“21st Century Conflict: From “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) to “Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs” (RCMA)

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The title of this conference is “21st Century Conflict: Redefining Security and the Priorities for Cooperation.” One only has to look at a given day’s headlines to see how urgent this topic is, how much national security threats are changing, and how important cooperation can be in enhancing security and stability.

The need to redefine security is being driven by a wide range of factors. They include the new uncertainties in Europe, the rising tensions in Asia, and the brutal ongoing civil-military conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Each region is experiencing new threats and the need for new forms of security.

It is violent religious extremism and international terrorism, the new roles of non-state actors, and the new emphasis on asymmetric warfare that do most to make us rethink almost every form of cooperation in national security, the tools we use in meeting these threats, and the way in which we train and educate.

The rise of non-state actors and the linkages between growing civil problems and civil conflicts force us to rethink the role of national security force and the need to link civil-military operations. It also forces us to think, educate, train and act far beyond the limits of what we once called the RMA or Revolution in Military Affairs.

We now face threats from failed states, civil conflicts, non-state actors, and religious extremists that are civil-military in character and require a much broader approach to cooperation in national security. We need to think and act far beyond the beyond the RMA’s emphasis on conventional warfare, and deal with a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs that responds to the new role national and transnational non-state actors, the systematic exploitation of divisions and tensions within the population of given states and regions, the shift to need kinds of civil-military warfare, and the need for more flexible and adaptive partnerships in security.

The “Conventional” Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Let me begin by addressing the current role of the “revolution in military affairs” or RMA. It seems almost nostalgic now to remember that in 1991, a broad coalition of US, European, and Arab forces fought a war to liberate Kuwait that involved regular military forces, was fought by conventional forces in direct air-land engagements, and ended in a lasting
ceasefire between state actors. It seems equally nostalgic to remember that what many analysts began to call the “revolution in military affairs” emerged out of that conflict.

In retrospect, this “revolution” placed what now seems to be an almost traditional emphasis on joint warfare and engagements between attacking conventional forces. It focused on the use of precision guided weapons and suppression of enemy air defense, or SEAD, followed by deep strike and an air-land battle, rapid maneuver, high tempo 24-hour conflict, radical advances in intelligence and targeting, and a near-real time decision cycle based on equal advances in secure communications and digital aids.

Stealth became a reality that showed how a single advance in technology could alter the battle, but missiles and missile defense also altered the nature of war. The Iran-Iraq War had already exposed the risk that weapons of mass destruction could be a reality in modern war, but during the conflict, it became clear that Iraq was also seeking to develop nuclear weapons and biological weapons – making proliferation an all too real element of the “revolution in military affairs.”

A little over a decade later, that “revolution in military affairs” still seemed to dominate 21st Century Conflict. In 2003, another US-led coalition invaded Iraq to deal with the perceived threat of weapons of mass destruction. This coalition again relied on suppression of enemy air defenses and rapid, high tempo sustained maneuver and the air-land battle. It built on the lessons of previous wars to make far more use of precision strike in both line of sight and stand off operations, and used a greatly improved mix of digital battle management and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

In terms of grand strategy, it is also important to note that for much of this relatively brief moment in time, the US and Europe seemed to have emerged as the dominant mix of global military forces, and the US seemed to be the world’s only “superpower.” The Soviet Union had collapsed and at the time, Russia seemed poised to become a future partner. China had not emerged as a major power capable of achieving parity with the US.

More broadly, it was also a moment where the Internet and social networking seemed to have created growing level of global unity reform, and when the steady expansion of world trade seemed to be creating a level of “globalism” that could also help unite and benefit the world.

In retrospect, strategists, politicians, and military analysts should have done a far better job of remembering just how rapidly history evolves, and how rarely one decade’s expectations turn into the next decade’s realities. Within a year, the defeat of Saddam Hussein had opened up Iraq to sectarian and ethnic civil war, religious extremism, and a mix level of insurgency that the previous efforts to define the “revolution in military affairs” could not cope with.

The Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

It is this same evolution that now requires us to cooperate in dealing with what has become a “revolution in civil-military affairs” or RCMA. The late 1990s saw the steady rise of both extremism and international terrorism. In September 2001, what had already become a rising global problem acquired massive new visibility when Al Qaida attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
At first, it did seem that limited amounts of outside force could help local Afghan forces defeat and suppress Al Qaida and the Taliban, just as the quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in 2003 seemed to validate the lessons of 1991 and the existing version of “revolution in military affairs.

By 2006, however, the fall of the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan in 2001 and early 2002 proved to be all too temporary and local. The Taliban and its affiliates began to present a new, far more challenging combination of terrorism, asymmetric warfare, insurgency, and religious ideological extremism.

Similar challenges had emerged in Iraq, along with growing sectarian and ethnic tensions and violence.

Iran continued to shift much of its force structure to focus on irregular warfare, and the support of non-state actors in other countries. The Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006 then showed how state sponsorship of a non-state actor and creating a non-state forces with rockets, missiles, and all the tools necessary for irregular warfare could change the regional balance.

More broadly, other 21st century threats were also changing the world. The rise of China and the threat of North Korea gave Asia and the Pacific new strategic priority, while both China and Iran developed new approaches to irregular or asymmetric warfare – ones that now included creating artificial islands out of coral reefs.

The Great Recession of 2007 to 2008 showed that “globalism” was scarcely a rising tide that brought on a new level of economic progress and development. Its lingering effects are still a source of tension and problems, and it became all too clear that many nations face critical political, demographic, and economic problems that can trigger lasting civil conflicts as well as critical constraints on their national security spending.

In retrospect, we all should have paid far more attention to the warnings of the Arab Development Reports from 2003 onwards that these forces had reached potentially explosive levels in much of the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa threatened to spread throughout the Islamic world, and created new civil conflicts in states like Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

What some optimistically called the “Arab Spring” also helped to lay the groundwork for the transformation of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) into what became the Islamic State or Daesh and revive the civil war in Iraq while helping to unleash an expansion of religious extremism into Africa, Central Asia, and other parts of the world.

And asymmetric warfare became a major threat in other regions. The Russo-Georgian crisis of 2008 proved to be the prelude to a far more serious Russian invasion of the Ukraine in late February 2014. It showed that “little green men” could implement a different kind of asymmetric warfare and revolution in military affairs. It again made European security a critical issue in the West, and it is still unclear how serious the new tensions between Russia and the US and Europe will become.

**Dealing with the New Forces Driving 21st Century Conflict**

It is important to stress that none of these changes mean that a conference focusing on 21st Century conflict and opportunities for cooperation in security can ignore the advances in
the conventional aspect of security and warfare that emerged in 1991 and 2003. Military planning, cooperation, and education can scarcely ignore the extent to which further advances are taking place in technology and tactics, development like the continuing risk of missile warfare and proliferation, and the fact that all of these changes call for advances in both military professionalism and military education.

And yes, there are other emerging threats. These include new forms of economic warfare, cyberwarfare, use of territorial claims, barriers to international trade and movement, threats to critical infrastructure, and the strategic use of roads, pipelines, rail systems, and the control of the flow of water. Military force can scarcely ignore the fact that geo-economics is becoming as important as geopolitics in some regions of the world.

At the same time, it is clear that military professionalism and military education must also adapt to the challenges of what amounts to a second form of “revolution in military affairs.” National security must increasingly be tied to meeting the challenges of ideological and religious warfare, to dealing with non-state actors, and to meeting threats that are both civil and military. These changes too call for advances in military professionalism and military education.

**New Forms of Ideological Warfare and Struggles for National Unity**

One key area of this “revolution in civil-military affairs” is the need to fight new kinds of ideological battles using new kinds of weapons. Ideological warfare at the secular level has been largely replaced by warfare at the religious level, religious extremism and by ethnic, racial, tribal, and sectarian tensions.

These new forms of ideological warfare are a critical threat to internal security in much of the Islamic world, as well as in Asian countries, and other parts of the world. Violent non-state actors are committing widespread acts of terrorism, launching violent new forms of insurgency, dividing nations and religions, and producing retaliation in kind.

The world – and particularly the Middle East and Central Asia – is caught up in an ideological war for the future of Islam where violent Sunni extremist movements offer an immediate threat in terms of terrorism and insurgency, but where religious extremism threatens to create far broader divide between Sunni, Shi’ite, and other sects, and which cannot be separated from ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions and conflicts.

This extremism has created non-state actors that are now the most serious threat that many countries face. At the simplest level, nations must respond with stronger and better-trained counterterrorism and counter insurgency forces. They also, however, must create military forces, paramilitary forces, police, and intelligence services that have a new form of jointness and professionalism.

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Religious extremists are fighting their ideological battle using all of the tools of the Internet, as well as other forms of media, modern communication, social networking, and civil
society. They are exploiting charity as well as international financing systems. They have turned extortion, kidnapping, drugs, and the smuggling of petroleum and archeological artifacts into both new methods of funding raising and further weapons of ideological intimidation.

**Dealing with the Causes Rather than Just the Symptoms**

An effective response requires action on a civil-military level to deal with the reasons given portions of the population response to ideological extremism. Terrorism, insurgency, and the rise of violent non-state actors are symptoms of these causes and the ideological extremism that seeks to exploit them, *and not the disease*. The use of force alone can at best suppress such challenges, not cure them.

The transformation of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula into ISIL, the rebirth of the Taliban, and the flow of foreign volunteers and money to violent extremists in many parts of the world have all shown the is a critical need for cooperation in countering the threat posed by ideological warfare and religious extremism.

No tactical victory really matters that loses the population, and this ideological war is being fought in ways that both exploit the broader fault lines in a given state’s civil society and on a generational level. A large share of those who have become extremists and now fight this conflict on the Web and in the field are younger men and women alienated from the power structure in their countries and their traditional religious leadership.

The reasons why these young men and women become extremists are not driven by any one factor, and the need to understand their motives better and how much they vary by movement and country has become a critical aspect of developing a more effective response.

It is clear, however, that demographic pressures that have made a fivefold increase in the population since 1950, dislocation and hyperurbanization, grossly unequal incomes and corruption, a youth “bulge” and unemployment, rapid social changes, immigration and alienation, and a host of other structural pressures ensure that extremism will be able to capture a significant portion of the population wherever a nation fails to counter it in ideological terms. It also ensures that degrading or repressing a given movement will almost inevitably see the rise of some successor.

Military and internal security forces must still play a direct and critical role in degrading and destroying such movements. Moreover, this is an international battle where no country’s use of force can have lasting effectiveness without broad cooperative efforts. But, there is no military solution or use of international security forces, no mix of tactics and military technology that can produce a lasting victory in this ideological battle without civil efforts to address its causes.

Strategic communications must change in response, and work with every possible civil element to cope with the extraordinary challenge of dealing with religion, the problems and expectations of a nation’s youth, and countering other internal divisions. There is a critical need for countries that have advanced intelligence capabilities to assess extremist uses of the Internet, media, social networking and other recruiting, revenue raising, and communications tools to assist nations with less capability to identify and track what is happening.
National security forces must develop new approaches to education and all forms of media and communication that can counter extremist propaganda. This means finding -- and institutionalizing -- new ways to exploit modern communications, media, the Internet, and social networking that can preserve national security while imposing the smallest possible burdens on civil society.

The mix of civil and security efforts and methods necessary to win this new kind of battle of strategic communications need to be refined, shared, and made available to every security partner. Counterterrorism, countering recruiting, and funding raising, need to be a cooperative effort, and the West needs to learn from the Islamic world how to best reach its growing Muslim population with respect and reassurance, rather than repression.

At the same time, winning the ideological battle must be a key element in shaping security and counterinsurgency operations, in limiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, in protecting the population, and providing for civil recovery after operations take place. The military and security forces involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency need expert help to explain to their populations and the outside world why force is being used in given ways, to counter extremist propaganda, warn when given types of military and internal security action are counterproductive, and deal with detainees and prisoners.

Both the nations that are subject to such threats and their security partners need to cooperate in identifying and sharing successful methods and lessons. Similar cooperation is needed to ensure that joint military operations and outside training and assist efforts minimize the risk of divisions between the forces of largely Islamic and allies and forces and advisors from non-Islamic states.

Cases like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen have shown that these aspects of cooperation are critical, and the new forms of civil-military cooperation are needed if Western or non-Islamic forces with different cultures and values are to work successfully with local police, militias, and other non-state actors – not only to build trust between outside and national forces, but to minimize the tension between different ethnic groups and sects.

Tactical victories are important as a critical first step in making a broader and more lasting form of victory possible, but there is no real “win” where local forces cannot counter the extremist message, identify key tools of extremist activity and influence, and lay the ideological ground work to “hold” and build.” Moreover, no amount of outside or partner military force can save a host country government or military force from itself and from its people.

**The Need for a Civil-Military Approach to National Security**

For all the reasons I have listed, military and internal security forces must have civil partners, and take a “whole of government” approach, to deal with the cause of both religious extremism and the broader upheavals that have taken place in the world since 2011. These are all struggles where any effort to produce lasting security and stability must have a major civil and political dimension.

They are struggles where governments must support their national security forces by seeking to heal the divisions within their society, and deal with the reasons their populations take sides and extremism can find recruits and funding. Repression alone
cannot win such conflicts, and security forces must be tied to the rule of law, new approaches to detention and prison sentences, and efforts to win back volunteers and supporters of extremism.

Every major insurgency, civil conflict, or case where terrorism has taken a major foothold is a warning that governments and security efforts must not concentrate on religious or extremists as if they were the only source of such threats.

And let me again stress a key theme of this conference. These are all areas where sharing successful methods, identifying failures, and cooperation are critical. It is also a key aspect of military education.

Nations – and their national security forces – must examine the impact of internal demographic pressures, urbanization and population movements, limited economic development, poor distribution of income and government services, unemployment, corruption, and other structural threats to internal security that divided states and push them into civil conflicts. National security forces must objectively assess such factors, and ties their tactics to civil-military efforts that honestly assess them.

There have already been all too many cases where conflicts, ideology, and the actions of violent non-state actors steadily divide nations along sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional lines. If these divisions go too far, even the best internal security efforts cannot prevent political upheavals that can destroy the structure of governance and political norms and prevent the emergence of new national leaders and forces for national unity.

In short, the need for a broader civil-military approach to national security really does require as much of a revolution in military affairs – or more properly a revolution in civil-military affairs – as the changes in the more conventional forms of warfare.

It requires new forms of international cooperation in finding the best civil and military approaches to the problem. It requires new forms of planning that integrate civil-military efforts, use the best methods to actually implement them, and assess the effectiveness of the rest and the ways in which resources are spent. It requires new forms of formal training as well as the development of suitable case studies to uses in national security education.

It means expanding the role of intelligence far beyond simply identifying terrorist and insurgent threats, and it means military forces must do far more than achieve tactical success and find civilian partners that can actually implement “win, hold, and build” to counter extremist and insurgent influence and create civil-military efforts that can earn the lasting support of the local population.

It also requires a new approach to cooperation, analysis, training and education, intelligence, net assessment, planning and operations that focuses as much – or more -- on the civil dimension, ideology, asymmetric warfare, and non-state actors as on conventional warfare and military technology.

The Challenge of Non-State Actors and State Support of Non-State Actors

One key area is to recognize that non-state actors have become as much of a threat as outside states – as well as a weapon or tool that hostile states and international movements
can exploit. The Algerian civil war that took place between 1991 and 1998 provided an early warning of how serious threat non-state actors can be in the 21st century. They have since become a major threat in much of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

It is all too clear that non-state actors are becoming steadily better organized and more effective than in the past, and that studying their tactics, organization, funding, and efforts to win political and ideological influence are critical.

Once they become a serious threat as well-organized movements of experienced fighters, they can be extremely difficult to defeat, require specialized intelligence and targeting networks to target, and require specially trained Special Forces, and new weapons and reconnaissance systems like unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) to attack.

At the same time, they have learned to use human shields, exploit international law and human rights, combine terror and extortion with jobs and incentives, attack governance and the rule of law as well as national security forces, and even become protostates like ISIL or Daesh.

Once again, this is a civil-military conflict, and Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that even long series of tactical victories can be strategically meaningless without victories at the civil, political, and economic levels. Moreover, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other states have shown that the threat posed by state support of non-state actors has also risen and has evolved far beyond small movements of terrorists, preventing limited flows of volunteers, or controlling transfers of money.

Both military forces and all the other elements of national security forces – including civil efforts that shape popular support for governments and counter ideological extremism -- need to develop training and expertise in dealing with the full range of threats from non-state actors.

National security forces and intelligence service need to steadily improve their education, readiness, and cooperation in dealing with the rise of non-state actors as major security threats, and especially in preventing them from making the transitions from terrorism to insurgency and from insurgency to protostate.

They must be equally ready to prevent outside states from supporting violent non-state actors as proxies, being used in spoiler roles, used to gain leverage in dealing with other states or to fight non-state actors with other non-state actors. And, security partners need to be ready to cooperate in dealing with a wide range of movements from religious extremists to the creation of such actors by hostile states using specialized elements like the Iranian Al Quds force.

**Failed State Wars and Facing the Limits to Military Intervention**

The Middle East and Central Asia has also seen the emergence of new forms of conflict in what can only be called “failed state wars.” The levels of prolonged civil and ideological conflict in states like Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan have reached the point
successful national security efforts become a civil-military exercise in “armed nation building.”

These levels of conflict involve challenges no national security structure can meet on its own. They push military operations out of the narrow limits of stability operations, and will require prolonged international cooperation and aid in both establishing and maintaining security and helping to reconstruct national politics, governance, economies and civil societies.

They require net assessments of all of the civil and military forces that shape today’s civil conflicts, fuel ideological extremism and support for violent non-state actors, and give states like Iran and Russia leverage in using non-state actors and asymmetric warfare to further divide and exploit such conflicts. They require changes in military training and education to show officers and planners at every level how to measure and counter such divisions and look beyond tactical victories to create lasting civil-military stability and security.

They require similar education and training of key civil elements in government that deal with education, media, and civil society to act as partners in civil-military operations. This requires new curriculums at every level of higher education and training and particularly at the staff college and national defense university level.

The record so far is mixed at best. Afghanistan has a population of some 29 million to 32 million. It is now in the first stages of a Transition to relying on its own security forces, and far more limited forms of aid and outside military spending. It already has seen a rising threat to more than 10 of its provinces, and unacceptably high casualties to its security forces. Studies by the World Bank and IMF warn of major budget and economic problems.

At the same time, studies of past aid efforts reflect major failures in civil-military coordination, planning and execution, and effective international cooperation. Afghanistan may still succeed, but it faces years of further conflict and uncertainty and 32 million people are clearly at risk.

An apparent victory in the fighting in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 was followed by rising civil conflict in 2011-2013, and the ISIL takeover of much of the Sunni and Western portions of Iraq in 2014 and 2015. More than a decade of aid could not produce effective governance, development, military forces and the rule of law, or national unity between Arab and Kurd or Sunni and Shi’ite. The security forces virtually disintegrated when they were attacked by ISIL, and assessments of the effectiveness civil aid program have far too often been a record of waste, corruption, and failure.

Today, Iraq is a nation of some 36 million people that is partially occupied, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, has seen more than 3 million of its citizens made into internally displaced person without a home or livelihood, is seemingly a year or more away from a major military effort to restore its unity, and presents a potential challenge in terms of some form of post-conflict political and economic power-sharing federalism that must be resolved at both the civil and security levels.

Syria faces even more direct and brutal threats. Some 250,000 civilians have been killed, and there is no meaningful estimate of the wounded. The UN estimates that a nation of some 19 to 22 million had 7.6 million internally displaced persons at the end of March
2015 and 3.9 million refugees in other countries. It was increasingly divided along sectarian lines and into the rule of repressive Assad regime and mix of movements like ISIL and the al Nusra Front – an affiliate of al Qa’ida. The UN estimated that a total of 12.2 million civilians – well over 50% of the population -- were at risk along with some 5.5 million children.

Libya to has steadily deteriorated into civil conflict, tribal divisions, regional divisions, and violent religious extremist movements. Oil wealth has to some extent eased the problems its 6.3 million people face, but Libya cannot avoid the growing cumulative human impact of ongoing violence, and failed governance, development, and social order.

The crisis in Yemen is still developing, and like previous three countries, mixes religious extremism with growing sectarian tension and conflict. Like Afghanistan, Yemen is extremely poor and far more vulnerable to the disruptions of war than wealthier states. It has a population of some 26 million, failed governance, a failed economy, and ongoing civil conflict.

Taken together, the “failed state” threat now affects the destiny of some 120 million people even if one ignores all of the massive impact that their problems have on the nations around them. One way or another, some form of international cooperation at both the civil and national security levels must be found to deal with each case, as well as the risk that the spread of violent extremism will create new cases.

At the same time, each cases poses problems on a scale that no institution is yet ready to address, and where the outside military role in terms of helping to build national security and stability is still uncertain and undefined.

**Strategic Partnerships**

All of these developments reinforce the need to build more meaningful strategic partnerships, and highlight the need for new approaches to structuring such partnerships. They show the need to go beyond formal security cooperation and create civil-military partnerships that are flexible and less formal, and are tailored to the specific problems and conditions that threaten given partners.

They show the need to have both a military dimension – which must often respond quickly and effectively to asymmetric wars dominated by an ideological and civil dimension – and a civil dimension that can go from tactical victories and “win” to civil security, healing deep civil divisions, and giving real meaning to “hold and build.”

The military dimension in cooperation cannot be ignored. One key step is to find more effective ways to transfer arms and technology and deal with the resulting impacts on logistics and sustainment. This requires focusing on the need to take full account of the key shifts in military technology and the related tactics in dealing with irregular warfare and civil conflicts. It means educating and organizing to ensure the proper degree of interoperability, logistics, and sustainability.

It means tying future purchases to tests and evaluations that truly validate a given buy, ensuring that there is a valid plan for maintenance and sustainment as a key part of every arms sale, and ensuring suitable national and joint training and exercise plans. These are all key areas for cooperation in both train and assist missions and creating new military
education programs, as well as cooperation in transfers and creating effective operational responses.

At a technical level, it means planning joint secure communications and data exchange systems, and arrangement for integrating key aspects of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems – adapting in the process to the growing need for near real time coordination, the rising tempo of operations, and the special real time demands of new force capabilities like theater missile defense.

This is particularly true when the partnerships go beyond bilateral limits and involve regional security arrangements like the Gulf Cooperation Council. As past NATO force planning exercises have demonstrated, truly effective and interoperable security cooperation requires long term planning a careful attention to resources, and focusing on common mission priorities.

At the same time there is a need to evolve new approaches to such partnerships that focus on the growing diversity in the forms of asymmetric and irregular warfare, and on forms of conflict that increasingly combine ideological, military, political, and economic means. Land, sea, air and missile warfare can be linked to political intimidation and warfare, economic sanctions, terrorism, and insurgency. Conflicts can on a multiple levels while rapidly altering the level of deterrence and the structure of alliances.

The second key step is to go beyond military operations and to work together in finding ways to help partner countries create the best possible mix of civil and military capabilities to deal with local threats on their own, while also creating the best mix of capabilities to support allied reinforcement and power projection capabilities when needed.

Partners need to work together to develop and implement mission-oriented force plans, programming, and budgeting that take full account of ideological threats, efforts to exploit ethnic and sectarian tensions and divisions, and the political and economic problems that help shape the broader “battlefield” in today’s different kinds of wars and military interventions.

They require plans that can implement “hold” and the restoration of civil order and the rule of law, heal internal divisions with aid and the rapid recovery of conflict areas, restore confidence in governments and rebuild trust. They require an understanding and civil-military effort that reflect the fact that stability operations will often be the most important aspect of the conflict.

Rethinking Train and Assist Missions

We all need to cooperate in addressing an area of military education, training, and cooperation that recent combat has shown needs special attention. Both military and civil leaders need to be educated at every level to rethink train and assist missions. Partnerships or cooperation in creating new or additional forces need to take account of the civil-military lessons of train and assist missions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They need to focus on combat effectiveness, and not just on generating forces.

Force generation is a key part of military cooperation and education. New and replacement units need to be created by recruiting and training personnel, providing suitable equipment and facilities, and forming the unit. No amount of training and force generation in the rear,
however, really prepares new units or their leaders for combat. This can create critical problems when outside or allied forces are withdrawn, and new units are sent into combat – as the problems new local forces encountered in the fighting in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have shown.

Future cooperative efforts need to act upon these lessons – and similar lessons in other past train and assist efforts. Generating or rebuilding forces in the rear is not enough, and is an almost certain recipe for failure. New or weak forces need forward deployed teams of advisors to help them actually fight, to win, and then to immediately act to “hold and build along civil-military lines.

There have been four key areas of failure in recent and all too many other train and assist efforts.

- **The first is a failure to provide sufficient time, sufficient resources, and adequate numbers of trained and competent advisors while rushing to meet artificial deadlines that are not conditions-based.** In both Afghanistan and Iraq, these problems have been combined with waiting too long to create local forces, rushing them into development to allow outside forces to leave, and raising the goal in mid-process.

  Strategic plans have to be realistic plans, and force development takes time, money, and competent and stable advisory efforts that leave as conditions make this possible and not according to any arbitrary deadlines.

- **The second is a disastrous effort to go beyond creating the military, internal security, and paramilitary necessary to defeat the enemy and trying to reform the police and justice systems in mid-war** – made far worse in the case of Afghanistan by launching a futile and hopelessly overambitious counter-narcotics program. Police and justice reform require stability, security, and political stability.

  They must be tied to the culture and society involved, linked to the real world level of corruption and economy of the nation, and be based on creating civil policing that can operate with the other elements of an effective justice system – courts, lawyers, prisons, etc.

  The justice system is not a form of war fighting, and trying to use police as paramilitary forces ends in getting them killed and devoting major resources to forces than cannot help “win” or create stability and security in the face of a serious enemy.

  Moreover, outside concepts of law and justice cannot suddenly be imposed at a time when governance must demonstrate it is effective in enforcing the concept of justice a given nation and society already

- **The third is that far too many of today’s train and assist missions are a recipe for failure at the tactical or “win” level.** No one can create effective combat leaders and forces from the rear. New and weak units need to have a small, but experienced teams of combat leaders embedded with them. New combat leaders and units need months of on-the-ground help in getting the essentials of combat operations right. Modern forward air control is critical, and the use of drones can make it effective
far beyond the line of sight, but so are human intelligence, and the constant assessment of tactics, defensive positions, and patrol activity.

Moreover, insurgents cannot be allowed to have a massive intelligence advantage on the ground, to learn the weakest links in the government forces and their defense, attack them, roll-up the weaker units, expose the flanks and position of the better units, and then force them into what at best is partially organized retreat.

Forward deployed train and assist teams – usually Special Forces or Rangers – are necessary to spot good combat leaders and warn against weak, ineffective, or corrupt ones. They are needed to provide intelligence backwards that static or inexperienced Iraqi leaders and units cannot. They are needed to be a voice for active patrolling. At the same time, they needed to be a second voice when resupply, reinforcement, regrouping, and relief are truly needed. Someone has to bypass the barriers, rigidities, and sectarian/ethnic prejudices in the chain of command and send the right signals to the top. The Iraqis can’t do this yet.

- **Fourth, every tactical victory or success has an immediate sequel.** Military doctrine, education, and training not only need to emphasize forward support at the tactical level, but the need for strategic planning in providing immediate efforts to restore civil life, ensure that victories in irregular warfare does not mean the excessive use of force or revenge, or leaving civilians without support, security, and immediate incentives to support and trust their governments.

Forward deployed train and assist teams are also needed to help encourage effective civil-military action in cases where the Iraqi unit has a different ethnic or sectarian bias or simply thinks in tactical terms rather than how to create a local capability to hold, recover, and build at both the military and civil levels.

There are times when support from the rear may be enough, however, several thousand years of military history should serve as a warning that there are no times when leading from the rear is adequate in actual combat.

**Human Shields and Propaganda:**

*Rethinking Rules of Engagement, Targeting, and Strategic Communications*

At the same time, strategic planning, and military analysis and education must address the key issue of how to create strategic communications that are tailored to the very different nature of ideological conflicts, internal civil divisions, and asymmetric wars that attempt to counter the use of military force and states through propaganda.

Non-state actors, ideological extremists, and supporting outside states have already focused on the use of human shields, exploiting civilian casualties and collateral damage, and finding ways to limit or paralyze the proper use of military force. The problems created by dealing with irregular and ideological warfare should not become problems that make it impossible to make effective use of the advances in targeting, precision strike capabilities, and UAVs and the other advances in IS&R.

The use of air and missile power should take careful account of political sensitivities, humanitarian considerations, and make every effort to limit civilian casualties and
collateral damage. But, states need to rethink the steady rise in limits to their rules of engagement, and restrictions on the use of airpower, and the problems in strategic communications in describing what such military systems do.

Non-state actors cannot be allowed to make human shields a new constant in every form of irregular and potentially conventional war. This ignores the grim realities of war. There is nothing humanitarian about saving a small number of civilian lives and opening whole towns and cities up to prolonged occupation by threats like ISIL. There is nothing humanitarian about prolonging wars, producing far higher net casualties, and adding to the massive totals of displaced persons and refugees.

The horrors of war are not shaped by a single target or moment in time, but by the cumulative impact of a conflict. There also is nothing cowardly about using force at a distance to strike at forces that butcher minorities, civilians with different religious beliefs, and prisoners of war.

At the same time, education, training, and exercises must emphasize the fact that strategic planning means effective strategic communications that explain both the necessities of war and that there are credible plans for “hold and build” and stability operations that have a major civil and humanitarian dimension. The civil-military partnerships needed to achieve any form of meaning and lasting victory must be transparent enough to be fully credible, to reach to threaten and divided populations, to obtain full media support, and ensure that action follows words and pledges. The use of military force cannot be meaningful or justified without enduring civil success.

Redefining Security and the Priorities for Cooperation

This is a complex and daunting list of ongoing 21st Century challenges that interact in many different ways. It is particularly challenging because we are now talking about two “revolutions in military affairs” and not just one.

All of the traditional problems in creating effective military forces and security cooperation still exist, and the preparation of forces for 21st century conflict is complicated by rising costs, constant shifts in technology and related tactics, and by a growing need for new levels of military professionalism – and changes in military education and curriculums that can prepare both officers and civilians for new challenges:

- Preparing for asymmetric and irregular warfare as methods of conflict that have equal importance to conventional warfare, and whose political and economic dimensions will often be as or more important than their tactical dimensions.
- Accepting the fact that there will often be no clear dividing line between terrorism, insurgency, and the divisions created by other forces within nations that sometimes approach the status of failed states.
- Accepting and responding to the challenge of religious ideological extremism as a key element of war, and the exploitation of sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional, and other differences and fault lines as methods of irregular warfare.
- Developing new forms of net assessments that produce a clear civil-military picture of the forces driving the emergence of non state actors and internal civil tensions and conflicts, and the relative strength and weaknesses of threat forces, host country forces, and outside strategic partners.
Creating strategic and tactical plans that look beyond “win” to civil-military stability operations that can produce both a quick response and lasting solution to “hold and build.”

Creating realistic force development and force generation plans for the military, internal security, and paramilitary forces – with realistic time scales, advisors numbers and capabilities, and stable funding profiles -- without attempting to transform the police and justices systems under crisis and conflict conditions.

Redefining “joint” operations to include military, paramilitary, internal security, and police operations, coupled to emergency services. Using all security assets effectively, and with as little compartmentation as possible.

Redefining intelligence “fusion” to support such operations by bring together intelligence and warning indicators in ways that serve the needs of all the actors in joint operations.

Preparing both military and civilians, and aid personnel, for an effective whole of government approach to such conflicts.

Rethinking strategic communications to respond to ideological threats and threats from non-state actors, to explain and justify the necessary military operations and civil actions, and wage ideological warfare as a key element of asymmetric warfare.

Developing new rules of engagement, conflict assessment, and methods of strategic communications to find the best balance between effective methods of waging war and the need to limit cumulative casualties and collateral damage.

Redefining strategic partnerships to have the flexibility to be effective in given conflicts.

Adapting the lessons of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq to provide direct civilian aid to the military and internal security forces, adapting aid efforts to support quick recovery and return in secured or liberated towns, and adapting aid efforts to support stability operations and reconstruction on a regional or national level.

Developing new case studies, models, and exercises that reflect the successes and failures in past conflicts, and learn the civil-military, ideological, and broader lessons of past wars.

Moreover, dealing with the civil-military challenges I have listed present special problems for cooperation. Every power must adapt its military forces, training, and education in its own way. One size very definitely does not fit all. Virtually every state faces a different mix of these challenges, and has different priorities for dealing with them.

Many of these challenges have political, religious, and ideological aspects that make them hard for governments to openly admit and deal with, and create new barriers to security cooperation even among allies that can cooperate in many other ways. Each major aspect of this second “revolution in military affairs” involves areas that have acute political sensitivity in given countries. Each creates a natural tendency to respond with empty reassurances and public relations exercises, with denial and delay, and by leaving them in in limbo, and to focus on more traditional forms of conflict and military education.

It is also all too clear that no country is yet ready to teach, rather than learn. There have been all too many areas in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria where the US has failed to face the seriousness of these challenges, the limits to its own civil-military operations, and the need to change and adapt. General Petraeus put it all too well when he was asked whether the US learned from the lesson of past wars. He responded by saying “Well, we take note of them.”

The last two decades have provided consistently brutal lessons about the cost of ignoring any of these 21st Century changes in the nature of war. It has shown again and again that
successful military and national security operations must redefine security to meet new threats, set new priorities for cooperation, and be ready for new forms of conflict.

The key message that we should take out of these lessons not that the Revolution in civil-Military Affairs is difficult or somehow impossible to deal with. It is rather that all of us – civilian policy makers, military commanders, planners, educators, and NGOs – must work together to learn the lessons of the revolution in civil-military affairs, and act upon them. These are challenges that we must not only accept, but embrace.