command and operations center capability at the national and GCC levels.
- Motivation and morale.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. (IS&R)
- Targeting and smart munitions capabilities.
- Command, control, communications, computer, and battle management capabilities (C4I/BM)
- Political leadership and unity.
- Interoperability and common doctrine, training, and leadership for allied forces.

## **Air Force Capabilities and Readiness**

The capabilities of Gulf air forces vary sharply according to force, and particularly according to the level of equipment modernization described in the following sections as well as factors like their comparative battle management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (IS&R).

### ***Iranian Air Force***

Iran's air force and the air elements of its IRGC have impressive numbers of combat aircraft. The IISS estimates Air Force manning at 30,000, including 12,000 men in the Air Defense Command. The air branch of the IRGC adds at least 3,000 to 5,000 men to this total.



IHS Jane's estimates that Iran has a total force of some 30 squadrons, with some 20 or more combat squadrons. Most are multi-role fighters, although the Su-24 is primarily a strike-attack fighter, the F-14 is optimized for air defense, and the Su-25 is designed for close support missions against armor.

Iran's total combat fighter strength includes 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; more than 55 F-5E/F Tiger IIs, 24 F-7M Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG-29A/U/UB Fulcrum; up to 6 Iranian-made Azarakhsh (a replacement for its obsolete F-5s), 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; 30 Su-24MK Fencer D; up to 6 Iranian-made Saegheh; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot; and 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (more than four of which may have been sent to Iran to assist in the fight against ISIL).

IHS Jane's reports that Iran may also have Mirage F-1EQss in service it obtained from Iraq, and Chinese F-7Ns designed for air combat. It also reports that Iran may have obtained 30 more Su-24s from Russia.<sup>160</sup>

The IISS reports the Iranian air force also has 5 P-3MP Orion maritime patrol aircraft which may still have limited ASW capability and which may have been modified to allow remote targeting of Iran's longer range anti-ship missiles. It has only limited capability in IS&R mode, using 6+ aging RF-4E that have had some Iranian upgrades.

Iran also has a squadron of tanker-transporters it can use for refueling. It has claimed to have an AWACS or AC&W capability, and there are reports it is modifying an ANATOV An-140 AEW aircraft with Russian assistance, but Iran's progress is unclear. Iran showed during the Iran-Iraq War that the AWG-9 radars and data links on its F-14 can be used to provide some AC&W functions, but with limited range and capability.

The air branch of the IRGC operates Iran's strategic missile force with 1-2 brigades of Shahab 1 and Shahab 2 missiles, and a forming brigade of Shahab 3 and Sejil missiles. It is reported to operate Iran's Su-25s. As is discussed in **Chapter X**, the IISS estimates that these forces operate 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 MRBMs; some Sajjil-2 (in development), and 18 SRBM fire units with some Fateh 110; 12-18 Shahab-1/2 fire units with 200-300 missiles, and some Zelzal forces. These forces are evolving so rapidly, however, that any such estimates are highly uncertain.

The overall structure and capability of Iran's sensor net and battle management, C4I, and IS&R systems continue to evolve, and Iran has regularly reported exaggerated upgrades and production developments in the past. IHS Jane's does report, however, that Iran has deployed far more advanced ground-based radars in recent years, which could support both air operations and its land-based surface-to-air missile forces including any future deployment of more advanced missile systems like the S-300.

These improvements include a "3,000 km range Sepehr (Sky) radar -- with capability to track stealth systems and cruise missiles as well as aircraft -- deployed in the northwest of the country to reduce its vulnerability to attack."<sup>161</sup>

IHS Jane's reports that Iran has a prototype facility near Garmsar for a Ghadir radar that was made public in June 2014. IHS Jane's reports that there may also be a prototype Ghadir radar site located at an air defense base in Tehran province.<sup>162</sup>

IHS Jane's also estimates that Iran will remain focused on a point defense use of its radars and surface-to-air missiles with some networking on a provincial level or higher -- creating

what it calls a “mosaic system” with major centers at Tehran, Esfahan, Kharg Island, Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. There is no way, however, to assess Iran’s actual level of progress, without access to classified data<sup>163</sup>.

Iran has large fixed wing transport and helicopter forces by regional standards and its army has both a large fleet of transport helicopters – some modified for IS&R roles – and 50 AHJ Cobra attack helicopters. Iran is the only country in the Gulf with a naval aviation branch, which the IISS reports has 3 PF-3F Orions, 10 SH-3D Sea King helicopters, and 3 RH-53D Sea Stallions.

The problem with these total force numbers, however, is that they do not reflect real world operational strength. Many of the aircraft involved are U.S. aircraft that date back to the time of the Shah and saw extensive wear and use during the Iranian-Iraq war, are low-grade Chinese imports, aircraft obtained by Iran when Iraq attempted to preserve its fighters by sending them to Iran during the first Gulf War, or export versions of Russian fighters that at least initially did not have the same capability as the version in service in Russia.

Outside experts feel that Iran has made some impressive efforts to upgrade its aircraft, keep them operational, produce its own spare parts, and arm its aircraft with modern missiles. As the later **Figures** in this chapter show, however, they also feel that Iran’s numbers still disguise a relatively obsolescent and low-grade force, and one that has not had access to U.S. and European upgrades.

As is the case with its other services, Iran has had to rely in part on spare parts and replacements obtained in the global black market. In spite of some Iranian claims to produce more than 90% of the parts it needs, experts put the real figure at no more than 15-20%. This presents major problems in preserving day-to-day operational readiness in peacetime and generating large numbers of sorties in war. Iran also lacks modern, high capability AWAC, IS&R, and electronic warfare assets and technology as well as some important aspects of communications and IFF security.

### ***Iraqi Air Force***

Iraq only has token air forces, but is seeking to create a far more modern and capable force using the F-16, COIN aircraft, and AH-64s or some Russian or other equivalent. The IISS estimates it had a 5,000-man air forces and 4,000-man air defense force in 2014, before the ISIL advance. Its actual forces seem, to have been significantly smaller, but it is unclear they have been as heavily affected by the military defeats and political upheavals that affected the ground forces.

The IISS and IHS Jane’s report that Iraq’s combat aircraft now consist of 6-13 or more SU-25, Su-25K, and Su-25BK Russia close-support fighters provided by Iran. It also has a squadron of up to 10 armed Cessna 208B and AC-208B armed, light attack aircraft, as well as helicopter forces – some armed – and trainers. Iraq’s U.S.-supplied combat aircraft can fire the Hellfire anti-armor missile.

Iraq also has benefited since August 2015 from the U.S.-led coalition against ISIL. In November 2014, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) reported that the U.S. State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for C-130E/J sustaining and related parts, training, and logistical support for an estimated \$800 million in an effort to boost Iraq’s air transport capabilities.<sup>164</sup>

Iraq also ordered 36 Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 52 jets. Delivery of the F-16s to Balad Air Base in Iraq was scheduled for late 2014/early 2015, but was diverted to Tucson, AZ instead, due to violence and insecurity associated with ISIL's advance in Iraq, according to Defense Industry Daily.<sup>165</sup> Iraqi pilots traveled to the U.S. for training by U.S. instructors of the Arizona ANG's 162nd Wing, a unit experienced in training foreign pilots of partner nations. In November 2014, Pentagon spokesman Col. Steven Warren announced,

We are going to deliver three F-16s to Tucson in December... then one per month after that through May for a total of eight F-16s. We expect the Iraqi pilots will begin flying their own aircraft for continuation training beginning in January... All maintenance for the F-16s will be provided by [contracted] logistic support.... So they're continuing their training, but instead of training using U.S. training aircraft they will now use their own aircraft in Tucson.<sup>166</sup>

Instability in Iraq and a longer than expected training period for Iraqi F-16 pilots delayed the original timeline for delivering the F-16s and trained Iraqi pilots to Iraq. As of April 2015, Pentagon spokeswoman Navy Cmdr. Elissa Smith disclosed, "It is not possible to provide a definite timeline for transport of the F-16s at this time, but we continue to assess the environment and work with the government of Iraq on details of the F-16 program, including basing, funding and transport."<sup>167</sup>

During Iraqi PM Abadi's visit to Washington in April 2015, he was asked what equipment the U.S. administration had agreed to provide. Abadi told an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that, "

All we have is...an agreed list beforehand. We have two divisions which are under training. They need heavy equipments, which we've agreed with the U.S. administration on that and with the Pentagon as well. And we have the F-16. We want to make sure the delivery is on time, and we've been assured that delivery will be on time and there is no problem in delivering these.<sup>168</sup>

On Iraq's purchase of F-16s and the evolution of its Air Force, Defense Industry Daily reported that,

In terms of its front-line fighters, its chosen F-16IQ Block 52s show a pattern of slight downgrades from the more advanced F-16C/D Block 52 base systems. The official export request's determined avoidance of sophisticated air to ground weapons like GPS-guided JDAMs, or advanced air-to-air missiles, also seems designed to assuage regional fears. The net effect seems cleverly calibrated to give Iraq an air defense force that can handle aging threats from Syria or Iran relatively well, and perform strike missions within Iraq, without being a serious threat to more advanced air forces in the region. Regional memories among its Arab neighbors, as well as Israeli concerns, make that a smart starting point. Upgrades can always take place later, and the F-16IQs have at least some of the equipment required to handle more advanced weapons.<sup>169</sup>

In May 2015, immediately following ISIL's seizure of Ramadi, PM Abadi visited Moscow in seek of military aid, where Russian President Vladimir Putin announced, "Our relations are developing very successfully ... Our companies are working in your country and we are talking of investments in the order of billions of dollars."<sup>170</sup> Abadi seeks to build on former Iraqi PM Maliki's 2012 deal with Russia that was estimated at \$4.2 - \$5.0 billion and purported to include the purchase of a combination of 43 Mi-35 (28) and Mi-28NE (15) attack helicopters, plus 42-50 mobile SA-22 Pantsir low-level air defense systems, as well as maintenance and support.<sup>171</sup>

Despite icy relations between Washington and the Kremlin related to Russian aggression in Ukraine, Abadi looks to be accepting help wherever he can get it, including Russia and Iran. "We are focused on developing ties in all spheres, including military-technical

cooperation, economic cooperation and cooperation in the oil and gas sector," PM Abadi said from Moscow in May 2015.<sup>172</sup>

### *Yemeni Air Force*

The Yemeni Air Force had 3,000 men and 75 combat aircraft before the Houthi crisis and the collapse of its government. Its major holdings are now extremely uncertain and little is known about their present operational readiness or losses the Saudi-led bombing campaign that began in the spring of 2015. According to Institute for International and Security Studies (IISS), these holdings included 10 F-5E Tiger II, 15 MiG-21 Fishbed; 3 MiG-21U Mongol A; 16 MiG-29SM/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 31 Su-22/Su-22UM3 Fitter G fighters, and 2 DHC-8 maritime patrol aircraft, 8 Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters, and 1 Ka-27 ASW helicopter assigned to transport roles before the Houthi takeover of much of Yemen.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), however, had different quantities for Yemen's major air holdings. The INSS assessment is older, but recent procurements do not explain the many discrepancies. According to INSS, Yemen's major holdings included a total of 9 F-5E/B multirole planes (all of which were in service), a total of 24 MiG-23 BN ground attack craft (none of which were in service), 30 Su-20/22 ground attack aircraft (10 of which are in service), 13 MiG-29 SMT interceptors (all of which were in service), and 760 MiG-21 obsolete craft (17 of which are in service)..

Yemen also had fleets of fixed wing transports and transport/utility helicopters. A Cessna 208B COIN and IS&R squadron was said to be forming. Its force was concentrated in the capital at Sanaa, with elements at Aden and Taiz.

It is unclear that the Yemeni Air Force has suffered from the same massive internal divisions as the Army, but it was the target of Saudi bombing during April and May 2015. Its current combat effectiveness is unclear, and the data shown in the following figures are nominal and reflect the pre-civil war forces. The Air Force also had poor maintenance standards and used black market and counterfeit spare parts before the Houthi crisis, but did have U.S. and other outside support in improving its counterterrorist and counterinsurgency strike capability against AQAP. IHS Jane's reports it also had help in sustainment and in C-130, F-5, and helicopter maintenance.

### *Arab Gulf Air Forces*

The Arab Gulf states have far better aircraft, weapons, and equipment than Iran, but the divisions between them mean that they lack integrated doctrine and training, air control and warning (AC&W) and AWACS capability, maritime surveillance, and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capability.

Interoperability is limited in both technical and tactical ways, and secure communications capabilities and munitions stocks vary by country. Some progress has been made in improving interoperability in exercises, and the GCC did begin to deploy some elements of an integrated C4I network, called the Hizam al-Taawun (HAT - Belt of Co-operation) in February 2001. This system uses optical fiber networks to integrate some elements of the national air defense systems in each GCC country.

The **Saudi Air Force** is one of the best-armed and equipped forces in the Middle East, and has steadily improved its readiness, training, and effectiveness in recent years. The IISS



estimates that it has 313 combat aircraft, Its air defense and strike attack fighters include 56 F-15C 25 F-15D, 71 F-15S; 69 Tornado IDS; and 40 Typhoon (with 32 more on orders). It also has 12 Tornado GR1A and several Beech 350ER King Air IS&R aircraft, 5 E-3A Sentry and 2 Saab 2000 Erieye AC&W aircraft, and RE-3A and RE-3B electronic intelligence aircraft. It has 11 tankers for airborne refueling, extensive air transport and helicopter capabilities, and its army has 15 AH-64D/E attack helicopters as well as scout and transport helicopters.

The Saudi Air Force had extensive combat experience in the first Gulf War, and has since been used against the Houthi in Yemen. It is one of the few Arab Gulf air forces with a modern set of command and control facilities, high capability AC&W and IS&R assets, and training and weaponry for long-range and stand-off strike as well as air defense missions.

Saudi Arabia has steadily improved air force readiness and training since 2009, and has used its Tornado IDS and F-15s extensively against the Houthi in 2015. It has also been developing a more efficient computerized maintenance and logistic system. It has prepared extensively for deployment of the Typhoon (IHS Jane's estimates that 43 of 72 were in service by April 2015), stepped up IDS Tornado training with British support, its F-15s have participated in Red Flag exercises in the U.S., and is improving in-squadron and simulator training.<sup>173</sup>

Saudi Arabia has restructured its support system increase its sustainable sortie rate, and has four major airbases covering each part of the Kingdom: Dhahran covering its oil facilities and the Gulf; Taif covering Jeddah, other ports, Mecca, and Medina, and the lower Red Sea; Khamis Mushait covering Yemen; and Tabuk covering the upper Red Sea, Syria, Jordan and Israel. The RSAF has numerous dispersal bases, and modern training ranges.

The UAE air force is another high quality Arab Gulf air force, and the UAE has given it priority as the most cost-effective way of strengthening its deterrent, defense, and offensive capabilities -- given its manpower limitations. Outside experts rate the UAE air force as one of the most effective forces in the region.

The IISS reports that it has 157 combat capable aircraft these include 54 F-16E Block; 24 F-16F Block 60 *Fighting Falcon* (13 in U.S. for training); 16 *Mirage* 2000-9DAD; and 44 *Mirage* 2000-9EAD multirole fighters. They also include 7 *Mirage* 2000RAD IS&R aircraft and 2 Saab 34 Erieye air control and warning aircraft. The UAE has 3 A330 MRTT transport tankers of in-air refueling.

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE air force is emphasizing multi-role use of its aircraft, while improving the most effective mission capability of each type of fighter. It is acquiring long-range, standoff strike air-to-ground missiles. It is arming its *Mirage* 2009 aircraft to fire them and has practiced long-range strike sorties using F-16 escorts and its MRT tankers. It has carried out strikes in Libya and against ISIL, and has practical combat experience as well as advanced training in the U.S.

Maintenance and sustainability are good, but heavily dependent on foreign contract personnel. Overall C4I and IS&W capabilities are good by Gulf standards but IHS Jane's notes that, "national air components, comprising the Abu Dhabi Air Force (ADAF) and the much smaller Dubai Air Wing (DAW), correspondingly operate as the Western and Central

Air Commands, with each having local headquarters and individual operational organizations. Some UAE units are also deployed to Sharjah, within Northern Command, which covers the remaining Emirates.”<sup>174</sup>

**Kuwait** has developed a small but effective 2,500-man air force with 66 combat capable aircraft, and high training standards. Its aircrews train in the U.S., and it uses modern training ranges to maintain proficiency. It operates 40 F-18s and 16 AH-64s and has an effective complement of trainers and support aircraft. IHS Jane’s reports that Light aircraft are generally armed, with the Tucano able to carry a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun pod and FZ 70 mm rocket launchers, and its Gazelle helicopters are compatible with HOT missiles and M621 20 mm automatic cannon.<sup>175</sup>

U.S. experts believe it is one of the more effective air forces in the region, but it does lack an airborne warning and air control system and has not acquired data links to the Saudi AWACS or overall air control systems. It relies heavily on the U.S. for advanced IS&R, battle management and targeting capabilities. It is also dependent on contractors for some sustainability and air defense functions.

**Bahrain** has a small, but effective air force with 1,500 men and 39 combat capable aircraft. It operates two squadrons of 21 F-16C/Ds and one with 12 F-5E/F *Tiger II* fighters, and has a squadron of 6 armed Hawk Mark 129 trainers. It also has 28 AH-1E/F Cobra attack helicopters, and fixed wing and helicopter transports.

Bahrain’s air force has supported the U.S. in operations against ISIL and Saudi Arabia in its air operations in Yemen. There are some reports that it is seeking to obtain additional fighters and attack helicopters, but these are not confirmed.

**Oman** is modernizing its 5,000-man air force. It now has 44 combat capable aircraft in service and has on a squadron of 15 F-16C/D Block 50 fighters with a second squadron of 12 forming. It also has a squadron of 16 Hawk Mk103/Mk203 light attack aircraft, one with SC.7 3M Skyvan maritime patrol aircraft, and an armed training squadron with 12 PC-9s.

Oman is buying four DB-110 reconnaissance pods for its F-16s, AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, AIM-120-Cy missiles, and Paveway laser-guided bombs. It also is buying 12 Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighters and eight Hawk Mk 128s. Oman uses light fixed wing attack aircraft for COIN missions but does not have attack helicopters.

Its air force lacks AC&W or IS&R aircraft and tankers for air refueling, but does have fixed wing and helicopter lift capability and 15 super Lynx helicopters for the maritime SAR role. Its ground based radar capabilities are aging and limited.

**Qatar** has a small 1,500-man air force with 12 Mirage 2000ED/2000D fighters and 6 armed Alpha Jet trainers. It has had problems in operating the Mirage 2000, but deployed small numbers to Libya and for missions in Yemen. Some sources report that Qatar has had serious problems in operating its Mirages, and has sought to sell its Mirages and buy more advanced aircraft. It also has an SA 342L Gazelle attack helicopter squadron, a Commando Mk 3 anti-surface and ASW squadron, and Commando Mk 3 multi-role squadron.

Qatar is, however, involved in a major effort to expend and modernize its Air Force. President François Hollande of [France](#) announced in late April 2015 that Qatar was buy 24

Rafale fighter jets, with an option to buy 12 more, at a cost of at about 6.3 billion euros or about \$7 billion.<sup>176</sup>

Qatar is also reported to be buying three 737 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and UAVs. Other reports indicate it will buy Apache attack helicopters and Airbus A330 tankers. In practice, Qatar now relies heavily on the U.S. for defense in any crisis, and the U.S. maintains major operating base at Al Udaid, as well as its Gulf air defense command facilities.

### **Air Force and Air Defense Manning**

Total Air Force and Air Defense manning is shown in **Figure VI.1**. Such data provide a crude indication of the relative scale of Gulf Air Forces, but little else. It is the quality and training of key personnel like aircrews, maintenance crews, surface-to-air missile operators, and C4I/BM/IS&R that counts, rather than total numbers. These standards vary significantly by country. Outside experts feel the UAE set the highest standards in the GCC, followed by Saudi Arabia. Iran's standards are mixed, but have been shaped to some extent by necessity. Flying and maintaining Iran's aging air fleet requires competence.

### **Total Air Force Strength and Combat strength by Aircraft Category and Mission**

**Figure VI.2** shows total combat aircraft by country and is a more valid measure of force strength than manpower. **Figure VI.3** shows similar total force strength data by aircraft primary mission and category. Some key aspects of this Figure, however, are questionable. It makes a distinction between "fighter" (IDF/AWX) and fighter ground attack (FGA) that no longer seems realistic. Almost all of the combat aircraft listed can be used in both the air defense and strike/attack modes. IHS Jane's also has a notably higher count of Iran's holdings of Su-24s, reporting a total of 54 aircraft with the first Iranian Su-24 pilots qualifying in 1994.<sup>177</sup>

As noted above, aircraft and munitions quality are also critical, however, and aircraft numbers can be misleading in other ways. Sortie generation rates -- and the ability to generate sorties over time -- determine real world capability in serious air combat, not inventory numbers. Israel, for example, was able to consistently generate far higher sorties numbers over time in past Arab-Israeli conflicts than Egypt and Syria, and operate its sorties with much higher effectiveness.

Experts like Dr. Abdullah Toukan feel that the UAE has relatively high capability sortie generation capability, and Saudi Arabia is close. Other GCC standards vary by country and aircraft type. As **Figure VI.4** shows, Iran faces major challenges in competing with the Arab Gulf air forces in sortie generation because of the age of many of its aircraft, and its limited access to spare parts and repair equipment, as well as problems introduced by Iranian designed and built upgrades, which vary in reliability.

Outside estimates also put GCC operational availability rates at 75-85%, and Iranian rates at 50%-60%. Iran's ability to sustained sorties over time is also believed to be low compared to Arab Gulf and U.S. standards. As **Figure VI.4 – Part Two** shows, this has a striking potential impact on the real world force ratios that can Iran and the Arab Gulf states can achieve and sustain in combat.

## Modern Combat Aircraft and Munitions Strength

**Figure VI.5** provides a break out of the more modern combat aircraft in the Gulf. This **Figure** deliberately exaggerates Iranian capability by including its aging F-4D/Es and F-14s in the total, along with its older export versions of the Mig-29 and Su-24. They have been included as modern combat aircraft in order to illustrate the strength of the best elements of the Iranian Air Force, but all of Iran's aircraft have distinctly lower performance capability in air combat and strike missions than the F-15s, F-16s, Mirage 2000s, Tornados, and Typhoons in GCC forces.

Iran also has a munitions problem with its U.S.-supplied aircraft. Its stocks of U.S. missiles are long beyond their shelf life and Iraq has never had the U.S. software codes necessary to fully modernize its aircraft avionics. Iranian air force personnel also made it impossible for Iran's F-14s to use their long-range AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles after the fall of the Shah. Iran claims to have modified its Hawk surface-to-air missiles as a replacement, and its F-14s have been seen flying with such missiles, but it is unclear they are operational or how well they could perform if they are operation. It claimed in 2010 to have developed a new air-to-air missile with better guidance and longer-range than the AIM-54, but there is no confirmation that it has done so.

Iran does have an extensive range of other air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, but its operational capability to make full use of such systems is uncertain.

In real world terms, Iran has not been able to modernize its air force in the face of sanctions and other barriers to modern arms imports and simply is not competitive with GCC air forces. It is even less competitive against a U.S. force equipped with stealth fighters and bombers, and far more advanced IS&R, AWACS, and SEAD aircraft and other systems. These limits to its air force and land-based air defenses are summarized in **Figure VI.6**.

The GCC air forces have also generally taken advantage of their superior access to modern aircraft avionics and munitions to steadily upgrade their precision strike and air-to-air combat capabilities in ways Iran has not been able to match. There is no easy way to summarize these differences, since they require country-by-country data and simulation, but a number of outside experts feel that avionics and munitions place as serious a limitation on Iran as the age of its aircraft.

Countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are acquiring advanced long-range precision strike munitions like the Storm Shadow (French name is SCALP EG). This is a "fire and forget" cruise missile with a 300-kilometer range in low altitude flight and that uses a combination of inertial, GPS, and TERPROM guidance with terminal guidance using imaging infrared DSMAC, and which has optional hard target kill warheads. It can be fired by the Tornado, Typhoon, and Mirage 2000. For most practical mission purposes in the Gulf in a conflict with Iran, it is equivalent to the U.S. Tomahawk. It also illustrates just how critical assessing air launched munitions has become. They are now as critical in terms of mission capability as the airframe used to fire them.

At the same time, GCC air forces face some of the problems in terms of integration and interoperability affecting land and naval forces, and the limited reaction times in conducting air combat and strike missions mean the need for common tactics, combat

training, large-scale exercise experience, aircraft and munitions mission capability, advanced IFF, and fully integrated IS&R and C4I/BM is urgent.

The fact that the Arab Gulf air forces and the U.S., UK, and France have an advantage in precision strike capability also does not mean that Iran's capabilities can be ignored. Iran has been able to draw on acquisitions from the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia, and North Korea. Additionally, Iran has been reverse engineering some of these missiles to produce locally made copies— although some of which may not perform as reported due to technological deficiencies caused by international sanctions. As a result, its inventory remains both an important part of the Gulf balance and an illustration of what airpower can do in the region. Moreover, Iran's asymmetric naval strategy tactics include launching smaller, air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), anti-ship missiles (AShMs), as well as land-based missiles, and deploying seaborne mines.

### **Air Force and Land Force Attack and Armed Helicopters**

All Gulf forces have rotary wing mobility, but capability varies sharply by country, as does tactical employment doctrine and exercise performance. Relative strength in armed and attack helicopters is shown in **Figure VI.7**, and is becoming another major new aspect of the Gulf balance.

Iran was the first Gulf nation to focus on creating a force of rotary wing combat systems, and bought an extensive force of armed and attack helicopters under the Shah. As is the case with its fixed wing aircraft, however, Iran has since had major problems in modernizing such aircraft and keeping them operational. Helicopters present a major challenge in maintenance time, part replacement, and ground crew skills in comparison to most fixed wing aircraft.

In contrast, the GCC states have access to the latest and most capable attack helicopters like the AH-64, advanced munitions and avionics, and can obtain contract maintenance and support if necessary. This provides some GCC land forces with a significant advantage in rapid strike, deep strike, and combat reinforcement capability.

### **Naval Armed Helicopters and Air Capability**

A number of the GCC states and Iran have armed naval helicopters for attacking surface ships, supporting helicopter raids and troop/special forces missions, and mine warfare. Some have limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities. These forces are shown in **Figure VI.7** and **Figure VI.8**

Arab Gulf naval fixed wing capabilities are limited, and the GCC does not have a meaningful integrated maritime patrol or surveillance capability. It would be forced to rely on the U.S. in a serious naval combat. Oman has one squadron of SC.7 3M Skyvan maritime patrol aircraft. Saudi E-3s does have an advanced maritime surveillance capability but it is unclear how effective the Saudi Air Force is in using it. The UAE has a Joint Aviation Command that includes one squadron with AS332F Super Puma and AS565 Panther armed helicopters for anti-submarine warfare missions. It is reported to have some maritime patrol aircraft, but their status is unclear. Mission capability, readiness, and sustainability, are all issues limiting Arab Gulf forces to different degrees.

Iran is the only Gulf Navy that formally has a separate Naval Aviation branch. The IISS *Military Balance* for 2015 indicates that this command has 2,600 personnel and is equipped with 3 P-3F Orion maritime patrol aircraft, PAX 3 Falcon 20 electronic intelligence aircraft and 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendships; and 4 Turbo Commander 680 light transports, as well as the helicopters shown in **Figure VI.8**. Iran's systems are obsolescent, but have been modified and upgraded.

### **IS&R, C4I/BM, and AWACS Capabilities**

Advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R), command, control communications, computer and battle management systems (C4I/BM), and especially in airborne warning and air control systems (AWACS) are steadily changing the nature of every aspect of air operations and long range strike operations. Improving ISW&R assets steadily improve the ability understand and target enemy operations at every level of combat, and to target and re-task air operations in near real time.

The U.S. has a global lead in these capabilities, and is the only power currently affecting the Gulf balance that can draw on a full range of satellite, advanced airborne intelligence and surveillance platforms, UAVs, and stealth assets and has shown that "fusion" systems that integrate a wide range of different intelligence and reconnaissance assets are major force multipliers and essential in efficiently allocating strike aircraft and cruise missile for deep strike and interdiction missions. It has shown that such capabilities can sharply reduce the number of aircraft and missions needed to accomplish a given objective as well as rapidly allocate airpower where it is most needed, improve battle damage assessment, cope with the limited target profiles of non-state actors, and attack unconventional mixes of targets to limit logistic, maneuver, and sustainability capabilities.

Israel has many elements of such capabilities in could use in preventive strikes against Iran, however, and GCC and other allied Arab states can make use of U.S. data, along with outside power like Britain and France in a wide range of air combat scenarios. Many of the GCC states, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as Britain and France, have or are acquiring significant capabilities of their own, as well as more advanced data handling and secure communications that have the *potential* to share such data. It is far from clear, however, how such capabilities are evolving, and the unclassified reporting available to date indicates that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only GCC states making a major effort to develop more advanced capabilities and the necessary tactics and interoperability to make full use of the data the U.S. can share. In the interim, many air forces would have to rely heavily on air reconnaissance, forward observers and air controllers, other intelligence sources, and/or on-board observation and avionics to plan and execute air strikes.

Air-to-air combat, and beyond-visual-range (BVR)/all weather (AWX) combat is a different story. Saudi Arabia has long acquired the E-3 AWACS for airborne warning and managing air-to-air combat, as well as intelligence collection and maritime time surveillance. Other GCC states are acquiring their own more advanced intelligence, reconnaissance, and AWACS type aircraft. An unclassified estimate of GCC and other Gulf holdings of dedicated IS&R, C4I/BM, and AWACS capabilities is shown in **Figure VI.9**.

Iran is also developing its capabilities. An IHS Jane's reported in 2014 and 2015 that Iran has made significant progress in building an airborne early warning system, but that this

system which involves small, low altitude attack fighters and the relocation of SAMs is unlikely to produce a national defense system.<sup>178</sup>

Iran had extensive plans to purchase airborne early warning and control systems (AEW&Cs, or AWACS) under the Shah, but, the 1979 revolution prevented the delivery of many of these systems.<sup>179</sup> The only dedicated aircraft reported by the IISS are an upgraded version of the aging RF-4E, and two to three operational P-3MP Orion maritime patrol, intelligence aircraft it bought at the time of Shah but has since heavily modified. Iran has, however, upgraded some civil aircraft -- including three Falcon 20s -- with at least limited ELINT and SIGINT capability. It is also developing UAVs for such missions.

The nature of Arab Gulf air control and operations centers is unclear. The full strengths and limitations on the HAT system have not been made public, and only limited data are available on the AC&W/AWAC, IS&R, C4I, and sensor capability of each Gulf force.

Saudi Arabia acquired an advanced facility from the U.S. and operated it effectively during the first Gulf War in 1991. It has since upgraded its technical capacity significantly but has not fully exploited its capability to improve air operations, manage joint warfare operations with its land and air operations, or maintain readiness to de-conflict air and surface-to-air missile operations. The UAE has developed some capability, but GCC air forces would be heavily dependent on the U.S. Combined Air operations Center in Qatar for some C4I/B&M capabilities. Iran does have an air defense command center and regional centers to try to coordinate air force, army and land-based air defenses, and Revolutionary Guard forces, but unclassified data on their capabilities are too limited to make even a summary assessment.

### **Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs)**

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) represent one of the most rapidly evolving aspects of the Gulf balance. Many of the GCC states are acquiring or examining the purchase of such systems. The U.S. has systems that range from small UAVs that can be used at the platoon level by ground forces to long-range, high endurance UAVs and UCAVs that can reach anywhere in Gulf, and that have stealth variants. It has extensive experience in using such systems in both intelligence and combat in Afghan and Iraq and covering Iran. Iran is both deploying UAVs and UCAVs experimenting with a wide range of additional systems.

A rough estimate of Iran's systems is shown in **Figure VI.9**, but there is no clear way to assess this aspect of the balance, particularly because the number and character of UAV and UCAV platforms is only a small part of the story. The far less visible capability to allocate such resources, use the data they collect, alter operations and targeting, and provide the C4I/BM to fire the ordnance on UCAVs is equally critical.

UAVs and UCAVs are most valuable to the extent they are integrated into the overall intelligence and strike planning of given users, and it is unclear how Iran and the Arab Gulf states will do. So far, the U.S. is the only country for which there are clear data on how UAVs and UCAVs can alter combat, and some U.S. reporting has tended to exaggerate the capability to create IS&R fusion systems that can make effective use of UAV sensor data,

and provide the targeting to ensure that UCAVs can be used to kill hostile state and non-state actors and do so with minimal civilian losses and collateral damage.

These problems have been compounded by the fact that non-state actors like ISIL and Al Qaida routinely attempt to use civilians and civilian facilities as human shields against such attacks, make exaggerated claims about civilian casualties, and attempt to portray UCAVs as a special category of weapons. In practice, any use of artillery in built up areas, especially in area fire or fire beyond line of sight has long been a far more lethal killing mechanism in causing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Both fighters and armed helicopters have limited time and ability to discriminate targets even with the most advanced vision aid and avionics now available especially when using precision guided ordnance at a distance.

It is clear that UAVs and UCAVs are becoming a critical new part of the regional military balance, and real world efforts to achieve something approaching a “revolution in military affairs,” but it is far from clear how current procurement efforts and concepts for using such systems will translate into operational realities.


### **Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Capabilities**

The ability to attack or survive land-based air defenses is another critical aspect of modern air warfare, and is a critical aspect of U.S. land and carrier based air operations. The GCC states, Jordan, and Egypt have all sought to develop capabilities that could be used to counter Iranian sensors, air combat, and surface-to-air missile capability. Several GCC countries have acquired modern electronic countermeasure (ECM), electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM), and other electronic warfare pods for their fighters. Saudi Arabia has acquired anti-radiation missiles like the Alarm and the UAE has acquired the AGM-88 HARM. It is not clear, however, what assets most have or how combat effective they would be. It seems likely that in many scenarios, they would be heavily dependent on the U.S. for the SEAD mission.


Iran has sought to develop such capabilities, but they seem limited. It has acquired Russian KH-58 (AS-11 Kilter) anti-radiation missiles.




**Figure VI.1: Air Force and Air Defense Manpower in the Gulf**



Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.2: Total Gulf Combat Aircraft**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.3: Gulf Combat Air Strength by Category and Mission**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

### Figure VI.4: Comparative Arab Gulf and Iranian Air Force Sortie Generation Rates Part One

#### GCC: Force Level Total Sortie Generation - 2014


Tactical Fighter	Country	Order of Battle	Operational Readiness	Force Available	Sorties per Aircraft per	Total Sorties per day
Tornado IDS	Saudi Arabia	69	65	45	3	135
Typhoon-2	Saudi Arabia	32	75	24	3	72
Mirage 2000	UAE	60	75	45	3	135
	Qatar	12	75	9	3	27
F-18L	Kuwait	39	70	27	3	81
F-16C/D	Bahrain	21	80	17	3	51
	Oman	12	80	10	3	30
	UAE	78	80	62	3	186
F-15C/D	Saudi Arabia	81	75	61	3	183
F-15S	Saudi Arabia	71	75	53	3	159
Total		475		353		1059

#### Iran: Force Level Total Sortie Generation - 2014


Tactical Fighter	Order of Battle	Operational Readiness	Force Available	Sorties per Aircraft per	Total Sorties per day
MIG-29	36	60	22	2	44
Su-23	13	60	8	2	16
Su-24	30	60	18	2	36
F-14	43	50	22	2	44
F-4E	65	55	36	2	72
Total	187		106		212

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, April 10, 2014

**Figure VI.4: Comparative Arab Gulf and Iranian Air Force Sortie Generation Rates -- Part Two**



Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, April 10, 2014

**Figure VI.5: Modern Combat Aircraft Strength in the Gulf – Part One**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.5: Fighter Strength in the Gulf – Part Two**

	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
F-16E/F Block 60										78
F-16C/D	1			36	21		15			
F-14			43							
F-15S									71	
F-15C/D									81	
F/A-18C/D						39				
F-4D/E			64							
MiG-21		15								
MiG-21U		3								
MiG-29SM		15								
MiG-29A/U/UB		1	36							
Su-22UM3										
Fitter G		4								
Su-22 Fitter D		27								
Su-24MK Fencer D			30							
Su-25/K/UBK	7		10							
Mirage 2000-9DAD										16
Mirage 2000-9EAD										44
Mirage 2000ED/D								12		
Tornado IDS									69	
Typhoon									40	

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.


**Figure VI.6: Iranian Reliance on Aging/Mediocre Systems/Air**

- **FTR 184+:** 20 F-5B *Freedom Fighter*; 55+ F5E/F *Tiger II*; 24 F-7M *Airguard*; 43 F-14 *Tomcat*; 36 MiG-29A/U/UB *Fulcrum*; up to 6 *Azarakhsh* reported.
- **FGA 110:** 64 F-4D/W *Phantom II*; 10 *Mirage* F-1E; 30 Su-24MK *Fencer D*; Up to 6 *Saegheh* reported.
- **ATK 10:** 7 Su-25K *Frogfoot*; 3 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot* (Including 4+ Su-25K/UBK deployed in Iraq; status unclear)
- **ASW 5:** 5 P-3MP *Orion*
- **ISR 6+:** RF-4E *Phantom II*
- **TKR/TPT 3:** e1 B-707; e2 B-747
- **TPT 117:**
  - **Heavy:** 12 Il-76 *Candid*;
  - **Medium:** e19 C-130E/H *Hercules*;
  - **Light:** 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140 *Faraz*) (45 projected); 10 F-27 *Friendship*; 1 L-1329 *Jetstar*; 10 PC-6b *Turbo Porter*; 8 TB-21 *Trinidad*; 4 TB-200 *Tobago*; 3 *Turbo Commander* 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1 B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 *Falcon* 20; 3 *Falcon* 50.
- **HELICOPTERS**
  - **MRH: 2 Bell 412**
  - **TPT 34+:**
    - **Heavy:** 2+ CH-47 *Chinook*;
    - **Medium:** 30 Bell 214C (AB-214C);
    - **Light:** 2+ Bell 206A *Jet Ranger* (AB-206A); some *Shabaviz* 2-75 (Indigenous versions in production); some *Shabaviz* 2061.
    - *Jet Ranger* (AB-206A); some *Shabaviz* 2-75 (Indigenous versions in production); some *Shabaviz* 2061.

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.



**Figure VI.7: Air Force and Land Force Attack and Armed Helicopters – Part One**




Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.


## Figure VI.7: Air Force and Land Force Attack and Armed Helicopters – Part Two

Attack Hel	Iraq	Yemen	Iran	GCC	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	UAE
AH-1E/F/J			50	28	28					
SA 342				13		13				
AH-64D/E				61		16			15	30
Commando MK3				8				8		
SA341				2				2		
SA342	4			11				11		
AW-139				29				21		8
AS365N/F				13						13
Bell 412				24					15	9
AS565				15					15	
Bell 406CS				13					13	
AS332F				7						7
AS550C3				18						18
AS565				7						7
Bell 407				2						2
SA316				4						4
Mi-35		8								
Mi-17		10								
Ka-27		1								

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.8: Naval Armed Helicopters**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.9: IS&R and AWACS Capabilities**

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

**Figure VI.10: Iranian UAV Projects /Assets**

Name	Translation	Date of usage	Weapons, payload	Range (km) and Ceiling (ft.)	Specifications	Purpose
Fotros (Petros)	“Peter,” “Fallen Angel”	November 2013-Present	Air to surface missiles; hellfire missile derivative <sup>180</sup> ; anti-tank missiles	R: 2,000 C: 25,000	Can remain aloft for 16-30 hours; ceiling of 25k feet. Able to cover much of the Middle East, including Israel	Reconnaissance, and missile strikes <sup>181</sup>
Ababil and variants (B, S, T, II, III, and V)	“Swallow”	1986-present	The Ababil-T variant is armed with an explosive warhead. Its use, however, ensures total destruction of the UAV. <sup>182</sup>	R: 100-150 C: 5,000-14,000 <sup>183</sup>	Pneumatic or rocket boosters <sup>184</sup>	The primary purpose of the Ababil series is ISR. Historically, Iran deployed this family of UAVs during the Iran-Iraq War, and has provided some to the Iraqi government for ISR missions against ISIL. <sup>185</sup>
Mohajer Series (1-4)	“Immigrant”	Late 1980s-present	RPGs	R: 150 C: 15,000 <sup>186</sup>	Max Speed: 120mph; Launched off rail and assisted by rocket booster.	ISR; Used in Syrian Civil war by Assad; a variation was used by Hezbollah in 2006 war with Israel. The most recent variation is said to be able to generate maps for military and civilian purposes <sup>187</sup>
Karrar	“Striker”	August 2010-Present	Can carry a single bomb or two anti-ship missiles	R: 970-1000 C: 40,000 (est.)	Turbojet-propelled	Long-range reconnaissance and attack; Based on the BQM-126 target drone <sup>188</sup>
Yasir (Yaseer)	“Expedient”	2009	Electro-optical or infrared camera.	C: 16,000	Reverse engineered U.S. Scan Eagle. <sup>189</sup> <sup>190</sup> Able to operate 16 hours.	ISR
H-110 Sarir	“Throne”	2013-Present	Air to air missiles	*Unknown	Speculative stealth capabilities	ISR and combat
Hazem series		2012-Present	Can be equipped with missiles	Short, medium, and long range	Stealth; not originally designed for carrying missiles, but the Hazem 3 may be equipped with them; rocket propelled	Bombing and reconnaissance <sup>191</sup>
Shahed 129	“Witness”	Sept. 2012-present	8 bombs or smart missiles	R: 1,700m C: 24000	24 hour non-stop flight	Combat

					capability; similar to U.S. Predator and Reaper drones	
Hamase h	"Epic"	May 2013- present	Missiles and rockets	High altitude and range <sup>192</sup>	HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance); Purported stealth capabilities, but structurally impossible.	Reconnaissance and combat
Ra'ad 85	"Thunder," "Thunder Bolt"	Sept. 2013- present		R: 100 C:	Suicide drone "capable of destroying fixed and mobile targets" <sup>193</sup>	
Nazer	"Observer"				Small chopper drone;	Reconnaissance and border patrol (drug trafficking)
Sadeq <sup>194</sup>	"Sincere"	Sept. 2014- present	Air-to-air missiles		Sent aloft by launcher;	
RQ-170 variant	"Sentinel"	May 2014- present			Stealth; copy of U.S. made system.	

\*R/S: Reconnaissance / Surveillance; \*\*ISR: Intelligence / Surveillance / Reconnaissance

## ***VII. Land-Based Air Defense Forces***

Land-based air defenses form a critical part of modern air combat operations, as well as perform a steadily more important role in defending ground forces, in defending against cruise missiles and UAVs, and in providing ballistic missile defense capability. They are also another area where the GCC and have a major advantage over Iran. Most of Iran's systems date back to the time of the Shah or are based on Vietnam War era Russian and Chinese systems. While Iran has had more freedom in acquiring modern radars and sensors, and dual use C4I/BM systems, it also lags behind the GCC states and US in these areas.

### **Land-Based Air Defenses, Scenarios, and Joint Warfare**

Land-based air defenses fall into three major categories: systems that defend ground forces and ships, medium and long-range air defense systems that provide air defense over wide areas, and medium and long-range defense systems that provide both air and missile defense. Each needs to be judged separately on a country-by country basis in the Gulf, and in the context of enemy stealth and SEAD capabilities as well.

Iran has a significant number of MANPADs, SHORADS, and AA guns, but many of its longer-range surface-to-air missile of its systems are approaching obsolescence, and have little real capability against an aircraft armed with modern stand-off precision strike missiles and guided bombs. Iran has sought for years to obtain more advanced Russian systems like the S-300 and S-400 – which provide far more capable SAM and some missile defense capability. Russia has so far denied it such arms transfers, however, and China has not sold its more advanced systems. Iran has claimed to be able to produce its own equivalent by modifying or upgrading its copies of older Russian systems like the S-200, but there is no current evidence that it has succeeded.

In broad terms, each Arab Gulf country has short-range systems to defend its ground forces, and most have modern longer-range surface-to-air missiles like the IHAWK or Patriot. Each Arab Gulf country, however, has at least a slight different doctrine, level of training, and engagement criteria. Given the broad superiority over Iran that the GCC has in modern combat aircraft, the man portable air defenses (MANPADs), short range air defense missiles (SHORADS), and anti-aircraft guns (AA guns) in Gulf forces seem adequate for most scenarios. It is important to note, however, that none of these systems would defend against an area where Iran's land forces have a significant advantage: Its ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets.

The end result is that GCC has a striking advantage in longer-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). With the exception of the very short range TOR-M, all of its major SAMs are now dated, obsolescent, and derived from systems where the U.S. has developed successful countermeasure in the past. Iran has modified some of these systems, and they can scarcely be ignored, but Iran badly needs to upgrade its SAMs and acquire systems with missile defense capability like the U.S. Patriot PAC-3.

### **The Less Quantifiable Elements of Land-Based Air Defense**

Once again, however, the more easily quantifiable measures of force strength do not compare many critical elements of real world airpower and combat capability.

- Training and large scale, realistic, joint warfare combat exercise performance.

- Readiness based on actual exercise tests and firings against simulated targets.
- Missile reserves, reload, and fire rates.
- Sustainability of assets.
- Combinations of sensors and precision strike systems.
- Effective rules of engagement and deconfliction capability.
- Command, control, communications, computer, and battle management capabilities (C4I/BM)
- Real world secure communications and data link capability.
- Real world capability to provide effective air command and operations center capability at the national and GCC levels.
- Motivation and morale.
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. (IS&R)
- Interoperability and common doctrine, training, and leadership for allied forces.

One of the most serious issues is the capability to integrate the sensors and kill capability of SAM fire units with effective national and regional command and control and sensor systems, and manage the overall defense system in ways that limit vulnerability to the full mix of SEAD options in enemy forces. The GCC states have an advantage in access to technology and weapons, but some have failed to develop fully effective national systems for managing and de-conflicting air, AA, and SAM operations. As is the case with all aspect of GCC air operations, the lack of full integration of air and air defense sensors, battle management and combat systems also seriously degrade the potential capability of GCC air defense forces.

Iran, in contrast, faces major problems in working around its lack of access to modern technology and advance weapons systems. In a 2012 and 2015 analysis of Iran's air defenses, IHS Jane's concludes that Iran continues to develop its land-based air defenses , but is:

“unlikely to seek to develop a fully integrated nationwide air defense system...Instead, it seems to prefer a point defense strategy, with forces located around key strategic centers such as Tehran, Esfahan, Kharg Island, Bandar Abbas and Bushehr.”<sup>195</sup>

Iran also faces more of a sensor and C4I/BM challenge than the GCC states. Iran's size, combined with its mountainous terrain, create numerous barriers to radar coverage at low altitudes and the integration of Iran's air defense systems.

### **Air Defense Manning**

Total air defense manning is shown in **Figure VII.1**. Such data again only provide a crude indication of the relative scale of dedicated land based air defense forces and are largely irrelevant since they do not measure the size of either the ground forces operating shorter range systems, or the manning of SAM forces in countries that integrate their longer-range SAM and missile defense systems into their armies, air forces, or guards. The exact status of Iran's air defense force is unclear but a 2012 IHS report indicates that Iran established an Air Defense Force to “enhance the state of readiness of deployed units.”<sup>196</sup> Saudi Arabia is the only GCC member to have a separate air defense force.

### **Air Defense Forces and Weapons**

**Figure VII.2** and **Figure VII.3** show the land-based air defenses in each Gulf state, and summarize the capability of the key SAM systems. As is discussed in the chapter on missile defenses, the systems in most GCC forces are being steadily upgraded with the Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 long-range systems, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have



all expressed an interest in acquiring wide area theater missile defense systems like the U.S. THAAD or the SM series. Oman is the only GCC country that does not presently have longer-range air defense missiles.

### *Iranian Land-Based Air Defenses*

Iran created a separate air defense force in 2009, and the IISS estimates it's manning at around 12,000 men. Iran has since attempted to develop a better integrated system of regional air defense sectors, and conducted extensive exercises of its radars and C4I/battle management systems in 2013 and 2014. Its level of progress is unclear.

#### *Medium to Long-range Systems*

The IISS indicates Iran has 16 battalions with longer-range MIM-23B I-HAWK (Homing all the way Killer)/*Shahin* surface to air missile (SAM) launchers and more than 150 missiles. It is also reported to have 45 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) very long range SAM systems; and 29 9K331 modern Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range point defense missiles.

Reporting by IHS Jane's differs in detail from the reporting by the IISS and indicates that Iran has,<sup>197</sup>

- Three S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) sites with one battalion each covering its northern border and the area around Tehran. A fourth covers the Esfahan region, a fifth at Bandar Abbas covers the Strait of Hormuz and a sixth at Bushehr covers the northern half of the Gulf. Each battalion has six single-rail missile launchers and a fire-control radar.
- Complexes of Chinese-made HQ-2 missiles (upgraded copies of the FSU SA-2 'Guideline') at Bandar Abbas, Tehran, Esfahan, and near Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz; Hawks are deployed at all four locations, and in the Bushehr region.
- A least 19 unoccupied sites for the HQ-2 and/or Hawk. IHS Jane's feels these may be planned dispersal sites or sites for hardware currently in storage.
- 10 Pantsyr-S1/96K6 SA-22 Greyhound self-propelled SHORADs
- Possible holdings of Chinese FM-90 vehicle-mounted Short range air defense systems
- Domestically made systems called the Shahab Thaqeb, similar to the R440 Crotale SAM.
- Shorter-range air defense weapons that include five Rapier squadrons with 27-30 fire units, 5-10 Chinese FM-80 launchers, 10-15 Tigercat fire units and some RBS-70s.
- Large numbers of man-portable 9K32/9K32M Strela-2/Strela 2M (SA-7 'Grail'), HN-5s, and 91C36 Strela-3 (SA-14 'Gremlin').
- Some 2,000 anti-aircraft guns - including some Vulcans and 37 mm Oerlikons.
- 50 to 60 radar-guided and self propelled ZSU-23-4 weapons.
- 29 Tor-M1 (SA-15 'Gauntlet') modern Russian road-mobile shelter-mounted low-to-medium altitude systems that protect critical military and civilian assets from air and cruise missile attack.

Iran has three medium to long-range systems that deserve special attention. The *Shahin* SAM is reverse engineered from the U.S. made MIM-23 missile sold to Iran prior to the 1979 revolution. In 2009, then-Iranian Defense Minister, Brig. Gen. Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, announced that the missile was capable of reaching targets at a range of 40km (24.85 miles) at supersonic speeds, while "targeting enemy aircraft and helicopters

intelligently.”<sup>198</sup> Iran claims that the SAM was “successfully” tested in 2011. However, some experts question whether the *Shahin* was actually tested, as opposed to firing remanufactured missiles delivered by the United States.<sup>199</sup>

The S-200 system is a long-range system originally designed to counter bombers flying at medium to high altitudes, with a theoretical range of up to 300km (186 miles) and maximum altitudes of 20,000m (12 miles) when properly maintained. According to IHS Jane’s, the S-200s are positioned around Tehran and the northern border, Esfahan, Bandar Abbas (where many of Iran’s important naval craft are stationed), and Bushehr.<sup>200</sup> Furthermore, Iran was said to have upgraded this SAM system and claimed that they could be linked with other radar systems, providing the ability to track stealth aircraft.<sup>201</sup>

Finally, Iran also possesses *Tor-M1s* (SA-15 Gauntlet), which are road-mobile shelter-mounted SAMs. They are modern Russian systems designed for low-to-medium altitude target ranges from aircraft to cruise missiles, and are stationed to provide point defense for vital military targets.<sup>202</sup>

### ***Shorter Range (SHORAD) Systems***

Iran is reported to have more than five squadrons of older shorter range SAM launchers including the FM-80 (*Crotale*), the *Rapier*, the *Tigercat*, the FIM-92A *Stinger*, and the 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*).

The FM-80 (*Crotale*) is the Iranian copy of the Chinese reverse engineered copy of the French *Crotale* SAM system. It is a low-altitude system. The missiles are launched from the bed of a truck, or from an independent trailer, possessing the capability to launch either two or four missiles, respectively.<sup>203</sup> This system is reported to be able to track very low altitude targets and have a range of 20 kilometers.<sup>204</sup>

The *Rapier* SAM system was made by the United Kingdom and entered into service in 1971. While Iran has not had the ability to upgrade this SAM system from the manufacturer itself, it has successfully tested eight of these systems after a complete rebuild and local upgrade suggesting a more comprehensive plan to produce the *Rapier* locally.<sup>205</sup> The *Rapier* has a range of 6,500 meters (4 miles) and can reach speeds of Mach 2.<sup>206</sup>

In addition to the *Rapier*, Iran also owns a host of *Tigercat* SAMs. The *Tigercat* land-based SAM system is identical to its sea platform, the *Seacat*. This missile is considered to be very old. In fact, the British replaced their *Tigercat* platforms with the *Rapier* in the late 1970s. *Tigercat* SAMs are not the only outdated SAMs that Iran possesses. Iran also possesses the S-75 *Volhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*) which is a Soviet era, Soviet grade SAM designed to strike high-altitude targets. It’s most notable use was downing the U.S. U2 spy plane in 1960 by the Soviet Union. It has a range of about 30km (19 miles) and can reach altitudes of 60,000 feet (11 miles).<sup>207</sup>

### ***Manportable (MANPAD) Systems***

Finally, Iran has extensive stocks of man-portable systems, including modern systems like the SA-14 *Strela-3* and SA-24 *Grinch*, and produces its own Misagh-1 and Misagh-2 systems.

### ***Force Modernization Potential***

*It is critical to understand, however, that these assessments could change radically in the near to mid-term.* Iran has long claimed to be developing its own more advanced systems and/or copies of Russian and other systems. These include systems that never seem to have been deployed like the Mesbah-1 (Lantern-1) and Mersad (Ambush) – the latter similar to the Russian S-300. It is uncertain Iran could ever develop its own system, but it might be able to copy a system like the S-300 with Russian or Chinese help. It also could easily absorb a Russian supplied S300 system – include fire units, radars, C4I/BM, and other equipment of the kind it seemed to have ordered in 2012, and which Russian may now be ready to supply in the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 are successful.

As is discussed in **Chapter X**, Russia announced in the spring of 2015 that it would now sell Iran the far more advanced S-300, and Russian sources talked about a \$20 billion deal. There were no specifics provided about such a sale and the specific systems involved, however, and the S-300 has at least nine different variants that are operational or in development with very different mixes of air defense and missile defense capability. Some could make a major improvement in Iran's land-based air defense and some would be much less effective, although unclassified sources vary sharply as to capability and their credibility is uncertain. Much would also depend on the sale of associated radars, ELINT, electronic warfare, secure communications, and command and control facilities.

### ***Iraqi Land-Based Air Defenses***

Iraq is reported to have a 4,000 man Air Defense Command, but it now has no major land-based air defense forces. It lost part of its extensive ground-based air defense system in the First Gulf War in 1991, and the rest in the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

The IISS military balance for 2015 reports that its land-based air defense holdings now consist of one battalion of 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*) short-range surface-to-air missiles (vehicle borne, radar guided system with 20 kilometer range), a battalion with M998/M1097 *Avenger* short-range surface-to-air missiles (vehicle borne, radar guided system with 4-8 FIM-92 Stinger missiles with 8 kilometer range) and, *a battalion with* 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24 *Grinch*) man-portable air defense missiles (with 5.2 kilometer range), and one battalion with ZPU-23 AA guns. These at best offer limited point defense capability.

IHS Jane's does not report on such holdings in detail.

### ***Yemeni Land-Based Air Defenses***

Yemen's operational air defense forces and operational holdings of surface-to-air missiles are unclear. The IISS *Military Balance* for 2015 was drafted before the major civil war in Yemen in 2015, and reported a 2,000 man air defense force with holdings of S-75 *Dvinas* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); 2K12 *Kubs* (SA-6 *Gainful*); 9K31 *Strela-1* (SA-9 *Gaskin*), 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*); and 9K36 *Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*).

Outside experts report that the effectiveness of Yemeni air defense units had begun to deteriorate years earlier. At least some units also seem to have been targets by Saudi bombing in April and May 2015.

### *Arab Gulf Land-Based Air Defenses*

As **Figure VII.1** shows, each of the Arab Gulf states has a mix of short-range air defense missiles (SHORADS), man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADS) and anti-aircraft (AA) guns to protect its ground forces and dispersed operating areas. The GCC systems are generally more modern, but once again there is a lack of standardization in weapons type, doctrine, training, real world IFF capability and rules of engagement and de-confliction methods. There is also little data on GCC and Iranian live-fire training and realistic exercise training.

According to IISS, the GCC possesses sixteen batteries with 96 *Patriot* PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles, seventeen batteries with *Shahine*/AMX-30SA missiles, sixteen batteries with upgraded MIM-23B I-HAWK missiles, and 73 units with *Crotale*/*Shahine* missiles used for static defense. While the total numbers of missiles for these systems are very uncertain, and vary sharply by country and system, one estimate indicates that the GCC possesses over 1,805 SAMs compared to Iran's 552+ largely antiquated Russian, Soviet, and Chinese-made missiles.<sup>208</sup>

The GCC also has an impressive mix of shorter-range systems. Saudi Arabia has over 40 *Crotale* systems, and these Saudi systems have been significantly upgraded in comparison to Iran's. In 2010, Saudi Arabia was exploring the option of upgrading their *Crotale* systems to the Mk 3. GCC forces also have 400 *Avenger*, and 73 *Shahine*.

The *Avenger* system is a low-level air defense system, equipped with eight stinger missiles, each with a range of 4.8km (3 miles). The *Shahine*/AMX 30 is a French made armored SAM system. It is equipped with six R460 SAMs, with a range of 11.8km (7.3 miles) and can reach targets up to 6km (3.7 miles) in altitude. It can "keep up with armored units;"<sup>209</sup> and its armor allows it to be placed near the front lines to directly engage incoming enemy aerial bombing runs.

**Saudi Arabia** has a large, independent Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF) with some 16,000 men. The IISS reports that it has 128 MIM-23B I-HAWK; 96 *Patriot* PAC-2 long-range surface-to-air missile launchers. It also has 40 *Crotale*; 400 M998/M1097 *Avenger*; 73 *Shahine*; 68 and *Crotale*/*Shahine* SHORAD launchers, as well as Mistral 500 naval air defense missiles, and FIM-43 Redeye and more modern MANPADS.

IHS Jane's reports that the Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF) has 16 batteries, with I-Hawk III SAMs (128 launchers) and 16 short-range *Crotale* acquisition units and 48 firing units. It also has *Patriot* surface-to-air missiles to provide theatre anti-ballistic missile defenses near Riyadh, protecting key targets in the Eastern Province near the Gulf and elsewhere, possibly near its ballistic missile forces.<sup>210</sup>

As is touched upon in **Chapter X**, the *Patriot* missile is an advanced American-made SAM. It can intercept incoming enemy aircraft. The PAC-3 is designed for ballistic missile defense and the PAC-2 variation—a variation operated by Saudi Arabia—has the ability to "intercept a hostile ballistic missile during war."<sup>211</sup> The RSADF operates Saudi Arabia's CSS-2 ballistic missiles.

Saudi Arabia has a major integrated air defense command center, and a network of 17 AN/FPS-117; 28 AN/TPS-43; AN/TPS-59; 35 AN/TPS-63; AN/TPS-70 advanced radars.

These are integrated into the “Peace Shield” C4I and radar system that is also used to control its air force.

IHS Jane’s reports that there are five major air defense sub-commands: 1st Group at Riyadh, 2nd Group at Jeddah, 3rd Group at Tabuk, 4th Group at Khamis Mushait, 5<sup>th</sup> Group at Dhahran) and a 6th Group at Hafar Al-Batin - King Khalid Military City. The bulk of the Saudi Patriot force is deployed with the 5th Group to protect oil infrastructure in the Eastern Province and with the 1st Group to protect the capital. It is improving its logistic, maintenance, and support capabilities, and ability to simulate large-scale CPXs for training purposes.

The UAE Air Defense Command operates five batteries of Raytheon I-Hawk Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), and some reports indicate that it will take delivery on a purchase of the U.S. THAAD theater ballistic missile defense system. This purchase is reported to include 9 launchers, 48 missiles, and support equipment and training at a cost of \$1.1 billion.

The IISS reports that its air defense forces include two brigades with 3 battalions of MIM-23B I-HAWK; missiles and *Patriot* PAC-3 missile defenses, as well as three battalions of short-range air defense missiles: *Crotale*; *Mistral*; *Rapier*; RB-70; *Javelin*; 9 K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*); and *Pantsir*-S1. IHS Jane’s reports that at least three I-Hawk batteries are positioned around Abu Dhabi city.<sup>212</sup> The overall readiness, integration of national air defenses, and quality of its radar sensor net and C4I/battle management capabilities seems to be good, but too few details are available to make a clear assessment.

**Kuwait’s** Air Force air defense command has at least four operational Patriot missile batteries and keeps them at a high level of operational readiness in sites dispersed around Kuwait City. Kuwait has also purchased six Amoun air defense batteries that are now operational. IHS Jane’s reports that they each have a Skyguard radar, two Aspide launchers, and two Oerlikon Contraves twin 35 mm anti-aircraft guns.

Kuwait has sought to obtain data links from the Saudi air control and command center or from the Saudi E-3S AWACs, but is not believed to, as of yet, have such data links. The Kuwait Air Force is believed to have developed effective command and control links and rules of engagement to de-conflict its combat aircraft and land-based air defenses.

**Qatar’s** air defenses are now limited to 24 Mistral and 9 Roland II mobile short-range air defense missile fire units, and Blowpipe; FIM-92A Stinger; and 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) MANPADS.

It Qatar is considering purchase of THAAD or Aegis ballistic missile defenses and an advanced air and missile radar and command and control system. Press reports indicate that it asked the U.S. for a \$6.5 billion package of arms in 2012 that included 2 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units, 12 THAAD Launchers, 150 THAAD Interceptors, 2 THAAD Fire Control and Communications, 2 AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars, 1 Early Warning Radar (EWR), and maintenance and support.<sup>213</sup>

Its Air Force currently, however, has limited land-based air defenses. Qatar considered the purchase of the Patriot PAC-3, but did not go forward with it once the U.S. deployed its own PAC-3s to Qatar.


**Bahrain's** Army air defense command has 6 towed MIM-23B I-HAWK surface-to-air missile fire units, 7 Crotale fire units, and FIM-92A *Stinger* and RBS-70 MANPADS. Outside experts rate its capability as limited to moderate, but feel its IHawk fire units are effective.

**Oman's** Air Force air defense command does not yet have modern or heavy surface-to-air missiles. Oman is reported to be planning to buy the Patriot heavy surface-to-air missile – evidently the Patriot 2 that has both air and missile defense capability. The U.S. DSCA announced this in May 2013.

The IISS reports the Oman's current shorter-range air defense holdings include two Rapier squadrons with 40 short-range air defense fire units, and Blindfire and S713 Martello radars. Its Army has 8 Mistral 2 short-range air defense fire units, and Javelin and 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) MANPADS.

Oman ordered a new air defense system from Raytheon in January 2014 -- called the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS). IHS Jane's reports that it was initially developed as a ground based using the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, but can be used with the AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range AAM and RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow naval surface-to-air missile which was developed to defend against supersonic anti-ship missiles.<sup>214</sup>

Figure VII: Air Defense Manpower



Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

## VII.2: Gulf Land-Based Air Defense Systems

Country	Major SAM	Light SAM	AA Gun
Bahrain	(6) IHAWK	RBS-70 FIM 92A Stinger (7) Crotale	(24) Guns (12) Oerlikon 35mm (12) L/70 40mm
Iran	(16/150) IHAWK (3/10) SA-5 (45) SA-2 Guideline	SA-7/14/16/24, HQ-7 (29) SA-15; Some QW-1 Vanguard (Misaq 1) and QW-11 (Misaq 2); HN-54 (29) TOR-M1; Some HN-5 (30) Rapier; Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat; Some FIM-92A Stinger	(1,700) Guns ZSU-23-4 23mm ZSU-57-2 57mm ZPU-2/4 23mm ZU-23 23mm M-1939 37mm L/70 S-60 57mm Some Oerlikon
Kuwait	(24) IHAWK Phase III (40) Patriot PAC-2	Aspide Starburst Stinger	12 Oerlikon 35mm
Oman	None	(2) Mistral SP (34) SA-7; (6) Blindfire (20) Javelin; (40) Rapier S713 Martello	(26) Guns (4) ZU-23-2 23mm (10) GDF-(x)5 Skyguard 35mm (12) L-60 40mm
Qatar	None	(10) Blowpipe (12) FIM-92A Stinger (9) Roland II (24) Mistral (20) SA-7	
Saudi Arabia	(16/128) IHAWK (4-6/16-24) Patriot (17/141) Shahine Mobile (2-4/160) PAC-2 Launchers (17) ANA/FPS-117 Radar	(40) Crotale (500) Stinger (ARMY) (500) Mistral (ADF) FIM-43 Redeye (ARMY) (500) Redeye (ADF) (73-141) Shahine Static FIM-92A Stinger (ARMY)	(1,220) Guns (92) M-163 Vulcan 20mm (30) N-167 Vulcan 20mm (NG) (850) AMX-30SA 30mm (128) GDF Oerlikon 35mm (150) L-70 40mm (store)



	<b>(73/68) Crotale Shahine</b>	<b>( M998/M1097Avenger (ADF)</b>	<b>(130) M-2 90mm (NG)</b>
<b>UAE</b>	<b>(2/31) IHAWK</b>	<b>20+ Blowpipe (20) Mistral Some Rapier/Crotale/ 70/Javelin/SA-18/Pantsir-S1</b>	<b>(62) Guns (42) M-3VDA 20mm SP (20) GCF-BM2 30mm</b>

Source: Based on "Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa," in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane's as adjusted by the authors.

### VII.3: Key Gulf Land-Based Air Defense System Performance

Air Defense System	Associated Warning/Acquisition Radars	Early Tracking & Guidance Radars	Missile Ranges (km) Altitude (ft.)	In Service Date
SA-2	Spoon Rest D (P-18) Flat Face A (P-15)	Fansong A/B	Max (km): 40 Min (km) : 8 Altitude (ft.): 3,000 to 90,000	1971 Upgraded
SA-3	Flat Face B (P-19) Squat Eye	Low Blow	Max (km) : 30 Min (km) : 6 Altitude (ft.): 150 to 160,000	1971
SA-6	Long Track (P-40) Height Finder: Thin Skin B (PRV-9)	Straight Flush	Max (km): 24 Min (km) : 4 Altitude (ft.): 50 to 45,000	1973
SA-8	Flat Face B (P-19) Long Track (P-40) Height Finder: Thin Skin B (PRV-9)	Land Roll	Max (km) : 15 Min (km) : 0.2 Altitude (ft.): 40 to 40,000	1982
SA-5	Back Trap (P-80) Tall King C (P-14) Spoon Rest D (P-18) Height Finder: Odd pair (PRV-13) Odd Group (PRV-16)	Square Pair	Max (km) : 250 Min (km) : 20 Altitude (ft.): 1,500 to 130,000	1983
IHAWK	AN/MPQ-50 AN/MPQ-55(PIP II)/62 (PIP III) Range only Radar	AN/MPQ-57 (PIP II)/61 (PIP III)	Max (km): 35 Min (km): 3 Altitude (ft.): 0 to 55,000 ft.	1971
Patriot PAC-2	AN/MPQ-53 Phased-Array Radar Carries out Search, target detection, track and identification, missile tracking and ECCM functions	AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station (ECS)	Max (km): 70 Min (km): 3 Altitude (ft.): 80,000	1990
Patriot PAC-3	AN/MPQ-65 <b>Sweeps the sky for enemy threats and determine whether incoming object is an aircraft, missile, or UAV</b>	AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control Station (ECS)	Max(km): 20 against ballistic missile <b>Altitude (ft.): 79,500</b>	2003
S-300	9S457ME Command Post	9S15M2 all-around surveillance radar; 9S19ME sector-surveillance radar	Max (km): 200 <b>Altitude (ft.): 98,425</b>	1978

S-400	92N6E (multifunctional radar)	96L6E/30K6E	Max (km): 60 <b>Min (km): 5</b> <b>Altitude (ft.): 98,425</b>	2007
THAAD	AN/TPY-2 Radar, SBX sea-based radar	“THAAD radar”	Max (Km) 200+	Designed: 1987 Produced: 2008
Standard SM-3	AN/SPY-1	Aegis weapon system	Max (km): 2500 <b>Min (km): 700</b> <b>Altitude (ft.):</b>	2010

Source: Based on “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance, 2015*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

### ***VIII. Surface-to-Surface Missiles***

Surface-to-surface missiles are becoming a steadily more important aspect of the Gulf military balance. Iran has placed a major emphasis on surface-to-surface missiles and long-range artillery rockets, Saudi Arabia has purchased Chinese surface-to-surface missiles and several GCC states have some long-range artillery rockets. These forces are summarized in **Figure VIII.1**

At present, Iranian and Saudi ballistic missile forces, and long-range artillery rockets, have limited lethality. They rely on conventional warheads, only have a small lethal radius, and have limited accuracy and reliability. Iran, however, is seeking to create precision-guided surface-to-surface missiles and may be seeking nuclear-armed missile warheads. Both developments would radically change the lethality of Iran's missile forces, which are now used more as terror weapons suited for fire into large populated areas, large critical infrastructure and petroleum facilities, or large military bases where the lack of ability to hit a point target would be partly offset by the political signals sent by such attacks, and the psychological impact.

U.S. -- and possibly Iranian -- cruise missiles present a different kind of threat. U.S. cruise missiles were first used in the region during the first Gulf War in 1991, and showed they had a high degree of precision and reliability and could inflict serious damage with minimal risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties. They were equally effective against Iraq in 2003, and in attacks on the Korashan Group in Syria in 2014. They confronted Iran with a serious threat to all of its critical targets that are not underground or sheltered.

The unclassified data on Iran's cruise missiles do not indicate that they have completed comprehensive operational testing or have proven performance capability, but Iran is believed to be deploying a growing family of medium and long range cruise missiles. Like the U.S., it also has long-range armed drones or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles, although again, reliable performance data are lacking.

Iran's growing missile threat has led most GCC countries to buy some form of point defense anti-missile systems like the PAC-3. The U.S. has deployed wide area missile defense ships to the Gulf, and Qatar and the UAE are examining purchases of wide-area threat defense systems like THAAD or the SM-3. Iran has sought variants of the Russian and Chinese S-300 and S-400 that have some capability for missile defense but has not been able to obtain them. It has, however, bought advanced Russian short-range TOR-M air defenses that have considerable capability to defend against cruise missiles.

#### **Saudi Missile Forces**

Saudi Arabia has a small ballistic missile arsenal that it originally bought as a result of the missile exchanges during the Iran-Iraq War. It turned to China to buy such systems after the U.S. refused to transfer the Lance missile to the Kingdom. While reports differ, IHS Jane's and the IISS report that the Saudi force is operated by a separate branch of the Royal Saudi Air Defence Forces (RSADF) that is called the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force. NTI also reports that Saudi missiles are operated by the Royal Saudi Air Defence Forces (RSADF).

The Saudi missiles are reported to be a mix of the Chinese Dongfeng-3 (DF-3; NATO: CSS-2), and Dongfeng-21 (DF-21; NATO: CSS-5). Both Chinese systems were originally designed have nuclear payloads, but were modified to deliver conventional warheads before their sale to Saudi Arabia.<sup>215</sup>

The DF-3 is an aging missile design with limited accuracy. Furthermore, the NTI reports that Saudi Arabia has never tested the DF-3 as an operational system, which would be critical to ensuring its reliability, estimating its real-world lethality and accuracy, and providing proper training. Similarly, it reports that Riyadh is dependent upon China to maintain and operate the DF-3, which further limits the missile's military utility.<sup>216</sup>

The NTI reports that the DF-3 is a road mobile, liquid fuelled, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 2500km, Saudi Arabia deploys the DF-3 at two confirmed sites: Al-Joffer, northwest of Riyadh, and As-Sulayyil, southwest of Riyadh. The NIT also reports that Sean O'Connor identified two additional DF-3 launch sites in 2009 at Rawdah, 280 km west of As-Sulayyil, and in the far northwestern desert region. O'Connor released a new report in July 2013 that identified another potential missile base at al-Watah with two launch pads oriented towards Israel and Iran to expedite the launch process by providing guidelines for placing a so it could target a given area.<sup>217</sup>

The NTI reports Saudi Arabia purchased a somewhat more accurate Dongfeng-21 (DF-21; NATO: CSS-5) ballistic missile from China in 2007. Some sources report it has a CEP of as low as 30 meters, but it is unclear there is any test data to support this estimate, and it seems to be based on the theoretical accuracy of the guidance platform and not the actual performance of the missile. The NTI reports that Saudi Arabia released a photo of officials holding scale models of three different missiles in July 2013, including the DF-3 and two unknown missiles. Almost a year later in April 2014, Saudi Arabia displayed its DF-3 missiles in public for the first time during a major military parade.<sup>218</sup>

WIKIPEDIA reports that Saudi missile forces are based as follows:

- Modern underground ballistic missile base with number 544 which was built in 2008 - the Al-Watah ballistic missile base...in the rocky central part of Saudi Arabia, some 200 km southwest of the capital city of Riyadh. The base has extensive storage and underground facilities. It also includes administrative buildings, two launch pads, a communications tower and seven gates leading to the underground facilities. Fortified depots for launchers lie behind the secondary checkpoint in the ravine area.
- A partially underground base Rawdah (Raniyya) under the number 533 lies 550 km south-west from the capital and 23 km south of the city. Tunnel across the rocky ridge has two entrances which have coordinates (21° 3'33"N 42° 53'2"E) and (21° 3'16"N 42° 52'52"E), base itself: 21° 2' 59.3" N 42° 52' 36.8" E. At the 21° 2.42' N 42° 52.43' E. One can clearly see old Chinese missiles DF-3 (probably for training). The missiles themselves are located a short distance away within a secured complex. The administrative and support complexes are outside the security perimeter:
- The oldest base is the Al Sulayyil ballistic missile base, also known as Wadi ad-Dawasir. It was built by Chinese in 1988, and is 450 km southwest of the capital. The Al Jufayr (Al Hariq) base is approximately 70-90 km south of Riyadh). Another unconfirmed base called Ash Shamli and number 566, may exist in the desert (27°15'49"N 40°03'14"E or 27°39'52"N 40°14'14"E) roughly 750 km northwest of the Saudi capital. The older bases have similar characteristics, suggesting that all Saudi bases are similar. Each complex has two missile garrisons (one in the North and another in the South) with another area serving housing, maintenance and administrative functions.

The IISS reported in its 2015 Military Balance that Saudi Arabia had a separate Strategic Missile Force with some 2,500 personnel, 10 DF-3 missile launchers and 40 missiles, and an unknown number of DF-21 launchers and missiles.<sup>219</sup>

It is not quite clear what these Saudi forces could do other than strike a large area target with limited effect. They may have some symbolic or deterrent effect, but they seem far less capable of destroying a key target than the Saudi Air Force.

### **Yemeni Missile Forces**

Yemen had a small missile force before the Houthi crisis and Saudi air attacks. The IISS estimated this force included 12 FROG-7 artillery rockets, 10 SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*) short-range ballistic missiles, and 6 *Scud*-B launchers with some 33 missiles -- at least some of which were provided by North Korea in 2002.<sup>220</sup> These were deployed in a special brigade of the Yemeni Army.

The readiness of these forces was unclear even before the Houthi crisis, and it was bombed extensively by Saudi forces in the spring of 2015. Even so, it was able to fire a Scud B at some target in the area of Khamis Mushayt in Saudi Arabia -- probably its air base -- on June 6, 2015.<sup>221</sup> Saudi air defenses destroyed the missile before it could hit a target.

### **Iranian Missile Forces**

Iran has a wide variety of artillery rockets and missiles that goes from very short-range tactical systems, like multiple rocket launchers, to short and medium range artillery rockets and cruise missiles, to short and long-range ballistic missiles. Iran's family of artillery rockets and shorter-range missiles give Iran a wide mix of capabilities. Iran's shorter-range systems include a family of artillery rockets that supplement its tube artillery forces, and provide a major increase in area fire capability in terms of both range and volume of fire. They could also compensate in part for Iran's limited close air support capability, particularly in a defensive mode.

There are varying reports on Iran's holdings of longer-range artillery rockets, but key types and their ranges include the Fajr 1-Type 63-BM-12 (8 kilometers), H-20 (unknown distance), Falaq 1 (10 kilometers), Oghab/Type 83 (34 -45 kilometers), Fajr 3 (43 kilometers), and Fajar 5 (75-80 kilometers). Iran's shorter-range artillery rockets can deliver mass fires against nearby tactical targets and Iran's longer-range artillery rockets can be used in harassment fire and as weapons of intimidation against targets across the Iranian border in Iraq and Kuwait. The longest-range systems artillery rockets could reach targets in nearby Southern Gulf states.

The key types of Iranian missiles, and their range, are shown in **Figure VIII.2 and Figure VIII.2, and Map VIII.1 and Map VIII.2**. Iran's shorter-range missile systems include a wide variety of systems, and again reports vary sharply as to types, numbers, and performance. Iran sometimes announces missile programs, names, and ranges that are questionable, but its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) seem to include the Naze'at (100–130 km), Zelzal family (Zelzal-1 (150 km), Zelzal-2 (210 km), Zelzal-3 (200–250 km), Fateh-110 (200–300 km), Shahab-1, Scud B (350 km) Shahab-2, Scud C, Hwasong-6 (750 km), and Qiam 1 (700–800 km).

These systems are being modified and improved over time. The Fateh-110 is at least in its

fourth generation, and the Qaim has been modified since first appearing in August 2010.

To put these ranges in perspective, any system with a range of 200 kilometers can strike from a position on Iran's Gulf coast at a target on the Southern Gulf coast that is immediately across from it. Iran can also disperse many of its shorter-range missiles away from positions directly opposite a target in the Southern Gulf and still fire from sites deliberately chosen to disperse its missiles. Iran's longer-range systems can be widely dispersed and still used against targets on the Southern Gulf Coast.

Such strikes would normally have serious limits. The limited lethality and accuracy of most of Iran's rockets and shorter-range ballistic missiles mean that most Iranian missiles cannot hit a point target and would not produce significant damage if fired into an area target. They lack advanced precision guidance systems or terminal homing capabilities that could make them more political weapons and sources of intimidation than effective war fighting systems – except for the systems Iran is beginning to equip with GPS guidance systems. Some experts feel, however, that less accurate and reliable systems might be used in large volleys against key area targets, and that Iran is developing the capability to use GPS guidance for the larger and long-range systems – improvements that would greatly increase their lethality.

### ***The Strategic Value of Iran's Short Range Rockets and Missiles***

Iran has shown that even short-range artillery rockets can have a strategic impact, and be used in irregular warfare and as an indirect form of power projection. Iran has played a major role in helping Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad create a major pool of steadily improving rockets that it can conceal, disperse and fire against Israel, and that Israel cannot easily seek out and destroy even in a land invasion.

Israel has responded with defensive systems like Iron Dome and is developing systems to deal with larger and longer-range rockets like David's Sling and improved versions of the Arrow. It has also steadily improved its IS&R capability and tactics and training to use air strikes and land raids to attack launch sites and missile storage facilities.

Israel, however, was not able to suppress the threat from Gaza in 2014. In spite of a massive air campaign and a land invasion, the IDF estimated that the Palestinians had fired some 3,000 out of 10,000 rockets they held before the fighting started, the IDF had destroyed a total of roughly 3,000-4,000 rockets in combat, and 3,000-4,000 remained. Moreover, the Palestinians had been steadily able to improve the range and payload of their rockets with outside aid during 2008-2014.

Iran and Syria have transferred far larger forces of rockets and guided missiles to the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed to have an inventory of 33,000 by 2006, fired some 3,970 rockets into Israel from southern Lebanon, killing 44 Israeli civilians and 118 soldiers.<sup>222</sup> U.S. experts felt that Hezbollah had some 33,000 rockets and missiles as of July 2014. Israel's official estimate was some 40,000 largely short-range systems – and some Israeli experts put the total at 100,000, while sources like Iran tracker put the total at 40,000 to 50,000.<sup>223</sup>

Iran has some 300-450 Shahab 1 and Shahab 2 short-range ballistic missiles.<sup>224</sup> Most sources agree that the Hezbollah has significant holdings of rockets and missiles like the Zelzal 2 (Range of 100-300 kilometers, 600 kilogram warhead, solid fuel), possibly some

Scud missiles, and 12 or more anti-ship guided missiles. There are also reports that Iran and Syria have transferred longer-range versions of the Iranian Zelzal like the Zelzal 2, and Syrian M300/M302 and M600, with GPS guidance to the Hezbollah, which would greatly increase Hezbollah capability to carry out lethal strikes against targets in Israel.<sup>225</sup>

Uzi Rubin, a key developer of Israel's missile defense program warned in January 2014 that: "The Iranians took the Zelzal 2 and turned it into a guided rocket. The third generation of it contains a homing sensor and a GPS. The Syrians can have this capability, too, to create a fully guided M-600 rocket with a GPS...Hezbollah will seek to import such guided weapons."<sup>226</sup>

Ehud Barak warned on March 25, 2014 that, "We will continue to see many more missiles, a lot more accuracy, and within five years the missile will reach a maximum level of accuracy that will allow them to choose which building in Israel to hit. These means will proliferate, and will be cheaper for terror organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza...In the future we will see terrorism backed by science and technology...Somewhere in a small lab, hostile elements sit planning the future weapon of mass destruction. This is an unprecedented terrorism potential...We can't wait until the threat is realized, as the gap will be difficult to close."<sup>227</sup>

The end result is that Iran has the ability to put pressure on Israel from two fronts without taking direct responsibility for its actions or a high risk of retaliation, and transfer a relatively low-cost threat that forces Israel to purchase far more expensive missile defenses – with exchange ratios where Israeli's defensive missiles are far more costly than the systems held by Hamas and Hezbollah.

### ***Iran's Medium and Long-Range Missile Systems***

Iran's medium and long-range missile systems include a wide range of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that can cover the range from Iran to targets across the Gulf, and throughout the areas near Iran's borders. There is no clear dividing line that defines the military role of such medium-range systems from Iran's longer-range or intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) that Iran it can use to attack strategic area targets. At least some have been quietly deployed in missile silos – a fact revealed by launches from silos near Tabriz and Khorramabad during the Great Prophet Six exercises in 2011.<sup>228</sup>

The end result is that Iran is deploying a constantly evolving family of missiles that have the range to attack virtually any target in Israel, the Levant, the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Pakistan and part of Central Asia, and targets in Southern Russia and Europe. These systems give Iran a longer-range strike capability that its aging air force largely lacks. Iran's combat aircraft have the potential range-payload to strike deep beyond the Gulf, but they lack the performance, numbers, and enablers to operate effectively in large numbers of sorties against the U.S. and Southern Gulf mix of fighters, strike aircraft, enablers, and surface-to-air missiles.

### ***Key Uncertainties***

Iran has announced fewer tests and specific details regarding its missile developments over the last few years. As this report makes clear, there also are many are conflicting reports about the names and range of such missiles, and conflicting unclassified reports about key aspects of individual missile systems.



The key uncertainties involved are:

- Iran's testing of missiles and rockets and their accuracy and reliability, the operational realism of such testing, and Iran's perceptions of its progress versus the reality. Limited tests under "white suit" conditions can produce a greatly exaggerated picture of capability, particularly if success is exaggerated to the political leadership.
- The warhead and fusing design, of Iran's rocket and missile forces and the real world lethality of unitary high explosive warheads under operational conditions, and of any cluster munitions Iran may have for such systems. A unitary conventional missile warhead that relies on a near surface burst can have only 30-60% of the lethality of a bomb with a similar payload because the closing velocity vectors much of the explosive force upwards.
- The relative accuracy of the missile and targeting systems relative to high value targets and the ability to launch or "volley" enough systems to compensate for limited accuracy against point and area targets.
- The strength and quality of U.S., Gulf, Israeli and other missile defenses.
- Iranian perceptions of the risk of counterstrikes by Gulf and Israeli air forces, and U.S. and Israeli missiles.
- The actual political, psychological, and retaliatory behavior of targeted countries and their allies.

Nevertheless, a wide range of reports indicate that Iran's missiles and missile developments now include a mix of solid and liquid-fuels medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with names and ranges like the Ghadr-110 (2,000–3,000 km), Shahab-3 (2,100 km) (Iran), Fajr-3 (2,500 km) Ashoura (2,000–2,500 km), and Sejil (2,000–2,500 km). These ranges vary according to both estimates of booster capabilities and differences over payload size, which is nominal and ranges from 700-1,000 kilograms.<sup>229</sup>

More controversially, they also may include developmental systems like the intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) like the Seiji 2 (solid propellant missile (tested to 2,000+ kilometers in May 009, possible range of 3,700 kilometers), Shahab-5 or Toqyān 1 (3000–5000 km) and the Shahab-6 or Toqyān 2) (3000–5000 km).<sup>230</sup>

The Shahab 3 is known to be actively deployed. The number of deployed Shahab 3 missiles is uncertain, along with the precise configuration of the missiles. Some are, however, deployed in hidden shelters, and the Shahab is based on the North Korean No Dong system, and the basic missile has 1,200-kilogram payload and range of 1,100-1,200 kilometers. A variant with a 700-kilogram warhead and range of 1,300 to 1,400 kilometers is also believed to be deployed.

These systems still lack advanced guidance systems, do not seem to have had enough tests in their final configuration to establish a high level of reliability or an accuracy based on real-world tests, and have guidance systems present major problems in attacking point targets or high value parts of area targets without being armed with nuclear weapon. As a result, much of Iran's missile force is more a weapon of intimidation than a war fighting tool. Such missiles can, however, hit large area-sized targets, and disrupt military and economic operations, and civil life.

Yet, systems that rely on conventional warheads and lack high accuracy or terminal guidance still have military value. They present the constant risk of a lucky hit – which increase with multiple firings. The very fact Iran deploys such missiles forces states in the region to buy missile defenses, consider civil defense programs, and potentially halt

petroleum exports and other economic activity from vulnerable area targets.

Accordingly, they can partly compensate for the fact that Iran has not been able to compete with the U.S. and its Arab neighbors in modernizing its airpower and surface-to-air missile defenses. They also help compensate for the fact that Iran's land and naval forces also face many limits in terms of modernization, equipment strength, and readiness, but Iran's missiles and rockets give it added strike capabilities at every level for land and naval tactical warfare to the ability to threaten states throughout the region with long range missiles.

### *Strategic Leverage from ICBMs?*

Iran's longer-range missiles and space developments missiles have political and strategic value as well. The inability to predict how and when Iran will use them, how quickly they will evolve into more accurate and lethal systems, and know their operational impact until they are used gives them both deterrent value and makes them weapons of intimidation. Iran's satellite program not only is giving it new intelligence and surveillance capabilities, it is leading to improvements in its boosters that could – over time – potentially give it an ICBM capability.

Iran's present satellite launch vehicles like the Simorgh-3 (Phoenix 3) have only limited lift capability. However, Iran is believed to have gotten aid in developing a much more powerful SLV with clustered engines from North Korea. The expansion of its launch capabilities at the Semnan Space Center is giving it growing capabilities to test key components of an ICBM.<sup>231</sup> So it's the development of new test capabilities for larger missile engines at the Bin Ganah test facility. According to a report by IHS Jane's Iran may be working on a solid fuel booster that could give an ICBM a range of up to 10,000 kilometers.<sup>232</sup>

Iran already gains strategic leverage from developmental programs that could someday enable it to launch missiles that can strike the U.S., as well as all of Europe and Russia. It is still unclear that Iran actually intends to deploy a real ICBM or IRBMs that can cover all of Europe and Russia. Iran is, however, developing boosters for what it claims are space purposes that create the potential to deploy a future ICBM.

Any Iranian long-range IRBM or ICBM would require an extraordinarily effective guidance system, predictable accuracy, and level of reliability to have any real lethality with conventional warheads, even if it could be equipped with a functional GPS guidance platform. It would probably require nuclear warheads in order to compensate for critical problems in accuracy, reliability, and warhead lethality.

Iran would also face problems in conducting anything approaching a suitable test program at the ranges involved. Iran can, however, still gain visibility and political leverage simply by assembling the components of an ICBM or a booster for a satellite launch vehicle. It can also potentially push the U.S. into expensive additional investments in missile defense and preemptive strike capabilities.

One option would be to obtain technology and proven components from an outside power or experts such as those in China, the FSU, and North Korea – although North Korea's capabilities and the performance of its KN-08 are developmental and uncertain. There have been reports for decades from sources like the National Council of Resistance

of Iran (NCRI) and MEK that Iran and North Korea cooperate in missile design.

The *New York Times* reported on November 28, 2010 that Wikileaks released U.S. State Department cable traffic indicating that that Iran has obtained advanced missiles like a North Korean BM-25, a copy of the Russian submarine launched R-27 that has a nominal range of 2,000 miles. It also reported that Iran might have tested a Safir booster stage in 2009 based on DPRK assistance – and one that had a 40% increase in lift over previous designs.<sup>233</sup>

Iran has tended to be much more quiet about its missile test and design data since the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 began, but John Irish of Reuters reported on May 29, 2015 that the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) claimed sources inside Iran, including within Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, said a seven-person North Korean Defense Ministry team was in Iran during the last week of April, that this was the third time in 2015, and that a nine-person delegation was due to return in June. It also claimed that, "The delegates included nuclear experts, nuclear warhead experts and experts in various elements of ballistic missiles including guidance systems."

Reuters also reported that the NCRI had claimed that the North Korean delegation "was taken secretly to the Imam Khomeini complex, a site east of Tehran controlled by the Defense Ministry. It gave detailed accounts of locations and whom the officials met. It said the delegation dealt with the Center for Research and Design of New Aerospace Technology, a unit of nuclear weaponization research, and a planning center called the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, which is under U.S. sanctions." The State Department said it could not confirm such claims.<sup>234</sup>

Reporting by Bill Gertz in the *Free Beacon* on April 15, 2015 indicated that,<sup>235</sup>

North Korea supplied several shipments of missile components to Iran during recent nuclear talks and the transfers appear to violate United Nations sanctions on both countries, according to U.S. intelligence officials... Since September more than two shipments of missile parts have been monitored by U.S. intelligence agencies as they transited from North Korea to Iran, said officials familiar with intelligence reports who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Details of the arms shipments were included in President Obama's daily intelligence briefings and officials suggested information about the transfers was kept secret from the United Nations, which is in charge of monitoring sanctions violations... One official said the transfers between North Korea and Iran included large diameter engines, which could be used for a future Iranian long-range missile system.... U.S. officials said the transfers carried out since September appear to be covered by the sanctions.... Other details of the transfers could not be learned. However, U.S. intelligence agencies in the past have identified Iran's Islamic Republic of Iran... Shipping Lines (IRISL) as the main shipper involved in transferring ballistic missile-related materials.

Some of this reporting is controversial, but many expert believe Iran and North Korea do continue to cooperate. There is less support for Israeli reports that Iran actually displaced a functional ICBM design measuring 27 meters in length (88.5 feet) on a launch pad outside Tehran. It seems more likely that these reports refer to a facility has been under construction for several years and is designed for the Simorgh satellite launch vehicle (SLV) that Iran needs to lift heavier payloads into orbit.

Jeremy Binnie, London, and Sean O'Connor, Indianapolis, of *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly* reports that,<sup>236</sup>

The Iran Space Agency announced in October 2014 that it planned to put three satellites into orbit using the Simorgh in the Persian year 1394, which starts on 21 March... The declassified version of the U.S. Department of Defense's annual report on Iran's military power, released in January 2014, noted that "Iran has publicly stated it may launch a space launch vehicle by 2015 that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as a ballistic missile... While the Simorgh is theoretically capable of ICBM ranges, it cannot deliver an effective warhead over such distances. Iranian media have reported that it will be able to lift a payload of just 100 kg into orbit.

No one can dismiss the possibility that Iran acquire an effective ICBM or get meaningful aid in doing so. The indicators it has a major effort, however, are still uncertain and until it has actually shown its capabilities in tests, guessing at its intentions, at its level of cooperation without outside state, and its future progress is just that – a guess. Moreover, reports from hostile opposition groups are not enough. These are areas where confirmation by U.S. intelligence is critical.

### *Ongoing Cruise Missile Developments*

Iran is also developing a family of cruise missiles, longer-range air-launched systems, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs); that can supplement its ballistic missiles and provide targeting and damage assessment data. It is also seeking to develop satellite reconnaissance, targeting, and damage assessment capabilities, developing better mobile missile launchers, experimenting with missile shelters and silos, and creating less vulnerable and more secure command and control systems using optical fibers and land lines.<sup>237</sup> An estimate of its major developments is shown in **Figure VIII.3**

U.S. intelligence reports indicate that Iran is developing longer-range cruise missiles with a land attack capability. According to various reports, some of dubious veracity, it has had access to as many as three advanced cruise missiles that could pose a significant threat to U.S. forces in the region, with one capable of carrying nuclear payloads. These three systems may include the Kh-55 or AS-15A, the SS-N-22 Sunburn, and the SS-N-26. All three were developed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the latter two to combat Aegis-equipped ships; if they have been properly maintained and are used correctly, in the confined waters of the Gulf they represent a threat to U.S. ships.<sup>238</sup>

Twelve Kh-55 missiles may have been transferred to Iran by Ukraine in 2001.<sup>239</sup> Although the weapon was designed to carry a nuclear warhead, it could carry 410 kg of conventional explosive, enough to do substantial damage to a land target or naval vessel. With a maximum speed of Mach 0.8, a range of 2500 km, and inertial navigation and terrain matching guidance giving it a theoretical CEP of 25 meters. If it can actually approach this accuracy, it would be slower but more accurate than any of Iran's ballistic missiles.

The Kh-55 was designed as air-launched cruise missiles, and while Iran may have adapted them for ground launch, so far there have been no public demonstrations of these missiles. The system was designed as a ground-attack system and is unlikely to be effective against moving vessels unless Iran has upgraded its seeker system. Given Iran's difficulty fabricating parts for its ballistic missile program, and the need to develop suitable power plants and guidance packages, Iran is unlikely to have reverse-engineered this or any other cruise missile. There are no indications that Iran has test-fired a Kh-55 or any cruise missile with similar characteristics in recent drills.

If Iran could eventually make use of these systems or reverse engineer them, they could represent a serious threat. Their range would allow Iran to target Israel, the entire Gulf, and Southeastern Europe from bases well within Iran. While the missile was originally armed with nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that Iran would be able to develop a 410 kg nuclear device in the near future (see below). The Kh-55's main danger comes from precision and long range. Although it may be more accurate than any ballistic missile currently in Iran's inventory, its relatively small payload (410 kg vs. 1000 kg for most SRBMs) and vulnerability to anti-missile weapons limits its effectiveness in hitting hardened and defended targets.

There are also unconfirmed reports that Iran received eight SS-N-22 Sunburns from Russia early in the 1990s.<sup>240</sup> The Sunburn is larger and heavier than the Kh-55, with a maximum speed of Mach 2.5 at high altitudes and 2.1 at low altitudes. It carries a 300-320 kg warhead and has a maximum range of 160 km. Its guidance package uses inertial navigation and data links for launch and mid-course flight, with the final approach controlled by the missile's radar. This weapon was designed to be a carrier-killer for Soviet bombers, and for its time would likely have been highly effective against U.S. anti-missile defenses. It is unknown if Iran has managed to improve on these weapons or has only been able to refurbish its current stock, and with the exception of a 2006 image of a Sunburn-like missile being fired from an Iranian frigate, there are no public data on their current status.

The SS-N-26 is another system that is sometimes reported to be in Iranian forces. The SS-N-26 was designed to be a lighter, cheaper version of the SS-N-22. While some reports claim that it was publicly displayed in 1993, it is unknown if Iran has received any shipments of this missile. It has a longer range than the Sunburn but carries a lighter payload - 300 km vs. 160 km and 250 kg vs. 300-320 kg. It can be launched from submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and land batteries. If Iran actually has any SS-N-26s, they are likely stationed on mobile launchers around the Strait of Hormuz. With the exception of a passing reference in *Missile Threat*, however, there is no indication that Iran has access to these weapons and intelligence experts do not feel they are a current threat.

In addition to these cruise missiles, Iran has several hundred C-801, C-802, and SSC-3 missiles. These weapons have shorter ranges (50 km, 120 km, and 80 km), slower speeds (Mach .85, .85, and .9), and generally smaller warheads (165 kg, 165 kg, and 513 kg). All three carry some form of inertial guidance or autopilot combined with radar for the attack phase. All are based on designs that date from the 1960s or 1970s, although the Chinese production runs that Iran likely had access to from the 1980s and 1990s.

Iran claims to have upgraded its speedboats and patrol craft to launch more advanced cruise missiles, and to have used them in exercises.<sup>241</sup> Observers of recent naval exercises have not publicly verified such claims. The mounting of the C-700 and C-800 series of weapons on small vessels is confirmed, however, and presents a real threat. It is also one where U.S. and allied navies and air forces must attack the moment such a missile launch becomes likely in order to minimize the threat of a successful strike on a U.S. or allied ship.

Iran may have the Chinese HY-4 (C-601, Fl-4 Silkworm; NATO designation CSSC-7 Sadsack), although reports in this regard are unconfirmed. The HY-4 has a range of 135-150 km, a maximum speed of Mach .8, and a 513 kg warhead. It is a lighter version of the HY-2 Silkworm (2,000 kilograms versus 3,000 kilograms) with a turbojet sustainer with

solid-fuel booster, a speed of Mach 0.8. There are reports that turbojet has had power and reliability problems.

According to Global Security, it has an, “autopilot for mid-course guidance and a J-band (10-20 GHz) monopulse active radar seeker for the terminal phase. A radio altimeter allows the cruise height to be adjusted between 70 and 200 m and the terminal phase involves a high angle dive attack. It is equipped with a 500 kg warhead, which is probably semi-armor-piercing.”

It is normally air-launched, but a version is available that can be ship-launched. While it seems to be longer-range maximum range than the C-801, C-802, or SSC-3, none pose the same level of risk to military vessels that the SS-N-22 and SS-N-26 do. China is reported to have developed a longer-range version with an up to 300-kilometer range, but not to have put it into production.

In any case, Iran is developing the capability to produce and deploy long-range cruise missiles, and to have enough long-range cruise missile technology and production capability to deploy such systems in the future. In fact, Iran has already claimed it is going to deploy a new long-range land attack missile. The *New Straits Times* reported on April 1, 2013 that,<sup>242</sup>

Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Mehdi Farahi announced that a new domestically manufactured cruise missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers will be unveiled in the near future, Iran’s Mehr News Agency (MNA) reported. Farahi also said that the cruise missile, named the Meshkat (Lantern), can be launched from land-based and sea-based missile systems, adding that the missile can also be fired by fighter jets.

In addition, he said that Iran has built or is building 14 types of cruise missiles, including Zafar, Nasr, Qader, and Ghadir missiles. Elsewhere in his remarks, Farahi said that in the field of missile technology, the Defense Ministry has focused its efforts on increasing the precision, radar-evading capability, and operational range of domestically manufactured ballistic missiles.

On the United States plan to build missile defense shields in the region, he said, “They are making some efforts and some claims, most of which are false, exaggerated, and have no basis in fact.” He also said, “We hope that no incident will take place, but if a conflict occurs, they will see that their claims are ineffective.”

This would be a far more ambitious cruise missile strike system that Iran has deployed to date. The Zafar missile is a short-range anti-ship cruise missile designed for mounting on speedboats and small craft. The Noor seems to be a larger anti-ship cruise missile with a range of 130 to 1270 kilometers.

The Qader or Ghadr is a system that has variously been reported as an upgrade to the Shahab 3, as an unpowered electro-optically guided 2,000 pound glide-bomb, as a cruise missile with a range of up to 200 kilometers that can be used against ships and land targets, and as identical to the Meshkat - illustrating the problems in characterizing Iran’s forces using unclassified sources discussed earlier in **Chapter V**.

One problem that helps create some of this confusion is poor translation and transliteration of Farsi into English and Roman lettering. For instance, while poor transliteration may lead one to believe that the same name is being used to designate a 200km anti-ship cruise missile and a ballistic missile derived from the Shahab 3, a proper translation from the Farsi reveals that the anti-ship cruise missiles English name is “Capable” and the ballistic

missiles name is “Intensity.” Unfortunately for those who do not understand Farsi, those two Farsi words sound similar.

Some of the resulting uncertainties have already been discussed in **Chapter V**, but a land attack capable version of the Qader anti-ship cruise missile called does seem to be the same system that the U.S. Director of National intelligence identified as a new land attack capability in April 2013. However, a similarly named Ghadr/Ghadrir has been reported to be a smaller anti-ship cruise missile that can also be used against land targets, and the same name is used for midjet submarines.

During the IRGC-ASF exhibition in May 2014, the IRGC also unveiled the “Ya Ali” land attack cruise missile, which has a reported range of 700km. IHS Jane’s notes that it is similar to the Chinese YJ-62 (export designation C-602) and may use a version of the Tolou turbojet that is already in use with Iran’s long range anti-ship cruise missiles. The wings do not retract into the missile body, suggesting that the missile cannot be launched from a container.<sup>243</sup> Little is known about the Ya Ali and it does not appear to have been shown outside of the May 2014 IRGC exhibition.

The Tasnim news agency reported that Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, the Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated in late November 2013 that Iran planned to demonstrate new cruise missiles during military exercises in January 2014. He stated the Velayat-92 exercises would be Iran’s largest yet, and would be held in northern part of the Indian Ocean and neutral waters, Tasnim news agency reported, “The newest cruise missiles will be tested during these exercises, aside from that, we will also test new weapons.” He also talked about new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and said that Iran would demonstrate a new phased array radar named “Asr.”<sup>244</sup>

These statements came days after Iran had reached its nuclear agreement with the P5+1, but were tied to National Navy Day in Iran which occurs on November 28<sup>th</sup>, and celebrates Operation Morvarid of 1980, an Iranian Navy victory in the Iran-Iraq war. Sayyari also said that new military vessels and aircraft were planned to enter service, that the Navy would step up manufacture of the Sahand destroyer and that a 28th fleet of warships, comprised of Alborz and Bandar Abbas warships, along with the Younes/Taregh/Kilo-class submarine, had been sent on a 70-day mission to in the Indian Ocean and would go to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and would dock in a number of ports in India, Sri Lanka, and Oman.<sup>245</sup>

A May 2015 study by IHS Janes’s also reports the discovery of a newer and long-range (2,000 kilometer?) cruise missile and test site. According to satellite imagery, “the long-range Soumar cruise missile that Iran unveiled in March was tested on a range 40 km east-south-east from the city of Qom”.<sup>246</sup> IHS Jane’s analysts conclude that,<sup>247</sup>

- The satellite imagery lends credibility to the Iranian claim that the Soumar is now in serial production as it indicates that its test programme was completed by August 2014. There are, nevertheless, lingering doubts about the capabilities of Iran's long-range cruise missile.
- The test footage showed missiles being launched by their solid-fuel booster motors, but did not show them flying in their cruise phase using their air-breathing engines.
- While the Iranian Ministry of Defence released photographs showing five Soumars painted just in primer, suggesting they had recently emerged from a production facility, their engines could not be seen.

- Unusually, Iranian officials did not give a range figure for the missile. This may indicate that the Iranians have failed to acquire the small turbofan engines they need to replicate the 2,000-2,500 km range of the original Kh-55 and have been forced to use a less efficient turbojet engine instead.
- Uncertainties persist over the range of Iran's Soumar cruise missile. Due to shortcomings in Iran's engine development, "the assumption that Iran's Soumar cruise missile has a range of 2,500 km almost certainly overstates the weapon's performance," according to IHS Jane's.

### ***The Near-Term Impact of the Iranian Missile Threat***

Iran's existing missile forces give it the capability to attack targets in the Gulf and near its border with conventionally-armed, long-range missiles and rockets. Iran can attack targets in Israel, throughout the region, and beyond with its longest-range ballistic missiles. However, the short-term risks posed by Iran's current conventionally armed rockets and missiles should not be exaggerated.

Most are relatively short-range systems, and have limited accuracy and lethality. They can be used as artillery, limited substitutes for air power, or as weapons of terror or intimidation. While Iran is deploying some systems with GPS guidance, most of Iran's are not accurate and lethal enough to play a substantial role in a conventional war, despite Iran's efforts to upgrade them.

The limited lethality of Iran's current warheads, the severe limits on the real world operational accuracy of most currently deployed systems, and the uncertain reliability of Iran's longer-range systems, now combine to limit the threat posed by anything other than large volleys of strikes to almost random hits somewhere in a large area. Even a lucky hit would only produce damage or casualties that would most probably be limited to those resulting from a single 1,000-pound unguided bomb.

Experts debate the extent to which Iran is developing missile systems with basic or advanced penetration aids, and the cumulative uncertainties in trying to estimate the effectiveness of current missile defense systems against Iran's current missile capabilities making any modeling effort highly uncertain. Israel, the Arab Gulf states, and the U.S. are, however, steadily improving their missile defenses and shifting from point defense to wide area defenses.

In the near-term, this combination of real-world limits to the lethality of Iran's missiles and growing missile defenses sharply limits the military effectiveness of Iran's rockets and missiles as long as they are armed with conventional warheads:

- Iran would need to use large numbers of shorter-range rockets as artillery to achieve a major impact on military area targets. The seriousness of such threats will depend in part on Iran's ability to launch rockets and missiles in salvos and volleys, and in the ability to launch "stacked threats" of different types of weapons that complicate the use of missile defenses and suppressive strikes.
- While it is beginning to deploy shorter-range systems with GPS guidance, it would need to use volleys or salvos of short-range missiles and long-range rockets to have even a moderate probability of hitting a high value building or facility in military bases and civil area targets. These are tactics Iran has exercised, but may not yet implemented effectively.
- Iran use of MRBM and IRBM strikes could not be massed effectively in large numbers against longer-range area targets, and they will remain weapons of intimidation that can be used largely psychological or "terror" purposes until they either acquire far better guidance and terminal homing capability and/or terminal homing.



Nevertheless, Iran is making a major effort to deploy more accurate missiles, and there have also been indications that it is developing nuclear warheads and seeking to give its systems penetration aids to counter missile defenses. No nearby state can disregard the fact that Iran can use conventionally armed missiles long-range rockets as terror weapons, and strike against large area targets like petroleum export facilities and cities. No state can disregard the fact that Iran might escalate to the use of such systems because of a conventional war in the Gulf, in reaction to any military threat to its ruling regime, as a response to covert action against the state, or as a method of resolving domestic fissures.

If one considers the full range of Iranian missiles, it is also clear that any assessment of its current military and strategic capabilities must include the entire Gulf, Israel, and U.S. bases in the region. Iran's can threaten every other regional state, including Turkey, Jordan, and Israel, and Iran has shown that it can develop additional threats by transferring longer-range or more precise rockets and missiles to "friendly" or "proxy" forces like the Hezbollah and Hamas or to new friendly state or non-state actors forces in countries like Yemen.

When it comes to assessing to overall military balance in the region, it is also important to note that Iran's rocket and missile forces blur the distinction between ground and air forces. The same is true of any distinction its sea and air-launched systems, and Iran's longer-range systems blur any distinction between missile and air power in both the offensive and defensive roles. There also is no clear separation between the impact of Iran's rocket and missile systems based solely on range. Like efforts to distinguish between "asymmetric" and "conventional" warfare, they are potentially useful in structuring an analysis but they have steadily less real world meaning in terms of both deterrence and warfare.

### ***Putting Iran's Missile and Nuclear Programs in Perspective***

The main focus of world attention is on the possibility that Iran will deploy nuclear-armed missiles, although the threat of missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction is also not restricted to nuclear weapons. While no outside source has produced clear indications that Iran has stockpiled anything other than unitary and cluster conventional warheads, Iran is a declared chemical weapons state that has never declared its actual holdings. It is possible that it has chemical warheads, and such warheads could have a major impact in increasing the terror and intimidation effect of Iranian missile strikes even if their real world lethality is limited. Iran also has all of the technology to produce advanced biological weapons, although no source has reported any major indicators that it is doing so.

It is difficult to predict how aggressive Iran would become in exploiting its nuclear capability if Iran acquired nuclear-armed missiles. Iran has so far been cautious in initiating any use of force that might threaten the survival of the regime. Its best strategy would be to limit its use of nuclear missile forces to pressure, deter, and intimidate.

Iran, however, is clearly involved in an active competition with the U.S. and with its Arab neighbors in an effort to win strategic influence and leverage. Iran faces U.S. and Arab competition for influence and control over Iraq, the emerging threat of ISIL, and growing uncertainty over the future of its alliance with the Assad regime in Syria and the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran also still seems to see American influence behind all of these steadily growing pressures.

Iran has long sought to develop asymmetric military capabilities and forces that can challenge U.S. encroachment in “its” region. Iran has threatened in the past to use such forces to “close” the Gulf, and has carried out major exercises targeted against the U.S. and less directly at the GCC states. It has also described many of its exercises as a response to Israeli or American threats and “aggression”.

While Iran has normally been careful to avoid any major threats and military incidents, to avoid provocative military steps, and to limit the risk of military confrontation; it is not clear that Iran would show the same restraint in using its full range of asymmetric warfare capabilities if it could arm its missile forces with nuclear weapons or if its missile forces developed a precision strike capability. Iran might then be more willing to take risks in using its other irregular warfare capabilities to try to force more favorable compromises, persuade the Iranian people they do face real foreign enemies, show how serious the impact could be on the global economy, or simply punish other powers.

Military history is also a warning that restraint in peacetime does not necessarily last in a crisis or limited conflict. The history of war is not the history of rational bargainers. Tempers can grow short, given units can overreact, situations can be misunderstood, and one nation’s view of how to escalate rarely matches another’s once a crisis begins. Iran could escalate to major rocket and missile strikes because of miscalculations on both sides of a future clash or lower level conflict.

The Iranian missile threat is also likely to become far more serious in the future even if Iran never does arm its missiles with weapons of mass destruction. Left to its own devices, Iran would probably deploy both nuclear-armed missile and highly accurate missiles with conventional warheads. Iran has powerful military incentives to deploy nuclear weapons, and Iran’s missile forces give it the potential ability to develop a major nuclear strike force.

### ***The Challenges to Iran if It Does Deploy a Nuclear-Armed Missile Force***

Even if the P5+1 nuclear arms talks with Iran fail, Iran faces technical challenges in creating and deploying nuclear-armed missiles and in ensuring they would not be subject to preemption or counterforce nuclear strikes. It will be vulnerable to preventive strikes during its development and initial deployment phases, and Iran might well have a very limited stockpile of nuclear weapons for some years after it first began to deploy such weapons, and creating a survivable and effective force would pose problems of a different kind.

Long before Iran could deploy a meaningful nuclear-armed missile force, Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons could also lead to U.S. or Israeli preventive attacks on both its nuclear and missile facilities and forces. If the current P5+1 talks fail, President Obama and other senior U.S. officials have made it clear that U.S. policy sees Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as “unacceptable.” Both Israel and the U.S. have repeatedly stated that they are planning and ready for military options that could include preventive strikes on at least Iran’s nuclear facilities and, and that U.S. strikes might cover a much wider range of missile facilities and other targets.

Such preventive strikes would present risks for the attacker as well as Iran. They might trigger a direct military confrontation or conflict in the Gulf with little warning. They might also lead to at least symbolic Iranian missile strikes on U.S. basing facilities, GCC targets

or Israel. At the same time, it could lead to much more serious covert and proxy operations in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, the rest of the Gulf, and other areas.

Furthermore, unless preventive strikes were reinforced by a lasting regime of follow-on strikes, they could trigger a much stronger Iranian effort to actually acquire and deploy nuclear weapons and/or Iranian rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and negotiations. The U.S., in contrast, might see it had no choice other than to maintain a military over-watch and restrike capability to ensure Iran could not carry out such a program and rebuild its nuclear capabilities or any other capabilities that were attacked.

A preventive war, however, is only part of the threat Iran will face. As has been touched upon earlier, Israel is a mature nuclear power that already has a thermonuclear-armed missile forces with considerable counterstrike capability. Israel's ability to destroy Iranian cities and population centers already makes Israel an existing existential threat to Iran. At least initially, Iran could only secure its evolving forces by relying on launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch-under-attack (LUA). This, however, would push Israel into shaping a nuclear force posture designed to react to any Iranian use of nuclear forces – or even an Iranian threat – by launching an all-out nuclear attack with a force posture that would almost be designed to lead both sides to miscalculation or over-reaction.

It is far from clear that if Iran ever used nuclear weapons, it would not suffer far more than any nation or nations it attacked. Iran faces the grim fact that its missiles can make a war far more damaging and lethal, but it cannot win any arms race in which the U.S. takes part, or any process of escalation that involves the U.S. and Israel.

Simply possessing a few early nuclear devices and nuclear-armed missiles weapons does not mean they are effective. The risks to Iran in deploying nuclear-armed missile forces are increased by the fact that an Iranian effort to create survivable and effective nuclear-armed or precision strike missile forces would take years to deploy, and would present other kinds of challenges in the process. Iran cannot become a meaningful nuclear power overnight, and Iran does not exist in a “nuclear vacuum.”

A “nuclear Iran” seems likely to trigger a constant regional arms race to develop larger nuclear forces, missiles with larger nuclear warheads, missiles with more accuracy and penetration aids, better missile defenses, less vulnerable basing and deployment systems and the ability to launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch under attack (LUA). What Albert Wohlstetter once called the “delicate balance of terror” between the U.S. and USSR and NATO and Warsaw Pact could become the “unstable balance of terror” in the Gulf and Middle East.

A nuclear arms race already exists between Israel and Iran - albeit one where only Israel now has a nuclear strike capability. Iran's actions have almost certainly already provoked Israel into developing the capability to target thermonuclear warheads on every major Iranian city, creating an “existential” threat to Iran long before Iran will pose one to Israel. It seems certain that if Iran goes further, Israel will seek to create and maintain an even greater nuclear “edge” over Iran – if it does not launch preventive war. The practical problem this raises for Iran - and for stabilizing this arms race - is that Iran will face a possible Israeli first strike option until it can secure its nuclear armed forces.

This could push Iran towards a concealed or breakout deployment, followed by phase where it would have to launch on warning or under attack until it has a survivable force. Iran would then, however, have to compete with powers with far larger stockpiles and boosted and thermonuclear weapons until it can create a more sophisticated force of its own. This confronts Iran with the reality that it at least initially faces a high-risk arms race, and is then likely to become trapped in a steady race to increase its forces, find ways to secure them against counterforce strikes, find ways to compete in missile defense and still find itself confronting an escalating mix of Israeli, U.S., and Gulf nuclear and conventional strike capabilities superior to any force Iran can deploy.

If Iran moves from a threat to actually acquiring nuclear weapons, it seems likely to provoke a Gulf power like Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear-armed missiles, and any nuclear-armed neighboring state would almost certainly respond to any nuclear attack in kind. Saudi Arabia and the GCC states may well have the option of turning to Pakistan for nuclear-armed missiles, and senior Saudi officials have said Saudi Arabia has examined nuclear options.

A credible Iranian threat to use nuclear weapons against other regional targets also seems likely to lead the U.S. to fully implement its past offer to provide “extended deterrence.” The U.S. has officially offered its regional friends and allies “extended deterrence” of the kind it once provided to Europe during the Cold War - essentially confronting Iran with an open-ended threat of U.S. retaliation.

The end result would at best be a “delicate balance of deterrence” where deterrence might fail. While any form of nuclear preemptions or “bolt from the blue” seems unlikely, a nuclear exchange might grow out of escalation from the response to Iran’s use of asymmetric warfare, a threat of some “takeover” of a given regional government or a state, or the risk of some “accident” or miscalculation. The worst moments in history rarely occurred because of accurate calculations by rational bargainers.

This is why successful negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran seem likely to be of significant strategic benefit to Iran. They would eliminate Iran’s nuclear option, but the end result would do more to ensure Iran’s overall security than Iranian nuclear-armed missiles. Once Iran tests a nuclear device or claims to have nuclear weapons, it will enter a very different world of risks. Iran’s missiles will be seen by many Israelis as “existential” risks the moment Iran has – or even claims to have – nuclear weapons. It is Iran, however, that will face the most immediate threat from Israel of preventive war, preemption, or massive retaliation.

At the same time, the failure of such negotiations would have a negative impact on the U.S. and its regional allies as well. The end result is that if the P5+1 negotiations – or some form of negotiations – fail, Israel, the U.S., and Arab states cannot choose between preventive war and containment. Unless Iran fundamentally changes its present course, the choice is between preventive strike and containment, or containment alone. Neither of which has favorable results for the U.S. Preventive strikes may be able to delay Iran for a given period of time, but if Iran seeks to rebuild its nuclear capabilities, Israel, the U.S., and the Arab countries will have to strengthen their missile and other defenses, develop great retaliatory capabilities and/or restrike every new Iranian effort to move towards nuclear weapons.

Containment alone also becomes much more difficult for the U.S. and its Arab and Israeli allies should the P5+1 fail to reach a settlement with Iran, because other powers—including some European allies—are interested in trading with Iran. The risk that important United Nations sanctions may be removed if the failure to reach a deal is perceived to be the responsibility of the United States. Disunion among the sanctions regime will make it much more difficult to contain Iran and prevent it from obtaining the necessary technology to build and construct an effective nuclear weapon.

### ***Shaping the Future Threat: Nuclear Warheads vs. Precision Conventional Warheads***

At the same time, Iran's search for precision guided conventional missiles could also pose another kind of major strategic threat. Reliable and effective precision guidance would make Iran's missiles far more lethal even if Iran rejects a nuclear option. Such systems could do sufficient damage to critical military and infrastructure targets to effectively replace "weapons of mass destruction" with "weapons of mass effectiveness."

Iran has claimed levels of accuracy in the past that it actively faked, just as it has used altered videos to show more launches than actually took place. In the case of the Great Prophet Seven exercise, for example, it fired missiles during July 2-4, 2012 at what it called "replica air bases like those used by the trans-regional military forces." Iranian press reports indicated that these include Shahab 1, 2, and 3 missiles.<sup>248</sup> Iran then released photos showing cluster of explosions with diagrams of air bases overlaid over the supposed warhead strikes – some of which later proved to be explosions that had nothing to do with its missile strikes. It is remarkably easy to achieve accuracy if one moves the target to the point where the warhead has struck, or sets off an explosion on the ground without firing a missile. The real world lethality of a missile, however, is non-existent.

If Iran is to make a major advances in missile lethality without arming its missiles with nuclear warheads, it must make advances in one of three other areas: (1) it must deploy missiles with precision guidance and terminal homing; (2) deploy missiles with chemical or biological weapons, or (3) greatly enhance its command and control to launch semi-accurate volleys – potentially in "stacked" arrays of different missiles from different launch sites.

Iran may be pursuing options (2) and (3), but it is clearly taking steps to give its conventionally armed missiles far more accuracy. Iran is deploying short-range systems with GPS guidance and has said publicly that it is seeking to provide its missiles with precision guidance and/or terminal homing warheads, and with countermeasures to ballistic missile defenses. It already has deployed at least one missile with GPS guidance and begun to experiment with cruise missiles.

Iran's current conventionally-armed missiles are already becoming somewhat more lethal as they are equipped with cluster munitions and better fusing. However, their lethality is still limited by their restricted range-payload, reliability, and continuing lack of accuracy if this remains the only area of improvement. Even substantial volleys of missiles and rockets with better conventional warheads against area targets would still be limited in real world lethality, and would be more terror strikes than strikes capable of quickly hitting and destroying key point targets.

If Iran does succeed in deploying forces with a truly reliable precision strike capability, however, its missiles will become capable of targeting key military, petroleum, power, and water facilities with enough accuracy to destroy them with a credible conventional payload. It would radically alter the lethality of Iran's longer-range systems against high value military targets and civil targets like key oil product facilities and desalination plants - creating the equivalent of "weapons of mass effectiveness." Iran would also run far less risk of catastrophic escalation in retaliation to either the threat of using its missiles, or carrying out limited strikes, if it could use missile forces with conventional warheads in strategic attacks rather than nuclear warheads.

There is no evidence as yet that Iran has such capabilities for most of its systems and no certainty that it can acquire them in the near future. Iran has, however, made claims that imply it already has such accuracy, and a number of Israeli experts believe it is developing such systems. A number of sources indicate that its systems with greatly improved guidance include production of the Zelzal-2 as a guided rocket, and development of the Ya Ali land attack cruise missile, the Zelzal-3 ballistic missile, and the Raad-301 precision guided bomb. Iran has also claimed to have demonstrated that it has a near precision strike capability by attacking a simulated airfield -- although satellite photos of the target area indicate it simulated at least some of its accurate missile hits by using explosive devices at the scene.

As for the second option, Iran does not seem to be arming its missile forces with other weapons of mass destruction. No key source has yet claimed that Iran is actively pursuing to deploy chemical or biological warheads to give its missiles more lethality -- although Iran did have short-range, chemically armed rockets in the past.

The value of this option to Iran also needs to be kept in perspective. Chemical and biological missile warheads would have an immediate impact as terror weapons, but making them highly lethal is another story. It is easy to exaggerate the lethality of chemical missile warheads under real world operational conditions. Dispersing a chemical agent effectively is a major challenge, and chemical cluster weapons present serious timing and height of burst problems. Mounting chemical and biological weapons on longer ranged ballistic missiles also requires the warhead to survive the harsh re-entry environment that could degrade the effectiveness of the weapon if it is not shielded properly. It might well take a substantial volley of shorter-range rockets to have a major effect, and such a strike could remove all limits to a conflict and might still produce limited damage to critical targets.

Biological weapons can theoretically be as - or more - lethal than fission nuclear weapons and Iran has all of the technology and manufacturing capability needed to make such weapon. Effective dispersal is, however, even more difficult than with chemical weapons, and developing and testing such a warhead presents serious technical problems, could only have its lethality fully validated by human or primate testing, and presents the political problem that such a threat might not be credible until Iran's capability was proven. Moreover, the very threat that Iran was arming its missiles with biological weapons could trigger massive preventive strikes and any use of such warheads would eliminate any barriers to counterstrikes with nuclear weapons.

The third option is difficult to implement simply because of the numbers required. The lethal radius of conventional warheads against many targets is so limited that it takes

extremely large nuclear of conventionally armed missiles to have a significant probability of producing meaningful and lasting damage. Volleys using mixes of missiles might, however, allow Iran to saturate Gulf and U.S. missile defenses by mixing older and less accurate systems with more modern precision-guided systems

### ***Missiles, Political and Psychological Warfighting, and Wars of Intimidation***

Any discussion of lethality must also take account of the fact that the political impact of missiles can be as important in political and psychological terms as in military terms. Iran can already use its longer-range artillery rockets and missiles to copy Saddam Hussein's strategy in using missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War 1991. Missile forces also have political dimensions that help Iran fight "wars of intimidation" even in peacetime.

At a minimum, Iran's growing missile forces already increase its deterrent and defensive ability to deter attack on Iran and compensate for its weaknesses in airpower. More broadly, Iran can use its missiles politically and strategically, and not simply to damage targets. Selective firings and "volleys" of conventionally armed, unguided long-range missiles and rockets can be used as political symbols or terror weapons.

Iran might use its missiles to strike Israel after an Israeli preventive strike, or to strike at Israel in some other contingency where it felt the political symbolism inside Iran and the Arab and Islamic worlds were worth the cost. Iran could hope that conventional missile strikes on Israel would lead to limited Israeli retaliation, leading in turn to political pressure on Arab states to reduce ties to the U.S.. Strikes on Arab states would bring the costs of war home to populations that are ill prepared for conflict, raising the penalties for Gulf publics that have rarely had to face the personal risks stemming from regional instability.

As was demonstrated during the "war of the cities" during the Iran-Iraq war, by the use of the Scud missile during the Afghan War, and by the Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War in 1991, missile strikes can have a powerful propaganda impact that vastly exceeds their actual warfighting effect - at least initially. There were reports during the Iran-Iraq War of civilians and officials fleeing Tehran. Iraqis, Israelis, Saudis, and Coalition forces also routinely took shelter during missile attacks, and the Israeli press reported many cases of individuals that effectively panicked in 1991 - although perhaps more from fear that missiles might have chemical weapons than out of a fear of missiles or conventional warheads per se.

Even a few Iran missile strikes on either Israel or Saudi Arabia might also be seen by Arab states as a demonstration of Iran's willingness and capability to escalate even further, and growing future ability to strike with far more effectiveness. Iran could pick on one or a few Arab states, and seek to divide Arab states from each other. Moreover, Iran can use even token or failed missile strikes for internal political propaganda purposes.

Iran might also use missile strikes as a counter to any U.S., Gulf, or other conventional air or cruise missile strikes on Iranian military, civil, or infrastructure targets. Such a response might be deliberate, or escalate out of an incident in the Gulf or some other form of military clash. There are no clear boundaries between conventional and irregular/asymmetric warfare, and no clear steps on the escalation ladder that deter the use of one form of force

against another, or the level and mix of land-air-sea-missile force that will be used. Iran has historically been a relatively cautious power focusing on regime survival, but history is a clear warning that even the most cautious power can suddenly become locked into a massively escalating conflict.

Regardless of the current limits to the lethality of Iran's missile forces, the psychological impact of Iran's ability to launch a sudden, massive missile barrage on regional population centers and military installations should not be underestimated. Neither should the possibility of a lucky hit producing enough casualties or highly visible damage to have a lasting psychological impact - what might grimly be called the "World Trade Center effect." Iran's ability to launch a large volume of missiles over a period of days with little warning before the first round of launches gives Iran leverage and makes such missiles a weapon of intimidation. Even if - and perhaps especially if - they are never used, Iran's missiles also have the capability to intimidate and leverage Iran's neighbors, and to force the U.S. and its regional allies to devote resources to missile defense.

Missile and long-range rocket attacks can boost Iranian morale. In the face of limited, attrition-like conflict between Iran and the U.S. and GCC, ballistic strikes provide Iran with the chance to show its public that it is prosecuting the war and inflicting casualties on the other side. Framed as retaliation for a combination of sabotage, assassination, sanctions, and potentially overt strikes, ballistic missiles demonstrate to the Iranian population that its government is capable of repaying the suffering it has undergone.

As the exports of Iranian artillery rockets and shorter-range missiles have shown, Iran's missiles also have a growing political, strategic and psychological impact outside Iran. Current Iranian doctrine seems to stress building up the risk and reality of allied and proxy attacks around the world, Hamas and Hezbollah rocket and missile strikes already have had a major impact on Israel's military posture, and "third party" missile strikes may be a growing problem for the U.S. and its Arab allies in the future.

At the same time, it should be noted that many of the political psychological effects of ineffective missile strikes, however, wore off relatively quickly. There were not enough missile firings to sustain a high degree of popular fear, and people were soon reported to be going to their roofs at night to "watch the show." There is simply too much empty area in a given urban complex or large military base for largely random strikes to either produce critical damage or kill enough people to shock or intimidate the population. Limited by the number of TELs and static launching sites, Iran may be unable to continue a bombardment campaign for an extended period of time in the face of Arab or U.S. airstrikes.

### ***The Challenges from an Iranian Conventionally-Armed Precision Strike Missile Force***

The outside response is likely to be far less threatening to Iran if it succeeds in deploying precision strike missile systems with conventional warheads than if it deploys nuclear weapons, but the end result would still be a regional arms race which Iran is unlikely to win. Once again, Iran cannot act in a vacuum. As full analysis shows, outside powers have a major advantage in overall air warfare capability, combat aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Iran's target base is at least as vulnerable as that of its Gulf neighbors. The Arab Gulf states already have missile defenses for many key targets, the U.S. is deploying missile defense ships with wide area missile defense capability, and nations like the UAE



and Qatar have already indicated that they may buy land-based wide area missile defenses like THAAD.

Unless Russia or China alter their policies to sell Iran virtually any advanced weapons technology it wants, the Arab Gulf states, Israel, and the U.S. will have an overwhelming advantage in many areas of air and missile strike capability and missile and air defense. Every major Iranian improvement in its missile forces will trigger an overall set of counter efforts by the U.S. and the other states in the region.

Iran may be able to gain some political leverage by exploiting the risk of a conflict, but it will progressively increase the probable damage to Iran if a conflict actually occurs. Iran will also then face a military situation where Israel retains a nuclear option and Iran does not. It seems unlikely that Israel would ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons against Iran in response to any probable scenario in a world where Iran did not deploy nuclear-armed forces, but Israel might well adopt a preemptive or launch on warning strategy if Iran did deploy nuclear weapons and showed any sign of actively preparing to use them.

### **U.S. Missile Forces**

The U.S. does not formally deploy missiles to the Gulf, but showed in the first Gulf War in 1991 that its seaborne cruise missile forces could be extremely effective against Iraq, and it has since repeated such strikes in the Gulf region through 2014. As unclassified U.S. sources indicate, the U.S. has demonstrated that the U.S. Tomahawk Block IV missile can,<sup>249</sup>

...circle for hours, shift course instantly on command and beam a picture of its target to controllers halfway around the world before striking with pinpoint accuracy. Tomahawk can be launched from a ship or submarine and can fly into heavily defended airspace more than 1,000 miles away to conduct precise strikes on high-value targets with minimal collateral damage. The Tomahawk is a highly accurate, GPS enabled precision weapon that has been used over 2,000 times in combat, and flight tested more than 500 times.

During the NATO-led effort against the regime of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi in 2011, Tomahawk played an instrumental role in the operation. One submarine fired more than 90 missiles at a variety of targets, and the USS Barry fired the 2,000th Tomahawk in combat. The latest variant (Tomahawk Block IV) includes a two-way satellite data-link that enables the missile to be retargeted in flight to preprogrammed, alternate targets. In 2013, Raytheon delivered the 3000th Tomahawk Block IV missile to the U.S. Navy. The Block IV design was initiated as both a cost savings and a capability improvement effort.... Planned upgrades to the Tomahawk Block IV include: upgraded communications, a more powerful warhead, and a new seeker designed to hit moving targets at sea or on land in darkness and all kinds of weather.

The U.S. Navy and Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) conducted two successful flight tests on Jan. 27 and 29. The first flight test demonstrated a [Tomahawk](#) cruise missile that was synthetically guided to hit a Mobile Ship Target (MST). The second flight test demonstrated a reduced mission planning time in a realistic "call for fire" scenario. In the first test, a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile fired from the destroyer *USS Kidd (DDG 100)* flew a pre-planned mission until a surveillance aircraft sent real-time target information to the Joint Network Enabled Weapons Mission Management Capability (JNEW-MMC) located at Naval Air Warfare Center – Weapons Division (NAWC-WD), China Lake. The JNEW-MMC provided updated data to the missile in flight before it successfully struck the MST. This demonstration is the first step toward evolving Tomahawk with improved network capability and extends its reach from fixed and mobile to moving targets. In the second test, the *USS Kidd (DDG 100)* launched another Tomahawk Block IV missile on a "call-for-fire" mission in support of shore-based Marines staged on San Nicolas Island.

Using GPS navigational updates, the missile performed a vertical dive to impact on San Nicolas Island, scoring a direct hit on the target designated by the Marines.

Raytheon Company successfully completed a passive seeker test designed for a Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile using company-funded independent research and development investment. The captive flight test, using a modified Tomahawk Block IV missile nose cone, demonstrated that Raytheon's advanced, next-generation; multi-function processor can enable the cruise missile to navigate to and track moving targets emitting radio frequency signals. For the test, the nosecone of a Tomahawk Block IV missile was equipped with passive antennas integrated with Raytheon's new modular, multi-mode processor, and fitted to a T-39 aircraft. Flying at subsonic speed and at varying altitudes, the aircraft simulated a Tomahawk flight regime. The passive seeker and multi-function processor successfully received numerous electronic signals from tactical targets in a complex, high density electromagnetic environment. A Raytheon-funded active seeker test with the company's new processor inside a Tomahawk nosecone is planned for early next year. That event will demonstrate the processor's ability to broadcast active radar as well as passively receive target electromagnetic information – a critical step in enabling the missile to strike moving targets on land and at sea.

The U.S. Navy has conducted more than 70 successful Tomahawk Block IV flight tests since 2006. The cruise missile has been employed in combat more than 2000 times since it was introduced. Tomahawk a key weapon used by U.S. and British forces in defeating integrated air defense systems and striking high value fixed and mobile targets in support of national policy.

These developments illustrate the steady improvement in cruise missile capability and the fact that focusing on aircraft or ballistic missiles alone does not provide an adequate picture of the Gulf military balance. As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also acquiring the long-range, air launched Storm Shadow, and both Russia and China are developing hypersonic cruise missiles that may affect the Gulf balance in the future.

After the May 2015 fall of Ramadi to ISIS, the U.S. sent 1,000-2,000 anti-tank missiles to the Iraqi government to counter IS's use of VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive devices) which overwhelmed the Iraqi Army defense of the city, and aided IS's seizure of Ramadi. On May 20, 2015, a U.S. State Department spokesperson stated, "One of the main things is the tactic of these enormous suicide VBIEDs is something that we have to help the Iraqis and our partners in Syria defeat."<sup>250</sup>

Pentagon spokesperson Commander Elissa Smith said: "Contact is ongoing between the Pentagon and the Iraqi government to speed up the delivery of 2,000 anti-tank missiles which are expected to reach Iraq in early June."<sup>251</sup> Delivery of the 84mm, unguided, single-shot AT4 anti-tank missiles are in response to IS's use of VBIEDs. "This is a good counter to that (type of bombing)," Pentagon Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren told reporters, adding that Americans will remain in control of calling in the U.S. airstrikes. "If the (American) joint terminal attack controllers says, 'Put a bomb there,' no questions are asked," he said. "That is not something we are going to delegate to anyone other than Americans. Period."<sup>252</sup>

## **The Impact of Retaliatory Threats and Retaliation**

Regardless of how or why Iran uses its missile and other delivery system, Iran cannot operate in an environment where there will be no response. As has been discussed earlier, Iran faces far superior air strike forces and air and missile defense forces.

Israel has a wide range of retaliatory and escalatory options, including nuclear-armed ballistic and sea-launched cruise missiles. Saudi Arabia already has long-range, conventionally armed Chinese missiles that can strike area targets in Iran, and the UAE has

some SCUD-B missiles (likely equivalent to Shahab-1s). There are questions about the status, reliability, readiness, and accuracy of the Saudi and Emirati missiles, but these same questions apply to Iran's forces. This raises the specter of any missile "war of the cities" of the kind observed between Iran and Iraq.

Iran faces the risk of steadily more capable retaliation by U.S. strike fighters and bombers with "stealth capability and by the best air forces of the Gulf as states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE acquire steadily better strike fighters with may be less likely to initially have a terror impact on civilian populations, they provide a far more effective strike and targeting capability that Iran can do little to reduce. In the near-to-midterm, Iran's forces and critical infrastructure are becoming more vulnerable to Southern Gulf air forces as they acquire missile defenses and become less vulnerable to Iranian missiles.

Any Iranian use of long-range missiles against another Gulf state also presents a serious escalatory risk to Iran. Even one such missile firing would effectively escalate to a level where the U.S. would have no clear limits on its use of air and cruise missile power to strike at strategic targets in Iran. Iran's major cities are as vulnerable in terms of power, water, and fuel supplies as the cities of the southern Gulf, and Iran's refineries and certain key links in its ports and transport systems are highly vulnerable as well. Iran cannot possibly win a contest in escalation with its current conventional forces and conventionally armed missiles, and such a contest could spiral into an asymmetric or unconventional war that is costly and destructive for all sides.

Moreover, the first time Iran uses even a conventionally armed missiles, it may create conditions that lead to some form of U.S. guarantees and "extended deterrence." The U.S. has stated that it will not accept an Iran with nuclear weapons, but even if does, this scarcely offers Iran security or freedom from preemption and retaliation. Should Iranian nuclear efforts prompt Riyadh to develop its own nuclear program, as was mentioned previously, this would only increase the risks of escalation if Iran uses its ballistic missiles.

### Figure VIII.1: Gulf Surface-to-Surface Missile and Long Range Rocket Launchers

**Bahrain:** 9 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units with 30 ATACMS missiles.

**Egypt:** 26 M270 MLRS artillery rocket fire units plus; 48 BM-24 240mm artillery rocket fire units in storage. Missile forces include 42+ launchers: 9 FROG-7, 24 *Sakr*-80 and 9 *Scud*-B.

**Iran:** (No accurate estimate exists, *see Figure VIII.2.*) The IISS lists 50 *Arash/Hadid/Noor*; **240mm** 19: ε10 *Fad战略* 3; 9 M-1985; **330mm** *Fad战略* 5 artillery rocket launchers; and 30 CSS-8 surface-to-surface launchers (175 missiles); plus an unknown number of *Shahin*-1/*Shahin*-2; *Nazeat*; *Oghab* launchers in the Army. It does not provide any estimate for the Revolutionary Guards. It reports one brigade with *Shahab*-1/2 launchers and one battalion with *Shahab*-3 launchers in the Air Force, plus an unknown number of *Ghadr*-1 and *Sajjil*-2 (in development) forces. These forces include 12+ *Shahab*-3/*Ghadr*-1 MRBM launchers and some *Sajjil*-2 launchers. It also lists 18 SRBM launchers, including some *Fateh* 110; and 12-18 *Shahab*-1/2 launchers with 200–300 missiles, plus *Zelzal* forces.

**Iraq:** 3 TOS-1/1A artillery rocket launchers

**Israel:** Israel is “widely believed” to have a nuclear armed missile capability – with 3 *Jericho* squadrons with *Jericho* 1 SRBMs and *Jericho* 2 IRBMs, and *Dolphin*-class SSKs with land-attack cruise missiles.

**Jordan:** 12 227mm HIMARS and 2+ 273mm WM-80 artillery rockets.

**Kuwait:** 27 9A52 *Smerch* artillery rockets.

**Oman:** N/A

**Qatar:** 4 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers.

**Saudi Arabia:** 60 ASTROS II Mk3 127mm artillery rocket launchers. Ballistic missiles include 10+ DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM fire units with 40 missiles, and some DF-21 (CSS-5 – variant unclear) MRBM fire units.

**UAE:** 20 227mm HIMARS and 6 9A52 *Smerch* artillery rockets.

**Yemen:** The following forces were reported before Saudi Arabia claimed to have largely destroyed them in its April 2015 bombing campaign: 12 FROG-7 launchers, 10 SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*) launchers; and 6 *Scud*-B (33 missiles).

**Figure VIII.2: Major Iran Missile Forces – Part One****Hildreth Estimate 2010**

	Shahab-1	Shahab-2	Shahab-3	Ghadr-1	Sejjil-2	Khalij Fars	Fateh-110	Zelzal-1/2/3
Range (km)	300-315	375-700	800-1300	1100-2500	1800+	300	200-400	125/200/150-400
Payload (kg)	1000	1000-730	1000	1000-750	1000	650	500	600
CEP (m)	450-1000	50-700	190-2500	1000	Unknown	<50	100-300	100-3000
Number in Service	200-300	100-200	25-100	25-300	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown; likely in hundreds	Unknown; likely in thousands
Launchers	18	18 (same as Shahab-1)	6-20	6-20 (same as Shahab-3)	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Fuel	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Solid	Solid	Solid	Solid

Source: Steven A. Hildreth, Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, Congressional Research Service R42849, December 6, 2012, p. 15

## Figure VIII.2: Major Iran Missile Forces – Part Two

### Israeli INSS Estimate 2013

Missile Type	Launcher Numbers	Missile Numbers	Comments
SS-1 (Scud B)	20	300	-
SS-1 (Scud C)	20	100	-
Shahab 2	-	-	Probably similar to Syrian Scud D
Shahab-3/3B, Ghadir	10	300	-
BM-25	-	18	Operational Status unknown.
Tondar-69 (CSS 8)	16	-	-
Qiam-1	-	-	Liquid fuel
Fateh-100	-	-	-
Shahab 3B/Ghadir development	-	-	Includes new RV, believed in production.
Ashura/Sejjil	-	-	Solid propellant.

Source: INSS, “Iran-Strategic“, *Middle East Military Forces*, 2/1/2103, <http://inss.web2.moonsite.co.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/iran.pdf>, p. 7.

### IISS Estimate 2014

*Iranian Army holdings of Shahin-1/Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab*

*IRGC Holdings of:*

1 SRBM brigade with *Shahab-1/2*

- 18+ launchers: some *Fateh 110*; 12-18 *Shahab-1/2* launchers (€200–300 missiles)

1 MRBM brigade with *Shahab-3*; *Ghadr-1*; *Sajjil-2* (in development)

- 12+ launchers: 12+ *Shahab-3/Ghadr-1*; some *Sajjil-2*


Some units with Short-range *Zelzal* surface-to-surface missiles

Source: IISS, “Iran,” *Military Balance*, 2014, pp. 319-320

**Figure VIII.2: Major Iran Missile Forces – Part Three**  
**IHS Jane's 2013**

<b>System</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Range (KM)</b>	<b>Mission and Comments</b>
FROG 7 Rocket	250		battlefield rocket
Oghab	250		battlefield missile
Shahin-2	250		battlefield missile
Nazeat/Iran 130	500		battlefield missile
Fateh 110	na	200+	ballistic missile
Fateh A-110 (Mersad)	na	250	ballistic missile
Fateh-110-D1	na	250	ballistic missile
Tondar 69	200		ballistic missile
Shahab-1 (SS-1c 'Scud B')	250	300	ballistic missile, 1000 Kg warhead
Shahab-2 (SS-1d 'Scud C')	50	500-600	ballistic missile, 800 Kg warhead
Shahab-3 (No-dong 2)	25		ballistic missile
Shahab 3A	na	1,500-1,800	uncertain variant
Ghadr 1	na	1,800	uncertain variant
Shahab 3B	na	2,000-2,500	uncertain variant
Sejjil-2	na	2,000	developmental, 1000 Kg warhead
BM-25	18?		ballistic missile
Qiam 1	na	700	ballistic missile

Source: IHS Jane's "Iran, Strategic Weapons," *Sentinel Series*, 2013, pp. 6-9

**Map VIII.1: Estimated Range of Iranian Shorter-Range Missile Forces**

Source: Steven A. Hildreth, *Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs*, Congressional Research Service R42849, December 6, 2012.



**Map VIII.2: Estimated Range of Iranian Long-Range Missile Forces**

Source: Steven A. Hildreth, *Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs*, Congressional Research Service R42849, December 6, 2012.

### Figure VIII.3: Iranian Cruise Missiles and Systems Used for Reverse Engineering

System	Payload (kg)	Max Speed (Mach)	Range (km)	Notes
Kh-55	410 Nuclear/Conventional	0.8	2500	Designed as ALCM, with a CEP of 25m, is slower but more accurate than any of Iran's missiles.  Vulnerable to anti-missile weapons which degrades its effectiveness in hitting hardened and defended targets.  Not operational in Iran, maybe used as engineering testbed.
SS-N-22	300 - 320	2.1 (low altitude) 2.5 (high altitude)	150	Heavier than the Kh-55. Not operational in Iran, maybe used as engineering testbed.
SS-N-26	250	-	300	Lighter version than the SS-N-22. Launched from submarines, surface ships, aircraft and land batteries.
C-801	165	0.85	50	Chinese. The C-801 is carried on missile speedboats, submarines, escort boats, and destroyers, and is used to attack destroyers or escort boats
C-802	165	0.85	120	Chinese. land attack and anti-ship cruise missile
SSC-3	513	0.9	80	Soviet Cruise Missile launched from submarines
HY-4 Silkworm	513	0.8	130 - 150	Chinese. The HY-4 development of the C-201 is a mid-range ground-, air-, and ship-launched cruise missile.

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, May 4, 2014.

## ***IX. Missile Defenses***

The Arab Gulf states are placing a growing emphasis on missile defenses as Iran uses longer-range artillery rockets and a growing family of missiles to extend the strike range of its land, air, and sea forces, and to compensate for the weaknesses in its air forces. The Arab Gulf states and the U.S. not only must deal with the current threat posed by Iranian artillery rockets and missiles, but with the future threats of increasing accuracy, terminal guidance, increased reliability, targeting capability, and layers of different type of fire units in sufficient numbers for volleys to overcome defenses and make up for limits on accuracy and lethality.

- **Figure IX.1** shows the current strength of the ballistic missile defense forces in the Gulf region.
- **Figure IX.2** provides a diagram of integrated missile defense.
- **Figure IX.3** illustrates how missile defense would function.
- **Figure IX.4** illustrates the relative coverage of the PAC-3 and THAAD missile defense systems.

### **The Hawk and Patriot PAC Systems**

Many of the GCC states operate MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K versions of the Hawk surface-to-air missile system that have limited anti-ballistic missile capabilities if operated in a point defense mode to try to protect a specific target. They also deploy PAC-2 (MIM 104C) and the PAC-3 (MIM 104F) versions of a more advanced Patriot SAM system that can defend a wider – but still limited – area. These improved versions of the Patriot missile defense system can defend a limited area and provide “point defense” against Iran’s Shahab-1 and Shahab-2s, and have some capability against high-speed closures from larger missiles like the Sejil-2 and Shahab-3. The PAC 2 GEM provides greatly improved missile defense capability relative to earlier Patriots and can also be used for air defense.

Several Gulf states have – or will acquire – the PAC 3 version of the Patriot system.<sup>253</sup> Unlike the PAC-2 variant, the PAC-3 is a smaller missile that can accommodate 16 missiles per launcher rather than four and offers “more advanced radar and electronics systems” as well as “hit to kill” capabilities, whereas the PAC-2 uses a “proximity fuse.”<sup>254</sup> The PAC-3 system is designed solely for missile defense and can be used “against short-range ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, and air-breathing threats.”<sup>255</sup>

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency reports that PAC-3 is far more maneuverable in intercepting missile warheads than the previous Patriot missile series, including the PAC 2 GEM. It has a more advanced hit-to-kill warhead, has a much greater range, and an advanced Ka-Band seeker that can detect and home in on the missile warhead. Unclassified estimates give the PAC-3 a maximum ballistic missile intercept range of 15 kilometers and the improved PAC-3 MSE a range of 22 kilometers.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) states that the PAC-3:<sup>256</sup>

- Is a land-based element built upon the proven Patriot air and missile defense infrastructure.
- PAC-3 was deployed to the Middle East as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom where it intercepted ballistic missiles with a combination of GEM and PAC-3 missiles. The GEM missile uses a blast fragmentation warhead while the PAC-3 missile employs hit-to-kill technology to kill ballistic missiles.

- The Army is responsible for production and further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains responsible for the BMDS and PAC-3 interoperability and integration efforts.
- Provides simultaneous air and missile defense capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S. deployed forces and allies.
- Works with THAAD to provide an integrated, overlapping defense against missile threats in the terminal phase of flight. Jointly, these systems engage the threat by forming a multi-tier theater defense against adversary missile threats using peer-to-peer engagement coordination, early warning track data, and battle management situational awareness.
- Contributes to the entire system's situational awareness by transmitting precision cueing data to other theater elements while simultaneously protecting system assets against short-range ballistic missiles, large-caliber rockets, and air-breathing threats.
- ...provides detection, track, and engagement of short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. These engagements are further enhanced by networked remote sensors that supply early warning data to increase the probability of success.
- ...has added Upper-Tier Debris Mitigation capability to mitigate the excessive radar load and potential missile waste caused by debris from upper-tier intercepts.

### **The U.S. Deployment of AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense Ships and its Role in Encouraging Integrated and Wide Area Missile Defense**

The U.S. now deploys two to three Ticonderoga class cruisers or Arleigh Burke class destroyers to the Gulf that are equipped with AEGIS and the standard theater area ballistic missile defense system. Unlike the PAC-3, this system can cover a wide area and provide exoatmospheric intercepts to deal with Iran's longer-range ballistic missiles, which have far faster closing times and provide far less engagement time for the Patriot or IHawk. These ships also have the battle management capability to coordinate theater missile defense if they are provided with suitable data links by Arab Gulf states.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Office of the U.S. department of Defense describes the capability of AEGIS as follows:<sup>257</sup>

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is the naval component of the Missile Defense Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Aegis BMD builds upon the Aegis Weapon System, Standard Missile, Navy and joint forces' Command, Control and Communication systems. The Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, formally found Aegis BMD to be operationally effective and suitable. The Navy embraces BMD as a core mission. In recognition of its scalability, Aegis BMD/SM-3 system is a keystone in the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe.

Aegis BMD ships on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect and track ballistic missiles of all ranges – including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report track data to the missile defense system. This capability shares tracking data to cue other missile defense sensors and provides fire control data to Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. and other elements of the BMDS including land-based firing units (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Patriot) and other Navy BMD ships.

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- Defeats short- to intermediate-range, unitary and separating, midcourse-phase, ballistic missile threats with the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), as well as short-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase with the SM-2.
- Flight tests are conducted by Fleet warships. Each test increases the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios and is witnessed by Navy and Defense Department testing evaluators.
- Aegis BMD ships on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect and track ballistic missiles of all ranges — including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report track data to the missile defense system. This capability shares tracking data to cue other missile defense sensors and provides fire control data to Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and other elements of the BMDS including land-based firing units (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Patriot) and other Navy BMD ships.
- As of December 2014, there are 33 Aegis BMD combatants (5 cruisers [CGs] and 28 destroyers [DDGs] in the U.S. Navy. Of the 33 ships, 16 are assigned to the Pacific Fleet and 17 to the Atlantic Fleet. In response to the increasing demand for Aegis BMD capability from the Combatant Commanders, the MDA and Navy are working together to increase the number of Aegis BMD capable ships. Such efforts consist of upgrading Aegis DDGs to the BMD capability, incorporating Aegis BMD into the Aegis Modernization Program and new construction of Aegis BMD DDGs.
- The first deployment of European PAA Phase I capabilities came on March 7, 2011, when the Aegis BMD cruiser, USS MONTEREY (CG-61), armed with SM-3 Block IA missiles, deployed to Europe.
- Aegis BMD is the first missile defense capability produced by the MDA that has been purchased by a military ally. Japan's four KONGO Class Destroyers have been upgraded with BMD operational capabilities.
- SM-3 Cooperative Development Program is the joint U.S.-Japan development of a 21-inch diameter variant of the SM-3 missile, designated SM-3 Block IIA, to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. Deployment begins in 2018.

It describes the future capabilities of the AEGIS system as follows:

- Engagement of longer range ballistic missiles.
- Improving existing early intercept capability.
- Enhanced terminal capability against short and medium range ballistic missiles.
- Aegis Ashore.
- Increased number of ships and missiles.
- More maritime ally involvement.

The U.S. also provides its Arab Gulf allies with satellite warning of Iranian missile launches and the probable target, and has long pressed the GCC states to develop integrated missile defenses. So far, however, the GCC has not made serious progress in creating an integrated system, although the U.S. can provide some integrated operational capability from its missile defense destroyers.

The most serious problem with current Arab Gulf missile defenses, however, is that a truly effective missile defense requires more capable “theater” missile defense systems that can protect a much wider area. So far, Qatar and the UAE are the only Arab Gulf states that have indicated that they will order a wide area defense system like the Terminal High

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) – although Saudi Arabia has expressed a strong interest in THAAD or AEGIS, and the GCC has collectively shown an interest in the land-based version of AEGIS.

## **Arab Gulf Missile Defense Systems and the Use of the U.S. THAAD Systems**

THAAD, like PAC-3, offers “hit-to-kill” capabilities, is designed to work synergistically with PATRIOT PAC-3 and Aegis systems already in the region.<sup>258</sup> According to Lockheed Martin, “[t]he system [THAAD] has a track record of 100% mission success in flight testing.”<sup>259</sup> THAAD, however, is both an endo and exoatmospheric system that is able to intercept ballistic missiles both outside the atmosphere and in the last segment of their flight, and is both a wide area missile defense system and capable of terminal defense. The ability of the system to intercept missiles at high altitude – including above the Earth’s atmosphere – makes it a potentially effective system to intercept nuclear, chemical, or biological-tipped missiles.<sup>260</sup>

THAAD has a range greater than 200 kilometers and a speed of over Mach 8.24 or 2.8 km/s. It began deployment in the U.S. Army in 2012. It is an advanced missile defense system capable of shooting down a ballistic missile both inside and just outside the atmosphere and is designed to defend against asymmetric ballistic missile threats. It uses hit-to-kill technology whereby kinetic energy destroys the incoming warhead, and its high altitude intercept reduce the effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction before they reach the ground. The system has four major components:<sup>261</sup>

- **Launcher:** Truck mounted, highly mobile, able to be stored; interceptors can be fired and rapidly reloaded.  
**Interceptors:** Eight per launcher.
- **Radar:** Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) – Largest air-transportable X-band Radar in the world searches, tracks, and discriminates objects and provides updated tracking data to the interceptor.
- **Fire Control:** Communication and data-management backbone; links THAAD components together; links THAAD to external Command and Control nodes and to the entire BMDS; plans and executes intercept solutions.

According to its manufacturer, THAAD,<sup>262</sup> “can accept cues from Aegis, satellites, and other external sensors to further extend the battle space and defended area coverage, and operates in concert with the lower-tier Patriot/PAC-3 system to provide increased levels of effectiveness.

The UAE is reported to have placed an order for THAAD as early as 2012.<sup>263</sup> It requested 9 launchers and 48 THAAD missiles, as well as support equipment and training, at a cost of \$1.1 billion.

Qatar has asked to purchase two fire units, 12 launchers, 150 interceptors, 2 THAAD Fire Control and Communications, 2 AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars, and 1 Early Warning Radar (EWR)”and associated spare parts and training.<sup>264</sup> Possible programs for both further THAAD sales and its incorporation into an integrate missile/air defense system are being briefed to other Gulf states, and some sources indicate that Saudi Arabia is examining this option.<sup>265</sup>

## The Land-Based AEGIS Option

It is important to note, however, that while the U.S. has supported the transfer of THAAD to the Arab Gulf states, they have used the GCC to collectively ask for a land-based version of AEGIS. The technical, cost, performance growth, and system integration with PAC-3 reasons that the U.S. has chosen to offer THAAD instead of AEGIS are not public, but the BMDO notes that,<sup>266</sup>

In recognition of its scalability, Aegis BMD/SM-3 system is a keystone in the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe. Aegis BMD is the first missile defense capability produced by the MDA that has been purchased by a military ally. Japan's four KONGO Class Destroyers have been upgraded with BMD operational capabilities...SM-3 Cooperative Development Program is the joint U.S.-Japan development of a 21-inch diameter variant of the SM-3 missile, designated SM-3 Block IIA, to defeat longer range ballistic missiles. Deployment begins in 2018.

...Aegis Ashore is the land-based component of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System. Aegis Ashore adapts the present and future Aegis BMD capabilities to address the evolving ballistic missile security environment. Aegis BMD and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) upgrades are being phased into deployed Aegis BMD ships and land-based facilities during this decade. Each Aegis BMD upgrade provides increased capability for countering ballistic missile threats. The land-based system is designed to be removable to support worldwide deployment. In addition to Aegis BMD at sea, Aegis Ashore is part of Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) Phases II and III.

- Use the same components (AN/SPY-1 Radar, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems, Vertical Launch System, computer processors, display system, power supplies and water coolers) that are used onboard the Navy's new construction Aegis BMD Destroyers.
- Will conduct flight tests at the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC) at Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii. Each test will increase the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios and will be witnessed by Navy and Defense Department test agents.
- Integrates advances in sensor technology such as launch of an SM-3 missile in response to remote sensor data.
- Defeats short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats.
- The Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex (AAMDTC) is being built at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Hawaii, will be a test and evaluation center in the development of the second phase of the PAA. The test complex will leverage the Aegis BMD Weapon System and the new SM-3 Block IB missile for PAA Phase II deployment, as well as, support deployment decisions and upgrades of future PAA Phase capabilities.
- The first land-based SM-3 Block IB missiles will be fired in 2014.
- In 2015, Aegis Ashore will be installed in Romania, as part of the PAA Phase II. This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.0 CU and SM-3 Block IB to provide ballistic missile coverage of Southern Europe.
- In 2018, Aegis Ashore will be installed in Poland, as part of the PAA Phase III. This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.1 and SM-3 Block IB and IIA to support defense of Northern Europe.

In broad terms, the current versions of AEGIS do have the capability to intercept faster missiles at longer ranges. However, It is impossible to compare the "range" of THADD and AEGIS in meaningful terms because it depends so much on the incoming missile involved and the systems kill probability, energy of maneuver, and countermeasure

capability, as well as the associated radars and command and control system. THAAD and AEGIS are also both systems with ongoing growth and improvements in performance

Moreover, the current variants of the AEGIS Standard SM-3 missile can only perform exoatmospheric intercepts, and is best suited to dealing with threats that only pose long-range, high apogee flight profiles. The Iranian threat includes a large number of endoatmospheric missiles that AEGIS is less suited to defend against. Dan Sauter of the Business Development for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense at Lockheed Martin, made the following case for THAAD in an article in the *National Interest*,<sup>267</sup>

THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts.

The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in a...display of the BMDS in action. While it is not appropriate for us to comment on other non-U.S. and non-Lockheed Martin systems, we believe that there is no other system in the world that can compare to THAAD's unique capabilities (Endo-Exo capability against current and emerging advanced threats, hit-to-kill technology to destroy an array of missiles and payloads, extraordinary Mass-Raid capability, deployability and tactical mobility, interoperability with other BMDS elements, etc.) and proven record (100 percent mission success record in nine years of rigorous developmental and complex operational BMDS testing—including 100 percent mission success and eleven for eleven intercepts, successful first operational deployment support strategic stability, delivering first <of many upcoming> THAAD foreign military sales ahead of schedule, operational readiness rate that far exceeds U.S. government standards, growing U.S. and international demand for THAAD, etc.).

While a spokesman for Lockheed can be expected to make a strong case for THAAD, several experts feel that most Gulf states would currently benefit from the mixed endo and exo atmospheric capabilities of THAAD, and only Saudi Arabia would have the strategic depth to benefit from the range and added intercept speed of AEGIS. What is not clear is that the development of more advanced versions of the Standard missile used by the Aegis – like the SM-6 –will not give the AEGIS endoatmospheric capability as well.<sup>268</sup>

In short, the trade-offs and advantages between THAAD and Aegis in Arab Gulf-based forces require a level of data and modeling well beyond the scope of this study.

### **The Need for Full Integration and Interoperability**

GCC forces clearly need to deal with their lack of true integration and interoperability in both air and missile defense. This is particularly critical in case of air and missile defenses, where the short flight times over the Gulf, concentration of key targets in the Gulf or near the coast, risk of Iran penetrating through the “edges” of national air defense systems, and problems in deconflicting air and surface-based defense systems all combine to create a clear need for a truly integrated air and missile defense system. While the failure to create such a system is the fault of the leaders of the GCC states, and not their militaries, it does significantly degrade the real-world capability of this aspect of Gulf forces. While a shared



common air picture, based on a fiber-optic communication system, has been developed for use by the Gulf states, it is not suitable for missile defense.<sup>269</sup>

Cost is also a critical factor. Anti-missile interceptor missiles are extremely expensive, as are the radars and associated command and control systems. The reaction times for intercept are also extremely limited and “man-in-the-loop” decisions to fire do not provide time for complex coordination or communication. Interceptor stocks will be limited and easy to exhaust, and there will be not time to work around alack of automated command and control and immediate authority to fire, If the Arab Gulf states rely on their own systems alone, it will be easy to target several interceptors on the same incoming missile and potentially miss one if several missiles are fired at the same time. The problems caused by the lack of integration and interoperability are bad enough in other military missions.in the case of nuclear-armed or precision guided missiles, they could be suicidal.

### **Turkish and other Related Missile Defense Efforts**

In September, 2011 the U.S. and Turkey reached an agreement whereby a missile defense radar site will be constructed some 435 miles from the Turkey-Iran border.<sup>270</sup> While Iran’s missiles have not been stated as the exclusive target of the system, it will greatly enable the U.S.’ ability to detect and intercept an Iranian missile launch.

This radar station is an element of the larger U.S.-driven European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, which is comprised of four phases:<sup>271</sup>

Phase one: the construction of the aforementioned radar system in Turkey as well as the stationing of three Aegis anti-ballistic missile cruisers in the eastern Mediterranean.

Phase two: the deployment of a ballistic missile defense interceptor site at Deveselu Air Base in Romania scheduled for 2015.

Phase three: the installation of a land-based interceptor site in Poland and the deployment of a more advanced Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor scheduled for 2018.

Phase four: the deployment of more advanced SM-3 interceptors in 2020 to enhance the ability to counter MRBMs and potential future ICBMs missile threats to the U.S. from the Middle East through the deployment of more advanced SM-3 interceptors.

### **Iranian Missile Defenses**

As has been discussed in Chapter I, Iran currently has no missile defense capabilities, and Russia and China are Iran’s only potential sources of direct sales of missile defense systems. Iran has shown in the past it is well aware that it would take major deliveries of a new integrated air defense system based around the S-300 or S-400 surface-to-air missiles to begin addressing Iran’s strategic vulnerabilities to an aerial campaign. Until recently, however, neither Russia nor China has proved willing to sell the Russian version or Chinese modified version of such systems.

Russia halted the sale of modern S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) long range SAMs in 2010, and has since refused since then to reopen the deal. Although a future shift in Russian policy – or Chinese sale of its version – represents a potential risk, this leaves a critical gap in Iran’s conventional capabilities that reinforces its weakness in airpower.

Iran has claimed it is compensating by upgrading its S-200 missile series and by building its own equivalent of S-300/S-400 called the Bavar 373, but its claims to date seem to be sharply exaggerated.<sup>272</sup>

- “With the changes being made to this system by our experts, the S-200 will be able to deal with threats at medium altitudes in addition to (threats) at high altitudes.” Brigadier General Farzad Esmaili, commander of the Khatam-ol-Anbiya Air Defense Base, announced in late September s announced that Iran is upgrading the S-200 long-range surface-to-air missile system.

He also said that after the upgrade of the missile system, it will be renamed because the system will undergo systemic and structural modifications and will be used as a medium-to-high altitude missile system. He stated this would eliminate the need to use medium-altitude missile systems, such as the Ra’ad (Thunder) air defense system, in the areas where the upgraded S-200 will be deployed.

Esmaili also said on September 7, 2012 Iran was building a missile system more advanced than the Russian S-300 missile system, and that missile system, named the Bavar 373 (Belief 373), would replace the need for the S-300 missile system. Tehran Times, September 28, 2012.

<http://tehrantimes.com/politics/101865-iran-upgrading-s-200-air-defense-system>.

- The IRGC displayed its new, domestically designed Ra’ad air medium ranged air to surface missile system during the annual military parade on Friday, which it said was designed to hit U.S. aircraft, and which it said can be equipped with ‘Taer’ (Bird) missiles, which can trace and hit targets 50km in distance and 75,000 feet in altitude. “The system has been built in a bid to confront U.S. aircraft and can hit targets 50km in distance and 75,000 feet in altitude,” Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh. September 21, 2012.

Open source intelligence suggests that Iran has only deployed limited upgrades of its Soviet-era SA-5/S-200 medium to high altitude long-range surface-to-air missiles. The NPO Almaz S-200 Angara/Vega/Dubna (Russian Ангара\Бера\Дубна), is called the SA-5 or Gammon by NATO. Upgraded versions of the SA-5/S-200s have been tested since 2008, but there are few unclassified data to support ambitious, and probably grossly exaggerated, Iranian claims for either upgrading the SA-5/S-200 or building its own versions of the S-300/S-400.<sup>273</sup> While the upgraded system may be more effective than the old SA-5/S-200, it is unlikely to pose a significant threat to American or Israeli aircraft as a long-range air-denial weapon.

As for the developmental Bavar-373 (Belief-373) system, Brigadier General Farzad Esmaili, a commander of the Iranian army’s air defense force said to reporters in Tehran on the National Day of Air Defense on September 3, 2012. He stated that the system was “30 per cent complete” and that Iran could execute the project without foreign assistance.

“We are through with developing the threat-detection capability of the system, and its sensitive parts have been manufactured in Iran. . . . we have no problem with supplying the missiles needed for this system.”

Esmaili went on to say that he hoped the system would be finished by the end of the Iranian year, which would be March 2013, or by March 2014, and would be a “*powerful rival*” to the Russian surface-to-air system. Iran would deploy up to three different types of missiles, with “*higher capabilities than the S-300 in detecting, identifying and destroying targets.*”

Other Iranian officers and officials have made similar claims:

- “We are through with developing the threat-detection capability of the system and its sensitive parts have been manufactured in Iran. We have no problem for supplying the missiles needed for this system.

With this powerful system in our hand, we would not think of S-300 anymore.

Bavar 373 system is an important and completely indigenous achievement that can be a powerful rival for S-300.” – Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli, Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base, September 3, 2012.

- “Manufacturing Bavar (Belief) 373 Missile System is in progress and all production needs have been supplied domestically.

This project will soon enter its final stage (of production) and it will be much more advanced than the S-300 missile system.

The flaws and defects of the (Russian) S-300 system have been removed in the indigenous version of the system and its conceptual designing has finished.” – Brigadier General Farzad Esmayeeli, Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base, September 22, 2011.

- “It is now several years that our defense industries researchers and experts have been designing a system whose capabilities are way beyond the S-300 missile system.

The system has been designed based on our own operational needs.” – Colonel Mohammad Hossein Shamkhali, Deputy Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base for Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad, September 22, 2011.

- Defense minister [Ahmad Vahidi](#) told Iranian media at Sept. 22, 2010 that they will develop a similar domestic system by themselves: “We have planned to build a long-range air defense missile system similar to S-300. By God’s grace and by the Iranian engineers’ efforts, we will reach self-sufficiency in this regard.”
- “If they do not deliver S-300 defensive system to us, we have replacements and we can supply our operational requirements through innovative techniques and different designs.” – General Hassan Mansourian, Deputy Commander of Khatam ol-Anbia Air Defense Base for Coordination, July 6, 2010.<sup>274</sup>

To put such statements in context, Iran has made many claims for systems it later did not deploy, only deployed in token numbers, or deployed in forms that lacked anything like the capability claimed – such as a radarless version of a supposed SA-6 clone. It is far from clear Iran has the production base required to build a robust air defense network. Moreover, anecdotal unclassified reporting indicates that Iran lacks effective test and evaluation methods and has politicized its technology to the point that it sometimes believes its own rhetoric. Exaggerated claims are a sin common to all weapons developers and military powers, but there are signs that Iran sins more than most.

It is also not clear that they are still relevant. The growing tensions between Russia and the United States and Europe over the Ukraine, and P5+1 negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programs, led Russia to announce on April 12, 2015 that it would now sell the S300 to Iran. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ending the ban on delivering the S-300 anti-missile rocket system to Iran, and potentially allowing a \$20 billion sale that had been halted in 2014 to go forward. Reuters quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov as saying that, “I wanted to draw your attention to the rolling out of the oil-for-goods deal, which is on a very significant scale.” In exchange for Iranian crude oil supplies, we are delivering certain products. This is not banned or limited under the current sanctions regime.<sup>275</sup>

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov soon made it clear that there would be no quick delivery of the S300, and no details were provided about the exact package of arms involved in the sale. The U.S. had, however, strongly objected to the Russian decision and – as is discussed in Chapter VII – the sale of even the air defense versions of the S300 could be a major game changer in altering the air balance. There are at least four versions

of the S-300: The S-300P (SA-10); S-300V (SA-12A/B Giant/Gladiator); S-300PMU-1/2 (SA-20A/B Gargoyle) and S-400 (SA-21). A more advanced system called the S-500 is said to be under development.<sup>276</sup>

All are far more advanced air defense systems than any of Iran's present surface-to-air missiles, and four have some missile defense capability: The S-300PMU1 and PMU2 can intercept SRBMs, and Russia claims the S-300V and S-400 Triumf systems can intercept a multiple IRBM attack by IRBMs as advanced as the DF-21. The S-300V/SA-12 is a large, high altitude interceptor and while there are no reliable data on its exact capabilities, it seems to be a highly capable system. The S-400 may still be in development along with a new SV300 (S-X-23) that is also reported to be an export version as well. Wikipedia reports that it,<sup>277</sup>

is an upgrade to the S-300V. It consists of a new command post vehicle, the 9S457ME and a selection of new radars. These consist of the 9S15M2, 9S15MT2E and [9S15MV2E](#) all-round surveillance radars, and the 9S19ME sector surveillance radar. The upgraded guidance radar has the [Grau index](#) 9S32ME. The system can still employ up to six TELARs, the 9A84ME launchers (up to 4 × 9M83ME missile) and up to 6 launcher/loader vehicles assigned to each launcher (2 × 9M83ME missile each). An upgraded version, dubbed S-300V4 will be delivered to the Russian army in 2011

Complex «Antey-2500» it is the export version of the developed separately from the family of S-300 but could this come in Venezuela, the estimated export price for 1 billion dollars, the system has 1 type missiles in 2 versions, basic and amended sustainer stage double range (up to 200 km, according to other data up to 250 km), can simultaneously engage up to 24 aircraft or 16 ballistic targets in various combinations.

- Became the first system in the world capable of in part 1 of complex simultaneously bruise and aerodynamic and ballistic targets. It also contains a private sector radar for the opening of the areas affected by interference (and does not use external elements of the system of special troops. The range of the developed overloads aim to 30 units.
- Different versions of the Giant missiles S-300V4 have a speed of 7.5 m and a range of 400 km or 9 M speed and range of 350 km. It is easy to destroy maneuvering targets even at very large-scale heights. Gladiator rockets significantly less.

There is no way to determine the actual air and missile defense capability of a Russian "S300" sale to Iran until the full specifics of the system are announced. Like many other arms sellers, Russia also has a long history of exaggerating the performance of its systems while not fully disclosing the full nature of actual sales.

An April 2015 report from *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly* stated that Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan claimed that new long-range SAMs would be operational in a year. "The long-range air defence missile system Bavar-373 will be built by the end of this year and will be deployed in specific regions," according to Iranian Defense Minister Dehghan.<sup>278</sup> Previously Dehghan had stated, "Talash defence system was designed and built to detect and intercept targets for the Sayyad-2 missile." The Defense Minister's comments are in line with those of Brig Gen Esmaili, who stated that the long-range Talash system "will be brought into operation by the end of this year".<sup>279</sup>

However, an April 2015 statement by senior Iranian military officer, Brigadier General Mohammad Mahmoudi, contradicted those claims. IHS Jane's reported BG Mahmoudi said "the long-range air defence system that is being indigenously developed is not operational yet".<sup>280</sup>

## Israeli Missile Defense Systems

Israel is not part of many aspects of the Gulf military balance, but it has declared that it will not accept any Iranian development and deployment of nuclear weapons, including nuclear armed missiles, and its growing missile defenses are designed primarily to counter the Iranian missile threat. Israel, it first deployed its Arrow missile defense system in 2000, and has integrated them with its Patriot defense systems. It has deployed two Arrow batteries. Their complement of missiles and fire units is not clear, but each fire unit holds six Arrow missiles, and Israel may be deploying a third battery.

Israel has upgraded its system to use the Arrow 2, Mod 4, with U.S. financial and technical assistance. It tested the system in intercepts at altitudes as high as 40 and 60 kilometers, at speeds of up to Mach 9, and at ranges of 90-135 kilometers. The Arrow 2 is designed for intercepts above the stratosphere, in order to ensure that the effects of hitting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons do not affect the Israeli populations. It uses a blast-fragmentation warhead, rather than hit-to-kill. Israel is developing an Arrow 2, Mod 5 to integrate lower altitude missile defense into a layered missile defense using its new Arrow 3.

Israel plans to deploy the Arrow 3 system in 2014 to provide a full exoatmospheric interception capability. The full details of the system are not available, but it is designed to intercept far outside Israeli territory and eliminate the risk of a nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon affecting the territory where the warhead is intercepted and destroyed.

These Israeli defenses inevitably affect the Gulf since they limit Iran's ability to pose a real world threat to Israel along with Israel's nuclear-armed missile forces. Israel is also developing two other systems, however, which may provide a model for upgrading mid-term Gulf missile defenses.

The Israel Iron Dome or Iron Cap system is a mobile system that – like the Arrow – is partially U.S.-funded under the United States–Israel Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act (H.R. 5327). It is designed to defend against mortars, short-range artillery rockets and missiles firing from ranges of 4 to 70 kilometers, as well as VSHORAD Missiles System (up to 10 kilometers, and discriminate against those that would hit key populated or infrastructure targets. The system has four major components: Mobile detection and tracking radar - multi-mission radar (MMR); battle management and control unit, sensors, and mobile missile firing unit (MFU) with 20 “TAMIR” interceptors.

Its manufacturer, Rafael, is seeking to expand the system to defend against firings up to 250 km and allow it to simultaneously intercept rockets and missiles come from different directions. Iron dome is also capable of anti-aircraft operations against targets flying up to 10,000 meters. It was used extensively against rockets being fired from the Gaza in 2012, and Israel claimed it achieved about 90% success against the rockets that would have hit population centers out of some 400 fired during this period.<sup>281</sup>

The second system is David's Sling or Magic Wand – a system in joint development by Raytheon and Rafael. It is a possible replacement for the IHawks in the IDF, and is an anti-ballistic and anti-cruise missile system with a range of 40 to 300 kilometers. It will use a larger, two-stage missile “Stunner” missile with both radar and electro-optical nose-cone sensors. It is in the final development stage and is due to be deployed in 2013 or 2014.<sup>282</sup>

While it is unlikely that Arab Gulf states will ever buy Israeli systems, they might buy similar systems made in the U.S.. More importantly, Israel's shorter range systems illustrate what may be the shape of things to come in the Gulf as Iran makes more long-range artillery rockets and missiles that can fire across the Gulf or directly into neighboring states like Iraq and Kuwait.

The U.S. and Gulf states may also adapt the missile and rocket suppression tactics that the Israeli air force first developed to use against Hezbollah rockets during the war between Israel and the Hezbollah in 2006.<sup>283</sup> Israel developed a mix of sensors and on-call strike fighter equipped with precision guided missiles that were often able to take out rocket launchers after their first firing. These tactics have grown steadily more sophisticated since that time, and Israel has shown that missile defense can be combined with anti-missile offense in ways the U.S. and Arab Gulf air forces are well equipped to adopt.

### **Iranian Counters to Missile Defenses**

It is clear that missile defense technology is becoming a key aspect of rocket, ballistic missile, and cruise missile warfare and can have a major impact on Iran's capabilities. Just as giving Iran's conventionally armed missiles terminal guidance or sufficient accuracy for small volleys to be used in precision strikes can be fundamental game changers, missile defense can radically alter the impact of rockets and missiles on containment, deterrence and warfighting at every level of combat. Missile defenses also create a highly uncertain duel in terms of future warfighting since real world exchange outcomes between missiles and missile defense systems are unproven in major combat, involve systems with limited real world testing, and involve weapons and technology that is constantly evolving.

At the same time, all of the rocket and missile defenses that have just been discussed present the problem that they are vulnerable to some degree to countermeasures ranging from tactics as simple as oversaturation of the defensive system to highly sophisticated penetration technology. Some Israeli experts also believe that Iran is developing penetration aids for its surface-to-surface missiles. Some analyses of the Shahab 3 indicate that Iran has taken serious steps to reduce the vulnerability of its missiles to missile defenses – although much of the following analysis of the Shahab is speculative and based on uncertain data,<sup>284</sup>

...the Shahab-3B differs from the basic production variant. It has improvements to its guidance system and warhead, a few small changes on the missile body, and a new re-entry vehicle whose terminal guidance system and rocket-nozzle steering method are completely different from the Shahab-3A's spin-stabilized re-entry vehicle.

The new re-entry vehicle uses a triconic aeroshell geometry (or 'baby bottle' design) that improves the overall lift to drag ratio for the re-entry vehicle. This allows greater range maneuverability that can result in better precision. The triconic design also reduces the overall size of the warhead from an estimated 1 metric ton (2,200 lb.) to 700 kg (1,500 lb.).

The rocket-nozzle control system allows the missile to change its trajectory several times during re-entry and even terminal phase, effectively preventing interceptor guidance via trajectory prediction by early warning radar - a method nearly all long range ABM systems use. As a high-speed ballistic missile and pre-mission fueling capability, the Shahab-3 has an extremely short launch/impact time ratio. This means that the INS/gyroscope guidance would also remain relatively accurate until impact (important, given the fact that the gyroscopes tend to lose accuracy with longer flights). The CEP is estimated to be at 30–50 meters (98–160 ft.) or less.[9] However, the accuracy of the missile is largely speculative and cannot be confidently predicted for wartime situations.[10]

These improvements would greatly increase the Shahab-3B's survivability against ABM systems such as Israel's Arrow 2 missile as well as being used for precision attacks against high value targets such as command, control and communications centers

If, as some Israeli and U.S. experts report, Iran is using relatively simply technologies to make the path of its warheads less predictable to missile defenses, this may have some effectiveness in both reducing the area coverage of missile defenses and their effectiveness even if the warhead is closer to the missile launcher. At the same time, such developments can increase the risk that the warhead will miss its target or tumble in ways that can affect its reliability.

Iran is also claiming to develop missiles with a limited radar cross-section, reducing the reaction time available to anti-missile systems. Like other Iranian claims about improvements in its weapons systems, such an assertion may lack merit and should be treated cautiously. Given Iran's difficulties in producing indigenous rockets and the significant trouble it has had constructing missiles with a range over 2000 km, reliable integration of effective countermeasures is still likely some years away.

Test, evaluation, simulation, and limited exchanges in actual combat are all useful in sources of data for building understanding of could happen in a potential exchange between Iran's missiles and missile defenses. There still, however, is no clear way to estimate real world defense capabilities since there have been no operational cases of sufficient scale to show the relative effectiveness of the improvement in missile defenses versus Iran's missiles. Real-world success of Iran's efforts to improve its missile countermeasures to missile defenses is both classified and untested against Gulf and U.S. missile defenses. While the U.S. has had the opportunity to test its missile defenses against SCUD missiles similar to Iran's Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 weapons, Iran's modifications to these and its use of newer models renders the statistical relevance of these models insignificant.

No system is likely to be "leak proof," or free from vulnerability to saturation or the exhaustion of its stocks of anti-missile missiles - and any exchange would now be one between missiles and anti-missile which both have unproven and unpredictable performance - but Iran's missile threat grows steadily less credible as these missile defenses improve. Moreover, it is one thing to be threatened by the risk that one nuclear-armed missile gets through to a key target area, and quite another to face the risk a few far less lethal missiles get through.

Conventional or even CB-armed missiles will become steadily less credible as "terror" or psychological weapons as missile defenses improve. However, limited salvos and volleys of Iranian missiles, attacks with "stacks" of different missile systems, and attacks with steadily improved accuracy will further challenge missile defenses. Sheer numbers could overwhelm a nascent anti-missile system, and any leakers, even if highly inaccurate, would still have a propaganda or psychological impact.


If worst case estimates are right that Iran estimated possess nearly 1,000 rockets and missiles that could be fired across the Gulf (including shorter range Fateh-110s and Zelzals), defending states would require a massive investment in anti-missile missiles to reduce the number of successful attacks to an acceptable level.

Furthermore, as Iran arms its missiles with more effective conventional warheads, deploys missiles with accurate and reliable terminal guidance, and/or develops long-range cruise

missiles with such capabilities - this will also change such war fighting calculations. Key export, power, desalination, and military targets could then become targets or hostages even with extensive missile defenses – particularly if the Southern Gulf states continue to fail to integrate their missile defenses. Iran could target any gaps in effective coverage, target the missile defenses with the fewest reloads and area coverage, and target isolated defenses of more forward targets where stack attacks would do most to saturate any missile defenses.


Similarly, even the credible threat - much less use of - CBRN warheads might dramatically upset the regional balance. Such capabilities would provide Iran with a much more solid deterrent, and a greater capability to exercise a bolder and more aggressive regional foreign policy. Nuclear warheads could also potentially produce enough EMP coverage with airburst on the perimeter of missile defense coverage to seriously compromise both air defense and missile defense radar capabilities.

**Figure IX.1: Gulf Forces with Point or Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Launcher Strength (without U.S. and Other Allied Forces)**



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Garrett Berntsen from IISS, *Military Balance*, 2014 and IHS Jane's Sentinel series.




**Figure IX.2: Integrated Missile Defenses**

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan. May 1, 2015

**Figure IX.3: Missile Defenses and a Missile War in the Gulf**

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan. April 29, 2015.

**Figure IX.4: Illustrative Coverage of THAAD vs. PAC-3 Missile Defenses**



Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan. April 29, 2015.

## ***X. Nuclear Forces***

Iran's efforts to create nuclear weapons remain uncertain and controversial, and its nuclear programs are now the subject of intense arms control negotiations with the U.S. and other members of the P5+1. The outcome of these negotiations will play a critical role in shaping the regional military balance. If Iran does go nuclear, so will the overall balance of forces in the region. If it does not, the balance is likely to be far threatening, although the risk of asymmetric and conventional conflict will remain, along with the constantly shifting threat from non-state actors.

### **Iran's Uncertain Search for Nuclear Forces**

Iran's leaders, including its Supreme Leader, have repeatedly said that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons, talked about the horrors of chemical warfare during the Iran-Iraq War, and claimed that Iran no longer maintains stocks of chemical weapons. Yet, such denials could well be an effort to buy time for weapons development and some Iranians who attend various forums of "second track" diplomacy state that the world's indifference to Iraq's chemical weapons attacks on Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, the collapse of the Qaddafi regime after it gave up Libya's covert nuclear weapons programs, and Iran's tensions with many of its Arab neighbors and Israel are all warnings that Iran may need nuclear weapons.

As **Figure X.1** shows, Iran has the missile capabilities to cover much of the region with nuclear attacks if its missiles are nuclear armed – although Israel's systems still have a substantial advantage in range and probably in accuracy.

As is discussed shortly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised serious question about a wide range of Iran's activities that seems to be weapons related and that Iran had failed to address as of April 2015. Iran has created significant nuclear facilities and the IAEA reports that it at least examined designs for nuclear weapons and nuclear missile warheads. The U.S. intelligence community has said that it has evidence Iran had a major nuclear weapons program through at least 2003, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised a long list of questions about suspect Iranian activity that Iran has never resolved.

### **Iran's Strategic Goals and The Impact of Israel's Nuclear Forces**

One of the potential motives for an Iranian nuclear program is Iran's hostility to Israel, and the risk that Iran could become an "existential threat" to Israel has been a key part of the debate over Iran's nuclear programs and the arms control negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. At the same time, Iran is more likely to be deterred by Israel than threaten it, and Iran's constant propaganda attacks on Israel may be more an effort to make Israel the rationale for its military buildup against its Arab neighbors than a serious sign of Iran's hostility to Israel.

The exact status of Israel's nuclear forces is uncertain, but few experts doubt that Israel has steadily upgraded a long-range missile force originally based on French designs and that was upgrade significantly in range-payload capability during the 1980s. Israel is not a party to any major arms control agreement limiting its ability to deploy such forces, including the NPT, CTBT, BTWC, CWC or MTCR. Israel is believed to long have had nuclear

weapons, and to have acquired extensive design and test data on such weapons, including boosted and thermonuclear weapons.

There are many different estimates of Israel's nuclear capability. One of the more convincing is an estimate by the Nuclear Threat Initiative that indicates that Israel is, "widely believed to have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium (at a nuclear reactor in Dimona) for 100 to 200 nuclear warheads... Most estimates of Israel's missile capabilities indicate that Israel possesses nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM); short-range sub-sonic cruise missiles with advanced capabilities such as non-line of sight targeting (NLOS) and midflight maneuverability; and significant defensive missile capabilities".

Other sources indicate that Israel may have 200-300 nuclear weapons or more, including possible smaller "tactical" designs and systems designed to hit mountain or underground targets.

The NTI assesses Israel's missile forces as including:<sup>285</sup>

- The Jericho-2 or YA-2 missile with a range of over 1,300 kilometers in tests conducted in 18=989, and that continued in development until test flights in 2001. It states that, "A Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study speculated that a Shavit, if modified and deployed as a ballistic missile, could carry a 1,000 kg warhead 4,850 km or a 500 kg warhead 7,600 km. [54] Using similar analysis, and also assuming that the Jericho-2 performs comparably with the American Minuteman-2 missile of the 1960s, Steve Fetter proposed a 4000km range with an 800kg payload - a range that would encompass "the entire Arab world (plus most of Europe)."
- The Popeye (Have Nap) – a cruise missile designed for precision strike against high-value ground targets such as airfields, bridges, and bunkers. [60] Production began in 1989, and the Popeye has since become a versatile platform that has been modified both for various Israeli military applications and for international customers. "In the summer of 2000 French media reported that Israel's German-built Dolphin submarines had tested 1,500km cruise missiles near Sri Lanka. [63] Some speculate that Israel had tested an upgraded "Popeye Turbo," a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that Israel previously proposed to the United Kingdom (Project "Kaeson"/"Keison"), and had reportedly performed design studies for as early as 1995. [64] The National Air and Space Intelligence Center declared the Popeye Turbo operational in 2002. [65] However, as of 2012 *Jane's* does not list the Popeye Turbo in Israel's missile inventory. "
- The Jericho-3 missile, with "an estimated maximum range between 4,800km and 6,500km, and a 1,000 to 1,300kg payload, would provide Israel with an intermediate-range nuclear strike capability. ...Israeli Defense Radio and other sources reported a Jericho-3 test launch in January 2008...In early 2008, Israeli weapons expert and former Isaac Ben-Israel head of the Israel Administration for the Development of Weapons and the Technological Industry declared that "everybody can do the mathematics ... we can reach with a rocket engine to every point in the world," thus appearing to confirm Israel's new capability...Israeli Ministry of Defense officials said that the 2008 launch represented a "dramatic leap in Israel's missile capabilities."
- "*Jane's* estimates that Israel deploys 50 to 100 Jericho missiles at the Zachariah airbase. However, IKONOS satellite images of Sdot Micha reveal only 23 to 50 missile shelters, implying that the total number of Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles deployed at Zachariah cannot exceed 50....Globalsecurity.org further notes that satellite images have not detected any additional missile shelters in Israel, and that Israel's geographic constraints make construction of additional and more secretive land bases difficult and field deployment highly risky...These factors would imply a much smaller deployment of Jericho missiles than the estimates from *Jane's*. No further information about the Jericho-3 has followed the 2008 flight test and statements."

The NTI summarizes Israel's nuclear weapons holding as follows:<sup>286</sup>



Throughout the 1970s Israel improved its operational nuclear arsenal both quantitatively and qualitatively, perhaps to the point of developing a two-stage nuclear weapon. ...In 1975, news reports claimed U.S. intelligence analysts believed Israel to have produced more than 10 nuclear weapons, as well as the aircraft and missiles to deliver them. ...Israel had received 10 tons of [uranium yellowcake](#) under [International Atomic Energy Agency \(IAEA\)](#) safeguards from [South Africa](#) in 1965 and continued to receive regular shipments of yellowcake that were stored in Israel and subject to yearly inspections by the South African Atomic Energy Board...In 1976, the two countries reached an agreement to remove these bilateral safeguards – freeing an additional 500 tons of uranium for use in Israel’s plutonium production reactor at Dimona – and South Africa sold an additional 100 tons of uranium to Israel in exchange for 30 grams of tritium. ..

On 22 September 1979, a U.S. Vela satellite detected a double flash of light hundreds of miles off the eastern coast of South Africa. Double flashes are associated with nuclear detonations, where the initial fireball of a nuclear explosion is “rapidly overtaken by expanding hydrodynamic shock wave,” which hides the fireball...A declassified U.S. National Security Council report from October 1979 stated that the intelligence community “ha[d] high confidence, after intense technical scrutiny of satellite data, that a low yield atmospheric nuclear explosion occurred.”...There was no official consensus on who conducted the nuclear explosion, but some U.S. officials admitted that they privately believed that Israel was responsible...Avner Cohen argues that Israel, if indeed developing a [thermonuclear weapon](#), had strong motivation to test in 1979, as development of a two-stage nuclear device typically requires testing in order to ensure the functioning of the trigger (or primary)...

On 5 October 1986, the *Sunday Times* published Mordechai Vanunu’s account of the nuclear activities at Israel’s top-secret Dimona facility....The former Dimona technician’s revelations challenged the steadfastness of nuclear opacity. Vanunu’s claims reinforced some of the U.S. intelligence community’s suspicions, such as the fact that Israel had expanded the [cooling](#) capacity of the Dimona reactor. His testimony also confirmed the existence of the long-suspected reprocessing plant, as well the layout of subterranean levels at Dimona....The credibility of Vanunu’s account was strengthened by the 58 photographs he took of equipment, such as a full-scale model of a [hydrogen bomb](#) and glove boxes where plutonium discs were fashioned into pits....Based on his revelations, some experts estimated that Israel had built between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons of varying yields and complexity....

As has been noted in the previous Chapter, Israel has also deployed an extensive ballistic missile defense force using a system called the Arrow, and has continued to steadily upgrade its defenses in cooperation with the U.S., which may soon lead it to deploy the Arrow 3. It also is developing systems like David’s Sling to deal with the threat posed by cruise missiles and short-range systems.

“Existential threats” are little more than a recipe for suicide when an opponent begins a nuclear arms race with a nuclear monopoly and the best possible outcome is mutual assured destruction. While Israel has never formally declared that it is a nuclear power, Iran and every Arab power have long seen its nuclear forces as a key – if undeclared – deterrent to any large-scale attack on Israel. Iranian planners and analysts have made it clear in second track diplomacy that they fully realize Israel can target Iran with nuclear weapons, and do it devastating – if not “existential” – damage. A nuclear-armed Iran missile force would help Iran deter any Israeli use of its present nuclear monopoly -- which now gives Israel nuclear-armed missiles with the range to strike at any target in Iran.

The most Iran can hope to do in countering Israel by going nuclear is to eventually create enough nuclear forces to confront Israel with the equivalent of mutual assured destruction. This will take years at a minimum, and Iran would initially run immense risk in confronting a mature nuclear power like Israel with what may be proven thermonuclear and boost

weapons designs based on French test data with a few untested fission warheads. Even if Israel did not respond with preventive or preemptive attacks, it would almost certainly respond by steadily increasing the size and capability of its nuclear forces, and become deeply engaged in a nuclear arms race with Iran that Israel is very likely to win.

### **The Strategic value of Iranian Nuclear Weapons**

Iran might, however, be able establish a nuclear monopoly relative to Arab states that it could maintain for years, continue to maintain an advantage in nuclear weapons holdings after Arab acquisition of nuclear weapons, and counter any U.S. agreement to provide its Arab allies with “extended deterrence” with tangible nuclear threats.

The major risks involved to Iran in pursuing nuclear weapons, have been discussed in **Chapter VIII**, but they could give its missile forces far more deterrent capability, and possibly create a nuclear barrier to Arab Gulf and U.S. air and cruise missile strikes at Iran. It is unclear that Arab Gulf states and the U.S. would be deterred from attacking Iran’s conventional and asymmetric forces, but this is possible.

It might limit the level at which either the Arab Gulf states and the U.S. would take the risk of escalating in response to a given level of Iranian attack or use of force. It might well, however, help deter any Gulf Arab or U.S. conventional air and missile strikes on Iran, and limit their retaliation against Iran’s use of lower levels of force. It would certainly act as a deterrent to the already limited risk of outside invasion.

Iran also exists in a nuclear “neighborhood.” Israel is not its only challenge, and Iran might well calculate that Pakistan would see any Iranian nuclear capability as a major increase in Iran’s nuclear capabilities – a calculation that Iran again has little reason to publicize and where it may feel a focus on Israel will limit the Pakistani reaction as well as Turkish and Arab incentives to seek nuclear weapons.

### **Enrichment Issues**

Part of the problem in assessing the impact of nuclear weapons on the balance is that much of the debate over Iran’s capability has been over how soon it might get enough fissile material to assemble one weapon, and not over when it could assemble a meaningful force, what that force would look like, whether it would trigger preventive strikes against it, and how the Arab Gulf states, Israel, the U.S., and its other neighbors would react. One weapon does not make a nation a nuclear power, particularly an untested device.

Similarly, the negotiations over a potential arms control agreement focused on a relatively narrow range of issues relating to Iran’s various nuclear enrichment efforts and its ability to acquire fissile material at the known facilities shown in **Figure IX.2**. These issues included potential limits, controls, and inspection arrangements dealing with

- The number of centrifuges,
- The development of more advanced centrifuges,
- The level of Uranium enrichment and the size of Iran’s stockpiles,
- The potential use of the new reactor at Arak to produce Plutonium,
- How soon Iran could use any of these to get enough material to produce a nuclear device,
- The extent to which any agreement dealing with all of these issues is enforceable,

- How long an agreement will be in force, and
- The incentives to Iran for reaching an agreement, especially the extent to which UN, U.S., and EU sanctions will be lifted, and the timing of such action.

These are all important issues, but they are only part of the problem in ensuring that Iran does not acquire a meaningful nuclear weapons capability and inventory, and removing the incentives for other regional states to seek nuclear weapons in ways that could reshape the military balance. They also focus relatively narrowly on Iran's approach to an initial "break out" point in acquiring some form of fissile device, rather than its ability to actually produce and deploy nuclear weapons. In many studies or critiques, the focus has been so limited that it only dealt with how soon Iran could get enough fissile material to produce one major fissile event, and not Iran's ability to actually produce a meaningful amount of nuclear bombs and missile warheads.

### **Looking Beyond Enrichment and Plutonium**

It is important to remember that the primary goal for Gulf security is not to roll back Iranian enrichment technology, but rather to prevent Iran from actually producing and deploying nuclear weapons. Any agreement that convincingly keeps Iran from building and deploying nuclear weapons would meet the security needs of the Gulf states, other regional powers, and the U.S. and other members of the P5+1. An agreement – or continuing negotiation process that delays Iranian enrichment activity but allowed Iran to conduct centrifuge development and complete the design of a nuclear weapon would not.

The collapse of negotiations – or the conclusion that Iran is simply stalling and seeking to break out of sanctions – raises different issues. It would immediately raise the issue of how close Iran really is to developing, producing, and deploying nuclear weapons and a nuclear force? It would have to look beyond the issue of fissile material and consider the reaction time the U.S. and its allies would have to use preventive strikes, create new defenses, and/or create a suitable deterrent.

In all three cases, the question arises as to how far Iran has moved towards a bomb, whether it would need to carry out a major fissile test or tests, how much covert research and development activity it still needs, and how well the U.S. and its allies can detect such actions and future covert fissile material production efforts – key considerations in judging IAEA inspection and verification capabilities as well.

These are all issues that the U.S. has never publically addressed and that are critical in assessing an agreement: how far has Iran gotten in nuclear weapons design, how much necessary development work could it covertly do in spite of any agreement, and what is the U.S. estimate of how long Iran would need to develop and deploy nuclear weapons versus simply produce fissile material?

### **Key IAEA Findings on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Efforts**

It is equally important to focus on what is and is not known about Iran's nuclear efforts, and how far Iran has moved towards the capability to design, assemble, and test a functioning nuclear weapon – as distinguished from simply producing some form of nuclear explosion in a test bed device. The military annex to a critical IAEA report issued on November 8, 2011 raised critical questions about Iran's past weapons-related efforts that Iran has so far refused to address, and remains the best summary of the issues involved



– issues that were largely ignored in the public negotiations over a possible arms control agreement.

This IAEA report was entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Its weapons annex summarized the key issues surrounding Iran's actual efforts to develop a nuclear weapon – issues that have never really formally surfaced in the public discussion of the P5+1 and Iran negotiations.<sup>287</sup>

In summary, the IAEA report:<sup>288</sup>

- Describes Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA regarding heavy water at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak. Although the Agency was allowed access to the site on October 17, 2011, it has not been permitted access since then. According to Iran, operation of the IR-40 reactor is due to commence by the end of 2013. Although the Agency has not been permitted access to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) since August 17, 2011, satellite imagery has indicated that the HWPP appears to be in operation. Lastly, to date Iran has not allowed the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) to take samples.
- Provides a description of the IAEA's knowledge of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) as of October 18, 2011. It reflects that Iran is continuing enrichment and heavy water production at the site in contravention of international demands and regulations. It indicates that as of October 18, 2011, the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> (uranium hexafluoride) enriched to 20% into U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> (triuranium octoxide).
  - Provides an introduction and summary of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Importantly, it indicates that Iran has not engaged the IAEA substantively regarding the military dimensions of its program since August 2008, and it stresses the following:
    - Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and materials by military-related individuals and entities.
    - Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material.
    - The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and the documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network.
    - Work on the development of indigenous nuclear weapon design, including the testing of components.

The report stated that the Agency had “serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.” It:<sup>289</sup>

- Provides a historical overview of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. It reveals that the IAEA discovered that Iran's program has roots going back nearly 40 years, and that it has had ongoing undeclared R&D program for nuclear testing, experimentation, uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication, and irradiation activities, including the separation of plutonium. Moreover, it reports that Iran admitted to engaging in undeclared activities at clandestine locations, and procured nuclear material via a clandestine supply network.
- Reflects what the IAEA believes to be the structure of Iran's nuclear production, which is thought to involve the participation of a number of research centers, government bodies, universities, and committees, all of which operate under the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Moreover, it indicates that the program's nuclear activity was consolidated under the AMAD Plan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, although it was halted in 2003.
- Provides the IAEA's knowledge of Iran's nuclear procurement activities relevant to nuclear weapons production, many of which were allegedly undertaken by private front companies. For

instance, Kimia Maadan, a private Iranian company, was a company for chemical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan, while also being used to help with procurement for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Among the equipment procured relevant to nuclear weapons production include high-speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high-speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear material production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (such as neutron cross section calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics).

- Describes the IAEA's knowledge of Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear material relevant to nuclear weapons production. It also emphasizes that Iran only declared a number of facilities once the IAEA was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. Taken with Iran's additional past efforts to conceal nuclear activity, this reality creates more concern about the possible existence of further undeclared nuclear facilities, material, and activities in Iran.
- Provides the IAEA's analysis of Iran's alleged ongoing efforts to acquire nuclear components for use in an explosive device. It reiterates that Iran received documents that describe the processes for the conversion of uranium compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components, which are integral in the production of a rudimentary fission device. Additionally, the Agency indicates that during a 2007 interview with a member of Iran's clandestine supply network, it was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. Lastly, this portion of the report stresses that the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004.
- Discusses the IAEA's knowledge of Iran's R&D into and acquisition of "safe, fast-acting detonators, and equipment suitable for firing the detonators," an integral component to constructing an implosion type nuclear device. It indicates that the Agency discovered that Iran had developed fast-functioning detonators known as "exploding bridgewire detonators" (EBWs) during the period 2002-2003 as safe alternatives to previous detonator technology it had developed. Moreover, in 2008, Iran told the Agency that before the period 2002-2004, it had already achieved EBW technology. It also provided the Agency with a short, undated document in Persian, which was understood to be the specifications for a detonator development program, and a document from a foreign source that showed the example of a civilian application in which detonators fired simultaneously. Iran, however, has not explained its own need or application for such detonators.
- Describes development of a multipoint initiation system, which is used to reshape the detonation wave into a converging smooth implosion to ensure uniform compression of the core fissile material to supercritical density. As such, it is a vital component of a fission weapon. According to the Agency, Iran has had access to information on the design concept of a multipoint initiation system that can be used to initiate a high explosive charge over its surface effectively and simultaneously. This information was reportedly supplied to the IAEA by a Member State.
- Discusses Iran's efforts to evaluate the theoretical design of an implosion device using computer simulations, as well as high explosive tests referred to as "hydrodynamic experiments" in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials. According to information provided, Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten. Such experiments have also been linked to experiments involving the use of high-speed diagnostic equipment, including flash X-ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of an explosive device. Such experiments would have little, if any, civilian application, and represent a serious source of concern regarding the potential weaponization of Iran's nuclear program.
- Provides an overview of the IAEA's knowledge of Iran's studies that focus on modeling of spheres, components, and neutronic behavior indicating investigation into a nuclear warhead. Moreover, the Cordesman/Gold Iran & The Gulf Military Balance 18.7.13AHC 80 Agency has acquired information that indicates Iran has conducted studies and done calculations relating to the state of

criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives. Such efforts provide an additional indication of the potential weaponization of Iran's nuclear program.

- Discusses Iran's research and development into neutron initiators, which, "if placed in the center of a nuclear core of an implosion type nuclear device and compressed, could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction." Iran has yet to explain its objectives and capabilities in this field.
- Discusses what the IAEA perceives as Iran's efforts to "have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device." It also indicates that these efforts directly reflect those undertaken by declared nuclear-weapon states. These indicators could perhaps point to a potential Iranian nuclear weapons test in the future.
- Reflects what the IAEA perceives as a structured Iranian program to carry out "engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile." Such explorations into warhead development provide a key indicator that Iran's program is military in nature.
- Describes Iran's efforts at developing "a prototype firing system that would enable the payload [a nuclear warhead on a Shahab 3 missile] to explode both in the air above a target, or upon impact of the re-entry vehicle with the ground." It presents further indication that Iran is at least considering the possibility of installing nuclear warheads on its existing arsenal of Shahab 3 missiles.
- Provides an overview of the different bodies and projects that constitute the Iranian nuclear program.
- Provides an analysis of the likely payload of an Iranian missile, given the above indicators. It shows that Iran's R&D into its ballistic missile and nuclear programs reflect a probable effort to develop both nuclear warheads and an effective delivery vehicle thereof.
- The IAEA report also provides insight into the foreign sources that supplied Iran with nuclear equipment and technical know-how. One of these sources was referred to as a "clandestine nuclear supply network," purported to be the now-disbanded A.Q. Khan network. According to the report, Iran admittedly had contact with the network in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The document also asserts that this network supplied Iran with technical know-how regarding the production of neutron initiators and spherical hemispherical enriched uranium metallic component, neither of which have any real civilian application.

## **Weapons Design Data**

According to the IAEA, Iran did admit to having received a 15-page document that provided detailed instructions for the construction of components critical to building a nuclear device. This document, known as the "uranium metal document" was also provided to Libya, and is known to have been part of a larger package of information that includes elements of a nuclear explosive design. Given the circumstances surrounding Iran's acquisition of the document as well as the well-known role the A.Q. Khan network played in jump-starting nuclear weapons programs in Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea, it remains doubtful that Iran's program is purely peaceful.

The IAEA's report of November 8, 2011 also stated that there were, "...strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon program of the country of his origin."<sup>290</sup>

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) later identified this individual as

former Soviet weapons engineer Vyacheslav Danilenko. According to the IAEA, Danilenko worked in Iran from 1996 to 2002, returning to Russia in 2002.<sup>291</sup> Moreover, given the small size and sophistication of a multipoint initiation system the IAEA observed in Iran in 2004, it was likely to have been developed using Danilenko's expertise as a springboard.<sup>292</sup> Iran's strides in detonator technology are, in all likelihood, the result of Danilenko's technical expertise.

It has been years since the IAEA issued this report, but the IAEA did report in February 2015 that it had not received any serious clarification from Iran, or any meaningful updates from member countries that allowed it to fully update its military annex -- aside from data on a possible weapons simulation test site at Parchin

On November 7, 2014 -- some three weeks from the deadline set for negotiating a comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, the Director General of the IAEA was forced to issue a report on the *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of the Security Council Resolutions in the Republic of Iran* that stated that, "Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the outstanding practical measures, nor has it proposed any new practical measures in the next step of the framework of cooperation."<sup>293</sup>

Iran did not provide data on key weapons-related issues like its work on the initiation of high explosives that could be used in an implosion weapon or neutron transport calculations. The section on "Possible Military Dimensions" noted that in spite of the fact the IAEA had acquired some additional information since 2011 showing that Iran had a weapons program and/or weapons related activities -- such as Iranian activity at Parchin -- "In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency's concerns largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations." In August 2014, Iran again stated that, most of the issues (were) mere allegations and do not merit consideration."

As of March 2015, Iran had done nothing to refute or explain its actions relating to a weapons program or weapons related research and development, to set the stage for complying with this aspect of a permanent agreement, setting the stage for meaningful inspection, and providing a clear indication of how close it is to a working weapons design and planning for the actual deployment of nuclear weapons on its missile and aircraft.

While Iran's weapons development efforts are only one part of providing the necessary reaction time, they are clearly the area where the least is known at any public level, where Iran has done the least to comply, and where major questions remain as to whether any agreement could keep Iran from running a covert research and development and planning effort short of serious and clearly detectable fissile event.

### **The Uncertain Level of Iranian Progress: No News is No News**

At least through May 2015, the U.S. has also done comparatively little at the official level to set the stage for understanding Iran's progress and evaluating what is a critical aspect of any arms control agreement -- as well as the ability to assess the consequences of a non-agreement. Previous Administrations had long since cancelled the annual Department of Defense unclassified summary of international proliferation activity, and had not reported regularly on Iranian missile development or the extent to which Iran's long range missile

problem is dependent on nuclear warheads because of its inaccuracy and reliability problems.

The most the U.S. did issue an unclassified nine-page summary of a *National Intelligence Estimate on Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities* on November 7, 2007. That document was issued under the Bush Administration and concluded that,<sup>294</sup>

- We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
- We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran's announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work.
- We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
- We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
- We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
- We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.
- Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

The U.S. never fully updated this limited level of analysis since 2007. However, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued an annual summary of threats to U.S. national security that did provide some insights. The 2013 report stated that,<sup>295</sup>

We assess **Iran** is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

Tehran has developed technical expertise in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year that better positions it to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, should it choose to do so. Despite this progress, we assess Iran could not divert safeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth of WGU before this activity is discovered.

We judge Iran's nuclear decision making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran's security, prestige and influence, as well as the international political and security environment, when making decisions about its nuclear program. In this context, we judge that Iran

is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities and avoid severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime threatening sanctions.

We judge Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon, if one is ever fielded. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD. In addition, Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps—along with a regime hostile toward the United States and our allies—provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile arsenal. Iran's growing ballistic missile inventory and its domestic production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and development of its first long-range land attack cruise missile provide capabilities to enhance its power projection. Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces.

The 2014 statement did not provide further data on Iran's research and development activity and progress in a nuclear weapons design. It did state, however, that,<sup>296</sup>

We continue to assess that **Iran's** overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so. At the same time, Iran's perceived need for economic relief has led it to make concessions on its nuclear program through the 24 November 2013

Joint Plan of Action with the P5+1 countries and the European Union (EU). In this context, we judge that Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives. It wants to improve its nuclear and missile capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions—such as a military strike or regime-threatening sanctions. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year by installing additional centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, developing advanced centrifuge designs, and stockpiling more low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6). These improvements have better positioned Iran to produce weapons grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, if it chooses to do so. Despite this progress, we assess that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded material and produce enough WGU for a weapon before such activity would be discovered. Iran has also continued to work toward starting up the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor near Arak.

We judge that Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if Iran ever builds these weapons. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

We assess that if Iran fully implements the Joint Plan, it will temporarily halt the expansion of its enrichment program, eliminate its production and stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium in a form suitable for further enrichment, and provide additional transparency into its existing and planned nuclear facilities. This transparency would provide earlier warning of a breakout using these facilities.

Similarly, the DNI's 2015 threat assessment statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee stated that,<sup>297</sup>

We continue to assess that Iran's overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so. We do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

We also continue to assess that Iran does not face any insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making Iran's political will the central issue. However, Iranian implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) has at least temporarily inhibited further progress in its uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities and effectively eliminated Iran's stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium. The agreement has also enhanced the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities, mainly through improved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access and earlier warning of any effort to make material for nuclear weapons using its safeguarded facilities.

We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran's progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

A careful reading of these words shows that they again focus on enrichment and fissile production, say nothing about Iran's current level of nuclear weapons design and production data, say nothing about the time it would take for Iran to deploy a meaningful nuclear force, and provide no basis for knowing whether the U.S. intelligence community feels it can detect Iran weapons research and development activity outside the fuel cycle, or whether an agreement would give the IAEA a credible verification activity.

### **Iran's Weapons Break Out Capabilities**

More broadly, the U.S. has never publically addressed the question of Iran's real-world reaction time in moving from acquiring fissile material to actual weaponization and deployment. Some seven years after the last serious U.S. estimate, the most the U.S. has said in unclassified terms seems to be that it believes Iran has not reconstituted a large, visible effort. It has never said that Iran is not conducting covert nuclear weapons research and development activities under another guise, explained Iran's calculations in creating a missile program that currently can only be effective with nuclear weapons, or discussed the problems Iran would face in any conflict in the Gulf or the rest of the region using its obsolete conventional forces without nuclear threat. It also has never defined its estimate of how quickly Iran could actually go from creating fissile material to actually having a weapon.

### ***Fissile Material Does Not Mean Weaponization***

This is critical in evaluating both an actual agreement and the risks in continuing to negotiate. Even actual nuclear weapons designers cannot agree on just how difficult it now is to design and manufacture a reliable and deployable nuclear weapon. Reports that Iran may have received significant design data from a number of sources, and reports by the IEA that Iran has been working on the design and key components for fission weapons for years, do not mean that Iran has detailed design data of the kind that allows it to produce an effective implosion weapon. Neither does it mean that it can easily move to develop a family of different weapons ranging from small nuclear weapons to boosted weapons that can be deployed on missiles or as relative light bombs.

North Korea's uncertain tests of fission devices -- which seem to have involved devices far too large for warhead weaponization -- show that getting large yields from a test device remains a major challenge. For new proliferators, India and Pakistan have both made spurious claims about the yields of their tests to disguise what seem to have been at least partial design failures. Even the simpler forms of gun devices can present significant problems in terms of reliability and yield.

The U.S. and Iran's neighbors may choose to assume that Iran could rapidly deploy a functioning nuclear weapon once it has sufficient fissile material, but such assumptions can exaggerate Iran's military capabilities, and it is unclear what kind of assumptions are actually correct. Bomb design also involves serious safety and reliability issues, as well as the need to be able to predict yield, the ability to operate in spite of the stress of a missile or air launch, and the ability of fuzing systems to trigger the weapon at the desired height of burst.

It is difficult, however, to go from standard fission implosion weapons to boosted weapons that have much higher yields, potentially raising the explosive force from a purely fissile 20-kiloton weapon to boosted weapons with yield of 100 kilotons or more. These involve key design issues, which include the problems involved in handling tritium and deuterium or solid lithium deuteride-tritide, and the fact that such designs are normally associated with plutonium weapons, not the uranium-based weapons that Iran would construct if it were successful in building a weapon.

### *How Much is Enough*

Much of the unclassified analysis of how soon Iran could get a weapon is tied to weapons and warhead design issues. Many tacitly assume that Iran could assemble a gun device or even nuclear missile warheads without any practical testing or even a fissile event. They also fail to state the assumptions made regarding the amount of material needed per weapon, and the major uncertainties involved.

Such estimates also tend to focus on one estimate of the necessary fissile material without noting the uncertainties in any nominal estimate or the variation by weapons design. Unclassified estimates made in an article on nuclear weapons design by the Federation of American Scientists illustrate the scale of the uncertainties involved -- as well as some of the reasons effective weapons design is so difficult and uncertain without actual testing:<sup>298</sup>

The minimum mass of fissile material that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction is called a critical mass and depends on the density, shape, and type of fissile material, as well as the effectiveness of any surrounding material (called a reflector or tamper) at reflecting neutrons back into the fissioning mass. Critical masses in spherical geometry for weapon-grade materials are as follows:

	Uranium-235	Plutonium-239
Bare sphere:	56 kg	11 kg
Thick Tamper:	15 kg	5 kg

The critical mass of compressed fissile material decreases as the inverse square of the density achieved. Since critical mass decreases rapidly as density increases, the implosion technique can make do with substantially less nuclear material than the gun-assembly method. The "Fat Man" atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki in 1945 used 6.2 kilograms of plutonium and produced an explosive yield of 21-23 kilotons [a 1987 reassessment of the Japanese bombings placed the yield at 21 Kt]. Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilograms would



typically be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Subsequently, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms. Some U.S. scientists believe that 1 kilogram of plutonium will suffice.

...In the gun device, two pieces of fissionable material, each less than a critical mass, are brought together very rapidly to form a single supercritical one. This gun-type assembly may be achieved in a tubular device in which a high explosive is used to blow one subcritical piece of fissionable material from one end of the tube into another subcritical piece held at the opposite end of the tube.

Manhattan Project scientists were so confident in the performance of the "Little Boy" uranium bomb that the device was not even tested before it was used. This 15-kt weapon was airdropped on 06 August 1945 at Hiroshima, Japan. The device contained 64.1 kg of highly enriched uranium, with an average enrichment of 80%. The six bombs built by the Republic of South Africa were gun-assembled and used 50kg of uranium enriched to between 80 percent and 93 percent in the isotope U-235.

Compared with the implosion approach, this method assembles the masses relatively slowly and at normal densities; it is practical only with highly enriched uranium. If plutonium — even weapon-grade — were used in a gun-assembly design, neutrons released from spontaneous fission of its even-numbered isotopes would likely trigger the nuclear chain reaction too soon, resulting in a "fizzle" of dramatically reduced yield.

...Because of the short time interval between spontaneous neutron emissions (and, therefore, the large number of background neutrons) found in plutonium because of the decay by spontaneous fission of the isotope Pu-240, Manhattan Project scientists devised the implosion method of assembly in which high explosives are arranged to form an imploding shock wave which compresses the fissile material to supercriticality.

The core of fissile material that is formed into a super-critical mass by chemical high explosives (HE) or propellants. When the high explosive is detonated, an inwardly directed implosion wave is produced. This wave compresses the sphere of fissionable material. The decrease in surface to volume ratio of this compressed mass plus its increased density is then such as to make the mass supercritical. The HE is exploded by detonators timed electronically by a fuzing system, which may use altitude sensors or other means of control.

The nuclear chain-reaction is normally started by an initiator that injects a burst of neutrons into the fissile core at an appropriate moment. The timing of the initiation of the chain reaction is important and must be carefully designed for the weapon to have a predictable yield. A neutron generator emits a burst of neutrons to initiate the chain reaction at the proper moment — near the point of maximum compression in an implosion design or of full assembly in the gun-barrel design.

A surrounding tamper may help keep the nuclear material assembled for a longer time before it blows itself apart, thus increasing the yield. The tamper often doubles as a neutron reflector.

Implosion systems can be built using either Pu-239 or U-235 but the gun assembly only works for uranium. Implosion weapons are more difficult to build than gun weapons, but they are also more efficient, requiring less SNM and producing larger yields. Iraq attempted to build an implosion bomb using U-235. In contrast, North Korea chose to use 239 Pu produced in a nuclear reactor.

To fission more of a given amount of fissile material, a small amount of material that can undergo fusion, deuterium and tritium (D-T) gas, can be placed inside the core of a fission device. Here, just as the fission chain reaction gets underway, the D-T gas undergoes fusion, releasing an intense burst of high-energy neutrons (along with a small amount of fusion energy as well) that fissions the surrounding material more completely. This approach, called boosting, is used in most modern nuclear weapons to maintain their yields while greatly decreasing their overall size and weight.

There are many different weapons designs Iran might choose from, many different levels of fissile material requirements, and many different levels of associated risk. Iran might take the risks of producing weapons without actual testing by trusting foreign design data and ignoring key safety and reliability issues. It is also possible that Iran might claim it has

nuclear weapons without actually producing them or concluding that it has them in a truly usable form. However, Iran has been cautious in the past about taking any steps that threatened the existence of its regime. It seems equally or more possible that Iran would never seriously weaponize without either full design details or some form of underground or other active testing.

As noted earlier, the IAEA has reported that Iran has had many elements of an R&D and test program that examines the behavior of every other aspect of weapons performance by setting off bomb designs without fissile material and examining the result. The now dismantled facility Iran created at Parchin might well have been designed for the purpose of non-fissile testing on an entire weapons assembly.

A September 2014 report by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) notes that activity at the Parchin facility had started again, raising concerns about Iran's suspected effort to develop a nuclear weapon.<sup>299</sup>

Recent Digital Globe satellite imagery dated August 12, 2014 shows that some activity continues at the Parchin site. As figure 1 shows, new construction material or debris, as well as new dirt or water runoff, appear in front of three buildings in the southern part of the site. Also, light vegetation appears to be growing at the center of the site, including on the protective berm, and the construction material or debris previously identified in front of the suspected test building remains. Finally, the dirt or water runoff and some of the possible construction material that appeared in previous imagery is no longer present in front of the large building in the northern part of the site.

A [May 2014 ISIS Imagery Brief](#) showed several signs of external activity at the site. ISIS noted that possible building material and debris appeared in front of two main buildings at the site. Two trucks or containers had been removed from the area surrounding the suspected high explosives test building, while a larger object, possibly a truck or large container, appeared slightly north of it. Dirt or water runoff was visible in front of the northern building and three vehicles were clearly visible at the south entrance.

Previously, a [February 2014 ISIS Imagery Brief](#) confirmed IAEA reporting of possible building material and debris appearing at the site. All of this activity followed a period of lull at the site (second half of 2013) in which commercial satellite imagery showed no significant visible alterations.

Some experts feel that Iran might also seek to obtain additional design validation data in the future by using subcritical radioactive material in such a test program, a speculation some other experts discount on the grounds it might not produce a reliable indication of full scale fissile event performance.

This makes obtaining accurate estimates of how much design data Iran actually has a critical issue. The UN Panel of Experts report issued in June 2014 did, however, confirm earlier IAEA reports, and stated that,<sup>300</sup>

There remain areas of concern regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program and its possible military dimensions. In its report of 20 February 2014, IAEA referred to its 2011 analysis of allegations that the Islamic Republic of Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.

Among the issues identified by IAEA in 2011 are concerns about "alleged studies" regarding "how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile"

...IAEA recently noted that information regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's development of a nuclear explosive device "is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible" and despite the

country's insistence that the claims are unfounded, "the Agency has obtained more information since November 2011 that has further corroborated the analysis contained in [the annex to the Director-General's report of November 2011]"... It is not known whether the additional information addresses the integration of a nuclear payload on a delivery vehicle.

As work by Michael Eisenstadt notes that,<sup>301</sup>

Iran's weapons design choices will also be influenced by the kind of foreign assistance it has received in the past, and could receive in the future. This includes a Chinese weapons design that it may have received from the AQ Khan network (reportedly a smaller, more advanced design than that the latter provided to Libya); useful insights it might have gleaned from flawed plans for a firing set that the CIA allegedly provided Iran in order to sabotage and delay its weapons program (i.e., Operation Merlin); and assistance it may have received in designing the initiation and conventional explosives system for a nuclear weapon from the Russian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko. In light of this history, it would be prudent to assume that Iran's future weapons design efforts will continue to benefit from foreign assistance, despite best efforts by the U.S. and others to prevent it.

This leaves any effort to assess Iran's actual weaponization capability dependent on public data going back to the IAEA report in November 2011. As noted earlier, the Institute for Science and International Security summarized Vyacheslav Danilenko's contributions to the Iranian nuclear program, and gave some technical details regarding one aspect of Iran's nuclear weapons development.

The technical details in the ISIS report give a sense of the progress that Iran was able to make with external assistance:<sup>302</sup>

The IAEA obtained additional information that adds credibility to the conclusion that Danilenko used his technical and practical knowledge and expertise to provide assistance to Iran's program to develop a suitable initiation system for a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA assessed that a monitoring, or diagnostic, technique described in one of his papers had a remarkable similarity to one that the IAEA saw in material from a member state about a hemispherical initiation and explosives system developed in Iran (see below). This system is also described in the IAEA safeguards report as a multipoint initiation system used to start the detonation of a nuclear explosive.

The IAEA also obtained from member states details of the design, development, and possible testing of what is called in IAEA information the R265 shock generator system, which is a round multipoint initiation system that would fit inside the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile tri-conic nose cone. This device involves a hemispherical aluminum shell with an inside radius of 265 mm and wall thickness of 10 mm thick. Outer channels are cut into the outer surface of the shell, each channel one by one millimeter, and contain explosive material. Each channel terminates in a cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled through the shell and contains an explosive pellet. The geometrical pattern formed by channels and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer hemispheric surface which allows a single central point of initiation and the simultaneous detonation of explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere. This in turn allows the simultaneous initiation of all the high explosives under the shell by one exploding bridgewire (EBW). If properly prepared, the R265 constitutes the outer part of an explosively driven implosion system for a nuclear device. The outer radius of the R265 system is 275 millimeters, or a diameter of 550 millimeters, less than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab 3 (or the Sejil-2 missile).

No credible unclassified data currently exist to show just how much outside warhead design data that Iran has received, and this highlights a much broader limit to any unclassified analysis. How much is actually known at the classified level about Iran's access to serious design data, test program, and test options is obviously uncertain. What, if anything, this says about Iran's plans and intentions is another issue. If – as seems likely – Iran has been slowly advancing a nuclear weapons program since the time of the Shah, how much have the U.S. and other intelligence communities learned that they have not made public?

Intelligence does need to protect key sources and sensitive methods, but it often uses security to conceal the fact that its analysis is almost all method and “guesstimate” and no source.

This uncertainty regarding public versus unclassified knowledge is also critical to any real world success in implementing a P5+1 agreement or dealing with its failure. Any effort to both halt and characterize Iran’s programs will, after all, be part of an ongoing duel with Iranian efforts to conceal as much as possible. No unclassified analysis can really address this aspect of Iran’s programs. No one can do more than speculate as to what, if anything, Iran has been able to conceal that is not known to either outside intelligence agencies or analysts of the Iranian program.

### **Judging the Success or Failure of a Final Agreement with Iran**

Any meaningful arms control agreement must be based on the principle of “trust but verify.” For all the reasons set forth in this analysis, there is no basis for trust in any aspect of Iran’s weapons related activities. This will evidently be true whether an agreement is reached, whether the negotiations are extended, or whether the negotiations collapse.

At present, however, a successful negotiation would mean that these aspects of an agreement to some kind of classified and non-public annex and focus on fissile material production or rely on some future level of inspection and verification with no agreed baseline as to how far Iran has moved towards designing and being able to produce a nuclear weapon.

Delay would mean going forward with no picture of how far Iran has already gotten, how dependent it is on visible actions like actual fissile or weapons tests for success, and how long Iran would need to develop a meaningful nuclear strike capability. It also would mean going forward without any serious public U.S. assessment of how dependent Iran’s missile program are on deploying nuclear weapons or the extent to which a nuclear-armed force is critical to deterring preventive/preemptive strikes or U.S. and Gulf escalation to major conventional strikes on Iran if Iran should conduct a major military action like using its asymmetric forces to try to bloc petroleum exports out of the Gulf.

At the same time, the lack of such data means that many judgments based solely on Iran’s theoretical ability to acquire fissile material may grossly exaggerate the spend with which Iran can acquire a meaningful nuclear capability, and the need for preventive strikes.

### **Prevention, Deterrence, and Proliferation**

Much depends on both whether an agreement is reached and whether it proves to be effective. An ongoing Iranian nuclear weapons effort could lead to Israeli preventive military strikes, or U.S. preventive strikes under some conditions – radically changing the scenarios for combat in the region and the forces driving every aspect of the regional arms race and the military balance.

A clear indication that Iran was proceeding to develop and deploy nuclear weapons would lead to even more emphasis on missile defenses, might well lead Arab Gulf states to seek nuclear weapons, and might press the U.S. into offering its allies the same kind of “extended deterrence” that it once offered its allies in Europe. At the same time, preventive

strikes might end in driving Iran into far more intense covert nuclear weapons efforts, or to take reprisals in the form of asymmetric warfare, new efforts to win military influence in nations like Syria and Iraq, and new efforts to use the Shi'ite population in nations like Bahrain. Saudi Arabia, and Yemen to pressures those states.

### **Gulf Nuclear Weapons**

It will be several years before Iran can develop and deploy a meaningful nuclear force, but even the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran has already helped persuade the GCC states and the U.S. to developed better theater missile defenses, and led them to see Iran as far more of a potential threat, and consider preventive strikes. Some in the GCC have talked about creating their own nuclear enrichment cycles to support their nuclear power plants – a first step in creating the fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia has stated that Saudi Arabia has at least examined the possibility of building its own nuclear weapons or seeking to buy them from a nuclear weapons state like Pakistan. Some senior UAE officials have privately raised the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons as well. Turkey might also seek nuclear weapons if it confronted a mix of nuclear-armed states like Israel, Iran, and Pakistan

### **The U.S. Role in Extended Deterrence**

The Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) initiated by the Bush Administration has been sustained as Washington engages the region. There has been discussion indicating the possibility of U.S. security guarantees or “extended deterrence” in an effort to protect these states against Iranian threats. Such efforts could reduce the possibility that some Gulf states would acquiesce to Iranian pressure and limit the threat of proliferation in the event that Iran actually equips its force with nuclear weapons.<sup>303</sup>

Senior U.S. officials have already raised these possibilities in broad terms. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters during a trip to Bangkok that, “We want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the United States extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf, it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer because they won't be able to intimidate and dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon.”<sup>304</sup>


It is far from clear what form of extended deterrence the U.S. would offer, how conditional it would be on Arab Gulf state not pursuing their own nuclear programs, and how such U.S. actions would be seen by Iran and other regional states. What is clear is that the practical choices may be an effective agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, preventive war, or some form of sustained regional nuclear arms race.

**Figure X.1: Estimated Capability of Iranian and Israeli Long-Range Missile Forces With a Nuclear Warhead**

Nuclear Missile Delivery Capability for a 1,000 kg Warhead Weight

Iran Ballistic Missiles	Status	Missile warhead radius (cm)	Max weight of a nuclear device that could fit the missile (kg)	Max warhead deliverable range (km)	Missile range required to reach main targets (km)	Nuclear missile delivery capability
Shahab 1	In Service	44	750 - 1,310	285	>350	No
Shahab 2	In Service	44	750 - 1,310	370	>350	Marginal
Shahab 3	In Service	62.5	2,030 - 3,200	910	>500	Yes
Shahab 3M	In Service	62.5	2,030 - 3,200	1,150	>500	Yes
Safir	Under Development	62.5	2,030 - 3,200	1,910	>1,000	Yes
Sejjil	Under Development	62.5	2,030 - 3,200	2,160	>1,000	Yes
<b>Israel Ballistic Missiles</b>						
Jericho 2	In Service	78	3,880 - 5,720	1,510	>1,000	Yes
Jericho 3	Development/In Service	78	3,880 - 5,720	3,500	>1,000	Yes

Source: Dr. Abdullah Toukan, April 29, 2015.

**Figure X.2: Major Iranian Nuclear, Other WMD, and Missile Facilities**

Source: NTI, <http://www.nti.org/gmap/?country=iran&layers>, and <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/>, March 2015



## ***XI. Extremism and Terrorism, Failed State Wars and Paramilitary and Security Forces***

The military balance in the Gulf has become a broader security balance involving major civil conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, the transformation of extremist movements into something involving a protostate in the case of the Israel State or ISIL, and growing civil tension and violence between sects, ethnic groups, tribes and the other fault lines in Gulf and regional societies. The kind of more orthodox conflict that existed between the conventional forces of Gulf and allied states in the Iran-Iraq War, in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, and during the initial phases of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been replaced by asymmetric wars within given states, as by the intervention of neighboring and outside states in support of their governments or the non-state actors that oppose them.

This has sharply increased the tensions between Iran and the Arab Gulf states and the U.S. It has led to a focus on international security forces which now equals the focus on conventional military forces, and it has led to a critical new civil-military dimension in regional conflicts and security efforts that is linked to a ideological struggle between the legitimate voices of Islam and violent ideologically-driven extremists. In the process it has crippled the political unity, civil society, and economies of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen to the point where they have become or approach the status of “failed states.” It has created massive refugee problems, and has linked Gulf security to the security of the Levant, Turkey, and Kurdish populations throughout the region. It also increasingly risks creating violent divisions between Sunnis and Shi’ite and other Muslim sects, as well as driving minorities out of conflict nations.

The end result is that the most important dynamics of the Gulf balance are now difficult or impossible to quantify and are being shaped by new kinds of 21 Century conflicts. The security balance in the Gulf has changed sharply as the result of the rise of violent Jihadist elements and violent non-state actors – which now are reshaping the military balance in ongoing wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and threaten many other Gulf states.

The resulting mix of internal threats and outside non-state actors has grown to the point where it poses as serious a threat than the risk of serious military conflict between states. These are also threats where local regimes must generally take most of the responsibility for counter-terrorism and internal security, and for addressing the causes of internal threats and unrest. Outside powers like the US, Britain, and France can help in some aspects of intelligence, counter-terrorism, and train and assist missions, but only local regimes can deal with the fundamental tasks in maintaining and establishing security, and four such regimes – Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – have so far failed to do so.

Unfortunately, the impact of both non-state actors and the role states play in supporting them has become at most impossible to assess. The size, strength, and role of non-state actors in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen is constantly evolving, and so is the role Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, US, and other states play in supporting and attacking them. It can be argued that the civil conflicts in the region, the role of non-state actors, and inter-state conflict and competition in using or supporting non-state actors has become the most important current aspect of the military balance. This does not mean, however, that enough reliable and stable data are available to describe the conflicts and interactions between them.



Strategic partnerships must do a far better job of adapting to the worst case challenges of the revolution in civil military affairs. These challenges now include the emergence of extreme forms of civil-military conflict in what can only be called “failed state wars.” The levels of prolonged civil and ideological conflict in states like Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan have reached the point where successful national security efforts have become civil-military exercises in “armed nation building.”

Afghanistan is a key example. It has a population of some 29 million to 32 million. It is now in the first stages of a Transition to relying on its own security forces, and far more limited forms of aid and outside military spending. It already has seen a rising threat to more than 10 of its provinces, and unacceptably high casualties to its security forces. Studies by the World Bank and IMF warn of major budget and economic problems.

At the same time, studies of the aid efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 to the present reflect major failures in civil-military coordination, planning and execution, and effective international cooperation. Afghanistan may still succeed, but it faces years of further conflict and uncertainty and 32 million people are clearly at risk.

Iraq is another clear case in point. An apparent victory in the fighting in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 was followed by rising civil conflict in 2011-2013, and the ISIL takeover of much of the Sunni and Western portions of Iraq in 2014 and 2015. More than a decade of aid could not produce effective governance, development, military forces and the rule of law, or national unity between Arab and Kurd or Sunni and Shi’ite. The security forces virtually disintegrated when they were attacked by ISIL, and assessments of the effectiveness civil aid program have far too often been a record of waste, corruption, and failure.

Iraq has become a nation of some 36 million people that is partially occupied, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, has seen more than 3 million of its citizens made into internally displaced person without a home or livelihood, is seemingly a year or more away from a major military effort to restore its unity, and presents a potential challenge in terms of some form of post-conflict political and economic power-sharing federalism that must be resolved at both the civil and security levels.

Syria faces even more direct and brutal threats. Some 250,000 civilians have been killed, and there is no meaningful estimate of the wounded. The UN estimates that a nation of some 19 to 22 million had 7.6 million internally displaced persons at the end of March 2015 and 3.9 million refugees in other countries. It was increasingly divided along sectarian lines and into the rule of repressive Assad regime and mix of movements like ISIL and the al Nusra Front – an affiliate of al Qa’ida. The UN estimated that a total of 12.2 million civilians – well over 50% of the population -- were at risk along with some 5.5 million children.

Libya too has steadily deteriorated into civil conflict, tribal divisions, regional divisions, and violent religious extremist movements. Oil wealth has to some extent eased the problems its 6.3 million people face, but Libya cannot avoid the growing cumulative human impact of ongoing violence, and failed governance, development, and social order. The World bank estimates that its per capita income in PPP terms has dropped from an average of over \$21,000 in 2010-2013 to some \$12,000, and to only \$5,340 in current prices.

The crisis in Yemen is still developing -- but like previous four countries -- Yemen is steadily mixing religious extremism with growing sectarian tension and conflict. Like Afghanistan, Yemen

is extremely poor and far more vulnerable to the disruptions of war than wealthier states. It has a population of some 26 million, failed governance, a failed economy, and ongoing civil conflict.

Taken together, the “failed state” threat in these five countries affects the destiny of some 120 million people -- even if one ignores all of the massive impact that their problems have on the nations around them. Moreover, similar conflicts now threaten to escalate in Africa and Asia.

These levels of conflict also involve challenges no national security structure in the developing world can meet on its own. They push military operations far beyond the narrow limits of traditional stability operations. They require prolonged international cooperation and aid in both establishing and maintaining security and helping to reconstruct national politics, governance, economies and civil societies.

One way or another, some form of more effective international cooperation must be developed at the civil and national security levels that can do a better job of dealing with each existing case, as well as with the risk that the spread of violent extremism will create new cases.

### **Strategic Planning: The Need for a New Degree of Realism, Honesty, and Transparency**

Strategic partnerships also require the development and execution of strategic plans that are honest in dealing with just how serious the revolution in civil-military affairs has now become. Each of the previous failed state conflicts has posed problems on a scale that neither its own government nor its security partners have been willing to openly and properly address.

Each became a case where the host country government tried to rely on denial and propaganda. Each became a case where the outside civil and military effort has failed to come to fully grips with the causes of conflict, and where the outside military role in terms of helping to build stability was uncertain and poorly defined.

This was partly been a result of allowing the scale of such conflicts to escalate to the point where an effective civil response became more and more difficult. It also, however, was the result of the fact these conflicts had political, religious, and ideological aspects that have made it hard for governments to openly address and deal with. They also created new barriers to security cooperation even among allies that have shown they can cooperate in many other ways.

Each major aspect of this second “revolution in military affairs” has involved areas that have acute political sensitivity in given countries. Each has created a natural tendency to respond with empty reassurances and public relations exercises, with denial and delay, and by leaving them in in limbo, and to focus on more traditional forms of conflict and military education.

It has also become all too clear that no country is yet ready to teach rather than learn. There have been all too many areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria where the U.S. and other outside partners have failed to face the seriousness of these challenges, the limits to their civil-military operations, and the need to change and adapt.

A meaningful strategic plan for serious civil-military conflicts requires a new degree of realism, honesty, and transparency about the interactions between the use of force and the ability to meet civil challenges. Denial, spin, and indifference – like a focus on tactical victories –cannot have a lasting strategic meaning.

These are mistakes to learn from, rather than forget. General Petraeus put it all too well when he was asked whether the US learned from the lesson of past wars. He responded by saying. “Well, we take note of them.” The time has clearly come to learn from the lessons of the past and particularly from the lessons of 9/11, 2003, and 2011.

Strategic plans must be based on net assessments of all of the civil and military forces that shape today’s civil conflicts, fuel ideological extremism and support for violent non-state actors, and give states like Iran and Russia leverage in using non-state actors and asymmetric warfare to further divide and exploit such conflicts.

A proper response also requires changes in military training and education to show officers and planners at every level how to measure and counter such divisions and look beyond tactical victories to create lasting civil-military stability and security.

It requires similar education and training of key civil elements in government that deal with education, media, and civil society to act as partners in civil-military operations. There need to be new curriculums at every level of education and training and particularly at the staff college and national defense university level.

### **Rethinking the Train and Assist Missions**

Another key example of the need for better cooperation, training, and education is the train and assist mission. Recent combat has shown all too clearly that partnerships need to take account of the civil-military lessons of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Military and civil leaders need to be educated at every level to learn these lessons, and to rethink and broaden their train and assist missions. They need to focus on combat effectiveness and on effectiveness in civil-military operations, and not just on generating new forces.

Force generation does remain a key part of military cooperation and education. New and replacement units do need to be created by recruiting and training personnel, providing suitable equipment and facilities, and forming the unit. There will also be times when outside support from the rear may be enough. However, several thousand years of military history should serve as a warning that there are no times when leading from the rear is adequate in actual combat.

No amount of training and force generation in the rear, however, can really prepare new units or their leaders for combat. This can create critical problems when outside or allied forces are withdrawn, and new units are sent into combat – as the problems new local forces encountered in the fighting in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown.

Far too many of today’s train and assist missions are a recipe for failure at the tactical or “win” level. No one can create effective combat leaders and forces from the rear. Generating or rebuilding forces in the rear is not enough, and is an almost certain recipe for failure. New or weak forces need forward deployed teams of advisors to help them actually fight, to win, and then to immediately act to “hold and build along civil-military lines.

New and weak units need to have a small, but experienced teams of combat leaders embedded with them. Forward deployed train and assist teams – usually Special Forces or Rangers – are necessary to spot good combat leaders and warn against weak, ineffective, or corrupt ones. They are critical in providing the assessment of tactics, defensive positions, and patrol activity. Forward deployed train and assist are needed to encourage active patrolling, and help keep new units active and from becoming static or defensive.

New combat leaders and units need months of on-the-ground help in getting the essentials of combat operations right. Modern forward air control is critical, and the use of drones can make it effective far beyond the line of sight, but so is help in developing effective human intelligence. Insurgents cannot be allowed to have a massive intelligence advantage on the ground, to learn the weakest links in the government forces and their defense, attack them, roll-up the weaker units, expose the flanks and position of the better units, and then force them into what at best is partially organized retreat.

Train and assist teams are needed to provide a second voice when resupply, reinforcement, regrouping, and relief are required. Someone has to bypass the barriers, rigidities, and sectarian/ethnic prejudices in the chain of command and send the right signals to the top..

At the same time, the role of train and assist missions must be broadened to include the civil side of operations. Every tactical victory or success has an immediate sequel: The need for immediate efforts to restore civil life, ensure that victories in irregular warfare does not mean the excessive use of force or revenge, or leaving civilians without support, security, and immediate incentives to support and trust their governments.

Going from “win” to “hold and build” requires a consistent effort at every level from high command to the field, and from strategic planning to day-to-day operations. However, forward deployed train and assist teams can play a critical role in encouraging effective civil-military action. They also can play a critical role in providing advice and feedback in the all too many cases where host country units, militias, and paramilitary forces have has a different ethnic or sectarian bias -- or simply think and act in tactical terms, They can help partners create a local capability to hold, recover, and build at the military and civil levels..

### **Ideological Warfare and the Changing Role of Strategic Communications**

Strategic partners need to be far more forthright in addressing the fact that many 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflicts have become ideological conflicts that must also be fought on ideological terms. Some of the key weapons involved in meeting these new threats are civil. They are job creation, better and more relevant education, improving key state services like health and medical treatment, reducing corruption, and making governance more responsive to popular needs.

Winning the ideological battle must be a key element in shaping security and counterinsurgency operations, in limiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, in protecting the population, and providing for civil recovery after operations take place. The military and security forces involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency need expert help to explain to their populations and the outside world why force is being used in given ways, to counter extremist propaganda, warn when given types of military and internal security action are counterproductive, and deal with detainees and prisoners.

Key military and national security activities like strategic communications must change radically in response. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts must work with every possible civil element to cope with the extraordinary challenge of dealing with religion, the problems and expectations of a nation's youth, and countering other internal divisions.

National security forces must develop new approaches to educating and reaching the civil population that can be used to counter extremist propaganda. This means finding -- and institutionalizing -- new ways to exploit modern communications, media, the Internet, and social

networking that can preserve national security while imposing the smallest possible burden on civil society.

There are limits to what outsiders can do in addressing critical issues like religion. However, there is still a critical need for partner countries that have advanced intelligence, computer, and communications capabilities to assist nations with less capability to identify and track what is happening. This is an areas where far more work is needed to identify areas of cooperation, but they clear include aid in identifying extremist uses of the Internet, media, social networking and other recruiting, revenue raising, and communications tools

Better methods of winning the ideological battle in strategic communications need to be refined, shared, and made available to every security partner. Countering recruiting, the movement of foreign volunteers, extremist propaganda, and fund raising efforts all need to be cooperative efforts.at the same time, the West and Asian states need to learn from the Islamic world how to best reach their Muslim population with respect and reassurance, rather than relying on repression.

Similar cooperation is needed to ensure that joint military operations and outside training and assist efforts minimize the risk of divisions between the forces of largely Islamic and allies and forces and advisors from non-Islamic states.

Cases like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen have all shown that these aspects of cooperation are critical, and the new forms of civil-military cooperation are needed if Western or non-Islamic forces with different cultures and values are to work successfully with local police, militias, and other non-state actors – not only to build trust between outside and national forces, but to minimize the tension between different ethnic groups and sects.

### **Human Shields and Propaganda: Rethinking Rules of Engagement, Targeting, and Strategic Communications**

The problem of rules of engagement, targeting, and the use of force that can produce civilian casualties and collateral damage is another area that needs special attention. One of the clear lessons of the last decade and half of 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflict is the need for strategic partnerships to find better ways to address the issue of how to reshape rules of engagements and the use of force in dealing with ideological conflicts, civil conflicts, and asymmetric wars.

Operations need to both take full account of the need to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, and to ensure that this does not paralyze the effective use of force. There is an equal need avoid creating a political climate and rules of engagement whose net effect is to prolong conflicts, paralyze effective military action, raise the cumulative total of civilian casualties and collateral damage, and increase the risk of defeat.

Non-state actors, ideological extremists, and supporting outside states have already focused on the use of human shields, exploiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, and finding ways to limit or paralyze the proper use of military force. They have made such propaganda and political warfare a key aspect of their operations, and they have often done so with great success.

The problems created by dealing with irregular and ideological warfare should not become problems that make it impossible to make effective use of the advances in targeting, precision strike capabilities, and UAVs and the other advances in IS&R. The use of air and missile power should take careful account of political sensitivities, humanitarian considerations, and make every effort to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage. But, states need to rethink the steady rise

in limits to their rules of engagement, and restrictions on the use of airpower, and the problems in strategic communications in describing what such military systems do.

Non-state actors cannot be allowed to make human shields a new constant in every form of irregular and potentially conventional war. This ignores the grim realities of war. There is nothing humanitarian about saving a small number of civilian lives and opening whole towns and cities up to prolonged occupation by threats like ISIL. There is nothing humanitarian about prolonging wars, producing far higher net casualties, and adding to the massive totals of displaced persons and refugees.

The horrors of war are not shaped by a single target or moment in time, but by the cumulative impact of a conflict. There also is nothing cowardly about using force at a distance to strike at forces that butcher minorities, civilians with different religious beliefs, and prisoners of war.

Strategic partnerships must do a far better job of addressing every aspect of these issues. This means changes in strategic planning, the use of technology, intelligence, targeting, and damage assessment. It also means changes in education, training, and exercises

At the same time, however, there is a need for strategic planning that ensures that effective strategic communications efforts take place that explain the real world necessities of war, that focus on the use of human shields and false casualty claims, that address the cumulative impact of each side's actions on civilian casualties and damage, and that show that there are credible efforts in "hold and build" and stability operations that have a major civil and humanitarian dimension.

The civil-military partnerships must be transparent enough to be fully credible, to reach out to threatened and divided populations, to obtain media support, and ensure that action follows words and pledges. The use of military force not only cannot be meaningful or justified without enduring civil success, it cannot win.

### **The Strategic Challenges from the Rise of the Islamic State in the Levant and Iraq (ISIL)**

In the Gulf, these efforts must be tailored to key threats like the sudden rise of ISIL. In late 2014 and during the first half of 2015, ISIL made gains in Syria and Iraq that also made fundamental changes in the Gulf military balance. What began as a relatively small irregular force that had suffered serious reversals at the hand of other rebel forces in Syria like the Al Nusra Front was able in a matter of months to seize much of Western Iraq, and destroy key elements of the Iraqi Army.

ISIL's rise led the US to organize a broad coalition to conduct an air campaign against ISIL, and deploy major advisory and assist to rebuild a shattered Iraq Army which had lost so much of its capability that it has not been possible to provide a meaningful assessment of its capability in the previous chapters. It also triggered the build-up of separate Shi'ite militias and Pesh Merga forces to fighting ISIL, as well as a growing Iranian advisory presence that supports both the Iraqi military and Shi'ite militias in the field.

As of mid-2015, the Islamic State in the Levant and Iraq (ISIL) faced far more serious military resistance in Iraq, as well as from other rebel groups in Syria. Nevertheless, it could still make gains that offset its defeats.. It was still unclear how well Iraq could succeed in building effective national military forces, and even whether it could succeed in maintaining national unity. A wide range of nations are now assisting Iraq – and to some extent the Assad regime in Syria. At

the same time, continuing defeat of Iraqi government forces incases like Ramadia made it unclear that the Iraqi central government could overcome the legacy of former Prime Minister Maliki in alienating Iraq's Sunnis and Kurds. Similarly, ISIL's seizure of Palmyra and defeats of other rebel forces in Northeast Iraq, made it seem unlikely that it would be possible to bring unity to a Syria that was divided into an Assad/Alawite-dominated west, increasingly Jihadist Sunni rebels in its more populated center, and ISIL dominated east.

### **The Strategic Challenge in Iraq**

The key question in both Iraq and in Syria – and in assessing what was often being treated as a “war against the Islamic state” -- was how any form of military activity – including even the most effective counterinsurgency operations can bring meaningful stability to either country? Military victories in serious counterinsurgencies were at best a means to a political end, and could actually make things worse if they are not tied to some lasting form of political stability. Iraq showed all too clearly that the struggles involving ISIL and other non-state actors in the Gulf region were largely an outgrowth of the fact that Syria, Iraq, and Yemen were “failed states.” As noted earlier, they were empowered by the fact that past governments had failed to meet the needs of their peoples, and had created deep structural divisions and problems that could not be overcome by military or internal security activity alone. They had become states where where any successful form of civil-military stability operations required years of nation building to ensure stability and progress.

Iraq –like Yemen and Syria – was a clear case in point. Any meaningful and lasting form of “victory” in Iraq meant that it had emerge out of the fighting with some solution to the deep divisions between Arab and Kurd, and Sunni and Shi'ite, with a functioning level of government and security, and with the ability to move towards some workable path of development. A Shi'ite-led occupation of Sunni areas may be better than an Islamic State occupation, but it will not solve Iraq's political, governance, security, and stability problems.

Ethnic problems remained at the crisis level. The Kurdish forces that drove ISIL out of some of its gains in the the north created new tensions between Arab and Kurd, after the Kurds took advantage of the central government's losses in the North to grab more territory around Kirkuk, and with a sharp rise in Sunni and Shiite tensions around a “liberated” Mosul, will create ethnic problems that may be as serious as the sectarian ones between Sunni and Shi'ite, as well as spill over into Kurdish areas in Turkey and Syria.

Using US and allied airpower to create a situation where a divided, Shiite-led Iraq became steadily more dependent on Iran created other dangers. Arab Sunni states around Iraq saw even more reason to be hostile to Iran, and Iraq is a constant reason for more division between Sunni and Shi'ite. Turkey saw Iraq's Kurds as a threat or as an extension of its struggles against its own Kurds by other means – particularly because the past fighting has made it impossible for Turkey to separate the challenge it sees from Iraq's Kurds from their ties to the Kurds in Syria.

Economics remained a key issue affecting the security balance. Iraq faced a new economic crisis because of a radical decline in its petroleum export revenues, the massive impact of the fighting on its development, and on a structure of governance that the World Bank rated as one of the worst in the world, and that is corrupt that Transparency International rates Iraq as the 170<sup>th</sup> most corrupt nation in world out of 175. The government not only had to deal with civil conflict and ISIL, but the impact of the fighting on some 32 million people.

More than 12 million had now been displaced or occupied by extremists, and Iraq had become one of the poorest states in the region. The CIA ranked its per capita income at only \$7,100 before the serious fighting began, and this compares with \$12,800 for an Iran under sanctions, and \$31,300 for a relatively stable Saudi Arabia. It is also an extremely young country, where more than 56% of the population is 24 years of age or younger, 16% of the total population and over 25% of young men were directly or indirectly unemployed before the new round of fighting started.

Iraq also faced the challenge of dealing with levels of sectarian and ethnic tension that have involved the near destruction of even those cities like Tilkri that have been “liberated” from the Islamic state, and civil society suffered from endemic terrorism. The U.S. State Department country report on terrorism for 2014 rated Iraq as the scene of the highest levels of terrorism in the world, with a total of 3,370 attacks in 2014 versus 2,501 in 2013, 9,929 killed in 2014 versus 6,387 in 2013, and 15,137 injured in 2014 versus 14,976 in 2013.<sup>305</sup> It noted that,<sup>306</sup>

- Although terrorist attacks took place in 95 countries in 2014, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than 60% of all attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria), and 78% of all fatalities due to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria).
- The number of terrorist attacks in 2014 increased 35% and total fatalities increased 81% compared to 2013, largely due to activity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. In certain countries, including Greece, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Russia, terrorist attacks and total fatalities decreased.
- Large increases in Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries that also experienced high numbers of attacks in 2013, comprise more than one-third (37%) of the 35% increase in total attacks worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013.
- Several countries observed large increases in the number of hostages taken in terrorist attacks in 2014. However, the largest increases took place in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria, comprising more than two-thirds (68%) of the 201% increase in hostages worldwide in 2014 compared to 2013. This considerable increase in the total number of hostages taken by perpetrators of terrorist attacks is a result of a large increase in the number of attacks that involved any hostages as well as a large increase in the number of attacks that involved more than 100 hostages.
- By a wide margin, the highest numbers of total attacks, total fatalities, and total injuries took place in Iraq. The average lethality of attacks in Iraq was 3.07, nearly 20 percent higher than the global average (2.57 fatalities per attack), and 19% higher than the 2013 average in Iraq (2.56).
- The increases in terrorism in Iraq in 2014 coincided with the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The percentage of attacks in Iraq for which no perpetrator group was identified decreased from 84% in 2013 to 70% in 2014. During the same time period, the number of attacks in Iraq attributed to ISIL (also known as al-Qa'ida in Iraq in 2013) increased from 400 to more than 950, representing 96% of all attacks in Iraq for which a perpetrator group was identified in 2014.
- Five of the 20 most lethal individual attacks in 2014 took place in Iraq; all were carried out by ISIL. In addition, terrorism in Iraq continued to be marked by extremely deadly coordinated attacks. On 160 occasions in 2014, there were more than 10 attacks on a single day within a particular country. Of these, more than two-thirds (71%) took place in Iraq. Likewise, there were 109 occasions in 2014 when more than 50 people were killed in terrorist attacks on one day in a particular country. Approximately one-third of these highly lethal days (36%) occurred in Iraq and involved up to 27 attacks on a single day.
- More than three-quarters of all attacks in Iraq (77%) were classified as bombings/explosions and 7% were suicide attacks. An additional 12 were armed assaults, 5% were kidnappings, and 5% were assassinations, often targeting government figures and police leadership.
- Although the percentage of attacks involving hostages in Iraq (5%) was half that of the global percentage (10%) in 2014, in 2014 Iraq experienced an extraordinary increase in the total number of hostages taken (896%) in terrorist attacks compared to 2013. This increase was due to a small number of attacks that involved



extremely high numbers of hostages.

- The most common types of targets in Iraq were private citizens and property<sup>2</sup> (41%), police (24%), and general (non-diplomatic) government, entities (9%).
- The majority of the attacks in Iraq took place in the governorates of Baghdad (26%), Saladin (22%), Nineveh (13%), Diyala (13%), and al-Anbar (12%).

The Iraqi government and the U.S. were seeking to rebuild Iraqi forces from the ground up to defeat ISIL. However, Iraqi military operations, U.S. “train and assist” efforts, limited use of airpower by a U.S.-led coalition, and the efforts of Iran have not yet provided to be meaningful strategy even in defeating ISIL at a tactical level. Moreover, warfighting is necessary, but is only a means to an end. Even far more success than has occurred to date will only provide marginal benefits unless there is some far more meaningful strategy to bring broader stability to Iraq and make major improvements in civil efforts in politics, governance, and development.

### **The Strategic Challenge in Syria**

The situation in Syria was far worse than in Iraq, and presented the additional problem that it might well be impossible to secure Iraq if Syria remains caught up in one of the modern world’s civil wars. Estimates of Syria’s population differ, but the CIA puts it at very close to 18 million and the World Bank at around 20.4 million. There are no reliable estimates of the numbers killed in the fighting, but even the most conservative estimates put the total at over 220,000. Wounded normally are at least three times the numbers killed, which would put the number of wounded at 660,000, and create a total of at least 880,000 casualties by January 2015.

The U.S. State Department country report on terrorism for 2014 noted that the limitations of media coverage in Syria meant that the data it presented were conservative estimates of terrorism in Syria because they only counted attacks that had been verified by at least one well-regarded source, and incidents reported by independent news outlets. Even so, it rated Syria as the scene of the sixth highest level of terrorism in the world, with a total of 232 attacks in 2014 versus 222 in 2013, 1,698 killed in 2014 versus 1,084 in 2013, and 1,473 injured in 2014 versus 1,776 in 2013.<sup>307</sup> It noted that,<sup>308</sup>

- While the number of terrorist attacks recorded in Syria in 2014 remained relatively stable compared to 2013, the total number of deaths increased 57%. Approximately one-quarter of the increase in fatalities (26%) in Syria was a result of a large increase in the number of perpetrators killed while carrying out attacks, however.
- The average lethality of terrorist attacks in Syria in 2014 (8.24) was more than three times as high as the global average (2.57) and 59% higher than the average lethality of terrorist attacks in Syria in 2013.
- As in 2013, the average number of people wounded in attacks in Syria in 2014 was particularly high at 9.32. This was 226% higher than the global average for injuries (2.86), but 1% lower than the average number injured in terrorist attacks in Syria in 2013.
- Syria experienced a more than 300% increase in the number of hostages taken in 2014, compared to 2013. More than 870 people were kidnapped or taken hostage in 30 terrorist attacks in Syria, including three attacks in which more than 100 people were taken hostage. These three attacks targeted Kurdish civilians, particularly children, and were attributed to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
- Information about the perpetrator groups responsible for terrorist attacks in Syria was reported in 61% of all cases. Among those attacks for which perpetrator group information was available, ISIL was responsible for 62% and al-Nusrah Front was responsible for 20%.
- Approximately two-thirds of all terrorist attacks in Syria in 2014 took place in the governorates of Aleppo (32%), Damascus (17%), and Homs (17%).

The real human tragedy, however, was much broader and involved more than half the population. Estimates by USAID put the total number of Syrians needing assistance at 12.2 million as of December 2014 and as at least several million higher by May 2015. Some 7.6 million of these Syrians had been displaced inside Syria away from their homes, schools, businesses and jobs. Another 3.8 million had been driven out of the country by January 2015. Estimates of Syrians in combat areas where they could not receive aid reached as high as 4.6 million.

Like Iraq, the World Bank ranked Syria as a badly governed country long before the current fighting, and Transparency International ranks Syria close to Iraq in corruption. The CIA ranked its per capita income at only \$5,100 in 2011 before the fighting began – a level so low that Syria ranked only 159<sup>th</sup> in the world in per capita income. Like Iraq, Syria is an extremely young country. More than 53% of the population is 24 years of age or younger, and at least 20% of Syria's youth were directly or indirectly unemployed before the new round of fighting started.

Unlike Iraq, however, Syria showed no signs of moving toward any military progress or solution. Various rebel factions and exiles make claims, but the one “moderate” faction the US seriously tried to support and arm has suffered two catastrophic defeats at the hands of the al Nusra Front. Syria is now divided into three armed sections – all of the vicious and violent.

There was an Assad-Alawite dominated government in the Western coastal areas,. There was a mix of rebel factions fighting for control of Aleppo and the urban and agricultural belt to the east where the Al Nusra Front and Korashan group – both tied to al Qaeda – dominate a mix of rebel factions. ISIL controls the less populated areas from Raqqa and further East into the area around Hasakah and down along the Euphrates to Deir al-Zour and Abu Kamal, but much of the area shown as being under its control in media maps was actually an empty desert.

No major element of Syria's three main groups of warring factions offered hope, security and stability through a military option. Arab Gulf aid did strengthen the rebel factions that opposed ISIL, but as yet had had no decisive results. U.S. efforts to train some 5,000 “moderate” rebels a year had made no meaningful progress as of mid-2015, and the more moderate rebel groups in exile seem too weak to be more than a forlorn hope.

As for outside military options, various experts had proposed a number of ways to help generate more effective rebel forces. Some had proposed sending U.S. troops and/or using airpower, imposing no fly zones, or creating a buffer zone in the north. None of these proposals seemed likely to be implemented as of mid-2015, and it was unclear that any could decide the struggle between the forces of the Assad regime, ISIL, and largely Islamist rebel groups,.

As was the case in Iraq. It was too clear that any form of tactical victory would not mean any lasting form of political victory or stability. It also seemed clear it would leave massive numbers of Syrians displaced without the ability to return to their homes and businesses, as well create critical security challenges in neighboring countries if millions of Syrian refugees become a lasting presence in neighboring states that have little economic and political capability to absorb them.

### **The Strategic Challenge in Yemen**

The political crisis in Yemen that had led to border clashes with Saudi Arabia in 2009, and which had steadily divided the Yemen from 2011 onwards, deteriorated into a massive civil conflict in the spring of 2015. Two key sets of non-state actors dominated this set of divisions: Shi'ite Houthi groups, originally centered in the northwest and now in control of much of “North” or western Yemen and its capital at Sanaa, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – an affiliate of Al Qaeda

central and the main terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia – in central Yemen. By mid 2015, the situation had become so volatile that was no clear structure Yemen's regular military forces, the nation was caught up in a growing conflict between the Shi'ite Houthis anair combat coalition led by Saudi Arabia,, and a serious risk that Yemen could become locked into a lasting nation-wide civil conflict or permanently divide.

### **Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Houthi, Iran, and the Bab el Mandab**

Lkje ISIL, Yemen taught the Arab Gulf states and the U.S. a lesson in just how quickly the strategic situation and military balance in the region can change as a result of the revolution in civil-military affairs, and Yemen is of major strategic importance to the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula.

Even in late 2014, the US and Saudi Arabia still focused on the fact that Yemen had become the base of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) -- after Saudi counterterrorism forces largely drove it out of Saudi Arabia in 2003-2008. It remains the most powerful terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states, and both the State Department and National Counter Terrorism Center report that it is the most active single extremist movement in planning terrorist attacks against the United States. Any serious rise of ISIS in Yemen can only make this worse.

The sudden rise in the intensity of the civil war that gave the Houthi control over much of the country in the spring of 2015, and the growing ties between Yemen's Houthi Shi'ites and Iran, posed another important threat to Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states, and the US. It posed the risk that Iran might beable to outflank the Gulf, and deploy air and naval forces into Yemen. This threat still seemed limited in mdi-2015, but Yemen's territory and islands do play a critical role in the security of a global chokepoint at the southeastern end of the Red Sea called the Bab el Mandab or "Gate of Tears."

The EIA describes the energy impact of importance of this chokepoint as follows, and is critical to note that far more is involved than energy: the cost and security of every cargo ship that goes through the Suez canal, the security of US and other allied combat ships moving through the canal, the economic stability of Egypt, and the security of Saudi Arabia's key port at Jeddah and major petroleum export facility outside the Gulf: <sup>309</sup>

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and it is a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait is located between [Yemen](#), Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline also pass through Bab el-Mandeb.

An estimated 3.8 million bbl/d of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed through this waterway in 2013 toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, an increase from 2.9 million bbl/d in 2009. Oil shipped through the strait decreased by almost one-third in 2009 because of the global economic downturn and the decline in northbound oil shipments to Europe. Northbound oil shipments increased through Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 2013, and more than half of the traffic, about 2.1 million bbl/d, moved northbound to the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.

Any hostile air or sea presence in Yemen could threaten the entire traffic through the Suez Canal, as well as a daily flow of oil and petroleum products that the EIA estimates increased from 2.9 MMBD in 2009 to 3.8 MMBD in 2013. Such a threat also can be largely covert or indirect. Libya demonstrated this under Qaddafi when he had a cargo ship drop mines in the Red Sea.

This has led to both Saudi and US military action. In May 2015, Saudi Arabia took the lead in forming a military coalition to attack the Houthi in Yemen with US support. Saudi Arabia and its allies were conducting air strikes in Yemen to try to halt the advance of a Houthi militia, and attempting to restore President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi's and Yemen's elected government to Aden. Saudi Arabia had formed a coalition of more than 10 countries to try to protect the Hadi government. Saudi Arabia had also taken the lead in getting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar to sign a joint statement announcing the military action. Moreover Reuters reported that Egypt, Jordan and Sudan have said that they have forces involved in the operation, the Sudan has pledged ground troops and warplanes. Some reports say that Morocco will send combat aircraft as well.<sup>310</sup> The United States provided the Saudi-led forces with logistic and intelligence support, and provided naval forces to help block an Iranian convoy. It also, however, sought a political solution, regional efforts at nation building, and diplomatic pressure on Iran.

### **Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Nation-Building**

The combination of a Houthi-driven civil war, Iranian influence, and AQAP has made Yemen a threat to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the other GCC states. It has also highlighted the links between counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and nation-building. Yemen may be a small country, but it has a population of 26.1 million, with one of the highest population growth rates in the world. Nearly 63% of its population is 24 years of age or younger. It is deeply divided between Sunnis (65%) and Shiites like the Houthi (35%). It is incredibly poor, running of water, crippled by a drug oriented Qat economy, and facing a steady decline in its already limited petroleum exports.<sup>311</sup>

Even before the rise towards civil war after 2011, Yemen was a nation with a doubtful future for anyone who did emigrate or have a source of income from family working outside the country. Its per capita income was only around \$2,500 – ranking only 187<sup>th</sup> in the world. Its direct unemployment rate was at least 35% -- giving it a global ranking of only 188<sup>th</sup> in the world -- and youth direct and disguised unemployment was probably around 50%. Its agriculture sector was so unproductive that the CIA estimated it accounted for over 70% of the jobs, but less than 8% of the GDP. More than 45% of the population was calculated to live below a dismally low national poverty line, while the elite 10% accounted for over 30% of national consumption.<sup>312</sup>

These steadily deteriorating economic realities rose to absolute crisis level because of political divisions and fighting, and created one of the world's most fertile grounds for political extremism, terrorism, sectarian struggles between Sunni and Shi'ite and even more intense effort to leave the country and find jobs in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Oman, face the fact that Saudi Arabia has a 1,458 kilometer border with Yemen and Oman has a 288 kilometer border.<sup>313</sup>

Saudi Arabia has also faced a major threat from Yemeni illegal immigration, smuggling, and hostile terrorist and political forces for decades. This immigration not only has included hundreds of thousands of illegals from Yemen, but other illegals from unstable countries like Somalia, and some of these illegals and extremists move into the other Arab Gulf states. Saudi Arabia already had to try to expel them from the Kingdom when Yemen support Iraq in the Gulf War in 1990 and

1991, and instability in Yemen may well now pose a more immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf petroleum exporting states than the instability in Syria and Iraq.

### **The Rise of the Broader Terrorist and Extremist Threat**

The threats in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – and the disruption of government forces and rise of non-state actors in shaping the balance -- are the result of ongoing wars between a mix of states and non-state actors. At the same time, they involve a wide range of outside actors like the US, Iran, and a mix of other Arab, Sunni governed states. At the same time, there is a different mix of threats from terrorism and extremism that is leading most of the states in the region to restructure their security forces.

The data in **Figure XI.1** and **Figure XI.2** provide official US State Department estimates of the recent growth and nature of part of this terrorist and extremist threat, which became steadily larger following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the emergence of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2003, and the political upheavals that began in 2001.

These conflicts drove the sharp rise shown in **Figure XI.1** and **Figure XI.2**, along with the tensions between Sunni and Shi'ite in Bahrain, Iraq, Yemen, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. These Figures, however, focus on terrorism and not insurgency or civil war, and only cover the period through 2013. They do not reflect the seriousness of much broader civil war in Syria, the emergence of ISIL as a protostate in Syria and Iraq in 2013-2014, and the steadily accelerating civil war in Yemen in 2015-2015.

**Figure XI.3** provides a summary of the database used in the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information in the US State Department, Bureau of Counterterrorism Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. It provides eight different trend lines for the growing rate of terrorist activity in each country. It also shows just how complex *and different* the patterns of violent extremism are in each country in terms of key actors, levels of violence, casualties, and methods and targets of attack.<sup>314</sup>

As the sources used state, there are serious limits to such data. It is hard to collect reliable information that cover areas under limited government control. Some governments do not report or ask to avoid being reporting in unclassified data. Sources often conflict, and further problems occur because of the difficulty of distinguishing between terrorist casualties and incidents and the impact of regional political upheavals and uncertainties. Official unclassified reporting often lags a year behind the growth of the threat, and much of it only addresses terrorist movements and the state sponsors of terrorism. It often does not fully cover extremist activity that is not violent, smaller or emerging groups, or the far more serious threat posed by various insurgent groups like ISIL and sectarian and other violent militias in nations like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

### **Increases in Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces**

There are equal limits to the reporting on the recent build-up of Gulf internal security and paramilitary forces. Estimates by various think tanks and commercial risk firms are uncertain at best. The data in **Figure X.4** and **Figure X.5** only provide a rough indication of the scale of Gulf state efforts to improve counter-terrorism forces, suppress violent internal opposition movements, and increase the size of states security forces throughout the region.

There is no clear way to quantify the elements of regular forces that are devoted to counter-terrorism missions, and many of the changes involve major investments and internal shifts in role

of Ministries of the Interior, Information and Justice, as well as in national police forces and non-military intelligence branches that are not reported in unclassified military studies, although they sometimes involve massive expenditures, increase in forces, and low-level combat.

Efforts to improve counterterrorism and internal security capabilities also involve significant shifts in civil politics, the control of foreign labor and immigration, surveillance and control of mosques and religious activity, and civil governance that affects different Islamic sects – particularly the Shi'ite population in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The security balance in two other countries – Yemen and Iraq – has been sharply affected by ongoing tensions or conflict between Sunnis, Shi'ites and other religious minorities that are compounded by tribal and regional tensions.

### **Problems and Challenges in Creating Effective Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces**

All this complex mix of civil-military issues, the rise of non-state actors, civil conflicts, ideological extremism, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare is making major changes in the Gulf balance and in the need for new forms of security cooperation. Some GCC countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already made major progress in these areas, and the U.S. continues to adapt its own forces. Even so, the Arab Gulf states, the U.S. and other outside powers face significant challenges.

These challenges include:

- Protection of the regime within sufficient attention to the causes of unrest and the need for reform.
- Overreliance on repressive internal security measures that achieve short-term gains but breed anger and support for violent non-state actors.
- Failure to address discrimination against Shi'ite, Sunnis, and minorities, compounded by tribal rivalries and regional discrimination.
- Abuse of the justice system in terms of detentions, trials, imprisonment, and denial of citizenship.
- Poor training and equipment for handling public demonstrations and crowds.
- Failure to develop an effective balance of control and tolerance over religious preaching and practices, compounded by a failure to engage extremist non-state actors at all of the necessary levels of media, communication, and uses of cell phones and the internet.
- Failure to address to enforce efforts to limit the size of foreign labor coupled to failures to protect foreign labor and ensure there not be future unrest.
- Mixed progress in controlling the flow of money and volunteers to foreign extremists.
- Mixed progress in finding ways to integrate military, paramilitary, and police assets and operations to achieve success without delays and/or the excessive use of force.
- Failure to eliminate delays, corruption, and favoritism in related aspects of the police and justice systems.
- Excessive use of special security legislation and courts to bypass the regular justice system in ways that increase popular anger and support for violent non-state actors.
- Failure to separate out young volunteers and other detainees from hardcore extremists, and to offer an effective path to reintroduce detainees to national society.

**Figure XI.5** provides a summary of US State reporting on human rights and rule of law problems in counterterrorism and internal security forces by country.

## **Redefining Security and the Priorities for Cooperation**

This is a complex and daunting list of ongoing 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges that interact in many different ways. It is particularly challenging because we are talking about two “revolutions in military affairs” and not just one, because it requires the same focus on internal security as military security, and because the outcome of the civil-military balance – and the struggle against extremism and terrorism – require changes in governance, economic development, and civil society as well as in the security side of the balance.

No military officers or national security planner can ignore the fact that all of the traditional problems in creating effective military forces and security cooperation still exist. None can ignore the fact that the preparation of forces for 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict is complicated by rising costs, constant shifts in technology and related tactics, and by a growing need for new levels of military professionalism.

It is clear, however, that there is a revolution in civil-military affairs, that there are solutions to the problems this revolution raises, and that the right kind of strategic partnership is one of them. Each area of possible improvement is a subject in itself, but all of the following steps can clearly make a difference:

- Preparing for asymmetric and irregular warfare as methods of conflict that have equal importance to conventional warfare, and whose political and economic dimensions will often be as or more important than their tactical dimensions.
- Accepting the fact that there will often be no clear dividing line between terrorism, insurgency, and the divisions created by other forces within nations that sometimes approach the status of failed states.
- Accepting and responding to the challenge of religious ideological extremism as a key element of war, and the exploitation of sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional, and other differences and fault lines as methods of irregular warfare.
- Developing new forms of net assessments that produce a clear civil-military picture of the forces driving the emergence of non state actors and internal civil tensions and conflicts, and the relative strength and weaknesses of threat forces, host country forces, and outside strategic partners
- Creating strategic and tactical plans that look beyond “win” to civil-military stability operations that can produce both a quick response and lasting solution to “hold and build.”
- Preparing both military and civilians, and aid personnel, for an effective whole of government approach to such conflicts.
- Rethinking strategic communications to respond to ideological threats and threats from non-state actors, to explain and justify the necessary military operations and civil actions, and wage ideological warfare as a key element of asymmetric warfare.
- Developing new rules of engagement, conflict assessment, and methods of strategic communications to find the best balance between effective methods of waging war and the need to limit cumulative casualties and collateral damage.
- Redefining strategic partnerships to have the flexibility to be effective in given conflicts.
- Developing new case studies, models, and exercises that reflect the successes and failures in past conflicts, and learn the civil-military, ideological, and broader lessons of past wars.

In fact, each has become an essential step in dealing with the new forms of conflict that have emerged in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It is true that every power must adapt its military forces, training, and education in its own way. One size definitely does not fit all. Virtually every state faces a different mix of these challenges, and has different priorities for dealing with them. At the same

time, the fact that strategic partnerships require a new degree of flexibility scarcely makes them less important. The last two decades have provided consistent brutal lessons about the cost of ignoring any of these 21<sup>st</sup> Century changes in the nature of war. They have shown again and again that successful military and national security operations must meet these new threats, set new priorities for cooperation, and be ready for new forms of conflict.



## Figure XI.1 Measuring the Comparative Intensity of Gulf and Nearby Terrorist Threats – Part One

*Countries with the most terrorist attacks or fatalities, 2014*

	Total Attacks		Total Fatalities		Fatalities per Attack		Total Injuries		Injured per Attack		Hostages Taken	
	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013
Iraq	3370	2501	9929	6387	3.07	2.59	15137	14976	4.79	6.10	2658	267
Pakistan	1821	1941	1757	2351	0.99	1.24	2837	5075	1.61	2.71	869	417
Afghanistan	1591	1149	4505	3111	2.92	2.76	4699	3724	3.16	3.37	719	273
India	763	632	426	409	0.59	0.66	643	717	0.90	1.18	302	190
Nigeria	662	309	7512	1842	12.8	6.46	2246	472	6.31	1.98	1298	89
Syria	232	222	1698	1084	8.24	5.19	1473	1776	9.32	9.45	872	214
Worldwide	13463	9964	32727	18066	2.57	1.86	34791	32880	2.86	3.45	9428	3137

**NOTE:** India, which was among the five countries with the most attacks in 2014, ranked 13th in terms of fatalities. Syria, which was among the five countries with the most fatalities in 2014, ranked 14 th in terms of attacks.

Source: U.S. State Department, “Annex of Statistical Information,” *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2014*, April 2014, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/>.

## Figure XI.1 Measuring the Comparative Intensity of Gulf and Nearby Terrorist Threats – Part Two

### *Five perpetrator groups with the most attacks worldwide, 2014*

	Total Attacks		Total Fatalities		Total Injuries		Hostages Taken		Number of Countries	
	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013	2014	2013
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	1083	429	6286	1752	5808	4529	3158	114	5	4
Taliban	894	648	3492	2356	3312	2249	649	229	2	2
Al-Shabaab	497	196	1022	517	850	761	579	132	4	4
Boko Haram	453	217	6644	1595	1742	370	1217	38	3	3
Maoists/Communist Party of India-Maoist	305	203	188	192	165	126	160	83	1	1

- Information about perpetrators was reported in source materials for 46% of terrorist attacks in 2014.. In 30% of the attacks with information about perpetrator groups, the groups explicitly claimed responsibility. In the remaining attacks, source documents attributed responsibility to a particular group or groups based on reports from authorities or observers.
- The perpetrator groups responsible for the most terrorist attacks in 2014 were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and Maoists in India. These groups were also responsible for the most attacks in 2013. All five increased the frequency of their attacks in 2014, though at different rates.
- Of the attacks for which perpetrator information was reported, 17% were attributed to ISIL. Although ISIL operated primarily in Iraq and Syria, the group expanded its influence geographically in 2014 by carrying out attacks in Lebanon and Egypt for the first time. In addition, several organizations based in other countries pledged allegiance to ISIL and self-identified as a “province,” “chapter,” or “supporter” of the Islamic State.
- Among these five perpetrator groups, the average lethality of attacks carried out by ISIL (6.46 people killed per attack), the Taliban (4.07), and Boko Haram (16.86) were higher than the global average (2.57) in 2014. The average lethality of attacks carried out by al-Shabaab (2.46) was slightly lower than the global average. Attacks carried out by Maoist perpetrators in India were by far the least deadly and the least likely to be deadly, causing 0.63 deaths per attack.
- All five of the most active groups markedly increased the number of hostages taken in 2014; however, the increases in hostage-takings by ISIL and Boko Haram were exceptionally large. Attacks carried out by these two groups in 2014 involved more than 4,300 hostages, 50% of all hostages taken in terrorist attacks worldwide in which the perpetrator group was identified.

Source: U.S. State Department, “Annex of Statistical Information,” *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2014*, April 2014, pp. 4-6, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/>.

## Figure XI.2: US State Department Description of Terrorist Threats and State Sponsors of Terrorism in or Near the Gulf States:

### ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES

**aka** Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades

**Description:** The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a July 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against Israel. The group is divided into two branches: the Arabian Peninsula-based Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, named after the now-deceased founder of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula; and the Lebanon-based Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Ziad al Jarrah, a Lebanese citizen who was one of the planners of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

**Activities:** AAB has relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, and is responsible for numerous rocket attacks fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon. These attacks in Israel have targeted population centers, including Nahariya and Ashkelon. In addition to rocket attacks, AAB carried out a July 2010 suicide bombing attack against the Japanese-owned oil tanker M/V M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz.

In November 2013, AAB began to target Hizballah. It claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded over 140, and warned that the group would carry out more attacks unless Hizballah stops sending fighters to support Syrian government forces.

In February 2014, a twin suicide bomb attack targeting the Iranian cultural center in Beirut killed four people; AAB claimed responsibility for the attack and said that it had carried out the bombings as retaliation for Hizballah's involvement in the Syrian conflict. AAB is also believed to have been responsible for a series of bombings in Hizballah-controlled areas around Beirut. A June suicide bombing at a police checkpoint on the Beirut-Damascus highway targeted Lebanese General Security head Major General Abbas Ibrahim, who narrowly escaped. Also in June, a suicide bombing in the Beirut neighborhood of Tayyouneh killed a security officer and wounded 25 people.

In July, AAB briefly turned its attention back towards Israel, firing a series of rockets into northern Israel in response to Israel's Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** AAB is based in Lebanon and operates in Lebanon and Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown.

### ANSAR AL-ISLAM

**aka** Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22, 2004, Ansar al-Islam's (AAI's) goals include expelling western interests from Iraq and establishing an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia law. AAI was established in 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan with the merger of two Kurdish violent extremist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. On May 4, 2010, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i, AAI's leader, was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad and remains in prison. On December 15, 2011, AAI announced a new leader, Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibrahim.

Mullah Krekar (aka Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad), an Iraqi citizen and the founder of AAI, continued to reside in Norway on a long-term residence permit. In March 2012, a trial court in Norway convicted Krekar of issuing threats and inciting terrorism, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Krekar appealed, and in December 2012, an appeals court affirmed his convictions for issuing threats and intimidating witnesses, but reversed his conviction for "inciting terrorism." The appeals court reduced his sentence to two years and 10 months in prison.

**Activities:** AAI has conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Coalition Forces. AAI has conducted numerous kidnappings, executions, and assassinations of Iraqi

citizens and politicians. The group has either claimed responsibility or is believed to be responsible for attacks in 2011 that killed 24 and wounded 147. During August and September 2013, AAI claimed attacks against Iraqi Army security forces, as well as an attack against an individual associated with the Iraqi government.

In 2014, AAI claimed responsibility for attacks that occurred near Kirkuk, Tikrit, and Mosul, Iraq. AAI's attacks were primarily directed at the Iraqi police and security forces, and in one instance an oil field. AAI claims to have killed several Iraqi military members, law enforcement officials, and claims to have obtained weapons and vehicles.

**Strength:** Although precise numbers are unknown, AAI is considered one of the largest Sunni terrorist groups in Iraq.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Primarily northern Iraq, but also maintains a presence in western and central Iraq.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

## GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA

**aka** al-Gama'at; Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama'at; IG; Islamic Group

**Description:** Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Once Egypt's largest militant group, IG was formed in the 1970s. In 2011, it formed the Construction and Development political party that competed in the 2011 parliamentary elections, winning 13 seats. Egypt-based members of IG released from prison prior to the 2011 revolution have renounced terrorism, although some members located overseas have worked with or joined al-Qa'ida (AQ). Hundreds of members, who may not have renounced violence, were released from prison in 2011. The external wing, composed of mainly exiled members in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state. IG's "spiritual" leader, the "blind Sheikh," Omar Abd al-Rahman, is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Supporters of Abd al-Rahman have called for reprisal attacks in the event of his death in prison.

**Activities:** In the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG has not committed a known terrorist attack in recent years.

**Strength:** At its peak, IG likely commanded several thousand core members and a similar number of supporters. Security crackdowns following the 1997 attack in Luxor and the 1999 ceasefire, along with post-September 11 security measures and defections to AQ, have probably resulted in a substantial decrease in what is left of an organized group.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The IG is believed to have maintained a presence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, the UK, Germany, and France.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

## HIZBALLAH

**aka** the Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

**Description:** Hizballah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme Leader, which was Ali Khamenei in 2014. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with Syria, and like Iran, the group is providing assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Hizballah has strong influence in Lebanon, especially with the Shia community. Hizballah plays an active role in Lebanese politics, and the group holds 12 seats in the 128-member Lebanese Parliament and two seats in the 24-member Council of Ministers. Hizballah's political strength grew in the wake of the 2006 war with Israel and the group's 2008 takeover of West Beirut, although its reputation and popularity have been significantly undermined by the group's active support for the Asad regime.

Hizballah provides support to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as a number of local Christian and Muslim militias in Lebanon. Besides overt political support, support includes the covert provision of weapons, explosives, training, funding, and guidance.

**Activities:** Hizballah's terrorist attacks have included the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and on the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area and, separately, kidnapped an Israeli non-combatant in Dubai. Although the non-combatant survived, on November 1, 2001, Israeli Army Rabbi Israel Weiss pronounced the soldiers dead. The surviving non-combatant and the bodies of the Israeli soldiers were returned to Israel in a prisoner exchange with Hizballah in 2004.

Two attacks against UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeepers – an attack in late July 2011 that wounded six French citizens and a second attack days later that injured three other French soldiers – were believed to have been carried out by Hizballah. Also in 2011, four Hizballah members were indicted by the U.N.-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an international tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. A fifth Hizballah member, Hassan Habib Merhi, was indicted in October 2013.

In 2012, Hizballah increased the pace of its terrorist plotting, and was implicated in several terrorist plots around the world. In January 2012, Thai police detained a Hizballah operative on immigration charges as he was attempting to depart Thailand from Suvarnabhumi International Airport. He led police to nearly 10,000 pounds of urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok. The Hizballah operative was convicted of possessing bomb-making materials by a Thai court in September 2013. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison.

In Cyprus, a suspected Hizballah operative was detained by the Cypriot authorities on July 7, 2012 for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists in Cyprus. The trial began in September 2012, and on March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.

In July 2012, a terrorist attack was carried out on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Sarafovo Airport near the Bulgarian city of Burgas. The explosion killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, and injured 32. On February 5, 2013, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Tsvetan Tsevtanov publicly linked two operatives in the Burgas bombing to Hizballah, and in July 2013, the Bulgarian government identified the operatives as Hassan al-Hajj Hassan, a dual Canadian-Lebanese citizen; and Meliad Farah, a dual Australian-Lebanese citizen. In August 2013, Hizballah claimed responsibility for an attack on the Lebanese-Israeli border that wounded four members of an Israeli military convoy.

In May 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying to support Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Hizballah's support for the Asad regime carried into 2014, and the group remained active in Syria. Separately, in October 2014, Hizballah set off an explosive device on the border between Lebanon and Israel. The attack wounded two Israeli soldiers.

**Strength:** Tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Hizballah is based in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. As evidenced by Hizballah's activities during the course of 2012 and 2013, the group is capable of operating around the globe. As of December 2014, Hizballah fighters were assisting Asad regime forces in many areas across Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran continued to provide Hizballah with training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid; Syria has furnished training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding from private donations and profits from legal and illegal businesses. Hizballah receives financial support from Lebanese Shia communities in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. As illustrated by the Lebanese-Canadian bank case, Hizballah supporters are often engaged in a range of criminal activities that benefit the group financially. These have included smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, trafficking in narcotics, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

## IRAN

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its terrorist-related activity in 2014, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Lebanese Hizballah, and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. This year, Iran increased its assistance to Iraqi Shia militias, one of which is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), in response to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) incursion into Iraq, and has continued to support other militia groups in the region. Iran also attempted to smuggle weapons to Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza. While its main effort focused on supporting goals in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iran and its proxies also continued subtle efforts at growing influence elsewhere including in Africa, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF is the regime's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.

Iran views Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Lebanese Hizballah, its primary beneficiary, and as a key pillar in its "resistance" front. In 2014, Iran continued to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of primarily Iraqi Shia and Afghan fighters to support the Asad regime's brutal crackdown that has resulted in the deaths of at least 191,000 people in Syria, according to August UN estimates. Iran publicly admits to sending members of the IRGC to Syria in an advisory role. There is consistent media reporting that some of these troops are IRGC-QF members and that they have taken part in direct combat operations. While Tehran has denied that IRGC-QF personnel participate in combat operations, in 2014 it acknowledged the deaths in Syria of two senior officers (Brigadier Generals Abdullah Eskandari and Jamar Dariswali). Tehran claimed they were volunteers who lost their lives while protecting holy shrines near Damascus.

Likewise in Iraq, despite its pledge to support Iraq's stabilization, Iran increased training and funding to Iraqi Shia militia groups in response to ISIL's advance into Iraq. Many of these groups, such as Kata'ib Hizballah (KH), have exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq and have committed serious human rights abuses against primarily Sunni civilians. The IRGC-QF, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device (IED) technology and other advanced weaponry. Similar to Hizballah fighters, many of these trained Shia militants have used these skills to fight for the Asad regime in Syria or against ISIL in Iraq.

Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). These Palestinian terrorist groups have been behind a number of deaths from attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank. Although Hamas's ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war, in a November 25 speech, Supreme Leader Khamenei highlighted Iran's military support to "Palestinian brothers" in Gaza and called for the West Bank to be similarly armed. In December, Hamas Deputy Leader Moussa Abu Marzouk announced bilateral relations with Iran and Hamas were "back on track."

In March, Israeli naval forces boarded the Klos C cargo ship in the Red Sea off the coast of Sudan. On board, they found 40 M-302 rockets, 180 mortars, and approximately 400,000 rounds of ammunition hidden within crates of cement labeled "Made in Iran" and believed to be destined to militants in the region.

Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Lebanese Hizballah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701. General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force stated in November that "The IRGC and Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together," and Lebanese Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem boasted that Iran had provided his organization with missiles that had "pinpoint accuracy" in separate November public remarks. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. These trained fighters have used these skills in direct support of the Asad regime in Syria and, to a lesser extent, in support of operations against ISIL in Iraq. They have also continued to carry out attacks along the Lebanese border with Israel.

Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa'ida (AQ) members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran previously allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria.

Iran remains a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple UNSCRs requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran continued to be in noncompliance with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the

United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the EU), and Iran began on January 20, 2014. Iran has fulfilled the commitments that it made under the JPOA. The parties negotiated during 2014 to pursue a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to achieve a long-term comprehensive solution to restore confidence that Iran's nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful.

## ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT

aka al-Qa'ida in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa'ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa'idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State in Iraq; Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-'Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production

Description: Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant, organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world and the West's support for and the existence of Israel. In late 2004, he joined al-Qa'ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. After this, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as AQI. Zarqawi traveled to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and led his group against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006. In October 2006, AQI publicly re-named itself the Islamic State in Iraq, although within the past year the group adopted the moniker Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to express its regional ambitions as it expanded its operations to include the Syrian conflict. Since 2012, ISIL has been led by Specially Designated Global Terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, aka Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, aka Abu Du'a. On May 15, the Department of State amended the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of AQI to add aliases, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and to make ISIL the organization's primary name. In June 2014, ISIL leader al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic caliphate.

Activities: As AQI, ISIL has conducted high profile attacks, including improvised explosive device attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure; videotaped beheadings of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 11, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 22, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004); suicide bomber attacks against both military and civilian targets; and rocket attacks. ISIL perpetrates the majority of suicide and mass casualty bombings in Iraq using foreign and Iraqi operatives. ISIL was active in Iraq in 2012 and 2013; in 2013 alone it was responsible for the majority of deaths of the over 7,000 Iraqi civilians killed that year. ISIL was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria during 2013, including against other militant opposition groups, and participated in a number of kidnapping incidents against civilians, including aid workers and reporters.

ISIL remained active in 2014, launching numerous attacks on a variety of targets in both Syria and Iraq. In January, ISIL captured Fallujah, Iraq, and proclaimed an Islamic state there. In June, the group took over Mosul, the second most populous city in Iraq, and a large part of the surrounding Nineveh province. In early July, ISIL captured Syria's largest oilfield, the al-Omar. By late July, they took a Syrian 17th Division base near Raqqah. In early August, the group captured the Iraqi city of Sinjar, precipitating a humanitarian refugee crisis when the Yazidi, an Iraqi minority ethnic group living in the area, fled to avoid ISIL atrocities. Reported atrocities include the massacre of Yazidi men and the holding of Yazidi women and girls captive and selling them as slaves. In mid-August, ISIL beheaded U.S. journalist James Foley; in September, the group beheaded journalist Steven Sotloff; in October, ISIL killed British aid worker Alan Henning; and in November, American aid worker and ISIL hostage Peter Kassig was also murdered. In late December, ISIL captured a Jordanian pilot after his aircraft malfunctioned and he ejected into ISIL-controlled territory.

Strength: Estimates at year's end placed the number of fighters that ISIL can muster between 20,000 and 31,500.

Location/Area of Operation: ISIL's operations are predominately in Iraq and Syria, although supporters and associates worldwide who are inspired by the group's ideology may be operating without direction from ISIL central leadership. In October 2014, Ansar al-Shari'a-Darnah publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL, and in November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to the group. Also in October 2014, the chief spokesman of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and five regional commanders defected from TTP and publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL.



**Funding and External Aid:** ISIL receives most of its funding from a variety of businesses and criminal activities within areas it controls in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities include robbing banks, smuggling oil, looting and selling antiquities and other goods, as well as extortion and kidnapping for ransom

## KATA'IB HIZBALLAH

**aka** Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata'ib Hezbollah; Khata'ib Hezbollah; Khata'ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezbollah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata'ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A'abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 2, 2009, Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) was formed in 2006 and is a radical Shia Islamist group with an anti-Western outlook and violent extremist ideology that has conducted attacks against Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition targets in Iraq. KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians that support the legitimate political process in Iraq. The group is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda by filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to Lebanese Hizballah and receives support from that group and its sponsor, Iran.

**Activities:** KH has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including improvised explosive device bombings, rocket propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety with attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. KH was particularly active in the summer of 2008, recording and distributing video footage of its attacks. In June 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in a rocket attack in Baghdad when KH assailants fired between three and five rockets at U.S. military base Camp Victory. The group remained active in 2014, participating in fighting in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but has not conducted an attack on U.S. interests since July 2011.

**Strength:** Membership is estimated at 400 individuals.

**Location/Area of Operation:** KH's operations are predominately Iraq-based, but also include fighting alongside pro-regime forces in Syria. Traditionally, KH conducted the majority of its operations in Baghdad, but its operations have expanded across Iraq in response to ISIL.

**Funding and External Aid:** KH is heavily dependent on support from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

## KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY

**aka** the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; the People's Defense Force; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; Kurdistan People's Congress; People's Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL

**Description:** Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, launched a campaign of violence in 1984. The PKK's original goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, but in recent years it has spoken more often about autonomy within a Turkish state that guarantees Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights.

**Activities:** In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Anatolia was the scene of significant violence; some estimates placed casualties at least 40,000 persons. Following his capture in 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. Ocalan's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment; he remains the symbolic leader of the group. The group foreswore violence until June 2004, when the group's hardline militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed ceasefire of the previous five years. Striking over the border from bases within Iraq, the PKK engaged in terrorist attacks in eastern and western Turkey. In 2009, the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after a PKK-initiated attack in July 2011 that left 13 Turkish soldiers dead. In 2012, there were multiple car bombings resulting in the deaths of at least 10 people. Primary targets included Turkish government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey.

Widely publicized peace talks between Ocalan and the Turkish government to resolve the conflict began at the end of 2012. Peace talks continued throughout 2014 with the ceasefire holding, even with sporadic PKK attacks on Turkish government forces, including one attack in September where three Turkish police officers were killed.



**Strength:** Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 members; 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The PKK operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Europe.

**Funding and External Aid:** The PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe and from criminal activity.

## AL-NUSRAH FRONT

**aka** Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad

**Description:** Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 15, 2014, and is led by Specially Designated Global Terrorist Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. It was formed in late 2011 when al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells in the region. In 2013, the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF's stated goal is to oust Syria's Asad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state; it currently controls a portion of Syrian territory from which it participates in the Syrian conflict.

**Activities:** ANF has been active in a number of operations against other factions in the Syrian Civil War. The group claimed responsibility for the Aleppo bombings in 2012, the al-Midan bombing in January 2012, a series of Damascus bombings in 2012, and the murder of journalist Mohammed al-Saeed. In December 2013, ANF abducted 13 nuns from a Christian monastery in Maaloula and held them until March 9, 2014. In late February 2014, ANF claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on an army checkpoint in Hermel, Lebanon, claiming it was in retaliation for Hizballah's involvement in the civil war in Syria. In March, ANF reportedly kidnapped 30 Palestinians in the Yarmouk refugee camp, located near Damascus. In May, American citizen Abu Huraira al-Amriki, reportedly working for ANF, carried out a suicide truck bombing in Idlib. There were no reported casualties, but this is believed to be the first example of an American conducting a suicide attack in Syria. Also in May, high-ranking Syrian military official and head of Syria's air defense, Lt. Gen. Hussein Ishaq was killed in clashes with ANF. In June, it was reported that ANF had enlisted child soldiers into its ranks. In the same month, it was also reported that ANF militants killed a 14-year-old boy in Lebanon. On August 28, ANF militants kidnapped 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers from Golan Heights in the UN Disengagement Observer Force Zone. The Fijian soldiers were later released in September. In early November, ANF attacked moderate rebel groups associated with the Free Syrian Army in Idlib. The rebel groups surrendered local towns to ANF and some members defected to ANF, while others were arrested.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Al-Nusrah Front receives funding from a variety of sources, such as ransom payments accrued through kidnapping operations and donations from external Gulf-based donors.

## AL-QA'IDA

**aka** al-Qa'eda; Qa'idat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qa'idat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Laden Network; the Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1999, al-Qa'ida (AQ) was established by Usama bin Laden in 1988. The group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamist extremists for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. AQ's strategic objectives are to remove Western influence and presence from the Muslim world, topple "apostate" governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia law that ultimately would be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group's 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. AQ leaders issued a statement in February 1998 under the banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders," saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. AQ merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001. Many AQ leaders have been killed in recent years, including bin Laden and then second-in-command Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, in May and August 2011, respectively. Al-Rahman's replacement, Abu Yahya al-Libi, was killed in June 2012. Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri remained at-large at year's end.

**Activities:** AQ and its supporters conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992, and claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993. AQ also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing up to 300 individuals and injuring more than 5,000. In October 2000, AQ conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39.

On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania – leaving over 3,000 individuals dead or missing.

In November 2002, AQ carried out a suicide bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya that killed 15. In 2003 and 2004, Saudi-based AQ operatives and associated violent extremists launched more than a dozen attacks, killing at least 90 people, including 14 Americans in Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri claimed responsibility on behalf of AQ for the July 7, 2005 attacks against the London public transportation system. AQ likely played a role in the unsuccessful 2006 plot to destroy several commercial aircraft flying from the UK to the United States using liquid explosives. AQ claimed responsibility for a 2008 suicide car bomb attack on the Danish embassy in Pakistan that killed six, as retaliation for a Danish newspaper re-publishing cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and for Denmark's involvement in Afghanistan.

In January 2009, Bryant Neal Vinas – a U.S. citizen who traveled to Pakistan and allegedly trained in explosives at AQ camps, was captured in Pakistan, extradited to the United States, and charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit murder. Vinas later admitted his role in helping AQ plan an attack against the Long Island Rail Road in New York and confessed to having fired missiles at a U.S. base in Afghanistan. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant and U.S. lawful permanent resident, was charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, to commit murder in a foreign country, and with providing material support to a terrorist organization as part of an AQ plot to attack the New York subway system. Zazi later admitted to contacts with AQ senior leadership, suggesting they had knowledge of his plans. In February 2010, Zazi pled guilty to charges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

In a December 2011 video, AQ leader al-Zawahiri claimed AQ was behind the August kidnapping of American aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein remained in captivity until his death in January 2015 in a U.S. counterterrorism operation in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In September 2014, AQ leader al-Zawahiri and other AQ leaders announced the establishment of Pakistan-based AQ in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Two days after the announcement, two Pakistani warships were attacked in Karachi; AQIS took responsibility for plotting the attack almost one week later. The thwarted plan included commandeering the ships and missile system to attack nearby American warships. AQIS claims the orders came from al-Zawahiri. In February 2014, AQ removed the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as an affiliate.

**Strength:** In South Asia, AQ's core has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives – including bin Laden in May 2011 – have disrupted communication, financial, facilitation nodes, and a number of terrorist plots. However, AQ serves as a focal point of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups – AQAP, AQIM, al-Nusrah Front, and al-Shabaab – and other violent Sunni Islamist extremist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network also have ties to AQ. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are “inspired” by the group's ideology may be operating without direction from AQ central leadership, and it is impossible to estimate their numbers.

**Location/Area of Operation:** AQ was based in Afghanistan until Coalition Forces removed the Afghan Taliban from power in late 2001. Since then, the group's core leadership is believed to reside largely in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. AQ affiliates – al-Nusrah Front, AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab – operate in Syria and Lebanon, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara, and Somalia, respectively.

**Funding and External Aid:** AQ primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters, as well as from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

## AL-QA'IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

**aka** al-Qa'ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida in Yemen; al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa'ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY;

Ansar al-Shari'a

**Description:** Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on January 19, 2010. In January 2009, the leader of al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. This announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP's self-stated goals include establishing a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, as well as implementing Sharia law. On September 30, 2011, AQAP cleric and head of external operations Anwar al-Aulaqi, as well as Samir Khan, the publisher of AQAP's online magazine, *Inspire*, were both killed in Yemen.

The FTO designation for AQAP was amended on October 4, 2012, to include the alias Ansar al-Shari'a (AAS). AAS represents a rebranding effort designed to attract potential followers in areas under AQAP's control.

**Activities:** AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both internal and foreign targets since its inception in January 2009, including: a March 2009 suicide bombing against South Korean tourists in Yemen, the August 2009 attempt to assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, and the December 25, 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. AQAP was responsible for two unsuccessful attempted attacks against British targets during 2010. In October 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States via cargo plane. The parcels were intercepted in the UK and in the United Arab Emirates. AQAP attacks in 2012 targeted the Yemeni military, including a February 2012 suicide car bombing that killed 26 Yemeni soldiers in Hadramawt Governorate.

AQAP, operating under the alias AAS, carried out a May 2012 suicide bombing in Sana'a that killed 96 people. Also in May, press reported that AQAP allegedly plotted to detonate a bomb aboard a U.S.-bound airliner using an improvised explosive device (IED). Although there was no imminent threat to U.S. jetliners, the device, which was acquired from another government, was similar to devices that AQAP had previously used in past attempted terrorist attacks.

In 2013, AQAP focused its targeting efforts on the Yemeni military. In September, AQAP carried out a coordinated attack on two military targets in southern Yemen that killed at least 21 Yemeni soldiers. In December, an AQAP attack on the Yemeni Defense Ministry headquarters compound in Sanaa, Yemen killed 52 people, including civilian medical personnel.

In 2014, AQAP claimed responsibility for over 150 attacks in Yemen, using tactics such as IEDs, suicide bombings, and small-arms attacks. The group aggressively targeted both Houthis and Yemeni military and government institutions, including military bases, the Presidential palace in Sana'a, military checkpoints and vehicles, and the police academy in Sana'a. Over 75 Yemeni government or military personnel were killed in these attacks.

In September 2014, AQAP launched a rocket attack against Yemeni security forces around the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a. The attack did not cause any casualties, but was followed two months later by an IED attack at the northern gate of the embassy that injured multiple embassy security guards. Also in November, AQAP attempted to detonate explosives targeting the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Yemen. In December, AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack against the Iranian ambassador's residence in Sana'a that killed one guard and two pedestrians.

**Strength:** AQAP is estimated to have approximately one thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Yemen

**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP's funding primarily comes from robberies and kidnap for ransom operations, and donations from like-minded supporters.

## AL-SHABAAB

**aka** The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; the Youth; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 18, 2008, al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have undertaken a violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the series of transitional Somali governments. In 2014, the group continued to fight to discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia. Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa'ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates including al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In September 2014, former al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed and replaced by Ahmed Diriye. The group is composed of Somali recruits as well as a number of foreign fighters. Since 2011, al-Shabaab has seen its military capacity reduced due to the efforts of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces against al-Shabaab; and clashes, some violent, within the group itself. Despite al-Shabaab's loss of key territory since 2012, the organization was able to maintain its hold on large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia in 2014, and conducted attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Federal Government of Somalia, recruit new fighters, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group has claimed responsibility for several high profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. It has been responsible for the assassination of numerous civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. Al-Shabaab fighters and those who have claimed allegiance to the group have conducted violent attacks and have assassinated international aid workers and members of NGOs.

In its first attack outside of Somalia, al-Shabaab was responsible for the July 11, 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda during the World Cup, which killed nearly 76 people, including one American citizen. In 2013, al-Shabaab again expanded its activities outside of Somali and staged a significant attack in September against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The siege resulted in the death of at least 65 civilians – including foreign nationals from 13 countries outside of Kenya – six soldiers and police officers, and hundreds of injured.

In 2014, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks, including a May attack on the building of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, that injured at least two lawmakers; a May bombing attack on a restaurant in Djibouti that was popular with foreigners that killed 20 and wounded at least 15; and an attempted attack in July on Villa Somalia, the Somali Presidential Headquarters. In mid-November, al-Shabaab attacked a bus traveling in northern Kenya, singling out and killing 28 non-Muslims. In early December, al-Shabaab killed 36 Christians working in a quarry in northern Kenya. On December 25, al-Shabaab fighters penetrated the Mogadishu International Airport compound for the first time in several years, ambushing and killing at least 10 AMISOM soldiers and contractors.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have several thousand members, including a small cadre of foreign fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Al-Shabaab has lost full control of significant areas of territory. In September 2012, al-Shabaab lost control of Kismayo, a vital port it used to obtain supplies and funding through taxes. In October 2014, al-Shabaab lost another strategic port in Baraawe to AU and Somali troops. Despite these losses, al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in the middle and lower Juba regions, as well as Bay, Shabelle, and Bakol regions, and maintained its presence in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within Puntland's larger urban areas.

**Funding and External Aid:** Since 2012, al-Shabaab has seen its income diminish due to the loss of the strategic port cities of Kismayo, Merka, and Baraawe; furthermore, it lost a general ability to freely levy taxes in certain urban areas in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab continued to operate and carry out attacks despite fewer financial resources, however, and still obtained some funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, taxation of local populations, and foreign donations.

Because al-Shabaab is a multi-clan entity, it reportedly receives donations from individuals in the Somali diaspora; however, the donations are not always intended to support terrorism, but also to support family members.

## SYRIA

Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Asad regime continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, even amid significant internal unrest. The regime continued to provide political and weapons support to Lebanese Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm the terrorist organization. The Asad regime's relationship with Hizballah and Iran continued to grow stronger in 2014 as the conflict in Syria continued. President Bashar al-Asad remained a staunch defender of Iran's policies, while Iran

has exhibited equally energetic support for Syrian regime efforts to defeat the Syrian opposition. Statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, were often in Syrian government speeches and press statements.

The Syrian government had an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the permissive attitude the Asad regime took towards al-Qa'ida's foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict. Syrian government awareness and encouragement for many years of violent extremists' transit through Syria to enter Iraq, for the purpose of fighting Coalition Troops, is well documented. Syria was a key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq. Those very networks were the seedbed for the violent extremist elements, including ISIL, which terrorized the Syrian and Iraqi population in 2014 and – in addition to other terrorist organizations within Syria – continued to attract thousands of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria in 2014.



As part of a broader strategy during the year, the regime still attempted to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all of its armed opponents as “terrorists.”



Asad's government has continued to generate significant concern regarding the role it plays in terrorist financing. Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not use formal banking services. Despite Syrian legislation that required money changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast black market, estimated to be as large as Syria's formal economy. Regional *hawala* networks (an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honor of a large network of money brokers operating outside traditional western financial systems) remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering, and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials. This raised significant concerns that some members of the Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist finance schemes conducted through these institutions.

Despite the progress made through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon's Executive Council and UNSCR 2118 (2013) to dismantle and destroy Syria's chemical weapons program, there continued to be significant concern, given ongoing instability in Syria, that these materials could find their way to terrorist organizations. Additionally, Syria continued to use toxic chemicals, including chlorine, as a weapon against its citizens. Syria's behavior raises serious questions about the regime's willingness to comply with its Chemical Weapons Convention and UNSCR 2118 obligations.



Source: State Department reporting is excerpted from US State Department, “Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism, “Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014*, June 2015, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239413.htm>.

**Figure XI.3: State Department Estimates of Trends in Terrorism, 1970-2013**  
**Bahrain**
























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












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











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
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## Saudi Arabia











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



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







**UAE**



















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













## Iraq























**Yemen**







## Figure XI.4: U.S. State Department Report on Counterterrorism Efforts of the Gulf States

### BAHRAIN

**Overview:** The Bahraini government continued to increase efforts to detect, neutralize, and contain terrorist threats in 2014. Some groups' use of real and fake improvised explosive devices remained a threat to security services, resulting in the death of at least five police officers. The Government of Bahrain also began to implement tougher counterterrorism laws that the legislature approved during the first half of the year. Peaceful opposition groups and some international observers expressed their concern at the scope of the new laws, which they say could easily be used to hinder peaceful opposition activity as well as terrorism. The inability of the government and political opposition to reach an agreement on political reforms threatened to fuel further domestic unrest, upon which violent opposition groups could seek to capitalize.

The Government of Bahrain has supported the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and on November 9 hosted an international conference on countering ISIL's financing. The Bahraini government welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178. Bahraini leaders have publicly condemned ISIL's activities, ideology, and recruitment, while the government has worked to detect, counter, and discourage domestic ISIL recruitment and extremist messaging. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has arrested and charged, or stripped the citizenship of some Bahrainis suspected of supporting ISIL, and in March it called on all Bahrainis fighting in Iraq and Syria to return to Bahrain or face prosecution.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Notable incidents included:

- On February 15, a policeman was killed and three others were injured after a homemade bomb detonated in Al-Dair.
- On March 2, a policeman was injured after a homemade bomb detonated in East Eker.
- On March 3, a homemade bomb exploded in al-Daih, killing two local policemen and one officer from the United Arab Emirates.
- On March 22, a policeman was injured after a homemade bomb detonated in Sitra.
- On July 4, a homemade bomb detonated in East Eker, killing a police officer.
- On July 27, three policemen were injured when a homemade bomb exploded in Al-Dair.
- On December 9, a homemade bomb exploded on December 9 in Dumistan, killing a policeman.
- On December 10, a civilian was killed by a homemade bomb that exploded in Karzakan.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Throughout 2014 Bahrain bolstered existing counterterrorism laws and criminal penalties. Bahrain's legislature approved and the government promulgated a series of royal decrees issued during the second half of 2013 increasing penalties for terrorism-related crimes and expanding counterterrorism finance regulations. Terrorism-related acts, a broadly-defined category, are treated as criminal cases, with prescribed penalties spelled out in the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006 and Articles 155 and 168 of the Penal Code. There were concerns that the government used counterterrorism laws to prosecute or harass individuals for their criticism of the government.

The MOI is the lead government agency regarding the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism and the arrest of suspects in terrorist-related acts, with the Bahrain National Security Agency providing support. The Bahraini Coast Guard also contributed to the counterterrorism mission by monitoring and interdicting the seaborne movement of weapons and terrorists into and out of the country. The major deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security remained the lack of interagency coordination and limited training opportunities to develop requisite law enforcement skills.

Bahrain has participated in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program since 1987, and assistance in 2014 focused on developing the capacity to investigate and respond to terrorists' use of explosives. Leahy vetting challenges, however, prompted the cancellation of nearly all planned ATA courses in 2014. The U.S. Embassy was able to assist with the delivery of an ATA K9 Train the Trainer course that graduated two trainers and eight

trainees, but as a result of a general lack of training and antiquated investigative methods and technologies, the MOI Police Force's progress in areas of counterterrorism and criminal investigation has slowed.

On January 4, an MOI explosives team defused a bomb placed on a busy commercial street in central Manama. On March 16, an MOI explosives team defused a gas cylinder bomb located in a vehicle along a busy public road in central Manama.

Notable prosecutions included:

- On April 28, a court handed down life sentences to eight individuals convicted of killing a police officer (and injuring five others) in a September 2013 bomb attack on a police patrol.
- On May 11, a court sentenced six Bahraini to life in prison for planting an explosive device that killed a civilian in 2013.
- On July 17, a court sentenced three men to prison terms ranging from five years to life for forming a terrorist cell and detonating a bomb in 2013 in Budaiya.
- On August 6, a court sentenced nine Bahrainis to up to 15 years in prison and stripped their citizenship for establishing a terrorist cell, possessing unlicensed firearms and ammunition, receiving militia training, and smuggling weapons.
- On August 13, a court sentenced fourteen individuals to a range of prison terms for their involvement in an explosion in July 2013 that killed a policeman.
- On September 29, a court sentenced nine individuals to life imprisonment and stripped their citizenship for smuggling weapons and explosives into Bahrain.
- On November 21, a court sentenced three men to 10 years in prison and stripped them of their Bahraini citizenship for their involvement in an August 2013 explosion in Eker.
- On December 30, two individuals were sentenced to death for their role in an explosion on February 14 that killed a policeman.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Bahrain is an important regional financial hub, which makes it vulnerable to the large amounts of money flowing through the Gulf region to support various terrorist and violent extremist groups. The Bahraini government did not provide information on prosecutions. In November, Bahrain hosted an international seminar on countering the financing of terrorism. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Bahrain worked closely and cooperatively with international partners throughout the region. Since formally endorsing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in March 2008, Bahrain has proactively worked to expand air, sea, and causeway border control points.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) heads Bahrain's efforts to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism, in part by organizing regular workshops for clerics and speakers from both the Sunni and Shia sects. The MOJIA also undertakes an annual review of schools' Islamic Studies curricula to evaluate interpretations of religious texts.

## IRAQ

**Overview:** Iraq witnessed a significant surge of terrorist activity in 2014, primarily as a result of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) seizure of large areas of the country. The resulting security vacuum and humanitarian crisis presented new challenges to the Iraqi government and exacerbated existing ethno-sectarian grievances. Building on military victories in Syria, in January 2014 ISIL captured the city of Fallujah in Anbar Province. On June 7, fighting erupted between ISIL, allied groups, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Mosul, the capital of Ninewa Province and Iraq's second largest city. Within a week, ISIL had seized control of the city and began using its significant business, industrial, and energy resources to fund its operations. ISIL formations moved south from Mosul through the Tigris Valley in June, seizing multiple cities and putting to flight several Iraqi Army divisions. Outside Tikrit, ISIL terrorists captured nearly 1,700 Iraqi Air Force recruits and executed many of the captives, posting the slaughter on YouTube.



Nearby, ISIL surrounded the Baiji refinery – beginning a siege that would last five months. On August 2, ISIL invaded the Sinjar district causing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee, tens of thousands of whom were forced to seek refuge and became trapped on Mt. Sinjar when they were unable to reach safety ahead of ISIL's advance. In response, President Obama ordered four initiatives to gather information and help the Iraqis counter the ISIL threat, and on August 8, U.S. airstrikes against ISIL targets began in response to the group's advance toward Erbil. In mid-September, the United States took the lead in forming the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, uniting over 60 countries in the effort.

After a general election on April 30, Iraq began a four-month government formation process, resulting in the August 11 selection of Haider al-Abadi as the next Iraqi prime minister. Prime Minister Abadi assumed office on September 8, and in October, Abadi secured the appointment of a full cabinet for the first time since 2010, including Defense and Interior Ministers. Throughout the latter part of 2014, the Iraqi government worked to implement its National Program, which includes a number of initiatives to ease ethno-sectarian tensions. It engaged with tribes fighting against ISIL and began to recruit a force composed of Sunni tribal units that could eventually be subsumed into the proposed National Guard. In addition, the Abadi administration reached an agreement in December with the Kurds on oil exports and revenue sharing. Looking forward to the needs of areas liberated from ISIL control, PM Abadi called for international assistance during the Global Coalition's first ministerial in Brussels on December 3, as well as in the January meeting of the Small Group in London.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Terrorist groups significantly increased the number of attacks throughout the country in 2014. Most notably, ISIL's rapid acquisition of abandoned ISF military equipment in the course of fighting from January onward gave ISIL greater capabilities in line with a more conventional military force, including the reported use of tanks, artillery, and unmanned aerial drones. According to estimates from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), acts of terrorism and violence killed more than 10,000 civilians and injured more than 17,000 in 2014. ISIL's unsparing brutality affected many lives. Following is an illustrative sample that highlights only a small number of the most egregious practices:

- On January 15, an improvised explosive device explosion at a funeral in Diyala province killed thirteen civilians and wounded eighteen.
- In February, ISIL militants surrounded a police encampment near a stadium construction site in the town of Tuz Khurmatu. ISIL gathered six policemen, asked if they were Shia or Sunni, and then shot and killed the men after their prayer ritual indicated they were not Sunni.
- In June, ISIL attacked an Iraqi military base, formerly known as Camp Speicher, in Salah ad Din, killing as many as 1,700 cadets and soldiers.
- On July 27, ISIL destroyed the tombs of Sufi sheikhs in the al-Rawtha al-Muhamadiya Mosque in Muthanna District in eastern Mosul.
- On August 2-3, ISIL forces invaded Sinjar district. Hundreds of Yezidis (predominantly men) were killed and thousands fled to Mt Sinjar or the Iraqi Kurdish Region. In the course of the fighting and in subsequent days, an estimated 5,000 Yezidis (including approximately 4,000 women and children) were taken captive.
- On August 15, in Kocho (var. Kojo), media and eyewitnesses reported that as many as several hundred Yezidi male captives were killed.
- On August 31, ISIL executed 19 Sunnis in Saadiya for not pledging allegiance to ISIL.
- On September 3, ISIL abducted two former Iraqi Army officers and four civilians from Gheda village in Daquq area, Kirkuk.
- On October 13, approximately 33 people were killed in three attacks in Baghdad as Shia Muslims celebrated Eid al-Ghadir.
- On November 3, media reports indicated ISIL forces had massacred more than 300 members of the Abu Nimr tribe in Iraq's western province of al Anbar.
- On December 10, there were reports in Mosul that ISIL had punished a homosexual man by throwing him from a rooftop and stoning him to death.



**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In 2014, ISIL's existential threat to Iraq forced the central government to focus entirely on the campaign to defeat it. ISIL offensives significantly degraded Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability, manpower, and equipment. The Government of Iraq suffered attrition across its national security apparatus, especially in the Iraqi Army and Federal and local police, and worked with the Coalition to address training and equipping shortfalls. In addition, Prime Minister Abadi's National Plan specifically pledged to strengthen border security and improve law enforcement, among other areas.

Iraq adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program's Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. The Government of Iraq has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land and air ports of entry. Iraq also continued to participate in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and ATA training for the Emergency Response Brigades contributed to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Before ISIL's dramatic advance into northern Iraq in June, there was already significant population displacement as a result of its attacks in Anbar. These attacks, dating back to January, resulted in the displacement of some 474,000 people from Fallujah, Ramadi, and the surrounding areas. ISIL's takeover of Mosul in June and its subsequent advances on the Ninewa plain resulted in massive additional displacements, of minority populations in particular, primarily into the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the Kerbala and Najaf governorates. The UN estimates that over 2.1 million Iraqis were displaced in 2014 alone, adding to the estimated one million Iraqis who were displaced prior to 2014.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Since 2005, Iraq has been a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Iraq held the presidency of MENAFATF from November 2013 to November 2014. In November 2012, MENAFATF adopted Iraq's mutual evaluation to review compliance with international anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The report identified significant and serious risks, and Iraq agreed on an action plan to address its vulnerabilities. In November 2014, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) provided an update to the MENAFATF Plenary. In addition, Iraq is also reviewed three times a year under the FATF International Cooperation Review Group process, which includes a negotiated action plan with timelines to address specific identified deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime. The international community, including the United States, provided subject matter expertise to assist Iraq and seeks to develop capacity building as the situation improves.

In 2014, ISIL derived income from a range of sources, such as oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, looting, extortion, illegal "taxation," antiquities theft and smuggling, and foreign donations. Together with Global Coalition partners, the United States took a holistic approach to combating ISIL's ability to generate revenues and sustain itself, including through direct military action. Global coalition airstrikes targeted ISIL's energy infrastructure – modular refineries, petroleum storage tanks, and crude oil collection points – and these airstrikes significantly degraded ISIL's ability to generate revenue from its control of energy assets. Additionally, the United States used sanctions to ensure that banks, companies, and citizens across the world did not engage in financial transactions with ISIL. Partner nations actively implemented sanctions against ISIL pursuant to the UN Security Council 1267/1989 al-Qa'ida Sanctions regime, which obligates all member states to freeze assets, ban travel, and embargo arms from al-Qa'ida-associated individuals and entities, including ISIL. Each of the over 60 Global Coalition countries reaffirmed their commitment to countering ISIL's financing in the joint statement at the Global Coalition Ministerial in Brussels on December 3.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** As a result of ISIL's rapid territorial gains in Iraq in the first half of 2014, in September, the United States led the creation of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The Coalition focused on training, equipping, advising, and assisting the ISF, including Kurdish forces. Along with Coalition partners, the United States stood up multiple training sites across Iraq to focus on improving ISF capabilities in command and control, intelligence, logistics, fire support, and other combat-enabling roles. On December 3, the Secretary chaired a Global Coalition ministerial conference in Brussels, at which all partners unanimously endorsed a detailed communiqué to guide and coordinate global efforts going forward, including a commitment to five lines of effort designed to guide the ongoing action against ISIL. These five lines of effort include: supporting military operations, capacity building, and training; disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; cutting off ISIL's access to financing and funding; addressing the humanitarian crises; and exposing ISIL's true nature (ideological de-legitimization).

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** On October 27 the United States participated in the conference of Global Coalition partners focused on countering ISIL's messaging and countering violent extremism. Bahrain, Egypt, France, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UK, and the UAE joined the conference. In addition, Iraq has taken several significant steps towards diminishing the pull of ISIL's propaganda on potential recruits. On April 10, then Minister of Higher Education Ali al-Adeeb opened a one-day conference on Countering Violent Extremism and appealed for scientific research focused identifying what motivates suicide attackers. The conference received significant national press coverage and included several high profile speakers.

## JORDAN

**Overview:** Jordan remained a key ally and a model partner in combating terrorism and extremist ideology. Jordan's geographic location leaves it vulnerable to a variety of regional threats, while also facilitating its regional leadership in confronting them. During 2014, the emergence and rapid growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq further entrenched terrorism as a top concern for Jordanian security services. Jordan actively participated in Global Coalition to Counter ISIL military efforts, and amended key counterterrorism legislation. Jordan continued to provide diplomatic and political support to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in addition to its support for a political resolution to conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

Jordan demonstrated regional leadership in the fight against ISIL, joined the Global Coalition from the outset, and participated fully on the diplomatic, political, financial, and military fronts. King Abdullah II, in a November address to the Jordanian parliament, declared, "the war on these terrorist organizations and their radical ideology is [Jordan's] war because we are targeted and we must defend ourselves, Islam, and the values of tolerance and moderation by fighting extremism and terrorists." The Royal Jordanian Air Force participated in Global Coalition military operations against ISIL, humanitarian operations in support of communities targeted by ISIL, and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) bolstered defenses against terrorist incursions in the northern and eastern border regions.

On December 24, ISIL captured, and ultimately killed, a Jordanian pilot in Syria who was participating in counter-ISIL operations. The JAF in 2014 continued to host United States military units, as well as other Global Coalition partners, for various joint counterterrorism exercises and training on Jordanian territory. Jordan actively worked to prevent flows of foreign fighters to extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, and took steps to restrict terrorism financing.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** In April, during a period of civil unrest in the southern city of Ma'an, armed civilians raked several buildings with gunfire, including an Islamic bank, a school for girls, and a local headquarters for the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). They also reportedly used hand grenades. Additionally, a series of low-yield improvised explosive device attacks against Interior Ministry police forces occurred at major traffic circles in the affected area. No deaths or casualties were reported, and no suspects were arrested in connection with these incidents.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The State Security Court (SSC) is the primary legal apparatus for trying and convicting alleged terrorists. The SSC oversees the prosecution of civilians charged with crimes affecting national security. In April, the parliament passed amendments to the SSC Law, limiting the court's jurisdiction to five crimes: treason, espionage, terrorism, drug-related offenses, and currency forgery.

The parliament amended the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law in April. The amendments broadened the definition of terrorism to include forming a group with the intention of committing terrorist acts, harming relations with a foreign state, using the internet to facilitate terrorist acts or promote terrorist ideas, and attacks on the life or liberty of members of the royal family. The penal code provides an even broader definition of terrorism to include acts intended to "contravene the public order." Civil society organizations have criticized the amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law, saying that by broadening the definition of terrorism, the law expands the SSC's jurisdiction over speech-related offenses.

Jordan has advanced capabilities to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism within its territory. Comprehensive training programs, detailed planning, and recurring surveys of key facilities have enabled Jordan to engineer a coordinated national response to crises. GID has authority to investigate acts of terrorism. The Public Security Directorate (PSD) has authority over non-terrorism related crimes but frequently supports GID counterterrorism activities through PSD Special Branch, which includes a criminal intelligence function. The GID also coordinates with the JAF and its intelligence branch, particular on cases involving border security, which the JAF oversees. Prosecutors typically are not consulted until the later stages of investigations, when terrorism cases are referred to the SSC.

Jordan also remained a critical partner for the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Jordan continued to host the training and development of other ATA partner nations at its various academies and training facilities.

Jordan remained committed to securing its borders and denying safe haven to terrorists. Jordan continued to develop its border security infrastructure, largely through the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), which began in 2009. JBSP consists of a sophisticated package of sensors to help improve situational awareness along the border and prevent infiltrations into Jordan or unauthorized departures. Phase II neared completion at the end of 2014. Jordan actively monitors airports and border crossings for potential foreign fighters. Jordan maintains a terrorist watchlist, uses biographic and biometric screening, and actively engages in passenger information sharing.

During 2014, Jordanian authorities took legal action against numerous individuals deemed to be terrorists under local law. Jordanian authorities also arrested and began prosecuting men accused of seeking to join al-Nusrah Front and ISIL; recruiting for or otherwise supporting ISIL, especially on the internet; attempting to travel to – or return from – Syria to fight with extremist groups; and individuals affiliated with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood accused of providing weapons to Hamas. Legal actions included:

- Abu Qatada: The public trial of Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric who was deported from the UK in July 2013, concluded in September with an acquittal on all charges. The SSC had previously convicted Qatada in absentia for his involvement in conspiring to carry out acts of terrorism in 1998 and another foiled attempt in 2000 against Western and Israeli targets during Millennium celebrations.
- Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: Jordan released Maqdisi, a Salafist leader who was convicted of providing support for al-Qa'ida in 2010, in June. Jordan briefly detained Maqdisi in September, and arrested him again in October, formally charging him with "using the internet to promote and incite views of jihadi terrorist organizations."
- Beginning in August, security officials arrested over 100 ISIL supporters, many for posting pro-ISIL videos or statements on social media sites. The government began charging them before the State Security Court in October for using the internet to propagate terrorist ideology.
- Security forces regularly arrested departing or returning Jordanian foreign fighters, charging them with joining armed groups, including al-Nusrah Front or ISIL in Syria.
- In late 2014, security officials arrested several members of the Engineers Association, a group with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and charged them under the Counterterrorism Law with possessing weapons and explosives, undermining public order, and carrying out illegal activities that could expose the kingdom to hostile acts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body; its financial intelligence unit has been a part of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units since 2012. The Jordanian parliament introduced proposed amendments to the 2007 Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorist Financing Law, which would bring Jordan more in line with international standards. As of December, the legal committee had endorsed the amendments, but no vote to adopt the changes had taken place. No known prosecution of terrorist financing cases occurred in 2014. Jordan faces significant challenges in monitoring financial flows for extensive refugee camps on its territory but seems to be managing these risks well.

Although the Associations Law requires non-profit organizations to apply for Cabinet approval before receiving foreign funds, Jordan's Anti-Money Laundering Law does not oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International *Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Jordan is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2014, Jordan was a member of the UN Security Council and also a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

Jordan continued to assist Palestinian Authority law enforcement institutions through training at the Jordan International Police Training Center. In 2014 both advanced-level and refresher courses were offered to Palestinian security services, in addition to basic-level courses. Jordan also provided anti-terrorism training for Iraqi Security Forces at the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Jordan has sought to confront and weaken the violent ideology that underpins ISIL and other radical organizations. Jordan is examining ways to better counter radicalization in schools and mosques. The Prime Minister announced the formation of an interagency anti-extremist task force in October. The task force issued a wide-ranging set of recommendations to various line ministries, but it had not received authorities, resources, or staff as of the end of the year.

The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Thought, under the patronage of Prince Ghazi bin Mohammad, promotes religious tolerance and coexistence. This institute continued its sponsorship of a series of ecumenical events promoting interfaith dialogue. Jordan hosted events geared toward rejecting terrorism and sectarianism. King Abdullah II continued to promote his “Amman Declaration” of 2005, calling for tolerance and peace within the Islamic community, and rejecting “wanton aggression and terrorism.” The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs conducted outreach to imams across the country, encouraging them to refute radical extremist ideology in their sermons.

Jordanian prisons have a religiously based de-radicalization program that seeks to re-engage violent extremist inmates into the non-violent mainstream of their faith.

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## KUWAIT

**Overview:** Kuwait is an important ally located in the critical Arabian Gulf region and a valued partner in promoting policies that strengthen regional security and stability. Kuwait is a key partner in the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Kuwait hosted the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL’s Communications Conference on October 27, attended by delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states and other partner countries. Discussions centered on how to combat ISIL and violent extremism in the region, degrade and defeat ISIL’s messaging, and confront and contest its presence in the information space. Over the reporting period, Kuwait showed a full commitment to countering the ISIL threat through its humanitarian and logistic contributions to coalition efforts. This included taking steps to reduce ISIL’s access to financing, cracking down on suspected ISIL supporters, and providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons primarily from Syria, but also to displaced people in Iraq.

According to media reports, Kuwait implemented new security measures to prevent possible terrorist attacks on its soil. Deputy PM and Interior Minister Sheikh Mohammed al-Khalid Al-Sabah announced a new security team of 80 officers to counter violent extremist threats. On December 5, media reported that state security forces had foiled a terrorist attack planned by an ISIL-affiliated terrorist cell of 12 persons, two of whom were former police officers. The Jahra-based cell had allegedly planned to carry out a number of bombings at civilian and government sites.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** On December 14, a draft law was introduced in parliament criminalizing terrorism and stipulating harsh punishments for it. The legislator who introduced the bill explained that regional circumstances and terrorist threats to Kuwait necessitated a law specifically criminalizing terrorism. Terrorist acts are currently prosecuted under general provisions of the penal code.

In 2014, Kuwait security forces arrested several suspected members and sympathizers of ISIL. The Kuwait State Security (KSS) service reported it had received information that some of the defendants had gone to Syria and Iraq and had fought with, or contributed financially to, violent extremists. KSS also handed over an unidentified number of Saudi nationals, suspected of ISIL links, to the Saudi authorities. In December, media reports quoted a source within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) as saying that approximately 10 employees were terminated when it was discovered they had travelled to either Iraq or Syria to participate in fighting.

On December 18, a criminal court jailed three Arab (non-Kuwaiti) supporters of ISIL. The court also sentenced a Kuwaiti to 10 years in jail for urging support of the terrorist group and also for insulting Kuwait’s ruler in public. An Egyptian and a Jordanian were handed four-year sentences for helping the Kuwaiti distribute pro-ISIL leaflets. It was the first such court ruling against supporters of ISIL. The courts were examining several similar cases at year’s end.

Law enforcement units had the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents, but were often hindered by internal stove-piping. Kuwait's primary counterterrorism organizations, the MOI and Kuwait National Guard (KNG), are well-resourced and have plentiful training opportunities. Under the auspices of the Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, the Embassy's Office of Military Cooperation has heavily and consistently engaged with local counterterrorism units for both training and bilateral exercises in an effort to match capabilities with resources. Because MOI also includes the country's criminal investigative apparatus and border protection mission, it has broad latitude with respect to investigations and border security. MOI is also generally considered to be the single point of contact for incident response; some terrorism-related matters fall under the prerogative of its semi-autonomous arm, KSS. Law enforcement units generally have a record of accountability.

On June 29, media reported that MOI had instructed its forces at border crossings to remain on high alert in anticipation of possible attacks by ISIL militants. The ministry instructed officers to intensify their security procedures at all borders after it received "confirmed information" that ISIL might try to enter Kuwait via land or sea ports.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. It took initial steps in 2014 to implement bylaws to Law 106 of 2013, which govern the criminalization of terrorist financing – including a requirement to report suspected terrorist financing that creates the legal basis to freeze terrorist assets without delay. In April, the Cabinet issued Ministerial Resolutions 4 and 5, mandating the establishment of a ministerial-level counterterrorism committee (CTC) and stipulating the creation of mechanisms to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, including the freezing of assets. Kuwait froze accounts and banned travel for the five Kuwaiti individuals added to the UN al-Qa'ida Sanctions Committee list in 2014. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established and chaired the CTC, on which 11 governmental bodies were represented. The CTC met regularly to execute Kuwait's Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Counterterrorism Financing (CFT) obligations under UNSCRs and domestic regulations.

Additionally, Kuwait established the Kuwaiti Financial Intelligence Unit (KFIU) in 2013. It named its first president in February and opened a temporary office and started to process limited types of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) in June. By November, the KFIU was working and improving its capacity to receive and analyze STRs. It is not publicly known if any have resulted in investigations or criminal proceedings.

In July, Kuwait re-established a working-level National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Chaired by the president of the KFIU, it consists of the 11 governmental bodies represented on the CTC.

Despite progress, vulnerabilities remain in Kuwait's CFT regime. Though Kuwait regulates donations to and spending by licensed charities, unlicensed fundraisers are able to operate on social media and raise and send funds through other unofficial channels. The KFIU does not oversee many sectors of the economy, such as money transfer businesses, according to international standards.

The CTC currently disseminates additions to the lists via facsimile, as well as by note. Financial institutions electronically monitor the UN lists directly. The CTC plans to set up a website that will post both UN and domestic designations. Financial institutions will be required by regulators to check the online list for updates on a regular basis.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** As in previous years, the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, KNG, and MOI conducted a number of exercises aimed at responding to terrorist attacks, including joint exercises with regional and international partners. Kuwait also cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism, for example, conducting joint training programs with the United States and working with governments to conduct missions and exchange information.

Kuwait held the GCC's and Arab League's rotating presidencies in 2014. During the reporting period, Kuwaiti officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League members. Kuwait was the only GCC member not to ratify the Gulf Security Pact.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In 2014, Kuwait began issuing weekly circulars to all mosques with approved language for Friday sermons and instructions to avoid extremist or sectarian language. It began broadcasts of "Kuwait Youth Radio," which included public service announcements promoting social cohesion and religious tolerance, and also announced formation of the Higher Commission for the Promotion of Moderation, the main goal of which was to counter violent extremist ideology through education.

Media reported that an agreement was reached in September between the MOI and the Ministry of Awqaf (Islamic endowments) and Islamic Affairs to form a joint committee to monitor Friday sermons to ensure imams were not addressing any political or sectarian issues. Over the reporting period, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs referred 16 imams for investigation and deported one Egyptian imam under the Mosques Charter, which prohibits promoting sectarianism, radicalization, and incitement.

## OMAN

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism partner and worked actively to prevent terrorists from conducting attacks within Oman, or using its territory for safe haven or to transport terrorists, weapons, and materiel. The Government of Oman actively sought training and equipment from U.S. government and commercial entities as well as from other countries to support its efforts to control its land and maritime borders. Oman used U.S. security assistance to improve counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. Omani officials engaged regularly with U.S. officials on the need to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Oman participated in Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) meetings and signed the September 11 Jeddah Communiqué to express support for combating the spread of ISIL's extremism. After the Jeddah meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement noting that regional cooperation was needed to end the threat posed by ISIL as quickly as possible. Omani officials also participated in the October Coalition Partners Communications Conference in Kuwait to develop a counter-narrative to ISIL messaging, and the December Counter-ISIL plenary meeting in Brussels. In his remarks to the UN Security Council (UNSC) September 19, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi, disparaged ISIL as the "un-Islamic" state.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Royal Decree 8/2007 outlines specific penalties, including the death penalty and life imprisonment, for various terrorist acts, including establishment or leadership of a terrorist group, attempts to join or recruit for a terrorist group, development of an explosive or weapon, or takeover of any mode of transportation for purposes of terrorism. Royal Decree 55/1999, ratified the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and Royal Decree 22/2002, ratified the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Convention on Combating International Terrorism. Royal Decree 105/2005 ratifies the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Convention to Counter Terrorism. Oman's criminal procedure law permits those suspected of posing a threat to national security to be held for 30 days without a charge.

A widespread corruption crackdown started in 2013 continued into 2014, with guilty verdicts and lengthy prison terms – up to 23 years in prison – issued to well-placed government officials, influential business persons, and senior leadership of state-owned corporations.

Counterterrorism investigation, crisis response, and border security capabilities were limited by local capacity and a challenging operating environment due to Oman's long and remote borders with Yemen and Saudi Arabia. There was little coordination among the many agencies with jurisdiction over counterterrorism. Roles and responsibilities between law enforcement and the armed forces were not clearly delineated.

In 2014, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security engaged with the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard, the Directorate General of Customs, and the Royal Army of Oman to deliver numerous training programs designed to assist Omani personnel in enhancing interdiction capabilities at official Ports of Entry on land and at sea ports, and along land and maritime borders.

Oman participated in the U.S. Department of Energy's week-long Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Commodity Identification Course, which included training on identifying and interdicting dual-use material that may be used in a WMD terrorist attack.

Oman also participated in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided training on maritime border security, cyber investigations, and critical incident management for Omani security officials representing a number of government agencies.

Omani authorities made significant progress on construction of a fence along Oman's long and remote border with Yemen to deter entry into its territory.

The major deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security are the lack of interagency coordination and lack of training to develop requisite law enforcement skills. Oman's border with Yemen also features extremely rugged, mountainous terrain which challenges border security efforts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Oman is a member of the Middle East-North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012), the Government of Oman banned in January the import of Somali charcoal - a measure aimed to deny revenue from charcoal sales to the al-Shabaab terrorist group. The Switzerland-based Basel Institute assessed Oman in September 2014 as having the lowest risk among GCC states for money laundering and terrorist financing, according to its Anti-Money Laundering Index, which ranks Oman as 29th globally with a score of 4.76 on a scale from 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). *Hawala* are not permitted to operate in Oman. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Oman participates in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum. During the September 25 forum, Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi, joined other GCC foreign ministers in reaffirming the rejection of terrorism, violent extremism, and sectarianism in all their forms, condemning the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and the recruitment of children to carry out attacks, and emphasized that ISIL poses a direct threat to shared peace and security. The foreign ministers agreed to follow up the Strategic Cooperation Forum discussion with concrete steps to destroy and ultimately defeat ISIL, and establish security and stability, including by cutting the group's sources of revenue, blocking travel of foreign fighters, and sharing information on ISIL activities.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed al-Khalili, published an essay in October calling on all Muslims to reject extremism and promote tolerance, themes he again amplified in his popular and widely broadcast weekly television program.

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## QATAR

Overview: In 2014, Qatar restructured its national counterterrorism committee to improve interagency coordination on counterterrorism efforts, including counterterrorist financing, cybersecurity, threats to civil aviation, and internal security threats. The Qatari government is concerned by the threat of foreign terrorist fighters transiting through Doha's new international airport hub to or from Syria to receive training and provide support to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as the possibility that violent extremists could seek to commit terrorist acts in or from Qatar using Qatar's internet or financial systems. In 2014, the Qatari government implemented new tools to enhance monitoring and enforcement against persons using charities and the internet for terrorist purposes or in support of terrorism, including fundraising.

Qatar is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In addition to hosting two U.S. military installations important to Coalition efforts, Qatar has offered to host a train-and-equip program for moderate Syrian opposition forces and provided operational and logistical support for Coalition activities. Qatari aircraft have participated in Coalition airstrikes against ISIL in Syria. Qatar has contributed humanitarian aid to the effort, and sent six planes full of humanitarian assistance to Iraq in September.

U.S. agencies had an active and productive dialogue with their Qatari counterparts and worked closely for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information. Qatar was generally responsive to U.S. requests and coordination efforts although limited in capacity and indigenous manpower. The United States and Qatar collaborated in fostering closer regional and international cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and rule of law activities.

Qatar has a strong legal framework to combat terrorist financing, and sought to strengthen it in 2014. Qatari officials recognized there were gaps in the law and acknowledged a critical need for improvement in implementation. Capacity to address this issue remained an obstacle during the year. As a result of information sharing and engagement on specific designated individuals, Qatari officials took enforcement steps against private financiers of terrorism and shared limited information on others with the United States.

Terrorist activity historically has been low in Qatar. Restrictive immigration policies and security services capable of monitoring and disrupting violent extremist activities helped to mitigate the terrorist threat.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In addition to existing laws which prohibit terrorist activities, in 2014 the Amir approved Law Number 14, the Cybercrime Prevention Law, which criminalizes terrorism-linked cyber offenses. The new cybercrime law clarifies that it is unlawful to establish or manage a terrorist organization on



any information network (including a website) or information technology device, or to use an information network to establish contact with leaders or members of terrorist organizations, promote or finance terrorism, or instruct on methods to assist in terrorist activity. Specifically, the law prohibits use of an “information network or information technology technique” to set up or run a website for a terrorist group or organization, facilitate communication with leaders and members of such a group or organization, promote its thoughts, secure financing thereto, or publish information relating to manufacturing explosives or incendiary devices of any device that can be used in a terrorist act.

The new cybercrime law grants law enforcement and prosecutors additional investigative tools, such as monitoring internet traffic and electronic data, to combat terrorism and terrorist finance in the information age. Qatar can also deport individuals for violation of the cybercrime law. A professional organization (such as a law firm), unless specifically exempted by law, must comply with court orders and investigations under the Cybercrime Law, and may not withhold information on the basis of professional confidentiality. The law also provides mechanisms and details for Qatar to comply with requests for information made by other countries under mutual legal assistance treaties, thereby expanding enforcement capabilities outside of Qatar.

The State Security Bureau, also known as the Qatar State Security, maintains an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal extremist or terrorism-related activities. The internal security-focused Ministry of Interior is well-positioned to respond to incidents with rapid reaction forces and trained internal security forces that routinely pursue and engage in structured counterterrorism training and exercises. Qatar’s Office of Public Prosecution is tasked with prosecuting all crimes, including any related to terrorism, and plays a significant role in terrorism investigations as the prosecutors conduct investigative interviews.

Qatar also maintains an interagency National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NATC) within the Ministry of Interior, which is composed of representatives from more than 10 government ministries and official institutions. The NATC is tasked with formulating Qatar’s counterterrorism policy, ensuring thorough and transparent interagency coordination within the government, fulfilling Qatar’s obligations to combat terrorism under international conventions, and participating in international or UN conferences on terrorism. During 2014, Qatar took steps to improve interagency coordination on terrorism-related security matters, by consolidating a restructured NATC, with a new Chairman. As of December 31, the NATC’s restructuring was ongoing, with pending law changes to formalize consolidation of interagency coordination on critical infrastructure and industrial security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism including counterterrorism financing and border security measures.

Qatar maintains its own watchlist of suspected terrorists that it uses to screen passengers on international flights. Qatar also conducts extensive vetting and background checks on all applicants for work visas. The Qatari government uses biometric scans for arrivals at the Doha International Airport. Through its state-owned airline Qatar Airways, Qatar signed an agreement in November with Interpol to check the validity of passports of travelers against the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents databases, a new initiative with only two airlines worldwide to help stem the flow of foreign fighters and enhance border security.

Overall, Qatar’s security services workforce is limited in scope and bandwidth, and in most agencies, is reliant on manpower from third countries to fill rank-and-file law enforcement positions. This limitation applies across the board with all Qatari government institutions (except for the Qatar State Security and elite units of the Ministry of Interior’s internal security force) and is commensurate with the demographics of the nation. Lack of capacity and to some extent the lack of advanced training of these non-Qataris does contribute to a lack of effectiveness in basic police operations. However, Qatar’s reliance on technology has provided state-of-the-art electronic surveillance capacity, which enhances Qatari security services’ effectiveness in the detection and monitoring of terrorist suspects.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Qatar is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Qatar’s Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law of 2010 requires Qatar’s Public Prosecutor to freeze the funds of UNSC-designated terrorist organizations. Qatar Central Bank works with financial institutions to confirm compliance of UN designations of terrorist entities and individuals, including Qatari citizens.

In September, the Amir of Qatar issued a new law regulating the work of charities oversight based on FATF standards. Law Number 15 of 2014 established an independent Charities Commission composed of an interagency board (headed by the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and including officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, the Central Bank, and Qatar State Security). It amended Law Number 4 of 2010 which previously charged the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs with the sole responsibility for regulating charities. According to the new



law, local charities must obtain authorization from the Commission prior to any dealings with foreign entities. The Qatar Central Bank scrutinizes charities' overseas transactions to ensure compliance.

The Amir also issued Law Number 14 of 2014 in September on cybercrime prevention, which penalizes the use of the internet for unauthorized fundraising in support of terrorism.

The Qatari government in 2014 took steps to stem the flow of funds from Qatar to violent extremist groups and individuals. Qatari authorities shut down the Madad Ahl al-Sham online fundraising campaign that was suspected of sending funds to violent extremist elements in Syria. Qatari authorities deported a Jordanian terrorist financier resident in Doha who had been employed by a Qatari charity. To further protect the State of Qatar from foreign terrorist financiers attempting to raise funds in Doha, the government barred the entry of multiple individuals of concern. The government also issued directives to local charities prohibiting them from transferring funds to several overseas charities suspected of engaging in illicit activities.

In June, Qatar sent fourteen interagency officials to a U.S.-hosted anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism training in Washington. Participants discussed with U.S. interagency experts the need to tackle the use of charities and misuse of the internet for illicit finance, and the relationship with funding foreign fighters and violent extremist groups overseas.

Qatari law authorizes the NATC to designate by resolution those who finance terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist organizations, independently of lists pursuant to UNSCR 1267. No designations were made in 2014.

Non-profit organizations are not obliged to file suspicious transaction reports, but the government has reportedly increased its regulation and monitoring of charities with the implementation of a new regulation of charities law issued in September.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Qatar is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and actively participated in GCTF coordination activities. Qatar participated in and was active in counterterrorism issues at the UN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Qatar hosted the March GCTF workshop on developing a plan of action for community-oriented policing as a tool for Countering Violent Extremism. Qatar also participated in the Global Countering Violent Extremism Expo hosted by the Hedayah Center in Abu Dhabi, UAE, in December.

Qatari officials and Qatari media work together on strategic communications to counter violent extremism; the Prime Minister has a senior aide responsible for overseeing strategic communications and senior Qatari officials oversee state media and sit on the Board of Directors of the Al-Jazeera network. An Assistant Foreign Minister attended the Global Coalition Communication Conference in Kuwait in October. Qatari officials also participated in a Global Coalition Communications Working Group in Abu Dhabi in December.

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## SAUDI ARABIA

**Overview:** For the first time in several years, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, was able to conduct a successful attack on Saudi soil with a July raid on the Wudayah Border Crossing and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) General Investigation Directorate (Mabahith) office in Sharurah (near the Saudi-Yemeni border), which resulted in the death of four Saudi security officers. AQAP continued efforts to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom.

In addition to facing the enduring threat from AQAP, Saudi counterterrorism efforts were increasingly focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as Saudi citizens returning from fighting in Syria. The Saudi government continued domestic and bilateral efforts to build, augment, and refine its capacity to counter terrorism and extremist ideologies in the Kingdom while increasing participation in international counterterrorism conferences and engagements. Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a robust counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of both U.S. and

Saudi citizens within Saudi territories and abroad. Saudi Arabia stood as a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, taking military action in support of coalition efforts.

The Saudi government took a zero-tolerance stance on ISIL by condemning the organization's activities and participating in Global Coalition military action to counter the group in Syria and Iraq. Its external action against ISIL was complemented by an aggressive campaign by both official clerics and Saudi King Abdullah to discredit the group and condemn their activities as acts of terrorism. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, expanding existing counterterrorism programs and rhetoric to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, and leveraged terrorist finance provisions of its Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist-Financing (CT Law) to combat funding of violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Several attacks on both Saudi nationals and Westerners occurred, despite Saudi efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist activity.

- On July 4, the most organized of the incidents, carried out by AQAP, targeted a Saudi border checkpoint in Sharurah near the Yemeni border, which resulted in the death of four Saudi security officers and five AQAP assailants.
- On October 14, there were two shooting events involving Western targets, including one targeting two American contractors working in Saudi Arabia who were shot at a gas station in Riyadh by a dual Saudi/U.S. national. There were indications that extremist propaganda influenced the attacker, a former employee of the victim's organization.
- On November 3, a group of gunmen killed five Saudi nationals and wounded nine others in the town of al-Dalwah in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The Saudi government has alleged that the gunmen had ties to ISIL.
- On November 22, a Danish national survived being shot three times by three assailants who were arrested by Saudi authorities on December 11. Initial Saudi investigations determined that the three Saudi attackers had unspecified links to ISIL.

In all cases, the Saudi government worked closely with the United States to clarify the circumstances regarding these attacks and responded quickly to ensure proper security measures were in place to better secure U.S. installations and interests.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In February, Saudi Arabia's robust legal counterterrorism apparatus was bolstered by the introduction of a new counterterrorism law containing 41 articles that further refined existing counterterrorism laws. Human rights activists have criticized the counterterrorism law, claiming that an overly-broad definition of terrorism greatly inhibits freedom of expression and association. Saudi Arabia has a specialized criminal court for handling counterterrorism cases; it was also used in 2014 to try human rights defenders.

Throughout 2014, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in the Kingdom by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. The Saudi General Investigations Directorate, also known as the Mabathith, is responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations in the Kingdom and, upon its discretion, will cooperate with other elements of the Saudi government to further investigations into specific cases. Once the investigation is complete, the case is transferred to the Special Investigations and Public Prosecutions Office in the Saudi Ministry of Justice for the duration of the trial. The Saudi government continued its programs to improve physical border security through the employment of biometric systems, aerial reconnaissance, thermal imaging, and remote unattended sensors along the border region, especially considering the deteriorating security situation with neighbors Yemen and Iraq. Saudi Arabia's MOI hosted the 17<sup>th</sup> Annual International Conference and Exhibition for Industrial Security, Fire, and Occupational Safety and Health in Riyadh in early November, which focused on strengthening industrial security practices and coordination between the government and private sectors to protect key infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about suspected terrorist activity. The government offered rewards for information on terrorists, and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of AQAP militants and supporters, as well as the successful disruption of a more than 70-member ISIL cell active in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism both through engagement in bilateral programs and through information exchange agreements with the United States. Despite the absence of a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, Post's Legal Attaché office brokered and enhanced direct engagement between Department of Justice Office of International Affairs and MOI's Department of Legal Affairs and International Cooperation. This year witnessed the first case in which Saudi Arabia produced certified bank records in response to a mutual legal assistance request.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The Saudi government affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts in the Kingdom. It continued to provide specialized training programs for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies as part of its efforts to maintain financial programs designed to combat terror financing. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has standing requirements to all Saudi financial institutions to implement all the FATF Recommendations regarding money laundering and terrorist finance. The February 2014 counterterrorism law further outlined the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorist financing. Despite these efforts, however, foreign charities with suspected links to terrorist groups continued to leverage social media to solicit funds from Saudi donors, a trend the Saudi government worked to combat. In 2014, the FATF decided to enable a small expansion of membership, and the Kingdom was selected as a candidate for potential membership. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Saudi Arabia cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues, including by participating in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative since 2008; Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which itself is a member of the FATF. Saudi officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the Saudi government hosted international counterterrorism conferences on subjects including countering violent extremist ideology and combating terrorist financing. In April 2014, the Saudi government participated in the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum Task Force on Counterterrorism and Border Security.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** As part of its strategy to counter violent extremism, the Saudi government focused on increasing public awareness campaigns and conducting outreach, counter-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs. Some of these efforts involved seminars that refuted radical Islamic interpretation and ideology. Public awareness campaigns aimed at reinforcing the values of the Islamic faith and educating Saudi citizens about the dangers of extremism and terrorism. Methods used included advertisements and programs on television, in schools and mosques, and at sporting events. The Saudi government expanded these programs to address the rising threat to youth from recruitment efforts from groups like ISIL and to dissuade its citizens from engaging as foreign fighters in Syria.

The Ministry of Interior continued to operate its flagship de-radicalization program (the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue), as well as its extensive prison rehabilitation program to reduce recidivism among former inmates. The Saudi government also continued its ongoing program to modernize the educational curriculum, including textbooks used in religious training criticized for intolerance of other religious traditions. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to re-educate imams, prohibiting them from incitement of violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

**Overview:** The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to build its counterterrorism capacity and strengthened its international counterterrorism cooperation. Over the course of the year, the UAE government improved its border security measures and renewed its efforts to counter terrorist financing. The UAE government was dedicated to providing strong support for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The pre-clearance facility for travelers boarding direct flights to the United States at the Abu Dhabi International Airport continued to operate and expand its services. Prominent officials and religious leaders continued to publicly criticize violent extremist ideology.

The UAE government leaders and senior Emirati officials publicly highlighted the dangers of ISIL and violent extremism, using media to counter ISIL messaging. Apart from the United States, the UAE has conducted more air operations against ISIL than any other Coalition member. The UAE government has openly advocated fighting violent extremism not only militarily, but holistically, including by stopping violent extremist funding, disrupting the recruitment of foreign fighters, securing borders, preventing the exploitation of the web and social media, and by contesting the use of religious centers to promote hatred and violence. To this end, the government restricts violent extremist messaging on the internet.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** On December 1, an American teacher was stabbed to death in a mall restroom by a 38 year-old Emirati woman. The alleged perpetrator then went to the home of an American doctor and planted a primitive bomb outside his apartment. The explosive was discovered by one of the doctor's children; the Abu Dhabi police were able to evacuate the area and defuse the device. Authorities identified the suspect, tracked her to her home, and arrested her in less than 48 hours. Security sources told the media that the crime committed was a "personal terrorist act" and said the accused did not have links to terrorist organizations although she had allegedly visited violent extremist websites.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The UAE government passed Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on combating terrorism offenses, which replaced Federal Law No. 1 of 2004. The new law strengthened existing legislation by criminalizing additional conduct and imposing stricter punishments, including fines and forfeitures, to deter terrorism and dissident activities.

In November, the government designated 85 groups as terrorist organizations in line with the new law. In conjunction with the new counterterrorism law, the designation of terrorist organizations laid the groundwork for prosecuting a greater number of individuals for a broader range of activities. However, the criteria used for designations, and procedures for organizations to appeal designations, were opaque. The list included Muslim affinity groups in several Western countries, alongside internationally recognized terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida and ISIL. The U.S. government requested additional information about the designation by the UAE of two American Muslim affinity groups, which the United States does not consider to be terrorist organizations, and which operate openly in the United States.

The State Security Directorate in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai State Security are the principal security services responsible for counterterrorism functions. These services have demonstrated capability in investigations, crisis response, and border security, and are trained and equipped to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The State Security Court, a branch of the Federal Supreme Court, has developed capacity for handling security cases.

In June, the Federal Supreme Court issued sentences for seven of nine alleged members of an al-Qa'ida (AQ) cell who were arrested in April 2013. The seven individuals were convicted on charges of running or belonging to an AQ terrorist cell; recruiting and promoting the actions of AQ (including possible terrorist attacks within the UAE); and illegally collecting money to finance a terrorist organization. The group was reportedly recruiting and fundraising for al-Nusrah Front.

In a separate trial in December, the Federal Supreme Court convicted 11 of 15 individuals who were variously charged with joining, supporting, and collecting funds for, and transferring funds to al-Nusrah Front and Ahrar Al Sham; making unauthorized explosives; possessing unlicensed firearms; and polluting the environment through dangerous and banned materials. This is believed to be the first case involving provisions of the new counterterrorism law, and the mixed verdict of convictions and acquittals shows discernment in the way that the laws were applied. The sentences included incarceration, fines, forfeitures, and the closing down of a website. Four Emirati nationals who were tried in absentia were each sentenced to life imprisonment. The case shows the ability of the UAE government to focus its investigative resources on rooting out networks, and to use conspiracy and aiding and abetting as prosecution theories in terrorism cases.

The government continued to cooperate with the United States by hosting a preclearance facility in Abu Dhabi International Airport. The preclearance facility expanded to cover additional direct flights to the U.S. through an increase in the number of deployed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers.

The UAE participated in the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives (CSI). The CSI, which became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port in the emirate of Dubai in 2005, co-locates two U.S. CBP officers with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid. On average, CSI reviewed approximately 250 bills of lading each week, resulting in about 25 non-intrusive inspections per month of U.S.-bound containers. Examinations were conducted

jointly with Dubai Customs officers, who shared information on transshipments from high risk areas, including those originating in Iran.

In 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) signed two Memoranda of Cooperation (MOCs) to support the respective training academies of the UAE Ministry of Interior's (federal) Immigration Authority and the Abu Dhabi (emirate-level) Customs Authority (ADCA) and to enhance capacity building of its police and customs authorities. The aforementioned MOCs remained in effect.

A critical challenge to the effectiveness of the UAE's law enforcement, border security, and judicial systems is the country's limited human capacity. These sectors are generally reserved for Emirati citizens, who compose only 11 percent of the country's total population, making it structurally difficult to develop the country's human resources to counter the full range of terrorist activities. Despite this, the UAE government remained vigilant in its overall counterterrorism pursuits.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UAE is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and chairs the Task Force's Training and Typologies Working Group. The UAE's financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The UAE continued efforts to strengthen its institutional capabilities to combat terrorist financing. In October, the government adopted Federal Law No. 9 of 2014, amending Law No. 2 of 2002 Regarding Combating Money Laundering. The new law is intended to address deficiencies identified in the UAE's 2008 FATF Mutual Evaluation and bring the UAE into compliance with the FATF Recommendations issued in February 2012. Notably, the amendments codified in law the obligation of all covered entities to report suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing.

The Central Bank conducted Anti-Money Laundering (AML) training both locally and regionally, and expanded its cooperation with foreign FIUs. Exploitation by illicit actors of money transmitters including licensed exchange houses, *hawalas*, and trading firms acting as money transmitters, remained significant concerns.

The UAE is a regional and global financial and transportation hub. Terrorist organizations have used the UAE to send and receive financial support. Operational capability constraints and political considerations sometimes prevented the UAE government from immediately freezing and confiscating terrorist assets absent multilateral assistance. In November, the UAE reported to the MENAFATF that Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on Terrorist Crimes addressed outstanding deficiencies related to implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373.

Both the Governor of the Central Bank and the Public Prosecutor may freeze funds based on suspicion of terrorist financing. The Central Bank may only freeze funds for a period of seven days, during which the Public Prosecutor must be informed. The Public Prosecutor may extend the freeze, pending investigation. Federal Law No. 7 stipulates that the Cabinet issue a list of designated terrorist organizations or persons, and that funds and other items owned by listed organizations may be seized by the court.

The UAE requires licensing and registration of exchange houses and *hawalas*. Federal Law No. 9 of 2014 extends due diligence, reporting, and record keeping requirements to Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Persons, such as real estate brokers, precious metals dealers, lawyers, etc.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The UAE is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and chaired the Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism with the UK. The International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, known as Hedayah, was formally launched in Abu Dhabi in December, 2012. The UAE is Hedayah's permanent host, pursuant to federal Law No. 7 of 2013. The government continued to support the center, which hosted the Global CVE Expo 2014 from December 9-11, bringing together more than 200 government officials, industry partners, technology specialists, academic experts, and civil society actors to generate new ideas and programs, and to leverage new technologies for countering violent extremist narratives.

The government cooperated with other states to build counterterrorism capacity and routinely invited participation from GCC countries at counterterrorism-related training sessions conducted by the FBI in the UAE. In December at the 35<sup>th</sup> GCC Summit, GCC leaders announced the creation of a regional police force to be headquartered in Abu Dhabi.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** To prevent violent extremist preaching in UAE mosques, the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments provided guidelines for all Friday sermons and monitored mosques' compliance. Abroad, the General Authority has since 2010 trained cohorts of Afghan imams on preaching messages of non-violence and tolerance. During key periods of Muslim religious observance, especially the fasting month of Ramadan, the UAE government aired commercials on television warning Muslim citizens and residents to refrain from donating money at mosques, as the funds could unknowingly go to support terrorist causes. The UAE worked to keep its education system free of violent extremist influences, and it emphasized social tolerance. Under its cybercrime law, the UAE criminalizes the use of the internet by terrorist groups to "promote their ideologies and finance their activities."

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## YEMEN

**Overview:** The Government of Yemen took steps to combat al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2014, despite significant challenges posed by elements of the former regime, heavily-armed Houthi forces, militant elements of the Hirak movement, and tribal adversaries. Yemeni security forces undertook two offensives against AQAP – one in the governorates of Shabwah and Abyan and one in Hadramawt – which temporarily reduced AQAP-controlled territory and safe havens. Gains in Hadramawt were hindered in the wake of advances by armed Houthi militia into Sana'a. As of the end of 2014, major counterterrorism operations and offensives by Yemen's armed forces were indefinitely paused.

AQAP's continued use of asymmetric tactics such as ambush-style attacks and assassinations took a heavy toll on military and security forces. AQAP also continued to conduct attacks against pro-government tribes, civilians, and international targets, such as the group's car bomb attack against the Iranian Ambassador's residence in Sana'a and AQAP's murder of two Western civilian hostages (American and South African nationals) during a December rescue attempt. Counterterrorism efforts also suffered from the continued delay in the military and security restructuring process mandated by the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the National Dialogue Conference outcomes, which left many units plagued by divided loyalties and unreliable command structures.

The National Dialogue Conference, which convened in 2013 to lay the groundwork for a political transition, concluded in January 2014. However, political maneuvering by elements of the former regime and other spoilers derailed the peaceful transition process. Most notably, the militant elements of the Zaydi Shiite movement known as Ansar Allah or the Houthis, aggressively expanded from their northwestern stronghold of Sa'ada in 2014. Events dramatically changed with the Houthi takeover of the capital Sana'a in September 2014, followed by the signing of the UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) which granted the Houthis significant political concessions. Despite the PNPA's call for Houthi withdrawal from the capital and disarmament, the Houthis forcibly inserted themselves into numerous government offices and ministries and expanded further south from the capital. The political instability resulting from the Houthi crisis diverted key resources from official Yemeni counterterrorism operations, which were at a near standstill at the end of 2014. Additionally, Houthi expansion in governorates such as Ibb and al-Baydha, including clashes with AQAP, spurred a significant increase in AQAP attacks in these areas, heightening sectarian sentiments and causing formerly neutral or anti-AQAP Sunni tribes to side with AQAP against the Houthis to defend their historic geographic and tribal locations.

Despite these challenges, Yemen, under the leadership of President Hadi, remained a willing U.S. counterterrorism partner. In 2014, Hadi supported U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen and encouraged cooperation between the U.S. military and Yemen's security forces. This report solely focuses on 2014 and does not address the dynamics that have unfolded in Yemen in 2015.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** AQAP militants carried out hundreds of attacks throughout Yemen in 2014. Methods included suicide bombers, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. The following list details only a small fraction of the incidents that occurred:

- On January 16, AQAP launched simultaneous attacks on three military installations, including a checkpoint and a military camp, near the Rada district in al-Baydha Governorate. The coordinated assault, which included an attempted suicide bombing, killed at least six Yemeni soldiers, five militants, and wounded a number of others.
- On February 14, AQAP militants conducted a complex attack targeting the Sana'a Central Prison, facilitating the escape of 29 prisoners, including 19 AQAP operatives. A VBIED exploded outside the gate and was

followed by a gun battle between security guards and the militants. Yemeni authorities report at least seven guards and three militants were killed in the fighting.

- On April 15, suspected AQAP militants assassinated the deputy governor of al-Baydha Governorate, Hussein Dayyan, near his home, fleeing the scene on motorcycles.
- On April 29, AQAP militants ambushed a Yemeni military convoy in Shabwah Governorate using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. At least 15 Yemeni soldiers and 12 militants were killed, with more wounded. Militants also captured a troop transport vehicle and took at least 15 Yemeni soldiers hostage. Two of these hostages were released soon thereafter, with reports indicating that they had been “severely beaten.” On April 30, three of the remaining hostages were executed and their bodies left on the roadside, reportedly bearing signs of torture.
- On July 4, six AQAP militants attacked the Wudayah Border Crossing at the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border in Hadramawt, killing at least one Yemeni soldier and several Saudi security officers. Several militants also died, two of them by detonating suicide bombs inside a Saudi government building after being trapped by Saudi security forces.
- On August 8, AQAP militants kidnapped 14 Yemeni soldiers traveling on a bus from Shibam, Hadramawt to Sana’a, executed them, some via beheading, in a market in Shibam, and left their bodies by a road near Sayun, Hadramawt.
- On October 9, an AQAP suicide bomber detonated his vest during a Houthi rally in Tahrir Square, Sana’a, killing at least 45 people and injuring at least 75 more.
- On November 10, AQAP militants detonated a VBIED near a Houthi-controlled building in the al-Manaseh region of al-Baydha Governorate, killing dozens.
- On December 6, AQAP militants shot and killed American journalist Luke Somers, who had been held hostage since 2013, during a joint U.S.-Yemeni rescue attempt. A video released by AQAP on December 3 had stated that Somers would be executed by the end of the week if the United States did not meet AQAP’s demands. A South African hostage, Pierre Korkie, was also killed by AQAP during this rescue effort.
- On December 16, AQAP militants in Rada, al-Baidha detonated two VBIEDs near a Houthi checkpoint, killing at least 10 Houthis and an estimated 20 children passing by in a school bus, and wounding many more. Possibly due to popular backlash, AQAP denied responsibility publicly for the attack.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Yemen does not have comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. Cases were prosecuted under a number of sections of criminal law, most with light maximum sentences. Draft counterterrorism legislation has been pending in the parliament since 2008. International experts provided technical advice in 2014 on the revised draft law introduced in September 2013. Prior to the political instability in the capital, the current draft was under review by the three parliamentary subcommittees responsible for counterterrorism law issues (Legal and Constitutional Affairs; Security and Defense; and Codification of Sharia Law). This law would facilitate the detention of suspects and include mandatory sentencing for a number of terrorism-related crimes.

Although Yemeni courts tried dozens of suspected terrorists in 2014, many received light sentences due to the lack of counterterrorism legislation or remained in detention while their cases were pending. A number of government organizations were involved in countering acts of terrorism, including the National Security Bureau, the Political Security Organization, the Special Security Forces, and the Yemeni military. However, cooperation and information-sharing between these organizations was sporadic and limited. The takeover of security institutions towards the end of 2014 has impeded information sharing. The weakness of the law enforcement system with respect to terrorism-related crimes discouraged law enforcement officials working these cases. Officials also noted pervasive problems with a lack of proper case development and a failure to meet the requirements of the criminal prosecutions process.

In 2014, Yemen joined the Regional Criminal Justice Sector Reform Series, a State Department program that brings together government officials and civil society from states beginning or undergoing political transitions in Africa and the Middle East to share information, best practices, and implementation strategies on civilian security and justice sector reform. Members include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, and Yemen.



Yemen participated in several U.S. civilian capacity building programs to improve counterterrorism law enforcement capacity within the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The State Department, in partnership with the UN Development Programme, provided strategic leadership support to the MOI during the ongoing political transition, including capacity development assistance for the new Inspector General's department, courses on strategic planning and leadership for several newly established central command units, and capacity development and support for senior female police officers within the MOI. Additional State Department programming assisted the Yemeni government in improving its capacity to respond to civil disturbances, improve criminal investigations, process and analyze physical evidence, operate and manage correctional facilities in an effective and accountable manner, and professionalize the justice sector in the area of criminal investigative and forensics. Yemen also continued to participate in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, political instability and the integration of Houthi personnel into many government organizations limited U.S. ability to effectively engage with the MOI and other Yemeni law enforcement agencies in 2014.

Yemen adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program's Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in 2002 in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Yemen has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land, sea, and air ports of entry.

Yemen has more than 2,400 kilometers of coastline vulnerable to penetration by militants and maritime smuggling of weapons, materials, and goods used to finance AQAP and other terrorist activities, so the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) plays a key function in border security. In past years, YCG forces have played a critical role in key interdictions of weapons and other illegal materials destined for Yemen-based terrorist groups. However, despite the strong focus the YCG places on counterterrorism efforts, Yemen's maritime borders remained extremely porous due to a lack of capacity. In 2014, Yemen continued its participation in the Yemen Quadrilateral Border Talks, a multilateral forum that brings together officials from Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to discuss opportunities for cooperation and assistance in securing the Yemen/Oman/Saudi Arabia border region.

The Yemeni government cooperated with the United States in the ongoing investigations of several murders of U.S. citizens in Yemen, including a civilian who was targeted and killed by AQAP gunmen. Yemen also cooperated in investigations into AQAP kidnapping for ransom activities.

The justice and law enforcement sectors in Yemen continued to face significant challenges in overcoming more than 30 years of neglect by the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Law enforcement entities were frequently plagued by ineffectiveness and mistrust from civil society, and in worst cases, an unwillingness to perform their assigned task. Corrections institutions, while suffering from severe resource constraints, lacked fundamental skills to manage and operate safe and secure facilities. Meanwhile, Yemeni courts have become a victim of political, economic, and security instability – poor facilities, limited or poorly trained staff, forced closures, and absenteeism all exponentially increased the case backlog and therefore denied access to justice. In many cases, suspected terrorists wait years for the conclusion of their trials. Yemeni prison institutions are commonly targeted by violent extremist groups for the 'rescue' of terrorist inmates, which later serves as propaganda to recruit others. Criminal justice institutions and services continued to be identified by Yemenis through the National Dialogue Conference as one of their primary concerns.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Yemen belongs to the Middle East/North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June 2014, the FATF upgraded Yemen from its October 18, 2013 Public Statement to its list of countries with strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/countering terrorist finance (AML/CFT) safeguards, in recognition of the significant steps Yemen has taken toward improving its AML/CFT regime and implementing its action plan. The FATF planned to visit Yemen in June, but this visit was prevented due to the security situation in the country. MENAFATF also upgraded Yemen, which is now required to submit follow-up reports every two years rather than every six months. Despite this progress, Yemen faced many challenges implementing AML/CFT safeguards due to ongoing political and economic turmoil.

Yemen's Financial Information Unit (FIU), which operates out of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), received 192 suspicious transaction reports as of November 26, in comparison with 166 at this time in 2013. These reports were on a wide range of individuals, including government officials, military commanders, Houthi figures, and AQAP elements. The FIU requested international assistance in developing a national strategic plan to assess the risks of AML/CFT and prioritize additional needs, such as financial analysis training. In 2014, the FIU identified a need to work more closely with the Customs Authority on the risks posed by money laundering, and expressed appreciation for an ongoing World Bank program aiming to improve networking between the CBY and other Yemeni banks and increase monitoring of banks' transactions.




In October 2014, following the September incursion of Houthi forces into Sana'a, the FIU reported that Houthis posted at the CBY briefly interfered with FIU operations despite a law guaranteeing the unit's independence. The Houthis reportedly used the FIU to target the assets of enemies decried by the Houthis as corrupt, initiating proceedings via the FIU to freeze the assets of a number of these individuals.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Yemen continued to cooperate with and be advised by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United States, and other donor countries with respect to its military restructuring plan, in accordance with NDC outcomes. It participated in several Global Counterterrorism Forum workshops. Yemen participated in the second annual Gulf of Aden Regional Counterterrorism Forum in February to support counterterrorism capacity and partnership building in Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia. Yemeni military, police, security, and maritime units cooperated with U.S., European and regional partners on counterterrorism and related security issues.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Throughout 2014, President Hadi and other senior officials stressed the importance of countering terrorism and violent extremism by attempting to address the conditions that terrorists exploit, such as a weak economy and low levels of education. Many political leaders and groups also publicly condemned terrorism and violent attacks. The Yemeni government expressed support for a rehabilitation/reintegration program for violent extremists, similar to the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care in Saudi Arabia, although the effort was on hold at year's end.

Source: State Department reporting is excerpted from US State Department, "Chapter 2, Middle East and North Africa Overview," *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014*, June 2015, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239413.htm>.

**Figure XI.5: Structure and Size of Gulf Paramilitary Forces**

Source: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from HIS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors.

**Yemen****Paramilitary:** 71,200+

Ministry of the Interior Forces 50,000

Tribal Levies 20,000+

Yemeni Coast Guard Authority: €1,200

Patrol and coastal combatants: 17

PBF 4 *Archangel* (US)PB 13: 2 *Marine Patrol*; 11 various

Central Security Forces: Counter terrorism and counter-coup purposes

**Strength:** 2002 estimate was 20,000; CSF-Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF CTU) is 200 strong, but is now a part of the Strategic Reserve Forces Command of the Armed Forces.**Division:** The CSF was organized in recent years on the basis of battalions of two different types, Special Forces Battalions and Commando/Ranger Battalions, with each of these battalions deploying 450-750 personnel. Equipment for a battalion includes pick-up trucks equipped with a 12.7mm machine gun, while arms carried by CSF members include Kalashnikov assault rifles and 9mm Makarov pistols. The CSF also deploys armoured personnel carriers. Major General Fadel al-Qawsi was appointed head of the CSF in 2012 by President Hadi, replacing Brigadier General Yahya Saleh, nephew of former president Saleh.**Iran**

Paramilitary: 40,000–60,000

Law-Enforcement Forces: 40,000–60,000

(border and security troops); 450,000 on mobilisation (incl conscripts). Part of armed forces in wartime

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: €90

Transport Aircraft: Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna 185/Cessna 310

Utility Helicopters: €24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/AB-206 (Bell 206) *Jet Ranger*

Basij Resistance Force up to €1,500,000 on mobilization; 90,000 active strength personnel with a reserve strength of up to 210,000. 740 regional battalions with 300-350 personnel each. Paramilitary militia, with claimed membership of 12.6 million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process, of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces.

**Other:** 2,500 militia bn (claimed, limited permanent membership)**Iraq****Paramilitary** n.k.

Iraqi Police Service n.k.

Iraqi Federal Police n.k.

Facilities Protection Service n.k.

Border Enforcement n.k.

Oil Police n.k.

**Bahrain****Paramilitary** €11,260

Police 9,000

Ministry of Interior

RECCE 8 S52 *Shorland*

APC

APC (W) Otokar ISV

PPV *Cobra*

Helicopters:

- MRH 2 Bell 412 *Twin Huey*
- ISR 2 Hughes 500
- TPT • Light 1 Bo-105

National Guard: €2,000: used expressly for internal security purposes according to IHS Jane's.

3 paramilitary bn

APC

APC (W) *Arma* 6x6PPV *Cobra*

Coast Guard: €260

Ministry of Interior; Special Security Force (SSF)

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 52

PBF 23: 2 Ares 18; 4 *Jaris*; 6 *Saham*; 6 *Fajr*; 5 *Jarach*PB 29: 6 *Haris*; 1 *Al Muharraq*; 10 *Deraa* (of which 4 *Halmatic* 20, 2 *Souter* 20, 4 *Rodman* 20); 10 *Saif* (of which4 *Fairey Sword*, 6 *Halmatic* 160); 2 *Hawar*Amphibious, Landing Craft: LCU 1 *Loadmaster* IILogistics and support: YAG 1 *Safra***Kuwait**

Paramilitary: €7,100 active

National Guard: €6,600 active

1 SF bn

1 armd car bn

3 security bn

1 MP bn

RECCE 20 VBL

APC (W) 97+: 5+ *Desert Chameleon*; 70 *Pandur*; 22 S600

(incl variants)

ARV *Pandur*

Coast Guard: 500

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 32

PBF 12 *Manta*

PB 20: 3 *Al Shaheed*; 4 *Inttisar* (Austal 31.5m); 3 *Kassir*

(Austal 22m); 10 *Subahi*

Amphibious, Landing Craft: LCU 4: 2 *Al*

*Tahaddy*; 1 *Saffar*; 1 other

Logistics and support: AG 1 *Sawahil*

## ***Oman***

Paramilitary: 4,400 active

Tribal Home Guard 4,000. org in teams of 100

Police Coast Guard: 400

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 33 (+20

*Cougar Enforcer* 33 PBF under 10 tonnes)

PCO 2 *Haras*

PBF 3 *Haras* (US Mk V *Pegasus*)

PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 *Haras* (SWE CG27); 3 *Haras* (SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 *Zahra*

Police Air Wing

Transport Aircraft; Light 4: 1 BN-2T *Turbine Islander*; 2

CN-235M; 1 Do-228

Transport helicopters: Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST)

## ***Qatar***

Three Special Force-type units under army command:

Oil Well Guard Units;

Static Guards Regiment;

Border Guards Regiment.

Each has 300-400 personnel.

Border Guards protect the borders, were Static Guards are stationed throughout the country. Oil Guards ensure the safety of oil pipelines.

## ***Saudi Arabia***

### **IISS estimate for Saudi Arabia:**

Paramilitary: 24,500+ active

Border Guard: 10,500

Subordinate to Ministry of Interior: HQ in Riyadh.

9 subordinate regional commands

Some mobile def (long range patrol/spt) units

2 border def (patrol) units

12 infrastructure def units

18 harbour def units

Some coastal def units

Some MP units

Coast Guard 4,500

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 14 (100+ small patrol boats are also in service)

PBF 6: 4 *Al Jouf*; 2 *Sea Guard*

PB 8: 6 *StanPatrol 2606*; 2 *Al Jubatel*

Amphibious, Landing Craft: 8: 3 UCAC; 5

LCAC *Griffin* 8000

Logistics and support: 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO

Facilities Security Force 9,000+

Subordinate to Ministry of Interior

General Civil Defence Administration Units

Transport Helicopters: Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107

Special Security Force 500

APC (W): UR-416

Ministry of the Interior (Under same chain of command within MOI):

Special Security Forces: 10,000

Mujahideen: 5000

Drug Enforcement Agency: 20,000

Passport and Immigration Dept: 7,500

Border Guard: 15,000

Coast Guard: 7,500

\*Civil Defense Administration: 25,000 --Rapid reaction force to deal with terrorist attacks or natural disasters and maintains its own helicopter fleet.

(\*Under same chain of command within MOI)

## ***UAE***

Coast Guard: Ministry of Interior

Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 112

PSO 1 *Al Watid*

PBF 58: 6 *Baglietto* GC23; 3 *Baglietto* 59; 15 DV-15; 34

MRTTP 16

PB 53: 2 *Protector*; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US Camcraft

77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 *Halmatic Work*; 12 *Al Saber*

## ***Yemen (Now in state of civil war and status unknown))***

Central Security Forces: Counter terrorism and counter-coup purposes

Strength: 2002 estimate was 20,000; CSF-Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF CTU) was 200 strong, but became part of the Strategic Reserve Forces Command of the Armed Forces.

The CSF was organized on the basis of battalions of two different types, Special Forces Battalions and Commando/Ranger Battalions, with each of these battalions deploying 450-750 personnel. Equipment

for a battalion included pick-up trucks equipped with a 12.7mm machine gun, while arms carried by CSF members included Kalashnikov assault rifles and 9mm Makarov pistols.

The CSF also deployed armoured personnel carriers. Major General Fadel al-Qawsi was appointed head of the CSF in 2012 by President Hadi, replacing

Brigadier General Yahya Saleh, nephew of former president Saleh.

Source: Based on Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa,” in *The Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 303-362, material from IHS Jane’s as adjusted by the authors, and IHS Jane’s, “IHS Global Limited 2015.” *IHS Jane’s Sentinel Gulf States*

## **Figure XI.6: US State Department Assessments of Gulf Governance, State Security Operations, and Their Impact**

The following excerpts are taken from the 2014 edition of the Country Reports on Human Rights issued on June 25, 2015. They only cover the actions of the government, justice system, and security services affecting political opposition, terrorism, and civil society and omit the case study examples in the original reports.

### **Bahrain<sup>315</sup>**

The most serious human rights problems included citizens' limited ability to change their government peacefully; arrest and detention of protesters (some of whom were violent) on vague charges, occasionally leading to their torture and mistreatment in detention; and lack of due process in trials of political and human rights activists, students, and journalists, including harsh sentences. Other significant human rights problems included arbitrary deprivation of life; impunity for security officers accused of committing human rights violations; arbitrary arrest; violations of privacy; and restrictions on civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion. The government at times imposed and enforced travel bans on political activists in conjunction with arrest charges.

The government maintained the revocation of citizenship for 31 individuals, and arbitrarily enforced a decree regulating communications between political societies and foreign entities. Discrimination continued against the Shia population, as did discrimination based on gender, religion, and nationality. There were reports of domestic violence against women and children. Trafficking in persons and restrictions on the rights of foreign workers continued to be significant problems.

Beginning in 2011 the country experienced a sustained period of unrest, including mass protests calling for political reform. Between February and October 2011, 72 persons, including police, died as a result. The government prosecuted and sentenced some police personnel implicated in abuses during the year and dating to 2011; however, authorities did not find high-ranking officials guilty of abuses, and it remained unclear if it held lower-ranking personnel in jail. Authorities reported they held accused police officers apart from other detainees. The government took steps to address the "culture of impunity," identified by the 2011 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. Actions included maintaining the Ombudsman's Office in the Ministry of Interior; continuing a Special Investigative Unit (SIU) in the Public Prosecutor's Office; funding the National Institution for Human Rights (NIHR), which issued its first annual report; and supporting the Commission on Prisoner and Detainee Rights.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

There were several reports government security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. The Shia opposition political society al-Wifaq's Freedom and Human Rights Department attributed eight deaths either directly or indirectly to security forces, including one due to beating or torture and one from exposure to tear gas. The government also reported two civilians died in clashes with police. In near nightly clashes in some communities, violent protesters used improvised explosive devices, Molotov cocktails, and other improvised weapons, resulting in the deaths of five police officers during the year. The government reported that as of September 1, there had been 263 injuries to police, five of which were severe.

The government claimed it held police defendants in a special jail reserved for security officers, but human rights activists maintained defendants continued to serve as law enforcement officers. Impunity among law enforcement officials remained a problem, including for cases from 2011 and 2012.

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution prohibits "harm[ing] an accused person physically or mentally," but domestic and international human rights organizations reported instances of torture, abuse, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Human rights groups reported prisoner accounts alleging security officials beat them, sometimes while they were blindfolded, and subjected them to sexual harassment,

removal of clothing, threat of rape, and sleep deprivation. Officials reportedly placed detainees in solitary confinement, sometimes in extreme temperatures; poured cold water on them; and forced them to stand for long periods. The MOI repeatedly denied torture was systemic. Human rights organizations reported authorities prevented some detainees from using toilet facilities, drinking, and eating. Other reports noted a similar pattern of abuse following arrest, including beating, harassment, and intimidation. Most detainees alleging abuse were Shia.

Local human rights groups, including the unlicensed Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS), and the Shia opposition political society al-Wifaq's Freedom and Human Rights Department reported authorities sometimes mistreated detainees, including youth, during interrogations and denied medical treatment to injured or ill detainees and prisoners. Reports indicated the MOI interrogated detainees about involvement in either sanctioned or unsanctioned protest activity, postings to social media, association with individuals known to law enforcement, recent travels, and participation in religious activities, sometimes with the intent of extracting confessions. Detainees reported mistreatment at official interrogation facilities. Local human rights groups claimed the most serious mistreatment took place at the MOI's Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID), but also named the following MOI facilities: Isa Town Detention Center for Women, Dry Docks Detention Center, and Jaw Prison.

Local human rights groups reported detainees also complained of abuse and torture at various unofficial temporary facilities. As with the CID, the most common techniques allegedly included blindfolding detainees; beating, punching, and hitting them with rubber hoses, cables, pieces of metal, wooden planks, or other objects; exposure to extreme temperatures; stress positions; verbal abuse; threats to rape the detainee or family members; sexual assault; preventing detainees from praying; sleep deprivation; and insulting the detainee's religious sect. Some detainees also reported security officials used physical and psychological mistreatment to extract confessions and statements under duress or as retribution and punishment. Authorities allegedly threatened pretrial detainees wishing to challenge the confessions they had signed at the CID with having to return to the CID so authorities could reopen the investigation. In May the government reiterated in a public report that authorities equipped all interrogation rooms with CCTV cameras and monitored them at all times; however, defense lawyers reported they were not given access to videos even when their clients were accused of attacking police while in custody. Detainees also reported security forces were abusive during searches and/or arrests at private residences.

In 2012 Public Prosecutor Ali al-Buainain announced the SIU would investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by government officials. Five of the eight SIU members were former MOI prosecutors. The SIU also consists of physicians, a psychiatrist, and judicial police officers who conduct investigations. The attorney general has the power to refer any cases deemed appropriate to the SIU. According to press and public government reports, the SIU completed dozens of reviews and referred a similar number of cases to court. The High Criminal Court of Appeals acquitted one ruling family member and one high-ranking MOI official of torture in 2013. In July the Lower Criminal Court sentenced a police officer to one month in prison for using excessive force against rioters. This was one of seven complaints referred to the SIU in June by the MOI Ombudsman's Office. Members of the SIU visited several prisons throughout the year and referred prisoners to medical examiners when appropriate. Detainees claimed that although the SIU made medical referrals, medical follow-up was limited and sporadic.

Authorities also subjected children to abuse and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Human rights groups reported authorities detained children, sometimes under the age of 15 (the maximum age the penal code considers a person a child), and subjected them to various forms of mistreatment, including beating, slapping, kicking, and verbal abuse. Al-Wifaq reported that as of October, authorities had arrested 110 children under age 15. Human rights activists reported at least two children were under age 12. Authorities released the large majority to their parents shortly after the children were detained. In December 2013 Amnesty International (AI) reported there were 110 children between ages 16 and 18 in Dry Docks Detention Center awaiting trial. In April the Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights reported 131 youths between ages 16 and 18 were in pretrial detention. In September the government reported there were 22 children under age 15 in pretrial detention.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Human rights activists reported conditions in prisons and detention centers were harsh and sometimes life threatening; government officials disputed the charges. Detainees and human rights organizations also

reported abuse in official detention centers as well as in Jaw Prison. Human rights groups alleged authorities mistreated youth at Jaw Prison. The SIU met with prominent detainees and claimed medical experts examined them. There were scores of informal reports of abuse at unofficial short-term detention centers. By year's end the government had not implemented other recommendations by the Ombudsman's Office, such as improving access to medical care.

Physical Conditions: According to the government, prison facilities held 2,626 convicted male prisoners, 84 female prisoners, and 212 minors all of whom were boys. There also were 1,001 male and 105 female pretrial detainees. The government claimed it held convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees in separate facilities. Human rights observers reported authorities sometimes held minors and adults in the same facilities. In November 2013 the Ombudsman's Office reported authorities held minors between ages 15 and 18 separately.

In September 2013 the Office of the Ombudsman reported Jaw Prison had capacity for 1,200 prisoners but held 1,608. For the prisoners defined as minors (between ages 15 and 21), there were facilities for 72 persons that held 154. The report recommended taking urgent action to address the overcrowding and that minors between 15 and 18 be held in separate facilities from the 19- to 21-year-old persons. The government fully implemented the recommendation to separate these prisoners. The report asserted that prison documents distributed to prisoners did not fully cover all of the prisoners' legal rights.

The government reported there were nine prisoner deaths, claiming the majority were for medical reasons unrelated to mistreatment. There were unconfirmed reports from the human rights community that prisoners died as a result of inadequate medical care. There were no reports of deaths in prison of pretrial detainees during the year.

Administration: It was unclear whether recordkeeping on prisoners was adequate, although the MOI reported authorities registered the location of detainees from the moment of arrest. Officials from the Ombudsman's Office were available to respond to complaints. Prisoners had access to visitors at least once a month, often more frequently. Authorities generally permitted prisoners religious services and allowed them to file complaints to judicial authorities without censorship, although there were reports prisoners were sometimes not able to communicate with lawyers and family members, or were denied access to religious services and prayer time. There were reports prison overcrowding placed a strain on administration, leading to a high prisoner-to-guard ratio. Prisoners needing medical attention reported difficulty alerting guards to their needs, and medical clinics at the facilities were understaffed. Those needing transportation to outside medical facilities reported delays in scheduling offsite treatment, especially those needing follow on care for complex or chronic conditions. There were outbreaks of communicable diseases that spread quickly and severely due to overcrowded conditions, lack of sanitation, and understaffed medical clinics.

Independent Monitoring: Authorities granted representatives from the ICRC and Red Crescent access to prison facilities throughout the year. According to the government, some international organizations and NGO personnel also received access to detention centers to monitor detainee conditions during the year. These included a delegation from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in April and AI in May. The government continued to postpone indefinitely the visit of the UN special rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez. Authorities also permitted access for the quasi-independent NIHR, the Ombudsman's Office, and the Commission on Prisoner and Detainee Rights, as well as the SIU. Some local human rights organizations expressed concern regarding the degree of independence of these groups.

The SIU, formed in 2012, acted as a mechanism for the public to complain about prisoner mistreatment or conditions in prisons and detention facilities. The SIU investigated approximately 205 cases and referred several others to court. In September it continued investigating 75 cases. The Office of the Ombudsman began monitoring prisons and detention centers when it opened to the public in July 2013, conducting announced and unannounced visits, and it accepted written and in-person complaints. From July 2013 until April, the office received approximately 107 complaints. The Ombudsman's Office's annual report released in April listed observations and recommendations, but the government did not fully implement the majority of these recommendations by year's end.

In September the NIHR published its first annual report addressing violations that occurred in 2013. The report recommended inviting the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit the country and enhancing



technical cooperation with the UNHCHR. As of July the NIHR publicly reported it had conducted five prison visits since its establishment.

In September 2013 the king issued a royal decree establishing the Commission on the Rights of Prisoners and Detainees, which the government described as an “independent national mechanism that allows monitoring prisons, detention centers, and detainees” consistent with the National Preventive Mechanism established by States Party to the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture. During the year the king appointed commission members, who participated in training on prison monitoring and conducted one prison visit. The cabinet reviews prison reports. In April the commission inspected Dry Docks Detention Center and released its first public report in August, emphasizing the need for further prison reforms, especially related to medical access.

Improvements: The Ombudsman’s Office and the SIU expanded the number of abuse cases each undertook to investigate and received greater access to prisons, to interview detainees and prisoners, and to question security personnel. Prisoners generally had more access to medical care. The government reported it had installed cameras in all police stations and had begun upgrading prison and detention facilities by year’s end. Human rights organizations reported those held in CID were now able to call home to alert relatives to their location.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, although local and international human rights groups continued to report the practice. In December 2013 the government reported that 1,001 men and 105 women were in pretrial detention. Human rights groups claimed the MOI conducted the majority of arrests at private residences in the early hours of the morning either without presenting an arrest warrant or presenting an inaccurate or incomplete one, but government sources disputed these claims.

In July 2013 an extraordinary parliamentary session sent 22 recommendations to the king, which he accepted and decreed. These recommendations tightened penalties for those involved in terrorism, banned demonstrations in the capital, allowed for legal action against political associations accused of inciting and supporting violence and terrorism, and granted security services powers to protect society from terrorism, including the ability to declare a State of National Safety. The MOI interrogated, arrested, detained, and charged individuals in accordance with these new laws. Human rights groups asserted the 2013 laws conflicted with protections against arbitrary arrest and detention, including for freedom of speech.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The MOI is responsible for internal security and controls the public security force and specialized security units responsible for maintaining internal order. The coast guard is under the jurisdiction of the MOI. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is primarily responsible for defending against external threats, while the Bahrain National Guard is also responsible for both external and internal threats.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces during the year, although impunity remained a problem. In 2012 the government established the SIU to investigate and refer cases of security force misconduct to courts. The February BICI follow-up report, *Moving Beyond 2011*, stated the SIU had received more than 150 complaints of torture and abuse since opening in 2012. Of these complaints 30 resulted in investigations of 51 officers. According to the report, the SIU pressed charges against 13 defendants in six cases related to eight victims. Four of the six cases, involving five victims, ended in prison sentences for seven defendants. One received a 10-year sentence, later commuted to two years. In May the SIU reported it had received 19 complaints that month. In July the SIU reported it had received 11 complaints that month, including five ill-treatment complaints, three use of excessive force complaints, and three complaints alleging torture. As of September the government reported the SIU had investigated 102 incidents.

In 2012 the king issued decrees to establish an independent ombudsman’s office at the MOI and create an independent office for the inspector general at the Bahrain National Security Agency (BNSA). These independent offices were responsible for addressing cases of mistreatment and abuse; they were operational throughout the year. It was unclear what role the BNSA’s inspector general played in investigating complaints. The MOI Ombudsman’s Office began official operations in July 2013 and conducted numerous prison visits during the year. The Ombudsman’s Office published its first annual report in April.

Security forces effectively maintained order and generally responded in a measured way to violent attacks, but there were occasional reports they used excessive force. Many human rights groups continued to assert investigations into police abuse were slow and ineffective.

The Bahrain News Agency reported in 2012 the interior minister approved the BICI's recommendation for a new code of conduct for police that requires officers to abide by 10 principles, including limited use of force and zero tolerance for torture and mistreatment. According to government officials, the code is consistent with international human rights standards and forbids the use of force "except when absolutely necessary." The Royal Police Academy included the code in its curriculum in 2012 and provided new recruits with copies in English and Arabic. The MOI reported it enforced the code of conduct throughout the year and took disciplinary action against officers who did not comply with the code.

The MOI Ombudsman's Office maintained a hotline for citizens to report police abuse, but human rights groups reported many citizens hesitated to report abuse for fear of retribution. As of September the police hotline received 240 calls; six of the calls related to police misconduct.

Starting in 2012 the MOI participated in training courses at the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences in Siracusa, Italy. As of July the MOI reported 6,000 of its officers had received human rights training.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

By law an arrested individual must be interrogated immediately by the arresting authority and cannot be detained for more than 48 hours, after which the detainee must either be released or transferred to the Public Prosecution for further questioning. The Public Prosecution is required to question the detainee within 24 hours, and the detainee has the right to legal counsel during questioning. To hold the detainee longer, the Public Prosecution must issue a formal detention order based on the charges against the detainee. Authorities may extend detention for a period of up to seven days for further questioning. If any further extension is required, authorities must bring the detainee before a judge, who may authorize a further extension not exceeding 45 days. The High Criminal Court must authorize any extensions beyond that and any renewals at 45-day intervals. In the case of alleged acts of terror, law enforcement officials may detain individuals for five days, with a 10-day extension granted by the Public Prosecution, and the initial detention authorized by the Public Prosecution can be 60 days. A functioning system of bail provided maximum and minimum bail amounts based on the charges. The bail law allows the presiding judge to determine the amount within these parameters on a case-by-case basis. In most cases attorneys must seek a court order to confer with clients. The state provided counsel to indigent detainees.

According to reports by local and international human rights groups, authorities held some detainees for weeks with limited access to outside resources. There were cases in which authorities denied detainees access to lawyers, sometimes for long periods (and at times until the day of their trials), and authorities did not formally announce charges. The government sometimes withheld information from detainees and their families about the detainees' whereabouts for days or weeks. In a few cases, the government failed to acknowledge it was holding individuals in detention for a period of days. Human rights groups alleged authorities held some detainees incommunicado for weeks.

Arbitrary Arrest: Human rights groups reported the MOI arbitrarily arrested some individuals for activities such as participating in protests, organizing protests, taking part in religious rites, expressing their opinion either in public or on social media, and associating with persons of interest to law enforcement. Many of these detained individuals reported arresting forces did not show them warrants. There were some reports security forces searched homes and damaged property without providing compensation.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial; Trial Procedures**

Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the king controls the judicial system. In accordance with the constitution, the king appoints all judges by royal decree. He formerly served as the chairperson of the Supreme Judicial Council, the body responsible for supervising the work of the courts, and as the public prosecutor. In September 2013, however, he issued a royal decree appointing Salem al-Kawari as the chairperson. Al-Kawari previously served as the head of the Constitutional Court. In 2011 the government used a hybrid military-civilian court to try civilians, including opposition leaders, political activists, rights activists, and others who supported or were perceived as supporting the protest movement.

Following recommendations put forward in the BICI, cases heard in the military-civilian court were retried in civilian courts, but some of the trials had not been completed by year's end, and there were widespread accusations the judiciary was highly politicized and not independent.

There were no new developments in the high-profile trial of 13 political activists, charged with attempting to overthrow the regime, during which defense attorneys and local and international human rights groups noted a number of irregularities. In 2012 the head judge placed a gag order on media coverage and declared all further sessions closed. Defense lawyers noted that confessions extracted through torture remained admissible in court. They also asserted the verdicts were politically motivated and based on the defendants' opposition to, and in some cases advocacy for the violent overthrow of, the government. In January 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the convictions of the 13. The court sentenced seven of the 13 to life sentences, four to 15 years in prison, and two to five years' imprisonment. Members of the defendants' families reported authorities did not permit them to attend the trial.

The constitution presumes defendants are innocent until proven guilty. There is a right to be informed promptly and in detail of charges. By law authorities should inform detainees about the charges against them upon arrest. Civil and criminal trial procedures provide for a public trial. There are no jury trials. A panel of three judges makes the rulings. Defendants have the right to prompt consultation with an attorney of their choice within 48 hours (unless the government charges them pursuant to counterterrorism legislation). The government provided counsel at public expense to indigent defendants. No law governs defendants' access to government-held evidence, and such evidence was available at the discretion of the court. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their behalf and question witnesses against them. Defendants are not compelled to testify or to confess guilt and have the right to appeal.

#### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

Human rights organizations and opposition groups reported authorities targeted many of those arrested because of their political activism. The government denied holding any political prisoners.

According to local human rights groups, authorities detained or imprisoned many individuals for activities related to the 2011 unrest. A number of the political detainees from 2011 were leaders or prominent members of political groups and societies. These included Ibrahim Sharif, former secretary general of the secular Wa'ad political society, and Shaikh Mohammed Ali al-Mahfoodh, secretary general of the dissolved Shia opposition political society Amal. Many of these political detainees remained in prison throughout the year. In 2012 the Higher Appellate Court upheld Sharif's five-year sentence on charges that included participating in a plot to overthrow the regime.

#### **Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies**

According to the December 2013 BICI follow-up report, authorities compensated 39 death cases, with families receiving 2.34 million dinars (\$6.3 million). The BICI report cited 35 cases; four additional cases, according to the compensation committee, merited compensation. Local human rights activists reported the government provided compensation only for deaths that occurred in 2011. In addition to deaths, there were 421 applications for compensation for injuries; 193 cases were selected for the first phase, and the Civil Settlement Office assessed the settlement value of each claim based on the percentage of permanent disability determined by a medical examiner. There were reports from human rights activists some families refused to accept the compensation due to conditions placed upon the funds. The government also reported the Civil Settlement Office agreed to compensate six deaths not mentioned in the BICI report, totaling 360,000 dinars (\$972,000) and to provide compensation of 315,000 dinars (\$850,500) for 47 injuries incurred during protests.

#### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

Although the constitution prohibits such actions, the government violated these prohibitions. Human rights organizations reported security forces sometimes entered homes without authorization and destroyed or confiscated personal property. Reports indicated security forces sometimes failed to identify themselves, to inform the arrested individual of the reasons for arrest, to show arrest warrants, or to inform family members of the reasons for arrest or location of arrested individuals. Wifaq's Liberties and Human Rights Department claimed authorities had searched more than 1,000 houses through June.

The government is required to obtain a court order before monitoring telephone calls, e-mail, and personal correspondence. Many local opposition groups believed the government monitored the activities of individuals and groups deemed to threaten national security. Many Shia citizens and human rights organizations believed there were extensive police informer networks.

Reports also indicated the government used computer programming to spy on political activists and members of the opposition inside and outside the country.

According to local and international human rights groups, security officials sometimes threatened detainees' family members with reprisals, including sexual assault, for the detainee's unwillingness to cooperate during interrogations and refusal to sign confession statements.

Security forces also threatened individuals if authorities believed they constituted a risk to national security. After having his citizenship stripped in 2012, Shia religious cleric Shaikh Hussain Najati departed the country indefinitely in April. On April 23, the MOI announced it deported Najati because he did not report his religious organization's activities to the government. Opposition groups stated he left the country because of extensive harassment by the MOI.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, "provided that the fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not prejudiced, and discord and sectarianism are not aroused." The government limited freedom of speech and press through active prosecution of individuals under libel, slander, and national security laws; targeting civilian and professional journalists; and passing legislation to limit speech in print and social media.

The government reported it dropped and no longer pursued charges or cases involving freedom of expression following BICI recommendations. During the year, however, the government took steps against acts of civil disobedience, which included critical speech, under charges of unlawful assembly or "insulting the king." On February 9, the government issued an amendment to the penal code that increased penalties to no less than one year and no more than seven years in prison, plus a fine, for anyone who "offends the monarch of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the flag, or the national emblem." Lawyers asserted that, as in the trial of 13 political activists convicted of attempting to overthrow the regime in 2011, prosecutors continued to pursue charges against their clients related to public expression.

Press Freedoms: The government did not own any print media, but the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) and other government entities exercised considerable control over privately owned domestic print media. The government owned and operated all domestic radio and television stations. Audiences generally received radio and television broadcasts in Arabic, Farsi, and English from countries in the region, including by satellite without interference. The IAA reviewed all books and publications prior to issuing printing licenses. The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs reviewed books that discussed religion.

Violence and Harassment: According to local journalists, authorities harassed, arrested, or attacked dozens of journalists due to their reporting. The government refused visas to some international media representatives. The government sentenced several journalists to prison for their Tweets. In September Reporters without Borders reported there were at least 12 news and information providers in prison.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Government censorship occurred. IAA personnel actively monitored and blocked stories on matters deemed sensitive, especially those related to sectarianism, national security, or criticism of the royal family, the Saudi royal family, or the judiciary. Journalists widely practiced self-censorship. Some members of the media reported government officials contacted editors directly and told them to stop writing about certain subjects or told them not to publish a press release or story.

Libel Laws/National Security: The government enforced libel and national security-related laws restricting freedom of the press. The penal code prohibits libel, slander, and "divulging secrets" and stipulates a punishment of imprisonment for no more than two years or a fine of no more than 200 dinars (\$540). Application of the slander law was selective. National security-related law provides for fines of as much as 10,000 dinars (\$27,000) and prison sentences of at least six months for criticizing the king or inciting actions that undermine state security, as well as fines of up to 2,000 dinars (\$5,400) for 14 related offenses. Punishable activities include publicizing statements issued by a foreign state or organization before obtaining the consent of the IAA, publishing any reports that may adversely affect the dinar's value, reporting any

offense against a head of a state that maintains diplomatic relations with the country, and publishing offensive remarks about an accredited representative of a foreign country because of acts connected with the person's position.

### **Internet Freedom**

The government restricted internet freedom and monitored individuals' online activities, including via social media, leading to legal action and punishment of at least 23 online users between May 2013 and May, according to Freedom House. Freedom House statistics indicated 90 percent of citizens could access the internet.

In August 2013 the Ministry of Communication blocked 70 websites in accordance with laws passed following parliament's July 2013 recommendations. The government stated that it took this action to prevent access to "terrorist materials," but NGOs asserted many of the websites featured only political speech.

In 2012 the governmental Telecommunications Regulatory Authority ordered service providers to block internet users' access to websites officials considered antigovernment, anti-Islamic, or likely to incite sectarian tensions. Many blocked websites featured live-streaming audio or video content. The government continued to block the websites of the BCHR, the online newspaper *Bahrain Mirror*, and the social forum *Bahrain Online*. Other websites reportedly blocked included sites that provided proxy or anonymity tools.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government restricted academic freedom and cultural events. In 2011 the government dismissed professors and suspended or expelled hundreds of university students for their participation in demonstrations and political activities. The government re-instated most but not all professors dismissed as a consequence of 2011 events; however, 12 teachers, including the president of the Bahrain Teachers' Society, Mahdi Abu Deeb, remained in prison throughout the year for a variety of crimes. Authorities re-instated all students not charged with violent crimes but required them to sign loyalty pledges; they received warnings not to engage in political activity on campus. Some academics engaged in self-censorship, avoiding discussion of contentious political issues.

### **Freedom of Assembly**

The constitution provides for the right of free assembly, but the law restricts the exercise of this right. The government limited and controlled political gatherings, and it sometimes denied permits for organized demonstrations. During the year security forces intervened during unauthorized demonstrations or when authorized demonstrations turned violent. According to the MOI, organizers must submit requests for permission to hold public gatherings or demonstrations at least 72 hours in advance. The law outlines the locations and times during which it prohibits functions, including areas close to hospitals, airports, commercial locations, and security-related facilities, and, further to parliament's July 2013 recommendations, downtown Manama. The MOI actively enforced the regulation prohibiting demonstrations in Manama. Opposition group Al Wifaq said the MOI rejected at least 49 permit requests for peaceful opposition protests or public gatherings regardless of location during October and November, which the MOI stated was done out of concern for public safety leading to the November elections, given violent opposition groups' calls for their followers also to participate.

The law states every public gathering shall have a committee consisting of a head and at least two members. The committee is responsible for supervising and preventing any illegal acts during the function. Human rights organizations reported authorities detained committee members following sanctioned protests, some of which turned violent, and questioned if law enforcement believed an infraction of any law occurred. Additionally, authorities detained organizers of protests for advertising a protest before the permit was approved. According to the law, the MOI is not obligated to justify why it approves or denies requests to allow protests. The penal code penalizes any gathering "of five or more individuals" that is held for the "purpose of committing crimes or inciting others to commit crimes." Lawyers asserted authorities should not prevent demonstrations in advance based on assumptions crimes would be committed. Authorities prohibit the use of vehicles in any demonstration, protest, or gathering unless organizers obtain special written permission from the head of Public Security.

There were dozens of violent attacks against security officers and government officials during the year, killing five security officers. For example, on March 3, a remotely detonated bomb in Daih killed three police officers - Tariq Al Sehhi, Ammar Abdu Ali Al Dhalei, and Muhammed Arslan Ramzan. On July 4, police officer Mahmood Fareed died after he walked past a bomb planted and remotely detonated in East Eker. On December 8, an improvised explosive device killed police officer Ali Mohammed Ali in Damistan. The trials of suspects in at least six attacks on security forces during 2013 were underway at year's end.

### **Freedom of Association**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government limited this right. Although the government does not allow the formation of political parties, it authorized registered political societies to run candidates for office and to participate in other political activities.

In September 2013 the minister of justice issued an order stipulating political societies should coordinate their contacts with foreign diplomatic or consular missions, foreign governmental organizations, or representatives of foreign governments with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which can elect to send a representative to the meeting. In contrast to 2013, in July the government actively enforced the order when it summoned two leaders of Al-Wifaq for questioning for meeting a visiting foreign official without seeking government permission. The government took no further action against the individuals under this order by year's end.

The government required all groups to register, including: civil society groups with the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD), political societies with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, and labor unions with the Ministry of Labor. The government decided whether a group was social or political in nature, based on its proposed bylaws. The law prohibits any activity by an unlicensed society as well as any political activity by a licensed civil society group. A number of unlicensed societies were active in the country.

In September 2013 the prime minister issued a decree directing government agencies to take action against "unlicensed organizations that provoke terrorist acts and sow sectarianism." Following the decree the Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit against individual members of the unlicensed Islamic Ulema Council. On June 16, the High Administrative Court of Appeals upheld the High Administrative Court's decision to dissolve the council. Lawyers appealed to the Court of Cassation and the appeal was pending at year's end.

To apply for registration, a political society must submit its bylaws signed by all founding members, a list of all members and copies of their residency cards, and a financial statement identifying the society's sources of funding and bank information. The society's principles, goals, and programs must not run counter to sharia or national interest, as interpreted by the judiciary, nor may the society be based on sectarian, geographic, or class identity. A number of societies operated outside of these rules, and some functioned on a sectarian basis.

In July the Ministry of Justice filed lawsuits against political societies Wifaq and Wa'ad for not complying with the political societies law and its requirements for internal elections. The government took no further action against Wa'ad after the society held a new election on October 27, through which it selected a new secretary-general to replace the imprisoned Ibrahim Sharif. On October 28, a court found Wifaq in violation of the political societies law, but the government stated it would not enforce the suspension of Wifaq's activities until it held internal elections. Wifaq held its elections on December 26.

Many NGOs and civil society activists asserted the MOSD routinely exploited its oversight role to stymie the activities of NGOs and other civil society organizations. While some local NGOs asserted bureaucratic incompetence characterized the ministry's dealings with NGOs, many others stated officials actively sought to undermine some groups' activities and imposed burdensome bureaucratic procedures on NGO board members and volunteers. The justice and interior ministries must vet funding from international sources, and authorities sometimes did not authorize it.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government did not always respect these rights, however.

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

Foreign Travel: The law provides the government may reject for “reasonable cause” applications to obtain or renew passports, but the applicant has the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. Individuals reported authorities banned them from travel due to unpaid debt obligations or other fiduciary responsibilities with lending institutions. Authorities relied on determinations of “national security” when adjudicating passport applications. Authorities prevented several activists from leaving the country because they were under criminal investigation. For example, the government banned former Wifaq Member of Parliament Khalil Marzooq from travel pending an ongoing trial on terrorism-related charges, of which a court eventually acquitted him.

Citizenship: Government decisions to revoke citizenship, both as a punitive measure for criminal cases and for political reasons, continued and may result in statelessness for some individuals who did not hold dual nationality. On July 7, the king ratified amendments to the law stipulating citizenship may be revoked upon request by the interior minister and approval of the cabinet concerning any naturalized person who has violated specific conditions, for example, acquiring citizenship by fraud.

In July the MOI Immigration Directorate summoned 10 Bahrainis, whose citizenship the government revoked for politically motivated reasons in 2012 and against whom it filed criminal lawsuits, requesting them to defend their legal status and asking for information on whether they had found citizens willing to sponsor them. On October 28, a court found them guilty of being in the country without having sponsors and fined each 100 dinars (\$270). The appeal hearing was set for April 14, 2015. On September 29, the High Criminal Court sentenced nine individuals convicted of attempting to smuggle weapons into the country to life imprisonment and revoked their citizenship, although a number of these individuals were and continued to remain outside of the country at the time of conviction.

### **Elections and Political Participation**

Recent Elections: Approximately 52 percent of eligible voters participated in parliamentary elections held on November 22 and 29, although turnout was significantly lower in opposition districts, due to a decision to boycott by the main opposition political societies, and a lack of confidence among opposition communities the elections would produce a parliament that would address their concerns. The government did not permit international election monitors. Domestic monitors generally concluded that authorities administered the elections smoothly. There were, however, broader concerns regarding voting district boundaries and limitations on freedom of expression and association.

Violent oppositionists intimidated candidates, including through arson attacks on their personal property and businesses. Boycotters pressured other candidates to withdraw from the race.

The parliament consists of an appointed upper house, the Shura (Consultative) Council, and the elected Council of Representatives, with 40 seats each. Approximately 52 percent of eligible voters participated in parliamentary elections held on November 22 and 29. Turnout was significantly lower in opposition districts, due to a decision to boycott the elections by the main opposition political societies and a lack of confidence among opposition communities that the electoral system could produce a parliament that would address their concerns.

In January the king relaunched the National Dialogue, which served as a forum for the government, legislature, and political societies to discuss a political solution. The dialogue ended in August. In October the opposition declared it would boycott the November parliamentary and municipal elections, arguing that the government had failed to offer an adequate political agreement.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The government did not allow the formation of political parties, but more than a dozen “political societies” developed political platforms, held internal elections, and hosted political gatherings. Individuals active with opposition political society groups faced repercussions during the year. In 2012 the government dissolved radical Shirazi society Amal for failing to hold general conferences and legal and bureaucratic irregularities,” and an appeal remained pending before the Court of Cassation.

In July the Ministry of Justice filed lawsuits against political societies Al Wifaq and Wa’ad for not complying with the political societies law by violating internal election procedures. The government dropped the lawsuit against Wa’ad after it held general elections on October 27. The government did not implement an October

28 court ruling suspending Al Wifaq for three months to give Al Wifaq time to hold a new general assembly. Wifaq held its elections on December 26, although the legal issue has not yet been resolved.

The opposition contended the government delineated voter districts to ensure its desired electoral outcomes.

Shia and Sunni citizens have equal rights before the law, but Sunnis dominated political life, although the majority of citizens are Shia. There were 13 Shia members in the newly elected parliament. The newly appointed Shura Council included 17 Shia members, as well as one Jewish member and one Christian member. Six of the newly appointed 23 cabinet ministers were Shia, including one of the five deputy prime ministers.

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law adequately, and some officials reportedly engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The law subjects government employees at all levels to prosecution if they use their positions to engage in embezzlement or bribery, either directly or indirectly. Penalties can be up to 10 years' imprisonment. The government reported that during the year the Public Prosecution referred seven corruption cases, which included 20 individuals, to the criminal courts. All cases remained pending, with one transferred to the appeal court.

Corruption: The Bahrain National Audit Bureau is responsible for combating corruption, and its December 2013 report detailed corruption, irregularities, and mismanagement in most government ministries. The report noted the government fully or partially implemented only 72 of 192 recommendations. The bureau commented nine government ministries failed to adopt any of the recommendations cited in the 2012 report. The report also cited the Ministry of Health as a major source of corruption and irregularities and cited the Ministry of Housing and Works for cost overruns and irregularities.

In interviews with local press, the Bahrain Transparency Society stated that, despite progress, concerns remained about corruption in parastatal companies. In January a unit of Alcoa, Inc., a U.S. aluminum producer, pleaded guilty to foreign bribery charges brought by a foreign government. The Alcoa subsidiary admitted to paying bribes to government officials for more than a decade to win contracts to sell supplies to the Aluminum Bahrain processing plant.

The privatization of public land continued to be a concern among opposition groups. Significant areas of government activity, including the security services and the BDF, lacked transparency. The press reported that in many cases authorities jailed or fined law enforcement and court officials for misconduct, most often for accepting bribes. On August 13, authorities arrested a labor director in the Directorate of Inspection in the Labor Market Regulatory Authority for soliciting and accepting a bribe of 12,000 dinars (\$32,400) from a restaurant to cancel the restaurant's ban on hiring foreign workers. The restaurant owners reported the bribe solicitation to the public prosecution and the MOI's Directorate for Combating Corruption, who arranged a sting operation. Authorities arrested the inspector immediately after he accepted the bribe. The inspector and his lawyer denied the allegations. Observers expected a verdict in the case in 2015.

Financial Disclosure: The law does not require government officials to make financial disclosures.

Public Access to Information: Generally, the government does not provide citizens access to government-held information. Most companies and ministries have public websites, but specific budgetary information, such as individual expenditures and income, was not available. Other officials resisted efforts in some parts of the government to improve transparency.

Government officials sometimes met with local human rights NGOs but generally were not responsive to the views of NGOs they believed were unfairly critical of the government. Most domestic human rights groups operated without significant government restrictions; including the BHRS, the primary independent and licensed human rights organization in the country; the BCHR, which the government officially dissolved in 2004; and the unlicensed Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights (BYSHR). The unlicensed umbrella human rights organization Bahrain Human Rights Observatory also issued numerous reports and had strong ties to international human rights NGOs. The licensed Bahrain Human Rights Watch continued to issue numerous reports and had strong ties to international NGOs.

The government sometimes arrested and harassed local NGO leaders. On May 29, the High Criminal Court of Appeals upheld a 15-year prison sentence for BYSHR board member Naji Fateel for "forming a group for the purpose of obstructing the provisions of the constitution" under the antiterrorism law. Authorities arrested Fateel in May 2013, and the BCHR alleged authorities tortured Fateel with electric shocks, simulated



drowning, and sexual harassment while in detention at the CID, although the SIU stated they found no evidence of mistreatment.

Government officials met with local human rights organizations ahead of the country's UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session in September. As compared with 2012, activists who participated in the meeting with government officials, or who participated in the session itself, did not report increased harassment.

The United Nations or Other International Bodies: In April the government permitted a visit by the Office of the UNHCHR. The government also permitted a visit by AI in May, but it barred entry to some representatives of international NGOs working to strengthen democratic institutions, civil society, and labor organizations. In March 2013 Brian Dooley of Human Rights First reported the government denied his request to visit the country. Dooley reported the same result in August. Authorities cancelled UN Special Rapporteur Juan Mendez's scheduled visit in May 2013 and did not set a new date.

Government Human Rights Bodies: In 2012 the government established a Human Rights Ministry, which was downgraded to Human Rights Agency in December as part of a cabinet reorganization following the parliamentary elections. This came after the government announced in May that Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa would chair the High Coordinating Committee for Human Rights and assume the responsibilities of the human rights portfolio. The foreign ministry drafted the country's voluntary interim report for the UPR session in September and consulted with human rights NGOs beforehand. In January 2013 the king issued a royal decree to re-establish the country's National Human Rights Organization, now called the National Institution for Human Rights (NIHR), to hear human rights violation complaints and investigate allegations. In February 2013 the institution elected its president and vice president. The NIHR conducted numerous human rights workshops, seminars, and training sessions, as well as prison visits, and referred numerous complaints to the Public Prosecution Office. In July the institution reported it had registered more than 30 official complaints and received 13 requests for legal assistance since January. It issued its first report on September 13, containing a wide-ranging set of recommendations for government action to improve human rights conditions. Generally, observers viewed the NIHR as effectively resourced and independent, although human rights groups doubted the government would implement most of its recommendations.

In 2011 the government convened the BICI, whose staff included international human rights experts, and tasked it with investigating allegations of human rights violations in early 2011. It presented recommendations for reform in late 2011, describing a "culture of impunity" in the security services and documenting excessive use of force, including torture and a range of other human rights violations by security forces during the unrest.

In February the government released a second BICI follow-up report, and, on October 13, the government launched a website outlining the government's progress on BICI recommendations. The government's February follow-up report stated it had re-instated all students not charged with violent crimes, adding that the University of Bahrain and Bahrain Polytechnic would facilitate readmission (even for students convicted of violent crimes).

During the year the government continued making progress on BICI recommendations, including rebuilding destroyed mosques and maintaining the Public Prosecution's SIU and the MOI Ombudsman's Office. Local and international observers continued to express concern the government did not make significant progress on other BICI recommendations, including dropping charges against individuals engaged in nonviolent political expression, criminally charging security officers accused of abuse or torture, and integrating Shia into security forces.

The law grants citizenship to Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 15 years and non-Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 25 years. There was a lack of transparency in the naturalization process, and there were numerous reports authorities did not apply the citizenship law uniformly. There were allegations the government allowed foreign Sunni employees of the security services who had lived in the country for fewer than 15 years to apply for citizenship. There were also reports authorities had not granted citizenship to Arab Shia who had resided in the country for more than 15 years and non-Arab foreign residents who had resided more than 25 years. There were reports of general discrimination, especially in employment practices, against Shia citizens of Persian ethnicity (Ajam).

## Iran<sup>316</sup>

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic republic with a constitution that created a political system based on the concept in Shia Islam of *velayat-e faqih* (“guardianship of the jurist” or “rule by the jurisprudent”). Shia clergy--most notably the “supreme jurisprudent” (or supreme leader) and political leaders vetted by the clergy--dominated key power structures. While mechanisms for popular election existed within the structure of the state, the supreme leader held significant influence over the legislative and executive branches of government (through various unelected councils under his authority) and held constitutional authority over the judiciary, the state-run media, and the armed forces. The supreme leader also indirectly controlled the internal security forces and other key institutions. Since 1989, the supreme leader has been Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani won the election for president with more than 50 percent of the vote. Despite high popular participation in the election following open debates, candidate vetting by unelected bodies based on arbitrary criteria, as well as restrictions on the media, limited the freedom and fairness of the election. Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.

The most significant human rights problems were severe restrictions on civil liberties, including the freedoms of assembly, speech, religion, and press; limitations on the citizens’ ability to change the government peacefully through free and fair elections; and disregard for the physical integrity of persons, whom authorities arbitrarily and unlawfully detained, tortured, or killed.

Other reported human rights problems included: disappearances; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, including judicially sanctioned amputation and flogging; politically motivated violence and repression; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities, with instances of deaths in custody; arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention, sometimes incommunicado; continued impunity of the security forces; denial of fair public trial, sometimes resulting in executions without due process; the lack of an independent judiciary; political prisoners and detainees; ineffective implementation of civil judicial procedures and remedies; arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence; severe restrictions on freedoms of speech (including via the internet) and press; harassment and arrest of journalists; censorship and media content restrictions; severe restrictions on academic freedom; severe restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and association; some restrictions on freedom of movement; official corruption and lack of government transparency; constraints on investigations by international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) into alleged violations of human rights; legal and societal discrimination and violence against women, ethnic and religious minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons based on perceived sexual orientation and gender identity; incitement to anti-Semitism; trafficking in persons; and severe restrictions on the exercise of labor rights.

The government took few steps to investigate, prosecute, punish, or otherwise hold accountable officials, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government, who committed abuses. Impunity remained pervasive throughout all levels of the government and security forces.

*Note: This report draws heavily on non-U.S. government sources. The United States does not have an embassy in Iran.*

### Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

The government and its agents reportedly committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including, most commonly, by execution after arrest and trial without due process. The government made few and limited attempts to investigate allegations of deaths that occurred after or during reported torture or other physical abuse or after denying detainees medical treatment. Members of ethnic minority communities were disproportionately victims of such abuses.

There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. The government executed 721 persons during the year, according to the NGO Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), which reported that many trials did not adhere to basic principles of due process. The government officially announced 268 executions but for many did not release further information, such as the dates of executions, the names of those executed, or the crimes for which they were executed.

The law provides for the death penalty in offenses such as “attempts against the security of the state,” “outrage against high-ranking officials,” “enmity towards God” (*moharebeh*), “corruption on earth” (*fisad fil-arz*), and “insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.”

Prosecutors frequently used moharebeh as a criminal charge against political dissidents and journalists, accusing them of struggling against the precepts of Islam and against the state that upholds those precepts. In his August 27 report to the UN General Assembly, Ahmed Shaheed, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, reported that authorities executed four cultural-rights activists from the Arab minority community during the year: Hashem Sha'abani, Hadi Rashedi, Ali Chebeishat, and Khaled Mousavi. At least two of the activists, Sha'abani and Rashedi, were executed on charges that included "enmity towards God" and "corruption on earth," according to the Oslo-based human rights NGO, Iran Human Rights (IHR). On November 24, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of the blogger Soheil Arabi for "insulting the prophet" (sabb al-nabi) on Facebook, according to Human Rights Watch. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) arrested Arabi in November 2013.

The law does not stipulate the death penalty for apostasy or heresy, but courts handed down capital punishments in prior years based on their interpretation of fatwas (legal opinions or decrees handed down by an Islamic religious leader). According to a September 26 report by Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), a press association of activists, officials at Rajai Shahr Prison stated that authorities executed Mohsen Amir Aslani on September 24 on charges that included "heresy in religion." Tehran judiciary head Gholam-hossein Esmaeili denied that Aslani's execution was tied to the heresy charge and claimed it was for a rape conviction. Human rights groups challenged Esmaeili's claim and called for an independent investigation.

There were also deaths in custody. HRANA reported that, on February 20, prison officials found Ali Naroui dead in Orumiye Central Prison in West Azerbaijan Province. Although the authorities reported he died of natural causes, Naroui's brother reported seeing evidence of torture and bruising on his body. On July 9, the NGO International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) reported that Mostafa Nosrati, an inmate at Bandar Abbas Central Prison, died on July 2, three days after he sustained injuries and officials denied him transfer to a medical facility.

Impunity for past unlawful killings remained a serious problem. Human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, cited documentation implying that Justice Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi was involved in the extrajudicial executions of thousands of political dissidents in 1988 and in the killings of several prominent dissident intellectuals in 1998.

## **Disappearance**

There were reports of politically motivated abductions during the year, all of which were attributed to government officials. The government made no effort to prevent or investigate such acts and meted out no punishment. Plainclothes officials often seized journalists and activists without warning, and government officials refused to acknowledge custody or provide information on them. In other cases, authorities detained persons incommunicado for lengthy periods before permitting them to contact family members.

## **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution prohibits all forms of torture "for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring information," but there were several credible reports that security forces and prison personnel tortured and abused detainees and prisoners. In his October report, the UN special rapporteur cited refugee testimony indicating the widespread use of physical and psychological abuse by authorities to secure confessions.

Commonly reported methods of torture and abuse in prisons included prolonged solitary confinement, threats of rape, sexual humiliation, threats of execution, sleep deprivation, electroshock, burnings, the use of pressure positions, and severe and repeated beatings. There were reports of severe overcrowding in many prisons and repeated denials of medical care for prisoners.

Some prison facilities, including Evin Prison in Tehran, were notorious for cruel and prolonged torture of political opponents of the government. Authorities also allegedly maintained unofficial secret prisons and detention centers outside the national prison system where abuse reportedly occurred. The government reportedly used "white torture," a type of psychological torture that included extreme sensory deprivation and isolation. According to reports, such treatment was used especially on political prisoners and often in detention centers outside the control of prison authorities, including Ward 209 of Evin Prison, which news organizations and human rights groups reported was controlled by the country's intelligence services.

The government defended its use of flogging and amputation as “punishment,” not torture. Judicially sanctioned corporal punishment included lashings and, for offenses involving multiple thefts, amputations. For example, according to an August 25 report by IHR, authorities in Yazd Province publicly amputated four fingers from the right hand of “M. N.,” a man charged with robbery.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Prison conditions reportedly were often harsh and life threatening. There were reports that some prisoners committed suicide as a result of harsh conditions, solitary confinement, and torture to which they were subjected. Prison authorities often refused medical treatment for injuries that prisoners reportedly suffered at the hands of abusers and for illness due to the poor sanitary conditions of prison life. Prisoner hunger strikes in protest of their treatment were common. Prisoners and their families often wrote letters to authorities and, in some cases, to UN bodies to highlight and protest their treatment. The UN special rapporteur reported that authorities sometimes subjected prisoners to threats after accusing them of contacting his office.

Physical Conditions: Based on government data from March, the University of Essex-affiliated International Center for Prison Studies (ICPS) estimated the country’s total prison population at 217,851, with approximately 25 percent of the population composed of pretrial detainees, and estimated that 3.5 percent of prisoners were women and 1 percent were minors. The ICPS reported the official prison capacity as 113,000. Overcrowding reportedly forced many prisoners to sleep on floors, in hallways, or in prison yards. There were reports that overcrowding within Evin Prison had worsened over the past year. The prison population appeared stable compared with 2013.

Political prisoners were often held in separate prisons or wards, such as Wards 2A, 209, 240, and 350 of Evin Prison and Ward 8 of Gohardasht Prison, or in solitary confinement for long periods of time. The IRGC reportedly ran Evin Prison’s Ward 2A and Gohardasht Prison’s Ward 8. Human rights activists and the international media also reported cases of political prisoners confined with accused violent criminals.

Numerous human rights NGOs and opposition websites reported poor prison conditions and mistreatment of prisoners. There were reports of prisoner suicides. On July 9, ICHRI reported that Ehsan Hedayatkar, a prisoner in Bandar Abbas Central Prison’s Ward One, who had been arrested on charges of drug possession, took pills and hanged himself. According to a September 15 report by HRANA, two inmates at Ghezel Hesar Prison committed suicide and two other Ghezel Hesar prisoners attempted suicide during the same week.

Administration: Official public statistics on the prison population were limited. There were no reports on the adequacy of or of any steps to improve recordkeeping or whether the penal system employed prison ombudspersons to respond to complaints. Authorities sometimes used alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders, including probation and travel bans.

Authorities mixed violent and nonviolent offender populations. Prisoners generally had access to visitors weekly, but authorities often revoked this privilege along with telephone and other correspondence privileges. It was not known whether prisoners could practice religions other than Islam while incarcerated. Prisoners were able to submit complaints to judicial authorities, but often faced censorship and retribution for doing so. Authorities did not initiate credible investigations into allegations of inhumane conditions. Families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of their deaths.

Independent Monitoring: The government did not permit independent monitoring of prison conditions.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

Although the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, they occurred frequently during the year.

Several agencies shared responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), law enforcement forces under the Interior Ministry, and the IRGC, which reported to the supreme leader. The Basij, a volunteer paramilitary group with local organizations in cities and towns across the country, sometimes acted as an auxiliary law enforcement unit subordinate to Revolutionary Guard ground forces. Basij units often engaged in crackdowns on political opposition elements without formal guidance or supervision from superiors.

The security forces were not considered fully effective in combating crime, and corruption and impunity remained problems. Human rights groups frequently accused regular and paramilitary security forces, such as the Basij, of committing numerous human rights abuses, including acts of violence against protesters and

participants in public demonstrations. There was no transparent mechanism to investigate or punish security force abuses, and there were few reports of government actions to discipline abusers.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

The constitution and penal code require a warrant or subpoena for an arrest and state that an arrested person must be informed of the charges against them within 24 hours. Authorities often violated these procedures by holding some detainees, at times incommunicado, for weeks or months without charge or trial, frequently denying contact with family or timely access to legal representation. The law obligates the state to provide indigent defendants with attorneys only for certain types of crimes. The courts set prohibitively high bail, even for lesser crimes, and in many cases courts did not set bail. Authorities often compelled detainees and their families to submit property deeds to post bail. Persons released on bail did not always know how long their property would be retained or when their trials would be held, which effectively silenced them for fear of losing their families' property.

The government placed persons under house arrest without due process to restrict their movement and communication.

Arbitrary Arrest: Authorities commonly used arbitrary arrests to impede alleged antiregime activities. Plainclothes officers often arrived unannounced at homes or offices, arrested persons, conducted raids, and confiscated private documents, passports, computers, electronic media, and other personal items without warrants or other assurances of due process. Individuals often remained in detention facilities for long periods without charges or trials and were sometimes prevented from informing others of their whereabouts for several days. Authorities often denied detainees' access to legal counsel during this period and imposed travel bans on individuals if they were released pending trial.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detention was often arbitrarily lengthy, particularly in cases involving alleged violations of national security laws. Approximately a quarter of the prisoners held in state prison facilities were reportedly pretrial detainees. According to Human Rights Watch, a judge may prolong detention at his discretion, and pretrial detention often lasted for months. Often authorities held pretrial detainees in custody with the general prison population.

Amnesty: On March 31, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced the pardon of 920 prisoners on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to an April 3 report by the ICHRI, no political prisoners were known at that time to be among those pardoned.

### **Trial Procedures**

The constitution provides that the judiciary be "an independent power" that is "free from every kind of unhealthy relation and connection." The court system was subject to political influence, and judges were appointed "in accordance with religious criteria." The supreme leader appoints the head of the judiciary, and the heads of the judiciary, members of the Supreme Court, and the prosecutor general were clerics. International observers continued to criticize the lack of independence of the country's judicial system and judges and maintained that trials disregarded international standards of fairness.

According to the constitution and criminal procedure code, a defendant has the right to a fair trial, to be presumed innocent until convicted, to access a lawyer of his or her choice, and to appeal convictions in most cases that involve major penalties. These rights were not respected. Panels of judges adjudicate trials; there is no jury system in either civil or criminal courts. Human rights activists reported trials in which authorities appeared to have determined the rulings in advance and defendants did not have the opportunity to confront their accusers or have access to government-held evidence.

The government often charged political dissidents with vague crimes, such as "antirevolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," "siding with global arrogance," "enmity towards God" (moharebeh), and "crimes against Islam." Prosecutors imposed strict penalties on government critics for minor violations. When post-revolutionary statutes did not address a situation, the government advised judges to give precedence to their knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law (sharia). Under sharia, judges may find a person guilty based on their own "divine knowledge," or they may issue more lenient sentences for persons who kill others considered "deserving of death," meaning that the victim was believed to have done something serious and contrary to sharia. Other trials were designed to publicize coerced confessions.

During the year human rights groups noted the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Courts admitted as evidence confessions made under duress or torture.

Numerous human rights groups continued to question the legitimacy and secrecy of the special clerical court, which is headed by a Shia Islamic legal scholar and overseen by the supreme leader. The constitution does not provide for the court, which operated outside the judiciary's purview. The court is charged with investigating alleged offenses committed by clerics and issuing rulings based on an independent interpretation of Islamic legal sources. Critics alleged that clerical courts were used to control non-Shia clerics as well as to prosecute Shia clerics who expressed controversial ideas and participated in activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism or reformist political activities.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

Statistics regarding the number of citizens imprisoned for their political beliefs were not available. According to the UN special rapporteur's March report, authorities incarcerated at least 895 political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. Other human rights activists estimated there could be more than 1,000 prisoners of conscience, including those jailed for their religious beliefs.

During the year the government arrested students, journalists, lawyers, political activists, women's activists, artists, and members of religious minorities, charged many with crimes, such as "propaganda against the system" and "insulting the supreme leader" and treated such cases as national security trials (see sections 1.a. through 1.e.; section 6, Women; and section 7.a.). On December 17, the NGO Committee to Protect Journalists reported that the country held 30 journalists in prison.

According to opposition press reports, the government also arrested, convicted, and executed persons on criminal charges, such as drug trafficking, when their actual offenses were political. The government reportedly held some persons in prison for years on baseless charges of sympathizing with alleged terrorist groups. Authorities often held political prisoners in solitary confinement for extended periods, denying them due process and access to legal representation. Political prisoners were also at greater risk of torture and abuse in detention. The government often placed political prisoners in prisons far from their homes and families. The government did not permit international humanitarian organizations or UN representatives access to political prisoners.

During the year the government released some political prisoners. Most of those released were approaching the end of their sentences, but the government could order them to return to prison at any time. In addition, authorities occasionally gave political prisoners suspended sentences to intimidate and silence them. The government also controlled political activists by temporarily suspending baseless court proceedings against them and allowing authorities to re-arrest them. The government attempted to intimidate activists by calling them in repeatedly for questioning. The government issued travel bans on some former political prisoners and imposed forced internal exile on others.

### **Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies**

Citizens had limited ability to sue the government and were not able to bring lawsuits against the government for civil or human rights violations through domestic courts.

The constitution allows the government to confiscate property acquired illicitly or in a manner not in conformity with Islamic law. The government appeared to target religious minorities in invoking this provision. There were several reports during the year of authorities evicting and seizing the property of members of the Baha'i community without due process.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The constitution states that "reputation, life, property, [and] dwelling[s]" are protected from trespass, except as "provided by law," but the government routinely infringed on this right. Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens, entered homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations and internet communications, and opened mail without court authorization. There were widespread reports that government agents entered, searched, and ransacked the homes and offices of reformist or opposition leaders, activists, political prisoners, journalists, and their families to intimidate them.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of expression and of the press, except when words are deemed “detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.” The law states that anyone who undertakes any form of propaganda against the state may be imprisoned for as long as one year; the law does not define “propaganda.” The law also provides for prosecution of persons accused of instigating crimes against the state or national security or “insulting” Islam; the latter offense is punishable by death. The government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the press and used the law to intimidate or prosecute persons who directly criticized the government or raised human rights problems. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the government continued a campaign of press intimidation throughout the year.

Freedom of Speech: The law limits freedom of speech, including by members of the press. Individuals were not permitted to criticize publicly the country’s system of government, supreme leader, or official religion. Security forces and the country’s judiciary punished those who violated these restrictions and often punished as well persons who publicly criticized the president, the cabinet, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The government monitored meetings, movements, and communications of opposition members, reformists, activists, and human rights defenders. It often charged persons with crimes against national security and insulting the regime based on letters, e-mails, and other public and private communications. According to the August 1 Amnesty International report, during the year anyone deemed critical of authorities, particularly journalists, were at increased risk of arrest and prosecution, creating an intense climate of fear.

Press Freedoms: The government’s Press Supervisory Board issues press licenses, which it sometimes revoked in response to articles critical of the government or the regime. During the year the government banned, blocked, closed, or censored publications deemed critical of officials...Under the constitution the supreme leader appoints the head of the audiovisual policy agency; a council composed of representatives of the president, the judiciary, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly oversees the agency’s activities. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance reviews all potential publications, including foreign printed materials, prior to their domestic release and may deem books unpublishable, remove text, or require word substitution for terms deemed inappropriate.

Independent print media companies existed, but the government severely limited their operations. It closed or prohibited opposition and reformist newspapers, intimidated and arrested journalists and censored news. Censorship and temporary closures for allegedly insulting the regime were also aimed at government-controlled print media. For example, on February 18, authorities reportedly shut down the *Aseman* newspaper after it published an article criticizing the country’s retributive criminal punishment practices as “inhumane.”

Under the constitution private broadcasting is illegal. The government maintained a monopoly over all television and radio broadcasting facilities through the state agency, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. Radio and television programming, the principal source of news for many citizens (especially in rural areas with limited internet access), reflected the government’s political and socio-religious ideology. There were widespread reports of the government’s engagement in the local “downlink” jamming of satellite broadcasts. Satellite dishes remained illegal but ubiquitous, although police launched several campaigns to confiscate privately owned satellite dishes around the country under warrants provided by the judiciary.

Violence and Harassment: The government and its agents harassed, detained, abused, and prosecuted publishers, editors, and journalists, including those involved in internet-based media, for their reporting (see also section 1.e.). The government also harassed many journalists’ families, and journalists in prison were often subjected to solitary confinement.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law forbids government censorship but also prohibits dissemination of information the government considers “damaging.” During the year the government censored publications--both reformist and conservative--that criticized official actions or contradicted official views or versions of events. “Damaging” information included discussions of women’s rights, the situation of minorities, and criticism of the government.

On December 26, the government announced plans to expand its so-called “smart filtering” practices, whereby it censors certain prohibited internet content without completely blocking the websites on which such content appears. At the time of the announcement, authorities appeared to be applying smart filtering only to the photo-sharing website Instagram.

Libel Laws/National Security: The government commonly used libel laws or cited national security to suppress criticism. According to the law, if any publication contains personal insults, libel, false statements,

or criticism, the insulted individual has the right to respond in the publication within one month. If the libel, insult, or criticism involves Islam or national security, the responsible person may be charged with apostasy and crimes against national security, respectively. The government applied the law throughout the year, often citing statements made in various media outlets or internet platforms that criticized the government, to arrest, prosecute, and sentence individuals for crimes against national security.

### **Internet Freedom**

The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet, monitored private online communications, and censored online content. Individuals and groups self-censored. The government collected personally identifiable information in connection with citizens' peaceful expression of political, religious, or ideological opinion or beliefs.

According to a 2013 World Bank study, 31.4 percent of the population used the internet and approximately 5.6 percent of households subscribed to fixed broadband services.

Reflecting the internet's importance as a source for news and forum for political expression, the government adopted technology and shaped restrictive laws enabling it to ban access to particular sites and to filter traffic based on its content. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance must approve all internet service providers. The government also requires all owners of websites and blogs in the country to register with the ministry, which, along with the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the Tehran Public Prosecutor's Office, compose the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Websites, the governmental organization that determines censoring criteria. The same law that applies to traditional press applies to electronic media, and the Press Supervisory Board and judiciary used the law to close websites during the year.

NGOs reported that the government continued enhanced restrictions on access to the internet that were initially imposed in advance of the 2013 presidential election. These restrictions included a change in the government's filtering methodology from "uniform resource locator (URL) filtering" to "content filtering" before the election. This change effectively imposed content-based restrictions on material not previously banned. Internet traffic over mobile communication devices, including cell phones, was reportedly subject to the same restrictions as traffic operating over fixed-line connections.

The Supreme Council for Cyberspace formulates the country's internet policies and devises plans to regulate its use. The Committee in Charge of Determining Offensive Content, headed by the prosecutor general and judiciary, reportedly implements the council's decisions regarding the filtering and blocking access to sensitive websites.

Organizations, including the Basij "Cyber Council," the Cyber Police, and the Cyber Army, which was presumed to be controlled by the Revolutionary Guards, monitored, identified, and countered alleged cyber threats to national security. These organizations especially targeted citizens' activities on social networking websites officially banned by the Committee in Charge of Determining Offensive Content, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr, and reportedly harassed persons who criticized the government, including by raising sensitive social issues. NGOs reported that the government attempted to block internet users' access to technology that would allow them to circumvent government content filters.

Notwithstanding government restrictions, many individuals used social media regularly, ranging across the spectrum from heavy users like urban youth to more measured users in high positions. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif posted messages using a verified Twitter account. Active Twitter accounts purporting to belong to Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Rouhani were widely considered to be authentic and run by their respective offices.

Ministry of Information and Communications Technology regulations prohibit households and cybercafes from having high-speed internet access, and the government requires cybercafes to install security cameras and to collect users' personal information. The government periodically reduced internet speed to discourage downloading material.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government significantly restricted academic freedom and the independence of higher education institutions. Authorities systematically targeted university campuses to suppress social and political activism



by prohibiting independent student organizations, imprisoning student activists, removing faculty, preventing students from enrolling or continuing their education based on their political or religious affiliation or activism, and restricting social sciences and humanities curricula. Women were restricted from enrolling in several courses of study and faced limited program opportunities, quotas on program admission, and gender-segregated classes (see section 6, Women).

### **Freedom of Assembly**

The constitution permits assemblies and marches of unarmed persons “provided they do not violate the principles of Islam.” The government restricted this right and closely monitored gatherings to prevent antiregime protests. Such gatherings included public entertainment and lectures, student and women’s meetings and protests, meetings and worship services of minority religious groups, labor protests, online gatherings and networking, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. According to activists, the government arbitrarily applied rules governing permits to assemble, with proregime groups rarely experiencing difficulty and groups viewed as critical of the regime experiencing harassment regardless of whether a permit was issued. The government sometimes slowed internet speeds or blocked e-mail or text messaging services to disrupt potential public gatherings or demonstrations.

There were reports that security forces disrupted demonstrations and meetings and arrested individuals who participated in such gatherings. According to the UN special rapporteur’s August report, between March 2013 and March 2014, security forces arrested at least 28 students and imprisoned at least 11 student activists.

### **Freedom of Association**

The constitution provides for the establishment of political parties, professional or political associations, and Islamic and recognized religious minority organizations, as long as such groups do not violate the principles of freedom, sovereignty, national unity, or Islamic criteria or question Islam as the basis of the country’s system of government. The government limited freedom of association through threats, intimidation, the imposition of arbitrary requirements on organizations, and the arrests of group leaders and members.

The government continued to exert significant pressure on members of human rights organizations, including the Defenders of Human Rights Center. The government also restricted groups advocating for women’s or minority groups’ rights (see section 5), recognized and unrecognized minority religious groups, trade unions, and other labor-related groups (see section 7.a.).

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The constitution provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government placed some restrictions on these rights. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with regard to refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq.

In-country Movement: Women, especially in rural areas, sometimes faced official and societal harassment for traveling alone. Conservative social norms often restricted the free movement of women in rural areas outside the home or village. Women in those areas often required the supervision of a male guardian or chaperone to travel.

Refugees faced restrictions on in-country movement. According to the UN special rapporteur’s October 2013 report, authorities prohibited Afghan nationals from residing in 16 of the country’s 31 provinces and in parts of 13 other provinces.

Foreign Travel: The government required exit permits for foreign travel for all citizens. Some citizens, particularly those whose skills were in demand and who were educated at government expense, had to post bond to obtain an exit permit. The government restricted foreign travel of some religious leaders, members of religious minorities, and scientists in sensitive fields. Several journalists, academics, opposition politicians, human and women’s rights activists, and artists remained subject to foreign travel bans and had their passports confiscated during the year.

Exile: The law does not provide for forced exile. Many dissidents, activists, journalists, academics, artists, members of recognized and unrecognized religious or ethnic minority communities, and LGBT persons practiced self-imposed exile to express their beliefs freely or escape government harassment.

### **The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The constitution provides citizens the ability to change the president and Islamic Consultative Assembly members peacefully through free and fair elections, but candidate vetting conducted by unelected bodies and often based on arbitrary criteria severely abridged this right. The Assembly of Experts, which is composed of 86 popularly elected clerics who serve eight-year terms, elects the supreme leader, who acts as the recognized head of state and may be removed only by a vote of the assembly. The Guardian Council vets and qualifies candidates for all legislative and presidential elections based on criteria that include candidates' allegiance to the state and to Islam. The council consists of six clerics, who are appointed by the supreme leader and serve six-year terms, and six jurists, who are nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. There is no separation of state and religion, and certain clerics had significant influence in the government. Voters elect the president by direct popular vote with universal suffrage.

Recent Elections: In June 2013 voters elected Hassan Rouhani president. The Interior Ministry announced that Rouhani won 50.88 percent of the votes with a 72 percent turnout of eligible voters. Although the government did not allow outside observers to monitor the election, several organizations observed that, while turnout was high and the official results appeared to be consistent with voter sentiment, the country's electoral system continued to fall short of international standards for free and fair elections as a result of the supreme leader's and Guardian Council's preeminent roles in all political processes, including selecting which individuals permitted to run for office.

In September 2013 the UN secretary-general reported that "open and critical" debates preceded the election but noted reports of intimidation of activists, journalists, and trade unionists as well as allegations of restrictions on freedom of expression in the period preceding the election, including the virtual shutdown of internet traffic, the sporadic blocking of text messages, and the censoring of opposition websites.

The Guardian Council approved eight candidates for president out of 686 individuals who registered as candidates. It did not approve any women registrants. In May 2013 the UN special rapporteur reported that several candidates were apparently excluded because of their involvement in postelection protests in 2009. The Guardian Council also excluded 78-year-old former two-term president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani on the ground that he was too old.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The constitution provides for the formation of political parties, but the Interior Ministry granted licenses only to parties with ideological and practical adherence to the system of government embodied in the constitution. Registered political organizations that adhered to the system generally operated without restriction, but most were small, focused around an individual, and without nationwide membership. Members of political parties and persons with any political affiliation that the regime deemed unacceptable faced harassment, violence, and sometimes imprisonment.

The government maintained bans on several opposition organizations and political parties. Security officials continued to harass, intimidate, and arrest members of the political opposition and some reformists (see also section 1.e.). At year's end two opposition leaders and 2009 presidential candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi as well as Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard, remained under house arrest that was imposed in 2011.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Women faced significant legal, religious, and cultural barriers to political participation. According to the Guardian Council's interpretation, the constitution bars women and persons of foreign origin from serving as supreme leader or president; as members of the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, or Expediency Council (a body responsible for mediating between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Guardian Council and serving as a consultative council for the supreme leader); and as judges. In May 2013 the Guardian Council disqualified all 30 women who registered as presidential candidates in the June election. Nine women won seats in the 281-seat parliament in the 2012 elections. Women served in senior government positions, including vice president for legal affairs, minister of environmental protection, minister of women and family affairs, and foreign ministry spokesperson.

Practitioners of religions other than Shia Islam were barred from serving as supreme leader or president and from membership in the Assembly of Experts, Guardian Council, or Expediency Council. The law reserves seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly for members of recognized minority religious groups. In the assembly elected in 2012, members of religious minorities (two Zoroastrians, three Jews, and nine Christians) held 14 of the 290 seats. There were no non-Muslims in the cabinet or on the Supreme Court.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government Share**

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and corruption was a serious and ubiquitous problem. Officials in all three branches of government frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Many officials expected bribes for providing routine service. Individuals routinely bribed officials to obtain permits for illegal construction.

Corruption: Endowed religious charitable foundations, or “bonyads,” accounted for a large portion of the country’s economy that some experts estimated at 30 percent. Government insiders, including members of the military and clergy, ran these tax-exempt organizations, which are defined under law as charities. Members of the political opposition and international corruption watchdog organizations frequently accused bonyads of corruption. Bonyads received benefits from the government but were not required to have their budgets publicly approved by any government agency.

International news agencies reported that numerous Revolutionary Guard-owned front companies and subsidiaries engaged in trade and business activities, sometimes illicitly, in the telecommunications, mining, and construction sectors. Other IRGC entities reportedly engaged in smuggling pharmaceutical products and raw materials. The domestic and international press similarly reported that individuals with strong government connections had access to foreign currency at preferential exchange rates, allowing them to take advantage of a gap between the country’s black market and official exchange rates.

Numerous government agencies existed to fight corruption, including the Anticorruption Headquarters, Anticorruption Task Force, Committee to Fight Economic Corruption, and the General Inspection Organization. Parliament’s Article 90 Commission was also authorized to look into complaints of corruption within the government. Information was unavailable regarding these organizations’ specific mandates, their collaboration with civil society, and whether they operated effectively, independently, and were sufficiently resourced.

Financial Disclosure: Government officials, including cabinet ministers and members of the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, and Assembly of Experts, are required to submit annual financial statements to the state inspectorate. There was no information available on whether the government effectively implemented the law, officials obeyed the law, or financial statements were publicly accessible. There was also no information available on whether there were public outreach activities or public official training to encourage effective use of the financial statements.

Public Access to Information: The law does not provide for public access to government information.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human RightsShare**

The government restricted the work of human rights groups and activists and often responded to their inquiries and reports with harassment, arrests, and monitoring of individual activists and organization workplaces.

The government continued to imprison lawyers and others affiliated with the Defenders of Human Rights Center advocacy group, such as Abdolfattah Soltani, who was serving a 13-year prison sentence for alleged “propaganda against the system” and “colluding and conspiring against national security.” Center founding member and attorney for several political activists, Mohammad Ali Dadkhah, also remained in prison after receiving a nine-year sentence in 2011 for “plotting a soft revolution,” “propaganda against the system,” and illegally owning a satellite dish.

The government denied all requests from international human rights NGOs to establish offices in or conduct regular investigative visits to the country. The most recent visit by an international human rights NGO was by Amnesty International in 2004 as part of the EU’s human rights dialogue with the country.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The High Council for Human Rights, headed by Mohammad Javad Larijani, is part of the judicial branch of the government and lacks independence. The council continued to defend the imprisonment of high-profile human rights defenders and political opposition leaders, despite domestic and international pressure. In a March 11 session of the governmental High Council for Human Rights, Larijani accused several imprisoned activists of collaboration with terrorist groups. There was no information available as to whether the council challenged any laws or court rulings during the year.

**Anti-Semitism**

While past media reports estimated the size of the country's Jewish population at 25,000, a 2012 census reported there were 8,756 Jewish residents. The law recognizes Jews as a religious minority and provides representation in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Samiakh Moreh Sedgh is the only Jewish member of parliament.

Officials continued to question the history and uniqueness of the Holocaust. On May 6, members of the Assembly summoned Foreign Minister Zarif and criticized him for having called the Holocaust a "tragedy" in an interview with a German television station. In a March 21 Nowruz, or Persian New Year, national address, Supreme Leader Khamenei asserted that the historical reality of the Holocaust was "unknown" and questioned if it "actually did happen."

The government continued to block the Persian language website of the Aladdin Project, a foreign-based NGO launched by the foreign Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah that provided information about the Holocaust and Jewish-Muslim relations. In November 2013 the domestic Fars News Agency published an article calling the website a creation of "international Zionism" that sought "to recognize the Zionists' fabricated narrative about the Holocaust, which will enable them to present the creation of [Israel] as both legitimate and necessary."

**National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**

While the constitution grants equal rights to all ethnic minorities and allows for minority languages to be used in the media and in schools, minorities did not enjoy equal rights, and the government consistently denied their right to use their languages in school. In addition, the Gozinesh (selection) law prohibits non-Shia ethnic minorities from fully participating in civic life. The law and its associated provisions make full access to employment, education, and other areas conditional on devotion to the Islamic republic and the tenets of Shia Islam.

The government disproportionately targeted minority groups, including Kurds, Arabs, Azeris, and Baluchis, for arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and physical abuse (see also section 1.e.). These groups reported political and socioeconomic discrimination, particularly in their access to economic aid, business licenses, university admissions, permission to publish books, and housing and land rights. Human rights organizations, including the ICHRI and the IHRDC, observed that the government's application of the death penalty disproportionately affected ethnic minorities.

The estimated eight million Sunni ethnic Kurds in the country frequently campaigned for greater regional autonomy. The government continued to use security law, media law, and other legislation to arrest and prosecute Kurds for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association. The government reportedly banned Kurdish-language newspapers, journals, and books and punished publishers, journalists, and writers for opposing and criticizing government policies. Although speaking the Kurdish language was not prohibited, schools were prohibited from teaching it. Authorities suppressed legitimate activities of Kurdish NGOs by denying them registration permits or bringing security charges against persons working with such organizations. Kurds were not allowed to register most Kurdish names for their children in official registries. The Gozinesh law impaired the ability of Sunni Kurds to integrate into civic life.

International human rights observers, including the IHRDC, stated that the country's estimated two million Ahwazi Arabs faced continued oppression and discrimination. In January authorities executed two Ahwazi Arab cultural rights activists in secret without prior notice to their families. The UN special rapporteur's October 2013 report had warned that five Ahwazi Arab cultural-rights activists faced imminent execution on charges of "gathering and colluding against state security," "propaganda against the system," "enmity against God," and "corruption on earth" for participating in protests in 2011-12. There was no new information on the remaining three individuals at year's end.

Ethnic Azeris, who numbered approximately 13 million persons or 16 percent of the population, were well integrated into government and society and included the supreme leader among their numbers. Nonetheless, Azeris reported the government discriminated against them by prohibiting the Azeri language in schools, harassing Azeri activists or organizers, and changing Azeri geographic names. Azeri groups also claimed a number of Azeri political prisoners had been jailed for advocating cultural and language rights for Azeris. The government charged several of them with "revolting against the Islamic state."

Local and international human rights groups alleged serious economic, legal, and cultural discrimination during the year against the predominantly Sunni ethnic Baluchi minority, estimated to be between 1.5 and two million persons. Areas with large Baluchi populations were severely underdeveloped and had limited access to education, employment, health care, and housing. The Gozinesh (selection) procedure limited Sunni Baluchis' employment opportunities and political participation and caused them to be underrepresented in government positions. Baluchi journalists and human rights activists faced arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and unfair trials.

### **Iraq<sup>317</sup>**

Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the April 30 national parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair elections and saw the peaceful transition of power from former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. On October 18, parliament approved the new prime minister's *final cabinet nominations*, *successfully* completing the government formation process. Due to attacks and offensive operations by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the year, the government lost effective control over large areas of the country, principally in Arab Sunni and some mixed Sunni/Shia areas. Control over the security forces was inconsistent, and the deterioration of the security situation led to a re-emergence of Shia militias, which operated largely outside the authority of the government.

ISIL committed the overwhelming number of serious human rights abuses. In a systematic and widespread fashion, ISIL targeted government officials and members of the security forces as well as civilians, especially Shia, religious and ethnic minorities, women, and children. To a lesser extent, Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Shia militias also reportedly committed abuses in the disorganized security environment.

Destabilizing violence and fighting between government forces and ISIL escalated in Anbar Province at the end of 2013 and spread to other provinces during the year. On June 9, ISIL launched an assault and quickly captured Mosul, the second largest city. Subsequently ISIL forces took control of large areas of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Armed clashes between ISIL and the ISF, including the Peshmerga--the armed forces of the Kurdistan regional government--caused massive internal displacements, with the United Nations estimating more than two million persons forced to flee their homes nationwide. The humanitarian crisis worsened in July and August, as ISIL targeted ethnic and religious minorities, perpetrated gender-based violence, sold women and children off as slaves, recruited child soldiers, and destroyed civilian infrastructure.

Severe human rights problems persisted. Large-scale and frequent killings, the vast majority of which ISIL carried out, destabilized the country. They included the June 10 mass killing of more than 600 inmates, almost all Shia, at Badoush prison near Mosul. ISIL also killed, abducted, and expelled from their homes members of religious and ethnic groups, including Christians, Shia Shabak, Shia Turkmen, and Yezidis. Simultaneously, but on a much smaller scale, there were unverified reports of government actors and Shia militias killing Sunni prisoners. Widespread corruption at all levels of government and society exacerbated the lack of effective human rights protections.

There were increasing reports of violence and criminal acts perpetrated by Shia militias and volunteers in the Popular Mobilization Committees, which the government established in response to ISIL's incursion. Abuses reportedly included kidnapping, extortion, and killing. Prime Minister al-Abadi called for these groups to come under ISF command and control.

Other significant human rights problems were reported: disappearances; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities; arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention, sometimes incommunicado; denial of fair public trial; insufficient judicial institutional capacity; ineffective implementation of civil judicial procedures and remedies; delays in resolving property restitution claims; arbitrary interference with privacy and homes; limits on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; violence against and harassment of journalists; limits on religious freedom due to violence by extremist groups; restrictions on freedom of movement; large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; discrimination against and societal abuse of women and ethnic, religious, and racial minorities; trafficking in persons; societal discrimination and violence against individuals based on perceived sexual orientation and gender identity; and limitations on worker rights.

Terrorist groups, most notably ISIL, on a mass scale committed acts of violence, including killing by means of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, execution-style shootings, and beheadings. These groups also engaged in kidnapping, rape, and other forms of violence. Terrorists targeted fellow citizens, including Shia, Sunni, and members of other religious groups or ethnicities, as well as security forces, places of worship, religious pilgrims, schools, public spaces, economic infrastructure, and government officials. The government initiated investigations of ISIL's human rights abuses, for instance the massacre of Air Force recruits at Camp Speicher and the targeted killing of Yezidis in Sinjar, but progress was slow and the status of official prosecutions unknown. Information about investigations or prosecutions of abuses by government officials and members of the security forces was not publicly available.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

During the year the security situation dramatically deteriorated due to widespread fighting between the ISF and ISIL (see section 1.g.). There were numerous reports that the government, militias, and terrorist groups committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

Civilian fatalities in the first half of the year, including civilian police, exceeded total civilian fatalities in 2013; terrorist groups also increasingly targeted police and security forces. Monitoring by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which included nonofficial sources, reported a significant increase in estimated civilian fatalities--from 7,818 in 2013 to at least 12,282 civilian fatalities. June was the deadliest month for civilians since 2008, according to UNAMI, with 1,531 deaths, due to escalated violence between the ISF and ISIL forces. UNAMI estimated that an additional 2,095 civilians were killed in heavily contested Anbar Province from January 1 to October 30.

Agence France-Presse (AFP), relying on government data, reported 7,137 confirmed casualties between January and September, including 615 police officers, 581 soldiers, 178 Kurdish Peshmerga, 81 fighters of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement, also known as the Sons of Iraq, and 1,794 militants. Continued armed clashes in ISIL-controlled areas, including most of Anbar Province, hindered the accurate collection of casualty estimates, with AFP reporting that actual figures were likely significantly higher. AFP estimates also excluded the number of militants killed during June because these figures could not be verified.

Security forces reportedly committed extrajudicial killings, although identification of specific killers was rare. Ministry of Interior officials reportedly tortured detainees to death, according to unverified accounts from human rights organizations (see section 1.c.). The outcomes of official investigations were often unpublished, unknown, or incomplete.

Between June 9 and June 21, Shia militias and security forces reportedly carried out the extrajudicial killing of approximately 255 Sunni prisoners, including at least eight boys under the age of 18, according to the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Victims were reportedly shot to death, burned, or killed by grenades thrown into their cells, in all but one instance, by Shia guards or militia fleeing ISIL advances. The vast majority of those killed were reportedly in pretrial detention awaiting charges under the antiterrorism law. On July 13, the Ministry of Interior issued a statement disputing allegations that security forces or police were involved and attributing responsibility to terrorist groups. The Ministry of Human Rights initiated an investigation into the killings, but no updates were available by year's end.

Terrorist activities throughout the country increased significantly during the year, particularly with ISIL assaults on cities across the west and north. ISIL frequently employed suicide attacks and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Some attacks targeted government buildings or checkpoints staffed by security forces, while others targeted civilians. For example, a complex attack on March 4, including mortar fire followed by a suicide attack by multiple individuals wearing explosive vests in a vehicle rigged with explosives, targeted the Municipal Council building in Samarra, killing at least five civilians and injuring more than 40 others. Attacks on playgrounds, mosques, government sites, civilian homes, and markets, as well as attacks directed at members of the security forces, public officials, journalists, ethnic and religious minorities, and local leaders opposed to ISIL were common. ISIL claimed responsibility for many of these attacks via its social media platforms.

ISIL forces targeted Sunni tribal leaders; Sunnis who cooperated with the government, including the Sahwa movement; and Sunni clerics who refused to recognize ISIL and its caliphate. For example, the Human Rights Ministry and UNAMI reported that on June 14, ISIL executed 12 Sunni clerics from the al-Isra mosque in

Mosul for refusing to take an oath of allegiance to ISIL. The UN reported that ISIL executed 12 members of the ISF and Sahwa in Hawija on August 25, and six days later it executed 19 Sunnis in Diyala Province for refusing to pledge allegiance to ISIL. According to the UN, ISIL forces continued to target and kill members of Sunni tribes who refused to affiliate with the terrorist group. In late October media reports indicated that ISIL forces killed hundreds of members of the Abu Nimr tribe--including children and elderly men--outside of Ramadi in Anbar Province.

A number of ISIL attacks targeted Baghdad's Shia-majority neighborhoods. UNAMI estimates recorded an average of 1.66 VBIED attacks per day in Baghdad in the first half of the year. For example, four coordinated explosions occurred in Baghdad nearly simultaneously on July 19, killing at least 27 persons and injuring many others. The first suicide bombing took place at a southern Baghdad checkpoint where soldiers, police, and Shia volunteer fighters were gathered. The second struck the predominantly Shia neighborhood of Khadimiya. At the same time, two car bombs detonated in Saydiya and Bayaa in western Baghdad. On July 22, another suicide car bomb targeted a checkpoint in the Khadimiya area, killing 21 persons, including seven police officers, and injuring 43 others.

Spillover across the porous border from the civil war in Syria increasingly destabilized the security situation in the country. By late June, ISIL forces seized control of the border with Syria, securing nearly all official border crossings and facilitating movement of foreign fighters and materiel across the border. Media reports confirmed that foreign ISIL fighters from Australia, Germany, and Syria committed several suicide attacks in Baghdad. For example, on July 17, ISIL announced on social media that an Australian member of the terrorist network detonated an explosive vest near a Shia mosque in a market in central Baghdad, killing three and injuring more than 90 persons.

International human rights organizations criticized the increasingly sectarian nature of militia activity and the lack of sufficient government oversight. Prime Minister al-Abadi repeatedly called for the elimination of independent militias and ordered all militia groups brought under ISF authority. Shia religious leaders also called for Shia volunteers to fight under the command of the security forces and condemned violence against civilians, including destruction of personal property. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases, Shia militias operated independently and without oversight or direction from the government. International NGOs, Sunni leaders, and the local media accused Shia militias of targeting Sunni communities. According to an October 24 HRW report, Shia militias attacked Sunnis who did not flee ISIL's advance, considering any remaining families "collaborators" and ransacking, burning, and even demolishing several Sunni villages. In November the local media reported that Shia militias razed homes, agricultural fields, and orchards in several parts of Saadia and Jalawla, to the northeast of Baquba in Diyala Province. These reports alleged that militias were altering the demographic composition of these areas by evicting Sunni residents after liberating the area from ISIL. Kurdistan regional government Peshmerga forces allegedly committed similar punitive actions such as razing homes, burning villages, and engaging in mass arrests of Sunni Arabs in ethnically mixed, disputed internal boundaries provinces in post-ISIL clearing operations.

According to the October HRW report, Shia militias kidnapped and killed Sunni civilians in Baghdad, Diyala, and Babil provinces. An August 22 attack on the Sunni Musab bin Omar mosque in Diyala killed more than 70 worshippers. This attack was largely viewed as retribution for ISIL attacks on Shia. Following the attack the Ministry of Interior detained a Diyala police officer on suspicion of colluding with Shia militias, and parliament launched an investigation. At year's end the investigation continued.

There were significantly fewer reports of killings or other sectarian violence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) than in the rest of the country, although minority groups reported threats and attacks targeting their communities in areas where the Kurdistan regional government had effective control. On April 23, a VBIED exploded in a majority Shabak town in the Hamdaniya District of Ninewa Province, killing 16 persons and injuring more than 35, including children. In addition two suicide bombings on June 6 killed or injured 46 members of the minority Shabak community in Bartalla, east of Mosul. The perpetrators of the bombings were not identified.

ISIL forces advanced into the IKR and neighboring provinces in July and August, causing large-scale displacement of ethnic and religious minorities, including Shabak, Turkmen, Yazidis, and Christians. There were also credible reports that ISIL fighters executed and abducted ethnic and religious minorities (see section 1.g.).

Authorities did not release the results of an investigation into the killing of Sunni Member of Parliament Ahmed al-Alwani's brother, Ali al-Alwani, and five bodyguards during a December 2013 raid by Iraqi army and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) forces. During the raid authorities arrested Ahmed al-Alwani on terrorism charges; on November 23, the central criminal court sentenced him to death for killing two soldiers. At the same time as the raid, security forces clashed with Sunni demonstrators in Ramadi and dismantled a yearlong antigovernment protest camp. According to HRW security forces killed 17 persons in the attack. Police alleged that unidentified gunmen opened fire on them, killing three and injuring others. Parliament sent a committee to investigate, but according to HRW, Baghdad Operations Command forces prevented the committee's entry into Anbar Province. Similarly, official investigations of excessive use of force in 2013 by the SWAT teams, elements of the 12th Division of the army, and the federal police in an operation to disperse Sunni protesters from Hawija and related demonstrations in Fallujah and Mosul failed to result in any prosecutions.

There were no known developments in other cases of arbitrary or unlawful killings reported in 2013.

### **Disappearance**

Disappearances and kidnappings were regular occurrences, and some kidnappers who did not receive a ransom killed their victims. There were also cases reported in which the abductor killed the kidnapped individual despite ransom payments being provided. Most kidnappings appeared to be financially motivated. ISIL forces and illegal armed groups kidnapped members of ethnic and religious minority communities, as well as Shia and Sunnis. According to UNAMI estimates, there were numerous "execution style" killings of victims kidnapped for ransom or to intimidate members of their communities.

Militias or criminal groups were most often associated with abductions outside of ISIL-controlled areas. For example, kidnapping cases increased throughout the year, with criminals and militias exploiting the security situation to carry out dozens of kidnappings a week in Baghdad either for personal gain or for sectarian reasons. An antikidnapping unit created within the Baghdad Operations Command identified seven kidnapping rings and secured the release of several victims.

Within ISIL-controlled areas, the terrorist group engaged in frequent abductions of members of the security or police forces, ethnic and religious minorities, and other non-Sunni communities. In early June, ISIL took over the Turkish consulate in Mosul, capturing 49 persons including the consul general and three children; ISIL released the hostages on September 20. According to Yezidi activists, ISIL also kidnapped an estimated 1,000 Yezidi men, women, and children and held them hostage in prisons, schools, and other locations in ISIL-controlled territory. The UN estimated that ISIL forces detained more than 2,000 Yezidi women and children, but accurate figures were difficult to establish. In another instance, on June 13, during an assault along the Iraq-Syria border, ISIL forces kidnapped border guards, including 28 Yezidis, and took them across the border to Syria, according to human rights groups. HRW reported that ISIL released 24 Yezidi guards after several weeks following a ransom payment of nearly 1.4 billion Iraqi dinars (\$1.2 million). The whereabouts of the remaining Yezidi guards and 12 Shia guards remained unknown.

ISIL kidnappers also targeted Shia Shabak and Shia Turkmen. According to Shabak groups, during several days in early July ISIL kidnapped more than 96 Shabak from villages near Mosul. From June 10 to July 19, ISIL reportedly abducted 75 Shia Turkmen from the villages of Guba and Shrikhan and the city of Tal Afar. Nine bodies were subsequently located; the others remained missing.

According to public sources, estimates of the number of missing persons from the Saddam Hussein era to 2014 ranged from 250,000 to more than one million and included persons missing due to human rights violations and other atrocities committed during the Saddam regime, as well as persons missing during the Iran-Iraq War and from more recent conflicts. Authorities made public their discovery of nine new mass graves during the year. The Human Rights Ministry reported that the central government had identified 157 mass graves of the Saddam Hussein regime as of June and opened 48 sites since 2010. On May 19, the Dhi Qar Directorate of Martyrdom announced the discovery of a mass grave containing the remains of an unknown number of persons killed during the Shabaniya (Shia) uprising in 1991. On June 5, the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, which oversees the Kurdistan regional government's response to the 1986-89 campaign of extermination and forcible relocation of Kurds and other minority groups by Saddam Hussein's Baath regime, announced three suspected mass graves with remains of 18 bodies from the 1987 Halabja



attacks. Following ISIL's June takeover of Tikrit and a nearby military base, the former Camp Speicher, ISIL executed as many as 1,770 men and left their bodies in mass graves (see section 1.g.).

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

Although the constitution expressly prohibits torture in all its forms under all circumstances and also cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, government officials as well as local and international human rights organizations documented instances of torture and other abuses by government agents. Police throughout the country continued to use abusive and coerced confessions as methods of investigation. ISIL, however, committed the overwhelming majority of such abuses.

The Human Rights Ministry confirmed that allegations of torture and systematic abuses were pervasive within prisons and detention centers. International human rights organizations documented credible cases of torture and abuse in Ministry of Interior facilities and to a lesser extent in detention facilities overseen by the Ministries of Justice and Defense, as well as in facilities of the Kurdistan regional government, including Interior and Justice Ministry facilities that held women. HRW contended that widespread torture and systematic abuses continued in detention facilities and reported several instances of torture and rape of female detainees.

As in previous years, accounts of abuse and torture, particularly by police and security forces, during arrest and investigation were common in pretrial detention and after conviction. According to reports by former prisoners, detainees, and human rights groups, methods of torture and abuse included the following practices: putting victims in stress positions, beating them, breaking their fingers, suffocating them, burning them, removing their fingernails, suspending them from the ceiling, overextending their spines, beating the soles of their feet with plastic and metal rods, forcing them to drink large quantities of water while preventing urination, sexually assaulting them, denying them medical treatment, and threatening to kill them. HRW documented reports of threats and cases of sexual assault of female detainees, particularly during arrest and interrogation. For example, interviewed detainees described being kicked, slapped, raped, or threatened with sexual assault by security forces. One woman reported receiving threats that officials would rape her teenage daughter to elicit her confession.

According to July media reports, the Committee of Saudi Prisoners in Iraq issued a statement detailing abuse of Saudi prisoners whom authorities transferred to al-Nasiriyah prison. The statement alleged that security forces entered the prison and beat the prisoners and guards provided razors and glass shards to other prisoners to use in assaults against the Saudi inmates.

The Kurdistan regional government's antiterrorist law allows abusive interrogation under certain conditions, and such practices reportedly occurred in some detention facilities of its internal security unit, the Asayish, and the intelligence services of the major political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) Parastin and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's (PUK) Zanyari.

The head of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament's Human Rights Committee reported that security forces detained and severely beat six activists from the Goran (Change) Movement immediately following the April 30 national parliamentary and regional provincial council elections. The heads of the Parastin and Zanyari did not respond to a parliamentary request to appear for a hearing.

Abuses by terrorist groups were widespread. In particular, ISIL reportedly targeted Shia detainees in prisons under its control. According to UNAMI and the Human Rights Ministry, ISIL militants killed as many as 670 Shia and other non-Sunni prisoners of Mosul's Badoush prison in June. UNAMI personnel interviewed six survivors of the attack who described how ISIL separated Sunni and Shia detainees, following which they executed the Shia detainees. Several of the bodies found showed signs of torture.

There were indications that government authorities initiated some investigations of security forces accused of committing human rights abuses, although authorities did not make public any investigation reports. The Human Rights Ministry reported that it received and investigated numerous complaints of torture inside prisons and detention centers throughout the country and forwarded the complaints to its "prisons team" to follow up. The ministry demonstrated its capacity to document credible allegations of systematic torture, deaths, forced confessions, and arbitrary detention, but there was no publicly available information at year's end that the government took judicial action against officials in the Justice, Interior, or Defense Ministries in response to allegations of torture.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Conditions at some prison and detention facilities remained harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, overcrowding, and inadequate access to sanitation facilities and medical care. The government temporarily closed some facilities, including Abu Ghraib, due to concern about possible ISIL attacks and relocated prisoners to facilities that were more secure. These movements further exacerbated the overcrowding of prisons outside of Anbar Province. There were also reported cases of abuse and torture in some facilities. The head of the Kurdistan regional government's Human Rights Committee and international observers alleged that both the central government and the Kurdistan regional government operated secret detention facilities. The Human Rights Ministry stated that a facility located in the International Zone in Baghdad, which security forces operated under the control of the Prime Minister's Office, remained vacant at the end of 2013. Due to the secret nature of these facilities, there was no information available to verify whether--or the extent to which--they remained in use.

According to local NGOs and the head of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament's Human Rights Committee, prisoners held in regional government-administered Asayish prisons sometimes remained in detention for more than six months without trial.

Physical Conditions: The Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) --the only government entity with the legal authority to hold persons after conviction--managed 24 correctional facilities; three (Abu Ghraib prison, Badoush prison, and Baghdad al-Balahdiyat prison) were not operational due to the security situation. The total intended capacity of ICS facilities was approximately 27,600 according to the Ministry of Justice. The ICS reported 27,600 inmates as of November, including 14,500 serving sentences for civil crimes and 6,000 for terrorism offenses; 5,900 were pretrial detainees. UNAMI reported 30,205 convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees in Justice Ministry facilities as of April. In the IKR the regional government's facilities held 2,486 convicted prisoners, including 84 women, as of August. No information was available on prisoners or detainees in undeclared facilities of Asayish and the Kurdistan regional government intelligence service. Authorities held men and women in separate facilities and separated detainees from convicts in most cases. Prisoners facing terrorism charges were isolated from general prisoners and were more likely to remain in harsher conditions in Ministry of Interior facilities.

Some Justice, Interior, and Defense Ministry authorities reported that conditions and treatment of detainees were generally poor. Overcrowding was a persistent problem in most facilities. Many inmates lacked adequate food, water, exercise facilities, vocational training, and family visitation. Access to medical care was inconsistent. Some detention facilities did not have an onsite pharmacy or infirmary, and authorities reported that existing pharmacies were undersupplied. Women's prisons often lacked adequate child-care facilities for inmates' children, whom the law permits to remain with their mothers until age four. Limited infrastructure or aging physical plants in some facilities compounded marginal sanitation, limited access to potable water, and poor quality food.

ISIL reportedly operated three facilities in areas under its control, including the Justice Ministry's Badoush prison in Mosul, and two Ministry of Interior prisons in Ninewa Province. Due to the lack of access and information, the conditions and numbers of individuals detained in these facilities was unknown.

Administration: The fractured penal structure continued to complicate detention and prison operations. By law the Justice Ministry retains full administrative authority over all detention facilities (including two prisons in the IKR), except for the Defense Ministry's military justice facilities and the facilities of the Kurdistan regional government's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Nevertheless, the government did not implement uniform oversight of detention facilities, and the Defense Ministry continued to hold civilian detainees, while the Interior Ministry continued to hold convicted prisoners.

The following various entities operated prison and detention facilities in the IKR: the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Labor and Social Affairs; the internal security unit (Asayish); the KDP-affiliated intelligence services (Parastin); and the PUK-affiliated intelligence services (Zanyari). Authorities of the Kurdistan regional government's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs supervised all convicted detention facilities as well as pretrial detention facilities for women and juveniles. The regional Ministries of Interior and of Labor and Social Affairs operated six prisons, one for men and another for women and juveniles in each of the three provinces in the IKR.

Recordkeeping on prisoners was reportedly inadequate and hindered the government's ability to identify the more than 500 prisoners who escaped in 2013 following assaults on Taji and Abu Ghraib. The government was also not able to identify those who escaped, were illegally released, or were killed by government forces, militias, or ISIL forces throughout the year (see section 1.a.). The government also transferred thousands of prisoners from Abu Ghraib prison and other Ministry of Justice prisons in Mosul and Kirkuk due to concerns about inadequate security, in view of ISIL's advances in these areas and its record of killing or releasing prisoners. According to officials at the Ministry of Interior, the Justice, Defense, and Interior Ministries and the Counterterrorism Service each maintained their own records of detainees, although some facilities held individuals detained by several entities, making it difficult to account for all of a facility's detainees. In addition many human rights organizations reported that prison guards or arresting officers released detainees after the detainees paid a bribe, a practice that further contributed to inaccurate detainee record keeping.

The government took steps to develop enhanced systems for maintaining prison records, yet progress remained stalled. The Ministry of Justice reported that the government was developing a unified database to track prisoners in justice, interior, and defense prisons. In the meantime the ICS relied on a single central computer to track prisoner statistics, which each ICS prison facility provided to the ministry on a regular basis.

There were no known examples of penal or judicial authorities using alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders.

ICS prisons maintained visitation programs that allowed regular visits by family members, legal counsel, and independent nongovernmental observers. Nevertheless, international and local human rights groups reported that authorities in numerous cases denied family visits to detainees and convicts. In many cases guards allegedly demanded bribes when detainees asked to telephone their relatives or legal counsel. Following the escalation in the conflict with ISIL in June, the Ministry of Justice temporarily restricted visits by family members due to security concerns, according to the local media and human rights groups. Prison officials generally permitted detainees religious observance and in some cases divided detainees into cellblocks by religion or sect.

The Human Rights Ministry reported that prisoners and detainees in Justice Ministry facilities were able to submit complaints to the ministry without censorship; the ministry publicly reported complaints, but there was no information available at year's end as to whether authorities investigated credible allegations of inhumane conditions. The Ministry of Justice operated human rights offices in 20 prisons to collect reports on prison conditions for the ministry's human rights division. The ministry also supported two citizen complaints offices to handle problems related to public inquiries or complaints. Within prisons, the ministry established complaint boxes for inmates to provide anonymous feedback to the ICS; the prison director, a social worker, and a legal officer reviewed the complaints.

**Independent Monitoring:** ICS prisons allowed regular visits by independent nongovernmental observers and government officials. The Ministry of Justice reported that independent organizations conducted 396 visits to ICS facilities in 2013. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to have access to Justice, Interior, Defense, and Labor and Social Affairs Ministry prisons and detention facilities. Authorities also granted prison and detention facility access to UNAMI, HRW, and the independent Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights. The Human Rights Ministry reported that authorities routinely denied the ministry's prison monitoring teams access to Ministry of Interior facilities. For example, on April 20, a member of parliament's Human Rights Committee told the media that prison administrators banned committee visits without a prior approval from the prime minister. There were reports of institutional interference in prison visits and in some cases advance notification to wardens and prison officials of visits by outside monitors.

From January to November, the ICRC conducted more than 100 visits to 62 prisons and transitory places of detention under the administration of the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Defense. Apart from the temporary suspension of visits to some facilities located in areas of active conflict, the ICRC continued to conduct visits to detention facilities located throughout the country. UNAMI resumed inspections of Justice Ministry prison and detention facilities and conducted four prison visits in Baghdad and three visits in Basrah and Dhi Qar. Due to the deteriorating security situation, inspections of ICS facilities became more difficult; as a result, in April UNAMI suspended prison visits outside the IKR.

The Kurdistan regional government generally allowed international human rights NGOs and intergovernmental organizations to visit convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees but occasionally delayed or denied groups access to some individuals, usually in sensitive cases involving terrorism. The UNAMI Human Rights Office and ICRC inspected prisons and detention facilities. From January through November, UNAMI conducted 59 visits to prisons and other detention facilities, and through December 2, the ICRC conducted 54 visits to various places of detention in the IKR.

Among independent organizations, local NGOs, the ICRC, and the UNAMI Human Rights Office had regular, but sometimes delayed, access to Kurdistan regional government internal security and intelligence service facilities.

**Improvements:** The provision of electricity, particularly at ICS facilities, continued to improve, according to the Human Rights Ministry and UNAMI. The Justice Ministry refurbished prisons and constructed new facilities to enhance detainee conditions, but progress in this area was subject to bureaucratic and budgetary delays. Many Justice Ministry detention facilities improved as the ministry brought them in line with international standards, and the ministry classified five of the 24 operational facilities as meeting necessary international human rights criteria. UNAMI officials reported receiving almost no claims of abuse from persons under Justice Ministry authority; reports of torture and abuse were most often related to pretrial detention in interior and defense facilities. In addition UNAMI reported that the ministry expanded education and vocational training opportunities for inmates in a number of prisons.

The Justice, Defense, and Interior Ministries, as well as the counterterrorism service, reported that employees at detention and prison facilities received human rights training provided by their respective ministry. In Justice Ministry facilities, the Human Rights Office conducted this training; ministry officials did not provide copies of the curriculum to human rights groups. UNAMI previously conducted human rights sensitivity training, but due to the deterioration in the security situation, UNAMI suspended training outside of the IKR. The Human Rights Ministry also provided human rights training to prison guards and security staff.

#### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The constitution provides some basic legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, although emergency laws give security forces broad discretion over arrest and detention when the government has declared a national emergency. During the year there continued to be many reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions. The Human Rights Ministry alleged that the “majority of arrests...were carried out without a legal warrant.” In its February 6 report focusing on the abuse of women in the criminal justice system, HRW documented cases of at least 15 women whom police or security officials detained during a roundup of the women’s entire family or village. A member of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament reported that during the year Kurdistan regional government security forces detained without charge family members of young men from Erbil who had traveled to Syria to fight with ISIL.

On December 2, Prime Minister al-Abadi issued Executive Order No. 57, which prohibits the arrest or remand of individuals except by an order issued by a competent judge or court or in the conditions warranted by law, including articles 102 and 103 of the code of criminal procedures. The authority that enforced the arrest warrant or detention is required to register the detainee name, place of detention, reason of detention, and legal article within 24 hours of the detention in the government’s central electronic and manual registers. The Ministry of Justice is then responsible for updating and managing these registers. The Ministries of Defense and Interior and the National Security Service are required to establish guidelines and mechanisms for commanders to register detainees’ details in this central register. The executive order also prohibits any entity, other than legally competent authorities, to detain any person. According to the executive order, abduction and illegal detention are considered criminal acts and perpetrators are to be brought to justice.

Prison authorities sometimes delayed the release of exonerated inmates pending the receipt of bribes. For example, on July 24, the Iraqi Commission of Inquiry’s Seizure Team apprehended a Ministry of Interior employee of al-Karkh central prison who demanded a bribe from the family of an inmate to carry out a release decision. In its February 6 report, *No One Is Safe*, HRW pointed to multiple examples of lengthy delays and demands for bribes before releasing female detainees. The Human Rights Ministry denied the allegations, stating that such delays were due to continuing investigations on separate charges. According to UNAMI, inmates whom the Ministry of Justice ordered for release continued to face delays from the Ministry of Interior or other ministries to clear their record of other pending charges.

Due to persistent complaints about such delays, the prime minister's December 2 executive order also mandates legal limits on detentions of those individuals who were not charged and expedites the release of those detainees who were ordered freed by the courts. The order requires the Justice Ministry to compile a list of all detainees, including date of arrest, summary of the proceedings, and other case details. This new reporting requirement was designed to remedy due process complaints concerning temporary detainees.

ISIL, in the areas under its control, undertook a campaign to silence any dissent to its rule. For example, ISIL carried out mass detentions in Mosul over a two-week period in September, with estimates that it took as many as 2,000 individuals into custody, according to local activists. The detainees, who reportedly included Yezidis, Shabak, Turkmen, and a small number of Christians, were believed to be former police or army officers. News reports stated that on September 11-12, ISIL apprehended and then executed 31 former police officers.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The ISF consists of internal security forces administratively organized within the Interior Ministry, external security forces under the control of the Defense Ministry, and the Counterterrorism Service. Interior Ministry responsibilities include domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order relying on the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, and Department of Border Enforcement. Conventional military forces under the Defense Ministry are responsible for external defense, but, working with elements of the Interior Ministry, they often also carried out counterterrorism and internal security operations. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the Prime Minister's Office and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes the three brigades of special operations forces.

The government rarely investigated reported human rights violations committed by ISF personnel and rarely punished perpetrators. There was no information available on official punishment for human rights violations. The minister of defense publicly called for holding perpetrators of human rights abuses within the security forces accountable.

There were accounts of torture and abuse throughout the country in Interior Ministry police stations and Defense Ministry facilities. According to UNAMI and international human rights organizations, abuse took place primarily during detainee interrogations while in pretrial detention. The Interior Ministry did not release the number of officers punished during the year, and there were no known court convictions for abuse.

Problems persisted within the country's provincial police forces, including corruption and the unwillingness of some officers to serve outside the areas from which they originated. The army and federal police recruited and deployed soldiers and police officers on a nationwide basis, reducing the likelihood of corruption related to personal ties to tribes or militants. This practice led to complaints from local communities that members of the army and police were abusive because of ethnosectarian differences.

Security forces made limited efforts to prevent or respond to societal violence. Although 16 family protection units operated through police stations around the country to respond to claims of domestic violence by women and children, they lacked management capacity. The Council of Ministers established a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender committee in 2012 to identify victims of targeted discrimination and violence in order to provide adequate protections. The committee did not make a discernible impact by year's end.

The two main Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, maintained their own security apparatuses. Under the federal constitution, the Kurdistan regional government has the right to maintain regional guard brigades, supported financially by the central government but under the regional government's control. Accordingly, the Kurdistan regional government established a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. There are 12 infantry brigades under the authority of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, but the PUK and KDP controlled tens of thousands of additional military personnel, also known as Peshmerga.

The KDP maintained its own internal security unit, the Asayish, and its own intelligence service, the Parastin. The PUK maintained its own internal security unit, also known as the Asayish, and its own intelligence service, the Zanyari. While the PUK and KDP took some nominal steps to unify their internal and external security organizations, they remained separate, since political party leaders effectively controlled these organizations through party channels.

Kurdistan regional government security forces detained suspects in areas the regional government controlled but also in the disputed areas. The poorly defined administrative boundaries between the IKR and the rest of

the country resulted in continuing confusion about the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. ISIL's control of parts of these areas exacerbated this situation.

There was no significant change in the number and pattern of arrests due to the 2011 repeal of article 136(b) of the criminal procedure code, which previously gave ministers the power to prevent the execution of arrest warrants stemming from criminal investigations of employees in their ministries.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

The constitution prohibits "unlawful detention" and mandates that authorities submit preliminary documents to a competent judge within 24 hours of arrest, a period that may extend in most cases to a maximum of 72 hours. For offenses punishable by death, authorities may legally detain the defendant as long as necessary to complete the judicial process. According to local press and rights groups, authorities arrested suspects in security sweeps without a warrant, particularly under the antiterrorism law, and held some detainees for prolonged periods without charge.

The government arbitrarily detained individuals and often did not inform detainees promptly of charges against them. The government periodically released detainees, usually after concluding that it had insufficient evidence for the courts to convict them. For example, in April the government announced the release of 630 detainees due to a lack of evidence. From January to June, the Ministry of Justice reported the release of 1,543 detainees after competent courts cleared outstanding charges. Many others remained in detention pending review of other outstanding charges. According to the Justice Ministry, it had referred approximately 3,060 cases to the Council of Ministers from January to November. The law allows release on bond for criminal (but not security) detainees. Authorities rarely released detainees on bail. Kurdistan regional government internal security units held some suspects incommunicado without an arrest warrant and transported detainees to undisclosed detention facilities.

The law provides for judges to appoint paid counsel for the indigent. Attorneys appointed to represent detainees frequently complained that insufficient access to their clients hampered adequate attorney-client consultation. In many cases detainees were not able to meet their attorneys until their scheduled trial date. There were reports that defendants did not have access to legal representation during the investigation phase, appointed lawyers lacked sufficient time to prepare a defense, and courts failed to investigate claims of torture while in detention. The Human Rights Ministry acknowledged the need for public defenders and judges far exceeded supply, resulting in delayed trials.

Arbitrary Arrest: Police and army personnel arrested and detained individuals without judicial approval, although there were no reliable statistics available regarding the number of such acts. Authorities often failed to notify family members of the arrest or location of detention, resulting in incommunicado detention...In July, UNAMI reported that sources in al-Zubair and Abu Khaseeb, predominantly Sunni areas of Basrah, stated authorities had arrested a large number of individuals after ISIL's advances in the north on suspicion of connections with ISIL; authorities released some of them within a day, and others were held for longer periods.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detainees represented approximately 20 percent of the total population of those incarcerated in Justice Ministry ICS facilities, according to ICS data. By law other ministries, including Defense, Interior, and Labor and Social Affairs, may hold pretrial detainees. Although there were no independently verified statistics concerning the number of pretrial detainees in government facilities, most individuals in Interior and Defense Ministry facilities were reportedly pretrial detainees. In the IKR there were 3,032 pretrial detainees, including 42 women, at various Kurdistan regional government facilities as of August 6.

Lengthy detentions without due process and without judicial action were a systemic problem.

Authorities held many detainees for months or years after initial arrest and detention, particularly those detained under the antiterrorism law. Authorities sometimes held detainees incommunicado, without access to defense counsel or without formal charge before a judge within the legally mandated period. For example, according to HRW accounts, security officers and judges collaborated to keep women detained on "suspicion of terrorism" charges, then demanded bribes to secure their release. Authorities at times detained spouses and other family members of fugitives, mostly Sunnis wanted on terrorism charges, as proxies to pressure the fugitives to surrender.

To address the issue of lengthy detentions, the prime minister issued an executive order on December 2 mandating that, without prejudice to any valid legal texts, detention should not be extended for more than six months except under permission from the Criminal Court, provided that it not exceed one quarter of the maximum penalty or that the court decides to release the subject on bail while observing the law.

Kurdistan regional government authorities reportedly held detainees for extensive periods in pretrial detention. According to local NGOs and the head of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament's Human Rights Committee, prisoners held in regional government-administered Asayish prisons sometimes remained in detention for more than six months without trial.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial**

The law provides for an independent judiciary, although certain articles restricted judicial independence. The country's security situation and political history left the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government. In addition in 2013 the Supreme Court overturned a court order mandating the separation of the Federal Supreme Court and the Higher Judicial Council, thus allowing one individual to head both the court, which rules on issues related to federalism and constitutionality, and the council, which manages and supervises the court system, including disciplinary matters. Local and international press claimed the decision was politically motivated and undermined judicial independence.

There were reports that corruption influenced authorities' willingness to respect court orders, except those concerning national security. For example, the Integrity Committee of the Council of Representatives reported that Interior Ministry and Justice Ministry employees demanded payment from detainees to release them.

Threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist, and criminal elements impaired judicial independence. Judges, lawyers, and their family members frequently faced death threats and attacks. Lawyers participated in numerous protests demanding better protection from the government against threats and violence. Judges were also vulnerable to intimidation and violence. Corruption or intimidation reportedly influenced some judges presiding over criminal cases at the trial level and on appeal to the Court of Cassation. The Commission of Integrity routinely investigated judges on corruption charges, but there were numerous reports that such investigations were often politically motivated.

By law the Kurdish Judicial Council was financially and administratively independent from the federal Ministry of Justice, but the Kurdistan regional government executive continued to influence politically sensitive cases.

### **Trial Procedures**

Observers, including some government officials, the United Nations, and NGOs, reported that trial proceedings fell short of international standards. Although investigative, trial, and appellate judges generally sought to enforce the right to a fair trial, defendants' insufficient access to defense attorneys was a serious defect in proceedings. Many defendants met their lawyers for the first time during the initial hearing and had limited access to legal counsel during pretrial detention. Trials were public, except in some national security cases, but some faced undue delays.

The law considers an accused person innocent until proven guilty and gives detainees the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges as well as the right to a privately retained or court-appointed counsel, at public expense if needed. Officials routinely did not inform defendants promptly or in detail of charges against them. Judges assemble evidence and adjudicate guilt or innocence. There is no right to a trial by jury. Defendants and their attorneys have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases before trial and have the right to confront witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence. In many cases forced confessions served as the only source of evidence without the corroboration of forensic evidence or independent witness testimony, according to Amnesty International. The law provides the right to appeal, although there is a statute of limitations for referral; the Court of Cassation reviews criminal cases on appeal.

Kurdistan regional government officials noted that prosecutors and defense lawyers encountered obstacles in carrying out their work and that prisoners' trials were unnecessarily delayed for administrative reasons.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

The government did not consider any incarcerated persons to be political prisoners or detainees and stated that all individuals in prison had been either convicted or charged under criminal law or were detained and awaiting trial while under investigation.

It was difficult to assess claims that there were no political prisoners or detainees due to the lack of government transparency, prevalence of corruption in arrest procedures, slow case processing, and inaccessibility of detainees, especially those held by counterterrorism, intelligence, and military authorities. Political opponents of the government and some detainees asserted the government imprisoned or sought to imprison persons for political activities or beliefs under the pretense of criminal charges ranging from corruption to terrorism and murder.

In the IKR similar factors obscured a reliable assessment concerning political prisoners and detainees. The 21st court session for Niaz Aziz Saleh took place on August 18, but a local NGO assisting with his defense reported that Kurdistan regional authorities did not bring Saleh to the court to participate in the proceedings or to meet with his lawyer. In 2012 Asayish forces detained Saleh, a former KDP headquarters official accused of leaking information regarding alleged KDP vote rigging in the 2009 IKR parliamentary election, to the independent magazine *Levin*. According to a 2013 Amnesty International report, Asayish officials repeatedly beat Saleh in his first three months of detention.

### **Property Restitution**

Delays and corruption prevented the government from effectively adjudicating property restitution claims. The deteriorating security situation also negatively affected resolution of pending claims. The Property Claims Commission, an independent governmental commission, resolved claims for property unjustly seized between 1968 and 2003 by the Saddam Hussein regime. The process was intended to benefit those whose land was confiscated for ethnic or political reasons as part of that regime's Arabization program and other sectarian displacement policies. The commission adjudicated approximately 90 percent of claims; the Court of Cassation continued to review the remaining outstanding claims.

Since 2003 more than 30,000 wafadin (Arabs previously settled in the Kirkuk region under Saddam Hussein's anti-Kurdish policies) returned to their previous homes in the center and south of the country and applied for compensation. As the wafadin left, the Article 140 Commission, which the government established to fulfill its obligation to undertake "normalization" measures as called for in the constitution's article 140, reviewed and paid their claims. Article 140 mandates that the executive authority implement the Transitional Administrative Law's article 58, which sets required measures to "remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk." These measures include restoring former residents to their homes and property while resettling and compensating newly introduced individuals. The head of the Article 140 Commission's Kirkuk office sent files of 11,743 claimants to Baghdad for compensation by August 31, but he stated that the federal government continued to delay settlement of the cases. The lack of a national budget impeded payment of approved settlements.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The constitution mandates that authorities may not enter or search homes except with a judicial order. The constitution also prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, but security forces often entered homes without search warrants.

During the year ISIL fighters entered homes, destroyed or looted private property, and converted houses into operational bases. In particular ISIL targeted religious and ethnic minorities, forcing members of such communities out of their homes and confiscating all their belongings, including valuables, at checkpoints. For example, after taking over Mosul in June, ISIL militants marked the homes of Christian families and gave them until July 19 to depart the city, pay a tax, convert to Islam, or face execution. ISIL confiscated all their property as the families fled the city, and those who departed received no compensation.

### **Use of Excessive Force and Other Abuses in Internal Conflicts**

The conflict between ISIL and the ISF led to a significant deterioration in the human rights situation during the year. The conflict, which intensified in January following armed clashes between the ISF and ISIL in Anbar Province, further escalated in June when ISIL launched an offensive and took control of Mosul, Tikrit, and other areas in the north. By November continued violence had displaced more than two million persons,



according to UN figures. Human rights abuses included mass execution, indiscriminate use of force, abductions, and repression of ethnic and religious minority communities. The United Nations reported that the minimum number of civilian casualties between January and the end of October was 8,571 killed and 13,787 injured.

Killings: In attempts to drive out ISIL from northern and western areas, the government targeted ISIL bases, many of which were located in populated civilian areas. Throughout the year the government escalated its use of force, leading to the deaths of a number of civilians, including children. ISF helicopters and airplanes conducted shelling and aerial bombardment of suspected ISIL locations and infrastructure in civilian neighborhoods, particularly in Anbar Province. The medical directorate for Anbar recorded 2,095 persons killed from January to October, some of whom were women and children, due to repeated shelling of residential neighborhoods in Fallujah and Ramadi. Unverified reports from Anbar residents, medical professionals, and aid workers acknowledged that casualty figures were likely to be much higher because many individuals could not reach hospitals due to the fighting.

Following ISIL's advances in June, ISF attacks on ISIL locations in civilian areas increased. HRW alleged that security forces killed at least 75 civilians and injured others in June and July during air strikes on Fallujah, Bayji, Mosul, Tikrit, and al Sherqat. In one reported case, an ISF aerial bombardment on July 20 of residential areas in Sulayman Bek, east of Tikrit, killed or injured 29 persons, including women and children. HRW reported that the ISF used barrel bombs, which caused 17 deaths in the attack.

The Human Rights Ministry denied reports that security forces committed violations against civilians, stating the government warned civilians to evacuate prior to ISF attacks. During the year the military also took steps to adjust its tactical operations to prevent undue loss of civilian life. For example, in August the air force distributed flyers to civilians in areas near Mosul to warn them to evacuate from the area to avoid injury in the event of an ISF attack. Prime Minister al-Abadi announced on September 13 that he had ordered the air force to stop air strikes against targets in civilian areas.

There were reports by human rights groups and the media of increased sectarian violence, including targeted killing of Sunni civilians suspected of having a connection to ISIL because they were Sunnis living in ISIL-controlled territory. Successful airstrikes and ISF ground operations to liberate ISIL-controlled areas created civilian security vacuums into which Shia militias moved. According to HRW the situation worsened during the year, and Sunni civilians, in the face of Shia militia violence and absent effective government security, either aligned with ISIL or faced displacement from their homes. As Sunni tribes turned against the terrorist group and fought with the ISF, ISIL conducted mass executions of tribesmen.

According to the United Nations and international human rights organizations, Shia militias--with participation or noninterference from the military and police--allegedly carried out extrajudicial killings of more than 200 Sunni detainees in June (see section 1.a.). For example, HRW documented the killing of 61 Sunni men between June 1 and July 9, as well as the killing of at least 48 Sunni men in March and April in towns around Baghdad. Witnesses, as well as medical and government sources, told HRW researchers that militias were responsible in each case. On July 30, police reported that militia forces executed 15 Sunnis and hung them by electricity poles in a public square in the town of Baqubah. UNAMI warned of increased violence toward Sunnis, particularly in the south, noting that since June at least 19 Sunni civilian men had been killed and 19 others injured in a spate of killings and abductions. Sunnis also received anonymous threats to leave Basrah or face death, according to UNAMI sources. It was unclear whether these allegations were investigated.

The United Nations, international human rights groups, and the media reported that ISIL executed hundreds of noncombatants, primarily captured soldiers or those who surrendered, military conscripts, police, and others associated with the government. The majority of those killed were Shia. For example, ISIL conducted mass executions in Tikrit and at a military base, the former Camp Speicher, in June after seizing control of the city. According to UN statements, ISIL killed as many as 1,700 men in mass execution sites after the June 11-12 takeover of Camp Speicher. ISIL claimed responsibility for the killing, posting photographs and videos on social media sites. The photographs showed ISIL militants apparently firing their weapons at young men packed closely together in large groups with hands bound behind their backs. In another instance the Human Rights Ministry announced that ISIL executed 175 Iraqi Air Force recruits in Tikrit on June 22. The government recovered the bodies of 11 victims from the Tigris River and reported that others were buried in a mass grave.

ISIL forces also targeted minorities. During an early August assault on Sinjar in the northern part of the country, ISIL killed at least 500 Yezidis, including women and children, and buried some victims alive, as the Human Rights Ministry documented in its report on ISIL atrocities. According to international media, ISIL seized the Yezidi village of Kocho on August 15, gathered boys and men older than 10 years of age, executed 84 of them, and kidnapped as many as 300 women.

According to media reports and the United Nations, ISIL increasingly targeted and killed members of Sunni tribes who refused to affiliate with the terrorist group. In late October and early November, a series of mass graves were found, and the government estimated that ISIL massacred nearly 800 members of the Albu Nimr tribe—including children and elderly men—in Anbar Province because of their resistance to ISIL. Numerous reports of ISIL abductions, public executions, and massacres of Sunni tribes emerged as members of these Sunni tribes increasingly turned against the terrorist group.

Throughout the year ISIL also targeted civilians, detonating VBIEDs and suicide bombs in public markets, security checkpoints, and predominantly Shia neighborhoods. Armed ISIL fighters also deployed in or near populated areas and failed to take precautions to avoid civilian casualties.

Abductions: There were reports of abductions by militias, illegal armed groups, and other unknown actors. In some cases individuals were kidnapped due to their ethnic or sectarian identity; in other cases individuals were abducted to destabilize the political process. For example, HRW alleged that militias kidnapped Sunni civilians in Baghdad, Diyala, and Babil provinces. In another instance unknown assailants abducted Riyadh Al-Adhadh, chair of the Baghdad Provincial Council, from his home during a sensitive period in the government formation process but released him several hours later. No update on the status of an investigation into his abduction was available at year's end.

According to unverified media reports, security and police officials alleged that Shia militias compiled “hit lists” of suspected Sunni insurgents to kidnap or execute. While the militias claimed to be securing the country from terrorist activity, the lack of oversight and accountability raised concerns of extrajudicial activity and impunity, and risked exacerbating sectarian conflict.

An October 31 press statement by the UN secretary-general to the Security Council documented ISIL's abduction of members of the Yezidi, Christian, and Turkmen Shia communities since its advance in the north. ISIL targeted religious and ethnic minorities, as well as women and children, some of whom the terrorist group held for ransom before releasing while sexually assaulting, torturing, and killing others (see also section 1.b.). International human rights groups, including HRW, detailed ISIL's abduction of 200 Turkmen, Shabaks, and Yezidis from Mosul in June. According to the UN secretary-general's report, UNAMI confirmed reports that ISIL abducted as many as 2,500 women and children during the year.

According to Yezidi groups, in August ISIL kidnapped at least several hundred Yezidi women and girls from the Sinjar District of Ninewa and used some of them as sex slaves (see section 6, Other Societal Violence). Some Yezidi sources claimed that ISIL may have abducted as many as 4,000 women and children, but lack of security in the area prevented an independent assessment of the numbers.

Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Reports from international human rights groups alleged that government forces and Shia militias abused prisoners and detainees, particularly Sunnis (see section 1.a.).

ISIL reportedly used brutal tactics to abuse, punish, and torture individuals connected to the security services and government, as well as those they considered apostates, such as Yezidis, according to international human rights organizations. The Human Rights Ministry and the United Nations reported multiple cases of rape and sexual assault carried out by ISIL and its affiliates; in one case four girls committed suicide after ISIL militants sexually assaulted them in Mosul.

Child Soldiers: There were no reports that ISF conscripted or recruited children to serve in the security services. According to UNAMI, militia groups and ISIL recruited children to serve as informants, checkpoint staff, and suicide bombers. Recruitments took place in areas of active conflict, as well as in Baghdad. Witnesses, including UN staff, observed children wearing uniforms, carrying weapons, and serving at checkpoints. UNAMI reported that children between ages 13 and 18 also voluntarily joined ISIL and militia groups, particularly in Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Samarra, and Baghdad. There were some reports of abductions of boys between ages 13 and 18 by unidentified armed groups. These reports were difficult to

verify. See also the Department of State's annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* at [www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/](http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/).

**Other Conflict-related Abuses:** Active areas of conflict continued to disrupt the lives of hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the country, particularly in Baghdad and the IKR, but also in Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Roads, bridges, and critical infrastructure sustained damage due to fighting, and roadblocks established by the government, militias, and ISIL impeded the flow of humanitarian assistance to communities in need.

Fighting between the ISF and ISIL caused damage to civilian institutions, including hospitals as well as water and energy infrastructure. For example, in June and July ISF repeatedly shelled areas of Fallujah in efforts to push out ISIL forces, resulting in accidental damage to Fallujah Hospital. Reports from international aid organizations also confirmed that shelling in Tikrit on June 13 damaged the main hospital as well as a clinic of the NGO Doctors Without Borders. The ICRC reported that hospitals in conflict areas were operating at reduced capacity or stopped functioning altogether.

Reports of ISIL's targeting and destruction of civilian infrastructure were common, including attacks on roads, religious sites, and hospitals. On July 29, according to local and international media reports, ISIL forces used multiple improvised explosive devices to destroy a strategic bridge on the Tigris River near Samarra located on the main highway connecting Mosul and Tikrit to Baghdad. ISIL also surrounded the largely Shia Turkmen community of Amerli in Salah ad Din for more than a month, preventing access to humanitarian aid and causing food, water, and fuel shortages for the community of 15,000 Turkmen.

ISIL systematically attacked religious and minority communities and their cultural and religious heritage to suppress minority ethnic and religious groups in areas under its control. ISIL repeatedly destroyed religious and cultural sites, including mosques, churches, and shrines. Between July 23 and August 3, ISIL destroyed the Shia shrines of Sayida Zainab and Saiyed Zakariya in Sinjar, the Sunni shrine of Imam Yahya Abu al-Qasim in al-Shafa, and the tomb and mosque of the Prophet Jonah. On July 27, ISIL destroyed the centuries-old tombs of two Sufi sheikhs in Mosul. Between August 28 and 31, in Hamdaniya in Ninewa Province, ISIL bombed four ancient shrines of the Kakai, a largely Kurdish religious minority oriented toward mysticism.

The Human Rights Ministry alleged that ISIL used civilians, including women and children, to shield combatants during fighting with the ISF, including in Fallujah.

### **Respect for Civil Liberties, Including Freedom of Speech and Press**

The main limitation on individual and media exercise of these rights was self-censorship due to credible fear of reprisals by the government, political parties, ethnic and sectarian forces, terrorist and extremist groups, or criminal gangs.

**Freedom of Speech:** Despite the constitutional protection for freedom of expression, the 1968 Publications Law provides, if authorized in the future by the prime minister, for fines or a prison sentence of up to seven years for any person convicted of publicly insulting the Council of Representatives, the government, or public authorities. Individuals were able to criticize the government publicly or privately, but not without fear of reprisal.

**Press Freedoms:** While the media was active and expressed a variety of views largely reflecting political party positions, it also practiced some degree of self-censorship to comply with the government's restrictions against violating public order. Political parties strongly influenced, or controlled outright, most of the several hundred daily and weekly print media publications as well as dozens of radio and television stations. For example, in advance of national parliamentary elections in April, the Press Freedom Advocacy Association in Iraq, an organization that monitors the country's media environment, revealed that politicians purchased significant shares in some satellite channels and established news agencies in an effort to influence reporting prior to polling.

International and local organizations reported arrests and harassment of journalists as well as closure of media outlets covering politically sensitive topics including poor security, corruption, and weak governmental capacity. In its 2013 report--the latest available--the NGO Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO) reported 328 cases of abuse against journalists, including 103 arrests, 63 acts of violence, and four assaults by armed groups. The deterioration in the security situation exacerbated harassment of journalists. Government oversight of media operations also tightened, at times resulting in closures of media outlets, restrictions on

reporting, and interference with internet service. For example, on July 14, the Communications and Media Commission, a nominally independent but government-run media regulator, told reporters that it would close news outlets that “incite sectarian violence” or support terrorist groups affiliated with ISIL.

In the IKR regional government authorities continued to try, convict, and imprison journalists, despite a 2008 law that decriminalizes publication-related offenses. According to syndicate officials, the 2008 law is the sole basis for prosecution of journalists for publication offenses, but prosecution is allowed for offense to public morals and other crimes. Public officials occasionally resorted to libel charges under criminal and civil law, which in some cases resulted in punitive fines against individual media outlets and editors, often for publishing articles containing allegations of corruption. Local NGO Metro Center reported 79 violations against journalists in the first seven months of the year, an increase compared with the same period in 2013. A Metro Center report stated these violations included Kurdish security forces preventing coverage of certain stories, confiscating equipment, and threatening and beating journalists. In March police arrested and subsequently released on bail television journalist Shoxan Abubakir of Kurdish News Network Television, affiliated with the Goran (Change) Movement, in connection with a lawsuit filed by a citizen alleged by the station to have received 40.8 million dinars (\$35,000) from the speaker of the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament.

Violence and Harassment: Journalists were targets of government security forces, corrupt officials, terrorists, religious groups that rejected media independence, and unknown persons or groups wishing to limit the flow of news. The JFO reported that kidnappers abducted 65 journalists and advocates for free speech, most of whom they killed. According to UNESCO at least six journalists were killed in the country between January and the end of November.

The intensification of the conflict between the ISF and ISIL put journalists at risk and restricted their movement, further limiting reporting, particularly in Anbar Province. In the second half of the year, reporting from ISIL-controlled areas in the north became increasingly difficult. Journalists covering armed clashes involving government, militia, and ISIL forces faced threats to safety, with several instances of journalists being killed or injured. For example, AFP and press freedom groups reported that a January 20 bomb attack targeting a police patrol in the city of Khalidiya, Anbar Province, killed Firas Mohammed Attiyah, a freelance reporter for Al-Fallujah Television. In another case Alahd Television camera operator Khalid Hamada was killed on June 15 while covering fighting between the ISF and ISIL in Diyala Province, according to the Iraqi Journalists’ Syndicate. ISIL also began to restrict access to the internet and telephone service in Mosul.

Military officials, citing safety considerations, restricted access of journalists particularly to areas with active fighting. For example, security forces arrested Al-Sharqiya news reporter Minas Al-Souhil and his camera operator June 15 in Baghdad, despite the journalists’ authorization from the Baghdad Operations Command to report from the area. No update on the status of the case was available. Since March 2013 the Ministry of Defense prevented foreign journalists from entering Anbar Province without prior approval from the ministry and the Anbar Operations Command Center.

Throughout the IKR there were numerous shootings, beatings, detentions, and death threats against media workers. In some cases the aggressors wore military or police uniforms. Many attacks targeted independent and opposition media, mainly the independent Nalia Radio and Television; the independent *Hawlati* and *Awene* newspapers; Payama Television, affiliated with the Kurdistan Islamic Group; and the Kurdish News Network Television, affiliated with the Goran Movement, part of the Kurdistan regional government rather than under control of the traditional ruling KDP and PUK parties. On August 17, Nalia Radio and Television stated PUK members threatened to attack the station in revenge for a report critical of the PUK’s leadership. On August 18, a trial began for two of three suspects in the December 2013 killing of journalist Kawa Garmiani in Sulaymaniyah Province. The third suspect, PUK Politburo member Mahmood Sangawi, continued to ignore a court summons to appear. In 2012 Sangawi threatened Garmiani’s life in a video that was widely circulated on social media.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law prohibits producing, importing, publishing, or possessing written material, drawings, photographs, or films that violate public integrity or decency. The penalties include fines and imprisonment. The censorship process relied substantially on self-censorship. Publications reflected the owners’ views, and writers understood the “acceptable” limits of reporting. Fear of violent retaliation for publishing facts or opinions displeasing to political factions also inhibited free expression. Content was also reportedly influenced by public officials rewarding positive reporting by providing money,

land, access to venues, and other benefits to journalists, particularly to members of the progovernment Journalists' Syndicate.

On June 18, the Communications and Media Commission issued mandatory guidelines to regulate reporting about insurgent groups and the fight against ISIL. The guidelines forbid coverage of the security forces that could be interpreted as negative and encouraged outlets to focus reporting on the security achievements of the armed forces, including "praising the heroic acts of security personnel," according to a July 3 HRW report. The directive also bans media outlets from broadcasting messages issued by armed groups and prohibits meetings or interviews with persons wanted by judicial authorities. According to local human rights organizations and HRW, the Communications and Media Commission threatened to revoke broadcasting licenses for noncompliance.

These restrictions extended to privately owned Iraqi television stations operating outside of the country. According to press reports, Egyptian authorities shut the offices of Al-Rafidayn and Al-Baghdadiya for critical coverage of the government following ISIL's June 10 takeover of Mosul. A Communications and Media Commission statement accused the two television channels of "sectarian incitement and threatening civil peace."

All books published in the country as well as imported books required the Ministry of Culture's approval and were therefore subject to censorship. According to the ministry, the purpose of the vetting was to suppress literature that promotes sectarianism.

Libel Laws/National Security: The law prohibits reporters from publishing stories that defame public officials. Many in the media complained this provision prevented them from freely practicing their profession by creating a strong fear of prosecution, although widespread self-censorship impeded journalistic performance as well.

Libel is a criminal offense under Kurdistan regional government law as well, and judges may issue arrest warrants for journalists on this basis. Police typically detained journalists named in a lawsuit until they posted bail.

Nongovernmental Impact: Criminal and terrorist groups sought to inhibit freedom of expression, including through threats and attacks directed at members of the press, and intimidation of their family members. Journalists were harassed, kidnapped for ransom, or killed in deliberate attacks for reporting information critical of ISIL. The NGO Committee to Protect Journalists called ISIL "one of the most dangerous forces for the press" in areas under its control. In addition to harassment and violence against journalists, ISIL also sought to control the media in areas under its control. For example, in Mosul, according to press reports, ISIL took over production of several media stations and censored the content.

### **Internet Freedom**

There were overt government restrictions on access to the internet, and there were credible reports, but no official acknowledgement, that the government monitored e-mail and internet chat rooms without appropriate legal authority.

Due to the deterioration in the security situation and the use of social media platforms by ISIL to inflame sectarian tensions, incite violence, and issue threats, the government interfered with internet access in some areas of the country. Reporters Without Borders alleged that on June 13, the country's telecom companies, at the request of the Ministry of Communications, suspended internet service in Kirkuk, Mosul, and other areas. The state-owned Telecommunications and Post Company and private internet service providers also blocked access to some social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Skype, and YouTube. The Ministry of Communications reportedly lifted the ban on June 30, but HRW asserted that residents in Tikrit and Mosul remained without internet access beyond that date. On June 19, the Communications and Media Commission announced that authorities decided to block social media sites due to the security threat posed by ISIL.

ISIL also engineered communications and internet blackouts. For example, on July 4, the self-proclaimed leader of ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appeared in Mosul to deliver the first Friday prayer service of Ramadan. During his appearance ISIL restricted internet and cell phone service in the city. In late November residents of Mosul told the Associated Press that ISIL blocked all cell phone networks in the city. ISIL

announced the decision to block cellular networks on November 26, using its Mosul-based radio network. Some residents continued to be able to access the internet, which operated on a different network.

Despite restrictions, political figures and activists used the internet to criticize corrupt and ineffective politicians, mobilize protesters for demonstrations, and campaign for candidates through social media channels. In one instance, in 2013 activists helped defeat the passage of a cybercrimes law that the Council of Representatives sent back to the prime minister's advisory commission for revisions to reduce its steep penalties, which included life imprisonment, for harming the reputation or affecting the unity of the country, and to clarify the punishable offenses.

According to the World Bank, approximately 9.2 percent of the population used the internet during the year, compared with 7.1 percent in 2013. Other observers estimated that internet penetration was approximately 10 percent, a significant increase since 2010. Social media and mobile applications became more widespread, particularly among youth.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

Social, religious, and political pressures significantly restricted the exercise of freedom of choice in academic and cultural matters. In all regions various groups reportedly sought to control the pursuit of formal education and granting of academic positions. The country's universities did not pursue gender-segregation policies. ISIL limited female education beyond the primary level in areas that it controlled, according to an August 7 statement by UNESCO.

Religious extremists and armed groups limited cultural expression by targeting artists, poets, writers, and musicians. For example, the local press reported that ISIL issued a directive banning all stores in Mosul from selling movies or music CDs and instructed businesses to stock only CDs containing Quranic verses or religious programs.

In the Kurdish region, local NGOs stated that government actions made student access to higher education increasingly merit-based. On the other hand, senior professorships continued to be easier to obtain for those with links to the traditional KDP and PUK ruling parties.

### **Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association**

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration "regulated by law." Regulations require protest organizers to seek permission seven days in advance of a demonstration and submit detailed information about the applicants, the protest, and participants. The regulations prohibit all "slogans, signs, printed materials, or drawings" involving "sectarianism, racism, or segregation" of citizens. The regulations also prohibit anything that would violate the constitution or law; encourage violence, hatred, or killing; or prove insulting to Islam, "honor, morals, religion, holy groups, or Iraqi entities in general." Provincial councils traditionally maintained authority to issue permits. Authorities generally issued permits in accordance with the regulations. In addition a limited number of peaceful protests occurred without permits.

Protesters demonstrated in several major cities demanding better government services and an end to corruption. For example, the press reported on demonstrations staged in seven provinces on March 8 to protest privileges granted to parliamentary members and senior officials, particularly related to pensions. On May 31, residents from Qadisiyah demonstrated against the lack of government services and deteriorating living conditions. On September 2, family members of the approximately 1,700 soldiers and cadets killed after capture at Camp Speicher demonstrated, including inside the Council of Representatives building, demanding an investigation into the June attack by ISIL forces on the camp.

The majority of protests were peaceful, and the government provided appropriate security. There were limited reports that the government dismissed unauthorized protests or restricted protests for security reasons during sensitive periods. Unlike in 2013 when on numerous occasions the government suppressed demonstrations, arrested organizers, used excessive force against protesters, and harassed protesters attempting to reach demonstration sites, protests were generally permitted and were peaceful. No update was available on the status of an investigation into the 44 demonstrators killed in 2013 during demonstrations in Hawija.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The constitution provides for freedom of internal movement and foreign travel, and the government generally respected these rights. Kurdistan regional government authorities allowed more than 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to reside in the IKR, but at times they limited the ability of some, particularly Sunni Arabs, to enter the region.

The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. The government did not fully establish effective systems to assist these individuals by year's end. The deterioration in the security situation and armed clashes between the ISF and ISIL throughout the year caused significant movement of civilians, further complicating the government's coordination and relief efforts. The United Nations estimated that from January to November, the conflict displaced more than two million persons in addition to the nearly one million IDPs from previous upheavals. Security considerations in active combat areas, destruction of roads, and official restrictions in some cases limited humanitarian access to IDP communities.

**In-country Movement:** The law permits security forces to restrict in-country movement pursuant to a warrant, impose a curfew, cordon off and search an area, and take other necessary security and military measures in response to security threats and attacks. There were numerous reports that security forces in the disputed areas, including Peshmerga and Iraqi Army forces, selectively enforced regulations requiring residency permits in order to limit entry of persons into the areas under their control. The Kurdistan regional government, imposing what it claimed were necessary security procedures, restricted movement across the areas it administered. Nonresidents of the IKR were required to obtain permits that authorized limited stays in the IKR. These permits were generally renewable. Iraqi citizens not from the IKR who sought to obtain residency permits for areas controlled by the Kurdistan regional government required sponsorship from a resident in the region. Citizens (of any ethnicity, including Kurds) crossing into the region from the south were obligated to enter at checkpoints and undergo personal and vehicle inspection.

Due to the surge in IDPs seeking refuge in the IKR and to security concerns about ISIL forces entering territory under the control of the Kurdistan regional government, Kurdish authorities did not apply restrictions consistently across the region. The United Nations and international humanitarian organizations alleged that practices regarding the entry of IDPs were more or less restrictive depending upon the location of the checkpoint and the background of the displaced individuals. There were also reports that checkpoints into the IKR were sometimes closed, forcing IDPs to wait for extended periods to enter the region. Officials prevented individuals whom they deemed security threats from entering the region. IKR officials generally admitted minority IDPs into the IKR, although the security checks were occasionally lengthy, and entry was more difficult for men, particularly Arab men, traveling without family than for others.

Due to increased violence, central government security forces increased the number of checkpoints and erected makeshift roadblocks in many parts of the country (see section 1.g.). For example, UNAMI reported that the government, as well as Shia militias, established illegal checkpoints in several districts in Baghdad after June 15, including Karrada, Hurriya, and central Baghdad. In addition authorities imposed curfews on cities to restrict movement.

ISIL restricted freedom of movement, particularly in the west and north (see section 1.g.). For example, ISIL forces surrounded the city of Amerli for more than two months, preventing entry and exit by the city's largely Turkmen Shia population. In early August, ISIL surrounded Mount Sinjar, initially preventing tens of thousands of Yazidis from departing the area to safety. ISIL severely restricted women's freedom of movement in areas under its control. Religious patrols reportedly checked to make sure that women wore suitable attire and male relatives or guardians accompanied them outside the home.

**Foreign Travel:** The government required exit permits for citizens leaving the country, but the requirement was not routinely enforced.

**Exile:** The constitution permits forced exile only of naturalized citizens and only if a judicial decision establishes that the citizenship was initially obtained based on material falsifications. There were no reported cases of forced exile.

### **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

During the year instability and armed conflict displaced more than two million persons, predominantly in the north, central, and western areas. The central government, the IKR, and international organizations provided protection and assistance to IDPs. The majority of the displaced fled to areas outside of their districts of origin. The United Nations estimated that the IKR hosted more than 900,000 of the country's 2.1 million IDPs. Sectarian violence and the advance of ISIL across the north and west displaced members of all ethnic and religious communities, including Shia, Sunni, Christian, Yezidi, Turkmen, and Sabeen-Mandaean families. Many displaced persons suffered secondary and tertiary displacement, some within weeks or months of earlier displacement. Many IDPs lived in rented accommodations, with host families, or in collective centers, while others took refuge on public land or in public buildings, including schools, churches, and mosques. As of November 7, according to the United Nations, 516,000 IDPs throughout the country urgently needed adequate shelter. The Kurdistan regional government worked with the United Nations to construct 21 new camps in the IKR with a combined holding capacity of more than 226,000 individuals. Existing infrastructure was expanded to address some of these needs. The government and the United Nations gave priority to shelter for persons living in open-air areas, schools, and unfinished buildings. IDPs faced harsh living conditions, with limited access to utilities, adequate sanitation, education, and employment opportunities. Displaced families were frequently subjected to multiple displacements.

In addition to massive displacements since January, authorities registered an estimated 950,000 IDPs who were displaced due to sectarian conflict in 2006-08.

Ethnic and religious minorities remained vulnerable to displacement. ISIL fighters forced many of these communities to abandon their homes in the north (see section 1.g.). ISIL advances toward the IKR in early August further displaced ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Yezidis, who were displaced from Sinjar to Dahuk, to the IKR and Turkey via Syria, or into the Sinjar mountain area.

Official efforts to promote the safe, voluntary return or local integration of IDPs were strained by the government's focus on improving the security situation and addressing the immediate humanitarian needs of those displaced due to violence. The constitution and the national policy on displacement address IDPs' rights, but few laws specifically do so. The Migration and Displacement Ministry's comprehensive strategy recognized local integration as a legal option for IDPs. The government attempted to integrate IDPs into local populations but also continued to encourage families to return to their original homes.

Government assistance focused on the provision of one-time initial financial grants. Faced with the large movement of IDPs across the country, the government provided food, water, and financial assistance to IDPs, including in the IKR. Following an escalation of the conflict in Anbar, the government provided 10 billion dinars (\$8.5 million) to aid displaced families. The government announced two additional grants of 500 billion dinars (\$430 million) each in June and August, which included cash payments of one million dinars (\$855) to each displaced family. On September 8, the Council of Ministers announced the government would pay displaced families a cash equivalent of the food rations they did not receive due to displacement. At year's end it was not clear when compensation would begin or whether it would be a one-time or monthly payment. In August the Kurdish cabinet announced a fund of 29 billion dinars (\$25 million) for IDPs. The media reported that 30,000 families received this financial assistance by August. The Migration and Displacement Ministry generally allowed IDPs access to domestic and international humanitarian organizations, collected information about IDPs, and provided some protection and assistance in the form of humanitarian supplies.

An IDP's habitual place of residence determined his or her access to services, including food rations allocated through the public distribution system that accounted for 30 percent of calorie consumption in the country and more than half of the calories consumed by the poor. IDPs who did not register as IDPs in their current places of residence also had limited access to services, such as schools, and to food rations from the public distribution system. Local authorities often determined whether IDPs would have access to local services. Through the provision of legal aid, the UNHCR assisted IDPs in obtaining documentation and registering with authorities to improve their access to services and entitlements. The IOM reported that some IDPs faced difficulty with registration due to lack of required documentation and administrative delays.

As of November, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there were approximately 900,000 IDPs in the IKR, as well as tens of thousands of others in the disputed areas under the control of the Kurdistan regional government.



**Protection of Refugees**

Access to Asylum: The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government established a system, albeit flawed, for providing protection to refugees. According to the UNHCR, more than 260,000 individuals sought refuge or asylum in the country, with most asylum seekers arriving from Syria and smaller numbers from Iran and Turkey. The government generally cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to the more than 2.3 million refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers, and stateless residents in the country. An estimated 208,000 of the 216,465 Syrian refugees who by August had registered, or were awaiting registration, with the UNHCR were Syrian Kurds who found shelter in the IKR. The UNHCR reported that approximately 17,000 refugees returned to Syria from the IKR from January through July. Two-thirds of these returnees were adult men, and some may have intended to return to the IKR.

Many Iraqi refugees who had earlier fled to Syria returned home because of continuing violence in Syria. Often these returnees could not go back to their places of origin due to conflict within the country, resulting in secondary displacement. An estimated 60,000 citizens returned to the country as of January. The Ministry of Migration and Displacement registered 7,111 returnee households (approximately 35,000 individuals) by September 2013. The ministry provided one-time financial grants of four million dinars (\$3,420) each to the registered returnees through smart cards.

The UNHCR reported that 28,300 Iraqi refugees were registered and receiving its assistance in Syria as of August; the Syrian government consistently reported a higher estimate of 149,292. The closure of the al-Qaim and Rabiah border crossings, continuous security incidents, and a lack of safety along the Anbar-to-Baghdad highway, which most returnees traveled, limited the number of cross-border movements.

In the first half of 2013, 1,135 refugees returned to the country under a voluntary repatriation program, mainly from Syria, Iran, Jordan, and Egypt.

Refoulement: The government cooperated with the UNHCR to prevent the deportation of refugees. The UNHCR relocated refugees at risk of deportation to refugee camps or attempted to resettle them. Unlike in 2013 the UNHCR did not document any cases of refoulement in the year, although international NGOs reported that the government forced some Iranian asylum seekers to repatriate, despite credible risk of their torture upon their return.

Refugee Abuse: There were reports that sectarian groups, extremists, criminals, and, in some alleged but unverified cases, government forces attacked and arrested refugees, including Palestinians, Ahwazis, and Syrian Arabs. As the country's security situation deteriorated, refugees in all areas of the country were at increasing risk.

Local NGOs reported that abuse of Syrian refugees--often by other refugees--was common, including violence against women and children, child marriage, forced prostitution, and sexual harassment. For example, on January 8, six men gang-raped a young Syrian refugee near Erbil. Kurdish authorities arrested the men the following day.

Employment: By law refugees and asylum seekers have the right to work in the private sector. Palestinian refugees, of whom UNHCR estimates there were 12,000, faced job insecurity when working in the public sector due to their ambiguous legal status; the government did not recognize their refugee status and did not allow them to obtain citizenship. In the IKR authorities issued six-month residence and work permits to Kurdish Syrian refugees, and many Syrian Kurds found work in the construction and services industries. Syrian refugees were able to obtain and renew residency and work permits both in refugee camps and in Erbil.

Durable Solutions: Syrian, Turkish, and Iranian Kurdish refugees in the IKR generally integrated well. Local integration remained the best and most likely option for the majority of Iranian Kurds. The Kurdistan regional government classified an estimated 40,000 Syrian Kurd refugees as "noncamp refugees." Many noncamp refugees worked in Erbil or found shelter with relatives in the IKR. The scale of the accelerating influx of Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs placed considerable strain on administration, infrastructure, and provision of services in the IKR.

**Stateless Persons**

The UNHCR estimated that 5 percent of Syrian refugees in the IKR--approximately 1,040--were stateless. Palestinian refugees, residing mostly in Baghdad, remained longtime stateless residents. The UNHCR estimated that an additional 110,000 stateless persons lived in the country. Many of these nonrefugee stateless individuals were previously citizens and had already begun the process of reacquiring Iraqi nationality. UNAMI estimated that the actual figure was likely to be lower than the official estimate. Since 2003 more than 25,000 persons regained their nationality, some in accordance with nationality law.

The Ministry of Migration and Displacement reported in 2013 that 97 percent of Faily Kurds had re-acquired their citizenship, although community leaders disputed this statement. Those who had not re-acquired their citizenship reported the difficulty was the result of insufficient paperwork confirming their Iraqi identity due to either destruction, loss, or their status as children at the time of their initial departure from the country. As of 2006, the latest year for which data were available, an estimated 54,500 Bidoun individuals living as nomads in the desert near or in the southern provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Qadisiyah remained undocumented and stateless. Other communities similarly at risk of statelessness included the country's Romani population, the Bahai religious minority community, inhabitants of the southern Marshlands, members of the Goyan and Omariya Turkish Kurdish tribes near Mosul, and nationals of newly independent South Sudan, which had not established a diplomatic presence in the country.

Stateless persons faced discrimination in employment and access to education. Many stateless persons, particularly Bahai, were not able to register for identity cards, which prevented them from enrolling in public school, registering marriages, and gaining access to some government services. Stateless persons also faced difficulty obtaining public sector employment and lacked job security.

#### **Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The constitution provides citizens the ability to change their government through free and fair elections and, despite violence and other irregularities in the conduct of elections, citizens generally exercised this right through periodic elections based on universal suffrage and free from widespread or systemic fraud.

The previous legislature, elected in 2010, comprised 325 seats, including eight reserved for minority groups and seven national compensatory seats allotted to the winning lists according to the proportion of votes received in the elections. The 2013 Election Law abolished the seven national compensatory seats following a Federal Supreme Court ruling in November 2013 declaring this process unconstitutional. In place of the compensatory seats, the provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Basrah, Babil, Dahuk, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Erbil, Karbala, and Sulaymaniyah each gained one seat. With the minority seats unchanged, the total number of seats contested in the elections for the Council of Representatives increased from 325 to 328.

Recent Elections: On April 30, eligible voters took part in the third nationwide parliamentary elections since 2003. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) certified 277 political entities and 36 coalitions to participate in the elections. Following a review of the 9,453 candidates submitted by IHEC to the Accountability and Justice Commission, IHEC approved 9,040 candidates, including 2,612 women, to run in the elections. IHEC reported voter participation at 62 percent with approximately 14 million persons casting their vote from a pool of 22 million eligible voters. There was variance across regions, with a high participation average of 77 percent in predominantly Kurdish areas and a lower average of 57 percent in predominantly Sunni or mixed Sunni/Shia provinces. Due to increased violence and security concerns in the predominantly Sunni province of Anbar, for example, HRW reported a voter turnout of less than 30 percent. Voting took place at 8,083 polling centers in 18 provinces. IHEC issued a decision to allow IDPs to vote conditionally in recognition of the scale of displacement in Anbar. For example, IHEC opened 97 polling centers in the IKR for special voting, serving approximately 23,948 IDPs as absentee voters.

Shia parties won more than 170 seats. Former prime minister Maliki's State of Law coalition won 93 seats, the Sadrist blocs won 34 seats, and the Citizens' Coalition won 31. Among Sunni parties the Mutahidoun bloc won 28 seats, the Wataniya list won 21, and the Arabiya list followed with 10. Kurdish parties won a total of 62 seats, including 25 seats for the KDP and 21 seats for the PUK.

Threats of violence and deadly attacks disrupted the political process. Prior to the election, ISIL and unknown groups targeted political rallies and harassed IHEC employees. For example, on April 25, multiple vehicles rigged with explosives detonated at an election rally in Baghdad, killing more than 30 civilians and injuring

at least 80 others. The media reported an unconfirmed number of IHEC staff in Salah ad Din resigned following threats from unidentified armed groups ordering them to quit or be killed.

Security services established additional checkpoints and protective units to guard polling centers. Nevertheless, multiple mortar and other attacks on polling stations across the country prevented some individuals from voting and killed at least 22 persons, including two IHEC members. The local media reported a number of security incidents on election day, and polling stations in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din provinces were targets. For example, a suicide bomb exploded at a polling center in Tikrit, killing four persons and injuring 18; multiple improvised explosive devices detonated near a polling station west of Ramadi, killing two members of the security forces; and an explosive charge went off near a polling center in Al-Dibs District, killing two women. ISIL took responsibility for the election rally bombing in Baghdad and at least eight attacks on polling centers on April 28, when army and other security officers cast their ballots in pre-election early voting. Unknown groups also targeted schools used as polling stations.

International and local observers, including UNAMI, the EU, the Arab League, and the Council of Representatives' Independent High Commission for Human Rights monitored the elections. Despite security concerns IHEC and the EU election monitoring team declared the elections credible and free from widespread or systemic fraud. There were limited reports of abuse or electoral irregularities. For example, IHEC reportedly annulled the results from 300 polling stations for violations and dismissed more than 1,000 electoral workers, according to local media sources; the individuals investigated were barred from future IHEC employment, but no further information was released on the investigations. IHEC announced preliminary election results on May 19, and the Federal Supreme Court certified the results on June 16, following a review of official complaints and appeals. The Council of Representatives elected Saleem al-Jabouri as its new speaker on July 15 and Kurdish politician Fuad Masum as president on July 24. On August 11, following the National Alliance's nomination of Haider al-Abadi, President Masum charged him with forming the next government as prime minister-designate. On September 8, the new government was formed. On October 18, parliament approved Prime Minister al-Abadi's nominees as the ministers of interior, defense, and several others, marking the conclusion of the government formation process and filling the top posts for the two security ministries for the first time since 2010.

On April 30, IHEC conducted elections for both the Iraqi Council of Representatives and the provincial councils of Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah. IHEC accredited 24 political entities and one coalition to run in the provincial elections. Of the 718 candidates nominated, 224 (31 percent) were women.

In September 2013 IHEC conducted elections for 111 seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP).

IHEC announced 28 complaints filed in connection with the Sulaymaniyah elections. Some politicians and NGO observers claimed that IHEC did not delete the names of up to 178,000 deceased individuals from voter rolls, and voting records showed votes registered under some of these names. There were allegations that staff at the additional vote counting centers IHEC created in the IKR before the September 2013 IKP elections fraudulently modified tally results from polling stations in favor of certain political parties. One NGO alleged that after complaining about procedures at these counting centers following the September 2013 elections, IHEC did not permit it to monitor the April elections. In July the IKP passed legislation to establish a new Independent High Electoral Commission for the Kurdistan region, separate from the national IHEC.

Political Parties and Political Participation: Political parties and coalition blocs tended to organize along either religious or ethnic lines. Membership in some political parties conferred special privileges and advantages in employment and education.

Participation of Women and Minorities: The constitution mandates that women constitute at least 25 percent of parliamentary and provincial council membership. In the 2014 national parliamentary elections, 22 women received sufficient votes to win seats in the 328-seat Council of Representatives without having to rely on the constitutional quota, compared with five in 2010. More than 60 additional women, who received fewer votes, were awarded seats based on the quota, bringing the total number of seats held by women to 86. Despite an increase in the number of female parliamentarians, female members of parliament were often marginalized in political discussions and were not selected to head influential ministries or Council of Representatives committees. Prime Minister al-Abadi named two women to his Council of Ministers as ministers of health and of state for women's affairs.

Of the 328 seats in parliament, the law reserves eight seats for minorities: five for Christian candidates from Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dahuk; one Yezidi; one Sabeen-Mandaeen; and one Shabak. The law allocates nine provincial council seats to minority groups. Two cabinet members, a Turkmen and a Christian, were from the country's minority communities.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in GovernmentShare**

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Officials in all parts of the government often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and investigation of corruption was not free from political influence. Family, tribal, and religious considerations significantly influenced government decisions at all levels. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds were common.

According to the 2014 report of the Commission of Integrity (COI), two former ministers and a former director general were in detention on charges of corruption. Seven officials with the rank of minister, two candidates for election to the Council of Representatives in 2010, and 244 directors general were also referred to courts for trial on corruption charges. The COI generally refrained from releasing the names of government officials. International observers alleged the COI intended the cases described in its annual reports for 2013 and the first half of 2014 to increase public awareness rather than eradicate corruption within the government.

Corruption: The COI, formerly the Public Integrity Committee, reported the level of bribery dropped with respect to junior government employees but rose for senior employees. There were reports alleging that senior officials involved in bribery schemes held illicit funds in overseas accounts, making bribery more difficult to detect. The COI noted bribery and corruption were most widespread in the Ministry of Interior, followed by the Ministries of Defense, Oil, and Electricity. For example, the deputy director of the Interior Ministry's Prisons Rehabilitation Directorate, who fled the country in 2012 after having allegedly embezzled nine billion dinars (\$7.7 million), remained on the COI's extradition list.

The COI received 963 allegations of corruption, including 633 complaints via mail, e-mail, and official letters. During the first half of the year, the COI investigated 15,897 cases and referred 70 percent of them to relevant courts. It reported issuing 875 subpoenas and arrest warrants, including 12 to officials at the ministerial level and 30 at the director general level.

Several government agencies are responsible for combating corruption and financial crimes. The COI is responsible for preventing and investigating official corruption nationwide (except in the IKR, where the Commission for Public Integrity has this responsibility). The COI refers cases of corruption involving public officials to the judiciary. The Federal Board of Supreme Audit serves as the auditing agency for private institutions and all government agencies except cabinet ministries. The board is responsible for oversight of contracts in the extractive industries and forwards all corruption findings to the judiciary. The inspectors general (IGs), under the jurisdiction of the prime minister's Office of Regulatory Affairs, inspect and report on corruption cases in all of the cabinet ministries and in seven commissions--government press and media, property claims, political prisoners, national intelligence, Hajj and Omrah, the Sunni endowment, and the Shia endowment--providing internal but independent oversight. The IGs may render administrative decisions and refer cases to the COI.

The Central Bank's Money Laundering Reporting Office (MLRO) leads the government's efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The MLRO is responsible for monitoring financial transactions and compiling information on money laundering and disseminating it to law enforcement agencies. Due to a lack of political support, the MLRO was largely ineffective. It lacked the human capacity and technical resources to monitor the financial sector effectively. Moreover, international organizations criticized its lack of independence--and vulnerability to politicization--because it remained under the control of the Central Bank.

The Council of Ministers Secretariat also has an anticorruption advisor, and the Council of Representatives has an Integrity Committee. The Joint Anticorruption Council reporting to the Council of Ministers oversees and monitors compliance with the government's 2010-14 anticorruption strategy. The government did not issue a new anticorruption strategy during the year. The secretary general for the Council of Ministers led the anticorruption council, which also included the chairman of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the commissioner of the COI, and representatives of the IGs' offices. When the agenda of the anticorruption council calls for high-level participation by the government, the Ministry of Interior's head of economic

crimes may attend. Despite the council's mandate, the public generally regarded it as having little impact due to the scale of official corruption.

Lack of agreement about institutional roles, insufficient political will, political influence, poor transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory processes exacerbated a lack of organizational accountability among anticorruption institutions and hampered joint efforts to combat corruption. Although anticorruption institutions increasingly collaborated with civil society groups, organizing workshops, surveys, and training courses, the impact of expanded cooperation was limited. The media and NGOs continued to attempt to expose corruption independently, although their capacity to do so was limited. Anticorruption, law enforcement, and judicial officials, as well as members of civil society and the media, faced threats and intimidation in their efforts to combat corrupt practices (see section 2.a.).

Government officials and the IGs frequently contended that corruption investigations were highly politicized. Human rights NGOs alleged that government officials sought to influence the outcome of corruption investigations or to stifle anticorruption efforts altogether. For example, on March 13, the central criminal court sentenced the former COI chair, Judge Rahim Ugaili, to four years in prison for breach of official duties. According to media reports, the former commissioner faced 22 lawsuits, of which the court convicted him in five and acquitted him in two. Judicial proceedings continued for the other charges. Prior to his 2011 resignation, Ugaili had launched investigations of high-ranking officials and parliamentarians, and local NGOs alleged that charges against him were retribution for those investigations.

As in previous years, ministries effectively stalled investigations by failing to comply with requests for information or for officials to appear in court. The IGs claimed some ministers stifled their oversight efforts or openly threatened IG staff with dismissal for performing basic oversight functions. Some government officials stated politically motivated corruption investigations hindered public administration because officials reportedly feared corruption allegations from political opponents.

The law requires the prime minister's approval before a corruption case may proceed against members of the presidency or the Council of Ministers; there was no information regarding specific instances of the prime minister or other ministers withholding approval during the year. The constitution provides members of the Council of Representatives immunity from prosecution, which the council may lift by a majority vote.

The IGs and other anticorruption officials lacked sufficient resources, especially adequate personal security. High turnover among the IGs left positions unfilled for long periods. The IGs reported that these deficiencies were key factors in determining whether to report instances of corruption. The executive branch's failure to seek legislative confirmation of the appointment of key anticorruption officials further weakened the independence of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, COI, Central Bank, and IGs by leaving many officials in an "acting" capacity, subject to removal by the prime minister at any time.

In an anticorruption drive launched in October, Prime Minister al-Abadi sacked dozens of military commanders in the Ministries of Defense and Interior for failure to perform their duties. The prime minister also announced the discovery of 50,000 "ghost soldiers," employees on the payroll of the Ministry of Defense who did not exist or show up to work but continued to get paid. Al-Abadi made a commitment to reconstitute the security ministries and root out the corruption that enabled ISIL to rise.

Widespread and pervasive corruption and lack of government transparency were major problems as well in the IKR. According to the Kurdistan Commission on Public Integrity, corruption in the IKR was extensive. Weak budgetary oversight and lack of training for personnel further hindered the commission from fighting corruption effectively. Elements of the IKR were connected to the purchase of ISIL-produced oil. While officials tried to root out those purchasing or transporting such oil, the trade continued to flourish and remained one of the primary resources funding ISIL.

Financial Disclosure: The law authorizes the COI to obtain annual financial disclosures from senior public officials, including ministers, governors, and parliamentarians, and to take legal action for nondisclosure. Penalties range from fines to imprisonment. A unified system for enforcing annual financial disclosures did not exist. The COI has no jurisdiction over the IKR, but Kurdish members of the central government were required to conform to the law. The law obligates the COI to provide public annual reports on prosecutions, transparency, accountability, and ethics of public service. The COI's annual report on financial disclosures indicated that by August a majority of government officials had filed financial disclosure reports.

The Kurdistan Commission on Public Integrity is responsible for distributing and collecting financial disclosure forms in the IKR. The commission reported that by August the Kurdistan region's president, all members of its parliament, and 13 of its 23 ministers had submitted financial disclosure. There was no information available indicating that public officials faced penalty for financial nondisclosure.

**Public Access to Information:** The law does not provide public access to government information. The 2013 IKR Information Law expands citizens' rights to request information from the regional government, parliament, and court system, except in cases of national security or classified information. According to the Kurdistan region's Human Rights Commission, the government did not implement this law.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights**

Domestic and international NGOs operated in most cases with little or no government interference. Due to the humanitarian crisis in western and northern areas of the country, many local NGOs shifted their focus to providing assistance to IDPs and other communities affected by the conflict. In some instances these local NGOs worked in coordination with central government and Kurdistan regional government authorities. For example, the United Nations reported in September that nearly half of the organizations providing humanitarian support to IDPs were domestic NGOs. A number of NGOs also investigated and published findings on human rights cases. When NGOs alleged human rights abuses that concerned government actions or actions of ethnic or religious groups allied with the government, there were some reports of government interference.

**Government Human Rights Bodies:** The Ministry of Human Rights is responsible for monitoring human rights abuses and for assisting and advocating for victims. The ministry received and investigated complaints from citizens and published public reports addressing violations, including reports on prisons and detention centers; women's civil, economic, and political rights; minorities; and victims of terrorism. Lack of political independence, poor cooperation from other ministries, and limited resources hindered the ministry's effectiveness.

The constitution mandates the creation of an independent Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights (IHCHR). The law governing the IHCHR's operation provides for commissioners with four-year nonrenewable terms. No less than one-third of the 11 full-time and three reserve commissioners must be women, and minorities must be represented by at least one full-time member and one reserve member. The law provides that the IHCHR be financially and administratively independent and have broad authority, including the right to receive and investigate human rights complaints, conduct unannounced visits to correctional facilities, and review legislation. In 2013 the Council of Representatives budgeted 20 billion dinars (\$17 million) for the commission. The commission did not elect a president or select an adequate number of female commissioners in accordance with the law.

The Kurdistan regional government has a Human Rights Commission, headed by Diya Patruz, the former secretary general of the Chaldean National Congress (an umbrella group of 14 Christian political parties). Its personnel lacked human rights experience, and employees often owed their positions to party affiliation.

### **Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons**

The constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the law without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, or origin. The law prohibits discrimination based on race, disability, or social status. The government was ineffective in enforcing these provisions.

### **National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**

The country's population included Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Shabak as well as religious minorities, including Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenian Orthodox, Yezidis, Sabean-Mandaeans, Bahai, Kakai, and a very small number of Jews. The country also had a small Romani community, as well as an estimated one million citizens of African descent, referred to as "black Iraqis," who resided primarily in Basrah and the south.

ISIL's targeted violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities, who were often Shia, was a significant problem. In areas under its control, ISIL also committed numerous abuses against Yezidis, Shabaks, Christians, and other minority communities, including execution, kidnapping, rape, expulsion, theft, and destruction of property. Activists from religious and ethnic minority communities faced the greatest risk,

prompting many to avoid activism. Other illegal armed groups also targeted ethnic minority communities (see section 1.g.).

Black Iraqis continued to face systemic societal discrimination. Many lived in extreme poverty with high rates of illiteracy and unemployment. The Institute for International Law and Human Rights, an international NGO, reported that although the government directly or indirectly employed as many as 70 percent of the country's citizens working in the formal economy, no Black Iraqi held a high-level position in government or served in an elected body.

There were reports of Kurdistan regional government authorities discriminating against minorities, including Turkmen, Arabs, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Christians, both in the disputed territories and in the Kurdistan region. In August the Asayish in Dahuk reportedly refused to allow a Yazidi IDP family to stay with other IDPs in a public school after the father insisted on identifying his ethnicity as Yazidi instead of Kurd.

Although Arabs are the majority in most of the country, they are a minority in Kirkuk, and Arab residents of the city frequently charged that Kurdish security forces targeted Arab communities. Arab residents of Kirkuk alleged that provincial authorities used the pretext of terrorist attacks to impose curfews on them and arrest Arabs who were without legal-resident permits. Residents reported these raids by provincial authorities increased in June after ISIL took over areas of Kirkuk Province, which remained the site of frequent fighting between Kurdish forces and ISIL. Beginning in June Kirkuk provincial authorities, citing security concerns, also significantly limited the ability of IDPs, many, if not a majority, of whom were Arabs, to enter the areas of Kirkuk controlled by the Kurdistan regional government. Many Arab IDPs were unable to work because the 1957 census did not record them as residents of Kirkuk, which the provincial government in Kirkuk used as a basis for legal employment. Arabs in Kirkuk also alleged discrimination by Kurdish and Turkmen officials in filling senior positions in the provincial government.

A 2006 law prevents Palestinians from obtaining citizenship. According to press reports, authorities continued to detain, harass, and abuse Palestinians for their stateless status (see section 2.d.). The UNHCR also reported that Palestinians who were compelled to leave the country for Syria without proper exit documentation during past periods of sectarian violence faced prosecution upon their forced return from Syria.

Local and international NGOs reported that the Romani population of approximately 120,000 experienced poor access to state services as well as economic and social discrimination.

## **Kuwait<sup>318</sup>**

Kuwait is a constitutional, hereditary emirate ruled by the Al-Sabah family. While there is also a democratically elected parliament, the emir holds ultimate authority. The 2013 parliamentary elections were generally free and fair, although some opposition groups boycotted them. Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.

Principal human rights problems included limitations on citizens' ability to change their government; restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, especially among foreign workers and stateless Arabs (called "bidoon"); and trafficking in persons within the foreign worker population, especially in the domestic and unskilled service sectors.

Other human rights problems included reports of security force members abusing prisoners and protesters, most with no reported punishment for their actions; arbitrary arrest and extrajudicial deportation of foreign workers; limitations on freedoms of press, association, and religion; and restrictions on freedom of movement for certain groups, including foreign workers and bidoon. Women, bidoon, and other noncitizens faced social and legal discrimination. Domestic violence against women remained persistent, particularly against noncitizen domestic workers. There were limitations on workers' rights.

The government took steps in some cases to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security services or elsewhere in the government. Impunity was sometimes a problem in corruption cases.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

**Disappearance**

There were no reports of politically motivated long-term disappearances.

**Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution and the law prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, but there were reports some police and members of other security forces abused detainees. Police and security force members were more likely to inflict such abuse on noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians. Security forces occasionally detained, harassed, and abused transgender persons.

Several persons reported being beaten, either by police or Kuwait State Security (KSS) force members, while stopped at police checkpoints or while detained. During one instance on July 7, a member of Frontline Defenders accused a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior of beating him at a checkpoint. Frontline Defenders--an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) that monitors the rights of human rights activists--released a statement claiming the arrest of the activist was connected to his human rights advocacy work. While the activist was arrested and charged with assaulting the senior official, there were no reports of investigations or prosecutions of this incident or many other alleged abuses by security forces.

The government stated in the past that it investigated allegations of abuse and punished some of the offenders, although the government did not make public all the findings of its investigations or all punishments it imposed.

**Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards, but the facilities were sometimes overcrowded, and some detention facilities lacked adequate sanitation, ventilation, and sufficient medical staff. There were reports security forces abused prisoners.

Physical Conditions: The Central Prison Complex houses the country's three prisons: a men's prison for those awaiting trial or convicted of minor offenses; another men's prison for those convicted of more serious crimes; and a women's prison for those held before trial, convicted, or awaiting deportation. There were approximately 3,200 inmates in the Central Prison. Cells held four to six persons, and inmates reportedly lived in moderately overcrowded conditions, although most overcrowding was at the women's prison. Political prisoners were held in the general prison population.

While men and women were held separately, there were no separate facilities for juveniles, and authorities detained those awaiting trial in the same facilities as convicted criminals. In February a juvenile reported authorities arrested him and kept him in the same detention cell with adult convicted criminals. Authorities released the minor after several days; reportedly, he was unharmed.

Authorities generally maintained control of the prisons. There were some reports, however, that security forces abused prisoners during questioning. Prisoners had access to potable water, adequate food, and medical care. In November the International Committee for the Red Cross highlighted the high level of medical services offered to detainees. Additionally, a nutritionist supervised meal preparation for prisoners.

Independent Monitoring: The Ministry of Interior permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions by some nongovernmental observers and international human rights groups. Authorities permitted staff from the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to visit the prisons and detention centers. The government, however, did not allow representatives of the Kuwait Human Rights Society or the Kuwait Association for the Basic Evaluation of Human Rights to visit prisoners. Both organizations submitted requests to the Ministry of Interior but did not receive a response.

**Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. There were numerous reports, however, that police arbitrarily arrested individuals, principally as part of sustained action against persons in the country illegally.

Police have sole responsibility for the enforcement of laws not related to national security, and the KSS oversees national security matters; both are under the purview of civilian authorities of the Ministry of Interior. The armed forces (land forces, air force, navy, and coast guard) are responsible for external security and subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The Kuwait National Guard is a separate entity whose



responsibilities include critical infrastructure protection, support for the Ministries of Interior Defense, and maintaining national readiness.

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over all security forces. While the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption, they did not always apply them. There were several allegations of mistreatment of detainees by KSS members that authorities did not investigate.

Police were generally effective in carrying out core responsibilities. There were reports some police stations did not take seriously charges by complainants, especially foreigners, and victims of rape and domestic violence. In cases of alleged police abuse, the district chief investigator examines abuse allegations and refers cases to the courts for trial. There was some evidence of police impunity, particularly in cases where security personnel used excessive force to disperse participants in unlicensed political demonstrations and protests. In cases of alleged KSS abuse, there was no information available regarding investigation procedures or actual investigations.

According to the government, during the first nine months of 2013, individuals filed 500 complaints against Ministry of Interior staff; however, this number was not specific to police.

Media reported sexual assaults by police officers throughout the year, usually against nonnational women. Security forces sometimes failed to respond effectively to societal violence between family members or against domestic workers, especially if the victims were nonnationals.

#### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

A police officer generally must obtain an arrest warrant from a state prosecutor or a judge before making an arrest, except in cases of hot pursuit, observing the commission of a crime, and certain other exceptions. There were numerous reports of police arresting and detaining foreign nationals without a warrant, primarily as part of the government's action against unlawful residents. The courts usually do not accept cases without warrants issued prior to arrests. Authorities generally informed detainees promptly of the charges against them and allowed access to their lawyers and family members.

Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government observed these prohibitions for citizens. Noncitizens generally benefitted from such protections, but during police raids there were widespread reports that police arbitrarily arrested nonnationals, including some who possessed valid residency permits and visas but claimed to be bystanders.

Pretrial Detention: Arbitrary lengthy detention before trial was a problem, and in 2013 more than 10 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees. Authorities held some detainees beyond the maximum detention period of six months. Excessive detention in the deportation center, where there are no maximum time limits on detention prior to deportation, was also a problem, particularly when the detainee owed money to a citizen or was a citizen from a country without diplomatic representation in Kuwait to facilitate exit documents.

#### **Denial of Fair Public Trial: Trial Procedures**

The law and the constitution provide for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence. Although the law and constitution provide for an independent judiciary, the emir appoints all judges; the renewal of judicial appointments is subject to executive approval. Judges who are citizens have lifetime appointments; judges who were noncitizens hold one- to three-year renewable contracts. The Ministry of Justice may remove judges for cause. Foreign residents involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently claimed the courts showed bias in favor of citizens. While no legal provisions prohibit women from appointment as judges and public prosecutors, the only path to those positions is through work in the prosecutor's office. The office began accepting women for entry-level positions in 2013. On November 22, the first group of women completed their initial training and became public prosecutors.

Under the law questions of status, immigration, and citizenship are not subject to judicial review, so foreigners arrested for unlawful residency, or those whose lawful residency is canceled due to an arrest, have no access to the courts. They are instead subjected to administrative deportation, unless they faced felony charges for separate offenses.

The constitution provides for the presumption of innocence and the right to a legal trial for the accused with the right to a defense. The judiciary is not independent of the executive in the case of noncitizen judges, due

to their reappointments requiring approval by the emir. The law expressly forbids physical and psychological abuse of the accused. Under the law defendants also enjoy the right to prompt, detailed, information on charges against them with free interpretation, as necessary. Criminal trials are public unless a court or the government decides “maintenance of public order” or the “preservation of public morals” necessitates closed proceedings. There is no trial by jury. The bar association is obligated upon court request to appoint an attorney without charge for indigent defendants in civil, commercial, and criminal cases, and defendants used these services. Defendants have the right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Defendants and their attorneys generally had access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases, but the general public did not have access to most court documents.

Defendants have the right to confront their accusers, confront witnesses against them, and present their own witnesses, although authorities did not always allow defendants this opportunity. Defendants cannot be compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants have the right to appeal verdicts to a higher court, and many persons exercised this right.

There were reports of low-income, foreign-citizen laborers and domestic workers who were unable to afford legal counsel pursuing cases against their employer or sponsor. If they had no legal representation, the public prosecutor sometimes tried the case with little or no involvement by the workers or their families. When workers received third-party assistance to bring a case, the cases were often resolved when the employer paid a monetary settlement to avoid a trial.

There were reports that the courts denied bidoon activists some legal rights. In one case police barred a bidoon activist’s attorney from entering the courtroom until well into the court proceedings.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

There were several instances of persons detained for their political beliefs, although the government officially arrested them on charges such as participation in unlicensed demonstrations or insulting the judiciary. Most of those arrested were either bidoon advocating for human rights or opposition political figures alleging government corruption. While authorities arrested and released some individuals after a few days, they held others for weeks or months pending trial. The extended detention was often the case with bidoon activists, who also regularly reported abuse by police or the KSS.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The constitution and the law prohibit such actions, and the government generally respected these rights. There were reports early in the year, however, of police entering the homes of bidoon activists and threatening family members if the activists were not made available for questioning. Security forces regularly monitored publicly available social media and sought information about owners of accounts, although foreign-owned social media companies denied most requests for information.

The constitution seeks to preserve the integrity of the family. The law forbids marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men and requires male citizens serving in the police or military to obtain government approval to marry nonnationals. Nevertheless, the government offered only nonbinding advice on such matters and did not prevent any such marriages. A source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that diplomats were not allowed to marry noncitizens without the diplomat being asked to resign.

The government may deny a citizenship application by a bidoon resident based on security or criminal violations committed by the individual’s family members. Additionally, if a person loses citizenship, all family members who are derivatives of that person also lose citizenship and all associated rights.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press “in accordance with the conditions and procedures specified by law.” The government sometimes did not respect these rights by issuing gag orders, temporarily or permanently shutting media outlets, and convicting persons for expressing their opinions, particularly those published on social media.

The passage of the telecommunications law 37/2014 in May established the Commission for Mass Communications and Information Technology (CMCIT) as an independent body under the communications minister with broad discretionary powers to grant or rescind licenses to companies that provide internet, cable, satellite, land, and wireless communications. The new law also imposes penalties on persons who

created or sent “immoral” messages and gave unspecified authorities the power to suspend communication services on national security grounds.

Freedom of Speech: The government restricted freedom of speech, particularly in instances purportedly related to national security. The law also specifically prohibits material insulting Islam, the emir, the constitution, or the neutrality of the courts or Public Prosecutor’s Office. The law mandates jail terms for anyone who “defames religion,” and any Muslim citizen or resident may file criminal charges against a person the complainant believes has defamed Islam. Any citizen may file charges against anyone the citizen believes defamed the ruling family or harmed public morals.

Press Freedoms: All print media were privately owned, although their independence was limited. They exhibited diversity of opinion, but most self-censored to avoid criminal charges or fines or to keep their licenses. Restrictions on freedom of speech also applied to the press. Discussions of specific social topics, such as the role of women in society and sexual problems, sometimes were self-censored. The law allows for large fines and up to 10 years in prison for persons who use any means (including media) to subvert the emiri system of government. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry may ban any media organization at the request of the Ministry of Information. Newspaper publishers must obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information.

Broadcast media are a mix of government and privately owned stations, subject to the same laws as print media. In July the government revoked the licenses of pro-opposition media outlets Al Yawm television and the *Alam Al Yawm* newspaper. The government cited the citizenship revocation of one of its owners as the reason for the closings. The media outlets appealed the decisions, but the courts had taken no action by year’s end. The country also declined in press freedom evaluations compiled by international human rights agencies. Those evaluations reflected the tougher measures taken with the media, including the adoption of a law that allows the authorities to fine journalists up to 300,000 dinars (\$1.065 million) for criticizing the emir or crown prince or misrepresenting what they said. It imposes sentences of up to 10 years in prison for those convicted of violating the law.

Violence and Harassment: The government sometimes harassed and prosecuted journalists for their reporting..

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The Ministry of Information censored all books, commercial films, periodicals, videotapes, CDs, DVDs, and other imported materials deemed illegal per the guidelines enumerated for speech and press. Authorities censored most English-language educational materials that mentioned the Holocaust and required education material to refer to the State of Israel as “Occupied Palestine” or remove such references, although authorities did not censor these topics in the news media. Widely available satellite dishes and virtual private networks allowed unfiltered media access.

Libel Laws/National Security: Throughout the year the government restricted media freedom based on libel laws and national security grounds.

### **Internet Freedom**

The government monitored internet communications, such as blogs and discussion groups, for defamation and security reasons. The Ministry of Communications continued to block websites considered to “incite terrorism and instability” and required internet service providers to block websites that “violate [the country’s] customs and traditions.” The government prosecuted and punished individuals for the expression of political or religious views via the internet, including by e-mail and social media, based on existing laws related to libel, national unity, and national security. There were reports the government attempted to collect personally identifiable information in connection with individuals’ peaceful expressions of political, religious, or ideological opinion or beliefs. Authorities required internet cafe owners to obtain the names and civil identification numbers of customers and to submit the information to the Ministry of Communications upon request.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The law provides for the freedoms of opinion and research, but self-censorship limited academic freedom, and the law prohibits academics from criticizing the emir or Islam.

The Ministry of Interior reserved the right to approve or reject annual public events, and it rejected those it considered politically or morally inappropriate. In July the government closed a play that critics accused of insulting Shias when a Shia actor improvised a portion of the play in a manner that some audience members interpreted as offensive.

Throughout the year publishers reportedly received pressure from the Ministry of Information, resulting in the publishers often self-censoring books made available in the country. The Ministry of Information ceased to provide information publicly on the number of banned books but claimed the books banned were usually those encouraging racism, prejudice, religious offenses, and sectarianism. According to the Ministry of Information, books religious in nature were sent to the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs for review, while others were presented for review to a special committee that includes academics and authors.

### **Freedom of Assembly**

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. The law prohibits noncitizens from demonstrating or protesting.

Political oppositionists organized several protests and rallies throughout the year. Security officials allowed many peaceful protests to proceed without permits, but intervened to disperse some demonstrations that were unauthorized. Citing public safety and traffic concerns, officials sometimes also restricted the location of planned protests to designated public spaces. Courts tried and sentenced participants in unlicensed demonstrations to as many as two years in prison for their involvement; however, authorities also administratively deported dozens of noncitizens for participation in rallies. In May authorities deported 15 Egyptians who participated in a rally for a presidential candidate in the days prior to Egypt's election. In June authorities deported 14 Sri Lankans after they staged a protest in front of their embassy.

Human rights groups often criticized security forces for using excessive force to disperse protesters. In some cases security forces claimed they required force because protesters were violent and threw rocks or set fire to cars or tires while rioting.

### **Freedom of Association**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. The law prohibits officially licensed groups from engaging in political activities.

The government uses its power to license associations as a means of political control. There were approximately 120 officially licensed NGOs in the country, including a bar association, other professional groups, and scientific bodies. Dozens of unlicensed civic groups, clubs, and unofficial NGOs had no legal status. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor rejected some license requests, contending established NGOs already provided services similar to those the petitioners proposed. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor can also reject an NGO's application if it deems the NGO does not provide a public service. Members of licensed NGOs must obtain permission from the ministry to attend international conferences as official representatives of their organization.

### **Freedom of Movement,**

The constitution generally provides for freedom of internal movement, but numerous laws constrain foreign travel.

The government was generally uncooperative with most efforts by the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, or other individuals of concern.

Foreign Travel: Bidoon and foreign workers faced problems with or restrictions on foreign travel. The government restricted the ability of some bidoon to travel abroad by not issuing travel documents, although it permitted some bidoon to travel to Saudi Arabia for the annual Hajj (Islamic pilgrimage). In March the Ministry of Interior stopped issuing "Article 17" passports (temporary travel documents that do not confer nationality) except on humanitarian grounds to bidoon not documented in the 1965 census.

Exile: While the constitution prohibits exile of citizens, foreigners can be deported for a number of legal infractions.

**Citizenship:** The government cannot revoke the citizenship of an individual who is born a citizen unless that individual has obtained a second nationality, which is against the law. Nevertheless, the government can revoke the citizenship of naturalized citizens for cause, including a felony conviction, and subsequently deport them. During the year the government revoked the citizenship of more than 30 individuals--some dual nationals, some not--including opposition activists, a media owner, a Salafist cleric, and several tribal members (badu). The government justified the revocations by citing a 1959 nationality law that permits withdrawal of citizenship from naturalized Kuwaitis if they acquired citizenship dishonestly or threatened to “undermine the economic or social structure of the country.” Persons who had their citizenship revoked became stateless individuals. As of the end of the year, persons who lost their citizenship had documents such as passports and civil identification cards taken from them and had a “block” on their name in government databases. This “block” prevented former citizens from traveling or accessing health care and other bureaucratic business reserved for citizens.

### **Protection of Refugees**

**Access to Asylum:** The law does not provide for granting asylum or refugee status. There is no system for providing protection to refugees, and the government did not grant refugee status or asylum during the year. According to the UNHCR, there were more than 2,800 registered asylum seekers and recognized refugees in the country. Most of these were from Syria, Iraq, and Somalia.

### **Stateless Persons**

The law does not provide nonnationals, including bidoon, a clear or defined opportunity to gain nationality. The judicial system’s lack of authority to rule on matters of citizenship further complicated the process for obtaining citizenship, leaving bidoon with no access to the judiciary to present evidence and plead their case for citizenship. According to government figures, there were more than 111,000 bidoon in the country.

According to the minister of interior, in 2013 more than 2,700 Kuwaiti women were married to bidoon men. A 2013 report by the Women’s Refugee Commission estimated that 30,000 bidoon were spouses or children of female Kuwaiti citizens.

The government continued to discriminate against bidoon in some areas. Some bidoon and international NGOs reported that the government did not uniformly implement a 2011 decree approving provision of some government services and subsidies, including education, employment, medical care, and the issuance of civil documents, such as birth, marriage, and death certificates, to bidoon. Bidoon activists claimed many bidoon families were unable to obtain birth certificates for their children, which restricted the children’s ability to obtain government-issued identification cards, access adequate medical care, and attend school.

According to a government official, the government issued 2,297 birth and death certificates to bidoon in the first 10 months of the year. The Ministry of Justice issued 2,084 marriage and divorce certificates to bidoon in 2013. The Ministry of Education provides the Education Charitable Fund to pay for some bidoon children to attend private schools, but the children must fall into one of seven categories to qualify for an education grant. The seven qualifications are: hold an identification card by the Central Apparatus for Illegal Residents, hold a civil identification card with a national number, have a birth certificate, receive a salary from the Social Insurance Public Authority, be serving in the armed forces, be a child of a bidoon who fought for Kuwait in previous wars, or be the child of a Kuwaiti woman and a noncitizen father. During the 2013-14 school year, the charity paid the school fees for approximately 15,000 bidoon children at a cost of 4.45 million dinars (\$15.8 million). Also during the 2014-15 school year, 150 seats were held for bidoon seeking bachelor of arts degrees.

In September authorities denied approximately 650 bidoon children access to public schools because they lacked birth certificates or other identifying documents. Between September and November, volunteer teachers in temporary school facilities taught them, but in November the government shut down those facilities and began integrating some of the children into schools, although some schools were located far from their homes.

Many adult bidoon also lacked identification cards, preventing them from engaging in lawful employment or obtaining travel documents. This restriction resulted in the bidoon children from the household working as street vendors to help support their families and not receiving an education. Lack of financial resources and proper documentation for some of their children forced some bidoon parents to choose which of their children

to enroll in school. Many bidoon children who attended school enrolled in substandard private institutions because only citizens may attend public school. Many bidoon families depended on charity to assist with medical and educational expenses.

The government allowed bidoon to work in some government positions, as dictated in the 2011 decree. According to an official at the Central Agency for Remediating the Status of Illegal Residents (Central Agency), between March 2012 and the end of 2013, a total of 1,265 bidoon began working in government ministries. Some bidoon worked in the armed forces or police. Although no legal strictures prevent their service in the enlisted ranks, authorities had effectively barred bidoon from enlisting in either force since 1985. In August the Ministry of Defense announced it had accepted into the army 700 bidoon children of Kuwaiti women and of bidoon killed fighting for Kuwait.

The naturalization process for bidoon is not transparent, and decisions appeared arbitrary. Despite calls during the year by MPs and various authorities to naturalize 4,000 bidoon, as of year's end, the government had naturalized only those who were children of soldiers killed fighting for Kuwait. The Central Agency had more than 100,000 bidoon citizenship requests under review at year's end. Central Agency officials said the agency had submitted three lists to the cabinet in 2012 of an undisclosed number of bidoon and another in 2013 of an additional 504 bidoon, all eligible for citizenship, but there were no reports that the cabinet made any decisions on granting citizenship to these bidoon.

According to bidoon activists and government officials, many bidoon were unable to provide documentation proving sufficient ties to the country or to present evidence of their original nationality. The government maintained, however, that the vast majority of bidoon concealed their true nationalities and were not actually stateless. According to the government, 6,051 bidoon "revealed their real nationalities" and rectified their legal status by May.

In November the Ministry of Interior announced a proposal to give "economic citizenship" to the bidoon from the small island nation of Comoros. It was unclear whether the government intended to simply give them the documentation of citizenship or physically relocate bidoon. Bidoon activists were concerned that some would accept the proposal due to fatigue over trying to obtain citizenship in Kuwait. Other activists were concerned that the government might force them to take another, illegitimate nationality.

The government instituted other policies that discriminate against the bidoon. Since the government treated them as illegal immigrants, bidoon do not have property rights. Bidoon identification cards included color codes that indicated when the carrier had a security restriction, such as a travel ban or other unresolved issues with the government. The Women's Refugee Commission reported that statelessness and discrimination against women in the nationality law threatened family unity.

### **The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

Citizens had only a limited, indirect effect on control of the executive branch because the constitution stipulates the country is a hereditary emirate. The 50 elected National Assembly members (along with government-appointed ministers) must, by majority vote, approve the emir's choice of crown prince (the future emir). The crown prince must be a male descendant of Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah and meet three additional requirements: be the age of majority, possess a sound mind, and be a legitimate son of Muslim parents. The National Assembly may remove the emir from power with a two-thirds majority vote if it finds that any of these three conditions is or was not met.

Recent Elections: The 2013 parliamentary election was generally considered free and fair, and international observers found no serious procedural problems. The election followed the Constitutional Court's June 2013 order to dissolve the parliament, which the court determined was elected unconstitutionally (the second such order in one year). Some opposition politicians and their supporters boycotted the election to protest the emir's 2012 decree reducing the number of votes per person from four to one. Official turnout for the 2013 elections was approximately 52 percent.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The government did not recognize any political parties or allow their formation, although no formal law bans political parties. Well-organized, unofficial blocs operated as political groupings, and MPs formed loose alliances. Some tribes held illegal primaries to maximize their members' chances for election to the National Assembly. Assembly candidates must nominate themselves as individuals.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Although they gained the right to vote in 2005, women faced cultural and social barriers to political participation. For example, tribal leaders excluded women from tribal primaries. Nevertheless, two women were elected to the National Assembly during the July 2013 elections, and there were two women in the cabinet. One female MP, however, lost her seat when the constitutional court declared a miscount in her district. The remaining woman in the National Assembly resigned in May to protest not being allowed to question the prime minister in the National Assembly. Women typically voted at a higher rate than men did.

No laws or cultural practices prevented minorities from participating in political life. In the July 2013 parliamentary elections, candidates from the Shia community, which comprised approximately one-third of the citizen population, won eight seats in parliament. In the previous two parliaments, elected in December 2012 and February 2012, Shia held 17 and five seats, respectively. The unusually high Shia representation in the December 2012 parliament largely resulted from a Sunni Islamist and tribal-led boycott of that election.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government***Share*

The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Government observers believed officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.

All judicial officers received training on corruption and transparency obligations as part of the Judicial Institute's official curriculum.

Corruption: The Audit Bureau is an independent agency responsible for supervising public expenses and revenues and for preventing any misuse or manipulation of public funds. The government publishes reports by the Audit Bureau annually and sends them to the emir, prime minister, head of the parliament, and minister of finance. The general public did not have access to these reports. The parliamentary Committee on the Protection of Public Funds frequently announced inquiries into suspected misuse of public funds, but none resulted in prosecution during the year.

In 2013 the National Assembly ratified an anticorruption law to establish the Anticorruption Authority (ACA), dictate financial disclosure provisions, and provide protection for whistleblowers. The law charges the ACA with receiving and analyzing complaints and forwarding complaints to the appropriate authorities in either the Public Prosecutor's Office or police for further investigation or action. The authority was funded by the government and had its own budget. By the end of the year, the ACA had established its board of directors but was still hiring staff and awaiting permanent office space. The ACA held several training sessions for government officials from more than 60 departments informing them about the financial disclosure requirements and preparing them for the submission process, slated to begin in 2015. No department in the Ministry of Justice specialized in corruption cases.

Media and government officials reported cases of widespread, visa-related corruption at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and Ministry of Interior, namely selling visas or visa fraud. Several officials at the ministry faced prosecution after their arrests on charges of falsifying labor import documents to profit from the sale of visas. Investigations into these activities continued at the end of the year.

There were many reports that individuals had to pay intermediaries to receive routine government services. Police corruption was a problem, especially when one party to a dispute had a personal relationship with a police official involved in a case. Widespread reports indicated police favored citizens over noncitizens.

Financial Disclosure: The 2013 anticorruption law requires that executive-level public employees, including officials at the ministerial level and above, MPs, the speaker of parliament, and the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, disclose their financial assets. Disclosure is required at three junctures: before taking office, every year while in office, and again upon leaving the public sector. Assets that must be disclosed include bank accounts, properties, investments, and any business assets. Children's assets must also be disclosed, but not those of spouses. Repercussions against those who do not provide financial disclosures include a fine of not more than 3,000 dinars (\$10,650) and possible termination of employment after not submitting the first statement before taking office. Person failing to submit their statements while employed can face a fine of not more than 3,000 dinars (\$10,650) and imprisonment for not more than one year and additional fines if the first warning is ignored. For failure to submit the final statement after leaving employment, a person can be fined not more than 5,000 dinars (\$17,750) and imprisoned for up to three years.

Financial disclosure reports are not public documents and are considered confidential; leaking of such information is a crime. The law mandates the ACA to monitor disclosures and has the right to oblige reportees to provide additional information. By late in the year, the ACA was not yet fully functioning.

Public Access to Information: The law provides for public access to unclassified government information by citizens and noncitizens alike, but access appeared theoretical. Legal experts stated that the only way for unclassified information to be released is through a request by a government ministry.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights**

The government restricted the operations of domestic and international human rights groups and limited cooperation with them. The law permits the existence of NGOs, but the government continued to deny licenses to some. NGOs may not engage in political activity or encourage sectarianism. The groups must demonstrate their existence is in the public interest. Major local independent NGOs dedicated specifically to human rights included the Kuwait Human Rights Society and the Kuwaiti Society for Fundamental Human Rights. The Kuwait Transparency Society was the local affiliate of Transparency International, and the Kuwait Trade Union Federation was the local affiliate of the Solidarity Center.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee, which operated independently of the government, is an advisory body that primarily hears individual complaints of human rights abuses. The committee visited the Central Prison and the central deportation center throughout the year to review overcrowding, prison and detainee treatment, and the condition of both facilities. The committee had adequate resources and was considered effective. It did not issue reports during the year.

### **National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**

Approximately 68 percent of residents were noncitizens, many originating from the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. Societal discrimination against noncitizens and bidoon was prevalent and occurred in most areas of daily life, including employment, education, housing, social interaction, and health care. As part of expanded activity against illegal residents, police stopped, arrested, and sometimes deported noncitizens believed to be using private automobiles as taxis. This action disproportionately affected the noncitizen laborers who could not afford their own automobiles or taxi fares

## **Oman<sup>319</sup>**

The Sultanate of Oman is a hereditary monarchy. Sultan Qaboos al-Said has ruled since 1970. The sultan has sole authority to enact laws through royal decree, although ministries or the bicameral Majlis Oman (parliament) draft laws, and citizens provide input through their representatives. The Majlis Oman is composed of the Majlis al-Dawla (State Council), whose 83 members are appointed by the sultan, and the elected 84-member Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council). The 2012 elections for the newly created "provincial councils" occurred in a transparent manner when citizens elected 192 individuals to seats in 11 provincial councils. The 29-member Council of Ministers (cabinet), selected by the sultan, advises him on government policies. Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.

The principal human rights problems were the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully; limits on freedom of speech, assembly, and association, including restrictions on citizens and civil society from associating with foreign governments; and societal discrimination against women.

Other concerns included lack of independent inspections of prisons and detention centers, restrictions on press freedom; instances of domestic violence, infringements on independent civil society, and instances of foreign citizen laborers placed in conditions of forced labor or abuse.

Security personnel and other government officials generally were held accountable for their actions. The government conducted extensive action against corruption in the early part of the year, with multiple cases going through the court system.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

### **Disappearance**



There were no new reports of politically motivated disappearances in the country. In 2013 armed security forces arrested Sultan al-Saadi, a social media activist, and detained him for one month for comments he posted online that were critical of the government.

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The law prohibits such practices; however, prisoners reported sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures, and solitary confinement. According to Amnesty International, authorities released four men--Ibrahim Abdullah Juma al-Balushi, Nasser al-Ehyai, Said al-Zeidi, and Talal Mohammed al-Ma'amari--without charge on July 12 after they signed a pledge not to "incite sectarianism" or "partake in advocacy work." In May authorities had arrested them and held them in solitary confinement.

Prison and detention center conditions generally met international standards.

Administration: Recordkeeping on prisoners was adequate. Alternative sentencing for nonviolent prisoners was not available. There is no ombudsman to serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees. Authorities permitted prisoners to practice their religions. Authorities allowed prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship and to request investigation of credible allegations of inhuman conditions.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a governmental body, investigated and monitored prison and detention center conditions through site visits. NHRC authorities in some cases investigated claims of abuse but did not publish the results of their investigations to protect the privacy of the individuals involved.

Independent Monitoring: The law permitted visits by independent human rights observer groups; however, none existed in the country. Consular officers from various embassies reported regular difficulties in meeting with prisoners. Prisoners and detainees did not always have reasonable access to visitors. There were no reports of independent nongovernmental observers requesting to visit the country. Foreign officials were not allowed to visit inside a prison to verify conditions for more than a decade.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The Ministry of the Royal Office, part of the cabinet, controls internal and external security and coordinates all intelligence and security policies. Under the Ministry of the Royal Office, the Internal Security Service (ISS) investigates all matters related to domestic security. The Sultan's Special Forces have limited border security and antismuggling responsibilities. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), also part of the cabinet, performs regular police duties, provides security at points of entry, and serves as the country's immigration and customs agency. The Coast Guard is also part of the ROP. The Ministry of Defense, in particular the Royal Army of Oman (RAO), is responsible for securing the borders and has limited domestic security responsibilities. The security forces performed their duties effectively.

Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over the ISS, the Sultan's Special Forces, the RAO, and the ROP.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention**

The law does not require police to obtain a warrant before making an arrest but provides that police must either release the person or refer the matter to the public prosecution within specified timeframes. For most crimes the public prosecutor must formally arrest or release the person within 48 hours of detention; however, the law permits authorities to hold individuals for up to 30 days without charge in cases related to security, which is broadly defined.

Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. In August, according to press and social media reports, Mohammed al-Fazari was allegedly summoned for questioning, then detained for five days and subsequently released. Media reports indicate he was detained for comments on his blog related to the lack of transparency in disbursement of state resources to members of the royal family. Human Rights Watch and the UN special rapporteur on rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association highlighted his case. According to online reports from human rights organizations, authorities stopped al-Fazari from leaving the country on December 22.

Pretrial Detention: For crimes related to terrorism or national security, the law allows police to hold a detainee up to 30 days without charge; authorities used this law at least once during the year. Court orders are required to hold suspects in pretrial detention. Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow for investigation and may grant extensions at their discretion. In most cases judges permitted defendants to be released on bail while lengthy investigations took place.

Amnesty: The sultan tended to pardon and grant amnesties to prisoners throughout the year, specifically on holidays. As of November 18, the sultan pardoned 160 citizens and 132 foreigners.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial: Trial Procedures**

Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the sultan may act as a court of final appeal and exercise his power of pardon as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the country's highest legal body, which is empowered to review all judicial decisions. Authorities generally respected court orders. Principles of sharia (Islamic law) inform the civil, commercial, and criminal codes. The law allows women to serve as judges. Civilian or military courts try all cases.

There were reports that authorities summoned private businesspersons to legal proceedings in front of a judge at the Public Authority for Consumer Protection, without access to a lawyer, and threatened them with criminal prosecution, including incarceration, for raising prices on retail products without permission of the consumer protection authority.

The law provides for the right to a fair trial and stipulates the presumption of innocence. The government did not uniformly provide language interpretation for non-Arabic speakers. Citizens and legally resident noncitizens have the right to a public trial, except when the court decides to hold a session in private in the interest of public order or morals; the judiciary generally enforced this right. While the vast majority of legal proceedings were open to the public, corruption cases, and at least one case concerning a member of the royal family, were sometimes closed. There was no trial by jury.

Defendants have the right to consult with an attorney in a timely manner and to be present, present evidence, and confront witnesses at their trials. Courts provide public attorneys to indigent detainees and offer legal defense for defendants facing prison terms of three years or more. The prosecution and defense counsel direct questions to witnesses through the judge. Defendants and their lawyers generally had access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Those convicted in any court have one opportunity to appeal a jail sentence longer than three months and fines of more than 480 rials (\$1,250) to the appellate and supreme courts. The judiciary enforced these rights for all citizens.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

In March the sultan pardoned 32 individuals who had been convicted of sedition and insulting the sultan. In 2013 the international press reported that 21 individuals accused of insulting the sultan started a hunger strike to protest their detention. The hunger strike concluded in less than a month; the sultan pardoned all those concerned in March.

### **Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies**

Civil laws govern civil cases. Citizens and foreign residents could file cases, including lawsuits seeking damages for human rights violations, but no filings occurred during the year. The judiciary was generally independent and impartial. Police enforced court orders effectively for all persons. The Administrative Court reviews complaints about the misuse of governmental authority. It has the power to reverse decisions by government bodies and to award compensation.

Appointments to this court are subject to the approval of the Administrative Affairs Council. The court's president and deputy president are appointed by royal decree based on the council's nomination. Citizens and foreign workers may file complaints regarding working conditions with the Ministry of Manpower for alternative dispute resolution. The ministry may refer cases to the courts if it is unable to negotiate a solution.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The law does not require police to obtain search warrants before entering homes, but they often obtained warrants from the Public Prosecutor's Office. The government monitored private communications, including cell phone, e-mail, and internet chat room exchanges. The government blocked some voice over internet

protocol sites, such as Skype and FaceTime. Authorities blocked the import of certain publications, including but not limited to pornography, into the country. Shipping companies claimed that customs officials confiscated these materials when found.

The Ministry of Interior required citizens to obtain permission to marry foreigners, except nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, whom citizens may marry without restriction; permission was not automatically granted. Citizen marriage to a foreigner abroad without ministry approval may result in denial of entry for the foreign spouse at the border and preclude children from claiming citizenship rights. It also may result in a bar from government employment and a fine of 2,000 rials (\$5,200).

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The law provides for limited freedom of speech and press, but authorities did not respect these rights. Journalists and writers exercised self-censorship. In September the UN special rapporteur on rights to freedom of peaceful assembly described a pervasive climate of fear and intimidation in the country, stating that individuals were “afraid to speak their minds, afraid to speak on the telephone, afraid to meet.”

Freedom of Speech: The law prohibits criticism of the sultan in any form or medium, as well as any “material that leads to public discord, violates the security of the state, or abuses a person’s dignity or his rights”; “messages of any form that violate public order and morals or are harmful to a person’s safety”; and “defamation of character.” Therefore, it is illegal to insult any public official or private citizen, and authorities sometimes prosecuted individuals for writing about the sultan. In August, according to press and social media reports, authorities detained Mohammed al-Fazari for five days for comments on his blog related to the lack of transparency in disbursement of state resources to members of the royal family; he was subsequently released. His case was highlighted by Human Rights Watch and the UN special rapporteur on rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. After his release al-Fazari continued to publish his blog and post on social media.

Press Freedoms: The media did not operate freely. Authorities tolerated limited criticism regarding domestic and foreign affairs in privately owned newspapers and magazines, although editorials generally were consistent with the government’s views. The government and privately owned radio and television stations did not generally broadcast sensitive political material. Authorities arrested bloggers during the year. The law criminalizes a wide variety of free expression. Reuters maintained a permanent correspondent in the country, representing the only international media presence. Authorities require journalists to obtain a license in order to work; freelance journalists are ineligible for a license.

Violence and Harassment: There were isolated instances where authorities harassed journalists during the year. In 2013 the Front Line Defenders website claimed police arbitrarily arrested Said Jaddad, a blogger, and held him for eight days in solitary confinement on charges including “calling for demonstrations” and “heaping discredit on state officials.” Jaddad alleged that the authorities continued to harass him throughout the year. While his blog remained accessible online, his last post was in May 2013. He posted actively on Facebook during the year and met with the UN special rapporteur on rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association in September.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Headlines in both public and private media print outlets were subject to an official, nontransparent review and approval process before publication. Journalists and writers exercised self-censorship. The law permits the Ministry of Information to review all media products and books produced within or imported into the country. The ministry occasionally prohibited or censored material from domestic and imported publications viewed as politically, culturally, or sexually offensive. Some books were not permitted in the country. There were no major publishing houses in the country, and publication of books remained limited.

Libel Laws/National Security: The government used libel laws and national security concerns as grounds to suppress criticism of government figures and politically objectionable views. Libel is a criminal offense, which allows for a heavy fine and prison sentence. The government also prohibited publication of any material that “violated the security of the state.”

### **Internet Freedom**

The law restricts free speech exercised via the internet, and the government enforced the restrictions. The government’s national telecommunications company and private service providers made internet access

available for a fee to citizens and foreign residents. Internet access was available via schools, workplaces, wireless networks at coffee shops, and other venues, especially in urban areas. The internet was widely used by citizens.

Authorities monitored the activities of telecommunications service providers and obliged them to block access to numerous websites considered pornographic, or culturally or politically sensitive. The criteria for blocking access to internet sites were not transparent or consistent. Authorities sometimes blocked blogs. All video-chat technologies, such as Skype, are illegal and blocked, possibly because they compete with local telecommunications services. Authorities also blocked some websites used to circumvent censorship, such as virtual private networks.

The Law to Counter Information Technology Crimes allows authorities to prosecute individuals for any message sent via any medium that “violates public order and morals.” The law details crimes that take place on the internet that “might prejudice public order or religious values” and specifies a penalty of between one month and a year in prison and fines of not less than 1,000 rials (\$2,600). Authorities also applied the law against bloggers and social media users who insult the sultan. In 2013 authorities upheld convictions against at least 20 activists for insulting the sultan. These individuals received prison sentences of six months (18 months when combined with charges of slandering the sultan) and fines of 1,000 rials (\$2,600) but were later pardoned.

The government placed warnings on websites informing users that criticism of the sultan or personal criticism of government officials would be censored and could lead to police questioning, effectively increasing self-censorship.

#### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government restricted academic freedom and cultural events. Academics largely practiced self-censorship. Colleges and universities were required to have permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Higher Education before meeting with foreign missions or accepting money for programs or speakers.

#### **Freedom of Assembly**

The law provides for limited freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right. Government approval was necessary for all public gatherings with more than nine persons present, although there was no clear process for obtaining approval for public demonstrations. Authorities enforced this requirement sporadically.

#### **Freedom of Association**

The law provides for freedom of association “for legitimate objectives and in a proper manner,” but it does not clearly define “legitimate objective.” Examples of associations include labor unions and social groups for foreign nationalities, such as the Indian Social Group. The council of ministers limited freedom of association in practice by prohibiting associations whose activities were deemed “inimical to the social order” or otherwise not appropriate. In August a royal decree promulgating a new nationality law stipulated that citizens joining groups deemed harmful to national interests could be subjected to revocation of citizenship. The UN special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of speech and assembly criticized the broad language of the law during his September visit.

Associations must register with the Ministry of Social Development, which approves all associations’ bylaws and determines whether or not a group serves the interest of the country. The average time required to register an association ranged from two months to two years. Approval time varied based on the level of preparedness of the applying organization and the subject matter of the organization, as well its leadership and focus of the organization’s mission. The approval time was often longer when a group required significant help from the ministry to formalize its structure. Formal registration of nationality-based associations was limited to one association for each nationality. For example, the Indian Social Group had many different subcommittees based on language and geography.

No association may receive funding from an international group or foreign government without government approval. Individuals convicted of accepting foreign funding for an association may receive up to six months in jail and a fine of 500 rials (\$1,300). Heads of domestic NGOs reported that the government periodically

asked to review their financial records to confirm sources of funding and required NGOs to inform the government of any meetings with foreign organizations or diplomatic representatives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was robust in its enforcement of this law, putting an effective stop to most foreign funding of educational and public diplomacy programs conducted by some foreign missions pending a government-wide review.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The law provides for freedom of movement within the country and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. The law does not specifically provide for foreign travel or emigration. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees visited the country, but it did not maintain an office or personnel in the country.

In-country Movement: There were no official government restrictions on internal travel for any citizen. The government must approve official travel by foreign diplomats to the Dhofar and Musandam regions.

Foreign Travel: Foreigners must obtain an exit visa from their employer prior to leaving the country. Exit visas may be denied when there is a dispute over payment or work remaining, leaving the foreign citizen in country without recourse except for local courts. Courts provided recourse to workers being denied exit visas, but the process was opaque and inefficient. One foreign diplomat reported that families of foreign workers needed permission from the sponsored worker to leave the country.

### **Protection of Refugees**

Access to Asylum: The laws provide for the granting of asylum or refuge for displaced persons, and the government has established a system for providing protection. The ROP reportedly granted asylum and accepted displaced persons for resettlement during the year. The ROP's system for granting asylum and resettlement is not transparent, and the law does not specify a time frame in which the ROP must adjudicate an asylum application.

### **Elections and Political Participation**

Recent Elections: In 2012 approximately 546,000 citizens participated in the country's first elections for provincial councils. Electoral commissions reviewed potential candidates against a set of objective educational and character criteria (at least a high school education and no criminal history or mental illness) before they allowed candidates' names on the ballot. Authorities disqualified approximately 50 individuals from running for election for unclear reasons, although some individuals claimed it was due to past participation in protest activity. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) administered and closely monitored campaign materials and events. There were no notable or widespread allegations of fraud or improper government interference in the voting process. The government did not allow independent monitoring of the elections.

Political Parties: The law does not allow political parties, and citizens did not attempt to form any.

Participation of Women and Minorities: During the 2012 elections, voters elected four women as representatives on provincial councils. Forty-eight women ran among an estimated 1,600 candidates for 192 representative spots across 11 provincial councils. The sultan appointed 15 women to the 93-member State Council and two women, the ministers of education and of higher education, to the 29-member Council of Ministers. There were no recognized or self-identified minority communities.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government**

Corruption: The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented these laws effectively. There were reports of government corruption during the year, including in police, ministries, and state-owned companies. The head of a prominent state-owned company and other prominent businessmen were detained in 2013 for alleged corruption. In January an Indian national managing director of a construction company was sentenced to 15 years in jail and a fine of 1.8 million rials (\$4.68 million). The director of the government-owned oil company was sentenced to three years in jail and a fine of 600,000 rials (approximately \$1,560,000) for receiving bribes. In a separate case, the CEO of the state-owned oil company, an Omani national, was sentenced to 23 years and a fine of eight million rials (approximately \$21 million), with the added stipulation that he may no longer serve in the government.

**Financial Disclosure:** In 2012 public officials became subject to financial disclosure laws. When selected for disclosure, officials are required to list their finances, business interests, and property, as well as that of their spouses and children. These records are made public, and there are fines associated with noncompliance. It is monitored by the State Audit Authority.

**Public Access to Information:** The law does not provide for public access to government information, although the government published all royal decrees and ministerial decisions in the official gazette.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human RightsShare**

No registered or fully autonomous domestic human rights organizations existed. There were civil society groups that advocated for persons protected under human rights conventions, particularly women and the disabled. These groups were required to register with the Ministry of Social Development.

**Government Human Rights Bodies:** The NHRC, a government-funded commission made up of members from the public, private, and academic sectors, reported on human rights to the sultan via the State Council. It continued investigating 40 human rights complaints it received during the year. The NHRC also conducted prison visits and continued a community and school outreach program to discuss human rights with students.

## **Qatar<sup>320</sup>**

Qatar is a constitutional monarchy in which Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani exercises full executive power. The constitution provides for hereditary rule by males in the emir's branch of the al-Thani family, which has ruled since 1868. The most recent national elections were in 2011 for the Central Municipal Council, an advisory and consultative body; observers considered them free and fair. Authorities maintained effective control over security forces.

The principal human rights problems were the inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections, restriction of fundamental civil liberties, and widespread denial of the rights of migrant workers. The monarch-appointed government prohibited organized political parties and restricted civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and access to a fair trial for persons held under the Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law.

Other continuing human rights concerns included restrictions on the freedoms of religion and movement, as foreign laborers could not freely travel abroad. Trafficking in persons, primarily in the domestic worker and labor sectors, was a significant problem. Legal, institutional, and cultural discrimination against women limited their participation in society. The noncitizen "bidoon" (stateless persons) who resided in the country with unresolved legal status experienced social discrimination.

The government took limited steps to prosecute those who committed abuses. Impunity existed for government officials.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

### **Disappearance**

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution and law prohibit torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; there were limited reports of abuse carried out by government officials. On May 26, three Filipinos previously convicted of espionage and economic sabotage claimed they were tortured at the hands of arresting officers. There were also reports that authorities kept some detainees in solitary confinement while in prison.

The government interprets sharia as allowing corporal punishment for certain criminal offenses, including court-ordered flogging in cases of alcohol consumption and extramarital sex by Muslims. On appeal, courts typically reduced this sentence to imprisonment or fine.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Prison conditions generally met international standards; however, UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Francois Crepeau noted concerns regarding Deportation Detention Center (DDC) facilities, describing them as “overcrowded and unsanitary” in his April report. Crepeau also documented cases of migrants at the DDC who had been detained for as long as a year.

**Independent Monitoring:** The government permitted monitoring visits by independent human rights observers and international bodies in accordance with their standard modalities to all facilities except the state security prison. The most recent reported visits by international human rights organizations to a detention center were by Amnesty International and the UN special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants in March. The government occasionally provided foreign diplomats access to state security prisoners at separate locations and did so during the year. Representatives from the NHRC conducted regular visits to all facilities.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions. There were isolated reports, however, that authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained individuals. Authorities may detain individuals in the state security prison for indefinite periods under the Protection of Society Law and the Combating Terrorism Law. The government limited detention to two months, however, for all DDC detainees except those facing additional financial criminal charges. The processing time for deportations ranged from two days to 10 months. There were also reports that authorities delayed deportations up to 10 months in cases where detainees had to resolve financial delinquencies before being allowed to depart the country.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the police under the Ministry of Interior and state security forces, and the government employed effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity of the security forces.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

Criminal law requires that persons be apprehended openly with warrants based on sufficient evidence and issued by a duly authorized official, be charged within 24 hours, and be brought before a court without undue delay, although the law empowers the judge investigating the case to extend the total detention period to six months before the case goes to court. The state security service can arrest and detain suspects for up to 30 days without referring them to the public prosecutor.

The Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law provide procedures that permit detention without charge for as long as 15 days, renewable for up to six months. The law permits an additional six months’ detention without charge with approval of the prime minister, who can extend the detention indefinitely in cases of threats to national security. The Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law empower the minister of interior to detain persons suspected of crimes related to national security, honor, or impudence. Decisions under this law are subject to appeal to the prime minister only. A provision of this law permits the prime minister to adjudicate complaints involving such detentions. The law permits a second six-month period of detention with approval from the criminal court, which can extend a detention indefinitely with review every six months.

In most cases a judge may order a suspect released, remanded to custody to await trial, held in pretrial detention pending investigation, or released on bail. Although suspects are entitled to bail (except in cases of violent crimes), bail was infrequent. Authorities were more likely to grant citizens bail than noncitizens. Noncitizens charged with minor crimes may be released to their citizen sponsor, although they cannot leave the country until the case is resolved.

By law in nonsecurity cases, the accused is entitled to legal representation throughout the process and prompt access to family members. There are provisions for state-funded legal counsel for indigent prisoners in criminal cases, and authorities generally honored this requirement. Authorities generally did not afford suspects detained under the Protection of Society Law and the Combating Terrorism Law access to counsel and delayed access to family members. The NHRC reported it had evidence that authorities did not refer some individuals arrested under the Protection of Society Law to the public prosecutor.

All suspects except those detained under the Protection of Society Law or the Combating Terrorism Law must be presented before the public prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest. If the public prosecutor finds sufficient evidence for further investigation, authorities can detain a suspect for up to 15 days with the approval of a judge, renewable for similar periods not to exceed 45 days, before charges must be filed in the courts. Judges may also extend pretrial detention for one month, renewable for one-month periods not to exceed half of the maximum punishment for the accused crime. Authorities followed these procedures differently for citizens than noncitizens.

There were no reports of individuals held under house arrest.

Arbitrary Arrest: The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and, with few exceptions, the government observed these prohibitions.

Pretrial Detention: With few exceptions, nearly all suspected criminals go to trial within a month of arrest.

Amnesty: During Ramadan and on National Day, the emir granted amnesty to 69 prisoners, including 59 noncitizens.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial: Trial Procedures**

Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the emir, based on recommended selections from the Supreme Judicial Council, appoints all judges, who hold their positions at his discretion. Approximately 55 percent of the judges were foreign citizens dependent on residency permits. Foreign detainees had access to the legal system, although some complained of opaque legal procedures and complications mostly stemming from language barriers. Foreign nationals did not uniformly receive translations of legal proceedings.

The law provides for the right to a fair trial for all residents, and the judiciary generally enforced this right, except for suspects held under the Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law.

The law provides defendants the presumption of innocence, and authorities generally inform defendants promptly of the charges brought against them, except for suspects held under the Protection of Society Law and Combating Terrorism Law. According to a 2013 press report, in some cases authorities did not adequately inform foreign detainees of charges pending against them, did not always provide access to legal counsel, and did not always offer interpreters who spoke the detainee's language. Judges give verdicts, and trials are open to the public, but the presiding judge can close the courtroom to the public if the case is deemed sensitive.

Defendants are entitled to choose their legal representation or accept it at public expense throughout the pretrial and trial process. In matters involving family law, Shia and Sunni judges may apply their interpretations of sharia for their religious groups. In family law matters, a woman's testimony or worth is not weighed equally with that of a man. In some cases a woman's testimony is deemed half of a man's, and in some cases a female witness is not accepted at all.

Defense attorneys have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases once the government files the case in court. Defendants have the right to confront and question witnesses against them and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. Defendants have the opportunity to give a statement at the end of their trial. Defendants have the right to appeal a decision within 15 days, and use of the appellate process was common.

The Court of Cassation requires a fee to initiate the appeals process. In some cases courts waived fees if an appellant demonstrated financial hardship.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

In rare cases authorities arrested or detained individuals for political activity.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The constitution and the criminal procedures code prohibit such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions. Police and security forces, however, reportedly monitored telephone calls, e-mails, and social media posts. The government prohibits membership in political organizations.



Citizens must obtain government permission to marry foreigners, which was generally not granted for females. Male citizens may apply for residency permits and citizenship for their foreign wives, but female citizens can apply only for residency for their foreign husbands and children, not citizenship.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press in accordance with the law, but the government limited these rights. Self-censorship for cultural norms and fear of prosecution remained the primary obstacle to free speech and press. In September the emir signed a cybercrime law that criminalizes a wide range of online speech. The maximum punishments are up to three years in prison and a fine of 500,000 Qatari riyals (\$137,500). The law prohibits any online activity that threatens the safety of the state, its general order, and its local or international peace. It also criminalizes the spread of “false news,” forces internet providers to block objectionable content, and bans the publication of personal or family information, even if true. Amnesty International assessed this law to pose a serious threat to freedom of expression.

Freedom of Speech: Citizens did not discuss sensitive political and religious issues in public forums, but these issues were discussed in private and on social media. The law prohibits residents from criticizing the emir. Members of the majority foreign population censored themselves publicly on sensitive topics.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Journalists and publishers continued to self-censor due to political and economic pressures when reporting on government policies or material deemed hostile to Islam, the ruling family, and relations with neighboring states. The Qatar Media Corporation, the Ministry of Culture, and customs officials censored material. There were no specific reports of political censorship of foreign broadcast news media or foreign programs. The government reviewed, censored, or banned foreign newspapers, magazines, films, and books for objectionable sexual, religious, and political content.

Libel Laws/National Security: Laws restrict the publication of information that could incite the overthrow of the regime, abuse the regime, or harm supreme state interests; slander the emir or heir apparent; report official secret agreements; ridicule or express contempt for one of the Abrahamic faiths; prejudice heads of state or disturb relations; harm the national currency or the economic situation; violate the dignity of persons, the proceedings of investigations, and prosecutions in relation to family status; or defame the state or endanger its safety.

### **Internet Freedom**

In September the government approved a new cybercrime law that severely limits online expression. The law requires internet service providers to block objectionable content based on a request from judicial entities. Internet providers are also obligated to maintain long-term electronic records and traffic data for the government. The government-controlled internet service provider Ooredoo restricted the expression of views via the internet and censored the internet for political, religious, and pornographic content through a proxy server, which monitored and blocked websites, e-mail, and chat rooms. A user who believed authorities had censored a site mistakenly could submit the website address to have the site reviewed for suitability; there were no reports that any websites were unblocked based on this procedure. The Ministry of Information and Communications Technologies is responsible for monitoring and censoring objectionable content on the internet.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The constitution provides for freedom of expression and scientific research. Instructors at Qatar University noted that they often exercised self-censorship. Instructors at foreign-based universities operating in the country, however, reported they enjoyed academic freedom. There were no reported government restrictions on cultural events, although some groups organizing cultural events reported they exercised self-censorship. Authorities censored books, films, and internet sites for political, religious, and sexual content and for vulgar and obscene language.

### **Freedom of Assembly**

The constitution provides for, but the law strictly hinders, freedom of assembly. Organizers for a public meeting must meet a number of restrictions and conditions to acquire a permit. For example, the director general of public security at the Ministry of Interior must give permission for a meeting, subject to appeal to the minister of interior, who has the final decision.

In July authorities permitted a peaceful rally to take place at the Palestinian embassy to protest the conflict in Gaza. The media reported that an estimated 200 residents attended the event, which did not require a permit because it was held on the extraterritorial grounds of the embassy.

### **Freedom of Association**

The constitution provides for the right to form groups, defined by the law as professional associations and private institutions, but the government significantly limited this right. There were no reports of attempts to organize politically. There were no organized political parties, and authorities prohibited politically oriented associations. Twenty-six professional and private organizations existed. The government prohibits professional associations and private institutions from engaging in political matters or affiliating internationally. Civil society organizations must obtain approval from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which can deny their establishment if it deems them a threat to the public interest.

Administrative obstacles, including the slow pace of procedures required to form professional associations and private institutions, and strict conditions on their establishment, management, and function restricted their recognition. The minister of labor and social affairs must approve applications, and the number of noncitizens cannot exceed 20 percent of the total membership without approval by the ministerial cabinet. Twenty-four organizations applied to form a professional society during the year.

Informal organizations, such as community support groups and activity clubs, operated without registration, but they may not engage in activities deemed political.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The constitution provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government did not fully respect these rights. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees generally did not ask the government to assist internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

In-country Movement: Restrictions on in-country movement for citizens concerned sensitive military, oil, and industrial installations. Although there was less emphasis on setting and enforcing “family-only times” at entertainment areas in Doha, several local malls and souks (markets) continued to restrict access to certain areas to foreign workers on weekends. Police also limited foreign workers’ access to National Day celebrations on the main thoroughfare along Doha’s waterfront.

Foreign Travel: The government prevented the travel of its citizens only when they were involved in court cases in progress. The government’s sponsorship system severely restricted foreign travel for noncitizens, which principally affected foreign workers

Citizenship: The law allows for the revocation of citizenship. There were no reported cases of citizenship revocation during the year.

### **Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The constitution does not provide citizens the ability to change their government through free and fair elections. In 2013 the former emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani issued a decree extending the term of the appointed advisory (“shura”) council by three years, reversing his 2011 call for elections to be held in 2013. The government did not permit political parties or opposition groups. The emir exercises full executive powers, including appointment of cabinet members. The shura council, whose members the emir appointed, plays an advisory role only. The constitutional provisions for electing two-thirds of the body and initiation of legislation by the shura council remained unimplemented. The strong influence of family and conservative tribal traditions dampened support for democratic reform.

Recent Elections: In 2011 citizens elected the 29 members of the fourth Central Municipal Council to four-year terms. The council advises the minister of municipality and urban affairs on local public services. Foreign diplomatic missions noted no apparent irregularities or fraud in the elections, although voter turnout was lower than authorities expected. There were an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 eligible voters and 32,662 registered voters. Of the voters who registered, 13,606 (41.6 percent) went to the polls.

Voting is open to all citizens who are at least 18 years old, including those who have been naturalized for at least 15 years.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The government did not permit the organization of political parties, and there were no attempts to form them during the year.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Although traditional attitudes and societal roles continued to limit women's participation in politics, women served in public office as minister of communications and information technology, chair of the Qatar Foundation, vice president of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs (SCFA) with ministerial rank, head of the General Authority for Museums, permanent representative to the United Nations, ambassador to Croatia, and president of Qatar University. One woman served on the Central Municipal Council, and there were two female judges on the Court of First Instance. Noncitizen residents are banned from participating in political affairs.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government**

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented these laws effectively.

Corruption: The State Audit Bureau and the National Committee for Accountability and Transparency have been responsible for combating corruption since their establishment in 2007. In 2011 authorities opened a second authority, the Administrative Control and Transparency Authority, headed by a former deputy prime minister. Its mandate includes probing the misuse of public funds and investigating complaints against government officials. There was no publicly available information on the authority's investigations. The agency may also have access to banking details in cases that allege money laundering. Also in 2011 authorities opened a quasi-governmental body, the Doha Rule of Law and Anticorruption Center, providing training to promote a culture of anticorruption.

Financial Disclosure: There are no legal requirements for public officials to disclose their income and assets, and they did not do so in practice.

Public Access to Information: The law does not provide for public access to government information beyond the requirement that the government publish laws in the official gazette. Information on the government, such as the budget, expenditures, or draft laws, was generally not available.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The NHRC investigated local human rights conditions. The NHRC reported that it handled 1,930 petitions for assistance during the year, 137 of which were from citizens and 1,793 from noncitizens. The NHRC typically handled petitions by liaising with government institutions to ensure a timely resolution to disputes.

### **National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities**

Legal and social discrimination against noncitizen workers was a problem. The government discriminated against noncitizens in employment, education, housing, and health services. The special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants reported that migrant workers in the country were often seen as their employer's property rather than as human beings with human rights equal to those of citizens.

Noncitizens were required to pay for electricity, water, and some secondary and higher education (services provided without charge to citizens). Noncitizens were eligible for medical coverage at a nominal fee. Noncitizens generally could not own property, but the law provides for property ownership in three designated areas. Cultural, linguistic, and religious differences and divergent economic status accentuated social discrimination between citizens and migrant workers. Bidoon also experienced social discrimination.

## **Saudi Arabia<sup>321</sup>**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who is both head of state and head of government. The government bases its legitimacy on its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) and the 1992 Basic Law, which specifies that the rulers of the country shall be male descendants of the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Saud. The Basic Law sets out the system of governance, rights of citizens, and powers and duties of the government, and it provides that the Koran and Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) serve as the country's constitution. In 2011 the country held elections on a nonparty basis for half of the 1,632 seats on the 285 municipal councils around the country. Independent

polling station observers identified no irregularities with the election; however, women could not be candidates and could not vote. Authorities generally maintained effective control over the security forces.

The most important human rights problems reported included citizens' lack of the ability and legal means to change their government; pervasive restrictions on universal rights such as freedom of expression, including on the internet, and freedom of assembly, association, movement, and religion; and a lack of equal rights for women, children, and noncitizen workers.

Other human rights problems reported included abuses of detainees; overcrowding in prisons and detention centers; investigating, detaining, prosecuting, and sentencing lawyers, human rights activists, and antigovernment reformists; holding political prisoners; denial of due process; arbitrary arrest and detention; and arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and correspondence. Violence against women, trafficking in persons, and discrimination based on gender, religion, sect, race, and ethnicity were common. Lack of governmental transparency and access made it difficult to assess the magnitude of many reported human rights problems.

The government identified, prosecuted, and punished a limited number of officials who committed abuses, particularly those engaged or complicit in corruption. Some members of the security forces and other senior officials reportedly committed abuses with relative impunity.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

The government or its agents were not known to have committed politically motivated killings during the year. Closed court proceedings in some capital cases made it impossible to determine positively whether authorities allowed the accused to present a defense or granted basic due process; however, the law requires a unanimous endorsement by the Supreme Judicial Council for all death sentences.

According to the country's interpretation and practice of sharia, capital punishment is the prescribed penalty for sorcery. The country lacks a written penal code listing criminal offenses and the associated penalties for them (see section 1. e.); absent such a code, the punishments for the practice of magic or sorcery are subject to considerable judicial discretion in the courts.

Authorities investigated or arrested several individuals in connection with sorcery during the year. On August 5, the Ministry of Interior announced that authorities beheaded Mohammad bin Bakr al-Alawi, a Saudi national, for practicing sorcery "and other similar offenses" in the border town of Gurayyat in al-Jawf Province, based on a judicial order.

### **Disappearance**

The government reportedly arrested and detained multiple persons during the year, refusing for extended periods in some cases to acknowledge the detention or to provide information about an individual's whereabouts.

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The law prohibits torture and holds criminal investigation officers accountable for any abuse of authority. Sharia, as interpreted in the country, prohibits judges from accepting confessions obtained under duress; statutory law provides that public investigators shall not subject accused persons to coercive measures to influence their testimony.

In contrast with previous years, there were no confirmed reports of torture by government officials. Ministry of Interior officials claimed rules prohibiting torture prevent such practices from occurring in the penal system. Former detainees in al-Ha'ir Prison, a detention facility run by the ministry's General Investigations Directorate (Mabahith), claimed that while physical torture was uncommon in detention, Mabahith officials sometimes resorted to mental or psychological abuse of detainees, particularly during the investigation phase when interrogating suspects. The ministry installed surveillance cameras to record interrogations of suspected persons in criminal investigation offices, some police stations, and in prisons where such interrogations regularly occurred, such as Mabahith prison facilities.

Government officials also claimed representatives from the governmental Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the quasi-nongovernmental National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), supported by a trust funded by the estate of the late king Fahd, conducted prison visits to ascertain whether torture did or did not occur in

prisons or detention centers and maintained permanent branches in some facilities. No former detainees, however, have verified independently that such office branches existed. Moreover, there continued to be reports ministry officials sometimes subjected prisoners and detainees to physical and mental abuse; however, due to lack of government transparency, it was not possible to ascertain the accuracy of some of these reports. There was no available information on the number of cases of abuse and corporal punishment; however, former detainees in Mabath-run facilities alleged abuse during detention, including sleep deprivation or long periods of solitary confinement for nonviolent detainees.

Authorities executed several individuals during the year for crimes such as drug smuggling and sorcery. On August 18, the Ministry of Interior announced the execution of four Saudi men, Hadi al-Mutlaq, Awadj al-Mutlaq, Mufreh al-Yami, and Ali al-Yami, following their conviction on charges of smuggling hashish into the kingdom.

The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), a semiautonomous agency--referred to by some as the "religious police"--has the authority to monitor social behavior and enforce morality subject to the law and in coordination with law enforcement authorities.

The courts continued to use corporal punishment as a judicial penalty, almost always in the form of floggings, a practice government officials defended as dictated by sharia. According to local human rights activists, police conducted the floggings according to a set of guidelines determined by local interpretation of sharia. The police official administering the punishment must place a book under his arm that prevents raising the hand above the head, limiting the ability to inflict pain on the person subjected to the punishment, and instructions forbid police from breaking the skin or causing scarring when administering the lashes. Courts sentenced several individuals convicted of theft to be punished by amputation, and there was one confirmed case of judicially administered amputation during the year.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Physical Conditions: The director general of prisons announced in February 2013 there were 47,000 male and female prisoners and detainees in the kingdom; noncitizens constituted approximately 72 percent of those held. Authorities held men and women in separate facilities and staffed women's prisons with female guards. Juveniles constituted less than 1 percent of detainees. Although information on the maximum capacity of the facilities was not available, overcrowding in some detention centers was a problem. Violations listed in reports by the NSHR following prison visits documented shortages of, and improperly trained, wardens; lack of access to prompt medical treatment when requested; holding prisoners beyond the end of their sentences; and failure to inform prisoners of their legal rights. An October report criticized prison authorities for allowing some prisoners and prison administrators to exploit other inmates by hoarding supplies sold by prison commissaries. Some detained individuals complained about lack of access to adequate health-care services. Some prisoners alleged prison authorities maintained cold temperatures in prison facilities and deliberately kept lights on 24 hours per day to make prisoners uncomfortable.

Administration: There were multiple legal authorities for prisons and detention centers. Local provincial authorities administered some prisons while the Ministry of Interior administered other prisons and detention centers. Authorities sometimes held pretrial detainees in the same facilities as convicted prisoners, as there was no enforced policy in place to detain the two groups separately. Recordkeeping on prisoners was inadequate. There were reports authorities held prisoners after they had completed their sentences. In June Nasir al-Yamani, the director of the Jeddah juvenile detention center Dar al-Mulhadh, stated 10 convicts detained at his facility had completed their 10-year prison terms, but authorities had not completed procedures necessary to release them. The Saudi Human Rights Commission registered a complaint with the Ministry of Social Affairs concerning the 10 detainees on behalf of their families.

Independent Monitoring: No independent human rights observers visited prisons or detention centers during the year. There were no reports the government permitted foreign diplomats to visit prison facilities to view general conditions in nonconsular cases.

In August the NSHR announced it had submitted 943 letters of complaint to the Ministry of Interior's Mabath concerning prison conditions on behalf of detainees housed between 2009 and the current year. The complaints alleged refusals of temporary release requests and poor healthcare; moreover, they charged Mabath officers flouted prison regulations. In September the NSHR reported it received 1,328 complaints since 2011 concerning conditions at prisons administered by the ministry's General Directorate of Prisons.

Sixty percent of the complaints concerned substandard health services and the spread of infectious diseases in detention centers. The NSHR report noted that, in some cases authorities held prisoners in facilities with no ventilation or in locations with direct exposure to the sun. The NSHR report also noted complaints that authorities held individuals beyond their prison sentences and did not provide women detained at al-Malaz prison in Riyadh regular access to legal counsel.

Improvements: The most recently available statistics indicated there were 116 prison facilities run by the General Directorate of Prisons, including 12 reformatories; however, authorities expanded the prison system through the construction of new facilities during the year. Human rights activists reported health services in certain Mabathith-run detention facilities improved, and prison authorities established commissaries in some facilities that allowed prisoners to purchase additional food in exchange for wages earned at the prison.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The law provides that no entity may restrict a person's actions or imprison him, except under provisions of the law. Legally, authorities may not detain a person under arrest for more than 24 hours, except pursuant to a written order from a public investigator. Authorities must inform the detained person of the reasons for detention. Nonetheless, because of the government's ambiguous implementation of the law and a lack of due process, the Ministry of Interior, to which the majority of forces with arrest power reported, maintained broad powers to arrest and detain persons indefinitely without judicial oversight or effective access to legal counsel or family. Authorities held persons for weeks, months, and sometimes years and reportedly failed to advise them promptly of their rights, including their legal right to be represented by an attorney. In December 2013 the government promulgated a royal decree revising key elements of the Law of Criminal Procedure, nominally strengthening some protections of the original law, but weakening some due process protections.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The king and the ministries of defense and interior, in addition to the Ministry of National Guard, are all responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of order. The Ministry of Interior exercises primary control over internal security and police forces. The civil police and the internal security police have authority to arrest and detain individuals. Military and security courts investigated abuses of authority and security force killings.

The semiautonomous CPVPV, which monitors public behavior to enforce strict adherence to the official interpretation of Islamic norms, reports to the king via the Royal Diwan (royal court) and to the Ministry of Interior. As of June the CPVPV had 12 branch offices, 129 subcommission offices, and 345 information centers throughout the kingdom. Regulations require the members of the CPVPV to carry official identification and have a police officer accompany them at the time of an arrest. In 2013 the king issued a royal decree curtailing some CPVPV powers and transferring responsibilities to other competent authorities. While the CPVPV may detain suspects for brief periods, it must transfer suspects directly to police authorities to complete legal proceedings against them. CPVPV agents have authority to investigate only certain categories of offenses, including harassment of women, alcohol and drug-related offenses, witchcraft, and sorcery. On February 19, the chairman of the CPVPV, Sheikh Abdullatif Al al-Sheikh, announced that CPVPV staff regularly monitored electronic websites to forward to the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution (BIP) cases of individuals who promoted "witchcraft and immorality" on social media sites such as Twitter.

Ministry of Interior police and security forces were generally effective at maintaining law and order. The Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazalim), a high-level administrative judicial body that specializes in cases against government entities and reports directly to the king, is the only formal mechanism available to seek redress for claims of abuse. Citizens may report abuses by security forces at any police station, to the HRC, or to the NSHR. The HRC and the NSHR maintained records of complaints and outcomes, but privacy laws protected information about individual cases and information was not publicly available. During the year there were no reported prosecutions of security force members for human rights violations, but the Board of Grievances held hearings and adjudicated claims of wrongdoing. The HRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, provided materials and training to police, security forces, and the CPVPV on protecting human rights.

The BIP and the Control and Investigation Board (CIB) are the two units of the government with authority to investigate reports of criminal activity, corruption, and "disciplinary cases" involving government

employees. These bodies are responsible for investigating potential cases and referring them to the administrative courts. Officers of the Mabahith, however, also have broad authorities to investigate, detain, and forward to the judicial authorities “national security” cases which ranged from terrorism cases to dissident and human rights activist cases separate from the Board of Investigation and Prosecution. A June, Ministry of Justice decree formalized and reaffirmed the role of the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC), founded in 2008 to try terrorism offenses, following the promulgation of a new counterterrorism law in February.

In 2011 the Council of Ministers consolidated legal authorities for investigation and public prosecution of criminal offences within the BIP; however, the CIB continued to be responsible for investigation and prosecution of noncriminal cases. All financial audit and control functions were limited to the General Auditing Board.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

According to the Law of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 2013, “no person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned except in cases provided by law, and any accused person shall have the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer or a representative to defend him during the investigation and trial stages.” Authorities may summon any person for investigation, and authorities may issue an arrest warrant based on evidence, but authorities frequently did not use warrants, and they were not required in cases where probable cause existed.

The law requires that authorities file charges within 72 hours of arrest and hold a trial within six months, subject to exceptions specified by amendments to the Law of Criminal Procedure and the new Counterterrorism Law (see section 2.a.). Legally, authorities may not detain a person under arrest for more than 24 hours, except pursuant to a written order from a public investigator. Authorities reportedly often failed to observe these legal protections, and there was no requirement to advise suspects of their rights. Judicial proceedings began after authorities completed a full investigation, which in some cases took years.

In November 2013 the government promulgated a royal decree revising key elements of the Law of Criminal Procedure. While some of the amendments offered nominal improvements, other changes weakened due process protections contained in the earlier law. For example, an amendment to the law removed the ability of the presiding judge in a case to transfer it to another court before a sentence was issued. Another amendment altered language in a manner that might deny defendants the automatic ability to appeal. The law specifies procedures required for extending the detention period of an accused subject beyond the initial five days. The amended law expands the number of individuals empowered to renew pretrial detentions for periods of up to six months to include the president of the Board of Investigation and Prosecution and his designated subordinates. The amended text allows authorities to approve official detentions in excess of six months in “exceptional circumstances,” effectively allowing individuals to be held in pretrial detention indefinitely. Another amendment to the law extends from three months to six months the deadline for the BIP to gather evidence against the accused and issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, summons, or detention. This provision is also contained in the new Counterterrorism Law, subject to the approval of the extension by the SCC. Another amendment explicitly allows an individual to represent himself in court.

There was a functioning bail system for less serious criminal charges. Detainees generally did not have the right to obtain a lawyer of their choice. In normal cases the government typically provided lawyers to defendants; however, human rights activists often did not trust the courts to appoint lawyers for them, out of concern the lawyer would be biased.

Incommunicado detention was sometimes a problem. Authorities reportedly did not always respect detainees’ right to contact family members following arrest, and the new Counterterrorism Law, as amended, allows the Ministry of Interior to hold a defendant for up to 90 days in detention without access to family members or legal counsel. Security and some other types of prisoners sometimes remained in detention for long periods before family members or associates received information of their whereabouts, particularly for detainees in Mabahith-run facilities. Following the April detention of human rights lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair, his wife, Samar Badawi, reported prison authorities did not grant any of multiple requests to visit her husband (see section 2.a.). Authorities repeatedly transferred Abu al-Khair multiple times while in detention during the year.

In response to protests by family members of long-term security detainees, many of whom were suspects held on terrorism or security grounds, in February 2013 the Ministry of Interior created a website designed to connect detainees with their families “for humanitarian reasons.” According to the ministry, the government provides family members of detainees with user names and passwords to access a website to send emails, make calls, and arrange direct video-conferencing sessions with detainees. Detainees could use the portal to apply for short periods of release to attend family weddings or funerals.

Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. The law no longer prohibits detention without charge for periods longer than six months, but it permits longer detention with a court order. During the year authorities detained without charge security suspects, persons who publicly criticized the government, Shia religious leaders, and persons who violated religious standards.

Pretrial Detention: Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Before authorities disestablished them, local officially unlicensed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (ACPRA) and the Adala Center for Human Rights, challenged the Ministry of Interior publicly and in court on cases considered to involve arbitrary arrest or detention; however, authorities disestablished them, and they ceased operating in 2013 and 2014. ACPRA claimed the ministry sometimes ignored judges’ rulings; judges appeared powerless to take action against the ministry.

In March 2013 the Ministry of Interior’s BIP released statistics accounting for those detained on suspicion of terrorism since 2001. The data indicated that of 11,527 such persons arrested, authorities had released 8,755. Of those released, according to the ministry, 551 were foreign nationals and 2,221 were Saudi citizens. Those not released had either been referred to “the competent criminal courts,” or were still “being tried,” according to previous announcements by the ministry. The differences in these legal designations were unclear. In 2012 the ministry also reportedly paid compensation of 32 million riyals (\$8.5 million) to 486 detainees for being detained longer than their jail sentences and provided 529 million riyals (\$141 million) in monthly assistance to the families of suspects. During the year the ministry announced it had detained hundreds of additional individuals for terrorist acts following a campaign against alleged material supporters of and ideological sympathizers with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), with detentions escalating after July. In September the ministry reported 1,100 persons involved in terrorist cases “have so far been referred to pertinent courts and around 500 cases have been reviewed and appealed according to legal procedures.” The beginning date for these referrals was not clear.

Amnesty: The king continued the tradition of commuting some judicial punishments. The details of the cases varied, but the demonstration of royal pardons sometimes included reducing or eliminating corporal punishment, for example, rather than setting aside the conviction. The remaining sentence could be added to a new sentence if the pardoned prisoner committed a crime subsequent to his release. There were general pardons or grants of amnesty on special occasions throughout the year. On June 30, the king pardoned and released at least 128 prisoners on the occasion of Ramadan, upon the recommendation of a special committee in charge of studying the cases of prisoners.

Additionally, authorities did not detain some individuals, despite their receiving prison sentences. The February Law on Countering Terrorist Crimes and their Financing contained a provision that allows the interior minister to stop proceedings against an individual who cooperates with investigations or helps thwart a planned terrorist attack. Moreover, the minister can release individuals already convicted on such charges.

In April the NSHR stated 45 percent of crimes addressed by courts were switched to alternative penalties such as community service, religious guidance, and behavioral counseling courses. In June the Reconciliation Committee in Mecca Province issued its annual report, which documented 715 cases in which it successfully secured pardons for prisoners sentenced to death.

#### **Denial of Fair Public Trial: Trial Procedures**

The law provides that judges are independent and are subject to no authority other than the provisions of sharia and laws in force. Nevertheless, the judiciary was not independent, as it was required to coordinate its decisions with executive authorities, with the king as final arbiter. Although public allegations of interference with judicial independence were rare, the judiciary reportedly was subject to influence, particularly in the case of legal decisions rendered by specialized judicial bodies, such as the SCC, which rarely if ever acquitted suspects. Human rights activists reported SCC judges received implicit instructions to issue harsh sentences



against human rights activists, reformists, journalists, and dissidents, although they were not engaging in terrorist activities.

On June 16, the Ministry of Justice announced inspectors tasked by the Supreme Judicial Council and the ministry with “verifying judges discipline” in dealing with defendants subjected regular courts to regular and unannounced inspections. In August the government pressed charges against a judge for acquitting a religious teacher convicted for having ties with al-Qaida. There were no reports during the year of courts exercising jurisdiction over senior members of the royal family, and it was not clear whether the judiciary would have jurisdiction in such instances.

In December 2013, however, Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz announced he would not pardon an unnamed Saudi prince whom authorities had sentenced to death for his alleged role in the death of a man. The family of the victim in the case had refused to accept *diyah* or “blood money” as compensation for their relative’s death.

Allegedly there were problems enforcing court orders from courts in the regular court system, particularly against the Ministry of Justice. On August 10, the Ministry of Justice announced electronic linkage of ministerial departments and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Fund designed to increase efficiencies in implementing financial rulings, in particular rulings related to alimony for divorcees and providing child support. In December 2013, 200 judges sent a letter to the king to complain about the slow pace of reform and the “poor performance” of the Ministry of Justice.

The law states defendants should be treated equally in accordance with sharia. In the absence of a written penal code listing all criminal offenses and punishments, judges in the courts determine many of these penalties by legal interpretations of sharia. The Council of Senior Religious Scholars, an autonomous advisory body, issues religious opinions (fatwas) that guide how judges interpret sharia.

Additionally, sharia is not solely based on precedent. As a result rulings and sentences diverged widely from case to case. According to judicial procedures, appeals courts cannot independently reverse lower court judgments; they are limited to affirming judgments or returning them to a lower court for modification. Even when judges do not affirm judgments, appeals judges, in some cases, return the judgment to the judge who originally authored the opinion. This procedure sometimes makes it difficult for parties to receive a ruling that differs from the original judgment in cases where judges hesitate to admit error. While judges may base their decisions on any of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the Hanbali school predominates and forms the basis for the country’s law and legal interpretations of sharia. Shia citizens use their legal traditions to adjudicate family law cases between Shia parties; however, either party can decide to adjudicate a case in state courts, which use Sunni legal tradition.

According to the law, there is neither presumption of innocence nor trial by jury. The law states that court hearings shall be public; however, courts may be closed at the judge’s discretion, and as a result many trials during the year were closed. In December 2013 and throughout the year, foreign diplomatic missions received permission for the first time to attend nonconsular court proceedings (that is, cases to which neither the host nation nor any of its nationals were a party). To attend, authorities required diplomats to obtain advance written approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, the court administration, and the presiding judge. Authorities sometimes did not permit entry to such trials to individuals other than diplomats who were not the legal agents or family members of the accused. Court officials at the SCC sometimes prevented individuals from attending trial sessions for seemingly trivial reasons, such as banning female relatives from attending due to the absence of women officers to inspect the women upon entry to the courtroom. According to the Ministry of Justice, authorities may close a trial depending on the sensitivity of the case to national security, the reputation of the defendant, or the safety of witnesses.

Representatives of the Saudi Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Justice, and sometimes representatives of the state-controlled media regularly attended trials at the SCC in Riyadh.

According to the HRC, the government may, at its discretion, provide an attorney to indigents at public expense. November 2013 amendments to the Law of Criminal Procedure strengthened provisions stating authorities will offer defendants a lawyer at government expense. Nevertheless, the new Counterterrorism Law limits the right of defendants to access to legal representation--in cases defined by the government as terrorism--to an unspecified period “before the matter goes to court within a timeframe determined by the investigative entity.”

The law provides defendants the right to be present at trial and to consult with an attorney during the investigation and trial. There is no right to access government-held evidence. Defendants may request to review evidence and the court decides whether to grant the request. Defendants also have the right to confront or question witnesses against them and call witnesses on their behalf, but the court presents the witnesses. The law provides that an investigator appointed by the BIP questions the witnesses called by the litigants before the initiation of a trial and may hear testimony of additional witnesses he deems necessary to determine the facts. A defendant may not be compelled to take an oath or be subjected to any coercive measures. The court must inform convicted persons of their right to appeal rulings.

Sharia as interpreted by the government extends these provisions to all citizens and noncitizens; however, the law and practice discriminate against women, nonpracticing Sunni, Shia, foreigners, and persons of other religions. For example, judges may discount the testimony of nonpracticing Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, or persons of other religions; sources reported judges sometimes completely disregarded or refused to hear testimony by Shia.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

The number of political prisoners or detainees who reportedly remained in prolonged detention without charge could not be reliably ascertained.

In many cases it was impossible to determine the legal basis for incarceration and whether the detention complied with international norms and standards. Those who remained imprisoned after trial were often convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and there was not sufficient public information about such alleged crimes to judge whether they had a credible claim to being political prisoners. The SCC tried a small number of political prisoners each year for actions unrelated to terrorism or violence against the state.

### **Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies**

Complainants claiming human rights violations generally sought assistance from the HRC or NSHR, which either advocated on their behalf or provided courts with opinions on their cases. The HRC generally responded to complaints; domestic violence cases were the most common. Individuals or organizations also may petition directly for damages or government action to end human rights violations before the Board of Grievances except in compensation cases related to state security where the SCC handles remediation. The new Counterterrorism Law contains a provision allowing detainees in Mabath-run prisons to request financial compensation from the Ministry of Interior for wrongful detention beyond their prison terms.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The law prohibits unlawful intrusions into the privacy of persons, their homes, places of work, and vehicles. Criminal investigation officers are required to maintain records of all searches conducted; these records should contain the name of the officer conducting the search, the text of the search warrant (or an explanation of the urgency that necessitated the search without a warrant), and the names and signatures of the persons who were present at the time of search. While the law also provides for the privacy of all mail, telegrams, telephone conversations, and other means of communication, the government did not respect the privacy of correspondence or communications, and the government used the considerable latitude provided by law to monitor activities legally and intervene where it deemed necessary.

There were reports from human rights activists of governmental monitoring or blocking mobile telephone or internet usage before planned demonstrations. The government strictly monitored politically related activities and took punitive actions, including arrest and detention, against persons who engaged in certain political activities, such as direct public criticism of some senior royals by name, forming a political party, or organizing a demonstration. Customs officials reportedly routinely opened mail and shipments to search for contraband. In some areas Ministry of Interior informants allegedly reported “seditious ideas,” “antigovernment activity,” or “behavior contrary to Islam” in their neighborhoods.

The CPVPV monitored and regulated public interaction between members of the opposite sex. On February 26, Tabuk governorate ordered members of the CPVPV in their jurisdiction not to contact women’s families when they arrested them for “moral cases,” which included those involving contact with the opposite sex. The governorate claimed reporting these cases “prematurely” would create problems for the women and render them unable to marry.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

Civil law does not protect human rights, including freedoms of speech and of the press; only local interpretation and the practice of sharia protect these rights. There were frequent reports of restrictions on free speech. The Basic Law specifies “mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and polite language, contribute towards the education of the nation, and strengthen unity. The media is prohibited from committing acts that lead to disorder and division, affect the security of the state or its public relations, or undermine human dignity and rights.” Authorities are responsible for regulating and determining which speech or expression undermines internal security.

On February 1, the Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist-Financing (CT law) went into effect following its approval by the Council of Ministers in December 2013. For the first time, the law officially defines and criminalizes terrorism and terrorist financing in the criminal code; however, the legal definition of terrorism is extremely broad, defining a terrorist crime (in part) as “any act...intended to disturb the public order of the state...or insult the reputation of the state or its position.”

Saudi human rights activists and international human rights organizations criticized the law for its vague definition of terrorism and complained that the government could use it to prosecute peaceful dissidents for “insulting the state.” The new CT law allows the Ministry of Interior to access a terrorism suspect’s banking information and private communications in a manner inconsistent with the legal protections provided by criminal procedure law.

On February 3, a subsequent royal decree set prison sentences for broadly defined terrorist crimes for the first time in the criminal code.

The Press and Publications Law states violators can be fined up to 500,000 riyals (\$133,000) for each violation of the law, which is doubled if the violation is repeated. Other penalties include banning individuals from writing. Formally, the Violations Considerations Committee in the Ministry of Culture and Information has responsibility for the law; however, sharia court judges, who consider these issues regularly, exercised wide discretion in interpreting the law, which made it unclear which expression accords with the law.

Government-friendly ownership of print or broadcast media led to self-censorship, and there was relatively little need for overt government action to restrict freedom of expression. The government, however, could not rely on self-censoring in social media and the internet. Accordingly, to control information it monitored and blocked certain internet sites. On a number of occasions, government officials and senior clerics publicly warned against inaccurate reports on the internet and reminded the public that criticism of the government and its officials should be done through available private channels. The government charged those using the internet to express dissent with subversion, blasphemy, and apostasy.

Freedom of Speech: The government monitored public expressions of opinion and took advantage of legal controls to impede the free expression of opinion and restrict those verging on the political sphere. The government prohibits public employees from directly or indirectly engaging in dialogue with local or foreign media or participating in any meetings intended to oppose state policies. The law forbids apostasy and blasphemy, which legally can carry the death penalty, although there have not been any recent instances of death sentences for these crimes. Statements authorities construed as constituting defamation of the king, monarchy, governing system, or the al-Saud family resulted in criminal charges for several Saudis advocating government reform.

Press Freedoms: The Press and Publications Law, which extends explicitly to internet communications, governs printed materials; printing presses; bookstores; the import, rental, and sale of films; television and radio; and foreign media offices and their correspondents. In 2011 a royal decree amended the law to strengthen penalties and created a special commission to judge violations. The decree bans publishing anything “contradicting sharia; inciting disruption; serving foreign interests that contradict national interests; and damaging the reputation of the Grand Mufti, members of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, or senior government officials.” The Ministry of Culture and Information may permanently close “whenever necessary” any means of communication--defined as any means of expressing any viewpoint that is meant for circulation--that it deems is engaged in a prohibited activity as set forth in the 2011 royal decree.

Satellite dish usage was widespread. Although satellite dishes were technically illegal, the government did not enforce restrictions on satellite dishes. Access to foreign sources of information, including the internet,

was common, but the government blocked access to some internet sites it considered objectionable. Privately owned satellite television networks headquartered outside the country maintained local offices and operated under a system of self-censorship. Many foreign satellite stations broadcast a wide range of programs into the country, in English and Arabic, including foreign news channels such as CNN, Fox, BBC, Sky, and al-Jazeera. Foreign media were subject to licensing requirements from the Ministry of Culture and Information and could not operate freely.

The Ministry of Culture and Information must approve the appointment of all senior editors and has authority to remove them. The government provides guidelines to newspapers regarding controversial issues. A 1982 media policy statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote Arab interests, and preserve cultural heritage. The Saudi Press Agency reported official government news.

All newspapers in the country must be government-licensed. Media outlets legally can be banned or have their publication temporarily halted if the government concludes they violated the Press and Publications Law.

**Violence and Harassment:** Authorities subjected journalists to arrests, imprisonment, and harassment during the year. On March 4, the SCC of Appeals upheld the sentences of two journalists from the Eastern Province, Habib Ali al-Maatiq and Hussein Malik al-Salam, and increased their prison terms to two years and five years, respectively. Authorities originally detained the two journalists in 2012; they had reported on protests in Qatif for the Al-Fajr Cultural Network news websites.

**Censorship or Content Restrictions:** The government owned, operated, and censored most domestic television and radio outlets. The government reportedly penalized those who published items counter to government guidelines and directly or indirectly censored the media by licensing domestic media and by controlling importation of foreign printed material. Authorities prevented or delayed the distribution of foreign print media, effectively censoring these publications. In some cases, however, individuals criticized specific government bodies or actions publicly without repercussions..

The Consultative Council (Majlis as-Shura), an advisory body, frequently allowed print and broadcast media to observe its proceedings and meetings, but the council closed some high-profile or controversial sessions to the media.

**Libel Laws/National Security:** There were no reports during the year of the government using libel laws to suppress publication of material that criticized policies or public officials.

### **Internet Freedom**

There were government restrictions on access to the internet and credible reports the government monitored e-mails and internet chat rooms. Activists complained of monitoring or attempted monitoring of their communications on web-based communications applications. Internet access was widely available to and used by citizens of the country. The Press and Publications Law implicitly covers electronic media, since it extends to any means of expression of a viewpoint meant for circulation, ranging from words to cartoons, photographs, and sounds. In 2011 the government issued "Implementing Regulations for Electronic Publishing," setting rules for internet-based and other electronic media, including chat rooms, personal blogs, and text messages. Security authorities actively monitored internet activity.

The Press and Publications Law criminalizes the publication or downloading of offensive sites. The governmental Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) filtered and blocked access to websites it deemed offensive, including pages calling for political, social, or economic reforms or human rights. In addition to blocking the websites of local and international human rights NGOs in the country, during the year authorities also blocked access to the websites of expatriate Saudi dissidents such as Ali al-Demainy and the website for the October 26 Women's Driving Campaign. Security regulations require internet cafe owners to install cameras and maintain records on their users.

The Ministry of Culture and Information or its agencies must authorize all websites registered and hosted in the country. During the year the government created a General Commission for Audiovisual Media and assigned the new entity responsibility for regulating all audio and video content in the country, including satellite channels, film, music, internet, and mobile applications, independent from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

On August 17, the CPVPV confirmed it actively coordinated with the CITC to block pornography and websites that promoted unorthodox or “ill informed” views on religion. According to HRW independent security researchers in June identified surveillance software that appeared to target individuals in Qatif in the Eastern Province, where a large proportion of the kingdom’s Shia religious minority live. The researchers discovered an altered version of an application for mobile phones, which, if installed, would allow the government to access information, including call history, e-mail, and text messaging.

According to the NGO Reporters Without Borders, authorities claimed to have blocked cumulatively approximately 400,000 websites. The CITC claimed Facebook removed materials the CITC deemed offensive, but Twitter ignored all CITC requests. On October 21, Grand Mufti Abdul Aziz Al Shaikh described Twitter as “the repository of scourge and evil and the source of lies and falsehoods.”

Access to the internet was legally available only through government-authorized internet service providers. Although the authorities blocked websites offering proxies, persistent internet users accessed the unfiltered internet via other means. In February the CITC blocked access in the country to 41 local news websites for failing to obtain the requisite licensing and permissions from the Ministry of Culture and Information.

Laws criminalize defamation on the internet, hacking, unauthorized access to government websites, and stealing information related to national security, as well as the creation or dissemination of a website for a terrorist organization. The government reportedly collected personally identifiable information concerning the identity of persons peacefully expressing political, religious, or ideological opinions or beliefs. On October 27, a court sentenced lawyer Abdulrahman al-Subaihi to eight years in prison and lawyers Bander al-Nogaithan and Abdulrahman al-Rumaih to five years in prison for “undermining and slandering the judicial system” via critical tweets and for “disobeying the ruler.” Authorities also imposed international travel bans and restricted their postings on social media.

#### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government censored public artistic expression, prohibited cinemas, and restricted public musical or theatrical performances apart from those considered folkloric and special events approved by the government. Academics reportedly practiced self-censorship, and authorities prohibited professors and administrators at public universities from hosting meetings at their universities with foreign academics or diplomats without prior government permission.

#### **Freedom of Assembly**

The law requires a government permit for an organized public assembly of any type. The government categorically forbids participation in political protests or unauthorized public assemblies. Security forces reportedly arrested demonstrators and detained them for brief periods.

As in 2013 security forces allowed a small number of unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country, despite a 2011 Ministry of Interior statement that demonstrations were banned and that it would take “all necessary measures” against those seeking to “disrupt order,” demonstrations were less frequent during the year. In 2011 the Council of Senior Religious Scholars reinforced the government’s stance, stating, “demonstrations are prohibited in this country” and explaining that “the correct way in sharia of realizing common interests is by advising.”

Throughout the year authorities continued to allow occasional small demonstrations in the Eastern Province city of Qatif. Activists reported security forces used intimidation to discourage persons from joining demonstrations as a general practice. There were also reports of security forces firing bullets in the air to disperse crowds. Videos posted on YouTube portrayed residents, largely Shia, protesting alleged systematic discrimination and neglect in public investment while showing antigovernment slogans written on walls.

In contrast to previous years, there were no significant protests by family members of long-term detainees in Mabath-run prisons. Most protests during the year occurred in the Eastern Province, although the size and number of protests decreased significantly over 2013. On the night of October 15, demonstrators held several peaceful marches in the Qatif area to protest the death sentence of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Observers estimated the largest of these had 500 attendees. There were no reported arrests or clashes with security personnel.

#### **Freedom of Association**

The law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and comply with its regulations. Some groups that advocated changing elements of the social or political order reported their licensing requests went unanswered for years despite repeated inquiries. The ministry reportedly used arbitrary means, such as requiring unreasonable types and quantities of information, effectively denying licenses to associations. As of year's end, the Council of Ministers had not acted on a proposed law on NGOs, which the Consultative Council endorsed in 2008. The law only provides for the establishment of philanthropic and charitable societies. Organizations that have social or research mandates require royal backing to avoid government interference or prosecution.

### **Freedom of Movement**

The law does not contain provisions for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government generally cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. In July the government contributed 330 million riyals (\$88 million) to the United Nations to support humanitarian aid for internally displaced and conflict-affected persons in Iraq.

In-country Movement: The government generally did not restrict the free movement of male citizens within the country, but it severely restricted the movement of female citizens. Authorities respected the right of citizens to change residence or workplace, provided they held a national identification card (NIC). The law requires all male citizens 15 years old or older to possess an NIC. In 2012 the Ministry of Interior announced it would start issuing NICs to all female citizens at 15 years of age, phasing in the requirement over a seven-year period. In September 2013 the ministry stated it had issued only 1.5 million NICs since 2002 to women; the country's female population was approximately 9.8 million.

The guardianship system requires a woman to have the permission of her male guardian (normally a father, husband, son, brother, grandfather, uncle, or other male relative) to move freely in the country. The government prohibited women from driving motor vehicles. On July 16, authorities arrested women's rights activist Aliya al-Fareed in the town of Safwa in al-Qatif governorate in Eastern Province for driving without a license. Despite her husband refusal to sign a pledge to prevent her from engaging in similar activity in the future, traffic police released al-Fareed the same day and fined her 1,110 riyal (\$295).

Foreign Travel: There are severe restrictions on foreign travel, including for women and members of minority groups. No one may leave the country without an exit visa and a passport. Women under the age of 45, minors (men younger than 21), and other dependents or foreign citizen workers under sponsorship require a male guardian's consent to travel abroad. A noncitizen wife needs permission from her husband to travel unless both partners sign a prenuptial agreement permitting the noncitizen wife to travel without the husband's permission. Government entities and male family members can "blacklist" women and minor children, prohibiting their travel. The male guardian is legally able in custody disputes to prevent even adult children from leaving the country.

Employers or sponsors controlled the departure of foreign workers and residents from the country; employers/sponsors were responsible for processing residence permits and exit visas on their behalf. Sponsors frequently held their employees' passports against the desires of the employees, despite a law specifically prohibiting this practice. Typically, foreign workers provide sponsors with their residence permit (iqama) before traveling in exchange for their passport to ensure the worker's return to their employer after their travel. The government continued to impose international travel bans as part of criminal sentences. The government on occasion reportedly confiscated passports and revoked the rights of some citizens to travel for political reasons but often did not provide them with notification or opportunity to contest the restriction.

The UNHCR unofficially estimated there were 70,000 stateless persons in the country, almost all of whom were native-born Arab residents known locally as bidoon (an Arabic word that means "without" [citizenship]).

Bidoon are persons whose ancestors failed to obtain nationality, such as descendants of nomadic tribes not counted among the native tribes during the reign of the country's founder, King Abdulaziz; descendants of foreign-born fathers who arrived before there were laws regulating citizenship; and rural migrants whose

parents failed to register their births. As noncitizens, bidoon are unable to obtain passports or travel abroad. The government sometimes denied them employment and educational opportunities, and their marginalized status made them among the poorest residents of the country. In recent years the Ministry of Education encouraged them to attend school. The government issues bidoon five-year residency permits to facilitate their social integration in government-provided health care and other services, putting them on similar footing with sponsored foreign workers. Additionally, in August the General Directorate of Passports began to issue special identity cards to bidoon similar to residency permits issued to foreigners in the country but with features entitling their holders to additional government services similar to those available to Saudi nationals.

There were also some Baloch, West Africans, and Rohingya Muslims from Burma; however, only a portion of these communities was stateless. For example, many Rohingya had expired passports their home government refused to renew. The UNHCR estimated there were between 250,000 to 500,000 Rohingya in the kingdom; some of these individuals benefited from a program to correct their residency status during the year; the government issued approximately 200,000 four-year residency permits by year's end. Only an estimated 2,000 individuals of Rohingya origin had Saudi citizenship. There also were between 300,000 and 400,000 Palestinian residents not registered as refugees, as well as between 750,000 and one million Syrian nationals in the kingdom, although most of these arrived prior to the 2011 outbreak of the conflict in Syria.

### **Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The law does not provide citizens the ability to change their government peacefully and establishes an absolute monarchy led by the Al Saud family as the political system. The law provides citizens the right to communicate with public authorities on any matter and establishes the government on the principle of consultation (shura). The king and senior officials, including ministers and regional governors, are required to be available by holding meetings (majlis), open-door events where in theory any male citizen or noncitizen may express an opinion or a grievance without the need for an appointment. Most government ministries and agencies had women's sections to interact with female citizens and noncitizens, and at least two regional governorates hired female employees to receive women's petitions and arrange meetings for women with complaints for, or requests of, the governor. Only a few members of the ruling family have a voice in the choice of leaders, the composition of the government, or changes to the political system. The Allegiance Commission, composed of up to 35 senior princes appointed by the king, is responsible for selecting a king and crown prince upon the death or incapacitation of either.

Recent Elections: On September 16, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs issued a decision extending the term of the current municipal councils, elected in 2011, by two years. The current elected councils were scheduled to end their terms on September 2, 2015, but now are expected to continue until September 2017. In 2011, following a two-year postponement, the government held elections for the second time since 1963 for the country's 285 municipal councils. Elected candidates filled half of the 1,632 seats, while the king appointed the other half. As in the first elections in 2005, participation was limited to civilian male citizens at least 21 years old. Uniformed members of the security forces, including the military and police, were ineligible to vote. According to the Municipal Council Elections Committee, there was no legal prohibition against women voting; however, as in 2005 the committee cited logistical and other technical reasons to explain why women were not allowed to vote or run for office.

More than 1,700 lawyers from the National Committee of Lawyers monitored the elections nationally, and the organization assessed the elections were fair and transparent. The NSHR, however, refused to observe the elections, protesting women's ineligibility to vote or seek election. Election regulations prohibited candidates from contesting under party affiliation.

Political Parties and Political Participation: There were no political parties or similar associations. The law does not protect the right of individuals to organize politically. The new CT law, issued in February, explicitly banned a number of organizations that also have political wings, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as regional and local terrorist groups. The government continued to regard human rights organizations, such as ACPRA, as illegal political movements and treated them accordingly.

In April the government-controlled press cited plans by the Ministry of Justice to exclude lawyers from practicing law if they proved to be members of organizations and parties that "incriminated" the government.

The statute governing the practice of the legal profession in the kingdom states authorities may terminate a lawyer's license if a court sentenced the lawyer for a "dishonorable or dishonest crime."

Participation of Women and Minorities: Discrimination excluded women from many aspects of public life, including from formal decision-making positions. Nevertheless, women increasingly participated in political life, albeit with significantly less status than men. In January 2013 the king issued a royal decree changing the governance of the Consultative Council, the 150-person royally appointed body that advises the king and can propose laws. The changes mandate women constitute no less than 20 percent of the membership of the Consultative Council. In accordance with the law, the council inducted 30 women as full members in February 2013.

On February 18, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs announced in its regulations governing the next municipal council elections women will have the right to contest the elections "without discrimination," reaffirming a 2011 decree by the king.

There were no women on the High Court or Supreme Judicial Council; women's ability to practice law is severely limited. There were no women judges or public prosecutors. There were two women in senior-level government positions, as deputy minister for women's education and general supervisor for women's higher education, in addition to senior advisors in multiple ministries. The country had an increasing number of female diplomats. Bureaucratic procedures largely restricted women working in the security services to employment in female prisons, at women's universities, and in clerical positions in police stations where they were responsible for visually identifying other women for law enforcement purposes.

No laws prevent male minorities from participating in political life on the same basis as other male citizens. Societal discrimination marginalized the Shia population. Tribal factors and longstanding traditions continued to dictate many individual appointments to positions. Unofficially, government authorities will not appoint a Bedouin tribesman to a high-ranking cabinet-level position, and Bedouins can only reach the rank of major general in the armed forces. All members of the cabinet who were tribal were not members of Bedouin tribes but urbanized "Hamael" tribes. Exceptions are sometimes made when a person marries into the Al Saud family.

While the religious affiliation of Consultative Council members was not known publicly, the council included an estimated seven or eight Shia members. In contrast to previous years, the cabinet contained one religious minority member. On June 28, the king appointed Mohammad bin Faisal Abu Saq, a Shiite, as minister of state and member of the cabinet for consultative council affairs. Multiple municipal councils in the Eastern Province, where most Shia are concentrated, had large proportions of Shia as members to reflect the local population, including a majority in Qatif and 50 percent in al-Hasa. Eastern Province Shia judges dealing with intra-Shia personal status and family laws operated specialized courts during the year.

Additionally, according to Eastern Province observers, in areas populated by Sunni and Shia, since the government appoints half of the seats on municipal councils, it frequently appointed members of either sect to councils to ensure equitable sectarian representation.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government**

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively, some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and perceptions of corruption persisted in some sectors.

Government employees who accept bribes face 10 years in prison or fines up to one million riyals (\$267,000). The National Anticorruption Commission (Nazaha), established by the king in 2011, was responsible for promoting transparency and combating all forms of financial and administrative corruption. The government resourced the commission adequately; it issued numerous publications and undertook awareness campaigns on the religious necessity to combat corruption, both governmental and business. The commission's ministerial-level director reported directly to the king. In January the Nazaha reported it had investigated and followed up on 10,479 reports of graft and financial irregularities and 2,620 cases of corruption during 2013. During the year the commission actively campaigned against corruption and had a hotline for reporting such abuses. The CIB, however, remains responsible for investigating financial malfeasance, and the BIP has the lead on all criminal investigations. In November the Nazaha issued a report criticizing cabinet ministers and top government officials for impeding the commission's work and not cooperating with corruption



investigations; however, the report did not specifically name any officials. The Human Rights Council also responded to and researched complaints of corruption. Provincial governors and other members of the royal family paid compensation to victims of corruption during weekly majlis meetings where citizens raised complaints.

Financial Disclosure: Public officials were not subject to financial disclosure laws.

Public Access to Information: The law does not provide for, and there is no right to, public access to government information, such as ministerial budgets or allocations to members of the royal family.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights**

The government did not allow international human rights NGOs to be based in the country but allowed representatives to visit on a limited basis. There were no transparent standards governing visits by international NGO representatives. The law provides that “the State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic sharia”; the government restricted the activities of domestic and international human rights organizations.

The government viewed unlicensed human rights groups with suspicion, frequently blocking their websites and charging their founders with founding and operating an unlicensed organization. ACPRA applied for a license in 2008, which was not granted; however, the government allowed its unlicensed operation. Since the group was formally “unlicensed,” it remained unclear which activities the group could undertake without risking punishment. Without a license the group was unable to raise operating funds legally, which limited its activities, and a March 2013 court order ordered disestablishment of the group and confiscation of its assets. Following the issuance of the new CT law in March, the Adala Center for Human Rights (a human rights NGO based in Eastern Province), announced that it would cease operations (see section 2.b.).

The Human Rights Commission stated the government welcomed visits by legitimate, unbiased human rights groups, but added the government could not act on the “hundreds of requests,” in part because it was cumbersome to decide which domestic agencies would be their interlocutor.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The HRC is part of the government and requires the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before meeting with diplomats, academics, or researchers with international human rights organizations. The HRC president has ministerial status and reports to the king. According to the NSHR’s 2009 report, the HRC “met with weak collaboration on the part of some governmental bodies in spite of the issuance of royal directives.” The well-resourced HRC was effective in highlighting problems and registering and responding to complaints received, but its capacity to effect change was more limited. The HRC worked directly with the Royal Diwan and the Council of Ministers; with a committee composed of representatives of the Consultative Council and the ministries of labor, social affairs, and interior; and with Consultative Council committees for the judiciary, Islamic affairs, and human rights. During the year the HRC and NSHR were more outspoken in areas deemed less politically sensitive, including child abuse, child marriage, prison conditions, and cases of individuals detained beyond their prescribed prison sentences. They avoided topics such as protests or cases of political activists or reformists that would require directly confronting government authorities. The HRC board’s 19 full-time members included at least three Shia; they received and responded to complaints submitted to them by their constituencies, including issues related to religious freedom and women’s rights. The Consultative Council’s Human Rights Committee also actively followed cases and included women and Shia among its members; a woman served as deputy chairperson of the committee.

### **UAE<sup>322</sup>**

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven semiautonomous emirates with a resident population of approximately 9.3 million, of whom an estimated 11.5 percent are citizens. The rulers of the seven emirates constitute the Federal Supreme Council, the country’s highest legislative and executive body. The council selects a president and a vice president from its membership, and the president appoints the prime minister and cabinet. In 2009 the council selected Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi emirate, to a second five-year term as president.

The emirates are under patriarchal rule with political allegiance defined by loyalty to tribal leaders, leaders of the individual emirates, and leaders of the federation. There are limited democratically elected institutions

but no political parties. A limited appointed electorate participates in periodic elections for the Federal National Council (FNC), a consultative body that can examine, review, and recommend changes to legislation, consisting of 40 representatives allocated proportionally to each emirate based on population. In 2011 the appointed electorate of approximately 129,000 citizens elected 20 FNC members, and the rulers of the individual emirates appointed the other 20. Citizens can express their concerns directly to their leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms such as the open majlis (forum). Topics of legislation can also emerge through discussions and debates in the FNC. Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.

The three most significant human rights problems were citizens' inability to change their government; limitations on citizens' civil liberties (including the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and internet use); and arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and lengthy pretrial detentions.

Other reported human rights problems included police and prison guard brutality. The government continued to interfere with citizens' privacy rights, including increased arrests and detentions following individuals' internet postings or commentary. There were limited reports of corruption, and the government lacked transparency and judicial independence. Domestic abuse and violence against women remained problems. Noncitizens faced legal and societal discrimination. Legal and societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS and based on sexual orientation and gender identity remained problems. Trafficking in persons, mistreatment and sexual abuse of foreign domestic servants and other migrant workers, and discrimination against persons with disabilities remained problems, although the government took steps to prevent them. The government restricted worker rights.

During the year the government reported it took steps to investigate allegations of mistreatment and abuse made by detainees.

#### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.

#### **Disappearance**

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

#### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution prohibits such practices, but there were several reports of police and prison guard brutality, including the report of Gabriela Knaul, the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. There were additional reports that unidentified members of the security forces mistreated and abused detainees. The government conducted internal investigation into allegations of abuse or illegal activity and, if necessary, prosecuted officers.

In June the State Security Circuit of the country's Federal Supreme Court issued sentences for seven of nine alleged members of an al-Qaida cell arrested in 2013. During the trial the judge ordered a medical investigation of the accused after they alleged prison guards mistreated and harassed them. According to the judge, that investigation revealed no signs of injury or torture.

Sharia (Islamic law) courts, which adjudicate criminal and family law, have the option of imposing flogging as punishment for adultery, prostitution, consensual premarital sex, pregnancy outside marriage, defamation of character, and drug or alcohol abuse. The penal code also requires all individuals to pay diya (blood money) to victims' families in cases where accidents or crimes caused the death of another person. There were reports that courts imposed these punishments during the year.

#### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Prison conditions varied widely among the individual emirates. Prisons were generally clean and, despite allegations to the contrary, there was generally no evidence of rape, violence, or beatings by prison guards. There were, however, unconfirmed reports that police and prison guards mistreated individuals.

Physical Conditions: The government did not release statistics on prison demographics and capacity. Some prisoners in Dubai reported poor sanitary conditions, inadequate lighting, and poor temperature control. Some prisons were reportedly overcrowded, especially in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

There were no reports of prisoners dying while in custody due to physical abuse. Prisoners had access to potable water, and food was adequate. There was no information available on whether prisoners with HIV/AIDS received appropriate health care.

Administration: Authorities kept adequate prison records but did not make records public. Judicial authorities did not use alternatives to sentencing for nonviolent offenders. Ombudsmen cannot serve on behalf of prisoners and detainees. Prisoners had access to visitors, but it was unclear if authorities permitted religious observance. Prisoners had a right to submit complaints to judicial authorities; however, details about investigations into complaints were not publicly available.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted charitable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to visit prisons and provide material support. Members of the government-sanctioned Emirates Human Rights Association (EHRA) met with federal Ministry of Interior officials and prisoners during visits to several detention facilities.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, there were reports that the government held persons in official custody without charge or a preliminary judicial hearing. The Ministry of Interior detained foreign residents arbitrarily at times. The law indirectly permits indefinite, routine, and incommunicado detention without appeal through exceptions for state security and extensions of detention. Authorities determined whether detainees could contact attorneys, family members, or others after an indefinite or unspecified period.

At times authorities treated prisoners arrested for political or security reasons differently from other prisoners. The government often held prisoners and detainees arrested for state security reasons in separate locations and, at times, did not provide consular notification to the appropriate diplomatic missions in the case of detained foreign nationals.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

Each of the seven emirates maintains a local police force called a general directorate, which is officially a branch of the federal Ministry of Interior. All emirate-level police general directorates enforce their respective emirate's laws autonomously. The emirate-level police general directorates also enforce the country's federal laws within their emirate in coordination with each other and under the ministry's auspices, but the manner in which they do so varied. The federal government maintains federal armed forces for external security. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over emirate-level police and federal security forces.

The Ministry of Interior has broad authority to investigate abuses. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over the local police forces, and the government had effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving security forces during the year.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

Police stations received complaints from the public, made arrests, and forwarded cases to the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor then transferred cases to the courts. The law prohibits arrest or search of citizens without probable cause; however, incidents occurred. There were reports that security forces failed to obtain warrants in some cases. Police must report an arrest within 48 hours to the public prosecutor, who then must determine within 24 hours whether to charge, release, or further detain the suspect. The public prosecutor did not always meet the 24-hour time limit, although police usually adhered to the 48-hour deadline. Prosecutors are required to submit charges to a court within 14 days of the police report and to inform detainees of the charges against them; however, this was not always done.

At the sole discretion of emirate-level prosecutors, foreign nationals had their passports taken during investigations. There were reported cases of foreign nationals who faced significant difficulties because of the seizure of their passports. Some also had travel bans placed on their names in immigration systems. Authorities did not lift travel bans until the completion of a case through the judicial system. In cases of technical and complex violations of the law, particularly in the investigation of financial crimes, travel bans remained in place for three years or more.

Public prosecutors may order detainees held as long as 21 days without charge or longer with a court order. Judges may not grant an extension of more than 30 days of detention without charge; however, they may

renew 30-day extensions indefinitely. Public prosecutors may hold suspects in terrorism-related cases without charge for six months. Once authorities charge a suspect with terrorism, the Supreme Court may extend the detention indefinitely.

There is no formal system of bail; however, authorities can temporarily release detainees who deposit money, a passport, or an unsecured personal guarantee statement signed by a third party. In accordance with the law, authorities may deny release to defendants in cases involving loss of life, including involuntary manslaughter. Authorities released some prisoners detained on charges related to a person's death after the prisoners completed diya payments.

A defendant is entitled to an attorney after police have completed their investigation. Police sometimes questioned the accused for weeks without permitting them access to an attorney. The government may provide counsel at its discretion to indigent defendants charged with felonies that are punishable by imprisonment of three to 15 years. The law requires the government to provide counsel in cases in which indigent defendants face punishments of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Authorities generally granted family members prompt access to those arrested on charges unrelated to state security; however, authorities held some persons incommunicado.

Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports that the government committed arbitrary arrests, notably in cases that allegedly violated state security regulations.

The government held citizens and noncitizens incommunicado and at undisclosed locations.

Pretrial Detention: According to reports, pretrial detention was in some cases arbitrarily lengthy. There was no estimate available on the percentage of the prison population in pretrial status.

Amnesty: On religious and national holidays or after returning from long periods of convalescence overseas, rulers of each emirate regularly pardoned and paid the debts of many prisoners. According to press reports, rulers pardoned at least 1,750 prisoners during Ramadan and subsequent national holidays and paid some prisoners' debts during the year.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial: Trial Procedures**

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, court decisions remained subject to review by the political leadership and influenced by nepotism. There were reports that the State Security Department interfered in judicial affairs. The judiciary consisted largely of contracted foreign nationals subject to potential deportation, further compromising its independence from the government. There is no functional separation between the executive and judicial branches.

By tradition the local rulers' offices, or diwans, maintained the practice of reviewing criminal and civil offenses before they referred cases to prosecutors. They also reviewed sentences that judges passed, returned cases to the court on appeal if they did not approve of the verdicts, and had to approve the release of every prisoner who had completed a sentence. The diwans' involvement--usually in cases between two citizens or between a citizen and a noncitizen--led to lengthy delays prior to and following the judicial process and lengthened the time defendants served in prison. Authorities considered a diwan's decision in any court case as final. If a judge and a diwan disagreed, the diwan's decision prevailed.

The constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and the judiciary generally enforced this right.

The law presumes defendants innocent until proven guilty. According to the law, a defendant enjoys the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges and the right not to be compelled to testify or confess. The constitution provides the right to a public trial, except in national security cases or cases the judge deems harmful to public morality. Consistent with the civil law system, there are no jury trials. Defendants have the right to be present at their trials and have a limited right to legal counsel in court. While awaiting a decision on official charges at the police station or the prosecutor's office, a defendant is not entitled to legal counsel.

In all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment, the defendant has a right to government-provided counsel. The government may also provide counsel, at its discretion, to indigent defendants charged with felonies punishable by imprisonment of three to 15 years. The law provides prosecutors discretion to bar defense counsel from any investigation. Defendants and their attorneys can present witnesses and question witnesses against them, but this did not always happen. Defense counsel has the right to access relevant government-held evidence, but this did not always occur, especially in state security cases.

Each court system has an appeals process. Convicted defendants may appeal death sentences to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense is committed or to the president of the federation. In murder cases, consent of the victim's family is required to commute a death sentence. The government normally negotiated with victims' families for the defendant to offer diya in exchange for forgiveness and a commuted death sentence. In cases that end in acquittals, the prosecutor may appeal and provide new or additional evidence to a higher court. An appellate court must reach unanimous agreement to overturn an acquittal.

The law requires all court proceedings to be conducted in Arabic. Despite the defendant's procedural right to an interpreter, in some cases involving deportation of illegal residents, the court provided interpretation only at sentencing. Defense counsel often used an interpreter to communicate with the defendant. In cases involving foreign defendants, especially for crimes of moral turpitude, authorities sometimes deported the defendants immediately based solely on allegations.

Foreigners charged with financial crimes are, in some cases, permitted to defend their cases under bail status at the judge's discretion.

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

During the year there were persons reportedly held incommunicado and without charge for unknown reasons.

### **Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

The constitution prohibits entry into a home without the owner's permission, except when police present a lawful warrant, but there were credible reports that security forces occasionally failed to obtain warrants. Officers' actions in searching premises were subject to review by the Ministry of Interior, and officers were liable to disciplinary action if authorities judged their actions irresponsible.

The constitution provides for freedom and confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, and all other means of communication. There were reports, however, that the government censored some incoming international mail, wiretapped telephones, and monitored outgoing mail and electronic forms of communication without legal process.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the law prohibits criticism of national rulers and speech that may create or encourage social unrest; the government restricted the freedoms of speech and press.

Freedom of Speech: After the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, authorities severely restricted public criticism of the government and ministers. During the year the government continued to make arrests or impose other restrictions reportedly related to Islamist political activities and calls for democratic reforms.

Press Freedoms: Except for media outlets located in Dubai and Abu Dhabi's free trade zones (and media targeted at foreign residents), the government owned most newspapers, television stations, and radio stations. All conformed to unpublished government reporting guidelines. The government also influenced the privately owned media, particularly through the National Media Council (NMC), which directly oversaw all media content. Satellite-receiving dishes were widespread and provided access to international broadcasts without local censorship.

International media and human rights organizations, including Freedom House, stated the government banned certain journalists from entering the country. International NGOs categorized the press as not free.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: By law the NMC, whose members are appointed by the president, licenses and censors all publications, including private association publications. The law authorizes censorship of domestic and foreign publications to remove criticism of the government, ruling families, or friendly governments; statements that "threaten social stability;" and materials considered pornographic, excessively violent, derogatory to Islam, or supportive of certain Israeli government positions. According to the NMC and Dubai police officials, authorities did not give journalists specific publishing instructions; however, government officials reportedly warned journalists when they published material deemed politically or culturally sensitive. Journalists commonly practiced self-censorship regarding the issues they covered due to fear of government retribution, particularly since most journalists were foreign nationals and

could be deported. Authorities banned some books perceived as critical of the government, Islam, and Emirati and tribal culture.

### **Internet Freedom**

The government restricted access to some websites and monitored chat rooms, instant messaging services, and blogs. Authorities stated individuals could be imprisoned for the misuse of the internet. Self-censorship was apparent in many chat rooms and blogs, and there were reports that the Ministry of Interior monitored internet use in cyber cafes. The International Telecommunication Union estimated that 85 percent of the population had access to the internet. Two major internet service providers, both linked to the government, provided access via fixed and wireless technologies.

The country's two internet service providers used a proxy server to block materials deemed inconsistent with the country's values, as defined by the Ministry of Interior. Blocked material included pornographic websites and a wide variety of other sites deemed indecent, including those that dealt with dating and matrimony; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) issues; Baha'is, Judaism, and atheism; negative critiques of Islam; testimonies of former Muslims who converted to Christianity; those that explained how to circumvent the proxy servers; and some that originated in Israel. The proxy servers occasionally blocked broad categories of websites. The service providers populated their list of blocked sites primarily from lists purchased from private companies, although individuals could also report offensive sites to be blocked. Social and politically oriented sites remained either blocked or modified during the year. International media sites accessed using UAE internet providers contained filtered content. The government also blocked some sites that contained content critical of ruling families. The NMC was responsible for creating lists of blocked sites. Service providers did not have the authority to remove sites from blocked lists without government approval. The government also at least partially blocked voice-over-internet-protocol websites, such as Skype and FaceTime, by restricting downloads of the program and preventing Skype-to-telephone calls and FaceTime computer-to-computer calls. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority claimed that the government did not restrict Skype. The authorities, however, stated only an Emirati telecommunications provider could provide Skype services and that these companies needed to apply for permission to deliver Skype.

The law explicitly criminalizes use of the internet to commit a wide variety of offenses and provides fines and prison terms for internet users who violate political, social, and religious norms. The law also criminalizes acts commonly associated with cybercrime, such as hacking, phishing, and financial fraud. The law provides penalties for using the internet to oppose Islam, to proselytize Muslims to join other religions, to abuse a holy shrine or ritual of any religion, to insult any religion, to incite someone to commit sin, or to contravene family values by publishing news or photographs pertaining to a person's private life or family.

A cybercrime decree includes provisions that clarify existing limitations on freedom of speech extended to online communication, including social media. Prohibitions on expression include criticism or defamation of the government, its officials, and religion, as well as insulting neighboring countries or calling for protests and demonstrations. The decree also specifies increased punishments for violations.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government restricted academic freedom, including speech both inside and outside the classroom by educators, and censored academic materials for schools. The government required official permission for conferences that discussed political issues. Some organizations found it difficult to secure meeting space for public events that dealt with contentious issues.

### **Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association**

The constitution provides for the freedoms of assembly and association; however, the government did not respect these rights.

The law provides limited freedom of assembly. The government imposed some restrictions.

The law requires a government-issued permit for organized public gatherings. During the year authorities dispersed impromptu gatherings or protests and at times arrested participants. While there was no uniform standard for the number of persons who could gather, civil society representatives reported that authorities could ask groups of four or more to disperse if they did not have a permit. The government did not interfere

routinely with informal, nonpolitical gatherings held without a government permit in public places unless there were complaints. The government generally permitted political gatherings that aligned with its policies.

The law provides limited freedom of association. The government imposed some restrictions.

Political organizations, political parties, and trade unions are illegal. All associations and NGOs are required to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs, and many received government subsidies. Registration rules require that all voting organizational members, as well as boards of directors, must be Emirati; this excluded almost 90 percent of the population from fully participating in such organizations.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The law generally provides for freedom of movement within the country, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights; however, the government imposed certain legal restrictions on foreign travel. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations.

The lack of passports or other identity documents restricted the movement of stateless persons, both within the country and internationally.

Foreign Travel: Authorities generally did not permit male citizens involved in legal disputes under adjudication and noncitizens under investigation to travel abroad. Custom dictates that a husband can prevent his wife, minor children, and adult unmarried daughters from leaving the country by taking custody of their passports. Without passports persons without citizenship or proof of citizenship (known as bidoon) could not travel internationally.

Citizenship: The government may revoke naturalized citizens' passports and citizenship status for criminal or politically provocative actions. There were no reported cases of authorities revoking citizenship during the year.

### **Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The law does not provide citizens the right to change their government. Federal executive and legislative power is in the hands of the Federal Supreme Council, a body composed of the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates. It selects from its members the country's president and vice president. Decisions at the federal level generally represented consensus among the rulers, their families, and other leading families. The ruling families, in consultation with other prominent tribal figures, also choose new rulers of the emirates.

Citizens could express their concerns directly to their leaders through traditional consultative mechanisms such as the open majlis. Women attended some majlises, but male proxies reportedly voiced concerns of women in majlises closed to them. There were reports that authorities occasionally held women-only majlises.

Recent Elections: While there were no democratic general elections, in 2011 an appointed electorate of nearly 130,000 members elected 20 members of the FNC, a 40-member consultative body with increasing legislative authority. Each emirate receives seats in the FNC based on population. Each emirate's ruler appoints that emirate's portion of the other 20 FNC members. The electorate appointment process lacked transparency. Approximately 28 percent of eligible voters participated, electing one woman among the 20 FNC members, with another six appointed by their respective rulers. There were more than 460 candidates, some of whom publicly lobbied for greater legislative authority without retaliation from the government.

Political Parties and Political Participation: Citizens did not have the right to form political parties. There were no reports of citizens attempting to form political parties during the year.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Although some traditional practices discouraged women from engaging in political participation, the government prioritized women's participation in the 2011 FNC elections and in other areas. Women constituted 46 percent of the electoral pool appointed by the emirates' rulers and 18 percent of FNC candidates. There were four women in the 24-member cabinet, two of whom held ministerial portfolios, and seven women, one elected, who served in the FNC.

Except in the judiciary, religious and racial minorities (including Shia) did not serve in senior federal positions. Many judges were contracted foreign nationals.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in GovernmentShare**

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were isolated reports of government corruption.

Corruption: Nepotism and corrupt financial and legal practices existed. The Ministries of the Interior and Justice and the state audit institutions are responsible for combating government corruption; however, there were constraints on resources and independence that limited their effectiveness.

The government took steps to punish government corruption. For example, in May authorities sentenced two police officers to three years in jail for forging police reports.

Financial Disclosure: There are no financial disclosure laws, regulations, or codes of conduct requiring officials to disclose their income and assets.

Public Access to Information: The law provides for public access to government information, but the government followed this provision selectively. Requests for access usually went unanswered. There were no reports of public outreach activities or training for public officials to encourage the effective use of the law to access public information.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human RightsShare**

The government generally did not permit organizations to focus on political issues. Two recognized local human rights organizations existed at the beginning of the year: the government-supported EHRA, which focused on human rights issues and complaints such as those concerning labor rights, stateless persons' rights, and prisoners' well-being and humane treatment; and the government-subsidized Jurists' Association Human Rights Administration, which focused on human rights education and conducted seminars and symposia subject to government approval. A government prosecutor headed the EHRA, and other EHRA members worked at lower levels of the local and federal government. It received limited government funding. Nevertheless, the EHRA viewed itself as operating independently and with neutrality without government interference, apart from the requirements that apply to all associations in the country.

The government directed, regulated, and subsidized participation by NGO members in events outside the country. All participants had to obtain government permission before attending such events, even if they were not speakers.

## **Yemen<sup>323</sup>**

Yemen is a republic with a constitution that provides for a president, a parliament, and an independent judiciary. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh formally stepped down in 2012, when voters elected Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the sole consensus candidate, president in a vote generally considered free and fair. During the subsequent transition, elements of the transitional government sought to expand political participation to formerly excluded groups, such as women, youth, and minorities.

Throughout the year the Houthis, a Shia movement, forcefully expanded from their base in the northwest part of the country, capturing cities and taking over territory. By September they seized government buildings and key infrastructure. On September 21, 13 Yemeni parties signed a Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) to end the violence. On November 9, a largely technocratic, transitional cabinet was appointed per the PNPA. Previously, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) had met in 2013 and during the year to make recommendations for the country's political future. The transitional government was also to implement these outcomes. The Houthi incursion increased sectarian hostilities, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched numerous reprisal attacks. Authorities did not always maintain effective control over the security forces.

The most significant human rights problems were arbitrary killings, disappearances, kidnappings, and other extremist threats and violence committed by various groups and a weak and corrupt judicial system that did not provide for the rule of law.

Other human rights violations included the use of excessive force by government forces during demonstrations; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detentions; some infringements on citizens' privacy rights;



some limits on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement; lack of transparency; corruption at all levels of government; violence and discrimination against women, children, persons with disabilities, and minorities; restrictions on worker rights; and trafficking in persons to include forced labor.

Impunity was persistent and pervasive. Prior to September 21, the government attempted to investigate and prosecute government and security officials for human rights abuses through special investigative committees, but political pressure and limited government capacity precluded significant action. Despite governmental efforts to disband the former police state and reform the security services, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists reported that abuses continued. Security forces essentially remained immune from civilian oversight. These trends worsened after September 21 because Houthi integration into government ministries and the armed forces further reduced government capacity to conduct investigations.

Nonstate actors engaged in internal armed conflict with government forces and committed significant abuses, especially in the latter half of the year. During the first nine months of the year, an estimated 3,000 persons died in fighting between tribal militias, Houthi insurgents, and government forces in the north; and militant secessionist elements, government forces, and AQAP militants in the south. AQAP repeatedly attacked security installations and conducted frequent campaigns to kill government officials and individuals considered to have violated sharia law. The use of child soldiers by nongovernment militias persisted.

### **Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life**

Despite progress in security sector reform, the government did not exercise full control over military and security forces due to competing family, tribal, party, and sectarian influences.

There were numerous reports that current or former members of the security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces, some affiliated with the former regime, and armed groups operated outside the law and committed human rights abuses (see section 1.g.).

On February 20-21, security forces used tear gas and live ammunition to disperse a protest by activists of the Southern Mobility Movement (Hirak) in Aden, killing three persons and injuring 12 others.

Politically motivated killings by nonstate actors, including terrorist and insurgent groups, increased, and targeted killings of military, security, and government officials by those claiming affiliation with AQAP increased significantly during the year. The number of killings involving gunmen on motorcycles increased to the extent that the government banned motorcycles in the capital. In January motorcyclists shot and killed Ahmed Sharafeddin, a prominent Houthi leader and NDC delegate, and in May suspected AQAP members on a motorcycle shot and killed a military intelligence officer in Lahj Governorate. Unknown assailants killed moderate Houthi leader Mohammad Mutawakil in November.

In January assailants killed an Iranian diplomat during a kidnapping attempt, and in May unknown assailants killed two French embassy workers in a drive-by shooting.

On June 15, gunmen attacked a bus carrying military hospital staff in Aden, killing six and injuring at least 12 persons.

Impunity for security officials remained a problem, because the government was slow to act against officials implicated in committing abuses and using excessive force. The government took some steps to address impunity by removing some officers from their posts.

### **Disappearance**

During the year there were reports of politically motivated disappearances and kidnappings of individuals associated with political parties, NGOs, and media outlets critical of various security forces within the government, as well as others reportedly kidnapped for supporting the Houthis in the north or Hirak in the south.

Tribal groups were responsible for kidnappings for ransom, as were other nonstate actors such as AQAP, according to the human rights NGO National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD). While the incidence of kidnapping of citizens increased during the past year, as a result of deteriorating

security in many areas of the country, kidnapping of foreigners decreased, probably because most foreigners had left the country.

Abductions were difficult for foreign entities to verify, unless they involved a foreigner or government official. Many unofficial groups abducted persons to achieve specific goals. Reports from local and international NGOs indicated decreased numbers of abductions compared with the previous year, primarily because of the lower number of foreigners in the country following increased instability in 2013 and heightened security precautions taken by the remaining foreigners. Security officials indicated kidnappers abducted four foreigners during the year, compared with eight in 2013.

Nonstate actors targeted foreigners and those working for foreign diplomatic missions. AQAP members kidnapped a Western citizen in Sana'a in September 2013 and held him until he and South African kidnap victim Pierre Korkie were killed in a rescue attempt in December.

In February kidnappers seized German and British citizens but released them after several months.

In March kidnappers seized two UN staff members and held them for several days prior to release.

### **Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

The constitution prohibits such practices, but there were reports that elements of the security forces employed them. In 2010 the UN Committee against Torture reported the country's laws lacked a comprehensive definition of torture. Law and policy barred mistreatment of prisoners and detainees, but numerous violations occurred, some of which observers reported.

While the transitional government pledged to change the former regime's culture of oppression, human rights NGOs, former detainees, and prisoners continued to allege authorities employed torture and mistreatment. Most incidents of torture and abuse occurred during arrests. Government forces and their proxies responded at times with excessive force to demonstrations and protests in various parts of the country.

Amnesty International reported that authorities released Hirak activists Anwar Ismail and Khaled al-Junaidi from prison in November. Both had been arrested without charge in August. Authorities reportedly held Ismail and al-Junaidi incommunicado and tortured them during their four-month detention in Aden. Both men reported authorities beat them and hung them by their wrists for hours at a time during their imprisonment. Al-Junaidi claimed authorities held him in solitary confinement at al-Solban Political Security Prison, permitted only one visit, and did not allow him to see a lawyer. He described his cell as having no air circulation, light, or toilet. Authorities eventually released al-Junaidi when his health deteriorated. In December security forces shot and killed al-Junaidi during a peaceful protest in Aden.

### **Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening and did not meet international standards. Prisoners lacked many basic needs.

Government officials and NGOs identified overcrowding, lack of professional training for corrections officials, poor sanitation, inadequate access to justice, intermingling of pretrial and convicted inmates, lack of case management control, lack of funding, and deteriorating infrastructure as problems within the 18 central prisons and 25 reserve prisons (also known as pretrial detention centers). Authorities held prisoners with physical or mental disabilities with the general population with no special accommodation.

Physical Conditions: According to the director of the Rehabilitation and Correction Authority, in July there were approximately 14,000 individuals in the country's prisons, 92 percent of whom were men between 18 and 35. Poor recordkeeping and a lack of communication between prisons and the central government made it difficult for authorities to estimate accurately the size of the prison population. Political prisoners reportedly faced torture, abuse, and other forms of mistreatment, while all prisoners experienced harsh physical conditions.

Sana'a Central Prison, which has a capacity of 1,200, held approximately 2,500 prisoners. Aden Central Prison, with a capacity of 300 inmates, held more than 1,000 prisoners, and Hajjah Central Prison, designed for a capacity of 300 persons, held more than 650 inmates.

No credible statistics were available on the number of inmate deaths during the year. Detainees did not always have access to potable water. Prison officials recognized the need to improve sanitation conditions and to

isolate prisoners with contagious diseases, reporting, “Once one prisoner gets sick, they quickly all get sick.” They cited inadequate supplies of drinking and bathing water and noted that open sewage trenches often existed inside the corrections facilities, causing more health problems. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) acknowledged prison conditions did not meet international standards and stated the government could not afford improvements. The transitional government reportedly reduced the prison budget by 50 percent during 2013 and kept the lower level during the year.

Administration: Recordkeeping was poor. Government restructuring also impeded improvement in recordkeeping. Many prisoners faced prolonged stays in detention beyond their sentences if they or their families were unable to pay fines or provide expected bribes.

Independent Monitoring: The government permitted visits to some facilities by independent human rights observers such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, but routinely denied parliamentarians and NGOs access to facilities to investigate claims of human rights violations. Local human rights NGOs and other organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) also interviewed former prisoners and family members of prisoners to report on prison conditions. International observers stated they had access during the year to the “remand prisons” of the MOI and to prisons operated by one of the country’s security and intelligence organs, the Political Security Organization (PSO).

International observers reportedly had access to some prisons operated by the AQAP-affiliated group Ansar al-Sharia in Abyan Governorate.

### **Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but authorities enforced the law inconsistently. In cases involving suspected security offenders and those affiliated with human rights NGOs or members of groups challenging the government, such as Hirak, arbitrary arrest and detention continued to occur.

Local human rights NGOs stated arbitrary detention was frequent in temporary prisons located in many areas. Elements of official security services or by others with the money and power to establish them might perpetrate such detentions.

### **Role of the Police and Security Apparatus**

The primary state security and intelligence-gathering entities, the PSO and the National Security Bureau (NSB), report first to the minister of interior and then the president. There was no clear definition of many of the NSB’s duties, which have evolved from protecting the country from external threats to overlapping with those of the PSO, which is domestically focused and charged with identifying and combating political crimes and acts of sabotage.

The Criminal Investigation Division reports to the MOI and conducted most criminal investigations and arrests. The Central Security Forces, often responsible for crowd control and accused in the past of using excessive force, was renamed the Special Security Force (SSF) and placed under the direct authority of the interior minister, along with the counterterrorism unit. The Ministry of Defense also employed units under its formal supervision to quell domestic unrest and to participate in internal armed conflicts.

The SSF, Yemen Special Operations Forces, Presidential Guard (formerly the Republican Guard), NSB, and other security organs ostensibly reported to civilian authorities in the MOI and Ministry of Defense and in the Office of the President. Civilian leadership of these agencies improved following restructuring efforts outlined in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, which committed the government to reorganizing the security services and armed forces. Interest groups, including former president Saleh’s family and other tribal and party entities, continued to influence these agencies, often through unofficial channels rather than through the formal command structure. Such influence, coupled with a lack of effective mechanisms to investigate and prosecute abuse and corruption, exacerbated the problem of impunity. The November change in government led to new leadership within the security institutions, including a new interior minister, PSO chief, and SFS chief.

### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

The law provides that authorities cannot arrest an individual unless apprehended while committing a criminal act or served with a summons and that a detainee must be arraigned within 24 hours or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney, who decides whether detention is required, must inform the accused of the basis for

the arrest. The law stipulates authorities may not hold a detainee longer than seven days without a court order. The government frequently did not adhere to these requirements, due to lack of capacity and poor policy guidance. Human rights organizations reported several cases where authorities held detainees for more than one month in violation of the law, and citizens regularly accused security officials of ignoring due process in arrests and during detentions.

The law states the government must provide attorneys for indigent detainees, but it often did not do so. Tribal mediators reportedly settled almost all rural cases without reference to the formal court system.

Detainees often did not know which investigating agency arrested them, and the agencies frequently complicated matters by unofficially transferring custody of individuals among entities. Security forces routinely detained relatives of fugitives as hostages until the fugitive was located. Authorities stated they detained relatives only when the relatives obstructed justice, but human rights organizations rejected this claim.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government routinely practiced arbitrary arrest. The number of persons arrested arbitrarily was difficult to estimate, as authorities did not record many detainees' names, did not transfer some detainees to official detention centers, and arrested and released many detainees multiple times during the year. Nongovernmental groups also arbitrarily arrested persons.

Pretrial Detention: International monitoring organizations estimated that half of all detainees held by the MOI were either awaiting trial or held while an investigation was pending. Prolonged detention without charge or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing within a reasonable time, were common practices, despite their prohibition by law. Staff shortages, judicial inefficiency, and corruption reportedly caused trial delays.

### **Denial of Fair Public Trial; Trial Procedures**

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary was weak and not fully independent, since corruption and political interference severely hampered its operations. Litigants maintained, and the government acknowledged, that judges' social ties and occasional bribery influenced verdicts. Many judges were poorly trained and some allowed personal or political affiliations to affect their handling of cases. The government's lack of capacity and reluctance at times to enforce court orders, especially outside the cities, further undermined the credibility of the judiciary. Members of the judiciary were threatened and harassed to influence cases. Following the kidnapping of 12 judges during the year, members of the judiciary went on strike for two months to demand increased security.

Laws governing trial procedures apply to all citizens. The law considers defendants innocent until proven guilty. Trials are generally public, but all courts may conduct closed sessions "for reasons of public security or morals." There are no jury trials. Judges, who play an active role in questioning witnesses and the accused, adjudicate criminal cases. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney in a timely manner. Defendants can confront or question witnesses against them and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf. The law provides for the government to furnish attorneys for indigent defendants in serious criminal cases, but the government did not always provide counsel in such cases. Defendants and their attorneys have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Authorities allowed defense attorneys to counsel their clients, address the court, and examine witnesses and any relevant evidence. All defendants have the right to appeal, and the slow pace of court cases provided adequate time to prepare a defense. Defendants cannot be compelled to testify or confess guilt.

A court of limited jurisdiction considers security cases. A specialized criminal court, the State Security Court, operates under different procedures in closed sessions. This court does not provide defendants with the same rights provided in the regular courts. Defense lawyers reportedly did not have full access to their clients' charges, relevant government-held evidence, or court files.

In addition to established courts, there is a tribal justice system for noncriminal issues. Tribal judges, usually respected neutral sheikhs, nonetheless often also adjudicated criminal cases under tribal law. Persons tried under the tribal system usually were not formally charged but rather were publicly accused. Tribal mediation often emphasized social cohesion more than punishment. The results carried the same weight as court judgments, if not more, because the public often respected the tribal process more than a formal court system seen by many as corrupt and lacking independence.

**Political Prisoners and Detainees**

There were numerous reports of political prisoners and detainees. Activists accused the government of detaining Hiraq activists, demonstration leaders, journalists, and persons with alleged connections to Houthis rebels. Authorities held some individuals for prolonged periods, while releasing many within days. Elements within the security forces reportedly continued to detain persons for political reasons on bases or within headquarters.

Confirmation of the number and assessment of the status of political prisoners or detainees was difficult. Authorities did not charge detainees publicly; their detentions were often short-term; and the government and other entities severely restricted or barred information to and access by local or international human rights organizations. Absent charges, it was difficult to determine whether detainees' actions had been violent or primarily consisted of advocacy and dissent. The government also sometimes did not follow due process in cases in which detained suspects were accused of links to terrorism.

**Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence**

According to human rights NGOs, security force officials searched homes and private offices, monitored telephone calls, read personal mail and e-mail, and otherwise intruded into personal matters without legally issued warrants or judicial supervision. Authorities claimed security reasons sometimes justified their actions and at other times the attorney general personally authorized telephone call monitoring and reading of personal mail and e-mail. One security organization reported that, to do a house search, it first must obtain a warrant and a signed certification by an appointed "head of the neighborhood" and that two neighbors who serve as witnesses must accompany officers on the search. Human rights organizations disputed the independence of heads of neighborhood.

The law prohibits arrests or serving subpoenas between sundown and dawn, but several local NGOs reported that authorities took some persons suspected of crimes from their homes at night without warrants.

Security forces sometimes detained relatives of fugitives as hostages until the suspect was located. In other cases detention of family members continued while the families negotiated compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. There were no reports that authorities injured or mistreated such family members.

**Use of Excessive Force and Other Abuses in Internal Conflicts**

Armed clashes continued in northern governorates, including Sa'ada, al-Jawf, and Amran, between supporters of the Houthi movement and supporters of both the Sunni Islamist Islah Party and the Salafi Rashad Party, with assistance from elements of the country's armed forces. The fighting went largely unchecked during the first nine months of the year because central government control in those areas remained weak. At the end of the year, clashes continued in al-Bayda, Marib, and Arhab.

Observers reported the use of excessive force and other abuses by all parties in conflict areas. Clashes occurred as Houthis sought to expand control over territory and fought pro-Islah tribal militias and elements of the armed forces. Fighting grew increasingly sectarian as the Houthi militia advanced southward until they took control of Sana'a in September. Clashes between Houthi supporters and AQAP increased following the fall of Sana'a. Terrorist groups, including AQAP, regularly carried out attacks against government representatives and installations, Houthis, members of Hiraq, and others accused of behavior violating sharia law.

Killings: All sides used excessive force in internal armed conflicts.

Fighting in al-Dhale in the early months of the year resulted in 50 dead, including 20 children, and hundreds injured.

Conflicts between the Houthi movement and its adversaries, which began in summer 2013, significantly escalated. Despite numerous ceasefires negotiated by several presidential committees, Houthi forces pushed southward to Amran, where they aligned with some members of the Hashid tribes against pro-Islah forces. In July, after fighting killed and injured hundreds, the Houthis occupied Amran. In July and August, intermittent clashes also occurred in al-Jawf Governorate between Houthis and pro-Islah tribesmen, with hundreds again reported dead and injured. In August, Houthi militants reportedly summarily tried and executed a man charged with murder in Amran.

In August and September, Houthi militias moved into Sana'a. Subsequent clashes with government forces and pro-Islah militia killed approximately 270 persons and injured more than 600. In September, Houthi militias captured Sana'a after fighting with supporters of Islah and government troops. On September 7 and 9, during mass demonstrations against President Hadi, government security forces fired on protesters who attempted to seize the prime minister's office, killing eight and injuring 67.

In October, AQAP launched retaliatory attacks against Houthi supporters, and on October 9, a suspected AQAP suicide bomber killed more than 50 individuals who had gathered in Sana'a to protest President Hadi's choice for prime minister. In all AQAP-aligned militants killed more than 80 persons in Sana'a and other areas.

Targeted killings, usually directed at members of security organizations or foreign officials, increased during the year. In May and June, two separate attacks in Sayun killed and injured dozens of individuals, and in May there were bombings targeting military targets in Sana'a, Shabwah, and other areas of the country.

AQAP continued attacks on civilian and military targets, particularly in the south. On February 14, AQAP attacked the Central Prison in Sana'a, killing seven and enabling the escape of 29 inmates.

Jihadist groups in the south reportedly beheaded or crucified those accused of spying, and in August AQAP killed 18 government soldiers on leave in Hadramawt.

Child Soldiers: According to the Seyaj Organization for Childhood Protection, the number of child soldiers increased due to a growing number of armed conflicts. Seyaj reported that the government had not taken tangible steps to remove child soldiers from their units or to provide rehabilitation.

Although law and government policy expressly forbid the practice, children under age 18 directly participated in armed conflict for government, tribal, and militant forces, primarily as guards and couriers. The Military and Security Working Group of the NDC, among others, called for an end to the use of child soldiers.

In May the government signed a UN action plan to prevent recruitment of children into the armed forces, which established specific steps for the release of children serving in the armed forces and programs, their reintegration into the community, and the prevention of further recruitment. The plan also provides for aligning domestic legislation with international norms, investigating allegations of recruitment, and facilitating access to UN officials to monitor progress and compliance with the action plan.

There were significant obstacles to full implementation of the plan, since poverty and high rates of unemployment were the root causes of the recruitment child soldier. Child recruits often received money and food, whereas parents might perceive a child at school as a financial burden.

The poor birth registration system, especially in rural areas, complicated assessment of the extent of the problem and removal of underage soldiers.

Government efforts to prevent recruitment of child soldiers included displaying large banners on major city streets, near military camps, and in high-traffic neighborhoods. The Army and Security Working Group of the NDC recommended including a ban on child soldiers in the new constitution.

Tribal members under 18 routinely took part in tribal militias or armed groups affiliated with the central government.

Tribes, including some armed and financed by the government to fight alongside the regular army, used underage recruits in combat zones, according to reports by international NGOs such as Save the Children. Houthis routinely used child soldiers to operate checkpoints and search vehicles. Combatants generally did not forcibly recruit tribal child soldiers. Carrying arms is a central component of male identity and adulthood in tribal society and continued to be expected of tribesmen as young as 12. Married boys ages 12 to 15 reportedly were involved in armed conflicts in the northern tribal areas. Tribal custom considers married boys as adults who owed allegiance to the tribe. As a result, according to international and local human rights NGOs, half of tribal fighters were youths under 18. Other observers noted tribes rarely placed boys in harm's way but used them as guards rather than fighters. Observers regularly witnessed underage recruits manning military checkpoints, particularly Houthi checkpoints, and carrying weapons. The popular committees in the Abyan Governorate used boys between the ages of 13 and 17 to guard checkpoints, and NGOs reported that both Houthi and Sunni tribal groups recruited children in Sa'ada and Amran.

Militant groups also used child soldiers. AQAP recruited boys for combat operations against military and security forces.

Other Conflict-related Abuses: At the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014, Sunni and Salafi forces blocked the main road connecting Haradh and Sa'ada city to establish an economic blockade around Houthi forces, which had erected a military blockade around the Salafi institute in Dammaj. This action halted shipments of food and fuel and hampered delivery of humanitarian supplies to the approximately 80,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in the area, thousands of African migrant workers, and undocumented Yemeni laborers deported from Saudi Arabia. The blockade increased food and fuel prices and made it difficult for aid agencies to support vulnerable populations.

According to international NGOs, during fighting in Amran in May, June, and July, Houthi elements seized a number of schools, using them as housing for fighters and as detention centers. Media sources reported that, following hostilities in Sana'a in September, Houthi militants seized schools and used them as detention centers and as stores for weapons and ammunition looted from military camps.

In the northern part of the country, international relief organizations confirmed humanitarian assistance projects could not operate in areas under Houthi control without Houthi permission and sometimes without hiring Houthi staff. Nevertheless, NGOs reported increased cooperation from Houthi leadership related to delivery of humanitarian aid compared with previous years.

### **Freedom of Speech and Press**

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and the press "within the limits of the law," but the government did not always respect these rights. The government enforced restrictions on coverage of security- and military-related events, and harassed journalists. The government had not taken further action to amend the Press and Publications Law, unchanged since 1990 despite several initiatives to amend it.

Freedom of Speech: While there were some signs of improvement, there were reports of official suppression of freedom of speech.

Press Freedoms: There were some reports the government harassed journalists, and police used violence against them.

Although the government selected items for news broadcasts and other government-owned print media, it allowed broadcasts critical of the government. The government also televised parliamentary debates including aggressive criticism of corruption at government institutions and ministries. Other official media outlets, including newspapers and radio stations, carried commentaries and programs very critical of the government. Government media also presented live and unedited coverage of plenary sessions of the NDC and conducted live interviews with representatives of the full range of political opinions. In February the government appointed a spokesperson in the Office of the Prime Minister who held press conferences to brief journalists on the weekly meetings and discussions of the cabinet.

In September, Houthi rebels shelled Yemen TV, the government's official television station, killing six and briefly forcing the station off the air. It then broadcast temporarily from an undisclosed secondary location in Sana'a. As of the end of October, Yemen TV broadcast from its headquarters, but Houthis prevented station management from returning to their posts. Other employees and studio crew resumed their work at the station.

Additionally, the Houthis broke into pro-Islah Suhail TV in September, looted its equipment, and forced it to stop broadcasting. Suhail TV remained off the air at year's end. Houthi rebels briefly detained seven employees, interrogated them, and asked them for the addresses of senior employees.

Media reports indicated the government sometimes prevented media outlets from reporting on the fighting between army troops and AQAP in the south.

Violence and Harassment: Government harassment of journalists lessened during the year, but there were reports of police violence against journalists, especially during coverage of protests. Media reports indicated the NSB monitored local calls by journalists. NGOs reported the majority of threats against journalists stemmed from nonstate actors, including tribal leaders, AQAP, and former regime loyalists but primarily from supporters of the Houthi movement.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The government penalized some of those who published items contrary to government guidelines by refusing to print their newspapers and magazines. In February, at the behest of local authorities in Aden, the government-owned 14 October printing press refused to print the *Aden al-Ghad* newspaper. When journalists protested the blackout the next day, police dispersed them with tear gas.

Libel Laws/National Security: The law criminalizes criticism of the “person of the head of state,” although not necessarily “constructive” criticism; the publication of “false information” that may spread “dissent and division among the people”; materials that may lead to “the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni revolution”; and “false stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their relations” with the country. Citing these restrictions the Specialized Press and Publications Court intimidated journalists with excessive prosecutions for criminal defamation.

### **Internet Freedom**

Censorship affected internet freedom, and there were notable cases of government intrusion into cyberspace. The state-owned Public Telecommunications Corporation blocked user access to Twitter and Facebook on several occasions. Government censorship of social media usually lasted for a few hours and targeted a range of internet providers in a geographic location. In July, Twitter was inaccessible in Sana’a for a few hours per day during peak hours. Immediately prior to the Houthi takeover of Sana’a on September 21, the government closed all mobile telephone communications for a day.

There were reports the government monitored Facebook pages, especially those affiliated with political groups and activists who used virtual forums to promote demonstrations and communicate with supporters. The government also attempted to create fake accounts to discredit such pages, but social media’s versatility and the proliferation of online platforms outpaced the government’s capacity to conduct surveillance.

The number of news outlets deploying online and virtual presence outlets substantially increased. The number of online news outlets and websites significantly outnumbered print media. These newly established media outlets lacked professionalism and credibility and more often than not served as outlets for ideological groups or political parties. The increase in news outlets has not led to greater transparency or factual reporting.

Internet usage was demonstrably rising. According to the Ministry of Telecommunication and Communication Technology, the number of internet users increased from 14.9 percent in 2012 to an estimated 17 percent in 2014. The locally based Social Research and Development Center, however, reported that only 14.2 percent of the population, located primarily in urban areas, had internet access.

The scarcity of electricity, unavailability of access points, poor quality of internet lines, and expensive access rates limited internet access.

### **Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

Political parties frequently attempted to influence university academic appointments and faculty and student elections. They actively recruited new students into party branches specifically created as youth divisions (for example, the General People’s Congress Youth Division and the Islah Youth Division), through which the parties could mobilize youth on campuses.

The National Security Bureau maintained permanent offices on campuses, reflecting continued government concern about security and, in some cases, controversial speech. Party-affiliated officials at the Ministry of Higher Education and academic institutions reviewed prospective university professors and administrators for political acceptability before hiring them and commonly showed favoritism toward supporters of specific political parties. There were no reported instances of censored curriculums, sanctioned professors or students, restrictions on travel, or intimidation that led to self-censorship, censored films, or canceled plays, art exhibits, or musical performances.

### **Freedom of Assembly**

The law provides for freedom of assembly. Authorities largely respected this right, and both large- and small-scale demonstrations continued during the year. At times security forces or competing political groups attacked and used excessive force against protesters.

### **Freedom of Association**



The law provides for freedom of association, and the government usually respected this right, although there were some instances of interference with this right. The law regulates associations and foundations and outlines the establishment and activities of NGOs. Registration is required annually. The law exempts registered NGOs from taxes and tariffs and requires the government to provide a reason for denying an NGO registration, such as deeming an NGO's activities "detrimental" to the state. It forbids NGOs' involvement in political or religious activities. It permits foreign funding of NGOs. The law requires government observation of NGO internal elections but, because of the large number of NGOs, it rarely did so. The government sometimes appeared to enforce restrictions selectively based on competing party interests.

Associations and NGOs operated openly, but with some government interference. The government cooperated to varying degrees with the more than 9,200 civil society organizations in the country, including human rights NGOs, depending on their problems of concern. Civil society organizations and NGOs not focused on human rights experienced minimal restrictions on their activities.

### **Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights, with some restrictions. Prior to September the government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to IDPs, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. Houthi presence, however, made it difficult for UNHCR's implementing partners to reach many areas of the country due to security concerns.

**In-country Movement:** The government at times restricted domestic travel by refusing to issue travel permits to conflict areas, and the army, security forces, and tribesmen maintained checkpoints on major roads. In many regions, especially in areas outside effective central security control, armed tribesmen frequently restricted freedom of movement, operating their own checkpoints, sometimes with military or other security officials, and often subjecting travelers to physical harassment, extortion, theft, or short-term kidnappings for ransom. The number of nongovernment checkpoints increased in many governorates as central government control in those areas weakened. Social discrimination severely restricted women's freedom of movement. Women in general did not enjoy full freedom of movement, although restrictions varied by location. Some observers reported increased restrictions on women in conservative locations where government control was weaker or absent, such as Sa'ada. Security officials at government checkpoints often required immigrants and refugees traveling within the country to show they possessed resident status or refugee identification cards. At times local officials reportedly did not honor official documents.

**Foreign Travel:** The law requires women to have the permission of a husband or male relative before applying for a passport or leaving the country. A husband or male relative may bar a woman from leaving the country by placing a woman's name on a "no-fly list" maintained at airports, and authorities strictly enforced this requirement when women traveled with children. The NDC outcomes recommended lifting restrictions on women's travel. The government limited the movement of foreigners, who were required to obtain exit visas before leaving the country.

### **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

Within its very limited capacity, the government provided protection and assistance to IDPs, mainly by facilitating international groups' humanitarian efforts within limits dictated by local security concerns.

According to the UNHCR and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there were nearly 334,000 registered IDPs as of November. The vast majority of IDPs displaced by the protracted multisided conflicts in the north were located in three governorates: Hajjah, Sa'ada, and Amran. In Hajjah Governorate, 12,000 IDPs lived in camps at al-Mazraq, the majority of whom were Muhamasheen, a marginalized and particularly vulnerable group.

As a result of fighting in the early months of the year between Houthi and pro-Islah forces in Amran, a reported 35,000 IDPs fled the governorate, but sources indicated that many of those IDPs returned to their homes following the Houthi withdrawal from the area in July and August. In August, Houthi-Islah clashes in al-Jawf Governorate reportedly caused an estimated 10,500 IDPs to leave the area.

The UNHCR reported that 90 percent of IDPs displaced by AQAP's conflict with government forces in the south in 2012-13 had returned to their homes by June.

Humanitarian organizations had limited access to southern governorates due to security concerns, but the UNHCR had offices in Aden, Kharaz, and elsewhere in the country. Ninety-six percent of IDPs in the south lived outside official camps, sheltering with host families and relatives in communities, scattered settlements, schools and empty public buildings, or under trees and bridges. Journalists reported that in the worst areas, many IDPs were malnourished and lacked basic requirements such as clean water, food, medicine, and sanitation. There was also a marked increase in food insecurity throughout the country; nearly half of the population did not have enough to eat. Rates of acute malnutrition were high among displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.

### **Protection of Refugees**

Many refugees became increasingly vulnerable due to the worsening economic situation and insecurity in the country. Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, and others shared the general poverty of the country, and many sought to cross the border into Saudi Arabia, despite difficulty and danger at the border. Within the country authorities did not limit refugees to camps or particular areas, and refugees generally did not suffer harassment. The economy offered few opportunities, however, for more than subsistence living.

Refugee Abuse: Multiple NGOs reported numerous, grave instances of refugee abuse, primarily at the hands of criminal groups and often with the knowledge and complicity of security officials. These reports indicated criminal trafficking groups built a large number of “camps” near the Yemeni-Saudi border city of Haradh where migrants hoping to reach Saudi Arabia were held for extortion and ransom. Witnesses observed evidence of abuse, including broken bones, ripped-out fingernails, cigarette burns, gouged out eyes, and lacerations caused by rape. Some migrants reported witnessing killings by captors. NGOs reported criminals tortured migrants while family members listened by telephone until ransom was paid. Female migrants also reported numerous incidents of gender-based violence.

Government officials were reportedly aware of these camps and conducted occasional raids but failed to prosecute the perpetrators.

### **Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government: Elections and Political Participation**

The law provides citizens with the ability to change their government peacefully through periodic elections based on universal suffrage. The government initiated a new voter registration program for possible future elections in cooperation with international organizations.

Recent Elections: Observers generally considered the one-candidate election conducted in 2012 to be free and fair. The NDC, although delayed, remained broadly on track to meet its objectives and concluded in January, generating nearly 1,800 recommendations, including the extension of President Hadi’s term through the end of the transition.

The Peace and National Partnership Agreement, which ended the violence associated with the Houthi entrance into Sana’a, was signed by 13 parties in September and called for implementation of the NDC outcomes, including elections and a new constitution. The Constitutional Drafting Committee, which has been meeting since March, continued its work as of year’s end.

Political Parties and Political Participation: The law requires political parties to be national organizations that cannot restrict their membership to a particular region, tribe, religious sect, class, or profession. The implementation of the 50-50 power-sharing agreement outlined in the GCC Initiative allowed a range of political parties to organize and operate without undue restriction or outside interference, although the media reported instances of harassment of political party members. The constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are contrary to Islam, “oppose the goals of the country’s revolutions,” or violate the country’s international commitments.

A number of parties were active during the year. The Houthis, who actively participated in the NDC, thus far declined to seek recognition as a political party.

Tribalism distorted political participation in previous years and still influenced the composition of parliament and ministries within the central government. Observers noted significant tribal influence in elections and the staffing of government ministries.

Participation of Women and Minorities: A quota of at least 30 percent women in all transitional political bodies and ensuing legislative and executive institutions exists. Thirty percent of NDC delegates were women, and women chaired many committees and working groups; the NDC outcomes included a 30 percent quota for women in all branches of government.

The NDC had one delegate representing the minority group commonly known as “Muhamasheen” or “Akhdam.” According to some estimates, the “Muhamasheen” comprised up to 10 percent of the population. Although only one of the 565 delegates, this representation was the community’s first official political role.

### **Corruption and Lack of Transparency in GovernmentShare**

While the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. A burdensome process creates a separate legal system for the political elite. According to the constitution, approval of one-fifth of the members of parliament is necessary to conduct a criminal investigation on a deputy minister or higher-ranking official. A two-thirds majority in parliament and presidential permission are then required to bring criminal investigation results to the general prosecutor for indictment. The government did not use the procedure during the year and employed it infrequently in prior years.

Corruption: The culture of corruption was pervasive, and observers reported petty corruption in nearly every government office. Job candidates often expected to purchase their positions. Observers believed tax inspectors undervalued assessments and pocketed the difference. Many government officials and civil service employees received salaries for jobs they did not perform or multiple salaries for the same job. Corruption also regularly affected government procurement.

Analyses by impartial international and local observers, including Transparency International, agreed that corruption was a serious problem in every branch and level of government, and especially in the security sector. International observers presumed government officials and parliamentarians benefited from insider arrangements, embezzlement, and bribes. Political leaders and most government agencies took negligible action to combat corruption.

In November 2013 Transparency International reported police harassed members of its Yemeni branch, the Yemeni Team for Transparency and Integrity (YITI) in Sana’a. According to YITI the group’s activists were gathering information concerning police and military bribery as part of an anticorruption campaign when police accosted the group, with one police officer pointing a rifle at YITI staff.

### **Reorganization of the Ministry of Defense and MOI explicitly addressed corruption.**

The Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA) is the national auditing agency for public expenditures and the investigative body for corruption. The president appointed its top officials. COCA presented its reports to parliament but did not make them publicly available. In cases involving high-level officials, COCA submitted reports directly to the president, who had the power to refuse to accept the reports. Since COCA’s inception in 1999, authorities have prosecuted only low-ranking officials for corruption.

Some police stations reportedly maintained an internal affairs section to investigate security force abuses, and citizens had the right to file complaints with the Prosecutor’s Office. The MOI had a fax line for citizens to file claims of abuse for investigation. There was no available information on how many fax complaints the ministry received or investigated.

In August, to combat fraud and corruption in the government payroll system, the government implemented a plan to collect biometric information on all government employees, including soldiers and security forces, and to create a central registry designed to eliminate tens of thousands of fraudulent names and double-dippers from the payroll. This registry, which by year’s end included nearly half a million civil servants, reportedly identified 5,000 workers who illegally received more than one paycheck. Additionally, the government will begin paying soldiers and security forces via bank or post office accounts, bypassing paymasters who had previously paid soldiers in cash, to ensure only the intended individuals will collect salaries.

The independent Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC) receives complaints and develops programs to raise awareness of corruption. It includes a council of government, civil society, and

private sector representatives. A lack of capacity, particularly in terms of financial analysis, hampered the SNACC.

The SNACC received 350 complaints and 3,655 financial disclosures by year's end and examined 870 cases, referring 15 cases to public prosecution. Yemen Parliamentarians Against Corruption (Yemen PAC), the local branch of Arab PAC, sought to stimulate action by the legislative branch to combat corruption. Without any legal mandate, Yemen PAC monitored the activities of anticorruption institutions such as the SNACC and provided limited, unofficial oversight of their activities.

As a part of the transitional government's pledge to maintain transparency throughout the course of the NDC, the government broadcast NDC meetings live on television and radio, and the NDC Secretariat established a website providing background information and daily updates of working group activities and other NDC news.

**Financial Disclosure:** The law requires annual disclosure of financial assets by all ministers, deputy ministers, agency heads, members of parliament, and Shura Council members. Disclosures are provided to the SNACC for verification. The information was not publicly available, and the SNACC published only the number of financial disclosures received and noted the names of the officials who failed to submit a disclosure. The SNACC may also request disclosures from any other government employee. The law does not require disclosure of assets of children or spouses. It provides for penalties for false filing of information.

Approximately 28,500 public employees filed financial disclosure statements with the SNACC, with an unknown number of noncompliance cases submitted to the Public Prosecutor's Office for action.

**Public Access to Information:** The country's "right of access to information" law requires establishment of an independent agency to respond to requests for information and resolve grievances when authorities deny requests. The government did not, however, establish that agency. The Houthis established extralegal "resolution committees" and "monitoring committees" within ministries, as part of their continued efforts to establish parallel government institutions, while at the same time inserting themselves into government machinery.

The Ministry of Finance is required to publish the government budget online, in print, and in CD format. Information related to contract awards, including geographical area, company, and terms of the contract, was publicly available through the High Tender Board website and announcements in state media. Government spending, however, particularly at the local level and with respect to military and security, and data relating to extractive industries were murky and difficult to trace.

The law provides for journalists to have some access to government reports and information, but the government did little to ensure accessibility or transparency.

### **Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights**

Domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without outright government restriction, but lower-level government officials, particularly those in security organizations, were occasionally uncooperative and unresponsive to human rights groups' views and requests for information. Groups attempted to investigate human rights cases, and some local and international organizations reported obstacles in accessing victims, prisoners, and prisons. International, regional, and local media published their reports.

Domestic human rights NGOs operated with little government restriction. They reported that the government, specifically the Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of Social Affairs, worked closely with them on human rights programs promoting women's rights and prison reform.

According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and some human rights organizations that attempted to obtain licenses, the Ministry of Social and Labor Affairs interfered with the licensing of some domestic human rights-related organizations that it viewed with suspicion, including organizations focused on accountability and transitional justice.

**Government Human Rights Bodies:** Within the NDC, multi-stakeholder working groups focused on a wide spectrum of problems pertaining to human rights, including freedom of press and expression, women's and minority rights, and religious diversity.

**Anti-Semitism**

Fewer than 200 Jews remained in the country, residing in two communities in Sana'a and Amran Governorate. Harassment of the Amran community increased following the resumption of fighting between Houthis and local Sunni tribal elements in October 2013. Reportedly, local residents of Amran threw stones at community members, harassed women in public, and pressured Jews to convert to Islam. Jewish children stopped attending local schools with Muslim classmates, and the men were unable to work and largely confined with their families to their homes. To deter harassment many Jewish men cut their beards and side curls. Weak law enforcement put the Jewish community at risk, particularly following the light sentences imposed on militants who killed members of the Jewish community in 2008 and 2012. The Hadi government continued to protect the Sa'ada Jewish community in Sana'a and provided secure housing and a living stipend.

In December there was a report that Houthis detained a Jewish man in Amran allegedly for doing business with Israel. Western government officials spoke to the man's family and learned that a family member had made false accusations against the man to the Houthis. At year's end he was released and reunited with his family in Sana'a.

Although criticism of Israeli actions was common, anti-Semitic material was rare. Many Yemenis were proud to sustain a small Jewish community with some charities reportedly donating food and gifts during Jewish holidays, and media coverage of the country's Jews was generally positive. The most prominent exception was the slogan of the Houthi movement, "Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews."

Members of the Jewish community are not eligible to serve in the military or federal government. Authorities forbid them from carrying the ceremonial Yemeni dagger. President Hadi reportedly promised the Jewish community would be represented in the 565-member NDC but revoked the offer following pressure from Salafi groups.

## ***XII. U.S. Forces in the Gulf and Total Power Projection Capabilities***

As has been noted from the start of this analysis, the military balance in the Gulf region is shaped by a number of outside powers. The key Western powers involved include Britain, France and the U.S. The U.S. effort, however, is by far the largest and it plays a key role in deterring and defending against Iran by strengthening its military capabilities in the Gulf and those of its partner countries on the Arabian Peninsula – particularly in the realm of air power, missile defense, and air-sea operations.

### **The Changing Strategic Context of the U.S. Partnership with the Arab Gulf States**

The U.S. has long been the major strategic partner of the Arab Gulf states, and has steadily strengthened its security partnerships in recent years. Still, key Gulf states like Saudi Arabia warned the U.S. that its invasion of Iraq in 2003 might destabilize the region, and the political upheavals in the Middle East since 2011 have led to serious differences, including divisions over how to deal with the crisis in Egypt, the civil war in Syria, the rise of the Islamic state, the deep divisions in Iraq, and the civil conflicts in Yemen.

The expansion of Iranian influence in the region has become a key issue affecting the strategic partnership in spite of U.S. and Arab Gulf cooperation in building up the U.S. military presence in the region and giving Arab Gulf forces a major high technology “edge” over Iran. This expansion of Iranian influence has been shaped by many different factors. They include the growing ties between Iran and Syria that began during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran's support of Hezbollah as the most serious political and military force in the Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982, that was strengthened during the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, and then by Iran's continuing shipments of weapons, rockets, and missiles to the Hezbollah.

Since 2011, the civil war in Syria has progressively divided the country into a coastal and heavily populated area controlled by the Assad regime – supported by Iran and the Hezbollah – and rebel factions that are dominated by the extremist forces of the Al Nusra Front (which is tied to Al Qaida) and the Islamic State. The Arab Gulf states have seen this division of Syria and rise of Iranian influence in part due to U.S. failure to back rebel elements that were still moderate and seemed ready to seize power when Assad seemed weakest in 2012, and then by the U.S. failure to make good on its threats to use force when the Assad regime was shown to be using chemical weapons. Deep divisions emerged over how to arm and support the rebels that continued into mid-2015 – although they also include the destruction of Iraq's military forces during the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 – which removed Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran, destabilized the country, and led to a major counterinsurgency battle between Sunni Islamist elements and the U.S. and Iraqi central government in 2004-2008.

Iraq's return to a low-level civil war under Maliki after the 2010 election and the departure of U.S. forces led to increased divisions and violence between Iraq's Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Kurds. It also led to a rise in Iranian influence that was compounded by –and exploited– Iraq's disintegration, and the effectiveness of its security forces. In late 2013, Maliki's efforts to use the Army and police to put down popular unrest in Anbar sparked outcry among Iraq's Sunnis and contributed to a low-level civil war between Sunnis in the West and Shi'ites. The Islamic State was able to capitalize on the sectarian conflict and make massive gains in Anbar in the final part of 2013, and then seize Mosul and much of Ninewa in June 2014. These gains that pushed the U.S. back into a military role in Iraq but which also gave Iran far more influence and forced the new Abadi government to become steadily more dependent on Shi'ite militias and Iranian support.

In May 2015 when the Sunni stronghold of Ramadi fell to Islamic State fighters, Prime Minister Abadi had to call upon Iranian-backed Shia militias to join the battle to try to win back the city.<sup>324</sup> The move underscored the continuing weakness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and Baghdad's dependence on Iran, despite the U.S. efforts and those of Gulf Arab neighbors to decrease Iranian influence in Iraq and the region. While Abadi did try to build up Sunni tribal forces and took steps to try to ensure the Shi'ite militias would remain under government control, his reliance on Shia militias still threatened to intensify Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions by angering and marginalizing Iraq's Sunnis. It also left his Arab neighbors uncertain about Iraq's political future, treatment of its Sunnis, and dependence on Iran.

Other tensions occurred because of the political upheavals in Egypt. The Arab Gulf states opposed the rise of the Morsi and Moslem Brotherhood government in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, and felt the U.S. risked supporting a regime that would present a serious threat of Islamic extremism in the Gulf. These tensions were reduced after the fall of Morsi in July 2013, and the U.S. decision to resume arms shipment to Egypt in March 2015, but left another legacy of uncertainty and distrust.

The U.S. and Arab Gulf states also differed over the political upheavals in Bahrain that led to a growing civil confrontation between its ruling Sunni elite and Shi'ite minority and to the intervention of Saudi and UAE security forces in March 2011, as well as U.S. criticism of Saudi Arabia for its treatment of its Shi'ite minority. While these tensions were less visible than those over Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, they also led to a rising fear that the U.S. would somehow turn away from the Arab Gulf and reach an accommodation with Iran as a security partner at Arab expense. These fears had less influence among Gulf military and officials who were directly involved as military partners, but had a more serious impact on the media, think tanks, and commentators outside the security structure—often taking the form of conspiracy theories that ignored the nature and scale of all the other aspects of U.S. and Arab Gulf military cooperation.

Both these fears and the conspiracy theories gathered new life after the sudden announcement in late November 2013 that the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany – had reached a tentative agreement with Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program. Many in the Gulf states felt they had been deliberately excluded by the U.S., or at least should have been consulted – if not made part of the negotiations.

In the months between November 2013 and the U.S.-GCC Summit meeting May 2015, some Arab voices joined in a rush to judge and condemn agreement that only existed in preliminary form, and then, only in outline form. Some felt that the Arab Gulf should have parity in creating a nuclear fuel cycle and potential weapons breakout capability, and others tied the nuclear agreement to demands for a security treaty or formal security guarantee and U.S. efforts to “free” Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen from Iranian influence. In far too many cases, voices in the Arab Gulf that should have known about the scale of ongoing U.S. support, either ignored the depth of U.S. commitments to America’s Arab partners or turned to some form of the conspiracy theory that the U.S. would betray its Arab allies and turn to Iran.

### **A Continuing U.S. Strategic Focus on the Gulf and Partnership with Arab Gulf Allies**

It is important to note that throughout this period, the U.S. not only provide the arms transfers and support discussed earlier, its strategic guidance stressed the importance of the U.S. strategic partnership with the Gulf states. This was true throughout the Bush Administration. When the Obama Administration had the Department of Defense issued new strategic guidance in February 2012, it gave the Gulf and Middle East the same priority as Asia and it has done so ever since.

Some press reports interpreted the new strategic guidance as being based on a “pivot to Asia,” but their reports were based on speeches and not the actual text. The guidance did call for “rebalancing” a limited portion of U.S. air and sea forces from Europe to Asia but gave equal priority to improving U.S. deterrence and defense capabilities in the Middle East and Asia.<sup>325</sup>

The U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. (p. 2-1)

In the Middle East the aim is to counter violent extremists, prevent destabilizing threats from developing, while upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. The U.S. continues to place emphasis on U.S. and allied military presence in the region, by working with partner nations in the region. (p. 2-1)

... DoD will tailor its global presence and posture with the right capabilities in the right places. We will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, emphasizing our existing alliances and expanding our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. We will maintain an emphasis on the greater Middle East to deter aggression and prevent the emergence of new threats... (p. 2-2)

...[The President’s strategic guidance calls for a [r]ebalance [in] force structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions while sustaining key alliances and partnerships in other regions. (p. 4-1)

... Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitments to allies and partner states. U.S. policy will emphasize gulf security to prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while standing up to Israel’s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. (p. 7-6)



The strategic guidance for long-term U.S. defense plans and strategy that the U.S. issued in 2014 as part of its new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reinforced the 2012 guidance, and stated that,<sup>326</sup>

Friction points also endure in the Middle East. Religious differences, particularly a widening Sunni-Shi'a divide, are among the sources of trans-national division in the region. Competition for resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions in the coming years and could escalate regional confrontations into broader conflicts – particularly in fragile states. In the region, Iran remains a destabilizing actor that threatens security by defying international law and pursuing capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons. Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran's other destabilizing activities will continue to pose a threat to the Middle East, especially to the security of our allies and partners in the region and around the world. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are undergoing significant political and social change. People in countries including Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt are seeking a greater voice in their governance, upending traditional power centers in the process. Terrorist groups seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their influence. Internal strife in Syria continues amid sectarian friction, at great cost to human life. Syria has become a magnet for global jihad – a situation that is likely to persist as long as the current leadership remains in power. Ongoing, severe spillover effects include an influx of foreign fighters and a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. These difficult political transitions are a reminder that events in the region will take years – perhaps decades – to develop fully.

... The United States will retain a deep, enduring interest in and a commitment to a stable Middle East. We will seek to deepen our strategic cooperation with Middle East partners based on common, enduring interests. We will strengthen joint planning with allies and partners to operate multilaterally, across domains, and to counter challenges to access and freedom of navigation. The Department will develop new or expanded forums to exchange views with allies and partners on the threats and opportunities facing the Gulf, particularly through the multilateral forum of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Department plans to pursue a U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial in 2014 and deepen U.S.-GCC ballistic missile defense cooperation. The United States will continue to seek more innovative and flexible approaches to meeting its enduring commitment to a secure Middle East.

... The Department will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region – one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies – while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. The U.S. Armed Forces today have a strong presence in the region with more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the Gulf, including advanced fighter aircraft, ISR assets, missile defense capabilities, rotational ground forces building partnership capacity, and a robust naval presence. Our forces are working closely with regional partners to provide reassurance and sufficiently robust capabilities to deter and respond to an array of challenges, from terrorist, paramilitary, and conventional threats, among others. Going forward, the Department will place even more emphasis on building the capacity of our partners in order to complement our strong military presence in the region. Together, we will work closely to enhance key multilateral capabilities, including integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and SOF. In addition to the forward posture in the region, the Department will plan to flow additional forces to the region in times of crisis.

Similarly, the new U.S. National Security Strategy that the U.S. issued on February 6, 2015 reacted to the growing instability in some parts of the region, and stated,<sup>327</sup>

In the Middle East, we will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people, confront external aggression against our allies and partners, ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world, and prevent the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we remain committed to a vision of the Middle East that is peaceful and prosperous, where democracy takes root and human rights are upheld. Sadly, this is not the case today, and nowhere is the violence more tragic and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from Beirut to Baghdad, which has given rise to new terrorist groups such as ISIL.

Resolving these connected conflicts, and enabling long-term stability in the region, requires more than the use and presence of American military forces. For one, it requires partners who can defend themselves. We are therefore investing in the ability of Israel, Jordan, and our Gulf partners to deter aggression while maintaining our unwavering commitment to Israel's security, including its Qualitative Military Edge. We are working with the Iraqi government to resolve Sunni grievances through more inclusive and responsive governance.

With our partners in the region and around the world, we are leading a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. At the same time, we will continue to pursue a lasting political solution to the devastating conflict in Syria.

Stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa also requires reducing the underlying causes of conflict. America will therefore continue to work with allies and partners toward a comprehensive agreement with Iran that resolves the world's concerns with the Iranian nuclear program. We remain committed to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution that ensures Israel's security and Palestine's viability. We will support efforts to deescalate sectarian tensions and violence between Shi'a and Sunni communities throughout the region. We will help countries in transition make political and economic reforms and build state capacity to maintain security, law and order, and respect for universal rights.

In this respect, we seek a stable Yemen that undertakes difficult structural reforms and confronts an active threat from al-Qa'ida and other rebels. We will work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic institutions and strengthening its economy. We will work with the U.N. and our Arab and European partners in an effort to help stabilize Libya and reduce the threat posed by lawless militias and extremists. And we will maintain strategic cooperation with Egypt to enable it to respond to shared security threats, while broadening our partnership and encouraging progress toward restoration of democratic institutions.

So did the justification for the President's FY2016 defense budget requests, which made it clear that the Middle East would continue to have the same priority as Asia. A Department of Defense report stated that the U.S. strategic goal was to, (page 2-1) <sup>328</sup>

Build security globally to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. In practice, this means continuing to rebalance the Department's posture and presence to the Asia-Pacific while maintaining a focus on the Middle East.

The emphasis that U.S. strategy places on the Middle East and Gulf area, and the importance of the strategic partnership between the U.S. and the Arab states was emphasized in more detail in a series of posture statements by the Commanders of USCENTCOM that were provided as testimony to the U.S. Congress. The testimony of General Lloyd Austin, the Commander of to the House Armed Service Committee to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2015 is a good example, and is summarized at length in **Figure IX.III-1**.<sup>329</sup>

This emphasis was also clear in the new U.S. plan for *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard issued in March 2015:<sup>330</sup>

The Middle East remains strategically vital for the United States and our allies. We will increase presence in the region from 30 ships today to about 40 in 2020 to maintain credible combat power in the Middle East to deter conflict, reassure allies and partners, and respond to crises. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue the rotational deployment of Carrier Strike Groups with embarked air wings and Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) to the region.

In addition, the Marine Corps will maintain a continuous presence in the Middle East, including a General Officer-led Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element and a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) equipped with MV-22 and KC-130 Hercules

aircraft to maximize the operating radius for security cooperation and crisis response. The Navy and Marine Corps will maintain a headquarters facility in the Arabian Gulf, continue the deployment of ships there, and use new multi-mission vessels such as the Littoral Combat Ship, Joint High Speed Vessel, and Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) to support security cooperation, counterterrorism, expeditionary operations, minesweeping, and Special Operations Forces.

The Coast Guard will deploy personnel to build partner nation capacity for maritime governance and simultaneously conduct maritime security, infrastructure protection, and Port State Control activities. Coast Guard patrol boats and deployable specialized forces on Navy and coalition ships will counter illicit maritime activity.

Our sustained forward naval presence in the Middle East will protect the homeland and promote regional stability by thwarting terrorist networks that threaten local and regional governance. It will also combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and deter potential adversaries from threatening the flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal. We will enhance the capability and capacity of key partnerships, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council, to promote interoperability with member states and other navies throughout the region.

It is interesting to note that for all the past talk of rebalancing U.S. forces from a strategic commitment in Europe to one in Asia, the region where the new Seapower study called for the largest percentage increase in the number of U.S. ships to be deployed as a result of future rebalancing was the Middle East and the Gulf.<sup>331</sup>

### **The U.S.-GCC Summit in May 2015**

The U.S. made its commitment to a strategic partnership even more clear before and during a Summit meeting that the President of the U.S. and the leaders of the GCC held at Camp David in May 2015. Before the Summit, President Obama gave an interview to Mina al Oraibi of Asharq Al-Awsat stating that,<sup>332</sup>

I have invited senior officials of the GCC states to Washington to further strengthen our close partnerships, including our security cooperation, and to discuss how we can meet common challenges together. That includes working to resolve the conflicts across the Middle East that have taken so many innocent lives and caused so much suffering for the people of the region. I'm grateful that all the GCC countries will be represented, and I look forward to our discussions at both the White House and Camp David.

Our meeting is rooted in our shared interest in a Gulf region that is peaceful, prosperous, and secure. As I said at the United Nations two years ago, the United States has core interests in the Middle East, including confronting external aggression; ensuring the free flow of energy and commerce, and freedom of navigation of international waters—and this includes the Strait of Hormuz and Bab El-Mandeb; dismantling terrorist networks that threaten our people; and preventing the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. I've made it clear that the United States is prepared to use all elements of our power to secure these interests.

These are not just words; they are backed by a strong record of real action. Across six decades, the United States has worked with GCC countries to advance our mutual interests. Americans have served in the region, and given their lives, for our mutual security. Thousands of U.S. personnel serve in the Gulf region today to reinforce regional stability. Our armed forces train together in numerous major military exercises every year. So there should be no doubt about the commitment of the United States to the security of the region and to our GCC partners.

My hope is that this week's meeting will deepen our cooperation across a range of areas. Together, we have the opportunity to improve our security coordination and help our GCC partners strengthen and further integrate their defense capabilities in a range of areas including missile defense, maritime security, cyber security, and border security. We can intensify our counterterrorism efforts with a focus on stemming the flow of foreign fighters and terrorist financing to conflict zones, as well as countering the evil ideology of ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS]. We can work together

to resolve ongoing conflicts—in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya—and address underlying sectarian tensions which hold the region back.

I will have the opportunity to update the senior GCC officials on our negotiations toward a comprehensive deal to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, which I strongly believe is the best way to ensure the security of the region, including our GCC partners. At the same time, this week's meetings will be an opportunity to ensure that our countries are working closely to counter Iran's destabilizing behavior across the Middle East, including Iran's support for terrorist groups.

... Iran clearly engages in dangerous and destabilizing behavior in different countries across the region. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. It helps prop up the Assad regime in Syria. It supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It aids the Houthi rebels in Yemen. So countries in the region are right to be deeply concerned about Iran's activities, especially its support for violent proxies inside the borders of other nations.

It's important to remember that Iran already engages in these activities without a nuclear arsenal. We can only imagine how Iran might become even more provocative if it were armed with a nuclear weapon. Moreover, it would become even harder for the international community to counter and deter Iran's destabilizing behavior. That's one of the reasons why the comprehensive deal we're pursuing with Iran is so important—by preventing a nuclear-armed Iran it would remove one of the greatest threats to regional security.

Even as we've pursued a nuclear deal with Iran, the United States has remained vigilant against Iran's other reckless behavior. We've maintained our robust military presence in the region and continued to help the GCC states build their capacity to deter and defend against all forms of external aggression. We've continued to fully enforce sanctions against Iran for its support of terrorism and its ballistic missile program—and we will enforce these sanctions going forward, even if we reach a nuclear deal with Iran.

When it comes to Iran's future, I cannot predict Iran's internal dynamics. Within Iran, there are leaders and groups that for decades have defined themselves in opposition to both the United States and our regional partners. I'm not counting on any nuclear deal to change that. That said, it's also possible that if we can successfully address the nuclear question and Iran begins to receive relief from some nuclear sanctions, it could lead to more investments in the Iranian economy and more opportunity for the Iranian people, which could strengthen the hands of more moderate leaders in Iran. More Iranians could see that constructive engagement—not confrontation—with the international community is the better path. There are two paths available to Iran. One is continued confrontation; the better one is a more constructive approach to the region that would allow Iran to become more integrated with the global community. But even if the political dynamics in Iran do not change, a nuclear deal becomes even more necessary because it prevents a regime that is hostile to us from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

The declarations that came out of the U.S.-GCC Summit meeting provided a more formal reiteration of the U.S. commitment to strategic partnership with the Arab Gulf states. They scarcely resolved all of the differences and mistrust between the U.S. and the states of the Arab Gulf, any more than they resolved the differences between the individual Gulf states. They did, however, include a clear and continuing U.S. commitment to a strategic partnership, and provided a formal level of U.S. commitment to the Arab Gulf states that made it clear that the U.S. would not somehow turn away from its Arab partners and “normalize” relations with Iran in ways that ignore the many other threats Tehran poses to the region.

The Joint Statement said that the U.S. and GCC states were acting to,<sup>333</sup>

reaffirm and deepen the strong partnership and cooperation between the United States and the GCC. The leaders underscored their mutual commitment to a U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to build

closer relations in all fields, including defense and security cooperation, and develop collective approaches to regional issues in order to advance their shared interest in stability and prosperity.

The United States shares with our GCC partners a deep interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous, and a vital interest in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity, safe from external aggression, of our GCC partners. The United States policy to use all elements of power to secure our core interests in the Gulf region, and to deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners, as we did in the Gulf War, is unequivocal.

...In this spirit, and building on the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, the leaders discussed a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to enhance their work to improve security cooperation, especially on fast-tracking arms transfers, as well as on counter-terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense.

...The United States is prepared to work jointly with the GCC states to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state's territorial integrity that is inconsistent with the UN Charter. In the event of such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what action may be appropriate, using the means at our

In signing this statement, the U.S. came close to saying it would treat the GCC states in much the same way as Article 5 of the NATO Treaty calls for U.S. and European cooperation in mutual defense – a statement President Obama reinforced later in a press conference. At the same time, the U.S. was careful to ensure that the Joint Statement referred to the “territorial integrity” of the GCC states, and did not offer or imply the kind of open-ended guarantee to respond to Iranian and other third party actions outside their territory that that some GCC states may want to describe as aggression.

Moreover, the White House took the unusual step of releasing a second documents following the Summit called the *Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement* that received less public and media attention, and both reinforced these statements and provided a more tangible basis for action.<sup>334</sup>

The United States has worked with its GCC partners over six decades on matters of mutual interest, including confronting and deterring external aggression against allies and partners; ensuring the free flow of energy and commerce, and freedom of navigation in international waters; dismantling terrorist networks that threaten the safety of their people; and preventing the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, we have made significant progress, under the framework of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, to work cooperatively on security and political issues of regional importance. Today, the United States and GCC member states recognize the need to consolidate and develop this relationship based on friendship and cooperation to more effectively address the challenges we face.

At Camp David, the leaders of the GCC states and President Obama reaffirmed the longstanding U.S.-GCC partnership and pledged to further enhance the relationship between the United States and GCC member states. This partnership is based on a shared commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region, mutual interest in confronting the threat of terrorism and other destabilizing activities, and resolving regional conflicts through political means. The leaders underscored their mutual commitment to the U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to provide for closer relations in all fields, including defense and security cooperation, and to develop collective approaches to regional issues in order to advance their shared interest in stability and prosperity.

The U.S.-GCC strategic partnership involves both enhanced cooperation between the United States and the GCC collectively and between the United States and individual GCC member states in accordance with their respective capacities and interests. It establishes a common understanding on mutual assurances and heightened cooperation, including efforts to build collective capacity to address the threats of terrorism and other regional security threats.

As part of this new partnership, the leaders of the United States and the GCC decided on the following steps to enhance their cooperation...The U.S.-GCC security relationship remains a major pillar of our strategic partnership and a cornerstone of regional stability. Our existing cooperation, including basing, information sharing, joint military exercises, and provision of sophisticated military equipment and training are a testament to the sustained value we place on our shared security interests. The leaders decided at Camp David to enhance security cooperation in the following areas:

**Security Assurances:** At the core of the partnership is our shared interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous. At Camp David, we have recommitted to the importance of this vision. President Obama affirmed that the United States shares with our GCC partners a deep interest in a region that is peaceful and prosperous, and a vital interest in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity, safe from external aggression, of our GCC partners. The United States policy to use all elements of power to secure our core interests in the Gulf region, and to deter and confront external aggression against our allies and partners, as we did in the Gulf War, is unequivocal.

The United States is prepared to work jointly with the GCC states to deter and confront an external threat to any GCC state's territorial integrity that is inconsistent with the UN Charter. In the event of such aggression or the threat of such aggression, the United States stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal, including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our GCC partners.

The United States and GCC member states also decided to set up a senior working group to pursue the development of rapid response capabilities, taking into account the Arab League's concept of a "unified Arab force," to mount or contribute in a coordinated way to counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the region. The United States and GCC member states also affirmed their strong support for the efforts of the P5+1 to reach a deal with Iran by June 30, 2015, that would verifiably ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon, noting that such a deal would represent a significant contribution to regional security.

As with Operation Decisive Storm, GCC states will consult with the United States when planning to take military action beyond GCC borders, in particular when U.S. assistance is requested for such action.

...The United States and GCC member states reaffirmed their shared interest in de-escalating regional tensions, resolving regional armed civil conflicts, and addressing the critical humanitarian needs of populations affected by conflict. The leaders made clear their belief that the conflicts in the region, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, are eroding state structures, creating ungoverned spaces, and promoting sectarianism, all of which serve as fodder for terrorists and other extremist groups and directly threaten their shared security interests.

The leaders set out core principles that, in their view, must govern efforts to resolve regional armed civil conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, including:

- the respect for state sovereignty;
- a shared recognition that there is no military solution to the regions' civil conflicts, and that they can only be resolved through political and peaceful means; and
- the importance of inclusive governance; and respect for, and protection of, minorities and human rights.

The leaders also held in-depth discussions on the most pressing conflicts in the region and steps they decided should be taken to help resolve them.

...The leaders pledged to further deepen U.S.-GCC relations on these and other issues, to build an even stronger, enduring, and comprehensive strategic partnership and work together for the same, aimed at enhancing regional stability and prosperity.

To ensure continuity of those efforts, and speedy implementation of decisions expressed in the Camp David Joint Statement of 14 May 2015, they directed their respective administrations to strengthen

the framework of the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, to include more frequent ministerial and technical meetings for foreign affairs, defense, security, economic and other areas relevant to the Forum's activities. They agreed to meet again in a similar high level format in 2016, in order to advance and build upon the U.S.-GCC Strategic Partnership announced today.

At least some in the Gulf did want a far stronger reassurance, as well as an agreement that at least implied that the U.S. would somehow help the GCC states reverse Iran's strategic expansion into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and deal with GCC country claims that Iran was interfering by meddling with the Shia populations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Some also wanted a NATO-like formal treaty –ignoring the real world political problems this would present in terms of the U.S. Congress, how the U.S. would define its territorial coverage, and how the U.S. would then have to deal with other regional allies like Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.

### *A Focus on Specific areas of Cooperation*

Unlike the main Joint Statement, the *Annex to U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement* addressed many specific areas of cooperation discussed earlier, and that are highlighted in more detail in the rest of the analysis and **Figures** in this chapter:<sup>335</sup>

**Ballistic missile defense:** GCC member states committed to develop a region-wide ballistic missile defense capability, including through the development of a ballistic missile early warning system. The United States will help conduct a study of GCC ballistic missile defense architecture and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. All participants decided to undertake a senior leader tabletop exercise to examine improved regional ballistic missile defense cooperation.

**Military Exercises and Training Partnership:** Building on their extensive existing program of military exercises and training activities, the United States and GCC member states decided to establish a new, recurring, large-scale exercise emphasizing interoperability against asymmetric threats, such as terrorist or cyber-attacks, or other tactics associated with hybrid warfare. The United States will also dispatch a military team to GCC capitals to discuss and decide on ways to increase the frequency of Special Operations Forces counter-terrorism cooperation and training.

**Arms Transfers:** In order to ensure that GCC member states are able to respond quickly to current and future threats, the United States and GCC member states will take steps necessary to ensure arms transfers are fast-tracked to GCC member states contributing to regional security. To that end, President Obama will dispatch a senior team to the region in the coming weeks to discuss specific modalities. The United States and the GCC will work together to set up a dedicated Foreign Military Sales procurement office to process GCC-wide sales, streamlining third-party transfers, and exploring ways the United States could accelerate the acquisition and fielding of key capabilities.

**Maritime Security:** To protect shared maritime security interests and freedom of navigation, the GCC member states decided to increase their participation in international maritime task forces on counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. They also decided to take further steps to exchange information about and, as appropriate, interdict illicit arms shipments to conflict areas. The United States committed to provide additional training and technical assistance for coastal security, protection of offshore infrastructure, and counter-smuggling.

**Counter-terrorism:** Building on a shared commitment to address the acute threats posed by Al-Qa'ida, ISIL/DAESH and their affiliates, the United States and GCC member states will pursue initiatives to further build their capacity to track, investigate, and prosecute those engaged in terrorist activities within their borders, as well as to contain and deter transit, financing and recruitment by violent extremists. The United States and the GCC will hold a second U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum Working Group on Counter-terrorism and Border Security to follow up on previous efforts to cooperate on border security, countering the financing of terrorism,

cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection. Leaders also decided to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation in the following areas:

- **Foreign Terrorist Fighters:** The United States and GCC member states will bolster their joint efforts to identify and share information on suspected foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). In response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), the United States and GCC member states will work together to implement traveler screening systems and enhanced biometrics collection capability, and share best practices to make it more difficult for terrorists to avoid detection at any GCC airport.
- **Counter-Terrorist Financing:** The United States and GCC member states will increase efforts to cut off terrorist financing, including through enhanced intelligence exchange and enforcement efforts to freeze assets of individuals and entities designated under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, especially in the region. The United States will organize a public-private sector banking dialogue in the fall of 2015 to facilitate discussions on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.

**Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity:** The United States and GCC member states will consult on cybersecurity initiatives, share expertise and best practices on cyber policy, strategy, and incident response. The United States will provide GCC member states with additional security assistance, set up military cybersecurity exercises and national policy workshops, and improve information-sharing.

**Countering Violent Extremism:** Recognizing the need to counter recruitment by extremist groups from at-risk youth and vulnerable communities, the United States and GCC member states will provide financial support for multilateral initiatives to counter violent extremism (CVE) aimed at strengthening resilience in vulnerable communities, including support for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. In addition, GCC leaders offered to host a CVE religious leaders conference aimed at boosting efforts that will expose the true nature of ISIL/DAESH and other terrorist organizations.

**Counter-proliferation:** The GCC member states determined to accelerate efforts against the proliferation of WMD, the means of their delivery, as well as advanced conventional weapons, by enhancing national controls on proliferation-sensitive items and technologies.

### ***Dealing with Mistrust over the Nuclear Negotiations with Iran***

The Summit meeting did seem to reduce the tensions between the U.S. and its Arab Gulf allies over the nuclear negotiations. It provided a general set of U.S. assurances regarding its relations with Iran, in return for a broad GCC endorsement of a *fully successful* P5+1 agreement with Iran – commitments that would only have meaning if a final agreement was ever reached, and if each of the Arab Gulf states that accepted the terms of the final agreement. The Annex to the Joint Statement provided the clearest view of how the U.S. would deal with Iran, and made it clear that the U.S. would seek some form of rapprochement at the expense of the Arab Gulf states,<sup>336</sup>

The United States and GCC member states oppose and will cooperate in countering Iran's destabilizing activities in the region and continue consultations on how to enhance the region's security architecture. As part of this effort, the United States will work in partnership with GCC member states to build their capacity to defend themselves against external aggression, including in terms of air and missile defense, maritime and cybersecurity, as GCC member states take steps to increase the interoperability of their military forces and continue to better integrate their advanced capabilities. At the same time, the United States and GCC member states reaffirmed their willingness to develop normalized relations with Iran should it cease its destabilizing activities and their belief that such relations would contribute to regional security.

The Joint Statement focused more on the nuclear issue and said that,<sup>337</sup>



They reviewed the status of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, and emphasized that a comprehensive, verifiable deal that fully addresses the regional and international concerns about Iran's nuclear program is in the security interests of GCC member states as well as the United States and the international community. The United States and GCC member states oppose and will work together to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the region and stressed the need for Iran to engage the region according to the principles of good neighborliness, strict non-interference in domestic affairs, and respect for territorial integrity, consistent with international law and the United Nations Charter, and for Iran to take concrete, practical steps to build trust and resolve its differences with neighbors by peaceful means.

This portion of the Joint Statement reflected a more sophisticated approach to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations than the almost blanket condemnation that some in the Gulf had previously made of an agreement that did not yet exist and which no one could yet assess. At the same time, it did not address the issues of how both sides would respond if no agreement was reached, how the Arab Gulf states would judge the adequacy of any agreement, and how the U.S. and Arab Gulf states would consult to determine whether Iran actually honored and implemented the agreement over time.

It also ignored the growing concern in the GCC that if an agreement with Iran preserves Iran's technology base and nuclear fuel cycle, the GCC states must have their own nuclear power and fuel cycle – effectively matching one nuclear weapons break out option with another. The fact that some of the wisest and most respected voices in the GCC – like Prince Turki of Saudi Arabia who has also been a strong advocate of a WMD-free zone—are reported to support such a position is a warning to both Iran and the U.S.

It is also important to note, that the GCC showed it was scarcely united on how to deal with Iran, just as it has divided to some extent over virtually every major security issue. For all of the Arab conspiracy theories about the U.S. pivoting to Iran at their expense, and calls for the U.S. to wave a magic wand in limiting the expansion of Iran's influence in the region, the fact remains that Oman largely stands aside from the other states in the GCC, Qatar is less hawkish than the Saudi and Bahraini regimes, and it is not clear that the UAE's Emirates have a clear consensus with each other, much less with Saudi Arabia.

### ***Uncertain Cooperation in Fighting the Wars in Failed States***

The Final Statement also showed that neither U.S. nor its GCC partners had a convincing or coherent policy for dealing with the broader threat from religious extremism and sectarian violence, or the “failed state wars” in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Joint Statement did call for unified action in broad terms:<sup>338</sup>

The leaders, furthermore, discussed how best to address regional conflicts and defuse growing tensions. In this context, the leaders discussed the most pressing conflicts in the region, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, and what could be done to advance their resolution. They decided on a set of common principles, including a shared recognition that there is no military solution to the regions' armed civil conflicts, which can only be resolved through political and peaceful means; respect for all states' sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs; the need for inclusive governance in conflict-ridden societies; as well as protection of all minorities and of human rights.

### ***Yemen***

In practical terms, however, the Joint Statement did not address the fact that the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC states had a convincing approach to either using force effectively in Yemen or to coming to grips with the fact that Yemen's problems went far

beyond the Houthi, AQAP, or Iran, and reflected deep internal differences, failed governance, a failed economy, a demographic nightmare, and structural problems like a shortfall of water,<sup>339</sup>

With regard to Yemen, both the United States and GCC member states underscored the imperative of collective efforts to counter Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and emphasized the need to rapidly shift from military operations to a political process, through the Riyadh Conference under GCC auspices and UN-facilitated negotiations based on the GCC initiative, National Comprehensive Dialogue outcomes, and the Security Council's relevant resolutions. Taking into consideration the humanitarian needs of civilians, they welcomed the start of a five-day humanitarian pause to facilitate delivery of relief assistance to all those in need and expressed hope it would develop into a longer, more sustainable ceasefire. They expressed their appreciation for the generous grant of \$274 million provided by Saudi Arabia for the UN humanitarian response in Yemen. The United States reaffirmed its commitment, in partnership with GCC member states and other members of the international community, to seek to prevent the resupply of Houthi forces and their allies in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 2216.

The Annex to the Joint Statement did little more than illustrated the problems involved in more depth,<sup>340</sup>

The United States and GCC member states expressed deep concern over the situation in Yemen and its destabilizing impact on the region. Leaders emphasized the need to rapidly shift from military operations to a political process, through the Riyadh Conference under GCC auspices and UN-facilitated negotiations based on the GCC initiative, National Comprehensive Dialogue outcomes, and the Security Council's relevant resolutions. Taking into consideration the humanitarian needs of civilians, they welcomed the start of a five-day humanitarian pause to facilitate delivery of relief assistance to all those in need and expressed hope it would develop into a longer, more sustainable ceasefire. They expressed their appreciation for the generous grant of \$274 million provided by Saudi Arabia for the UN humanitarian response in Yemen. Leaders emphasized the importance of working with the international community to prevent the provision of weapons to designated Yemeni parties or those acting on their behalf or at their direction in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 2216.

The United States also reaffirmed its assurance to help GCC member states defend themselves against external threats emanating from Yemen and emphasized its particular support for Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity. The leaders underscored that Yemen's political transition should be in accordance with the GCC Initiative, National Dialogue outcomes and UNSC resolutions. Furthermore, leaders stressed the imperative of collective efforts to counter the shared threat from Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is exploiting the crisis.

The U.S. and the GCC had no clear solution to using force on the ground, and the Summit reflected the fact that Saudi Arabia did not have the support of Oman, another critical GCC state. They face the dilemma that there was little immediate prospect that any use of force would be enough to bring stability, that there was no solution to Yemen as a failed state without security, and no lasting prospect of stability without dealing with Yemen's deeper challenges in economics, governance, and demographics, and water. Short of some form of internal compromise between Yemen's factions, or some kind of "victory" lasting enough to allow some civil progress, Yemen represented a massive challenge in armed nation building. It was too large a burden for Saudi Arabia and the GCC to can take on, and one the U.S. lacked domestic political support to address and also lacked the strategic priority for the U.S. to accept its cost and risk.

## *Syria*

Somewhat similarly, the Joint Statement's coverage of Syria did little more than paper over the lack of a plan for effective common action:<sup>341</sup>

The leaders committed to continue working towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria that ends the war and establishes an inclusive government that protects all ethnic and religious minorities, and preserves state institutions. They reaffirmed that Assad has lost all legitimacy and has no role in Syria's future. They strongly supported increased efforts to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL/DAESH in Syria and warned against the influence of other extremist groups, such as Al-Nusrah, that represent a danger to the Syrian people, to the region and to the international community. They expressed deep concern over the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and condemned the prevention of aid distribution to the civilian population by the Assad regime or any other party.

Once again, the Annex to the Joint Statement did little more than paper over the lack of any new and effective plans for cooperation that could address the full range of problems involved,<sup>342</sup>

The United States and GCC member states reaffirmed the importance of a genuine, sustainable political solution as soon as possible to end the war in Syria and prevent the further suffering of its people. All affirmed that Assad had lost all legitimacy and had no role in Syria's future. They affirmed their commitment to working towards a post-Assad government that is independent, inclusive, and protects the rights of minority groups. The United States and the GCC member states committed to increasing support to the moderate opposition. GCC member states decided to intensify efforts to combat extremist groups in Syria, notably by shutting down private financial flows or any form of assistance to ISIL/DAESH, Al Nusrah Front, and other violent extremist groups, and to intensify efforts to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of Syria. They expressed their determination to work together to mobilize the international community for post-Assad reconstruction of Syria. All affirmed their commitment to continue to support Syria's neighbors as they face the immense challenges posed by the ongoing conflict and to work together to strengthen the stability and security of these countries.

Restating weak policies that failed to deal with problems that had steadily worsened since 2011, and that the UN and USAID estimated had put more than 11 million people -- more than half of Syria's total population -- at risk, did not even mark the beginning of a common effort. The U.S. was already playing a critical humanitarian role, and there were some signs of more effective Saudi-UAE-Qatari cooperation in dealing with rebel movements, but none of this was addressed in the Joint Statement and there was little sign the Summit produced any progress at a classified level.

In fact, there was no clear U.S. policy beyond sporadic bombing and a glacially slow effort to train some 15,000 rebels for an undefined effort towards an unknown goal. Saudi-UAE-Qatari cooperation seemed more likely to create a future extremist threat, and a lasting legacy of Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict that will leave an opening for Iran to exert influence in both Lebanon and Syria, and to create a Shia bridge to Iraq. Neither the U.S. nor GCC efforts seem likely to produce lasting stability or security or to be making a meaningful attempt to address Syria's critical need for national unity and national recovery.

## *Iraq*

The Joint Statement was more useful when it comes to Iraq,<sup>343</sup>

The United States and GCC member states further affirmed their commitment to assisting the Iraqi government and the international coalition in their fight against ISIL/DAESH. They stressed the

importance of strengthening ties between GCC member states and the Iraqi government, based on the principles of good neighborliness, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for state sovereignty. They encouraged the Iraqi government to achieve genuine national reconciliation by urgently addressing the legitimate grievances of all components of Iraqi society through the implementation of reforms agreed upon last summer and by ensuring that all armed groups operate under the strict control of the Iraqi state.

The Annex to the Joint Statement reinforced these points, and did involve at least some form of added commitment by the Arab Gulf states,<sup>344</sup>

The United States and GCC member states reiterated their support for the Iraqi government in its efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL/DAESH. They encouraged the Iraqi government to achieve genuine national reconciliation by urgently addressing the legitimate grievances of all components of Iraqi society through the implementation of reforms agreed upon last summer and by ensuring that all armed groups operate under the strict control of the Iraqi state. GCC member states recommitted themselves to reestablishing a diplomatic presence in Baghdad and to working with the Iraqi government to support efforts against ISIL/DAESH, including in Anbar and other provinces.

As noted earlier, Iraq had become a case where the U.S. must take deep responsibility for invading Iraq without any plan or initial capability for stability operations and the years of counterinsurgency and armed nation building that followed. Iraq had also become a country where it was far from clear that the U.S.-led air campaign, training and assist mission for its ground forces, and diplomatic efforts were moving it towards unity, independence from Iranian influence, or offering real hope of military success as long as the U.S. focus is was largely on Iraqi territory, potentially leaving the threat from ISIL/Daesh (or some successor) on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Iraq has also become a case, however, where Saudi Arabia and most other GCC states had been far too slow to directly compete with Iran in reaching to the Iraqi government, to play an active role in trying to reconcile Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis, and to give Iraq strong economic and security incentives to counterbalance Iranian influence. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi may not have been perfect from an Arab Gulf viewpoint, but he had shown he was far more committed to a unified and independent Iraq than Maliki and offered a window of hope that the GCC states should do everything possible to encourage rather than let close.

### ***Libya, the Israeli Palestinian-Conflict and Lebanon***

The Joint Statement also touched briefly on other crises in the region, but the Annex at least addressed the need for continued action:

**Libya:** Noting growing concern about political deadlock at a time when violent extremism is expanding, the United States and GCC member states decided to coordinate their efforts more closely on Libya's political transition. They will press all parties to reach a political agreement based on proposals put forward by the UN and to urgently establish a national unity government before Ramadan, and stand ready to substantially increase their assistance to such a government. Leaders committed to seek to stem illicit arms flows into Libya, and called on all Libyans to focus on countering the growing terrorist presence, including that of ISIL/DAESH, instead of fighting their political rivals.

**Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:** The United States and GCC member states strongly affirmed the necessity of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a just, lasting, comprehensive peace agreement that results in an independent and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side

in peace and security with Israel. To that end, the United States and GCC member states underscored the enduring importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the urgent need for the parties to demonstrate—through policies and actions—genuine advancement of a two-state solution, and decided to remain closely engaged moving forward. The United States and GCC member states also recommitted to continue to fulfill aggressively their pledges made for Gaza's reconstruction, to include pledges made at the October 2014 Cairo Conference.

**Lebanon:** The leaders expressed their concern over the delay in electing a new president of Lebanon, called on all parties to strengthen Lebanese state institutions, and emphasized the critical importance of Lebanon's parliament moving forward to elect a president of the Lebanese Republic in accordance with the constitution.

### *The Value of Dialogue*

More broadly, the Summit did make the leaders of the U.S. and GCC address their mutual distrust and problems more openly. Hopefully, it will make those outside the Summit think a little harder as well. Many media and think tank sources had spent the week before the Summit focusing on why the King of Saudi Arabia was not coming to the meeting, some creating their own conspiracy theories about Saudi Arabia and its royal family.

The actual meeting demonstrated two very different things. First, both they and their Gulf counterparts should have focused on why the King of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf heads of state should come rather than why they weren't. They should have focused on what the key issues were, and what such a meeting could accomplish. Second, the fact the king did not come was ultimately far more useful than his coming would have been. It sent a useful signal to all sides and countries that they need to do far more to cooperate in shaping a common approach to security, to dealing with Iran, and to finding broader solutions to the "failed state wars" in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

On the part of the U.S., the Summit meeting showed the Obama Administration that it needed to listen far more carefully to its allies and reassure them far more clearly. It also needs to show its strategic partners that it could go from concepts and rhetoric to meaningful action. So far, the Obama Administration had largely reversed the order of Aesop's fable about the "Frogs Who Desired a King." If President Bush was King Stork, President Obama has tended to be King Log. On the part of the GCC states, the Summit showed them that the U.S. is a meaningful strategic ally but not a magic answer to the failures of Arab states, every regional security problem, or the divisions within the GCC and Arab world.

Hopefully, the Summit also sent a broader signal to the advocates of conspiracy theories in the Arab Gulf. Bad as some of the U.S. media and think tank commentary before the Summit may have been, the U.S. side never approached the surrealistic whining and conspiracy theories of far too much GCC media and far too many commentators. At least for a while, it seemed that the GCC now had three major exports: petroleum, blame, and responsibility.

### **Key Areas of Cooperation**

All of the developments that led to the May 2015 Summit between the U.S. and GCC reflect the fact that the strategic partnership between U.S. and its Arab Gulf partners has had to adapt to the fact that that Gulf security must now deal with new threats to Iraq and

Yemen, the spillover from a brutal civil war in Syria, the new for closer cooperation with Jordan and Egypt in dealing with security in the West and the Red Sea, the expansion of both Iranian influence and the role of violent Jihadist movements in the Gulf, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The competition between Iran and the Arab Gulf states for influence in Iraq has become particularly serious since an Iranian dominated Iraq—or Shi'ite portion of Iraq—would posed a far more tangible threat to the Gulf than Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria. The same is true of the crisis in Yemen, which could become a base for Iranian forces, Iranian support of a threat to Saudi Arabia, and the deployment of Iranian air and sea power in the Red Sea in a worst-case contingency. Both Iraq and Yemen are also crises where Iran has an advantage in dealing with Iraq's Shi'ites and those in Yemen, although such threats cannot be fully separated from Iran's efforts to support the Assad and Alawite side in the Syrian civil war and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Arab states also face a broader crisis that many are not yet fully ready to face. What some once called the “clash between civilizations” has actually become a war for the future of Islam within the Islamic world. The broader tensions and sometimes conflicts between hardline Sunni Islamists and modern Sunnis and Sunni regimes, and between such Sunnis and Shi'ites and other Islamic minorities, now affect the entire Islamic world, including Egypt and Jordan, and all of the Gulf states. They feed extremism, violence, and serious terrorist threats like the IISS, Al Nusra Front, AQAP, and extremist elements of the Moslem Brotherhood throughout the region.

Several factors have become particularly important in shaping the changing focus of the strategic partnership between U.S. and Arab Gulf states; the attitudes of the Southern Gulf states towards Iran; and the need for effective political, military, and economic unity and action by the Arab Gulf states:

- *Terrorism and Civil Unrest:* There is a history of Iranian-linked terrorism and civil unrest dating to the infancy of the Islamic Republic. Bahrain in particular has alleged that numerous uprisings, attempted coups, and recent bombings have been linked to Iranian support for Shia factions in that country. Kuwait also has a history of dealing with Iranian-linked terrorism as early as the 1980s, with another attempted attack recently uncovered. Plots in Bahrain and Kuwait have been linked to both Hezbollah and the IRGC Quds Force.
- *Threat to Maritime Trade:* The security of maritime commerce for much of the Arabian Peninsula is contingent upon safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The threat of Iranian mines, small boat attacks, and anti-ship missiles is a serious risk to regional commerce. At the same time, Yemen is scarcely the only unstable state in the Red Sea, and Saudi Arabia now needs to strengthen its Red Sea fleet and air capabilities. Saudi Arabia exports petroleum and refined products through its port at Yanbu and has a major trading port at Jeddah. In 2011, some 3.4 mmb/d of petroleum products flowed through the Bab el-Mandab at the eastern entrance to the Red Sea, and 3.8 mmb/d flowed through the SUMED pipeline and the Suez Canal at its western entrance.<sup>345</sup>
- *Missile Threat:* Iran's airpower capabilities are limited by sanctions and the aging nature of the country's fixed-wing air force. However, Iran has compensated for these shortcomings with short to intermediate range missile capabilities that put major population centers and critical infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula in range of Iranian strikes.
- *Nuclear Threat:* The GCC Supreme Council meeting in December 2012 made it clear that the leaders of the Arab Gulf states supported Iran's right to make peaceful use of nuclear power. However, these leaders were deeply concerned about the growing evidence that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons breakout capability and has plans to arm its missile forces with nuclear weapons.

- *Competition for the Levant and Iranian Support to Other Violent Non-State Actors:* As has been the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia groups in Iraq, Iran has been accused of providing material support to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Arabian Peninsula. The IRGC Quds Force is accused of meeting with and providing arms to Houthi militants in Yemen, which have been battling the U.S.-backed regimes of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
- *Iranian and Arab Gulf competition for influence in Iraq and Training and Support of Shia Militias in Iraq:* While Iran has largely supported the Maliki government; its Al Quds Force not only plays a role in Iraqi politics but trains, funds, and equips various Shia military factions.
- *Competition for Influence in Syria, and Role of Iranian Advisors and Arms Transfers in Syria:* Iran has become a major source of military advisors and trainers for the Shia militias backing Assad and a key source of arms, spare parts, and other military equipment to the pro-Assad elements of the regular military services and Syrian security forces. Along with its support of the Lebanese Hezbollah's efforts in Syria, it has become a key military factor in keeping the Assad regime in power.
- *Growing threat of instability in Jordan, Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world:* What some experts once called the Arab Spring now threaten to become the Arab quarter century. Political upheavals in Egypt and Syria, a civil war in Syria, growing violence in Lebanon, and instability in Jordan combine to form a new threat to Arab Gulf stability, and give Iran growing influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This has fed Islamic extremism throughout the region, threatens to create an Iranian influenced "axis" that extends to the Mediterranean, and raises questions about the future security of Saudi Arabia's western border.
- *The risk of a broader conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ite and Islamic minorities and other minorities:* What some experts once called the "clash between civilizations" has become a "conflict within a civilization." Islam risks repeating all of the mistakes and horrors of the Christian reformation and counterreformation and atrocities like the Albegensian crusade. Hardline violent Sunni extremists now struggle against modern Sunnis and Sunni regimes, Shi'ite and Alawites, other Islamic minorities, and Christian and other minorities in Islamic states. The result is a mix of political struggles, local violence, terrorism and extremism, and insurgency and civil war. It directly affects Gulf states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia with significant divisions between their Sunni and Shi'ite populations, but Sunni on Sunni tensions are a growing issue in Gulf states like the UAE and Qatar. The struggle for tolerance and modernization affects every Gulf and Islamic state.

The U.S. has responded to these threats with a series of major security cooperation initiatives in the region geared towards containing and deterring Iran. These have included deploying U.S. special forces and mine units to the Gulf, making the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states partners in its Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Qatar, sharply increasing the number of multilateral military exercises – especially with the U.S. 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet – and helping the GCC states make major improvements in their deterrence and defense capabilities.

It is clear that the U.S. strategic partnership with GCC and its other Arab allies must deal with a range of threats that goes from low-level attacks or clashes in the Gulf to a possible effort to close the Strait of Hormuz to Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war to Iran missile strikes. At the same time, the U.S. and its Arab Gulf partners must deal with the political unrest and uprisings that have surged in the MENA region since the first set of upheavals in Tunisia in early 2011, the possible impact of Israeli preventative military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, and growing extremist and terrorist threats like AQAP and AQIM.

## U.S. Forces in the Gulf and U.S. Power Projection Forces

The key U.S. deployments in the Gulf region and U.S. global forces are shown in **Figures XII.2 to Figure XII.7**. The U.S. forces that defend the Gulf and cover the western IOR, focus on the entire Middle East and are assigned to USCENTCOM. They include the forces the U.S. deploys in support of the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, and the Red Sea states.

The level of forces the U.S. deploys to the Gulf and Middle East at any given time varies with the level of tension or conflict in the region, and is drawn from a massive pool of global power projection forces the U.S. maintains in the U.S., in Europe and in the Pacific. The forces actually deployed by USCENTCOM vary according to the contingency commitments the U.S. makes in the CENTCOM region at any given time – a region which goes far beyond the IOR and extends from Egypt to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The U.S. does, however, continuously maintain a major air-sea force as part of its 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet, which is headquartered in Bahrain. The U.S. Navy has maintained a presence in the Gulf since 1949, has had facilities in Bahrain since 1971, and created the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet in 1995. In April 2015, the U.S. Navy deployed the following U.S. task forces and major ships in the region:<sup>346</sup> As noted earlier, the new seapower strategy the U.S. announced in April 2015 stated that the U.S. would increase its presence in the Middle East from 30 ships in 2015 to 40 by 2020.<sup>347</sup>

**CTF-50: Strike forces:** Plans & conducts strike operations. Commanded by a Carrier Strike Group Commander.

- Nimitz-class Aircraft Carrier
- Ticonderoga-class Cruiser
- Arleigh Burke-Class
- Destroyer
- Oliver Hazard Perry-Class
- Frigate
- Supply-Class Replenishment
- Ship

**CTF-51: Counter-Piracy:** Disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea, engage with partners to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation.

- Wasp-class LHD
- Tarawa-class LHA
- Harpers Ferry-class LSD
- Whidbey Island-class LSD
- AV-8B Harrier II
- CH-53D/E Sea Stallion
- CH-46D/E Sea Knight
- AH-1W Super Cobra

**CTF-52: Mine Warfare:** Provides command & control of all mine warfare assets in the region.

- Avenger-Class MCM
- MH-53E Sea Dragon

Other assets such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and Unmanned Underwater Vehicle teams also contribute to the success of the Mine Warfare mission.



**CTF-53: Logistics:** Provides logistics support to the Fleet, including underway replenishment by Military Sealift Command-operated ships.

- Ammunition Ship
- Combat Stores Ship
- Fast Combat Support Ship
- Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship
- Fleet Replenishment Oiler

**CTF-54: Submarine Forces:** Commands operation of U.S. submarine forces (SSN/SSGN) and coordinates theatre-wide Anti-Submarine Warfare matters.

- Ohio-Class Guided Missile Submarine
- Los Angeles-Class Submarine

**CTF-55: Surface Forces:** Controls surface forces such as USN Patrol Craft and U.S. Coast Guard patrol boats.

- Coastal Patrol Ships

**CTF-56: Expeditionary Combat Forces:** Controls Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Coastal Warfare, Sea Bees, Expeditionary Logistics Support Forces and Riverine Forces. Explosive Ordnance Disposal

- Marine Mammals
- Inshore Boat Units
- Mobile Construction
- Battalion
- Riverine Forces

**CTF-57: Maritime Patrol Forces:** Maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations region wide.

- P-3C Orion, ASW Aircraft

**CTF-58 Contingency Task Force:** A specified task force stood up to provide command and control to designated missions.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet also deploys three combined maritime task forces (CTFs) in the region, all of which cooperate with Arab, British, French, and other friendly naval forces. These include CTF-150 (Maritime Security), CTF-151 (Counter-Piracy), and CTF-152 (Gulf Maritime Security). The 5<sup>th</sup> fleet states that,<sup>348</sup>

“CTF-152 operates in the Arabian Gulf where it coordinates Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) activities with regional partners, conducts Maritime Security Operations (MSO), and remains prepared to respond to any crisis that may develop...CTF-152 was established in March 2004. It operates in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf and takes part in Operation Enduring Freedom. CTF 152 consists of ships, aircraft and personnel from a range of nations including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, UK and U.S. CTF-152 is a multinational task force which has included participation from Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Participation is purely voluntary. No nation is asked to carry out any duty that it is unwilling to conduct. Command of CTF-152 is rotated between participatory nations on a three to six month basis.

The overall U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force presence in the Gulf/Western IOR region is harder to quantify. The U.S. had approximately 25,000 personnel in the area for all services in 2013, and major air facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. It also has a major air base and command facility at Al Udaid Air Force Base in Qatar called the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (COAC), and prepositioning and contingency facilities

in Oman. In April 2015, the U.S. Air Force combat presence in the Gulf included at least three Air Expeditionary Wings (AEW),<sup>349</sup>

- **379th Air Expeditionary Wing:** The 379th Air Expeditionary Wing supports a wide range of missions to include: bomber, airlift, refueling, aeromedical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. This collection makes the 379th AEW a large hub for humanitarian airlift activity in Iraq and Afghanistan while providing mission-essential combat power, aeromedical evacuation and intelligence support for multiple-theaters of operations. The wing operates the KC135 Stratotanker, B-1B Lancer, C-21A, C-20G, C-130 Hercules, E-8C Joint Stars and RC-135U Combat Sentry and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint aircraft.
- **380th Air Expeditionary Wing:** The 380th Air Expeditionary Wing is a refueling wing for operations in the Arabian Gulf and provides combat service support to land component forces throughout the Gulf Region and Iraq. The wing operates the E-3 AWACS, RQ-4 Global Hawk, U-2S and KC-10 Extender aircraft.
- **386th Air Expeditionary Wing:** The 386th Air Expeditionary Wing is an airlift/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance hub supporting coalition operations throughout the Arabian Gulf and combat operations in Afghanistan. The Wing also provides combat service support to land and sea component forces throughout the Persian Gulf Region. The wing operates the MQ-1B Predator, the C-130H Hercules, the C-17 Globemaster and supports U.S. Army aviation detachments for both fixed wing and rotary assets

The U.S. has been flying active combat operations in support of Iraq and against ISIS and other extremist groups like the Al Nusra Front in both Iraq and Syria since August 2014. In October 2014, the U.S. formed a Combined Joint Task Force including the U.S., Arab, and other states as part of Operation Inherent Resolve to counter ISIL's sweeping takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria which came to have the support of more than 60 countries in operations against Daesh in Iraq and Syria – 39 of which have sent military planners to participate in joint planning conferences with the U.S..<sup>350</sup>

It is not possible to provide U.S. aircraft numbers for the entire range of USAF, USN, and Marine Corps air forces in the Gulf region. The scale of total U.S. Air Force (AFCENT) activity in Iraq and Syria between August 2014 and the end of March 2015, 2015 is shown in **Figure XI.8**, however, and does provide a rough indication of U.S. power projection and surge capabilities. **Figure XI.8** shows the U.S. flew over 12,600 close air support and interdiction sorties, 4,133 IS&R sorties, 4,292 airlift sorties, and 8,110 tanker sorties – and these were levels far lower than at the peak of the Iraq and Afghan Wars. These numbers clearly illustrate the fact that airpower in the Gulf area at any given time is not a measure of U.S. capability for a rapid deployment force.<sup>351</sup>

A U.S. Department of Defense report issued at the end of April 2015 stated that,<sup>352</sup>

At a total cost of \$1.83 billion, DoD reports that, as of March 2015, nearly 3,000 airstrikes had been conducted in both Iraq and Syria as part of military operations coordinated among 14 coalition countries.<sup>83</sup> Approximately 1,600 strikes have targeted ISIL positions in Iraq since August 8, 2014, and more than 1,200 have targeted ISIL in Syria since December 23, 2014. According to DoD, these strikes damaged or destroyed more than 150 oil and gas facilities, 441 ISIL staging areas, and nearly 1,700 buildings, among hundreds of other targets.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq have been pushed back since August 2014. ISIL can no longer operate freely in roughly 25 to 30 percent of populated areas of Iraqi territory where it once could. These areas translate into approximately 13,000 to 17,000 square kilometers (or 5,000 to 6,500 square miles). However, because of the dynamic nature of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, this estimate could increase or decrease depending on daily fluctuations in the battle lines. ISIL's area of influence in Syria remains largely unchanged,

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In addition, the U.S. now deploys U.S. Army train and assist teams in Iraq to help the Iraqi Army recover its military capabilities, and defeat ISIS forces on the ground.<sup>353</sup>

DoD reported that FY 2015 ITEF funds will be used to train and equip 12 brigades at four training sites in Iraq, including 9 Iraqi Security Forces brigades and 3 Kurdish *Peshmerga* brigades. According to DoD, approximately 3,000 U.S. military personnel were working in Iraq as of March 2015. About half were assigned to train, equip, and advise Iraqi forces. Trainers began working with local partners last summer. DoD requested \$0.7 billion for the ITEF in FY 2016 to continue the train and equip mission in Iraq next year.

- Of the \$1.3 billion in CTPF funding made available to DoD in FY 2015, \$500 million was allocated for the training and equipping mission in Syria. DoD reported that the first group of Syrians will begin their training in April. The program aims to train vetted recruits to provide the following outcomes:
  - Defend themselves and the Syrian people from ISIL attacks.
  - Secure areas under opposition control.
  - Eventually empower trainees to go on the offensive against ISIL.
  - Promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.
  - DoD requested \$0.6 billion for the STEF in FY 2016 to continue training and equipping appropriately vetted Syrian opposition forces, especially from areas most threatened by ISIL.<sup>95</sup> According to DoD, several coalition partners, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and the United Kingdom are providing support

The U.S. has also worked with allies like Jordan and Saudi Army to help train moderate Syrian rebel forces. In April 2015, it provided the Saudi-led air coalition with IS&R and logistic support in its operations in Yemen, deployed a carrier and other U.S. ships to block Iran from sending ships to Yemen, deployed a combat ship to monitor Iranian naval action against container ship flying a Marshall Island flag, and then deployed U.S. combat ships near the Strait to deter further Iranian action.

## U.S. Arms Transfers

As **Chapter III** has discussed, U.S. arms transfers play a critical role in shaping both the Gulf military balance and the U.S. strategic partnership with the Arab Gulf states. While the major Western European states and China have cut their weapons exports to the region in recent years relative to the mid-2000s, the U.S. increased its arms agreements with GCC states by over eight times between 2004-2007 and 2008-2011. Saudi Arabia made the most drastic increases, with a nine-fold increase in 2008-2011 versus 2004-2007. Kuwait, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar have also experienced considerable growth in weapons imports from the U.S.. Similar increases have also taken place in arms deliveries.<sup>354</sup>

The U.S. has clearly made arms transfer to the GCC a critical part of its strategy. Some of these transfers have already been summarized in Chapter III, but the U.S. provides more detailed data on its role in supporting its strategic partners in the Gulf through its Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) (<http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales>), although these are figures for proposed sales and not actual sales.

The DCSA reports total orders and deliveries by year for actual sales and orders by country but it has not published a new volume since 2013, and many NGO estimates do not seem to use these totals in their reporting on U.S. arms transfers.<sup>355</sup> These data are shown in **Figure XII.9**, and they clearly show the massive scale of U.S. arms transfers to the Gulf. During one five year period in the DCSA reports – 2009 to 2013 -- the DCSA reports that the U.S. provided the following FMS arms transfers to the GCC states:

- Bahrain signed \$372,341 million in new arms agreements and took \$421,117 million in arms deliveries.
- Kuwait signed \$3,386,192 million in new arms agreements and took \$1,503,455 million in arms deliveries
- Oman signed \$2,355,850 million in new arms agreements and took \$220,779 million in arms deliveries
- Qatar signed \$250,222 million in new arms agreements and took \$103,163 million in arms deliveries
- Saudi Arabia signed \$47,319,216 million in new arms agreements and took \$10,265,488 million in arms deliveries
- The UAE signed \$15,261,826 million in new arms agreements and took \$3,469,495 million in arms deliveries

They also indicate that GCC signed a grand total of \$68.9 billion in new FMS arms agreements and took \$15,983.6 billion in arms deliveries.

**Figure XII.10** shows another aspect of DCSA reporting. It shows the proposed packages of *major* U.S. arms sales reported by the Department of Defense to U.S. Congress. These sales are proposals, not final contracts, and only cover some major U.S. sales. It is clear, however, from **Figure XII.10** that the U.S. has treated the Arab Gulf states as real strategic partners and has given, and is giving, them a vast lead in military weapons and technology over Iran – a lead reinforced by the fact U.S. sales help make the Gulf states interoperable with both other Gulf states and U.S. power projection capabilities.

**Figure XII.1: Excerpts from the Statement of General Lloyd Austin III, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of the U.S. Central Command, March 3, 2015**  
<sup>356</sup>

**USCENTCOM Priorities**

Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will remain ready, engaged and vigilant—effectively integrated with other instruments of power; strengthening relationships with partners; and supporting bilateral and multilateral collective defense relationships to counter adversaries, improve security, support enduring stability, and secure our core interests in the Central Region. In support of this vision, the command remains focused on a wide range of issues, activities, and operations, including our priority efforts:

- Degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL in order to prevent the further spread of sectarian-fueled radical extremism, and to mitigate the continuing Iraq-Syria crisis.
- Continue support to Afghanistan, in partnership with NATO, as a regionally integrated, secure, stable and developing country.
- Defeat Al Qaeda, deny violent extremists safe havens and freedom of movement, and limit the reach of terrorists.
- Counter malign Iranian influence, while reducing and mitigating against the negative impacts of surrogates and proxies.
- Support a whole of government approach to developments in Yemen, preventing Yemen from becoming an ungoverned space for AQ/VEOs; retain CT capacity in the region.
- Maintain credible general and specific deterrent capability and capacity to counter Iran.
- Prevent, and if required, counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; disrupt their development and prevent their use.
- Protect lines of communication, ensure free use of the shared spaces (including the cyber commons), and secure unimpeded global access for legal commerce.
- Shape, support, and maintain ready, flexible regional Coalitions and partners, as well as cross-CCMD and interagency U.S. whole-of-government teams, to support crisis response; optimize military resources.
- Develop and execute security cooperation programs, improving bilateral and multi-lateral partnerships, building partnered “capacities,” and improving information sharing, security, and stability.

### **Critical Focus Areas.**

While we remain focused on the broad range of challenges present today in the Central Region, there are particular areas that merit a sizeable portion of our attention and resources. These areas are strategically important because of the potential impact on our core national interests and those of our partners. Below are descriptions of the current critical focus areas, along with a listing of some of the key opportunities that we are actively pursuing in an effort to improve stability in USCENTCOM's AOR.

### **Protection of Nation States.**

Historically, nation states have been the dominant players globally. However, in recent years we have witnessed the emergence of transnational extremist groups that desire and, in some cases, demonstrate the ability to operate as major players with unfavorable intentions. In many ways they are attempting to behave like nation states and, in so doing, they threaten the structures, rules, norms, and values that define the sovereignty of our nation-state based international system.

These transnational violent extremist organizations (VEO) are ideologically opposed to and target the nation states of the Central Region. They conduct attacks and terrorize local populaces in an effort to gain power and influence. This, in turn, weakens the nation states and generates increased instability. This is of obvious concern to us, given that nation states are typically anchors for stability across the globe, with some exceptions (e.g., Iran, Syria). Thus, the U.S. has a vested interest in buttressing our partner nations in the Central Region when necessary as part of a larger ‘whole of government’ effort to build regional stability through effective security assistance and support for inclusive governance.

As directed, we intervene to counter external threats, such as al Qaeda and ISIL. While our primary purpose for doing so is to protect U.S. interests, we also take action to allow time and space for the nation states in the region to build sufficient capacity to protect their own sovereignty. And, we support them through our planned regional engagements, our training and exercise programs, and foreign military sales (FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF) programs; all of which are designed to further enhance our partners nations’ military capacity.

One of the key opportunities that exist amidst the challenges posed by transnational VEOs is to persuade our partners in the region of the urgent need to build their military capacity so that they are better able to defend their own sovereign territory against such threats. Our regional partners are very concerned about the threat posed by ISIL and other VEOs. More importantly, many in the region recognize that if they do not do something to address the root causes of the growing instability, they can all but guarantee continued political upheaval and anarchy. Again, transformational change can only be achieved by the governments and people of the region.

They must decide that the instability caused by the “underlying currents” merits greater action on their part, and they must do more to address the root causes of many of the problems that exist in their region. We can and will support them; but, they must lead the effort.

#### **Iraq-Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve)**

We remain highly focused on the crisis in Iraq and in Syria. Since launching its major offensive from eastern Syria into Iraq in early June, ISIL, which is commonly referred to by our partners in the region as “DA’ESH,” has largely erased the internationally recognized boundary between Iraq and Syria and has sought to establish a proto state in the deserts of eastern Syria and western Iraq. ISIL’s goal is to spur regional instability in order to establish an Islamic Caliphate. To achieve this end, ISIL has employed three primary lines of effort: 1) instill fear and shape the operational environment using unconventional warfare and traditional terrorist tactics; 2) seize and hold territory; and 3) influence, shape, and define the conflict using sophisticated information operations. Importantly, although significantly degraded in recent months, ISIL still possesses the resources and organizational structure to pose a credible threat to the Government of Iraq (GoI). The erosion of Iraqi and regional stability caused by ISIL places extreme political and economic strain on Jordan, Lebanon, under-governed border areas, and, by extension, the broader Gulf and Levant sub- regions.

That said, ISIL is not a monolith; rather it is a symptom of the larger problems that continue to threaten the Central Region. In particular, the growing divide between ethno-sectarian groups and between religious moderates and radical Islamists, have created ideal conditions for a group like ISIL to take root. Over a period of years the previous government alienated important segments of its society, notably the Sunni and Kurdish populations, which resulted in growing disenfranchisement among these groups. ISIL capitalized on this opportunity and launched a successful blitz into Iraq absent much resistance and with support from local Sunnis who viewed ISIL as a means for bringing about a change in their government. The Sunnis simply refused to fight; and, in so doing, they facilitated ISIL’s offensive. The remaining Iraqi security forces were largely incapable of mounting a credible defense against ISIL. After we departed Iraq in 2011, the leadership of the country made a series of poor decisions. Among them was the decision to stop training the security forces, to stop maintaining their equipment, and to assign leaders based on sectarian loyalty rather than competence, merit, and experience. As a result, the security forces’ skills atrophied and the condition of their vehicles and weapon systems deteriorated. This precipitated a number of defeats early on in ISIL’s push towards Baghdad.

This past September, President Obama announced to the American people that the United States, with the support of a broad Coalition, would take action to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy. We are currently in the early stages of our counter-ISIL campaign, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). Our military campaign plan is comprised of five key elements. They will be achieved in a logical progression; although many of the efforts will occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. First, we must counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Our intent is to employ a Coalition effort in Iraq to halt the advance of ISIL and to enable the Iraqis to regain their territory and reestablish control over their border. Once we’ve halted ISIL’s advance in Iraq, which we have done, we said that we would need to contain ISIL, and we are doing so with the assistance of our Coalition partners, including Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. We are working with them to ensure they have the capacity to secure their sovereign borders. We also said that we would need to enable the moderate Syrian opposition forces through our train and equip efforts. Our goal is to develop a reliable partner that can assist in countering ISIL on the ground inside of Syria. Eventually we want to eliminate ungoverned spaces out of which ISIL and other terrorist groups have been operating by enabling the indigenous security forces to defend their own sovereign territories. Once we do all of these things, we will have defeated ISIL through a combination of sustained pressure, a systematic dismantling of ISIL’s capabilities, and by effectively expanding our regional partners’ CT capacities.

Our military campaign is having the desired effects. Iraqi security forces, to include Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and tribal elements, with the support of U.S. and Coalition air operations, have halted ISIL's advance in Iraq. The enemy is now in a "defensive crouch," and is unable to conduct major operations and seize additional territory. We can expect that ISIL will continue to conduct ineffective counter-attacks and leverage their information operations to amplify the significance of these attacks. However, they are unable to achieve decisive effects. The effort in Iraq continues to represent our main focus. The actions that we are taking now in Syria against ISIL are shaping the conditions in Iraq. Specifically, our precision air strikes are disrupting ISIL's command and control, attriting its forces and leadership, slowing the flow of reinforcements from Syria into Iraq, and interrupting the resourcing of their operations. The more than 2,600 total air strikes conducted in Iraq and Syria over the past several months have been extremely effective.

Of course, the United States is not doing this alone. Our efforts are intended to enable the broader, 'whole of government' approach that is currently underway among various departments and agencies in the U.S. government. Equally important are the contributions being made by our Coalition partners. Indeed, the Coalition represents the strength and cohesion of our campaign. In particular, the active and public involvement of five Arab-led nations, specifically Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, has greatly enhanced the fight and sends a clear message to ISIL and other VEOs that their actions will not be tolerated.

Ultimately, the intent of our regional campaign is not simply to destroy ISIL, although that is a primary objective. Even more importantly, we want to do what we can to help change the conditions inside of Iraq and Syria so that what we see happening there now, does not happen again in the future. The key to doing so is enabling indigenous forces to defend their own borders and provide for the security of their sovereign territory. This is the goal of our advise and assist and build partner capacity efforts currently underway in Iraq, and soon in Syria. We are also working with the Government of Iraq (GoI) to train Sunni tribal elements. Equally important, we are providing, in coordination with the GoI, support for the Kurds who continue to play a significant role in the fight against ISIL.

All that said, the effects of our military efforts will be short-lived if the Iraqis do not effectively address their political problems. The crisis in Iraq will not be solved through military means alone. The Iraqis have a new government and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has vowed to be more inclusive of the Sunnis and the Kurds and other minority groups. We are encouraged by the early steps he has taken to reach out to the Sunnis and Kurds and we are urging him to follow through on pledges made in the near-term. This is not a minor issue, as the government cannot succeed long-term without that support. National reconciliation is absolutely critical to the success of the counter-ISIL campaign.

A key opportunity that exists amidst the challenges posed by ISIL is to create conditions that reduce ungoverned spaces and allow for inclusion, security, and good governance in both Iraq and Syria. We pursue this opportunity, in part, by training, advising, and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces, helping them to rebuild their capacity, and restructuring them to ensure greater inclusiveness. With your support, we have also have established a program to train, equip and sustain elements of the Syrian moderate opposition. We anticipate that these forces will make important contributions toward degrading and defeating ISIL, and they also will help to guard against ungoverned spaces, protect local populations, and help to create the conditions for a negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria that leads to more responsible and responsive governance.

### **Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)**

As I travel around the region, I routinely hear from senior military leaders that they do not necessarily fear groups like ISIL's military prowess so much as they fear the groups' ideologies. These groups clearly demonstrate their ability to inspire extremist behavior and to recruit individuals in support of their causes.

In recent years, VEOs have increasingly exploited ungoverned or under-governed spaces in USCENTCOM's AOR. The extremists' use of these areas threatens regional security, as well as U.S. core national interests. They are able to plan and launch attacks, undermine local governments, and exercise malign influence from these spaces. At the same time, VEOs and other militant proxies continue to exploit security vacuums in countries experiencing political transitions and unrest, namely Iraq and Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon. Chronic instability, disenfranchised populations, and weak regional governments provide new footholds for

a resilient and expanding global jihadist movement and an ideal environment for Iran and its allies to aggressively undermine U.S. regional goals.

Of note, ISIL's rise as a competitor to al Qaeda (AQ) has significantly impacted the jihadist landscape. The two groups are now competing for recruits, resources, and publicity. This will likely result in increased terrorist attacks in the near-term as ISIL, AQ, and other elements attempt to out-do one another.

Meanwhile, the AQ movement is becoming more diffuse and decentralized as compared to pre- 9/11. The risk of affiliates and allies operating in more areas and increasingly collaborating and coordinating with one another as a transnational loosely-confederated 'syndicate' is cause for concern. The AQ ideology remains persuasive, attracting and radicalizing susceptible individuals in the region. Thus, it is critical that we maintain our vigilance in countering the group and its narrative.

We must also continue to look for ways to effectively counter ISIL. As noted earlier, ISIL seeks to broaden its reach beyond Iraq and Syria, and will try to leverage regional instability to revive a caliphate stretching from Europe to North Africa to South Asia. ISIL has already received pledges of allegiance from smaller jihadist groups in Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and they have inspired lone-wolf attacks in Algeria and the West.

Other extremist groups have leveraged Syria's security vacuum, including the AQ-affiliated Al Nusrah Front (ANF). As the civil war in Syria continues, ANF will threaten neighboring states, particularly Israel and Lebanon, where the group has launched anti-Hezbollah attacks. The ongoing Syrian conflict has also created a safe haven for the Khorasan Group, a network of veteran AQ operatives, providing them with territory to plot and train for attacks against the West and the U.S. homeland.

The Iraq-Syria area of operations is the premier destination for jihadist foreign fighters, with over 15,000 coming from around the globe, and particularly Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. The majority of these fighters are joining ISIL's ranks, although some have joined ANF and other Syrian opposition groups. As these conflicts carry on, returning battle-hardened foreign fighters will pose increasing risk to their home countries, including the United States. We must sustain our active measures to address this growing threat.

An important opportunity that exists in the Central Region is to limit the overall reach and effectiveness of VEOs, while also reducing the amount of ungoverned or under-governed space in which these groups typically operate. To do so, many of our partners acknowledge the need to counter radical extremists' ideologies, in part by helping to amplify the voice of moderates in the region. They also recognize the need to limit access to ungoverned and under-governed spaces; thereby diminishing the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating in the region. By setting the right conditions and helping to promote the efforts of moderate and influential regional leaders, we may achieve significant and lasting improvements. And, these improvements are likely to have pervasive positive effects on the global security environment.

## **Iran**

Iran represents the most significant threat to the Central Region. Our diplomats have been hard at work, trying to reach an agreement with Iran with respect to its nuclear program. The most recent extension allows for continued negotiations through 1 July 2015. While we remain hopeful that the two sides will eventually reach an acceptable deal, it is presently unclear how things will play out. We have to be prepared for what comes next. We will be prepared.

In the meantime, we remain very concerned about Iran's behavior in other areas. Iran continues to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East. In addition to its nuclear program, Iran has a significant cyber capability, as well as the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. With ranges up to ~ 2,000 km, Iran is able to strike targets throughout the region with increasing precision using creatively adapted foreign technologies to improve its missile arsenal. It also has increased its anti-access area- denial air defense capabilities. Iran is improving its counter-maritime capabilities (e.g., mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines), which serve to threaten the flow of global commerce in the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps most concerning, Iran routinely engages in malign activity through the Iranian Threat Network (ITN) consisting of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps- Qods Force, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and its surrogates, businesses, and logistics support. Iran also engages in malign activity through support to proxy actors such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas which threatens the sovereignty and security of Israel.



During the past year, the ITN primarily focused on Sunni groups in the Iraq and Syria-based conflict (including the moderate opposition in Syria) by bolstering the Syrian and Iraqi governments and overseeing engagements involving its own militant forces. Iran also maintains the ability to expand the scope of its activities. This is troubling as Iranian malign influence is enflaming sectarian tensions that are all too often exploited by violent extremist elements in the region. Needless to say, our relationship with Iran remains a challenging one. We will continue to pay close attention to their actions, and we will remain steadfast with our regional partners and do what we can to help improve their capacity to counter Iran and mitigate the effects of their malign activity.

One of the key opportunities that exist with respect to Iran is the prospect of an acceptable agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program. If the P5+1 are able to reach a long-term resolution, that would represent a step in the right direction and may present an unprecedented opportunity for positive change in the Central Region.

### **A Regional Perspective.**

In many ways our military-to-military relationships continue to represent the cornerstone of America's partnerships with the nation states in the USCENTCOM AOR. Below are synopses of the status of those relationships, along with the current state of affairs in each of the 20 countries, minus Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and Iran which were addressed in the previous section, "Critical Focus Areas" (see pages 8-21):

#### **The Gulf States**

The Gulf States have proven to be valuable Coalition partners, engaging in and supporting offensive operations against ISIL and providing the indispensable access, basing and overflight privileges that are critical to the conduct of operations in the region. In recent months, we have seen some improvement in relations between and among the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar after a period of increased tensions. A convergence of interests, namely the need to counter the increasing threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremists groups, has afforded a unique opportunity to strengthen the Coalition and also contribute to improving stability and security in the broader Middle East region. In many ways, ISIL's expansion in Iraq has forced the Gulf States to take more seriously the threat posed by ISIL and other violent extremist groups. As a result, they have begun to take a more proactive approach to countering extremist financing and foreign fighter facilitation. They must maintain their focus and continue to make much-needed progress in these areas. At the same time, we are strengthening our partners' military capacity as part of a collective security architecture designed to deter and, where necessary, counter Iranian hegemonic ambitions. Going forward, we will play a key role in making sure that our partners remain united on common interests and security challenges.

In late January of this year, the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia** (KSA) saw a smooth transition of power, as King Salman bin Abdulaziz ascended to the throne after the death of his brother, King Abdullah. King Salman comes to power during a very challenging period. The threat from ISIL, particularly along Saudi's northern border, and from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Huthis in the south, has led KSA to take a more proactive role in safeguarding the Kingdom's interests in the region. In particular, KSA's prominent role in the campaign against ISIL, to include its participation in air operations in Syria and in support of the Syria Train & Equip program, has paved the way for other Arab nations to join the Coalition efforts to counter ISIL. Recognizing the need for enhanced maritime security in the Gulf, the Saudis assumed command of the Gulf Maritime Security Task Force for the first time this year. Their leadership is critically important in demonstrating the cohesion of the Combined Maritime Forces generally and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations in particular. Of note, the Saudis have taken a lead role in reconciling the Gulf States. Looking ahead, our continued support of advanced Saudi defense competencies and further improvements in U.S.-Saudi military interoperability are expected to yield positive impacts, which will in turn contribute to greater stability in the region and beyond.

**Kuwait** remains a long-time partner and strong and reliable ally in the region, providing critical support for U.S. and Coalition troops, vehicles, and equipment deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. In addition to providing a permissive environment for our deployed forces in the USCENTCOM AOR, Kuwait plays a significant role in the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. They also continue to provide critical basing and access for U.S. forces and capabilities needed to address future contingencies. The Kuwaitis are committed to advancing regional cooperative defense efforts as evidenced by their role as a key

interlocutor between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain in response to recent tensions, as well as the extensive preparation they have done to host the Eagle Resolve multi-national training exercise in the spring of 2015. The Kuwaitis also have made significant progress towards reconciling the sub-region's long-standing issues with Iraq, leading Gulf Arab diplomatic outreach efforts with the Government of Iraq. The Kuwaitis remain committed to accommodating all segments of their population to preserve internal stability, particularly Sunnis and Shia; and, this has made them typically measured in their support for Gulf Arab regional initiatives. Overall, Kuwait continues to provide critical support to the U.S. and partner nations while managing these internal political challenges.

Our military-to-military relationship with the **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** continues along its historically positive trajectory. UAE's growing concerns regarding the spread of extremist ideologies and the threat that they pose to UAE's internal security and regional stability prompted the Emirates to take an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. They continue to demonstrate their value as a strategic partner by proactively addressing some of the region's toughest problems. Their military capability is arguably the best among the GCC states. UAE's is also the most expeditionary military, deploying forces in support of operations in Afghanistan and Syria. In addition to their participation in the ongoing air operations in Syria, UAE also has offered to send forces and personnel to support the military advise and assist mission and one of the four training sites in Iraq. Of note, the Emirates have a much broader definition of extremism and they want to expand the counter-ISIL military campaign to include a wide range of groups they perceive as extremist, from Islamist political groups to Salafi jihadist groups. Going forward, we will look to further strengthen our security cooperation partnership with UAE through continued engagement and through our FMS program.

**Qatar** remains one of our most stalwart partners in the Gulf, hosting three of our forward headquarters (USCENTCOM, U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Special Operations Command Central) and facilities and providing us with unimpeded access to the region. The Qataris were among the first to offer a site for the Syria Train & Equip program, along with a place to host the now-established Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) headquarters. Qatar also continues to play an active role in the counter-ISIL campaign. Unlike KSA, Bahrain, and especially UAE, Qatar makes a distinction between Salafi jihadist and political Islamist groups, which creates a challenge in terms of how we approach countering extremist groups in the region. That said, the Qataris' relationships with a wide range of groups, including more moderate elements, could present potential opportunities.

During the past 12 months, the Qatari Armed Forces have concluded extensive FMS equipment purchases and submitted additional requests. All told, 2014 saw the Qataris allocate billions of dollars to arm their forces with cutting edge American weaponry. This show of renewed and expanding cooperation with the U.S. defense industry clearly reflects the Qataris' drive for greater military interoperability with the United States. Future collaboration with Qatar may see the genesis of a partner force that reflects the United States in organization, arms, and training.

We have a long history of cooperation with **Bahrain**, to include hosting the headquarters of the United States Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces in Manama. Amidst boycotting by opposition members, the Bahraini government held elections in November and December of 2014, which resulted in additional Shia representation. However, there is still significant distrust between the Shia majority and Sunni-led government. The government perceives a direct threat from Shia opposition groups, which it believes are deliberately de-stabilizing the country by attacking the security forces and undermining the economy. The government believes these same Shia opposition groups are influenced and supported by Iran, and that Iran intends to eventually overthrow or supplant it with a Shia government.

Bahrain has been a strong member of the Coalition to counter-ISIL, participating in the initial air strikes into Syria in September of 2014. However, the historically strong relationship between the United States and Bahrain is showing significant strain as the U.S. FMS-hold carries into its third full year. Despite this political challenge, Bahrain continues to pursue the re-supply of munitions for some of its aviation systems, and it remains firm in its support for U.S. assets at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.

**Oman** continues to thrive as a moderate and peaceful interlocutor to all equity holders in the Arabian Gulf. Exercising a publically-declared non-interventionist foreign policy, the Sultanate maintains a pragmatic relationship with both Iran and the United States. From our perspective, cooperation between Oman and the U.S. remains close with Oman providing regional access through the use of air and sea ports and also freedom of navigation along the Strait of Hormuz. We value the stability and predictability that Oman provides and

will strive to maintain our close relationship with the Sultanate. In the meantime, the Omanis are understandably concerned about the deteriorating situation in Yemen. Of note, the Omanis maintain relationships with Iran and all of Yemen's competing factions, including the Huthis. The Omanis are playing a constructive role in helping to manage the volatile situation in Yemen. We will continue to do what we can to support their efforts and to expand our collaboration to improve Oman's border control, counter-terrorism, and maritime security capacity.

**Yemen's** long-term outlook is uncertain based on multiple converging drivers of instability. The Huthi takeover of the government and President Hadi's subsequent resignation created a political power vacuum and reenergized historical north/south tensions. Competing factions, including the Huthis, former-President Saleh loyalists, the Islamist Islah Party, and possibly other groups likely see this as an opportunity to assert control over the long-term. Meanwhile, Hadi moved south, rescinded his resignation, and indicated that he intends to govern from Aden. For now, the Huthis have solidified their position as the dominant force in the capital (Sanaa) and northern governorates, controlling all governance and security mechanisms. UN-sponsored negotiations over forming some type of transition government are ongoing, but Yemen's multiple competing factions will make political resolution very difficult to achieve. It is unclear if the southerners will simply deny Sanaa's authority or unite and declare independence in the near-term, although there are obvious signs of southern opposition to Huthi rule. Southern leaders are likely waiting to see how the situation develops, including the military's response and external actors' willingness to provide them with support. Additionally, Southern military commanders have indicated that they do not intend to take orders from Sanaa.

Yemen's economy has been in a steady state of deterioration for some time. Declining oil revenues and cuts to foreign assistance have contributed to a fiscal crisis. Meanwhile, rampant unemployment further exacerbates Yemen's problems, including making large segments of the population susceptible to radicalization.

The lack of central government leadership coupled with Huthi expansion [and the evacuation of all U.S. personnel in February 2015] have made it exceedingly difficult for us to [conduct partnered or unilateral CT operations against AQAP]. The Yemeni government has generally curtailed its CT operations, and this has allowed AQAP to regain some of its former territory and increase operations against government and security forces. While some of AQAP's combat power may be preoccupied with the Huthi incursion, their external operations cells remain active, especially in the south. We must figure out how to maintain our CT platform in Yemen in order to counter the threat from AQAP. Also concerning is the influence that Iran has with the Huthis, and the particular threat that poses to Saudi Arabia's southern border. Additionally, Huthi control of Yemen's Hudaydah Port gives them, and potentially Iran, direct influence over maritime traffic through the Red Sea, which presents a significant vulnerability in terms of the protection of core U.S. national and global economic interests.

... **Jordan** remains a steadfast partner in the Central Region and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) are among our strongest military partners. The country's civil and military leadership continue to provide a positive example of professionalism and moderation. That said, Jordan does have a large Palestinian and refugee population vulnerable to extremist messaging and influence. This challenge is further exacerbated by a weakened economy and limited economic opportunity in the country.

The Jordanians fought alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and are currently flying combat sorties as part of the counter-ISIL Coalition. The Jordanians also continue to provide critical basing support for OIR missions. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the family of the JAF pilot murdered by ISIL. This horrendous crime will only serve to reinforce Coalition unity and resolve. It prompted a significant increase in public support for the counter-ISIL campaign among the Jordanian populace, which before was generally ambivalent and, to some degree, even opposed to military involvement in the current fight. At the request of the Jordanian government, we recently conducted an assessment of the JAF and found several areas where we could assist in increasing their military capacity and improving their interoperability. We are also working to expedite the delivery of their urgent FMS request to enable their continued active support of the counter-ISIL campaign.

Meanwhile, we are doing all that we can to help Jordan to deal with its significant refugee crisis. The refugee population (>600K) has placed an enormous strain on the economy and on host communities. While the Jordanians are to be commended for the professional and compassionate manner in which they are handling this tough challenge, the reality is that, even with international assistance, the Jordanians are struggling to

cope with the impacts. Our goal is to help ease the burden on the nation's economy and infrastructure, while doing what we can to further enhance stability and security in the country.

**Egypt** remains an anchor state in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. It is important for a number of reasons, to include the country's geographic location, its enduring peace treaty with Israel, its oversight of the Suez Canal, and its cultural and religious influence across the region and the globe.

Egypt continues to deal with the effects of an improving, yet weak economy, damaged by years of political instability and escalated terrorist violence. President al-Sisi and the government are attempting to strike a balance between promoting representative government and countering what they perceive as a subversive form of political Islam and violent extremism that they maintain has found voice through the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptians believe that political Islam is bound tightly to the violent extremist activity they are witnessing in the Sinai and across mainland Egypt, into neighboring Libya. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the 21 Coptic Christians brutally murdered by ISIL last month in Libya.

Our strategic partnership with Egypt remains highly important and our military-to-military relationship represents a key pillar of that partnership. We have been very encouraged to see progress made by the Egyptians with respect to the current holds on FMF and FMS. We continue to work closely with Egypt's Armed Forces (EAF) to improve the security of their borders, including the Sinai, and to stop the flow of fighters and equipment transiting from Libya and Sudan through Egypt into the Central Region. We need to support the EAF's efforts to secure the Sinai so that it does not become an under-governed safe haven for extremist elements. At the same time, we continue to look for ways to integrate Egypt into the counter-ISIL Coalition and our broader regional counter-terrorism campaign.

#### ...Our Strategic Approach.

USCENTCOM's goal is to effect incremental, holistic improvements to Central Region security and stability, in part, by shaping the behaviors and perceptions that fuel regional volatility. The intent is to generate a cumulative impact that de-escalates conflicts, mitigates confrontations and sets conditions for durable peace, cooperation, and prosperity throughout the region. Our strategic approach is defined by the "MANAGE-PREVENT-SHAPE" construct.

Our priority effort is to MANAGE operations, actions and activities in order to de-escalate violent conflict, contain its effects, maintain theater security and stability and protect U.S. interests and those of our partners. At the same time, we recognize that our charge is not simply to wage today's wars for a period. Rather, our goal is to achieve lasting and improved security and stability throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. We do so by managing the current conflicts, while also taking measures to PREVENT other confrontations and situations from escalating and becoming conflicts. At the same time, we are pursuing opportunities and doing what we can to effectively SHAPE behaviors, perceptions and outcomes in different areas. These efforts cross the entire theater strategic framework (near-, mid-, long-term actions).

Our ability to effectively employ our MANAGE-PREVENT-SHAPE strategic approach is largely dependent upon the capabilities and readiness of our forward deployed military forces, working in concert with other elements of U.S. power and influence. These elements include our diplomatic efforts, both multilateral and bilateral, and trade and energy. Equally important are our efforts aimed at building regional partners' capability and capacity and also strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationships, principally through key leader engagements and training and joint exercise programs. The long-term security architecture of the Central Region demands that our partners be capable of conducting deterrence and defending themselves and our common security interests. This can only be accomplished if we maintain strong military-to-military relationships and build on existing security frameworks; recognizing that we cannot surge trust.

**Leverage Partnerships.** In an effort to counter the "underlying currents" that are the root cause of violence and instability in the Central Region, we must leverage the ability and willingness of key regional leaders to influence behaviors. By encouraging certain states to adopt more moderate positions, for example, while promoting the efforts and voices of others that are already considered moderate, we may be able to limit the impact of radical Islamists. Likewise, by limiting the availability of ungoverned spaces, we may diminish the reach and effectiveness of violent extremists operating in the region. We cannot force a universal change in behaviors. But, we can set the right conditions and promote the efforts of influential states and regional leaders who may, through their words and actions, achieve significant and lasting improvements.

**Building Partner Capacity (BPC).** Building partner capacity is a preventative measure and force multiplier. Our goal is for our partners and allies to be stronger and more capable in dealing with common threats. Joint training exercises, key leader engagements and FMS and FMF financing programs all represent key pillars of our BPC strategy. When compared to periods of sustained conflict, it is a low-cost and high-return investment that contributes to improving stability throughout the Central Region while lessening the need for costly U.S. military intervention. Tangible by-products include increased access, influence, enhanced interoperability and improved security for forward-deployed forces, diplomatic sites and other U.S. interests. Working “by-with-and through” our regional partners, whenever possible, also serves to enhance the legitimacy and durability of our actions and presence and allows for increased burden sharing.

**Training and Joint Exercise Programs.** The USCENTCOM Exercise Program continues to provide meaningful opportunities to assist with BPC, enhance unity of effort and shape occasions for key leader engagements throughout the AOR. During FY13 and 1st Quarter FY14, four of the five USCENTCOM component commands developed or continued existing exercises covering the full spectrum of USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Objectives. This past year, USCENTCOM executed 52 bilateral and multilateral exercises. Our successful training efforts included the Eagle Resolve exercise, which was hosted by Qatar and included naval, land, and air components from 12 nations, as well as 2,000 U.S. service members and 1,000 of their counterparts. Our Eager Lion 2013 exercise in Jordan involved 8,000 personnel from 19 nations, including 5,000 U.S. service members. The International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2013, conducted across 8,000 square nautical miles stretching from the North Arabian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz to the Gulf of Oman, united some 40 nations, 6,500 service members, and 35 ships in defense of the maritime commons.

In addition to military-to-military engagement, the exercise program achieved a number of objectives, including: demonstrating mutual commitment to regional security; combined command, control and communications interoperability; integrating staff planning and execution of joint combined operations; the development of coalition warfare; the refinement of complementary warfare capabilities; the enhancement of U.S. capability to support contingency operations; and the maintenance of U.S. presence and basing access and overflight in the region. FY14-16 exercise focus areas will be: enhanced U.S./coalition interoperability; CT/critical infrastructure protection; integrated air and missile defense; counter WMD; and, maritime security, with an emphasis on mine countermeasures.

#### **Critical Needs and Concerns.**

The realities of the current fiscal environment will have a lasting impact on USCENTCOM headquarters (HQs), our five component commands and 18 country teams, and these realities must be confronted soberly, prudently and opportunistically. The cumulative effects of operating under successive continuing resolutions and budget uncertainty have created significant obstacles to both USCENTCOM HQs and the USCENTCOM AOR in terms of planning and execution. Persistent fiscal uncertainty hinders efficient and timely implementation of operational, logistical, tactical and strategic milestones and objectives.

#### **Required capabilities.**

For the foreseeable future, turbulence and uncertainty will define the Central Region, and vitally important U.S. national interests will be at stake. Therefore, it is necessary that USCENTCOM be adequately resourced and supported with the authorities, equipment, capabilities and forces required to address existing challenges and to pursue opportunities. Among the specific capabilities required are:

*Forces and Equipment.* Forward-deployed rotational and permanently-assigned joint forces, fighter and lift assets, surveillance platforms, ballistic missile defense assets, naval vessels, ground forces, and cyber teams that are trained, equipped, mission-capable and ready to respond quickly are indispensable to protecting our vital interests and reassuring our partners in the region. It is likewise essential that we maintain the strategic flexibility required to effectively respond to contingencies.

*Information Operations (IO).* Our adversaries continue their reliance on the information domain to recruit, fund, spread their ideology and control their operations. Our investments in IO thus far have made it USCENTCOM’s most cost-effective method and the top non-lethal tool for disrupting terrorist activities across the Central Region. Our military information support operations programs provide critical non-kinetic capabilities designed to conduct a range of activities. Our Regional Web Interaction Program (RWIP), for example, provides non-lethal tools to disrupt ongoing terrorist recruitment and propaganda. The requirement

to employ IO will persist beyond major combat and counter-insurgency operations. We will need to maintain the technological infrastructure, sustained baseline funding and continued investment to allow for further development of this valuable tool.

*Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).* The theater ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. The threat from short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in regions where the U.S. deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a rapid pace, with systems becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate. This trajectory is likely to continue over the next decade. We must be ready and capable of defending against missile threats to United States forces, while also protecting our partners and allies and enabling them to defend themselves. Our capability and capacity would be further enhanced through the acquisition of additional interceptors and BMD systems. However, the global demand exceeds supply. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to pursue investments in re-locatable ground- and sea-based BMD assets balanced against U.S. homeland defense needs.

*Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Assets.* We have enjoyed, for the most part, air supremacy for the last 12+ years while engaged in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. Now, we are out of Iraq and in the process of transitioning forces from Afghanistan. However, VEOs, principally Al Qaeda and other proxy actors continue to pose a significant and growing threat in the Central Region. Ascertaining the intentions and capabilities of these various elements is not an easy task. As airborne ISR and other collection assets diminish in the region, our knowledge will lessen even further. Now, more than ever, a persistent eye is needed to gain insight into threats and strategic risks to our national security interests. In many ways, collection in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environments presents the toughest problem for the future. It simply cannot be overemphasized that human intelligence, satellite and airborne assets, and other special collection capabilities remain integral to our ability to effectively counter potential threats.

Combined military intelligence operations and sharing is a critical component of USCENTCOM operations. Over the past decade, intelligence community sharing policies have enabled near-seamless operations with traditional foreign partners. Over the last year, we have seen an increase in military intelligence collaboration with regional allies who bring new and unique accesses and insights into the actions and plans of our adversaries. These increasingly important regional partnerships are possible because of the close working relationship USCENTCOM's intelligence directorate maintains with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The progressive intelligence sharing authorities that we possess were provided by Director Clapper's team. I will continue to ask the intelligence community's senior leaders to emphasize the production of intelligence in a manner that affords USCENTCOM an opportunity to responsibly share it in a time-sensitive environment with our most trusted partners in order to enable increased bilateral and multilateral planning and operations.

*Appropriately Postured.* We sincerely appreciate Congress' continued support for capabilities required to sustain future operations in the Central Region and to respond to emerging situations; these include: prepositioned stock and munitions; a streamlined overseas military construction process that supports our necessary posture and security cooperation objectives; continued contingency construction and unspecified minor military construction authorities; increased sea-basing capabilities; and airfield, base, and port repair capabilities needed to rapidly recover forward infrastructure in a conflict. These capabilities enable our effective and timely response to the most likely and most dangerous scenarios in the Central Region. They also support our efforts to shape positive outcomes for the future.

*Cyber Security.* In the coming month and years, USCENTCOM will need to be able to aggressively improve our cyber security posture in response to advanced persistent threats to our networks and critical information. As the cyber community matures, we will plan, coordinate, integrate and conduct network operations and defensive activities in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations. Key requirements, resourcing and training and awareness for adequate cyber security remain at the forefront of USCENTCOM's cyber campaign. This campaign entails a multi-disciplined security approach to address a diverse and changing threat, adequate resourcing at appropriate operational levels to enable the rapid implementation of orders and a command and control framework that aligns with the operational chain of command.

DoD requires redundant and resilient communications in this AOR. We ask for your continued support in sustaining the investments we have made to make our information technology and communications infrastructure resilient, as these programs are currently 97% Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

funded. In addition, we are assisting our regional partners in building their capacity and expertise in the cyber domain as we are heavily reliant on host nation communications infrastructure across the Central Region. With Congress' backing, we will continue to focus on cyber security cooperation as a key part of our theater strategy.

*Enduring Coalition Presence at USCENTCOM HQs.* We enjoy a robust coalition presence at USCENTCOM HQs that currently includes 55 nations from five continents. These foreign officers serve as senior national representatives, providing USCENTCOM with a vital and expedient link to our operational and strategic partners. Their presence and active participation in the command's day-to-day activities assists the commander and key staff in retaining military-to-military relations with representatives of a country's chief of defense. Coalition presence also enables bilateral and multilateral information sharing, while maintaining a capability to rapidly develop plans to support military and humanitarian operations. It is a capability that we should retain, though I am currently looking to reshape and refocus the coalition as an enduring entity, post-2014. While their continued presence will require an extension of current authorities and funding, it represents a strong investment that aligns with and directly supports USCENTCOM's mission in what is a strategically critical and dynamic area of responsibility.


**...Building Partner Capacity.** Continued support for flexible authorities is needed to effectively react to urgent and emergent threats. Global Train and Equip and Global Security Contingency Fund authorities demonstrate the ability of DoD and the Department of State to work together to effectively build partner capacity. The FY14 NDAA extends authority for DoD to loan specific equipment to partners through Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) through December 2014. We strongly endorse and support making this authority permanent and global as an integral part of all ACSAs since it facilitates greater integration of coalition forces into regional contingencies and enhances security cooperation. Finally, continued support for our exercise and engagement efforts is necessary to maintain and enhance partnerships that are critical to ensuring and defending regional stability, which supports our national military and theater campaign strategies within the USCENTCOM AOR.

**Foreign Military Financing and Sales (FMF and FMS).** Our need for continued Congressional funding of FMF programs that support USCENTCOM security cooperation objectives cannot be overstated. We appreciate Congressional support for interagency initiatives to streamline the FMS and FMF process to ensure that we remain the partner of choice for our allies in the region and are able to capitalize on emerging opportunities.

**Iraq and Syria Train & Equip Resources.** Continued support for flexible authorities is needed to effectively react to the urgent threat posed by ISIL in Iraq and in Syria. Improving the capacity and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, to include Kurdish and Sunni tribal forces, and moderate opposition forces in Syria is key to countering ISIL and other extremists operating in those countries. The Congressional authorities and resourcing provided to initiate the training and equipping of Syrian moderate opposition forces to counter a degraded ISIL and to defend territorial gains will undoubtedly contribute to the ultimate defeat of ISIL and the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Assad Regime. The turnaround of the dire situation in Kobane, Syria is indicative of how, with a fairly limited, precise application of authorities (allowing U.S. aircraft to airdrop donated Kurdish weapons and equipment) and U.S. air support, and a determined and willing partner, ISIL's momentum and narrative were effectively countered.

The Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and authority demonstrate the United States' commitment, in partnership with the international community and the Government of Iraq, to build a diverse, inclusive, and sustainable Iraq security force. We strongly endorse and support extending the ITEF and establishing the stand-alone Syria Opposition Train and Equip Fund and authority in FY16 to ensure that the ISF and Syrian moderate opposition forces are professional and sufficiently equipped to accomplish their mission, which consists of disrupting, defeating, and ultimately destroying ISIL within their sovereign territories.

**Coalition Support (CF).** Authorities, such as Global Lift and Sustain, are critical to our ability to provide our partners with logistical, military, and other support, along with specialized training and equipment. Continuing to provide this support is vital to building and maintaining a coalition, which in turn reduces the burden on U.S. forces and increases interoperability.

**Figure XII.2: U.S. Army Gulf and Global Presence**

- ❖ The world is experiencing an increased velocity of instability
- ❖ America's Army remains indispensable to National Defense
- ❖ Nine of ten active Army division headquarters are actively engaged around the world
- ❖ The Army is the backbone of the Joint Force, providing command and control to Joint Forces, setting and sustaining theaters, and securing and controlling people and terrain



**Figure XII.3: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Gulf and Global Presence**

RADM William K. Lescher, Department of the Navy, FY2016 President's Budget. February 2015, p. 5,  
<http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/pb/books.htm>

**Figure XII.4: U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships**


Category	Ship Type	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016
Aircraft Carriers	CVN	10	10	11
<b>Aircraft Carrier Total</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines	SSBN	14	14	14
Guided Missile (SSGN) Submarines	SSGN	4	4	4
Nuclear Attack Submarines	SSN	55	54	53
<b>Submarine Total</b>		<b>73</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>71</b>
Cruisers	CG	22	22	22
Destroyers	DDG	62	62	65
<b>Large Surface Combatants Total</b>		<b>84</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>87</b>
Frigates	FFG	10	-	-
Littoral Combat Ships	LCS	4	6	11
Mine Countermeasures Ships	MCM	12	11	11
<b>Small Surface Combatants Total</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>
Amphibious Warfare Assault Ships	LHA	2	1	1
Amphibious Assault Ships	LHD	8	8	8
Amphibious Transport Docks	LPD	9	9	10
Dock Landing Ships	LSD	12	12	12
<b>Amphibious Warfare Ships Total</b>		<b>31</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31</b>
Dry-Cargo Ammunition Ships	T-AKE	12	12	12
Oilers	T-AO	15	15	15
Fast Combat Support Ships	T-AOE	3	2	2
<b>Combat Logistics Ships Total</b>		<b>30</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>
Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim)	AFSB (I)	1	1	1
Submarine Tenders	AS	2	2	2
Joint High Speed Vessels	JHSV	4	5	7
Command Ships	LCC	2	2	2
Mobile Landing Platforms	MLP	2	3	3
Surveillance Ships	T-AGOS	5	5	5
T-AKEs for Maritime Prepositioning	T-AKE MPS	2	2	2
Salvage Ships	T-ARS	4	4	4
Fleet Ocean Tugs	T-ATF	4	4	4
High Speed Transport Ships	HST	1	1	1
<b>Command and Support Ships Total</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Battle Force Ships</b>		<b>281</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>282</b>

Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2016 Budget. February 2015, p. 3-3, <http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/pb/books.ht>

**Figure XII.5: U.S. Navy Combat Air Inventory**

Type Model Series Category	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016
ANTI SUB	3	3	3
ATTACK	151	144	142
BAMS-D	4	4	4
Exec ROTARY WING	19	19	19
Experimental	2	2	2
FIGHTER	97	119	130
IN FLIGHT REFUEL	81	78	79
OTHER	1	1	1
PATROL	139	149	165
ROTARY WING	1,312	1,375	1,356
STRIKE FIGHTER	1,199	1,171	1,150
TRAINING JET	284	285	281
TRAINING PROP	310	290	311
TRAINING UTILITY	25	25	17
TRANSPORT	108	117	118
UAS Combat support	68	105	110
UAS Patrol	-	4	4
UAS ROTARY WING	22	41	41
UTILITY	25	24	24
WARNING	97	100	99
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,947</b>	<b>4,056</b>	<b>4,056</b>

Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2016 Budget. February 2015, p. 3-7, <http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmb/pb/books.htm>

**Figure XII.6. U.S. Air Force Manpower in Gulf and World Wide**

MG Jim Martin, U.S. Air Force FY2016 Budget Overview, February 2015, p. 5, <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/>


**Figure XII.7. U.S. Air Force Combat Aircraft Inventory**

Air Force Aircraft Inventory					
Active Air Force					
Aircraft	FY15	FY16	Aircraft	FY15	FY16
A-10	143	0	E-4	4	4
B-1	61	61	E-9	2	2
B-2	20	20	F-15	322	317
B-52	58	58	F-16	570	570
C-5	36	36	F-22	165	165
KC-10	59	59	F-35	74	102
C-12	27	28	G-15	5	5
C-17	170	170	G-16	19	19
C-20	6	5	UH-1	96	96
C-21	17	17	HH-60	70	74
C-25	2	2	HHX	0	4
C-32	4	4	QF-16	25	27
C-37	12	12	MQ-1	110	110
C-40	4	4	RQ-4	33	33
C-46	0	11	MQ-9	227	228
C-130H	53	34	T-1	178	178
C-130J	124	144	T-6	445	445
C-130N	2	2	T-38	506	506
C-130P	4	0	T-41	4	4
C-130U	13	12	T-51	3	3
C-130W	12	12	T-53	25	25
C-135	186	186	U-2	32	32
CV-22	46	49	UV-18B	3	3
E-3	31	31			
Air National Guard					
Aircraft	FY15	FY16			
A-10	85	64			
C-17	34	34			
C-21	2	2			
C-26	11	11			
C-32	2	2			
C-40	3	3			
C-130H	152	150			
C-130J	23	23			
C-130N	6	6			
C-130P	7	7			
C-135	172	172			
E-8	16	16			
F-15	142	137			
F-16	336	336			
F-22	20	20			
HH-60	17	18			
MQ-1	35	35			
MQ-9	16	35			
Air Force Reserve					
Aircraft	FY15	FY16			
A-10	55	55			
B-52	18	18			
C-5	22	16			
C-17	18	18			
C-40	4	4			
C-130H	56	56			
C-130J	20	20			
C-130N	1	1			
C-130P	5	5			
C-135	70	70			
F-16	53	53			
HH-60	15	16			

MG Jim Martin, U.S. Air Force FY2016 Budget Overview, February 2015, p. 5, <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/>



**Figure XII.8: Air Combat Role in Strikes Against ISIS and Extremist Forces in Iraq and Syria: August 2014-March 31, 2015**



Source: POC: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – [afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil](mailto:afcent.pa@afcent.af.mil), April 17, 2015.

## Figure XII.9: Defense Security Assistance Agency Report on Major Arms Sales to Arab Gulf States: 2000-2013 and Totals from 1950 to 2013

### Bahrain (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	108,743	338,258	108,743	338,215	-	43	-	-	-	342
02	86,219	83,666	86,219	83,665	-	*	28,500	-	-	11
03	102,723	90,051	102,723	90,051	-	-	90,000	-	-	246
04	69,048	87,964	69,048	87,964	-	-	24,682	-	-	2,139
05	26,242	63,237	26,242	63,237	-	-	18,847	-	-	921,775
06	88,013	54,697	88,013	54,697	-	-	15,593	-	-	871,438
07	203,022	84,074	203,022	84,074	-	-	14,998	-	-	7,352
08	75,649	42,090	75,649	42,090	-	-	3,968	-	-	618,122
09	94,593	100,886	94,593	100,886	-	-	8,000	-	-	-
10	87,753	110,998	87,753	110,998	-	-	19,000	-	-	-
11	104,353	50,729	104,353	50,729	-	-	15,461	-	-	-
12	25,589	98,108	25,589	98,108	-	-	10,000	-	-	-
13	60,053	70,396	60,053	70,396	-	-	12,575	-	-	-
TOTAL	2,843,700	2,436,543	2,822,584	2,415,427	21,116	21,116	263,124	-	-	2,450,091

### Egypt

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	1,541,433	924,129	1,482,227	875,187	59,205	48,942	1,297,140	-	-	923
02	979,521	1,743,200	946,325	1,699,829	33,197	43,371	1,300,000	-	-	42
03	880,957	1,173,838	869,810	1,077,929	11,147	95,909	1,291,550	-	-	15,061
04	2,256,886	1,581,586	2,202,127	1,511,879	54,758	69,707	1,292,330	-	-	166,813
05	1,064,324	1,453,958	1,022,980	1,421,140	41,344	32,818	1,289,600	-	-	340,532
06	370,326	1,227,636	358,757	1,194,219	11,570	33,417	1,287,000	-	-	327,145
07	469,774	1,226,374	441,090	1,210,794	28,684	15,579	1,300,000	-	-	29,505
08	2,158,041	885,705	2,116,755	856,017	41,286	29,688	1,289,470	-	-	121,485
09	1,752,881	924,194	1,600,656	877,546	152,225	46,648	1,300,000	-	-	-
10	2,622,197	957,205	2,415,647	880,121	206,550	77,084	1,300,000	-	-	-
11	419,132	942,263	406,089	878,488	13,042	63,775	1,297,400	-	-	-
12	1,432,089	846,230	1,422,483	742,451	9,606	103,780	1,300,000	-	-	-
13	308,539	1,582,586	299,940	1,441,463	8,599	141,123	1,234,259	-	-	-
TOTAL	38,964,294	32,593,049	36,962,461	30,848,107	2,001,832	1,744,941	38,482,259	-	4,550,000	2,038,986

**Iraq**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
03	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
04	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32,123
05	80,724	-	80,724	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,682,926
06	-	2,196	-	2,196	-	-	-	-	-	1,673,519
07	1,275,023	174,844	1,034,751	174,844	240,273	-	-	-	-	103,358
08	2,368,257	684,765	2,321,777	683,419	46,480	1,346	-	-	-	2,830,786
09	1,121,474	720,885	932,467	692,391	189,007	28,495	-	-	-	-
10	830,740	422,862	793,004	374,432	37,736	48,430	-	-	-	-
11	1,851,025	766,810	1,809,117	515,060	41,908	251,750	-	-	-	-
12	1,630,840	619,018	1,520,840	568,196	110,000	50,822	850,000	-	-	-
13	2,537,046	527,864	2,419,568	450,364	117,477	77,500	37,291	-	-	-
TOTAL	11,708,281	3,932,396	10,925,401	3,474,053	782,881	458,344	887,291	-	-	6,327,336

**Jordan (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	98,967	80,428	98,967	80,428	-	-	74,835	-	-	53
02	101,673	67,016	101,673	67,016	-	-	100,000	-	-	24
03	171,777	69,434	171,777	69,434	-	-	604,000	-	-	707
04	444,317	104,263	444,317	104,263	-	-	204,785	-	-	19,794
05	112,699	140,323	112,699	140,323	-	-	304,352	-	-	88,369
06	218,462	106,316	119,640	102,199	98,822	4,117	207,900	-	-	72,667
07	190,035	203,660	190,035	169,750	-	33,910	207,900	-	-	17,938
08	238,928	305,695	223,996	258,438	14,933	47,257	298,380	-	-	83,658
09	386,908	181,602	367,038	169,023	19,870	12,580	235,000	-	-	-
10	476,164	173,062	474,589	169,826	1,575	3,236	300,000	-	-	-
11	205,333	211,869	205,333	208,623	-	3,246	299,400	-	-	-
12	369,610	376,607	366,462	363,726	3,148	12,880	300,000	-	-	-
13	308,518	339,092	308,518	328,568	-	10,524	284,829	-	-	-
TOTAL	5,524,934	4,391,412	5,385,601	4,262,677	139,333	128,735	3,965,635	227,048	650,637	637,127



**Kuwait (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	276,414	501,943	276,414	501,879	-	64	-	-	-	82
02	989,645	130,746	972,645	130,746	17,000	*	-	-	-	68
03	311,756	143,414	308,473	143,407	3,283	7	-	-	-	9,360
04	110,572	209,226	110,572	209,226	-	-	-	-	-	63,773
05	94,000	290,923	94,000	277,514	-	13,409	-	-	-	586,570
06	572,570	544,814	572,570	541,580	-	3,234	-	-	-	1,609,209
07	80,521	455,044	80,521	455,044	-	-	-	-	-	32,664
08	514,386	245,287	514,386	245,287	-	-	-	-	-	1,474,238
09	318,394	252,288	299,126	252,184	19,268	104	-	-	-	-
10	1,178,027	242,067	1,070,233	236,177	107,794	5,890	-	-	-	-
11	438,841	433,642	414,757	416,779	24,085	16,863	-	-	-	-
12	178,758	262,494	178,758	235,975	-	26,520	-	-	-	-
13	1,272,172	312,964	1,272,172	301,210	-	11,754	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	13,923,228	10,551,717	13,590,257	10,325,761	332,971	225,955	-	-	-	3,885,540

**Oman (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	3,292	3,744	3,292	3,744	-	-	-	-	-	176
02	740,676	1,587	740,676	1,587	-	-	25,000	-	-	2
03	9,327	16,512	9,327	16,512	-	-	81,000	-	-	839
04	103,086	27,136	101,577	27,136	1,509	-	24,850	-	-	48,618
05	44,319	91,382	43,697	91,382	623	-	19,840	-	-	7,498
06	17,221	432,398	17,221	432,287	-	110	13,860	-	-	208,737
07	38,609	104,148	38,609	104,037	-	111	13,494	-	-	5,790
08	32,391	57,316	28,023	57,172	4,368	144	4,712	-	-	15,767
09	91,839	42,987	91,839	42,986	-	*	7,000	-	-	-
10	11,529	34,404	11,529	29,981	-	4,423	8,847	-	-	-
11	135,055	36,133	135,055	36,133	-	-	13,000	-	-	-
12	1,466,153	48,901	1,466,153	48,901	-	-	8,000	-	-	-
13	651,274	58,354	651,274	58,354	-	-	7,595	-	-	-
TOTAL	3,538,422	1,138,481	3,530,411	1,132,181	8,011	6,300	231,698	49,140	150,000	336,819

**Qatar (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	3	788	3	788	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	1,176	827	1,176	827	-	-	-	-	-	-
03	6,000	1,024	6,000	1,024	-	-	-	-	-	219
04	3,000	329	3,000	329	-	-	-	-	-	1,612
05	18	354	18	354	-	-	-	-	-	262,079
06	-	464	-	464	-	-	-	-	-	328,409
07	26	792	26	792	-	-	-	-	-	10,277
08	17,352	1,123	17,352	1,123	-	-	-	-	-	876,465
09	186,920	4,009	186,920	4,009	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	17,741	14,002	17,741	14,002	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	1,179	17,108	1,179	17,108	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	44,382	26,796	44,382	26,796	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	-	41,248	-	41,248	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	286,080	115,627	286,080	115,627	-	-	-	-	-	1,505,737

**Saudi Arabia – Ministry of Defense (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	656,423	1,797,089	656,423	1,682,374	-	114,715	-	-	-	1,028
02	884,346	1,263,524	884,346	1,172,667	-	90,857	-	-	-	530
03	674,276	953,731	647,224	897,082	27,052	56,649	-	-	-	36,150
04	1,838,532	1,118,902	1,785,399	1,098,855	53,133	20,047	-	-	-	45,709
05	708,164	871,665	708,164	839,922	-	31,743	-	-	-	85,352
06	812,356	984,216	812,356	930,084	-	54,132	-	-	-	124,840
07	1,667,559	1,045,145	1,612,391	1,007,778	55,168	37,367	-	-	-	38,205
08	6,235,582	911,143	6,235,582	894,590	-	16,553	-	-	-	232,082
09	3,242,159	1,747,945	2,808,633	1,713,686	433,526	34,259	-	-	-	-
10	2,408,009	1,679,258	2,018,799	1,587,114	389,210	92,143	-	-	-	-
11	3,608,726	1,520,495	3,358,726	1,405,193	250,000	115,302	-	-	-	-
12	35,093,955	1,656,898	34,683,230	1,551,132	410,725	105,767	-	-	-	-
13	2,863,204	3,660,892	2,863,204	3,496,996	-	163,896	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	141,236,824	92,619,553	122,211,291	74,908,022	19,025,533	17,711,531	-	65,222	188,945	2,627,522

**Saudi Arabia – Ministry of Interior (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
03	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
04	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
05	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
06	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
08	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
09	11,782	-	11,782	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	4,048	-	4,048	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	50,109	8,285	50,109	8,285	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	7,015	12,548	7,015	12,548	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	46,000	12,927	46,000	12,927	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	114,906	37,808	114,906	37,808	-	-	-	-	-	-

**UAE (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	154,653	15,505	154,653	15,505	-	-	-	-	-	3,608
02	183,135	53,146	183,135	53,146	-	-	-	-	-	3,979
03	124,637	84,118	124,637	84,118	-	-	-	-	-	20,535
04	157,453	153,672	157,453	153,672	-	-	-	-	-	360,820
05	26,556	149,194	26,556	149,194	-	-	-	-	-	1,041,638
06	766,526	191,526	766,526	191,526	-	-	-	-	-	1,464,928
07	1,602,406	61,989	1,602,406	61,989	-	-	-	-	-	451,112
08	617,335	82,612	617,335	82,612	-	-	-	-	-	1,034,029
09	7,508,697	118,695	7,508,670	118,694	27	1	-	-	-	-
10	502,101	583,712	502,101	583,689	-	23	-	-	-	-
11	1,520,230	638,829	1,520,230	638,829	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	3,763,846	1,357,038	3,763,846	1,357,038	-	-	-	-	-	-
13	1,966,952	771,221	1,966,952	771,221	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	19,157,521	4,263,907	19,157,494	4,263,883	27	24	-	-	-	4,384,574

**Yemen (In Current \$U.S. Thousands)**

YEAR	TOTAL SALES AGREEMENTS	TOTAL SALES DELIVERIES	FMS AGREEMENTS	FMS DELIVERIES	FMCS AGREEMENTS	FMCS DELIVERIES	FOREIGN MIL FIN WAIVED	FOREIGN MIL FIN DIRECT	FOREIGN MIL FIN GUARANTY	COMMERCIAL EXPORTS DELIVERIES
01	839	54	839	54	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	17	307	17	307	-	-	20,000	-	-	1
03	11,890	271	11,890	271	-	-	1,900	-	-	45
04	3,684	416	3,684	416	-	-	14,910	-	-	1,842
05	12,907	3,725	12,907	3,725	-	-	10,420	-	-	2,311
06	3,178	8,390	3,178	8,390	-	-	8,415	-	-	1,155
07	12,106	7,385	9,374	7,364	2,732	21	9,725	-	-	4,021
08	10,475	7,784	10,475	7,655	-	129	3,952	-	-	99
09	2,504	2,892	2,504	2,867	-	25	2,800	-	-	-
10	7,278	5,566	6,486	5,501	791	65	12,500	-	-	-
11	3,310	5,167	1,345	4,797	1,965	370	19,960	-	-	-
12	9,138	3,961	9,138	3,922	-	39	20,000	-	-	-
13	2,591	7,158	2,591	6,494	-	663	18,989	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>402,447</b>	<b>374,922</b>	<b>396,957</b>	<b>373,609</b>	<b>5,490</b>	<b>1,313</b>	<b>143,571</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>12,257</b>	<b>12,513</b>

Source: DCSA Fiscal Year Series,

[http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal\\_year\\_series\\_-\\_30\\_september\\_2013.pdf](http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_september_2013.pdf)

## Figure XII.10: Proposed Major U.S. Arms Sales to the GCC States and Iraq: 2002-2013 By Weapon and Arms Transfer (Information Adapted from Releases from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency)

### Bahrain

- **Sept. 14, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Bahrain for Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles, TOW Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support worth an estimated \$53 million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of 44 M1152A1B2 Armored High Mobility Multi- Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 200 BGM-71E-4B-RF Radio Frequency (RF) Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided Missiles (TOW-2A), 7 Fly-to-Buy RF TOW-2A Missiles, 40 BGM-71F-3-RF TOW-2B Aero Missiles, 7 Fly-to-Buy RF TOW-2B Aero Missiles, 50 BGM-71H-1RF Bunker Buster Missiles (TOW-2A), 7 Fly-to-Buy RF Bunker Buster Missiles (TOW-2A), 48 TOW-2 Launchers, AN/UAS-12A Night Sight Sets, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

- **Nov. 4, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 3 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) T2K Unitary Missiles and associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$70 million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) T2K Unitary Missiles, Missile Common Test Device software, ATACMS Quality Assurance Team support, publications and technical documentation, training, U.S. government and contractor technical and engineering support, and other related elements of program support.

- **July 28, 2009** – On July 27, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Bahrain of 25 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and associated equipment, parts and services at an estimated cost of \$74 million.
- **Aug. 3, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of Bell 412 Air Search and Recovery Helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$160 million.

- **July 28, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$252 million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of nine (9) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, two (2) T700-GE-701D turbine engines, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, a Quality Assurance Team, aircraft survivability equipment, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 21, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of JAVELIN missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$42 million.  
The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of 180 JAVELIN missile rounds and 60 JAVELIN command launch units, simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, Quality Assurance Team services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 21, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Government of Bahrain of continuing logistics support services/equipment for the F-16 aircraft and related components as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$150 million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of continuing logistics support services/equipment for the F-16 aircraft, ALR-69 radar warning receiver, ALQ-131 electric countermeasure pods, radar systems, and engines. The possible sale also includes support equipment, aircraft engine services/modification, repair/return services; depot level repair support; precision measurement equipment laboratory calibration, spare and repair parts, support equipment, supply support; personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, contractor technical services and other related elements of logistics support and to ensure aircraft operational availability.

- **Sept. 3, 2003** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of an AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMESIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures System as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$61 million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of one AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMESIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures System which consists of three small laser turret assemblies, six missile warning sensors, one system processor, one control indicator unit, two signal repeaters, included associated support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications, personnel training and training equipment, technical assistance, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.

- **June 26, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain of a 3 dimensional radar and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$40 Million.

The Government of Bahrain has requested a possible sale of one AN/TPS-59(V) 3 3-dimensional land based radar, one Air Defense Communication Platform, spare and repair parts, publications, personnel training and training equipment, technical assistance, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.

## Iraq

- **Dec. 19, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for M1151A1 Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$579 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 1000 M1151A1 Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 1000 M2 .50 caliber machine guns, and 1000 MK-19 40mm grenade launchers with universal mounts, commercial radios, communication equipment, repair and spare parts, publications and technical documentation, tools and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor logistics and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$579 million.

- **Dec. 19, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for M1A1 Abrams tanks and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$2.4 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 175 Full Track M1A1 Abrams Tanks with 120mm Gun modified and upgraded to the M1A1 Abrams configuration, 15 M88A2 Improved Tank Recovery Vehicles, 175 .50 Caliber M2 Machine Guns with Chrysler Mount, 350 7.62mm M240 Machine Guns, 10 .50 Caliber BR M2 HB Machine Guns, 10,000 M831A1 120mm High Explosive

Anti-tank TP-T Ammunition, 25,000 M865 120mm TPCSDS-T Ammunition, 10,000 M830A1 120mm High Explosive Anti-tank Multipurpose Tracer Ammunition, 10,000 M1002 120mm Target Practice Multipurpose Tracer (TPMP-T) Ammunition, and 190 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Dual Long-Range Radio Systems, 700 M1028 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles, Radios, Receiver Transmitters (RT-1702G), installation, ammunition, simulators, communication equipment, support equipment, fuel, transportation, spare and repair parts, site surveys, Quality Assurance Teams, special tools and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistical support services, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$2.4 billion.

- **Nov. 26, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for C-130E/J sustainment and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$800 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale for a five-year sustainment package for the C-130E/J fleet that includes operational, intermediate, and depot level maintenance, spare and repair parts, support equipment, repair and return, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$800 million.

- **Nov. 12, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for a Foreign Military Sales Order II (FMSO II) to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Agreement (CLSSA) and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$600 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a Foreign Military Sales Order II (FMSO II) to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative Logistics Supply Agreement (CLSSA) for spare parts to support M1A1 Battle Tanks, M1070 Heavy Equipment Tactical Trucks, M88A1/2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, M113 Vehicles, M198 Towed Howitzers, M109A5 Self Propelled Howitzers, High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), heavy and light machine guns, common repair sets, and additional authorized items with associated equipment and services. The estimated cost is \$600 million.

- **Nov. 12, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$97 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of up to 2,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS), weapon and test support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is \$97 million.

- **Oct. 20, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for M1A1 Abrams tank ammunition and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$600 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 10,000 M831 120mm High-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) munitions, 10,000 M865 120mm Kinetic Energy Warheads (KEW), 10,000 M865 120mm KEW-A1, and 16,000 M830 120mm HEAT-MP-T tank ammunition. Also included are U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of



logistical and program support. The estimated cost is \$600 million.

- **July 29, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AGM-114K/N/R Hellfire missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$700 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on July 28, 2014.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 5000 AGM-114K/N/R Hellfire missiles, Hellfire missile conversion, blast fragmentation sleeves and installation kits, containers, transportation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$700 million.

- **July 29, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for aviation sustainment support, on-the-job maintenance training and maintenance advice and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on July 28, 2014.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale to establish five years of contractor logistics support for its Bell 407, OH-58, and Huey II aircraft in support of the Iraq Aviation Command. This support will include maintenance support, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, site surveys, life support costs, Quality Assurance Teams, U.S. Government and contractor technical, logistics, and engineering support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$500 million.

- **May 13, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AT-6C Texan II aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$790 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on May 13, 2014.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 24 AT-6C Texan II Aircraft, 2 spare PT-6A-68 Turboprop engines, 2 spare ALE-47 Counter-Measure Dispensing Systems and/or 2 spare AAR-47 Missile Launch Detection Systems, non-SAASM global positioning systems with CMA-4124, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, tanker support, ferry services, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$790 million.

- **May 13, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for Aerostats and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment tower systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$90 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on May 13, 2014.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 7 Aerostats (17 meter) and 14 Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) Tower Systems, installation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, site surveys, U.S. government and contractor technical assistance, personnel training and training equipment, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$90 million.

- **May 13, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for M1151A1 Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$101 million.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on May 13, 2014. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 200 M1151A1 Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) with M2 .50



cal. machine gun mounts, commercial radios, communication equipment, repair and spare parts, publications and technical documentation, tools and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor logistics and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$101 million.

- **Feb. 4, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$700 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a proposed sale of commercially available FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) Equipment Suite and Airfield Navigational Aids Suites to be installed at four bases (Tikrit, Al Basra, Al Kut, and Taji). The ATC Equipment Suite includes 4 ASR-11 Airport Surveillance Radars, 10 ATC Automation system with 10 controller consoles, 4 AutoTrac II Airfield Support and Navigation Suites, 2 Primary Search Radars and 2 Mono-pulse secondary surveillance radars. The Airfield Navigation Aids Suite includes 2 Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range (VORTAC) and 3 Instrument Landing Systems with Distance Measuring Equipment, 2 Airfield Lighting Systems with Flush Mounted Lights for the runway and taxiways, Air Traffic Control Tower Equipment Suite. Also provided are site surveys, system integration, installation, testing, repair and return, facilities, warranties, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$700 million.

- **Jan. 27, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AH-64E APACHE LONGBOW Attack Helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$4.8 billion.

Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 24 AH-64E APACHE LONGBOW Attack Helicopters, 56 T700-GE-701D Engines, 27 AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27 AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component), 28 AN/AAR-57(V)7 Common Missile Warning Systems, 28 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR-39A(V)4 or APR-39C(V)2 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/ALQ-136A(V)5 Radar Jammers, 52 AN/AVS-6, 90 Apache Aviator Integrated Helmets, 60 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers, and 480 AGM-114R HELLFIRE Missiles. Also included are AN/APR-48 Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometers, AN/APX-117 Identification Friend-or-Foe Transponders, Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation with Multi Mode Receiver, MXF-4027 UHF/VHF Radios, 30mm Automatic Chain Guns, Aircraft Ground Power Units, 2.75 in Hydra Rockets, 30mm rounds, M211 and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions flares, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, design and construction, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$4.8 billion.

- **Jan. 27, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for support for APACHE lease and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.37 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 8 AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System, 3 T-700-GE-701D engines, 3 AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS), 3 AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (PNVS), 152 AGM-114 K-A HELLFIRE Missiles, 14 HELLFIRE M299 Launchers, 6 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Warning Systems with training Universal Data Modems (UDM), 2 Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation System (EGI), 6 AN/AVR-2A/B Laser Warning Detectors, 12 M261 2.75 inch Rocket Launchers, M206 Infrared Countermeasure flares, M211 and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCIM) flares, Internal Auxiliary Fuel Systems (IAFS), Aviator's Night Vision Goggles, Aviation Mission Planning System, training ammunition, helmets, transportation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance,

and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$1.37 billion.

- **Jan 23, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AGM-114K/R Hellfire Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$82 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 500 AGM-114K/R Hellfire missiles, Hellfire missile conversion, blast fragmentation sleeves, and installation kits, containers, transportation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$82 million.

- **Aug. 5, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of an Integrated Air Defense System and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$2.403 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 40 AVENGER Fire Units, 681 STINGER Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I 92H Missiles, 13 AN/MPQ-64F1 SENTINEL Radars, 7 AN/YSQ-184D Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence (FAAD C2I) Systems, 75 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS Radios, 3 HAWK XXI Batteries (6 Fire Units) which include 6 Battery Fire Direction Centers, 6 High Powered Illuminator Radars, 216 MIM-23P HAWK Tactical Missiles, 2 Mobile Battalion Operation Centers (BOC), 3 HAWK XXI BOC Air Defense Consoles (ADCs), 1 DS/GS Shop 20, 1 DS/GS Shop 21, 1 Mini-Certified Round Assembly Facility (MCRAF), Air Command and Control (C2) systems and surveillance radars for the Integrated Air Defense Systems that includes TPS-77 Long-Range Radars (LRR) and Omnyx-I0 Air Command and Control System, and 10 Medium Range Radars. Also included: Ground Air Transmit Receive Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency radio capability, facilities and construction for one (1) underground Air Defense Operations Center and two (2) Air Defense Sector Operations Centers, spare and repair parts, repair and return, software support, systems integration, long haul communication technical integration, communications equipment, support equipment and sustainment, tools and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representative engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$2.403 billion.

- **Aug. 5, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Mobile Troposcatter Radio Systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$339 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 19 Mobile Troposcatter Radio Systems, 10 Mobile Microwave Radio Systems, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$339 million.

- **July 25, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Multi-Platform Maintenance and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$750 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale to provide for a five year follow-on maintenance support for the M88A1 Recovery Vehicle, M88A2 Hercules, M113 Family of Vehicles, M109A5 Howitzers, M198 Howitzers, M1070 Heavy Equipment Trailer and Truck (HETT), M977 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and the Tactical Floating River Bridge System (TFRBS) Including, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, Quality Assurance Teams, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$750 million.

- **July 25, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 12 Bell 412 EP helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$300 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 12 Bell 412 EP helicopters equipped with Star SAFIRE III EO/IR systems, PT6T-3DF engines, KDM-706 Distance Measuring Equipment, KNR 634 VOR/LOC with MB/HSI, MST67A Transponder, Artex C406-1HM Emergency Locator Transmitter, Wulfsberg FlexComm II C5000 System with Synthesized Guard, KTR-908 Very High Frequency Radios, NAT AA-95 Audio System, 660 Weather Radar, AAI Radome, Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) Compatible Cockpit Lighting, SX-16 Nightsun, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$300 million.

- **July 25, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 50 M1135 Stryker Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$900 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 50 M1135 Stryker Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicles, DECON 3000 Decontamination Systems, M26 Commercial Joint Service Transportable Decontamination Systems (JSTDS), AN/VRC-89 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) with Global Positioning System (GPS), AN/VRC-90 SINCGARS with GPS, M40A1 Protective Masks, Lightweight Personal Chemical Detectors LCD-3, Portable Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors GID-3, MultiRAE PLUS Gas Detectors, AN/VDR-2 Radiac Sets, M256 Chemical Agent Detector Kits, Decontamination Kits, Chemical Biological Mask Canisters, M8 Chemical Paper Agent Detector Kits, water canteens, individual clothing and equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, communication equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, a Quality Assurance Team, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is \$900 million.

- **Feb. 28, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Feb. 27 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for 200 RAPISCAN cargo inspection systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$600 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested the possible sale of 90 M45 RAPISCAN Mobile Eagle High Energy Mobile System Vehicles, 40 M60 RAPISCAN Mobile Eagle High Energy Mobile System Vehicles, 70 American Science and Engineering brand Z Backscatter Vans.

The Z Backscatter vans will be used to scan vehicle interiors and will provide the Government of Iraq a tool to restrict the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to operate by detecting contraband movement through borders and checkpoints.

- **Dec. 24, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Dec. 21 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) operations and maintenance services and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$125 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) operations and maintenance services, equipment installation services, upgrade VSAT managed and leased bandwidth, video teleconferencing equipment, 75 VSAT Equipment Suites (consisting of 1.8m VSAT terminals, block upconverters (BUCs), low-noise down converters (LNBs), required cables and components, iDirect e8350 modem, network operation and dynamic bandwidth equipment, and iMonitor software), spares and repair parts, tools, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor representative technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

- **Aug. 15, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible

Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for commercially available Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control and Landing System/Navigational Aids and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support at an estimated cost of \$60 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a proposed sale of commercially available Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control and Landing System/Navigational Aids. The system will include an ASR-11 Radar, Autotrac II simulator, Instrument Landing System, and Airfield Lighting System, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, site survey, installation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

- **July 20, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for 12 FIREFINDER Radars and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$428 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)11 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 6 AN/TPQ-37(V)9 FIREFINDER Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 86 AN/VRC-92 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 12 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, 63 M1152A1 and 3 M1151A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, 12 M1083A1 Family of Medium Tactical Utility Vehicles, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 12, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for 18 F-16IQ aircraft and associated equipment, parts, weapons, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$2.3 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 18 F-16IQ aircraft, 24 F100PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, 120 LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, 24 APG-68(V)9 radar sets, 19 M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, 100 AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, 150 AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, 200 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), 50 GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 50 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 22 ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS), or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic System (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), 20 AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/ Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), 20 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, 4 F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), 22 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS), 20 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs), 120 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 20 AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 10,000 PGU-27A/B Ammunition, 30,000 PGU-28 Ammunition, 230 MK-84 2000 lb. General Purpose Bombs, and 800 MK-82 500lb General Purpose Bombs. Also included: LAU-117 Maverick Launchers, site survey support equipment, Joint Mission Planning System, Ground Based Flight Simulator, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **June 29, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for follow-on support and maintenance of multiple aircraft systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$675 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of follow-on support and maintenance of multiple aircraft systems that include TC-208s, Cessna 172s, AC-208s, T-6As, and King Air 350s. Included are ground stations, repair and return, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Oct. 14, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Oct 5 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for various explosive projectiles and charges, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$82 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles and 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination projectiles; also included are, M231 Propelling charges, M232A1 155mm Modular Artillery Charge System Propelling charges, M739 Fuzes, M762A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, M82 Percussion primers, M767A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, 20-foot Intermodal Containers for transporting ammunition, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 3, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq of various radios and communication equipment, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$67 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (750) 50-Watt Vehicular Multiband Handheld Radio Systems, (900) 5-watt Multiband Handheld Radio Systems, (50) 50-watt Multiband Handheld Base Station Radio Systems, (50) 20-watt High Frequency (HF) Base Station Radio Systems, (100) 5-watt Secure Personal Role Handheld Radio Systems, accessories, installation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **March 30, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq of six AN/TPQ-36(V)10 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$299 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)10 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 36 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 6 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 30, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 29 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) Systems and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth approximately \$68 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) Systems which includes, High Frequency, Ultra High Frequency, and Very High Frequency radios, Automatic Identification System, Surface Scan Radar System, Forward Looking Infrared System, Situational Display System, Mobile and Fixed Towers, Electro-Optical Cameras, Voice Over Internet Protocol, K Under Band Very Small Aperture Terminal upgrades, generators, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S.

Government and contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related logistical support.

- **Nov. 30, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 29 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of M1A1 Abrams Tank Ammunition for an estimated cost of \$36 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 14,010 TP-T M831A1 120mm Cartridges, 16,110 TPCSDS-T M865 120mm Cartridges, and 3,510 HEAT-MP-T M830A1 120mm Cartridges.

- **Sept. 24, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of contractor technical support of the Iraqi Defense Network and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth approximately \$98 million.
- **Sept. 24, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of contractor logistics support for Mobile Communications Centers and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth approximately \$57 million.
- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 14, of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for the refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$131 million.
- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 13 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 18 F-16IQ Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$4.2 billion.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (18) F-16IQ aircraft, (24) F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, (36) LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, (24) APG- 68(V)9 radar sets, (19) M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, (200) AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, (150) AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, (50) AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, (200) GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), (50) GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (50) GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (22) Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), (20) AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), (20) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), (20) AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, (4) F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB- 110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), (22) AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS); (20) Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs). Also included: site survey, support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Aug. 5, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of contractor logistics support for various helicopters for an estimated cost of \$152 million.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of two years of contractor logistics support for Mi-17 Helicopters and two years of logistics support for U.S.-origin rotary wing aircraft not in DoD's inventory.
- **March 5, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress March 4 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various communication equipment, associated parts and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$142 million.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (300) 50-watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station radios, (230) 50-Watt VHF Vehicular Stations, (150) 20-watt High Frequency/Very High Frequency (HF/VHF) Base Station Systems, (50) 20-watt HF/VHF Vehicular Radios, (50) 50-

- watt Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) Base Stations, (10) 150-watt HF/VHF Vehicular Radio Systems, (10) 150-watt HF Base Station Radio Systems, (30) 20-watt HF Vehicular Mobile Radio Stations, (250) 20-watt HF/VHF Handheld Radio Systems, (300) 50-watt UHF/VHF Vehicular Stations, (10) 150-watt HF/VHF Fixed Base Station Radio Systems, (590) Mobile Communications, Command and Control Center Switches, (4) Mobile Work Shops, High Capacity Line of Sight Communication Systems with Relay Link, generators, accessories, installation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Nov. 19, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 18 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 15 helicopters with associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$1.2 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of up to 15 Agusta Westland AW109 Light Utility Observation helicopters, or alternatively, 15 Bell Model 429 Medical Evacuation and Aerial Observation helicopters, or 15 EADS North America UH-72A Lakota Light Utility helicopters; and, up to 12 Agusta Westland AW139 Medium Utility helicopters, or alternatively, 12 Bell Model 412 Medium Utility helicopters, or 12 Sikorsky UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters equipped with 24 T700-GE-701D engines. Also included: spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, U.S. Government and contractor provided technical and logistics support services, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
  - **Dec. 10, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (64) Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters (DRASH), (1,500) 50 watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station Radios, (6,000) VHF Tactical Handheld Radios, (100) VHF Fixed Retransmitters, (200) VHF Vehicular Radios, (30) VHF Maritime 50 watt Base Stations, (150) 150 watt High Frequency (HF) Base Station Radio Systems, (150) 20 watt HF Vehicular Radios, (30) 20 watt HF Manpack Radios, (50) 50 watt Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 150 watt VHF/UHF Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 5 watt Multiband Handheld Radio Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$485 Million.
  - **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (80,000) M16A4 5.56MM Rifles, (25,000) M4 5.56MM Carbines, (2,550) M203 40MM Grenade Launchers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$148 million.
  - **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 26 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters, 26 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, 26 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 26 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box, 26 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$366 million.
  - **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers, 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers, 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles, 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances, and 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.160 billion.
  - **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (20) 30-35meter Coastal Patrol Boats and (3) 55- 60 meter Offshore Support Vessels as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.010 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (20) 30-35meter Coastal Patrol Boats and

(3) 55- 60 meter Offshore Support Vessels, each outfitted with the Seahawk MS1-DS30MA2 mount using a 30 x 173mm CHAIN gun and short range Browning M2-HB .50 cal machine gun, spare and repair parts, weapon system software, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$210 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with CMA-4124 GNSSA card and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) spares, ferry maintenance, tanker support, aircraft ferry services, site survey, unit level trainer, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 400 M1126 STRYKER Infantry Carrier Vehicles as well as associated equipment. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.11 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 400 M1126 STRYKER Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs), 400 M2 HB 50 cal Browning Machine Guns, 400 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), 8 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft as well as associated support. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$520 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft, 6 spare PT- 6 engines, 10 spare ALE-47 Counter-Measure Dispensing Systems and/or 10 spare AAR-60 Missile Launch Detection Systems, global positioning systems with CMA-4124, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, tanker support, ferry services, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 31, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of M1A1 and Upgrade to M1A1M Abrams Tanks as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.16 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers, 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers, 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles, 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances, and 420 AN/VRC- 92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters. Also included are: 35 M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Truck Tractors, 40 M978A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Tankers, 36 M985A2 HEMTT Cargo Trucks, 4 M984A2 HEMTT Wrecker Trucks, 140 M1085A1 5-ton Cargo Trucks, 8 HMMWV Ambulances w/ Shelter, 8 Contact Maintenance Trucks, 32 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, 16 2500 gal Water Tank Trucks, 16 Motorcycles, 80 8 ton Heavy/Medium Trailers, 16 Sedans, 92 M1102 Light Tactical trailers, 92 635NL Semi-Trailers, 4 5,500 lb. Rough Terrain Forklifts, 20 M1A1 engines, 20 M1A1 Full Up Power Packs, 3 spare M88A2 engines, 10 M1070 engines, 20 HEMTT engines, 4 M577A2 spare engines, 2 5-ton truck engines, 20 spare HMMWV engines, ammunition, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign



Military Sale to Iraq of Helicopters and related munitions as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.4 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 24 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters or 24 Boeing AH-6 Helicopters, 24 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, 565 M120 120mm Mortars, 665 M252 81mm Mortars, 200 AGM-114M HELLFIRE missiles, 24 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers, 16 M36 HELLFIRE Training Missiles, 15,000 2.75-inch Rockets, 24 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 24 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box, 24 M134 7.62mm Mini-Guns, 81mm ammunition, 120mm ammunition, test measurement and diagnostics equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.6 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of technical assistance to ensure provision of adequate facilities and infrastructure in support of the recruitment, garrison, training, and operational facilities and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will provide engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure (repair, rehabilitation, and new construction) in support of the training, garrison, and operational requirements of the ISF. The scope of the program includes provision of technical assistance for Light Armored Vehicles, Range Facilities, Training Facilities, Tank Range Complex Facilities, and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Facilities in support of Government of Iraq (GoI) construction projects throughout the country of Iraq. The facilities and infrastructure planned include mission essential facilities, maintenance and supply buildings, company and regimental headquarters, and utilities systems (including heating, water, sewer, electricity, and communication lines). Services include support, personnel training and training equipment, acquisition of engineer construction equipment, technical assistance to Iraqi military engineers, other technical assistance, contractor engineering services, and other related elements of logistic support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Light Armored Vehicles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$3 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 392 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) which include 352 LAV-25, 24 LAV-CC, and 16 LAV-A (Ambulances); 368 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); 24 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS; and 26 M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons. The following are considered replacements to vehicles/weapons requested in the Military Table of Equipment (MTOE): 5 LAV-R (Recovery), 4 LAV-L (Logistics), 2 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, 41 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), 2 MK19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, 773 9mm Pistols, 93 M240G Machine Guns, and 10 AR-12 rifles. Non-MDE includes ammunition, construction, site survey, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 28, 2008** – On July 24<sup>th</sup>, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Armored Security Vehicles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$206 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 160 M2 .50 caliber Machine Guns, 160 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), 4 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, 160 Harris Vehicular Radio Systems, 144 MK19 MOD3 40mm Grenade Machine Guns with Bracket, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 25, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of C-130J-30 Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total

value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.5 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 C-130J-30 United States Air Force baseline aircraft and equipment, 24 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engines, 4 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 spare engines, 6 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 2 spare AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 6 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems, 2 spare AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems. Also included are spare and repair parts, configuration updates, integration studies, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, technical services, personnel training and training equipment, foreign liaison office support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, construction, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 7, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$450 million.
- **March 21, 2008** – On March 12, 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms and ammunition, communication equipment, medical equipment, and clothing and individual equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1,389 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (700) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Armored Gun Trucks, (4,000) AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Devices, and (100,000) M16A4 Assault Rifles. Also included are: (200) Commercial Ambulances, (16) Bulldozers, (300) Light Gun Trucks, (150) Motorcycles, (90) Recovery Trucks, (30) 20 ton Heavy Trailer, (1,400) 8 ton Medium Trailers, (3,000) 4X4 Utility Trucks, (120) 12K Fuel Tank Trucks, (80) Heavy Tractor Trucks, (120) 10K Water Tank Trucks, (208) 8 ton Heavy Trucks, (800) Light Utility Trailers, (8) Cranes, (60) Heavy Recovery Vehicles, (16) Loaders, (300) Sedans, (200) 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, (1,500) 1 ton Light Utility Trailers, (50) 40 ton Low Bed Trailers, (40) Heavy Fuel Tanker Trucks, (20) 2000 gal Water Tanker Trucks, (2,000) 5 ton Medium Trucks, (120) Armored IEDD Response Vehicles, (1,200) 8 ton Medium Cargo Trucks, (1,100) 40mm Grenade Launchers, (3,300) 9mm Pistols with Holsters, (400) Aiming Posts, (140,000) M16A4 Magazines, (100,000) M4 Weapons, (65) 5K Generators, (5,400) hand-held VHF radio sets, (3,500) vehicular VHF radio sets, (32) Air Conditioner Charger kits, (32) Air Conditioner Testers, (4,000) binoculars, (20) electrician tool kits, (600) large general purpose tents, (700) small command general purpose tents, medical equipment, organizational clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 25, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms ammunition, explosives, and communications equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.257 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of the following: MDE includes: (980) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and (123,544) M16A4 Rifles.

Also included are: Upgrade and refurbishment of 32 additional UH-1 configuration; Armored Land Cruisers (189); Armored Mercedes (10); Light utility trucks (1,815); Fire trucks (70); Fuel trucks (40); Septic truck (20); Water truck (45); Motorcycles (112); Sedans (1,425); 5 Ton Trucks (600); Medium Trucks (600); BTR 3E1 (336); 8 Ton Trucks (400); 12 Ton Trucks (400); 16- 35 Ton Trucks (100); 35 Ton Trucks (20); Ambulances (122); Bulldozers (33); Excavators (10); Wheeled Loader (20); Variable Reach Forklifts (10); 5Kw generators (447); ILAV Route Clearing Vehicle (55); Wrecker w/Boom (19); Fuel Pumps (34); 11 Passenger Bus (127); 24 Passenger Bus (207); 44 Passenger Bus (80); Contact Maintenance Trucks (105); communication towers, troposcatter and Microwave radios, IDN, DPN, VSAT Operations and Maintenance, (1,518) VHF Wheeled Tactical and Base Station Radios, (4,800) VHF hand-held radios, (6,490) VHF man pack radios, clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance,

support equipment, publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; Quality Assurance Team support services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 21, 2007** – On September 21, 2007, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$172 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, electronic warfare support, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Aug. 17, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of UH-1 HUEY repair parts as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$150 million.
- **May 24, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of medical supplies, equipment, and training as well as associated support equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, will be less than \$1.05 billion.
- **May 18, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Technical Assistance for Construction of Facilities and Infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$350 million.
- **May 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various small arms ammunition, explosives, and other consumables as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$508 million.
- **Dec. 07, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq to provide funds for Trucks, Vehicles, Trailers, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$463 million.  
Major Defense Equipment (MDE): 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or 276 Infantry Light Armored Vehicles (I-LA Vs), eight Heavy Tracked Recovery Vehicles – either Brem Tracked Recovery and Repair or M578 Recovery Vehicles, six 40-Ton Trailer Lowboy – either M871 or Commercial, 66 8-Ton Cargo Heavy Trucks – either M900 series or M35 series or MK23 Medium Tactical Vehicles or Commercial Medium Trucks.

Also included: logistics support services/equipment for vehicles (Armored Gun Trucks; Light, Medium, and Heavy Vehicles; trailers; recovery vehicles; and ambulances) supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of King Air 350ER and potentially other aircraft, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$900 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of:

- 24 King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance role with L-3 Wescam
- MX-15 Electro Optics/Infrared (EO/IR) system, plus 1 of the following Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR/ISAR)/Inverse Synthetic: APS-134 Sea View or APS-143 Ocean Eye or RDR-1700 or Lynx II (APY-8) or APS144 or APY-12 Phoenix

- 24 Data Link Systems (T-Series Model-U or T-Series Model-N or ADL850 or TCDL or BMT-85)
  - 24 King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck Aircraft for light transport role
  - 48 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems
  - 48 ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems
  - 6,000 M-206 Flare Cartridges
  - 50 Global Positioning System (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)
- Also included: support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$142 million.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.
  - **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of helicopters, vehicles, weapons and support as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$500 million.  
Also included: logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems, on-job-training, laser pointers, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
  - **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for Helicopters, Vehicles, Weapons as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$250 million.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems including on-job-training, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
  - **March 10, 2005** – On 10 March 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$132 million.  
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

## Kuwait

- **June 30, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait for facilities and infrastructure construction support services and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.7 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on Jun 30, 2014.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale for the design, construction, procurement of medical, non-medical, and information technology equipment, and operation and maintenance for the Kuwait Armed Forces Hospital. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will provide project management, engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure for the hospital. The overall project will also include a new central utilities plant, site utilities, site improvements, covered parking, parking access and roads, and an enclosed pedestrian circulation connector for the new complex to the existing Armed Forces Hospital. The estimated cost is \$1.7 billion.

- **Dec. 5, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on Dec 4 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait for F/A-18 C/D follow-on contractor engineering technical services and associated equipment, parts, and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$150 million.

The Government of Kuwait requests the continuation of contractor engineering technical services, contractor maintenance services, Hush House support services, and Liaison Office Support for the Kuwait's Air Force's F/A-18 C/D program, which will include spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical support services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$150 million.

- **June 10, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress June 7 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of technical and logistics support for F/A-18 C/D aircraft for an estimated cost of \$200 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of continuation of logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of the F/A-18 C/D aircraft to include avionics software upgrade, engine component improvement, ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, engineering change proposals, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services and other related elements of logistical support. The estimated cost is \$200 million.

- **Apr. 17, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress April 16 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait for 1 C-17 GLOBEMASTER III aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$371 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 1 C-17 GLOBEMASTER III aircraft, 4 Turbofan F117-PW-100 Engines, 1 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning System, 1 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Set (CMDS), secure radios, precision navigation equipment, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, tactics manuals, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, aircraft ferry support, aircraft fuel, and technical and logistics support services; and related elements of initial and follow-on logistical and program support.

- **Jul. 20, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait for 60 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$4.2 billion.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 60 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missiles, 4 PATRIOT radars, 4 PATRIOT Engagement Control Stations, 20 PATRIOT Launching Stations, 2 Information Coordination Centrals, 10 Electric Power Plants, communication and power equipment, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, facility design and construction, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor

technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program and logistics support.

- **Jul. 12, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 10 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait for continuing logistics support, training, depot-level repair services and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$200 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale for continuing logistics support, training, depot-level repair services, and technical services in support of AH-64D APACHE helicopters, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program and logistics support.

- **Jun. 28, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress June 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government Kuwait of 43 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System Cockpit Units and associated equipment and support. The estimated cost is \$51 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 43 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System Cockpit Units, Single Seat Electronic Units, Helmet Display Units, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tool and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program and logistics support.

- **Jun. 28, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress June 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government Kuwait of 300 AGM-114R3 HELLFIRE II missiles and associated equipment and support. The estimated cost is \$49 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale 300 AGM-114R3 HELLFIRE II missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, repair and return support, training equipment and personnel training, U.S. Government and contractor logistics, Quality Assurance Team support services, engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.

- **Feb. 24, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Feb. 24 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of 80 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER Block II All-Up-Round Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$105 million.
- **Nov. 8, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait for continuing logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of the F/A-18 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$100 million.
- **Sept. 24, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of one Boeing C-17 GLOBEMASTER III aircraft and associated parts, equipment and logistics support for a complete package worth approximately \$693 million. The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of one Boeing C-17 GLOBEMASTER III aircraft, four Turbofan F117-PW-100 engines installed on the aircraft, one spare Turbofan F117-PW- 100 engine, one AN/ALE-47 Counter-Measures Dispensing System (CMDS), one AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning System, aircraft ferry services, refueling support, precision navigation equipment, spare and repairs parts, support, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$693 million.
- **Aug. 11, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Aug. 10 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of 209 MIM-104E PATRIOT Guidance Enhanced Missile-T (GEM-T) Missiles for an estimated cost of \$900 million.
- **Nov. 23, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 20 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait for the design and construction of facilities and infrastructure for Al Mubarak Air Base and the Kuwait Air Force Headquarters Complex for an estimated cost of \$700 million.

- **Dec. 18, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Dec. 17 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of construction support services to provide administrative, operational, storage, support facilities and utility infrastructure for the 26<sup>th</sup> Al Soor Brigade facilities for a complete package worth approximately \$360 million.
- **Nov. 16, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the government of Kuwait of four-year PATRIOT Air Defense System sustainment and repair/return programs and associated spare parts, equipment and logistical support worth approximately \$410 million.
- **July 20, 2009** – On July 15, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Kuwait of eight KC-130J Multi-mission Cargo Refueling Aircraft and associated equipment, parts and support for an estimated cost of \$1.8 billion. The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 8 KC-130J Multi-mission Cargo Refueling Aircraft with 32 AE-2100D3 Turbo propeller engines, 8 spare AE-2100D3 Turbo propeller engines, 4 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, 4 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 4 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispenser Sets, 20 AN/ARC-210 (RT-1851A(U)) Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency HAVEQUICK/Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, warranties, aircraft ferry support, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.
- **July 14, 2009** – On July 13, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government Kuwait of logistics support, contractor maintenance and technical services in support of the F/A-18 aircraft. The estimated cost is \$70 million.
- **July 14, 2009** – On July 13, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait of four M2 .50 cal HB Browning machine guns, two Swiftship Model 176DSV0702, 54X9.2X1.8 meter Nautilus Class Diver Support Vessels outfitted with a MLG 27mm gun system, and other related services and equipment. The estimated cost is \$81 million.
- **July 10, 2009** – On July 8, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Kuwait to upgrade the Desert Warrior Fire Control System with Gunner's Integrated TOW System (GITS II) worth an estimated \$314 million. The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale to upgrade the Desert Warrior Fire Control System with Gunner's Integrated TOW System (GITS II) hardware. The proposed sale includes installation of the Improved Thermal Sight System 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Forward-Looking Infrared Radar, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.
- **July 7, 2009** – On July 6, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Kuwait of continuing logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of F/A-18 aircraft worth an estimated \$95 million.
- **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM Missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$178 million. The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 78 LAU-127-B/A Launchers, 78 LAU-127-C/A Launchers, Captive Air Training Missiles, missile containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government (USG) and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
- **Jan. 3, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign

Military Sale to Kuwait of TOW-2A/B Radio Frequency Missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$328 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 2,106 TOW-2A Radio Frequency missiles, 21 Buy- to-Fly missiles, 1,404 TOW-2B Radio Frequency missiles, 14 Buy-to-Fly missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of program support.

- **Dec. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of PAC-3 missiles, PAC-2 missile upgrades to GEM-T, and PATRIOT ground support equipment upgrades as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.363 billion.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 80 PAC-3 Missiles, PATRIOT GEM-T Modification Kits to upgrade 60 PAC-2 missiles, 6 PATRIOT System Configuration 3 Modification kits to upgrade PATRIOT Radars to REP III, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, system integration and checkout, installation, personnel training, containers, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of program support.

- **Nov. 9, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of technical/logistics support for F/A-18 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$90 million.
- **Oct. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait to upgrade three L-100-30 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$250 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale to upgrade three L-100-30 aircraft (a commercial version of the C-130 aircraft), to include modifications, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, flight engineer training, communications equipment, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 17, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of 12 MKV-C Fast Interceptor Boats as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$175 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 12 MKV-C Fast Interceptor Boats including installed Hull, Mechanical and Electrical systems, 12 RWM GMBH MLG-27mm Mauser Lightweight Gun Systems, communications, technical ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services and other related elements of program support.

- **Aug. 22, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of continuing logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of the F/A-18 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$295 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of continuing logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services in support of the F/A-18 aircraft to include contractor engineering technical services, contractor maintenance support, avionics software, engine component improvement and spare parts, technical ground support equipment, spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical data, engineering change proposals, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of program support.

- **Aug. 4, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of 436 TOW-2A/B Anti-armor Guided Missiles as well as associated



equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$19 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 288 TOW-2A missiles, 4 TOW-2A Fly-to-Buy missiles, 140 TOW-2B missiles, and 4 TOW-2B Fly-to-Buy missiles. Also included are spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical data, engineering change proposals, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.

- **Oct. 11, 2002** – the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of an Aerostat Radar System as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$131 million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale to replace its Aerostat radar system with the Aerostat balloon/radar system comprised of the 71M Low Altitude Surveillance System (LASS) Balloon with a non-MDE version of the AN/TPS-63 radar. Also included in the proposed sale are: Interim AN/TPS-63 radar components, spare LASS balloon, AN/TPS-63 radar component (Tether Up), miscellaneous commercial vehicles, spare and repair parts, supply support, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **June 4, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of AIM-120C AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$58 Million.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 80 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 60 AIM-120C Launch Rails, two Captive Air Training Missiles, flight test instrumentation, software updates to support AMRAAM operational and training devices, missile containers, aircraft modification and integration, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, maintenance and pilot training, contractor support, other related elements of logistical and program support.

- **April 17, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Kuwait of AH-64D Apache Helicopters and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.1 Billion.

The Government of Kuwait has requested a possible sale of 16 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, four (4) spare T-700-GE-701C engines with gas generator first state 401C turbine blades, four (4) spare M299 HELLFIRE launchers, 96 Longbow HELLFIRE AGM-114L3 and 288 HELLFIRE AGM-114K3 missiles, 16 dummy missiles, 16 Modernized Targeting Acquisition and Designation Systems, eight (8) AN/APG-78 Longbow Fire Control Radar, 30mm cartridges, 2.75-inch rockets, ammunition, spare and repair parts, communications equipment, support equipment, simulators, quality assurance teams, chemical masks, tools and test sets, chaff dispensers, Integrated Helmet and Display Sight Systems, electronic equipment, test facility spares, publications, Quality Assurance Teams, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical support and other related elements of logistics support.

## Oman

- **May 15, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress May 14 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman for two AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$100 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of 2 AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems (1 B747-400 and 1 B747-800), 11 Small Laser Transmitter Assemblies, 3 System Processors/Repeaters, 14 AN/AAR-54 Missile Warning Sensors, User Data Module Cards and Control Interface Units, Multi-role Electro-Optic End-to-End test set, Card Memory, Smart Cards, and Support Equipment, Consumables, and Flight Test/Certification. Also included are tools and test equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documents, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor

technical assistance, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$100 million.

- **Dec. 12, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Dec. 11 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman for a number of F-16 A/C weapon systems, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$117 million.

The Sultanate of Oman has requested a possible sale of 27 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 162 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II 500-lb Laser Guided Bombs, 162 FMU-152 bomb fuzes, 150 BLU-111B/B 500-lb Conical Fin General Purpose Bombs (Freefall Tail), 60 BLU-111B/B 500-lb Retarded Fin General Purpose Bombs (Ballute Tail), and 32 CBU-105 Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD). Also included are 20mm projectiles, Aerial Gunnery Target System (AGTS-36), training munitions, flares, chaff, containers, impulse cartridges, weapon support equipment and components, repair and return, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representative logistics and technical support services, site survey, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 19, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 15 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman for 400 Javelin Guided Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$96 million.

The Sultanate of Oman has requested a possible sale of 400 Javelin Guided Missiles, Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES), containers, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor representative logistics and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

- **Jun. 13, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on June 12 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman for 55 AIM-9X Block II SIDEWINDER All-Up Round Missiles, 36 AIM-9X Block II SIDEWINDER Captive Air Training Missiles, 6 AIM-9X Block II Tactical Guidance Units, 4 AIM-9X Block II Captive Air Training Missile Guidance Units, 1 Dummy Air Training Missile, and other related equipment. The estimated cost is \$86 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of 55 AIM-9X Block II SIDEWINDER All-Up-Round Missiles, 36 AIM-9X Block II SIDEWINDER Captive Air Training Missiles, 6 AIM-9X Block II Tactical Guidance Units, 4 AIM-9X Block II Captive Air Training Missile Guidance Units, 1 Dummy Air Training Missile, containers, weapon support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Oct. 18, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman for AVENGER Fire Units, STINGER Missiles and Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles, as well associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.248 billion.

The Government of the Oman has requested a possible sale of 18 AVENGER Fire Units, 266 STINGER- Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP) Block 1 Anti-Aircraft missiles, 6 STINGER Block 1 Production Verification Flight Test missiles, 24 Captive Flight Trainers, 18 AN/VRC-92E exportable Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS), 20 S250 Shelters, 20 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 1 lot AN/MPQ-64F1 SENTINEL Radar software, 290 AIM-120C-7 Surface- Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, 6 Guidance Sections, Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) software to support Oman's Ground Based Air defense System, training missiles, missile components, warranties, containers, weapon support equipment, repair and return, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment,

U.S. Government and contractor technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 18, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman of logistics support and training for one C-130J-30 aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$76 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of logistics support and training for one C-130J-30 aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale, 1 AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures System, 7 AN/AAR-54 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 2 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, 2 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Sets, communication and navigation equipment, software support, repair and return, installation, aircraft ferry and refueling support, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and related elements of logistical and program support.

- **Aug. 3, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of 18 F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$3.5 Billion.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of 18 F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft, 20 F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, 36 LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, 24 APG-68(V)9 radar sets, 20 M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, 22 AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems with HAVE QUICK I/II, 40 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems, 36 LAU-117 MAVERICK Launchers, 22 ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS) or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems with Mode IV, 34 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded-GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), 18 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Targeting Pods or similarly capable system, 4 DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), 22 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS), and 35 ALE-50 Towed Decoys. Also included is the upgrade of the existing 12 F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft, site survey, support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), conformal fuel tanks, construction, modification kits, repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 2, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of logistics support and training for two C-130J-30 aircraft, including associated equipment and parts for an estimated cost of \$54 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of logistics support and training for two (2) C-130J-30 aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale, 2 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 2 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Sets, 2 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, communication equipment, software support, repair and return, installation, aircraft ferry and refueling support, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and related elements of logistical and program support.

- **July 28, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of JAVELIN anti-tank missile systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$48 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of 250 JAVELIN missile rounds and 30 JAVELIN command launch units, simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 18, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of podded reconnaissance systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$49 million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of two Goodrich DB-110 or two BAE Systems F-9120 Podded reconnaissance systems, one Goodrich or one BAE Systems Exploitation Ground Station, support equipment, spares and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **April 10, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Oman of various munitions for F-16 Fighter Aircraft and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$42 Million.

The Government of Oman has requested a possible sale of 50,000 20mm high explosive projectiles, 50,000 20mm training projectiles, 300 MK-82 500 lb. general purpose bombs, 200 MK-83 1,000 lb. general purpose bombs, 100 enhanced GBU-12 Paveway II 500 lb. laser guided bomb kits, 50 GBU-31(v)3/B Joint Direct Attack Munitions, 50 CBU-97/105 sensor fuzed weapon, 20,000 RR-170 self-protection chaff, 20,000 MJU-7B self-protection flares, support equipment, software development/integration, modification kits, spares and repair parts, flight test instrumentation, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

## **Qatar**

- **July 29, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar of one (1) A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar (EWR) and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.1 billion.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of one (1) A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar (EWR) to include Prime Mission Equipment package, technical and support facilities, communication equipment, encryption devices, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$1.1B.

- **June 27, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar of 2 F117-PW-100 C-17 Globemaster III spare engines, and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$35 million.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 2 F117-PW-100 C-17 Globemaster III spare engines, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, design and construction, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$35 million.

- **May 15, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress May 14 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar for two AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$110 million.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 2 AN/AAQ-24(V) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) Systems for B747-800 Aircraft, 11 Small Laser Transmitter

Assemblies, 3 System Processors/Repeaters, 14 AN/AAR-54 Missile Warning Sensors, User Data Module Cards and Control Interface Units, Multi-role Electro-Optic End-to-End test set, Card Memory, Smart Cards, and Support Equipment, Consumables, and Flight Test/Certification. Also included are tools and test equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documents, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$110 million.

- **Mar. 28, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress March 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar for 500 Javelin Guided Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$122 million. The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 500 Javelin Guided Missiles, 50 Command Launch Units (CLU), Battery Coolant Units, Enhanced Performance Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST), Missile Simulation Rounds (MSR), tripods, Javelin Weapon Effects Simulator (JAVWES), spare and repair parts, rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery chargers and dischargers, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representative engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related logistics support.
- **Dec. 24, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Dec. 21 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar for rocket and missile systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$406 million. The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 7 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Launchers with the Universal Fire Control System (UFCS); 60 M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Unitary Rockets (60 pods, 1 rocket per pod); 360 M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary Rockets (60 pods, 6 rockets per pod); 180 M28A2 Reduced Range Practice Rockets (30 pods, 6 rockets per pod); 7 M68A2 Trainers, 1 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 2 M1151A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV); and 2 M1152A2 HMMWVs. Also included are simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles, communications equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Nov. 7, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 6 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar for the sale of 11 PATRIOT Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$9.9 billion. The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 11 PATRIOT Configuration-3 Modernized Fire Units, 11 AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets, 11 AN/MSQ-132 Engagement Control Systems, 30 Antenna Mast Groups, 44 M902 Launching Stations, 246 PATRIOT MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missile-TBM (GEM-T) with canisters, 2 PATRIOT MIM-104E GEM-T Test Missiles, 768 PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missiles with canisters, 10 PAC-3 Test Missiles with canisters, 11 Electrical Power Plants (EPPII), 8 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVTs), communications equipment, tools and test equipment, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, facility design, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.
- **Nov. 5, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 48 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.135 billion. The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 48 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, 9 THAAD launchers; test components, repair and return, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related logistics support.

- **Nov. 5, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 2 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar for two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$6.5 billion.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 2 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Fire Units, 12 THAAD Launchers, 150 THAAD Interceptors, 2 THAAD Fire Control and Communications, 2 AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars, and 1 Early Warning Radar (EWR). Also included are fire unit maintenance equipment, prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, and other related support elements. The estimated cost is \$6.5 billion.

- **July 12, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 10 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar for 700 AGM-114K3A or AGM-114R3 HELLFIRE tactical missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$137 million.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 700 AGM-114K3A or AGM-114R3 HELLFIRE tactical missiles, 25 training missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical data, personnel and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor logistics, engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.

- **July 12, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 10 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar for 24 AH-64D APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack Helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$3.0 billion.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 24 AH-64D APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack Helicopters, 56 T700-GE-701D Engines, 27 AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27 AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component), 12 AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometers, 28 AN/AAR-57(V)7 Common Missile Warning Systems, 30 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers or Equivalent, 160 Integrated Helmet and Display Sight Systems-21, 58 Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation, 30 30mm Automatic Chain Guns, 8 Aircraft Ground Power Units, 52 AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, 60 M299A1 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers, 576 AGM-114R HELLFIRE II Missiles, 295 FIM-92H STINGER Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP) Block I Missiles, 50 STINGER Air-to-Air Launchers, 4092 2.75 in Hydra Rockets, and 90 APACHE Aviator Integrated Helmets. Also included are M206 infrared countermeasure flares, M211 and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM) flares, training devices, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles and organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **June 28, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress June 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar of 10 MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters, 12 MH-60S SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters with the Armed Helicopter Modification Kit, 48 T-700 GE 401C Engines (44 installed and 4 spare) with an option to purchase an additional 6 MH-60S SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters with the Armed Helicopter Modification Kit and 13 T-700 GE 401C Engines. The estimated cost is \$2.5 billion.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 10 MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters, 12 MH-60S SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters with the Armed Helicopter Modification Kit, 48 T-700 GE 401C Engines (44 installed and 4 spare) with an option to purchase

an additional 6 MH-60S SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters with the Armed Helicopter Modification Kit and 13 T-700 GE 401C Engines (12 installed and 1 spare) at a later date, communication equipment, spare engine containers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **June 13, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on June 12 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar of 12 UH-60M BLACK HAWK Utility Helicopters, 26 T700-GE-701D Engines (24 installed and 2 spares), 15 AN/AAR-57 V(7) Common Missile Warning Systems, 15 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 15 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 26 M240H Machine Guns, and 26 AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles. The estimated cost is \$1.112 billion.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 12 UH-60M BLACK HAWK Utility Helicopters, 26 T700-GE-701D Engines (24 installed and 2 spares), 15 AN/AAR-57 V(7) Common Missile Warning Systems, 15 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 15 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 26 M240H Machine Guns, and 26 AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles. Also included are M206 infrared countermeasure flares, M211 and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM) flares, M134D-H Machine Guns, system integration and air worthiness certification, simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles and organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support

- **Sept. 22, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Qatar of 6 MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi- Mission Helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$750 million.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 6 MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters, 13 T-700 GE 401C Engines (12 installed and 1 spare), communication equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 11, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar of logistics support and training for two C- 17 Globemaster III aircraft and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$400 million.
- **Sept. 3, 2003** – the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Qatar of an AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMESIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures System as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$61 million.

The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of one AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMESIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures System which consists of three small laser turret assemblies, six missile warning sensors, one system processor, one control indicator unit, two signal repeaters, included associated support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications, personnel training and training equipment, technical assistance, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.

## Saudi Arabia

- **Oct. 1, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a Patriot Air Defense System with PAC-3 enhancement and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.750 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on September 30, 2014.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 202 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) -3 Missiles with containers, and 1 Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) Flight Test Target/Patriot as a Target. Also included are 2 PAC-3 Telemetry Kits, 6 Fire Solution Computers, 36 Launcher Station Modification Kits, 2 Missile Round Trainers, 2 PAC-3 Slings, 6 Patriot Automated Logistics Systems Kits, 6 Shorting Plugs, spare and repair parts, lot validation and range support, ground support equipment, repair and return, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, Quality Assurance Team, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$1.750 billion.

- **Aug. 12, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for an AWACS modernization program and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$2.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on August 12, 2014.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has requested a sale of 5 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Block 40/45 Mission Computing Upgrade systems, 20 Next Generation Identification Friend or Foe (NG IFF) AN/UPX-40, communication equipment, provisioning, spare and repair parts, support equipment, Mission Planning System, repair and return, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor logistics and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The Block 40/45 major defense equipment includes new mission computing hardware and software with open architecture – including computers, servers, and mission interactive displays. The NG IFF major defense equipment includes receivers, interrogators and processor hardware for earlier detection of friendly contacts. The total estimated cost is \$2.0 billion.

- **April 21, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for support services and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$80 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on April 17, 2014.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale to provide three years of support services for the Facilities Security Forces- Training and Advisory Group (FSF-TAG) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Interior (MOI). The support will include technical assistance and advisory support salaries, housing, office equipment, training, maintenance, vehicles, travel, furniture, and other related support. The estimated cost is \$80 million.

- **Dec. 5, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for tube-launched, optically-tracked wire-guided 2A/2B radio-frequency (RF) Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$900 million.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 9,650 BGM-71 2A Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided (TOW) Radio-Frequency (RF) missiles, 4,145 BGM-71 2B Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided Aero RF missiles, 91 TOW-2A Fly-to-Buy missiles, 49 TOW-2B Fly-to-Buy missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$900 million.

- **Dec. 5, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for tube-launched, optically-tracked wire-guided missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$170 million.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested the possible sale of 750 BGM-71 2B Tube-launched, Optically-tracked Wire-guided (TOW) missiles, 7 Fly-to-Buy TOW2B missiles, 1,000 BGM-71 2A TOW missiles, 7 Fly-to-Buy TOW2A missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support



equipment, tools and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$170 million.

- **Nov. 18, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of C4I system upgrades and maintenance and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.1 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of C4I system upgrades and maintenance including: 109 Link-16 Multifunction Information Distribution System Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT), Global Command and Control Systems – Joint (GCCS-J), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) and follow-on systems, Commercial High Frequency (HF) Radios, Commercial Ultra High Frequency/ Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) Radios, HF Voice and Data, HF Sub-Net Relay (SNR), Commercial HF Internet Protocol (IP)/SNR, Global Positioning System (GPS), Air Defense System Interrogator (ADSI), communications support equipment, information technology upgrades, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical support, and other elements of program support. The estimated cost is \$1.1 billion.

- **Oct. 15, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on Oct. 11 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of various munitions and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$6.8 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 650 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missiles-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), 973 AGM-154C Joint Stand Off Weapons (JSOW), 400 AGM-84L Harpoon Block II missiles, 1000 GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), 40 CATM-84H Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), 20 ATM-84H SLAM-ER Telemetry Missiles, 4 Dummy Air Training Missiles, 60 AWW-13 Data Link pods, 10 JSOW CATMs, 40 Harpoon CATMs, 20 ATM-84L Harpoon Exercise Missiles, 36 SDB Captive Flight and Load Build trainers, containers, mission planning, integration support and testing, munitions storage security and training, weapon operational flight program software development, transportation, tools and test equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated total cost is \$ 6.8 billion.

- **Oct. 15, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on Oct. 11 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of support services for an estimated cost of \$90 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of support services to its Ministry of Defense for three years. The U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) responsible for identifying, planning, and executing U.S. security cooperation training and advisory support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Defense. The estimated cost is \$90 million.

- **Aug. 23, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Aug 22 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.2 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) aircraft, engines and weapons, to include contractor technical services, logistics support, maintenance support, spares, equipment repair, expendables, support and test equipment, communication support, precision measuring equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical support, exercises, deployments and other related elements of program

support services, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is \$1.2 billion.

- **July 10, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 9 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of 30 Mark V patrol boats and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$1.2 billion.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 30 Mark V patrol boats, 32 27mm guns, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$1.2 billion.

- **June 20, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for the continuation of the United States-supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$4.0 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of the United States-supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), consisting of the following defense services: OPM-SANG operation, support and equipment, and Modernization Program support, personnel training and training equipment, transportation, repair and return, spare and repair parts, automation initiatives, SANG Health Affairs Program support, construction, communication and support equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is \$4.0 billion.

- **Nov. 28, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for technical services to recertify the functional shelf life of up to 300 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) (MIM-104D) Guidance Enhanced Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$130 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of technical services to recertify the functional shelf life of up to 300 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) (MIM-104D) Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM), modernization of existing equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representatives logistics, engineering, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

- **Nov. 26, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a Foreign Military Sales Order II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement for an estimated cost of \$300 million.

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of a Foreign Military Sales Order II to provide funds for blanket order requisitions under the Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement, for spare parts in support of M1A2 Abrams Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, equipment, support vehicles and other related logistics support. The estimated cost is \$300 million.

- **Nov. 9, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 8 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 20 C-130J-30 Aircraft and 5 KC-130J Air Refueling Aircraft, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) also requested 120 Rolls Royce AE2100D3 Engines (100 installed and 20 spares), 25 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related logistics support. The total estimated cost is \$6.7 billion.

- **Aug. 15, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress August 9 of a possible

Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for ten Link-16 capable data link systems and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) suites and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support at an estimated cost of \$257 million

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has requested a possible sale of ten Link-16 capable data link systems and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) suites for four KSA-provided King Air 350ER aircraft and associated ground support, with an option to procure, via a Foreign Military Sales, an additional four King Air 350ER aircraft with enhanced PT6A-67A engines and spare parts equipped with the same ISR suites. The ISR suites include a Com-Nav Surveillance/Air Traffic Management cockpit, RF-7800MMP High Frequency Radios with encryption, AN/ARC-210 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency/Satellite Communication Transceiver Radios with Have Quick II and encryption, a High Speed Data Link, an AN/APX-114/119 Identification Friend or Foe Transponder, Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigations Systems (GPS/INS) with a Selective Availability Anti-spoofing Module (SAASM), AN/AAR-60 Infrared Missile Warning and AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures System, Electro-Optical Sensor, SIGINT System, Synthetic Aperture Radar. Also included are Ground Stations, Training Aids, C<sup>4</sup>I Integration, aircraft modifications, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, aircraft ferry, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Aug. 6, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for follow-on support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force at an estimated cost of \$850 million.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of follow-on support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines and weapons; publications and technical documentation; airlift and aerial refueling; support equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

- **Dec. 22, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the continuation of services for the PATRIOT Systems Engineering Services Program (ESP) and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$120 million.
- **Oct. 26, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Oct. 26 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 124 M1151A1-B1 Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 99 M1152A1-B2 Up-Armored HMMWVs and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$33 million.
- **Sept. 19, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Howitzers, radars, ammunition and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$886 million.  
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for 36 M777A2 Howitzers, 54 M119A2 Howitzers, 6 AN/TPQ-36(V) Fire Finder Radar Systems, 24 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), 17,136 rounds M107 155mm High Explosive (HE) ammunition, 2,304 rounds M549 155mm Rocket Assisted Projectiles (RAPs), 60 M1165A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles (HMMWVs), 120 M1151A1 HMMWVs, 252 M1152A1 HMMWVs, Export Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS), electronic support systems, 105mm ammunition, various wheeled/tracked support vehicles, spare and repair parts, technical manuals and publications, translation services, training, USG and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
- **June 13, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of a variety of light armored vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$350 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 25 LAV-25 series Light Armored

Vehicles, 8 LAV Assault Guns, 8 LAV Anti-Tank Vehicles, 6 LAV Mortars, 2 LAV Recovery Vehicles, 24 LAV Command and Control Vehicles, 3 LAV Personnel Carriers, 3 LAV Ammo Carriers, 1 LAV Engineer Vehicle, 2 LAV Ambulances, AN/VRC 90E and AN/VRC-92E Export Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS), battery chargers, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

- **June 13, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of 404 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$355 million. The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 404 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons, 28 CBU-105 Integration test assets, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **June 13, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of a variety of light armored vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$263 million. The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 23 LAV-25mm Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), 14 LAV Personnel Carriers, 4 LAV Ambulances, 3 LAV Recovery Vehicles, 9 LAV Command and Control Vehicles, 20 LAV Anti-Tank (TOW) Vehicles, 155 AN/PVS-7B Night Vision Goggles, M257 Smoke Grenade Launchers, Improved Thermal Sight Systems (ITSS) and Modified Improved TOW Acquisition Systems (MITAS), Defense Advanced Global Positioning System Receivers, AN/USQ-159 Camouflage Net Sets, M2A2 Aiming Circles, compasses, plotting boards, reeling machines, sight bore optical sets, telescopes, switchboards, driver vision enhancers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **May 12, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale Order to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for various night and thermal vision equipment, including parts and logistical support with an estimated cost of \$330 million. The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 200 High-performance In-Line Sniper Sight (HISS) Thermal Weapon Sights - 1500 meter, 200 MilCAM Recon III LocatIR Long Range, Light Weight Thermal Binoculars with Geo Location, 7,000 Dual Beam Aiming Lasers (DBAL A2), 6000 AN/PVS-21 Low Profile Night Vision Goggles (LPNVG), spare and repair parts, support equipment, technical documentation and publications, translation services, training, U. S. government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
- **Nov. 18, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of 150 JAVELIN Guided Missiles and associated equipment, parts and logistical support for a complete package worth \$71 million. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 150 JAVELIN Guided Missiles, 12 Fly-to-Buy Missiles, 20 JAVELIN Command Launch Units (CLUs) with Integrated Day/Thermal Sight, containers, missile simulation rounds, Enhanced Producibility Basic Skills Trainer (EPBST), rechargeable and non-rechargeable batteries, battery dischargers, chargers, and coolant units, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Oct. 20, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of:
  - 84 F-15SA Aircraft
  - 170 APG-63(v)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA) radar sets

- 193 F-110-GE-129 Improved Performance Engines
  - 100 M61 Vulcan Cannons
  - 100 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminal (MIDS/LVT) and spares
  - 193 LANTIRN Navigation Pods (3<sup>rd</sup> Generation-Tiger Eye)
  - 338 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS)
  - 462 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVGS)
  - 300 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles
  - 25 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM-9X)
  - 25 Special Air Training Missiles (NATM-9X)
  - 500 AIM-120C/7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
  - 25 AIM-120 CATMs
  - 1,000 Dual Mode Laser/Global Positioning System (GPS) Guided Munitions (500 lb.)
  - 1,000 Dual Mode Laser/GPS Guided Munitions (2000 lb.)
  - 1,100 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bombs (2000lb)
  - 1,000 GBU-31B V3 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) (2000 lb.)
  - 1,300 CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons (SFW)/Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD)
  - 50 CBU-105 Inert
  - 1,000 MK-82 500lb General Purpose Bombs
  - 6,000 MK-82 500lb Inert Training Bombs
  - 2,000 MK-84 2000lb General Purpose Bombs
  - 2,000 MK-84 2000lb Inert Training Bombs
  - 200,000 20mm Cartridges
  - 400,000 20mm Target Practice Cartridges
  - 400 AGM-84 Block II HARPOON Missiles
  - 600 AGM-88B HARM Missiles
  - 169 Digital Electronic Warfare Systems (DEWS)
  - 158 AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Targeting Systems
  - 169 AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) Systems
  - 10 DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods
  - 462 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System Helmets
  - 40 Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER)
  - 80 Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Pods
- Also included are the upgrade of the existing Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) fleet of seventy (70) F-15S multi-role fighters to the F-15SA configuration, the provision for CONUS-based fighter training operations for a twelve (12) F-15SA contingent, construction, refurbishments, and infrastructure improvements of several support facilities for the F-15SA in-Kingdom and/or CONUS operations, RR- 188 Chaff, MJU-7/10 Flares, training munitions, Cartridge Actuated

Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices, communication security, site surveys, trainers, simulators, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is \$29.432 billion.

- **Oct. 20, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of:

- 10 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Helicopters
- 28 T700-GE-701D Engines
- 13 Modernized Targeting Acquisition and Designation Systems/Pilot
- Night Vision Sensors
- 7 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Unit
- (Longbow Component)
- 7 AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometer
- 13 AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets
- 13 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets
- 13 AAR-57(V)3/5 Common Missile Warning Systems
- 26 Improved Countermeasures Dispensers
- 26 Improved Helmet Display Sight Systems
- 14 30mm Automatic Weapons
- 6 Aircraft Ground Power Units
- 14 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles
- 640 AGM-114R HELLFIRE II Missiles
- 2,000 2.75 in 70mm Laser Guided Rockets
- 307 AN/PRQ-7 Combat Survivor Evader Locators
- BS-1 Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch
- Fixed-Base Precision Approach Radar
- Digital Airport Surveillance Radar
- DoD Advanced Automation Service
- Digital Voice Recording System

Also included are trainers, simulators, generators, training munitions, design and construction, transportation, tools and test equipment, ground and air based SATCOM and line of sight communication equipment, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, GPS/INS, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is \$2.223 billion.

- **Oct. 20, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of:

- 24 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Helicopters
- 58 T700-GE-701D Engines

- 7 Modernized Targeting Acquisition and Designation Systems/Pilot
  - Night Vision Sensors
- 10 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Unit
  - (Longbow Component)
- 10 AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometer
- 27 AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets
- 27 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets
- 27 AAR-57(V)3/5 Common Missile Warning Systems
- 54 Improved Countermeasures Dispensers
- 28 30mm Automatic Weapons
- 6 Aircraft Ground Power Units
- 48 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles
- 106 M299A1 HELLFIRE Longbow Missile Launchers
- 24 HELLFIRE Training Missiles
- 1,536 AGM-114R HELLFIRE II Missiles
- 4,000 2.75 in 70mm Laser Guided Rockets
- 307 AN/PRQ-7 Combat Survivor Evader Locators
- BS-1 Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch
- Fixed-Base Precision Approach Radar
- Digital Airport Surveillance Radar
- DoD Advanced Automation Service
- Digital Voice Recording System

Also included are trainers, simulators, generators, training munitions, design and construction, transportation, tools and test equipment, ground and air based SATCOM and line of sight communication equipment, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, GPS/INS, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is \$3.3 billion.

- **Oct. 20, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of:
  - 36 AH-64D Block III APACHE Helicopters
  - 72 UH-60M BLACKHAWK Helicopters
  - 36 AH-6i Light Attack Helicopters
  - 12 MD-530F Light Turbine Helicopters
  - 243 T700-GE-701D Engines
  - 40 Modernized Targeting Acquisition and Designation Systems/Pilot
  - Night Vision Sensors
  - 20 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Unit

- 20 AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometer
- 171 AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets
- 171 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets
- 171 AAR-57(V)3/5 Common Missile Warning Systems
- 318 Improved Countermeasures Dispensers
- 40 Wescam MX-15Di (AN/AAQ-35) Sight/Targeting Sensors
- 40 GAU-19/A 12.7mm (.50 caliber) Gatling Guns
- 108 Improved Helmet Display Sight Systems
- 52 30mm Automatic Weapons
- 18 Aircraft Ground Power Units
- 168 M240H Machine Guns
- 300 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles
- 421 M310 A1 Modernized Launchers
- 158 M299 HELLFIRE Longbow Missile Launchers
- 2,592 AGM-114R HELLFIRE II Missiles
- 1,229 AN/PRQ-7 Combat Survivor Evader Locators
- 4 BS-1 Enhanced Terminal Voice Switches
- 4 Digital Airport Surveillance Radars
- 4 Fixed-Base Precision Approach Radar
- 4 DoD Advanced Automation Service
- 4 Digital Voice Recording System

Also included are trainers, simulators, generators, munitions, design and construction, transportation, wheeled vehicles and organization equipment, tools and test equipment, communication equipment, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems, GPS/INS, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of program support. The estimated cost is \$25.6 billion.

- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for continuation of a blanket order training program as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$350 million.
- **Dec. 17, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of 2,742 BGM-71E-4B-RF Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW-2A) Radio Frequency missiles and associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$177 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for 2,742 BGM-71E-4B-RF Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW-2A) Radio Frequency missiles (42 missiles are for lot acceptance testing), publications and technical documentation, and other related elements of logistics support. The proposed sale will support efforts to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG).
- **Aug. 6, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of Communication Navigation and Surveillance/Air



Traffic Management upgrades for an estimated cost of \$1.5 billion.

- The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of a two-phased approach for the Communication Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades of the communication and navigation systems for the Royal Saudi Air Force's fleet of 13 RE-3, KE-3, and E-3 aircraft. Phase One will include Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems, 8.33 kHz Very High Frequency radios, Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems, Mode S Transponders, Mode 4/5 Identification Friend or Foe Encryption, High Frequency radio replacements, Multifunctional Information Display Systems for Link 16 operations, Have Quick II radios, Satellite Communications and Common Secure Voice encryptions. Phase 2 will include digital flight deck instrumentation and displays, flight director system/autopilot, flight management system, cockpit data line message and combat situational awareness information. Also included are spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publication and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, personnel support and test equipment to include flight simulators, U.S. government and contractor engineering support, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.
- **Aug. 5, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible foreign military sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of Tactical Airborne Surveillance System (TASS) aircraft upgrades for an estimated cost of \$530 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested services to upgrade the TASS aircraft, installation of 10 AN/ARC-230 High Frequency Secure Voice/Data Systems, 25 AN/ARC-231 or 25 AN/ARC-210 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Secure Voice/Data Systems, four Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT), four LN-100GT Inertial Reference Units, 25 SY-100 or functional equivalent Crypto Systems, seven SG-250 or functional equivalent Crypto Systems, six SG-50 or functional equivalent, 10 CYZ-10 Fill Devices, modification of existing ground stations, TASS equipment trainer, mission scenario generator (simulator), and maintenance test equipment; spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation including flight/operator/maintenance manuals, modification/construction of facilities, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and support services and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Sept. 26, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of AIM-9X SIDEWINDER missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$164 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 250 All-Up-Round AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles, 84 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs), 12 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Dummy Air Training Missiles (DATMs), missile containers, missile modifications, test sets and support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Sept. 26, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of AN/FPS-117 Long Range Radar Upgrade as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$145 million.
- **Sept. 26, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$31 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 80 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-1) to be installed on United Kingdom Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, data transfer devices, installation, testing, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training, training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.

- **July 18, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of continued assistance in the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.8 billion.
- **Jan. 14, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of Joint Direct Attack Munitions as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$123 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) tail kits (which include 550 GBU-38 for MK-82, 250 GBU-31 for MK-84, and 100 GBU-31 for BLU-109). Also included are bomb components, mission planning, aircraft integration, publications and technical manuals, spare and repair parts, support equipment, contractor engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.
- **Dec. 7, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Targeting Pods as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$220 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 40 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods, aircraft installation and checkout, digital data recorders/cartridges, pylons, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, contractor engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.
- **Dec. 7, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of mission equipment for AWACS aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$400 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of five sets of Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Command, Control and Communications (C3) mission equipment/Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) Group B kits for subsequent installation and checkout in five E-3 Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS). In addition, this proposed sale will include spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, contractor engineering and technical support, and other related elements of program support.
- **Oct. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of Light Armored Vehicles and High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$631 million.  
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for:
  - 37 Light Armored Vehicles - Assault Gun (LAV-AG)
  - 26 LA V-25 mm
  - 48 LA V Personnel Carriers
  - 5 Reconnaissance LAVs
  - 5 LAV Ambulances
  - LAV Recovery Vehicles
  - 25 M1165A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
  - 25 M1165A1 HMMWV with winch
  - 124 M240 7.62mm Machine Guns
  - 525 AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Goggles (NVGs):

Various M978A2 and M984A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 120mm Mortar Towed, M242 25mm guns, spare and repair parts; sets, kits, and outfits; support equipment; publications and technical data; personnel training and training

equipment; contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 13, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the government of Saudi Arabia of 155 General Electric (GE) F110- GE129 engines or 20 Pratt & Whitney F100-PW229 engines in support of F-15S aircraft.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of either option or a combination of: a) 155 General Electric (GE) F110-GE129 engines in support of F-15S aircraft; b) 20 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) F100-PW229 engines to restore/refurbish the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) current inventory of P&W engines; support equipment; engine improvement program services; flight tests; Technical Coordination Group/International Engine Management; Hush House refurbishment; aircraft integration; program management; publications; trainers; mission planning; training; spare and repair parts; repair and return services; contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$1.5 billion.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for the continued effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$84 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of the United States supported effort to modernize the SANG by providing Major Defense Equipment (MDE) and non-MDE items:

552 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems; 225 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems Dual Long Range; 1,214 AN/PRC-119 E SINCGARS Man-pack Single Long-Range Radio Systems Man-pack and vehicular installation kits, communications management system computers, antennas, programmable fill devices, support equipment; publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 28, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of the remanufacture and upgrade of AH-64A to AH-64D Apache helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$400 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of the remanufacture and upgrade of 12 AH-64A APACHE attack helicopters to AH-64D configuration, 10 spare T-700-GE-701A engines converted to T-700-GE-701D models, Modernized Targeting Acquisition and Designation Systems, spare and repair parts, communications equipment, support equipment, simulators, quality assurance teams, chemical masks, tools and test sets, chaff dispensers, Integrated Helmet and Display Sight Systems, electronic equipment, test facility spares, publications, Quality Assurance Teams service, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical support and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 28, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of M1A1 and upgrade of M1A2 to M1A2S Abrams tanks as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$2.9 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale and reconfiguration for 58 M1A1 Abrams tanks, which, together with 315 M1A2 Abrams tanks already in Saudi Arabia's inventory, will be modified and upgraded to the M1A2S (Saudi) Abrams configuration, kits, spare and repair parts, communications and support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 21, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia to provide funds for blanket order requisitions, under a Cooperative

Logistics Supply Support Agreement (CLSSA). The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$276 million.

Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for a Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) to provide funds for blanket order requisitions FMSO II, under the CLSSA for spare parts in support of M1A2 Abrams Tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), construction equipment, and support vehicles and equipment in the inventory of the Royal Saudi Land Forces Ordnance Corps.

- **July 20, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia to continue modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$5.8 billion.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of the United States supported effort to modernize the SANG by providing Major Defense Equipment (MDE) and non-MDE items:

- 724 LAV-25, LAV-AG, LAV-M, LAV-AT, LAV-CC, LAV-PC, LAV-A, LAV-AC LAV-E and LAV-R Light Armored Vehicles (LAV)
- 1,160 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems
- 627 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems
- 518 AN/VRC-119 E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems
- 2,198 SINCGARS Spearhead Handheld
- 1,700 AN/AVS-7D Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
- 432 AN/PVS-14 NVG
- 630 AN/PAS-13 Thermal Weapon Sight
- 162 84mm Recoilless Rifle

Also included are Harris Corporation Commercial High Frequency Radios; various commercial vehicles; fixed facilities and ranges; simulations; generators; battery chargers; protective clothing; shop equipment; training devices; spare and repair parts; sets, kits, and outfits; support equipment; publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 20, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of UH-60L Utility/Assault Black Hawk helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$350 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 24 UH-60L Utility/Assault Black Hawk helicopters, spare and repair parts, communications and support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Oct. 3, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of the continuation of contractor, technical services and logistics support for aircraft, aircraft engines, and missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$760 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of support for F-5, F-15, RF-5, E-3, RE-3, KE-3, and C-130, aircraft; F-100-PW-220/229, J-85, T-56, and CFM-56 aircraft engines; and A/TGM-65 AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles which have already been delivered to and are being operated by Saudi Arabia; contractor services; maintenance; spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; goggles; communication support; precision measuring equipment;

personnel training; training equipment; technical support; and contractor engineering; and other related elements of program support.

- **Oct. 3, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia for the continuation of the United States supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) by providing Major Defense Equipment (MDE) and non-MDE items as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$918 million.

Major Defense Equipment (MDE) proposed:

- 144 Armored Personnel Carrier Vehicles
- 12 Water Cannon Vehicles
- 52 Command and Control Vehicles
- 17 Ambulance and Evacuation Vehicles
- 36 Platoon Command Vehicles
- 55,500 40mm Ammunition
- 3,600 F-2000 5.56mm Assault Rifles with 40mm Grenade Launchers
- 51,400 F-2000 5.56mm Assault Rifles without 40mm Grenade Launchers
- 198 AN/VRC-90E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems
- **Oct. 3, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of 165 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS)/Low Volume Terminals (Fighter Data Link terminals), 25 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$401 million.
- **Sept. 27, 2005** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of upgrade kits and services for 54 C-130E/H aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$800 million.
- **Nov. 20, 2003** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of modernization support services for the Saudi Arabian National Guard as well as associated equipment. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$990 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of services for the continuation of the U.S. supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) by providing minor defense articles including spare and repair parts for V150 armored vehicles, light armored vehicles, artillery pieces, communications equipment, other military equipment, medical equipment and medicines, automation equipment and software for logistics, training, and management, translated (into Arabic) tactical and technical manuals. Defense services transferred would include training, professional military advice and assistance, management assistance, contract administration, construction oversight, transportation of equipment, upper echelon maintenance, management of repair and return of components. These support services would be for the period 1 January 2004 through 31 December 2008. This proposed sale does not entail the procurement of Major Defense Equipment.

- **Sept. 3, 2003** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia of AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMISIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$240 million.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of four AN/AAQ-24(V) NEMISIS Directional Infrared Countermeasures Systems which consist of three small laser turret assemblies, six missile warning sensors, one system processor, one control indicator unit, two signal repeaters,

included associated support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications, personnel training and training equipment, technical assistance, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related elements of program support.

## UAE

- **Sep. 29, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$900 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of: 12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers, 100 M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) T2K (Block IA Unitary) Rockets, and 65 M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket (GMLRS) Unitary Pods.

Also included are 12 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Resupply Vehicles M1084A1P2; 2 Wreckers, 5 Ton, M1089A1P2, with Long Term Armor Strategy (LTAS) Cab and B-Kit Armor; 90 Low Cost Reduced-Range Practice Rocket (RRPR) pods; support equipment; communications equipment; spare and repair parts; test sets; batteries; laptop computers; publications and technical data; personnel training and equipment; systems integration support; a Quality Assurance Team and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team support; United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services; and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$900 million.

- **Sep. 26, 2014** - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$2.5 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale for the refurbishment and modification of 4,569 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles (that include 29 MaxxPro Long Wheel Base (LWB), 1,085 MaxxPro LWB chassis, 264 MaxxPro Base/MRAP Expedient Armor Program (MEAP) capsules without armor, 729 MaxxPro Bases, 283 MaxxPro MEAP without armor, 970 MaxxPro Plus, 15 MRAP Recovery Vehicles, 1,150 Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicles without armor, and 44 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles) being sold separately from U.S. Army stock pursuant to section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Also included are Underbody Improvement Kits, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, Field Service Representatives' support, U.S. Government and contractor logistics and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. Notification for the sale from stock of the MRAP vehicles referenced above has been provided separately, pursuant to the requirements of section 7016 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 and section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The estimated cost is \$2.5 billion.

- **Jan. 24, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on Jan 23 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for equipment in support of a Direct Commercial Sale of F-16 Block 61 Aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$270 million.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of equipment in support of its commercial purchase of 30 F-16 Block 61 aircraft and to support the upgrade of its existing F-16 Block 60 aircraft. Major Defense Equipment includes: 40 20mm M61A Guns; and 40 Embedded GPS Inertial Navigation Systems. Also included: Identification Friend or Foe Equipment; Joint Mission Planning System; night vision devices; Cartridge Activated Device/Propellant Activated Devices; Weapons Integration; spare and repair parts; tools and test equipment; personnel training

and training equipment; publications and technical documentation; International Engine Management Program-Component Improvement Program; repair and return; aerial refueling support; ferry maintenance and services; site surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is \$270 million.

- **Jan. 8, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for blanket order training and associated training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$150 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale for follow on United States Marine Corps blanket order training, training support, and other related elements of program support for the United Arab Emirates Presidential Guard Command. The estimated cost is \$150 million.

The proposed sale will provide the continuation of U.S. Marine Corps training of the UAE's Presidential Guard for counterterrorism, counter-piracy, critical infrastructure protection, and national defense. The training also provides engagement opportunities through military exercises, training, and common equipment. The Presidential Guard currently uses these skills alongside U.S. forces, particularly in Afghanistan.

- **Oct. 15, 2013** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Oct. 11 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of various munitions and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$4.0 billion.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 5000 GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) with BRU-61 carriage systems, 8 SDB Guided Test Vehicles for aircraft integration, 16 SDB Captive Flight and Load Build trainers, 1200 AGM-154C Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW), 10 JSOW CATMs, 300 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missiles-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), 40 CATM-84H Captive Air Training Missiles, 20 ATM-84H SLAM-ER Telemetry Missiles, 4 Dummy Air Training Missiles, 30 AWW-13 Data Link pods, containers, munitions storage security and training, mission planning, transportation, tools and test equipment, integration support and testing, weapon operational flight program software development, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$4.0 billion.

- **Nov. 5, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 2 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 48 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles, 9 THAAD launchers; test components, repair and return, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related logistics support. The estimated cost is \$1.135 billion.
- **Aug. 1, 2012** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 31 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for two F117-PW-100 engines for an estimated cost of \$35 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a proposed sale of 2 spare F117-PW-100 engines in support of the UAE C-17 GLOBEMASTER III aircraft.

- **Dec. 14, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of 260 JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and associated equipment, parts, weapons, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$60 million.
- **Nov. 30, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for 4,900 JDAM kits and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$304 million.

The Government of the UAE has requested a possible sale of 4,900 JDAM kits which includes 304 GBU-54 Laser JDAM kits with 304 DSU-40 Laser Sensors, 3,000 GBU-38(V)1 JDAM kits, 1,000 GBU-31(V)1 JDAM kits, 600 GBU-31(V)3 JDAM kits, 3,300 BLU-111 500lb General Purpose Bombs, 1,000 BLU-117 2,000lb General Purpose Bombs, 600 BLU-109 2,000lb Hard Target Penetrator Bombs, and four BDU-50C inert bombs, fuzes, weapons integration, munitions trainers, personnel training and training equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support, and other related elements of program support.

- **Sept. 22, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of 500 AGM-114R3 HELLFIRE missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$65 million.
- **Sept. 22, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Wednesday of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of 107 MIDS/LVT LINK 16 Terminals and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$401 million. The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 107 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT) to be installed on the United Arab Emirates F-16 aircraft and ground command and control sites, engineering/integration services, aircraft modification and installation, testing, spare and repair parts, support equipment, repair and return support, personnel training, contractor engineering and technical support, interface with ground command and control centers and ground repeater sites, and other related elements of program support.
- **June 24, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of five UH-60M BLACKHAWK VIP helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$217 million.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 5 UH-60M BLACKHAWK VIP helicopters, 12 T700-GE-701D engines (10 installed and 2 spares), 6 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 80 AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Devices, 6 Star Safire III Forward Looking Infrared Radar Systems, 6 AAR-57(V)3 Common Missile Warning Systems, 6 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets, C406 Electronic Locator Transmitters, Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems and Weather Radars, Aviation Mission Planning Station, government furnished equipment, ferry support, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **May 25, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for support and maintenance of F-16 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$100 million.
- **April 19, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of 218 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER Block II Tactical Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$251 million.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 218 AIM-9X-2 SIDEWINDER Block II Tactical Missiles, 40 CATM-9X-2 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs), 18 AIM-9X-2 WGU-51/B Tactical Guidance Units, 8 CATM-9X-2 WGU-51/B Guidance Units, 8 Dummy Air Training Missiles, containers, support and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Nov. 4, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of 100 Army Tactical Missile Systems



(ATACMS) and 60 Low Cost Reduced-Range Practice Rockets (LCRRPR), as well as associated equipment, training and logistical support for a total package worth approximately \$140 million.

- **Nov. 4, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of 30 AH-64D Block II lot 10 APACHE helicopters, remanufactured to AH-64D Block III configuration and 30 AH-64D Block III APACHE helicopters, as well as associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$5.0 billion.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 30 AH-64D Block II lot 10 APACHE helicopters, remanufactured to AH-64D Block III configuration, 30 AH-64D Block III APACHE helicopters, 120 T700-GE-701D engines, 76 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 70 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Units, 70 AN/ALQ-144A(V)3 Infrared Jammers, 70 AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 70 AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers, 70 AAR-57(V)3/5 Common Missile Warning Systems, 30mm automatic weapons, improved counter measure dispensers, communication and support equipment, improved helmet display sight systems, trainer upgrades, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 26, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of logistics support and training for two C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and associated equipment, parts, and logistical support for an estimated cost of \$250 million.

The Government of the UAE has requested a possible sale of logistics support and training for two additional C-17 Globemaster III aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale, 2 AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 4 AN/ARC-210 (RT-1794C) HAVE QUICK II Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 2 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispensing Sets, ferry support, communication and navigation equipment, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 28, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of logistics support, training and related systems for 12 C-130J-30 aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale. The complete package, including associated parts and equipment is worth approximately \$119 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of logistics support and training for 12 C-130J-30 aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale, 12 AN/AAR-47 Missile Approach Warning Systems, 12 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Sets, 12 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers, communication equipment, navigation equipment, aircraft ferry and refueling support, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, mission planning systems, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and related elements of logistical and program support.

- **Dec. 28, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of enhanced guided bomb units and associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$290 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 400 GBU-24(V) 11/B Enhanced PAVEWAY III, 400 GBU-24(V) 12/B Enhanced PAVEWAY III, 400 GBU-49(V) 3/B Enhanced PAVEWAY II, 400 GBU-50(V) 1/B Enhanced PAVEWAY II, 800 MK-84 2000 lbs. Bombs, 400 MK-82 500 lbs. Bombs, 400 BLU-109/B 2000 lbs. Bombs. Also included are containers, bomb components, mission planning software, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, and other related elements of program support.

- **Dec. 18, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to United Arab Emirates of logistics support, training and related systems for four C-17 Globemaster III aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale. The complete package, including associated parts and equipment is worth approximately \$501 million.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of logistics support and training for four C-17 Globemaster III aircraft being procured through a Direct Commercial Sale, 5 AN/AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 10 AN/ARC-210 (RT-1794C) HAVE QUICK II Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 5 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispensing Sets, ferry support, communication and navigation equipment, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Dec. 3, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of 16 Chinook helicopters, and communication equipment, as well as associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately \$2.0 billion.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 16 CH-47F CHINOOK Helicopters, 38 T55-GA-714A Turbine engines, 20 AN/APX-118 Transponders, 20 AN/ARC-220 (RT-1749) Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) with Electronic counter-countermeasures, 40 AN/ARC-231 (RT-1808A) Receiver/Transmitters, 18 AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Signal Detecting Sets with Mission Data Sets, flight and radar signal simulators, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, site survey, construction and facilities, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Aug. 4, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of 362 HELLFIRE Missiles, 15 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) four radar-warning receivers, and related equipment and services. The estimated cost is \$526 million.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 362 AGM-114N3 HELLFIRE Missiles, 15 AAR-57 CMWS, 21 AN/APR-39A (V) four Radar Warning Receivers, eight AN/APX-118 Transponders, 19 AN/PRC-117 Radios, 15 AN/ASN-128D Doppler Radars, six AN/ARC-231 Radios, and 15 Data Transfer Modules/Cartridges.
- **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of UH-60M BLACK HAWK Helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$774 million.  
The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 14 UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters with engines; 6 T700-GE-701D spare engines; 14 each AN/ALQ-144A(V)3 Infrared (IR) Countermeasure Sets, AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AAR-57(V)3 Common Missile Warning Systems, and AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets; Weaponization of 23 UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters; 390 AGM-114N HELLFIRE missiles; 8 HELLFIRE training missiles; 30 M299 HELLFIRE launchers; 23,916 MK-66 Mod 4 2.75” Rocket Systems in the following configuration: 1,000 M229 High Explosive Point Detonate, 540 M255A1 Flechette, 1,152 M264 RP Smoke, 528 M274 Smoke Signature, 495 M278 Flare, 720 M274 Infrared Flare, 20,016 HA23 Practice; 22 GAU-19 Gatling Gun Systems; and 93 M-134 Mini-Gun. Also included: spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, aircraft survivability equipment, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.
- **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$445 million.

- The Government of United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 288 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) Air Intercept Missiles, 2 Air Vehicle-Instrumented (AAVI), 144 LAU- 128 Launchers, Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) software, missile warranty, KGV-68B COMSEC chips, training missiles, containers, support and test equipment, missiles components, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements.
- **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) Fire Units as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$6.95 billion.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 3 Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) Fire Units with 147 THAAD missiles, 4 THAAD Radar Sets (3 tactical and one maintenance float), 6 THAAD Fire and Control Communication stations, and 9 THAAD Launchers. Also included are fire unit maintenance equipment, prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements.
  - **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 Missile Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$121 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 4 PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Intercept Aerial Missiles with containers, 19 MIM-104D Guided Enhanced Missiles-T with containers (GEM-T), 5 Anti-Tactical Missiles, and 5 PATRIOT Digital Missiles. These missiles are for lot validation and testing of the PAC-3 missiles notified for sale in Transmittal Number 08-17. Also included: AN/GRC-245 Radios, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS Export), power generation equipment, electric power plant, trailers, communication and support equipment, publications, spare and repair parts, repair and return, United States Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.
  - **Sept. 9, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of AVENGER and VMSLP fire units as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$737 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 78 complete AVENGER fire units including Vehicle Mounted Stinger Launch Platform (VMSLP) fire units (72 Tactical and 6 floats); 780 STINGER-Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP) Block 1 Anti-Aircraft missiles; 24 STINGER Block 1 Buy-to-Fly missiles; 78 Captive Flight Trainers, 16 AN/MPQ64-F1 SENTINEL Radars; 78 AN/VRC-92E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios; 78 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) Radios; 20 Integrated Fire Control Stations, S250 Shelters on HMMWVs, communication and support equipment, system integration and checkout, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, publications, installation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is \$737 million.
  - **Jan. 3, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of various munitions and weapon systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$326 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 224 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Air Intercept Missiles, 200 GBU-31 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) Joint Direct Attack Munition tail kits, 224 MK-84 2,000 pound General-

Purpose Bombs (GPB), 450 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III with MK-84 2,000 pound GPB, 488 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II with MK-82 500 pound GPB, 1 M61A 20mm Vulcan Cannon with Ammunition Handling System, containers, bomb components, spare/repair parts, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements.

- **Dec. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 Missile System as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$9 billion.

The Government of United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of the PATRIOT Air Defense System consisting of 288 PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles, 216 Guidance Enhanced Missiles-T (GEM-T), 9 PATRIOT Fire Units that includes 10 phased array radar sets, 10 Engagement Control Stations on trailers, 37 Launching Stations (4 per fire unit), 8 Antenna Mast Groups (AMG) on trailers, 8 Antenna Mast Group (AMG) Antennas for Tower Mounts, AN/GRC-245 Radios, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS, Export), Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals, generators, electrical power units, trailers, communication and support equipment, publications, spare and repair parts, repair and return, United States Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of upgrades and refurbishments of E-2C aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$437 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of upgrades and refurbishment for three (3) used, excess defense articles (EDA) E-2C Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft with radar and antennae. These upgrades/refurbishments include E-2C Group II Navigation Upgrade configuration, 8 T56-A- 427 Turbo Shaft engines, Phased Maintenance Inspection, spare and repairs parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications, tactical software and software laboratory, system software development and installation, testing of new system modifications, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related support elements.

- **Oct. 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of Blast Fragmentation Warheads and HELLFIRE II Longbow Missiles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$428 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 300 AGM-114M3 Blast Fragmentation Warheads and 900 AGM-114L3 HELLFIRE II Longbow missiles, 200 Blast Fragmentation Sleeve Assemblies, containers, spare and repair parts, test and tool sets, personnel training and equipment, publications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, Quality Assurance Team support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **June 18, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of a Pilot Training Program as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$201 million.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of United States pilot proficiency training programs and munitions, services and support for F-16 aircraft which includes: 105,000 20mm cartridges, aircraft modifications kits, maintenance, participation in joint training Continental United States (CONUS) pilot proficiency training program, Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals training, F-5B transition and continuation training, fighter follow-on preparation training, participation in joint training exercises, fuel and fueling services, supply support, flight training, spare/repair parts, support equipment, program support, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related program requirements necessary to sustain a long-term CONUS training

program.

- **Sept. 21, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$752 million.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of the following Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

- 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers
- 101 M39A1 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1A Anti-Personnel-Anti-Material Rocket Pods
- 101 M39A1 ATACMS Block 1A Unitary Rocket Pods
- 130 M30 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions Rocket Pods
- 130 M31 Unitary High Explosive GMLRS Pods
- 60 Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems (MLRS) Practice Rocket Pods
- 104 M26 MLRS Rocket Pods
- 20 M1084A1 Family of Medium Truck Vehicles
- 3 M108A1 Wreckers

Also included are support equipment, communications equipment, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment, systems integration support, a Quality Assurance Team and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team service support, United States Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 28, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$808 million.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 26 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters with engines, 4 spare T-700-GE-701D turbine engines, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, contractor engineering, logistics, a Quality Assurance Team, aircraft survivability equipment, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 17, 2004** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of JAVELIN anti-tank missile systems, missile rounds and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$135 million.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 1,000 JAVELIN anti-tank missile systems consisting of 100 JAVELIN command launch units and 1,000 JAVELIN missile rounds, simulators, trainers, support equipment, spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, personnel training and equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, a Quality Assurance Team, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 4, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of refurbished/upgraded E-2C aircraft to the E-2C HAWKEYE 2000 as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$400 million.

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a possible sale of 5 refurbished/upgraded E-2C aircraft to the E-2C HAWKEYE 2000, 5 AN/APS-145 radars, 5 OE-335/A antenna groups, 10 T56-A-425 engines, spare and repairs parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, technical data and publications, tactical software and software laboratory, system software development and installation, testing of new system modifications, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics services and other related elements of program support.

- **July 17, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to UAE of an upgrade of Apache Helicopters from the A variant to the D variant as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$1.5 Billion.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested the remanufacture of 30 AH-64A APACHE helicopters to the AH-64D model aircraft. This proposed sale also includes: 32 AN/APG-78 AH-64D Longbow Fire Control Radar; 32 APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometer; 32 T-700-GE-701C engines; 32 Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensors; 240 AGM-114L3 HELLFIRE II laser guided missiles; 49 AGM-114M3 HELLFIRE II blast fragmentation missiles; 90 M299 HELLFIRE missile launchers; 33 AN/ALQ-211 Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures/Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures; HAVE GLASS II capabilities; spare and repair parts; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical support and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 23, 2002** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the United Arab Emirates of Evolved Seasparrow Missiles and associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as \$245 Million.

The Government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested a possible sale of 237 Evolved Seasparrow Missiles (ESSM), containers, spare and repair parts, shipboard equipment, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

Source: Adapted from: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), <http://www.dsca.mil/>

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<sup>7</sup>Military Edge. "Country Profile: Lebanon." *Foundation for the Defense of Democracies*. Accessed 4 June 2015. Web. [http://militaryedge.org/countries/lebanon/?news\\_page=3](http://militaryedge.org/countries/lebanon/?news_page=3)

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<sup>29</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, RL31718, January 30, 2014, p. 6

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**Iranian designation**

*Fajr-e-Darya*

*Kowsar*

*Nasr*

*Tondar*

*Noor*

*Ra’ad*

**Designation in country of origin**

*Marte Mk 2 (Italian)/FL-6 (Chinese)*

*C-701 (Chinese)*

*C-704 (Chinese)*

*C-801 (Chinese)*

*C-802 (Chinese)*

*HY-2<sup>135</sup>(Chinese)*

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