The “Clash For Civilization:”
Creating an Effective Partnership in Fighting Extremism Between the West and the Muslim World

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Request for comments:
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The new outburst of violent terrorism in Paris, the threat of plans for other attacks in Belgium, and reports of other planned attacks by ISIS have all raised the specter of Jihadist attacks throughout Europe. They have also renewed all the fears and concerns that the tragedy of “9/11” caused in the United States. At the same time, the ongoing struggle between China and its own Islamic extremists, and similar threats to Russia, East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia have led to increased counterterrorist activity in much of the rest of the world.

Most of the resulting counterterrorist activity is useful and necessary, but it has sometimes led to focus on Islamic extremism that threatens to create a real “clash between civilizations.” If the support of “counterterrorism” confuses extremism and Jihadist violence with Islam and with the beliefs and attitudes of the vast majority of Muslims, it can trigger bigotry and prejudice of a kind that divides and separates the West from the Muslim world. If the search for security goes too far, it can go from necessary measures to the kind of counterterrorist activity that becomes broadly anti-Islamic, and further divides the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds.

At the same time, some in the Muslim world remain in denial about the true character of this threat. The threat is not terrorism in some generic sense, and it does not focus primarily on the West. Violent Islamic extremists may attack the US and other targets outside the Muslim world in passing, but it is a form of violent religious extremism that uses Islam as an ideological and political base to attack the mainstream of Islam, the governance of every state with a large Muslim majority, the values of virtually all Muslims, and the real world economic base for future development in every Muslim country.

It is a threat that feeds on regional, and national sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions in the Muslim world. It is a threat whose goals go far beyond using terrorism to change specific policies or leaders. It seeks to take control of states and then to dictate every aspect of human life. And, it is a threat whose violence that seeks to progress from terrorism to insurgency and civil war whenever it finds – or can create – a window of opportunity. This means that this type of threat can ultimately only be defeated by Muslims, by discrediting its abuse of one of the world’s great faiths, and by addressing its causes.

**The Security Partnerships and Sustaining the “Clash for Civilization”**

Both those inside and outside the Muslim world need to understand that the struggle against violent Islamic extremism is not a clash between Muslims and the West or a “clash between civilizations.” It is a common threat that is focused on the Muslim world, and one that can only be contained and defeated by a security partnership between the West, Muslim states, and other states. In essence, it has become a “clash for civilization” rather than a clash between nations or faiths.

Broad attacks on Islam, Muslim denial of the true character of the threat -- and counterterrorism measures that are so extreme that they become dysfunctional -- can all undermine the security partnerships between Muslim and non-Muslim states that offer the only effective way to fight violent Islamic extremism.

These strategic partnerships have become the core of what is approaching a global effort to fight that most dangerous forms of terrorism, and put an end to the civil wars and insurgencies that now threaten the stability of the Middle East. In the case of the US, our
national security strategy, and our military force posture is dependent on such partnerships. In the Middle East alone, we now have such partnerships with Muslim states like:

- Bahrain (where we base our fleet in the Gulf),
- Egypt (which is a critical staging point for US air movements and access to the Suez Canal),
- Jordan (which has long been an ally and is deeply involved in the fight against ISIS),
- Kuwait (which provides air bases and land warfare facilities),
- Lebanon (where US aid plays a key role in its fight against extremism),
- Morocco (which has a key strategic position in North Africa and the entry to the Mediterranean),
- Oman (which has been an ally for years and faces Iran across the straight of Hormuz),
- Qatar (where we locate our main airbase in the Gulf, and is a member of the coalition against ISIS),
- Saudi Arabia (which is our main partner in Gulf security, plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism, and is our partner in our efforts to defeat Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and bring some form of stability to Yemen),
- Turkey (which is a long-standing NATO ally), and
- The UAE (which as become a key military partner to our aid and naval forces, is also fighting ISIS, and provides bases to outside US allies like Britain and France).

More broadly, we are active military partners with Afghanistan and Iraq in their efforts to defeat major insurgencies that are driven by Islamic extremist movements. We have long sought to work with Pakistan in helping it deal with its growing Islamist extremist violence and we have close relations with Indonesia and other states with large Muslim populations in Asia.

We share many of these partnerships with key European allies like Britain, France, Germany and Italy, as well as Australia – whose close relations with Indonesia have had a major impact in East Asia. Nations like Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and the Philippines also play an important role. In a different part of the Muslim world, Russia and China have important partnerships with the Muslim states of Central Asia.

Movements like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State could have no greater victory than to undermine these strategic partnerships and create a real “clash between civilizations.” Violent Islamic extremists seek to feed on any broad alienation of non-Muslims from the vast moderate majority of Muslims. They know this will lead to western attacks on Islam rather than on what is a small minority of violent Islamic extremists. They know it will help create the kind of counterterrorism efforts that alienate Muslims living outside the Middle East and Islamic states as well as within them, and threaten the partnerships in counterterrorism between Muslim governments and the West.
The “Clash of Civilizations” Trap

Effective counterterrorism not only needs to recognize such risks, it needs to recognize the reality that violent Jihadist extremism can only be defeated by continuing to strengthen the partnerships between West and Islamic nations that cut across religious and cultural divisions, and focus on a combined effort to deal with a violent minority that is a threat to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

No one – Jew, Christian, or Muslim – can afford to let acts of terrorism by a small minority of extremists trap them into ignorance, intolerance, and division. As the rise of the Islamic State has shown, no country can afford to ignore the impact of any broad victory by Islamic extremism in an insurgency or civil conflict that creates a lasting state-like entity. The risks in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen go far beyond terrorism, per se.

The only way to permanently contain and defeat violent Islamic extremism is to create a steadily stronger partnership between Islamic and non-Islamic governments in both counterterrorist efforts and in fighting the threat of extremist insurgents.

As some of the reactions in the West and Muslim world have shown, however, it is also necessary to create a broader understanding of the common ethical and moral goals of all the world’s great religions, and to address the causes of violent Islamic extremism as well as to attack its advocates, terrorists, and insurgents.

Americans and Europeans need to remember the cost of the fighting between Christians during the Reformation and Counterreformation, and the cost of two millennia of anti-Semitism before treating any other faith like Islam as a threat. Crusades, forced conversion, religious exclusion and oppression, and sectarian struggles have produced nothing but failure and misery. Anti-Semitism has turned fear and ignorance into genocide.

Muslims need to remember that Jews and Christians are “peoples of the book” and that all of the great periods in Islam from the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates to the present have taken place when Muslims worked together with Jews and Christians, as well as avoided clashes between Sunni, Shi’ite, and other Islamic sects.
Focusing on the Islamic Extremist Threat

The threat of violent Islamic extremism does need to be kept in careful proportion. Violent Islamic extremism is scarcely the only threat that the US and world must deal with. Terrorism and violent extremism clearly exist in many other parts of the world, and involve very different motives, faiths, and ideologies.

The worst civil wars in the region have strong Islamic extremist elements, but it is the Assad regime that has put more than half of Syria’s population at risk and caused most of what now are over 250,000 dead. It was Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq and political struggles at the top of the Iraqi government that worsened the ethnic struggles between Arab and Kurd -- and the sectarian fighting and tensions between Shi’ite and Sunni -- that made Iraq vulnerable to ISIS.

Civil war in Afghanistan and Yemen opened the window of opportunity to movements like the Taliban and AQAP. Failed governance, efforts to exploit extremism as a weapon against India, and indifference to the needs of the people in Baluchistan and the FATA area have led to rising violence in Pakistan.

The Algerian civil war began as a military effort to keep power after moderate Islamists won an election and spurred a major set of violent Islamist movements as a result. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict bred Hamas, and repression and excessive counterterrorism measures in other states have fed it as well. Tribalism and failed governance have opened up new threats in Sub-Saharan conflict, and discrimination against Muslims threatens to create new sources of violence in Asia.

It is Jihadist extremist violence that presents the major international threat of terrorism and it is Jihadist extremist violence that does most to threaten the future of the Muslim states. It may be politically correct to keep referring to a “war on terrorism” in general terms, but the fact remains that the key struggle is essentially a war for the future of Islam and one where the struggle for power is centered around religion.

It is also clear that the strategic center of gravity in violent Islamic extremism is the Middle East, North Africa, and in South Asia states like Afghanistan and Pakistan -- although Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of East Asia and the Pacific also face such threats.¹ To put this in perspective, the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia had a total of roughly 9,600 terrorist incidents in 2013 -- the vast majority of which were carried out by Islamic extremist or Jihadist groups. No other region had more than 1,000.

Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are the center of the civil conflicts and insurgencies driven by such movements, as well as the nations that suffer most in terms of civilian dead and wounded, internally displaced persons, refugees and percentages of population at risk.

Any regional or Muslim denial of the religious character of such terrorist and insurgent threats can be as dangerous to fighting such threats as Western and other outside bigotry and prejudice against Muslims. Just as Americans and Europeans need to recognize that the governments of Muslim states, and the overwhelming majority of Muslims, are their natural allies in a fight that must by won or lost on Muslim soil, everyone involved needs to be realistic about the true nature of the threat, rather than politically correct. Every government, leading elite and general population in the Arab and Islamic worlds needs to
recognize that violent Islamic extremism – not terrorism or extremism in some vague general sense – is the threat.

*The Rising Wave of Violent Islamic Extremism is Centered in the Muslim World*

No one is yet winning the war on terrorism or the broader struggle against violent Islamic extremism, and there are clear indications that the threat is still increasing. It is equally clear that the threat goes far beyond the current media focus on the Islamic State, Al Qaida, Iraq and Syria.

The START global terror database is used by the US State Department, and the report it issued on the trends in global terrorism in April 2014 showed a massive rise in total terrorist activity from 2010 to 2014, driven largely by developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, and Pakistan.

The US State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013* showed that major incidents rose from less than 300 major incidents a year in the MENA region during 1998 to 2004, to approximately 1,600 in 2008. They increased again from around 1,500 in 2010 to 1,700 in 2011, and jumped to 2,500 in 2012, and 4,650 in 2013. This is a fifteen-fold increase in annual incidents since 2002, and threefold increase since 2010.²

There is little doubt that the challenge posed by violent Islamic extremism will become even more urgent in the future, and many other reports provide such a warning. A survey by the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Violence (ICSR) found that,³

- Jihadist fatalities occurred in 14 countries, of which four – Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Syria – produced 80 per cent of the total. Iraq was by the far the worst affected country, accounting for over a third, while Nigeria, Afghanistan and Syria were each responsible for 13-15 per cent. They were followed by Yemen (8 per cent), Somalia (4 per cent), and Pakistan (4 per cent), as well as the Philippines, Kenya, and Libya (each around 1 per cent). Cameroon, India, Niger, and Egypt all accounted for less than 1 per cent.

- Jihadism’s human cost, on average, was more than 20 attacks and nearly 170 deaths per day, jihadist groups destroy countless lives – most of them Muslim.

- The conflict in Syria and Iraq – which accounts for nearly half of the fatalities (48.8 per cent) – underlines how much of a center of gravity this conflict has become for the entire jihadist movement. Even so, it would be mistaken to dismiss or marginalize the other conflicts in which jihadist deaths were counted. Taken together, the five conflicts in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan produced nearly the same share (47.7 per cent) as Syria and Iraq without receiving similar amounts of attention in the media.

- The project recorded all deaths caused by jihadist violence, this included jihadists who were killed by other jihadists – or indeed by themselves. Of the 5,043 recorded deaths, we counted 935 jihadist militants who died as a result of ‘friendly fire’, infighting between different jihadist groups (especially in Syria), and as suicide bombers. If they are excluded, we are left with 4,108 victims of jihadist violence, of which nearly 51 per cent (2093) can be categorized as civilian...

A RAND Corporation study on trends in terrorism in 2014, led by Seth G. Jones, found:⁴

- A 58-percent increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013.

- The number of Salafi jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013, according to both RAND’s low and high estimates.
Significant increases took place in the number of attacks by al Qa’ida–affiliated groups between 2007 and 2013, with most of the violence in 2013 perpetrated by Daesh (43 percent), which eventually left al Qa’ida; al Shabaab (25 percent); Jabhat al-Nusrah (21 percent); and al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (10 percent).

Approximately 99 percent of the attacks by al Qa’ida and its affiliates in 2013 were against “near enemy” targets in North Africa, the Middle East, and other regions outside of the West.

And, a report by the Institute for Economics and Peace, issued in November 2014, found that:

- Fatalities related to terrorism soared 60 percent last year, and five countries with large Muslim populations — Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria — accounted for four-fifths of the almost 18,000 fatalities attributed to terrorism in 2013 – a total that compared with only some 11,100 in 2012.
- The highest terrorism index in the world was for Iraq at 10. Iraq had the bloodiest record of all, with more than 6,300 fatalities. Syria had a score of 8.12. Yemen had a score of 7.31. Egypt was 6.5. Lebanon was 6.4. Iran had a score of 4.9. Bahrain was 4.41. Saudi Arabia was 2.71. Jordan was 1.76. The UAE was 0.29. Kuwait was 0.04. Oman and Qatar were zero.
- Terrorism in 2013 was dominated by four organizations; ISIL, Boko Haram, al Qa’ida and the Taliban, collectively responsible for 66% of all fatalities.
- Over 80% of the deaths from terrorist incidents in 2013 were recorded in just five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria – all driven by Jihadist extremist movements.
- Iraq continued to be the country most impacted by terrorism. The number of fatalities in the country rose 164% to 6,362 – the largest increase in the index.

All of these trends mean that the threat from violent Islamic extremism will almost certainly get worse in the near term, and that Jihadist violence will continue in various forms for years to come. Yet, it is important to keep these trends in perspective. They have only produced serious casualties when extremist movements have become powerful enough to trigger or exploit major insurgencies or civil wars. Even the strongest extremist movements still are only actively supported by a tiny portion of the population even in the nations where they are most active.

It makes no sense to see Muslims as violent or extremist in broad terms, any more than it makes sense to make negative generalizations about the general population in any country or to stereotype any major faith in negative terms. Many largely Muslim states have only a few serious incidents a year, and their total casualties remain low. The key sources of casualties from regional violence come from civil wars and from broadly based internal struggles for power, and have many different causes.

The cadres of violent Islamists usually number in the hundreds in most Muslim countries. Even countries with violent Islamist insurgencies like those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen numbers their actual fighters in the thousands to tens of thousands – rather than as mass popular movements.

**Violent Islamic Extremists Largely Kill Fellow Muslims**

At the same time, history is filled with cases where small violent cadres posed a major threat. And, violent Islamic extremism has already proved that it is no exception. It is also
important for both Muslims and Non-Muslims to know who the majority of the victims of violent Islamic extremism really are.

US State Department and other expert estimates show that the overwhelming majority of the casualties caused by violent Islamic extremists occur in Muslim states and come from Muslims extremists killing fellow Muslims. Tragic as the recent deaths in France and other non-Islamic states have been, the human cost of sporadic incidents of violence outside Islamic states is negligible compared to the violence Islamic extremists have done within Muslim states and carried out against fellow Muslims.

There is no precise way to estimate the casualties caused by violent Islamic extremist movements, or to determine exactly how many have been Muslims. It is also all too clear that the religious minorities in Muslim states have often been the target of such attacks.

A BBC article by Ruth Alexander and Hannah Moore notes just how difficult such estimates are to make, and different various estimates are.\(^6\)

- The US government’s National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), report on terrorism for 2011 estimate that: “In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97% of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years.”

- The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland, doesn’t attempt to determine religion of people killed or injured because reports either omit such data or are uncertain, but between 2004 and 2013, about half of all terrorist attacks, and 60% of fatalities due to terrorist attacks, took place in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – states with largely Muslim populations.

- In contrast, the BBC article noted that, “The overall number of deadly terrorist attacks in France, the UK, Spain and the US, however, is very low by international standards. Between 2004-2013, the UK suffered 400 terrorist attacks, mostly in Northern Ireland, and almost all of them were non-lethal. The US suffered 131 attacks, fewer than 20 of which were lethal. France suffered 47 attacks. But in Iraq, there were 12,000 attacks and 8,000 of them were lethal.”

Yet, any review of the various sources of recent reporting and trend data on total casualties by country does indicate that it is unlikely that the percentage of the total casualties were caused by violent Islamic extremists in in Muslim states that went much below 90% during 2013-2014.\(^7\)

A “low end” estimate by the ICSR earlier found that, “considering that only about 16 percent of the deaths took place in non-Muslim majority countries (Nigeria and the Philippines) and that very few of the incidents in Muslim majority countries specifically targeted non-Muslim religious minorities, it is reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of victims – perhaps 80 per cent or more – were Muslim, albeit from different sects.” \(^8\) In the case where such estimates include the casualties of extremist-driven insurgencies as well as terrorism, the percentages are almost certainly higher.

At the same time, it is clear from such surveys that those Muslim states that had relatively stable and effective governments – and that were partners with the US and other Western states – had very different levels of terrorist incidents and total casualties than those Muslim states that were caught in the political upheavals that have taken place since 2011, that have not had stable governments, and that have not participated in UN and other international fights against terrorism, and that have not been partners in counterterrorism with the US and other Western states.

Public opinion surveys by leading polling groups like the Pew Research Center make it
clear that Muslims as a whole do not support extremism even in an abstract sense and when they live in countries where the general population reflects other sources tensions with Israel, the US, and other countries in the West.

A PEW poll conducted in the spring of 2014 spring – before the worst abuses of Daesh became apparent -- found that,

- 92% of the public in Lebanon was worried about Islamic extremism, up 11 points from the already high figure of 81% in 2013. Lebanese Christians (95%), Shia Muslims (95%) and Sunni Muslims (86%) all share high levels of concern.
- 80% of Tunisians expressed anxiety about extremism, up from 71% in 2013 and 65% in 2012.
- Three-quarters in Egypt are also concerned, slightly increased from the 69% measured in 2013.
- In the Palestinian territories, 65% worried about extremism, with much greater concern in the Gaza Strip (79%) than in the West Bank (57%).
- Concerns increased significantly years in Jordan and Turkey, which share a border with Syria. Roughly six-in-ten Jordanians (62%) were concerned about extremism in their country, up 13 percentage points since 2012. Just half of Turks held this view, but this was up 18 percentage points from two years ago.
- Strong majorities in Bangladesh (69%), Pakistan (66%) and Malaysia (63%) were concerned about Islamic extremism.
- Only about 39% in Indonesia shared s this view, down from 48% in 2013, but Indonesia is one of the states that has been most successful in controlling its domestic threat.
- In Nigeria, 72% of the public was concerned about Islamic extremism. Both Nigerian Muslims (76%) and Nigerian Christians (69%) express high levels of concern.
- 91% of Senegalese approved of France’s intervention against anti-government rebels in Mali, the highest support for the military action among the African and Middle Eastern nations surveyed.

When it came to specific movements – some of which play a role in the Arab-Israeli conflict or have reasons to be angry at the US or the West – the Pew survey found that many Muslims did not express and opinion. A large majority of those polled did, however, express negative views of the violent extremist movements that had the most impact on them:

- Roughly three-quarters in Tunisia (74%) and six-in-ten in the Palestinian territories (59%) had a negative view of al Qaeda. While a quarter of Palestinians had a favorable view of al Qaeda, support was down nine percentage points since 2013.
- In Asia, 66% in Bangladesh and 56% in Indonesia had negative opinions of al Qaeda. Roughly four-in-ten in Pakistan and 32% in Malaysia also saw the group unfavorably.
- In Tanzania, site of one of the first terrorist attacks by al Qaeda, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, 76% had an unfavorable opinion of the extremist organization. Al Qaeda also receives little support in Senegal and Nigeria.
- Overall, 82% of Nigerians had an unfavorable view of Boko Haram (which loosely translates as “Western education is sin”), including 79% of whom have a very unfavorable view. Negative opinions were shared by Muslims (80%) and Christians (83%) alike. Only 10% of Nigerians had a favorable view of the group. Support was little changed from 2013.
• Taliban, which has a base of operations on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was seen unfavorably by 59% of the population in Pakistan. Only 8% had a favorable view of this extremist organization.

• In Lebanon, 59% had an unfavorable view of Hezbollah. This included 88% of Lebanese Sunni Muslims and 69% of Lebanese Christians. However, 86% of Lebanese Shia Muslims had a favorable view of the Shia-dominated group.

• In Turkey (85%), Egypt (83%) and Jordan (81%) held unfavorable views of Hezbollah. These results would almost certainly have been far more negative if the Pew poll could have covered the countries where extremism has been most repressive and done the most human damage: Countries like Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

**Most Volunteers Come from Muslim States or are Alienated Muslims**

While reliable estimates again are not available, the broad consensus is that there are far more foreign volunteers flowing to the Jihadist movements from Muslim countries than from such movements to the outside world. For all the anti-US and Anti-Western rhetoric of Jihadist movements in Muslim states, the public reporting on the number of attempts to actually strike at US and European targets remains low and clearly reflects the priority they give to gaining power and influence in Muslim states.

An estimate by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), released in January 2015, estimated that some 20,000 foreign volunteers had gone to fight for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Only 20% came from Europe and 25% from Europe and North America.11

While the ICSR did not attempt to make such assessments, it is also clear that most of the volunteers that did come from Europe were young Muslims that had suffered from discrimination or became alienated from European society, or been caught up in recruiting efforts that lacked any support from local religious figures and Mosques.

The need to fight this discrimination and alienation is another reason for partnership between the US, Europe, and Muslim states. The West needs to recognize its growing dependence on Muslim immigration, the need to offer both real equality and real opportunity to these immigrants, and the need to educate its citizens in the true nature of Islam.

While Latinos dominate immigration to the US, Europe’s demographics are both aging its native population and reducing it. At the same time, population growth and poverty in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa have led many Muslims to immigrate to Europe and the United States. This growth will almost certainly continue in the future.

A study by the Pew Research Center of the growth of the global Muslim population projected that the total non-Muslim population of Europe would drop from 696.8 million in 1990 to 668.9 million in 2030. It projected that the total Muslim population of Europe would double during that time, and rise from 29.6 million (4.1%) in 1990 to 58.2 million (8.2%) in 2030.12

The Pew study also estimated that the number of Muslims in the Americas will more than double from 5.3 million in 2010 to 10.9 million by 2030. They will remain a small minority
in the region, rising to an estimated 1.0% of the population in 2030, compared with 0.6% in 2010. Most of the projected growth, however, will take place in the U.S. and Canada. The Muslim population in the United States is projected to more than double in the next 20 years, from 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million in 2030. Canada’s Muslim population is expected to nearly triple, climbing from 940,000 in 2010 to 2.7 million in 2030.¹³

Modern democratic societies cannot function by separating millions of citizens from the rest of society, alienating them, leaving them disadvantaged and in urban ghettos, and treating them as a threat. Europe, in particular, cannot solve its demographic problems and deal with an aging native population through discrimination, isolation, and treating Muslims as targets.

**Partnering in a “Clash for Civilization”**

At the same time, the fact that violent Islamic extremism is centered in the Muslim world means that the US, Europe, and other non-Muslim states cannot rely on counterterrorism efforts within their own borders. Such efforts are an essential part of counterterrorism. However, there is no meaningful way the US, Europe, and other non-Muslim states can successfully defend themselves by containing or isolating large parts of the Islamic world, or by letting whole nations be taken over by extremists that ultimately cannot govern, cannot create functional cultures and economies, and try to drag millions of people into a fantasy world that perverts every major element of real Islam in the name of Sharia and the constant use of force.

There are vital strategic reasons why the US and other Western states have strategic partnership with Muslim states. Once again, any lasting form of victory against terrorism and violent Islamic extremism requires a partnership in a “clash for civilization,” rather than becoming trapped in a clash between nations and faiths. The non-Islamic governments in the West and the rest of the world must deal with the causes of the alienation of Muslim immigrants and citizens in their countries. They need to educate non-Muslims in the real nature of Islam, and major powers outside the Islamic world need to aid Muslim states in both fighting terrorism and addressing its causes.

The importance of the Muslim world is illustrated by its share of the world’s population. While estimates differ, the CIA and US Census Bureau estimate that Muslims make up some 22-25% of the world population of some 7.2 billion people – a total of 1.6 billion to 1.8 billion.

- They dominate the Middle East and North Africa (at least 363 million),
- Turkey (82.5 million),
- Key regions in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia (108.8 million).
- They are a major part of the population of India (1,236.3 million), and
- Are the vast majority of three of the world’s ten most populated states outside the Middle East: Indonesia (253.6 million); Pakistan (196.2 million); and Bangladesh (166.3 million).

A study of the trends in the world’s Muslim population by the Pew Research Center estimated that it would grow from around 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion in 2030. In the Middle East and North Africa, the Muslim population would rise from 322 million to 439 million. It also would involve major growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, and rise from 243 to
386 million. Moreover, the demographic center of Islam would remain in Asia and the Pacific – rising from 1.0 billion to 1.3 billion.\textsuperscript{14}

Muslim countries dominate many of the key sources of the world’s petroleum exports and most of the sources of the energy imports that fuel most Asian exports. They occupy a portion of the globe that spreads from Morocco to parts of the Philippines, and from sub-Saharan Africa north to Kazakhstan. There is no practical chance of a stable and developing world, or a functioning global economy where today’s moderate Islamic governments and peoples are replaced by violent extremists.

Moreover, only the Muslim states where Islamic extremism presents an active major threat can deal with the full range of the various internal drivers of extremism that affect their country. The practical challenge is to build the best possible strategic partnerships between Muslim states battling their own extremist threats and the US, Europe, and other outside states, and to create an integrate effort to deal with a common threat. Just as the fastest way to lose is to be divided, the fastest way to win is to unite.

\textbf{Dealing with the Forces that Generate Violent Islamic Extremism}

At the same time, it is important to understand that fighting violent Islamic extremism cannot succeed through counterterrorism alone, and that the forces that have shaped this violent extremist minority go far beyond ideology and religion. Fighting terrorism and extremism is critical, but so is understanding and dealing with the range of forces that cause it.

\textbf{Common Demographic Pressures, “Youth Bulges, and Forces that Can Lead to Extremism}

There is no one cause or set of causes that drives men and women towards extremism, violence, and alienation from the mainstream of their societies. Demographics alone, however, are a warning of the sheer scale of the forces which now create problems for virtually every largely Muslim state, that have led to so much Muslim migration to Europe, and have helped alienate those who join extremist groups.

- \textit{Population Pressure on the Middle East and North Africa:}\textsuperscript{15} The US Census Bureau estimates that the total population of the Middle East was 38.7 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 74.2 million. In 1980, it was 95.1 million. In 1990, it was 137.0 million. In 2003, it was 183.6 million. It was 231.3 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 267.4 million in 2025 and 332.0 million in 2050. The total population in 2015 is 6 times what it was in 1950, and it will approach 9 times in 2050.

The US Census Bureau estimates that the total population of North Africa was 43.9 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 75.5 million. In 1980, it was 90.6 million. In 1990, it was 116.6 million. In 2003, it was 146.2 million. It was 179.3 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 206.0 million in 2025 and 257.7 million in 2050.\textsuperscript{16} The total population in 2015 is 4 times what it was in 1950, and it will approach 6 times in 2050.

The totals for the entire MENA region, using the prior definitions of North Africa and the Middle East would be 82.6 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 149.7 million. In 1980, it was 185.7 million. In 1990, it was 253.6 million. In 2003, it was 329.8 million. It was 410.6 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 473.4 million in 2025 and 589.7 million in 2050. The total for 2015 was 5.0 times the total for 1950. The projected total for 2050 would be over 7 times the total in 1950.
In short, population pressure on every aspect of governance, government services, national budgets, infrastructure and economic development has increased massively -- and will be a major factor shaping national and regional stability for at least the next two decades.

- The impact of a major “youth bulge.” High birthrates have created very young populations, even if one includes legal foreign workers in the total population. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates the percentage of the total population by age group in the Middle East in 2015 -- including legal foreigners -- was 30.1% age 0-14 years, 39% ages 0-19, and 48.4% ages 0-24. The Census Bureau estimates that 37.8% of the population of North Africa was age 0-14 in 2015, 48.2% was age 0-19, and 57.5% was age 0-24.

This “youth bulge” in the native youth population has become a major challenge to stability in terms of increasing and financing, education, housing, water and power, and other infrastructure -- as well as in creating a socially acceptable distribution of wealth and financing marriage and child rearing. While estimates differ -- and most countries fail to accurately report native unemployment by age group and disguise unemployment in any form -- virtually all sources agree that most regional countries have not been able to create real jobs, and often any job, even in the form of disguised unemployment -- for over 20% of young men. In most cases, the percentages are much higher percentages for young women.

- Population Migration and Hyperurbanization. Many countries have gone from agricultural and rural societies that helped separate different sectarian, ethnic and tribal groups to hyperurbanized societies. In the cases of poor states, population pressure has led to substantial legal and illegal migration to Europe and wealthier Muslim states. Reliable urbanization trend data are lacking and even current data are uncertain, but the data that are available indicate that the growth in urbanization may have increased at something close to the total rate of population growth, and led to radical changes in traditional and tribal society and safety nets.
   - CIA estimates that the percentage of urban population in 2015 was 63.48% for Morocco, 82.96% for Algeria, 75.66% for Tunisia, 70.3% for Libya, and 74.46% for Egypt.
   - The figures were 98.8% for Israel, 91.38% for Jordan, 90.64% for Lebanon, and 65.54% for Syria.
   - In the case of the Gulf region, it was 87.8% for Bahrain, 72.9% for Iran, 75.7% for Iraq, 98.3% for Kuwait, 73.4% for Oman, 98.8% for Qatar, 82.3% for Saudi Arabia, 84.4% for the UAE, and 46.6% for Yemen.

**But, There are Radical Differences in the National Patterns of Terrorism**

At the same time, it is equally important to stress that the patterns, intensity, and causes of terrorism and violent Islamic extremism differ radically from one Muslim country to another. While violent Islamic extremism has important international elements, it is largely a threat tied to unique mixes of national problems.

This is clear from the different national patterns of terrorist violence shown in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). It is clear from the very different trend data that data base shows for each country for incident numbers, attack types, target types, weapons type, perpetrators, total casualties, fatalities, and injuries warn against generalization that cut across national lines. The nation state is scarcely dying, and borders still matter.

**And, in the Other Forces that Can Shape Extremism**

It is equally clear that Islamic extremism in the MENA region -- and outside states -- has been shaped by very different pressures in given countries. These pressures include
different mixes of sectarian, cultural, ethnic, tribal, political, governance, and economic forces.

These are differences that are clearly reflected in the differences in the national data issued by given countries, and in UN, World Bank, IMF, and CIA. They are clear from comparisons of per capita income, human development indicators, quality of governance and justice systems, corruption, poverty and unemployment levels, urbanization, population growth, and sectarian and ethnic divisions.

- **Sectarian, ethnic, and Tribal Divisions:** There are no precise data on population by sect or religious minority, ethnic divisions, tribal groupings, and the real number of foreigners including transients and illegals. It is clear from a variety of efforts to estimate and map such differences, however, that population pressure has often pushed various sects, ethnic groups, tribal groupings, and foreigners together in ways that have fundamentally changed the populations and areas of friction within the MENA region, increased the contact and tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite, as well as with Muslim and non-Muslim minorities.

**Governance and Corruption:** The World Bank provides a wide range of metrics and trend data on the quality of governance, justice systems, regulation, and overall social violence for every country affected by violent Islamic extremism.23

Transparency International provides separate data on corruption.24 The most recent Transparency International global ranking for Middle East countries, are for 2014. The scores go from 0-9 for most corrupt to 90-100 for least corrupt. The global ranks go from 1 (least corrupt) to 175 (most corrupt in the world.) Once again, these rankings show just how different given countries are and the scores in some countries are more than four times better than it others. The global rank ranges from a low of 166th to a high of 25th – with the worst country nearly seven times lower than the best:25

- In the case of North Africa, the score was 39 for Morocco and the rank was 80th out of 175 countries. The score was 36 for Algeria with a rank of 100, 40 for Tunisia and with rank of 79, 18 for Libya with a rank of 166, and a score of 37 with a rank of 94 for Egypt.
- In the case of the Levant, the score was 60 for Israel and the global ranking was 37. The score was 49 for Jordan and the rank was 55th. The score was 27 for Lebanon and the rank was 136th. The score was 20 for Syria and the rank was 159th.
- In the case of the Gulf, the score was for 49 Bahrain and the rank was 55th. The score was 27 for Iran and the rank was 136th. The score for Iraq was 16 and the rank was 170. The score was 44 for Kuwait and the rank was 67th. The score was 45 for Oman and the rank was 64th. The score was 69 for Qatar and the rank was 26th The score was 45 for Saudi Arabia and the rank was 59th. The score was 70 for the UAE and the rank was 25th. Finally, the score was 19 for Yemen and the rank was 161st.

The World Bank governance indices provide a more nuanced set of trend lines rather than a simple score or ranking. Both sets of reporting show radical differences between states, but the world Bank data also show that problems in governance and the justice system, as well as corruption are often serious enough to alienate parts of the population and increase the threat of extremism. This is particularly true where military and/or small self-seeking elites govern, and where more secular ideological political opposition movements like the Ba’ath and Communist Party have been discredited.

- **Serious limits to wealth measured in per capita terms:** MENA countries differ radically in real wealth as measured in terms of per capita income – even if one ignores the fact that income distribution often involved very high poverty levels and very high levels of concentration of wealth in a small percentage of the most wealthy.

The CIA estimates that per capita income in 2013 in PPP terms was:26

- In the case of North Africa, it was $5,500 for Morocco, $7,500 for Algeria, $9,900 for Tunisia, $11,300 for Libya, and $6,600 for Egypt.
In the case of the Levant, the figures were $36,200 for Israel, $6,100 for Jordan, $15,800 for Lebanon, and $5,100 for Syria.\textsuperscript{27}

In the case of the Gulf, it was $28,900 for Bahrain, $12,800 for Iran, $7,100 for Iraq, $42,100 for Kuwait, $28,800 for Oman, $102,100 for Qatar, $31,300 for Saudi Arabia, and $29,900 for the UAE, and $2,500 for Yemen.\textsuperscript{28}

There is no direct correlation between poverty and extremism, but even if one ignores the acute differences in the distribution of wealth within given countries, and the level of corruption and favoritism that is sometimes involved, there is a reason why some countries exploded in 2011 and other did not. The high average per capita income in the Gulf region is well over 40 times the lowest, and that ratio dates back to a time of much greater stability in Yemen. The ratio may well be over 50:1 today.

Moreover, “oil wealth” is all too relative when measured in per capita terms. Fully comparable per capita data on “oil wealth” are not available. However, the US Energy Information Agency estimates that OPEC petroleum export income per capita in 2013 was $1,667 for Algeria, $2,706 for Iraq, $29,949 for Kuwait, $4,999 for Libya, $40,943 for Qatar, $8,939 for Saudi Arabia, and $9,736 for the UAE.\textsuperscript{29}

- \textbf{Human development indicators and ease of doing business.} At a more material level, equal differences exist between affected countries in making progress in the UN human development indicators and in creating opportunities for business and investment.\textsuperscript{30}

- \textbf{Human rights and the application of the rule of law.} A variety of reports by NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch provide reports on the very different strengths and weaknesses of human rights practices in given states. The US State Department’s \textit{Country Reports on Human Rights Practices} provide similar reporting on an official level, as well as additional data on national justice systems and issues in counterterrorism and national security practices. In many cases, they are a warning of excessive counterterrorism measures, problems with detention and trials, and broader problems that can help alienate young men and women and push them towards extremism.\textsuperscript{31}

There are major problems in this kind of data. There are often serious gaps as well as serious data collection and definitional problems. There also is a need to develop better indicators and more reliable data that focuses on the causes of instability and extremism. This requires more realistic data on real and disguised unemployment, national income distribution, education, health, poverty and many other areas that affect internal stability and the other forces involved.

It is time to go beyond the traditional macro-economic indicators used to measure economic performance and build on the broader examination of the impact of governance and politics on stability that can be found in the various Arab Development Reports that did much to warn that the kind of political explosions that began in 2011 were coming.\textsuperscript{32}

There is also a need for suitable polling data which focuses on the level of alienation and anger in key population segments and its causes.

\section*{Extremism, Stability, and Development}

At the same time, there is enough data on the pressures that affect all of the countries in the MENA region to be a warning to every citizen in a largely Muslim country. The same forces that are changing the Muslim world are forces that no country can deal with by following the extremist religious path that violent Islamist extremist movements now call for. The vast majority of Muslim countries already face economic and demographic pressures that require them to move forward far more rapidly in modernizing their
governance and economies. Like all of the countries in the world, they can only succeed by joining in -- and competing in an -- increasing global economy.

The Arab Development Reports issued by the UN between 2003 and 2009 warned again and again of the need for such reforms and modernization. So have the UN’s review of human development indicators, and studies by the IMF and World Bank. A modern education should not be a luxury. Neither should the creation of productive real world jobs, or the ability to attract investment and do business on a global basis. There is no place for state control of every religious and social practice, or an approach to the rule of law that ignores the entire history and evolution of Muslim jurisprudence.

Pursuing a ruthlessly intolerant form of extremism that rejects the ability to deal with change, govern effectively, provide real justice, and participate in modern business practices is worse than a dead end. Pursuing forms of violence that have already helped further impoverish whole nations like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – and threatened development and growth in others – literally has no future.

Fighting extremism does, however, mean that even the most stable states in the Middle East and North Africa need to examine their current and potential sources of instability – in terms of sectarian and ethnic divisions, demographics and the problems created by the current youth bulge, economics, governance, and tribal differences.

They need to do a far better job of showing their people that their governments are prepared to address these issues, and why Islamic extremist movements are incapable of doing so. The pressures upon Muslim or largely Muslim states are far too great to solve by regressing into the past, pursuing a fantasy world based on Caliphates that never really existed, and rigid and inflexible approach to economics and social structures that have nothing to do with mainstream Islam and are totally dysfunctional in dealing with the modern world.

Building on Strategic Partnerships

For all these reasons, the practical challenge is to build the best possible strategic partnerships between the Muslim majority states battling violent Islamic extremism and the US, Europe, and other outside states to create a truly integrated effort that addresses the threats without alienating the societies and governments best situated to counter them. As stated before, just as the fastest way to lose is to be divided, the fastest way to win is to unite.

Fortunately, these strategic partnerships already exist in most cases where there is a stable government in the region. The challenge is not to create security partnerships as much as to make them even more effective in improving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at the government-to-government level. As has been discussed earlier, core partnerships already exist at various levels with the MENA region. They include the counterterrorism and military forces of key Western nations like the US, Britain France, and Italy. They also include key Muslim governments like Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and the GCC states. There is some degree of cooperation with countries like Tunisia and Algeria.

These partnerships already deal with the core elements of counterterrorism, and already provide outside military support where the threat has escalated beyond the level that regional governments and forces can deal with.
• Countering messages of violence and extremism at the national and international level,
• Creating religious dialogue, reforming education, and building tolerance and understanding,
• Providing emergency aid and create political and economic stability.
• Sharing tactics and successful counterterrorism procedures.
• Sharing intelligence,
• Improving the training and equipment of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces,
• Providing outside counterterrorism and military support where nations lack the forces to cope or become involved in civil conflict.
• Limiting the flow of money to extremist groups,
• Limiting the movement of extremists and volunteers.

Meeting the Challenges of Strategic Partnership

These are all areas where more can and must be done. There is no way to halt the increase in terrorism and violence, or achieve any kind of lasting victory, without effective security, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

There also is a clear need to find better ways to deal with the outlying states: Iran and the Arab countries where there is a serious Islamic extremist threat, and an actual insurgency or civil war. At present, these countries include Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Western and Muslim security partnerships are already involved in all four countries, but they clearly present challenges where it is still unclear that outside partnerships can play a successful role.

It is easier to call for such progress, however, than it is to achieve it. The level of cooperation and partnership differs sharply from case to case, and much of the cooperation between given countries is classified to a point where it is difficult to make a valid appraisal.

The underlying reasons for these problems are clear. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency involve some the most sensitive issues governments face, and often present serious domestic political problems. Governments need to keep intelligence and counterterrorism methods secret, and MENA governments have good reason to avoid showing any degree of dependence on outside powers – particularly ones that are not Muslim.

Religion is an extraordinarily sensitive issue, and Muslim countries control their clergy and media in radically different ways and to very different degrees. Sectarian practices differ and the tensions between mainstream Sunni, Shiite, and other sects add to the problem – as do different levels of tolerance of other religions.

Rivalries and tensions between countries exacerbate the problem, as do countries that act as state sponsors of terrorism and that try to exploit non-state actors and extremist movements. As Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen have shown, there is also a critical difference between counterterrorism and a level of violence that has reached the point of low-level civil war or serious insurgency –whether it is caused by violent extremism or such movement exploit it.

These problems now limit the scale of partnerships between Muslim and non-Muslim states, the role international organizations like the UN can play, and regional or collective efforts
by Muslim states – just as they limit cooperation within the West. They limit the visibility that partnership in counterterrorism can be given, and level of transparency in reporting progress in key areas like cooperation in intelligence, training, joint operations, financial controls, efforts to limit the movement of volunteers, and efforts to counter extremist recruiting and use of the media and tools like the Internet.

**Progress at the Official Level**

It is all too easy to call for impossible levels of unity cooperation, make sweeping criticisms, call for drastic action, and/or replace analysis with conspiracy theories and self-seeking political posturing. In the real world, real progress requires secrecy and discretion. It requires an understanding of the limits given governments face, the impact of differences in culture and religion, and the fact that – important as violent Islamic extremism is – it is only one of the security challenges that partner countries face. It depends on carefully tailored bilateral or multilateral partnerships whose effectiveness does not undermine or embarrass any of the partners involved.

At the same time, there is still a case for efforts to build broader partnerships and more international efforts. One key step might be to provide more transparency. It would be to replace excessive secrecy with effective communication as to why partnerships are necessary and what their benefits are, and finding ways to encourage better national and partner efforts.

One such tool is better communication at the national level. Considerable transparency is more common in the West, but MENA countries like Saudi Arabia have already provided considerable transparency in discussing their terrorist threat, their actions in counterterrorism, reforms designed to reduce the threat, and efforts to reintroduce extremists back into civil society.

Agreeing on common efforts to provide regular national reporting on the threat, national action to fight extremism and terrorism, and efforts to build strategic partnerships would be a key step forward in creating transparency that took national sensitivities into account, but worked to create a national dialogue and public support that made further cooperation possible.

The US, NATO, and EU could also take on the broader task of surveying the progress in creating partnerships and focusing on both the progress given countries are making and the further steps that are necessary. The US already does this in part by issuing a relatively wide range of unclassified data on its counterterrorism cooperation with other states, and its annual State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* provide at least some insights into the level of partnership and cooperation with given countries.

Yet, these same State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism* have serious limits. They often are too vague or too diplomatic to provide an accurate picture. They do not set clear, workable priorities for national improvement. They also divide their analysis into what national governments are doing, what key terrorist organizations are doing, and the role of state sponsors of terrorism.

What is needed is a more proactive and net assessment approach to such reporting that openly sets clear priorities and standards for improvements in counterterrorism activity. It
should be unclassified and make country-by-country assessments of the level of real progress in counter-terrorism in each key area, each countries success in dealing with key terrorist and insurgent threats, and should be specific about the activities of State sponsors of terrorism – rather than lists vague complaints.

There is a need to provide more reliable unclassified data. Efforts like the current START database need to be quietly validated by the National Counter Terrorism Center, and to be restructured to provide numbers rather than just trend data, better support the analysis of given terrorist movements, and measure national progress in dealing with extremist movements. An Arabic edition is needed to reach to the MENA region.

There are times when it will be as necessary to report negatives as well positives. It should be clear when given nations are failing in key areas, and when then threat is growing. Such reporting should, however, focus on progress wherever possible. It should explain the US contribution to the partnership as well, along with that of other partners, and show the value of the partnership to all those concerned. It should be clear in every successful case that the partnership is real, and cuts across cultures, religions, and political systems. It should explicitly defuse key conspiracy theories, and deal with the concerns of the peoples concerned.

Independent reporting by the EU and Arab League may also be possible. At broader level, country-by-country reporting on progress in fighting terrorism by the UN faces obvious challenges. International organizations must show a high level of diplomatic discretion. At the same time, UN agencies have shown that they can address very sensitive issues like the readiness to deal with disease, human development indicators, and nuclear proliferation.

The UN already has a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which was established by the Secretary-General in 2005 and endorsed by the General Assembly, and a UN Counterterrorism Centre established in 2011. It has a United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted in 2006, and which has since been updated by several General Assembly resolutions. The mandate of the CTITF is to enhance coordination and coherence of counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system. The Task Force consists of 34 international entities which by virtue of their work, have a stake in multilateral counter-terrorism efforts. Each entity makes contributions consistent with its own mandate.

Building on the CTITF and UN Counterterrorism Centre to create a major new UN Agency to help coordinate and monitor progress in complying with UN resolutions and international agreements, while avoiding politically sensitive issues, would have its limits but also strengths. So would issuing an UN annual report which focused on national, regional, and international progress and compliance.

**Focusing on the Causes of Extremism**

For all the reasons cited earlier in discussing the pressure on MENA states, there is a need to focus on the causes of violent extremism as well. Improving counterterrorism and counterinsurgency – and partnerships in efforts to deal with civil conflicts – are the immediate priority, but this can only treat the symptoms and not the disease. Any lasting form of victory requires both national action and broader partnerships that deal with the underlying causes of extremism and unrest.
This will not be easy. As the previous data on the forces of change have shown, there is no easy or quick way to eliminate the causes of violent Islamic extremism. The social, political, and economic forces at work are far too strong. Even before the massive upheavals that began in some countries in 2011, the Arab Development Reports made it clear it would take a decade or more of sustained reform to put many states on a stable path toward governance and economic development.  

The situation has now gotten far worse in countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It also, however, is has gotten half a decade worse since 2011 in much of the rest of the region because so few countries have really devoted major resources to addressing the problems they faced in 2011.

Once again, it is important to stress that national sensitivities are involved in dealing with these issues, and there are no universal solutions to the pressures on individual Muslim states that have been touched upon earlier. Yet past Arab Development Reports, current UNDP reports, World Bank, and IMF reports have focused on human and economic development in ways that provided useful country-by-country examinations of current progress and problems.

Creating a different kind of development report -- one that focused on the issues that cause alienation and extremism -- could play a critical role in addressing the other side of counterterrorism. Acting as if development could somehow take place in a non-violent world where governance and security is not a way to provide real world diagnostics and solutions.

This is a role that the IMF and World Bank need to perform. It is also an area where academic research centers and think tanks in the West and Muslim countries can play a role. If they focus on reality and the art of the possible -- rather than letting hope triumph over experience -- they can provide outside analysis, criticism, and insights that addresses the issues that governments find politically difficult to deal with.

This kind of effort to rethink development is going to be vital if the West and MENA are to play a useful role in helping Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen recover and move towards any lasting stability. The use of force can bring temporary security, but it cannot bring that stability, and suppressing the causes of extremism has a long history of making things worse and leading to new outbreaks of violence.

There will be an equal need for careful outside review of how counterterrorism and counterinsurgency affect human rights. This review will require human rights advocates to show realism as to the need for decisive and violent action, and the fact that security is a human right as well. At the same time, human rights reporting by NGOs, the UN, and individual countries is equally necessary to prevent excessive measures from breeding more extremism than they counter.

Expanding the current range of official and NGO human rights reporting to put such pressure on countries to keep their security measures in proportion to their benefits -- and to openly address the trade-offs between security and human rights -- seems both possible and necessary. So do efforts to ensure that no segment of a population -- including European and US Muslims -- becomes a target of unfair practices.
Force and repression alone cannot defeat violent Islamic extremism, and excessive reliance on either can only end in alienating more of the population and breeding terrorism rather than defeating it. The few countries which did make a major investment in dealing with the causes of extremism after 2011 – like Indonesia and Saudi Arabia – have shown that major public efforts by government can have an important impact on changing perceptions and motives long before they can be put into action.

**Dealing with the Ideological Dimension**

Finally, both Western and Muslim countries need to confront the ideological challenge posed by violent Islamic extremism, and its methods of recruiting, communication, and indoctrination. Once again, it is important to stress that the religious dimension cannot be dealt with by denial; it can only be dealt with through the equivalent of information warfare.

True Muslims who support the real teaching of Islam have to confront such extremism at every level. Only Muslims can refute extremism’s misuse of the Koran and the key teaching of the Muslim faith. Only Muslims can make convincing arguments based on Islamic law and make it clear that the extreme violence, use of force to dictate social and religious practices, and efforts to rigidly control every aspect of life have no true religious legitimacy.

At a broader level, only fellow Muslims can make a fully convincing argument that Islamic extremism is also a destructive dead end for the Muslim world that cannot develop the Muslim world or Muslim countries, that cannot cope with the need to govern and manage economy, and that is living proof that the search for absolute power tend to corrupt absolutely. These are arguments that need to be made at every level to address and counter every way in which such movements recruit, communicate, and indoctrinate.

It is important that senior Islamic clerics and scholars issue formal statements, but Muslim states need to go further. This is an ideological battle that must be fought out in schools, in the media, and at every level of social networking. It must be carefully focused in ways that address every path than Islamic movements use to reach young men and women, to focus on the alienated and vulnerable, and to use cover organizations or religious institutions to recruit and train. This also requires countries to find ways to counter indoctrinate and bring fighters and volunteers back into mainstream society.

In many cases, this requires a major change in the way that many Muslim countries now fight such extremism. It is not enough to formally control what clerics say, and issue statement from religious authority figures. The response must be much broader, identify the methods and networks extremists are using, focus on the key elements of their messages, and meet them head on in the electronic media. It must also focus on education and the use of media to preempt the messaging by extremists.

These are all areas where the West can help by providing training, technology, and methods for this kind of information warfare. They are also areas where Muslim countries, scholars, and think tanks have a common interest in sharing the best messages, methods of education and reeducation, and techniques. It is important to note, however, that there are no universal ways to approach this challenge. Nations will need to focus on what is happening in their country, the different methods that different extremists use, and the different ideological
vulnerabilities and methods of communication they use, as well as the character of their main targets for recruiting. One size will not fit all.

It will also be important for governments in the Muslim world to address the key causes that lead a minority of their population to be vulnerable. Religious extremism cannot be fought effectively with failed secularism. No government can address every grievance, but every government can show it is focused on the worst and most provocative grievances and is moving forward to address them. Here, denial is again a problem. Governments need to honestly assess their key failures. They need to do so by using polling and other sampling and analytic techniques to make sure that they understand the perspective and views of their people.

At a different level, governments in the West – along with Western media and scholars – need to be equally realistic about the reasons why some Muslim citizens become alienated and vulnerable to violent Islamic extremist movements. Like Muslim governments, they need to address key grievances, to avoid excessive measures to deal with the threat, and be careful about urban slums and detention facilities that become the natural center for extremist activity.

Finally, the West needs to carefully consider whether tolerance based on ignorance can deal with Christian and Jewish attitudes toward Muslims and other faiths. Western religious figures and educators need to play a more active role as well. It is one thing to try to separate religion and state, and quite another to leave large parts of their population with no understanding of the beliefs and values that shape the rest of the world. Ignorance has never a secure source of tolerance in dealing with the differences between Christian sects and anti-semitism, and it is not just Muslims that need to fully examine the common values of the “peoples of the book.”

1 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=regions&casualties_type=&casualties_max=

2 Taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) as available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/, and as used in the “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information,” to the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, issued in April 2014, and available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224831.htm.

In 1990, the total for the Middle East was 253.6 million. In 2003, it was 329.8 million. It was 410.6 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 82.6 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 149.7 million. In 1980, it was 185.7 million. In 1990, it was 231.3 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 267.4 million in 2025 and 332.0 million in 2050.

The totals for the MENA region, using the prior definitions of North Africa and the Middle East would be 38.7 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 31.6 million. In 1980, it was 39.7 million. In 1990, it was 58.1 million. In 2003, it was 70.8 million. It was 81.8 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 90.5 million in 2025 and 100.0 million in 2050.

If the totals were adjusted for a more traditional “Middle East” -- and to include Iran, while excluding Cyprus and Turkey -- the totals for the Middle East would be 38.7 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 74.2 million. In 1980, it was 95.1 million. In 1990, it was 137.0 million. In 2003, it was 183.6 million. It was 231.3 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 267.4 million in 2025 and 332.0 million in 2050.

The totals for the entire MENA region, using the prior definitions of North Africa and the Middle East would be 82.6 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 149.7 million. In 1980, it was 185.7 million. In 1990, it was 253.6 million. In 2003, it was 329.8 million. It was 410.6 million in 2015, and was projected to

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7 For a good example, model the casualty trend data by region, subregion, and country using using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/, and http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=casualties&casualties_type=&casualties.


15 The U.S. Census Bureau definition of North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Its definition of the Near East include Bahrain, Cyprus, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the UAE, the West Bank, and Yemen.

This definition of the Near East excludes Iran and includes Cyprus and Turkey. Iran would add 16.4 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 31.6 million. In 1980, it was 39.7 million. In 1990, it was 58.1 million. In 2003, Iran had 70.8 million. It was 81.8 million in 2015, and was projected to increase to 90.5 million in 2025 and 100.0 million in 2050.

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The totals for the entire MENA region, using the prior definitions of North Africa and the Middle East would be 82.6 million in 1950. In 1973, the total was 149.7 million. In 1980, it was 185.7 million. In 1990, it was 253.6 million. In 2003, it was 329.8 million. It was 410.6 million in 2015, and was projected to
increase to 473.4 million in 2025 and 589.7 million in 2050. The total for 2015 was 5.0 times the total for 1950. The projected total for 2050 would be 7.12 times the total in 1950.


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17 Based on the database and model in the U.S. Census Bureau International Database available at http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?N=%20Results%20&T=4&A=both&RT=0&Y=2015&R=-1&C=BA,KU,MU,QA,SA,AE.

18 Measured in PPP terms.


22 Measured in PPP terms.


