The Islamic State Campaign: Key Strategic and Tactical Challenges

Anthony H. Cordesman
Grand Strategic Context

• Secular, “Christian” U.S. with poor track record in Iraq and ties to Israel; lack of allied confidence in U.S. in Arab world and Turkey; No allied unity.

• Islamist State is only one of many regional and “Islamist” challenges: Morocco to Philippines: Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Pakistan, Central Asia, Myanmar, Thailand.

• Islamist State is only one of many Jihadist movements and threats even within Syria and Iraq; 70+ in Syria alone.

• Defeating Islamic State will still leave Jihadist movements, continuing threat.

• Caught between in two increasingly sectarian civil wars with failed regimes in Syria (Aleites, Hezbollah, Iran-IRGC) and Iraq (Shi’ite militias, IRGC, Kurds).

• No chance of meaningful victory even in Iraq without Iraqi political unity. No clear good alternative in Syria.

• Many competing strategic priorities: Afghanistan, Ukraine, Asia, U.S. domestic issues and budget.

• Uncertain but growing Congressional and public support; none for major ground presence.
US Must Deal with Three Major Threats in every Serious Counterinsurgency Campaign

• Threat One: The Enemy
• Threat Two: Host country(ies) allies, and “neutrals”
• Threat Three: The U.S.
A US Tactical Response using Airpower and Special Forces will Fail

- Must look beyond the Islamic State as an enemy
- Must respond to overall politico-military-economic challenges
- Integrated civil-military operations critical
- Integrated operations in Iraq and Syria critical
- Victory or defeat depends on fundamental changes in partners and partnering
War with Multiple Threats: The Enemy(ies)

• The Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS) plus Iraqi “Ba’athists,” Syrian elements of Al Qaeda, other Islamist forces, alienated Sunni local and tribal fighters.

• Maliki legacy of secular, authoritarian corruption, tensions with Kurds, military and police corrupted and used to abuse Sunnis and population.

• Anti-U.S. hardline Shi’ite militias, factions.

• Assad regime: Secular extremism and violence that has made 20% to 30% of population IDPs and refugees, killed at least 192,000 civilians.

• Hezbollah?

• Iran and IRGC?

• Private (and semi-official) funding from outside states. Tolerance of IS and other Islamist trade, financial flows, and exports.
War with Multiple Threats: Islamic State

- First protostate for Jihadist extremism.
- Ability to operate simultaneously in Iraq and Syria, potential sanctuary in Syria.
- Highly flexible in absorbing and using captured equipment, captured money, and economic resources.
- Effective use of irregular war and terrorism, exploit sectarianism.
- Superior intelligence on weaknesses in Iraqi and Syrian forces, and conflicting loyalties within them.
- Decentralization, delegation of initiative.
- Absorption of rival or similar force elements, ability to get foreign and tribal volunteers.
- Seeming ability to handle key elements of governance, local justice, fundraising, infrastructure, and economy.
- But, extremism, fact is isolated and fact is not real state, make potentially vulnerable.
War with Multiple Threats: Can’t win Without Changes to Iraqi Government

- Iraq ranked 171st most corrupt of 176 governments rated by Transparency International.
- World Bank rates as one of the worst performing governments in the world.
- Key divisions between central government and Kurds.
- Two years of Shi’ite abuses of Sunnis and Kurds: Maliki legacy of secular, authoritarian corruption, tensions with Kurds.
- Command appointments politicized and command chain bypassed. Military and police corrupted. State Department reports growing major abuses of Sunnis and population.
- Failed economic and human development progress at every level. Failure to share oil wealth or economic development.
- New prime minister is still part of Dawa faction; movement towards unity uncertain at every level.
- Uncertain role of IRGC/Iran
Iraq: The “Poor” Oil State with Terrible Income Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CIA GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
<th>World Bank GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
<th>IMF GDP Estimate, PPP</th>
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World Bank Governance Ratings

Aggregate Indicator: Government Effectiveness

Aggregate Indicator: Control of Corruption

Aggregate Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence

Aggregate Indicator: Rule of Law
Iraq: UN Estimates Human Development Far Worse than Syria

**Figure 2: Trends in Iraq's HDI 2005-2012**

![Graph showing trends in Iraq's HDI from 2005 to 2012](image)

**Table B: Iraq's HDI indicators for 2012 relative to selected countries and groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (PPP US$)</th>
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Iraq: Population Pressure and “Youth Bulge”

Population in 2014: 32.6 million

**Age Structure:**
- Median age: 21.4 years
- 0-14 years: 36.7% (male 6,093,069/female 5,878,590)
- 15-24 years: 19.6% (male 3,237,212/female 3,142,202)

**Labor Force:** 8.9 million
- Dependency Ratio = 76.2%
- New entrants to the labor force each year
  - Men = 332,000
  - Women = 322,000
War with Multiple Threats: Key Military Challenge is Reforming The Iraqi Military

- Three years (2011-2014) of steady politicization, Maliki interference in command selection, tolerance of corruption, bypassing command chain.
  - Selective use of army and police against Sunnis and popular protests. Shift in order of battle to focus on loyalty, Shi’ite forces.
  - Lack of MOI and MoD and effective structure.
  - Selling of lower level posts and promotions.
  - Rise in absences, AWOLS, ghosts, and rapid turnover.
- Failure to create other elements of legal system and rule of law. Use of ill-trained and equipped police as paramilitary-repressive forces.
- Lack of US advisors to help transition from force generation to combat; key issues in sustainability, training, role of JOs and NCOs.
- Failure to build on Sunni “Sons of Iraq,” integrate Sunnis back into Iraqi forces and police; failure to correct de-Baathification abuses.
- Failure to integrate Pesh Merga into ISF; build up as effective force.
- Continuing role of Shi’ite militias, factions.
War with Multiple Threats: Partners

- Current lack of good and helpful relations between Arab states and Iraq; Turkey and Iraq.
- Scattered and divided efforts with serious rivalries within Gulf states, distrusts of US, uncertain role of Turkey.
- Turkey is seriously mismanaging Syrian refugees, Pesh Merga, and PKK ties. Major financial links to Islamic State through Mosul and oil trade.
- Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE show caution and restraint. Qatar and Kuwait present problems at least at the private citizen level.
- Islamic State money and trade flows do not face adequate barriers.
- Key issue of extent to which some kind of dialogue and modus vivendi is possible in with Iran in dealing with Iraq.
- Need to steadily reassess actual Syrian policy towards dealing with Islamic State.
War with Multiple Threats: The US Threat to the US

• Lack of clear and consistent commitment by Administration, uncertain resources. Confusion of rhetoric with reality.

• Critical issue of willingness to act in both Syria and Iraq, sustain action long enough to succeed.

• Military focuses on tactical goals to the exclusion of political and economic realities and need to defeat insurgents at the political, governance, and economic levels.
  • Uncertain fusion of military and CIA intelligence and targeting efforts – tensions exposed in dealing with Afghanistan.
  • Focus on having host country forced to do it “our way” rather than helping them improve by doing it “their way.”
  • High rates of civil and military rotation for short tours, lack of focus on proven area expertise

• Can’t be ruthlessly objective about problems in host country security forces and partners, effectiveness measures.

• Civil side usually too weak to press for effective reform and change; understates civil problems, fails to use aid effectively.
The Preconditions for Success

- Clear strategic commitment to what will be a long-term effort dependent on Iraqi political reform and support by regional allies.

- Effective civil-military unity of effort focused on defeating Islamic State by creating Iraqi unity, allied unity of effort in dealing with Syria. Defeat it by exploiting its extremism, economic weaknesses, political tensions.

- Major and lasting commitment to rebuilding Iraqi forces; supporting efforts to find some effective answer to creating rebel forces in Syria.

- Integrate air-land-intelligence operations in Iraq and Syria to defeat the Islamic state.

- Make it clear to all Iraqis and regional allies that US operations, aid, and training will not be used to take sides in Iraqi sectarian and ethnic tensions and conflicts even if this means shift to containing the Islamic state rather than defeating it.

- Fully understand the ideological and religious character of the war and work with Iraqis, Syrians, and regional allies so they fight on this level.

- Understand the problem of dealing with an enemy with the ideological and religious advantage, anticipate the use of human shields, efforts to limit air strikes.
“Imploding” the Islamic State - I

- The key is fusion of Iraqi, US, allied effort with possible expansion to include Syrian moderate rebel factions.
- Use combination of military and civil action to exploit extremism, weakness as a protostate.
- Fully analyze and constantly monitor ideological/religious, political, governance, and economic fault lines.
- Focus Arab and Iraqi strategic communications.
  - Get Sunni Islamic support to counter IS from Arab Sunni clerics; joint Sunni and Shi’ite messages of unity within Iraq.
  - Get Iraqi, Syrian rebel, Arab, Turkish media to constantly publicize IS extremism, abuses, atrocities.
- Target key and mid-level IS political, military, religious figures – include local leaders that provide key support.
- Use sanctions, financial warfare, strategic bombing, sealing of border to deny economic viability, military financing.
- Offer meaningful federalism, provincial power.
“Imploding” the Islamic State - II

- Create strong financial incentive programs to bring Sunnis back to supporting government; create stable financing and oil revenue sharing arrangements with Sunnis and Kurds. Pass petroleum laws.

- Restructure and clean up Iraqi forces to make them national and professional; end de-Baathification abuses of Sunni officers.

- Include Pesh Merga in aid to Iraq forces, support Sunni fighters on government side.

- Create strong neutral Ministries of Defense and Interior.

- Restructure key police elements to give them national paramilitary capability.

- Publically suppress an sectarian or ethnic violence, especially by Shi’ite and Sunni militias.

- Attack stream of foreign volunteers by preventing entry, giving targeting priority and killing, arresting on exit.
Focusing the Use of Air, UCAV, and Missile Power

• Expand strikes to include Islamic State targets in Syria.

• Commit to a long campaign at the needed level of intensity and do not give the Islamic State freedom of action when it is not attacking.

• Use Special Forces, CIA, and local assets to develop targeting that can reliably attack Islamic State and its support with minimal civilian casualties and collateral damage.

• Make US strike action and support for the IAF conditional on Iraqi restraint in avoiding Sunni and Kurdish targets, actions prolonging civil war.

• Use Special Forces and locals to create targeting that shows Sunnis that oppose Islamic State that they will have direct strike support.

• Develop a strategic targeting plan to cripple Islamic State in key areas like oil exports, trade, power, communications in ways that minimize impact on civilians.

• Bring Saudi and UAE air forces into strike action.

• Explain and re-explain that such strike action produces far less civilian suffering than alternative forms of military action.
Tie All Operations to Shaping the Domestic (and International) Strategic Message

- Minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage. SOF role in targeting, limiting Iraqi forces secular and ethnic clashes.
- Show humanitarian concern at all levels, protect minorities, civilians,
- Real time justification of air and UCAV strikes. Don’t let IS capture the initiative.
- Real time explanation in depth of US role in operations within security limits: Make the case in depth.
- Highlight all Iraqi and allied progress and success.
- Show SOF and US role in encouraging effective governance, security for population.
- Making Sunnis and Kurds into allies is critical in messaging as well as fighting.
- No cases where US forces become associated with security abuses, killings of civilians, ties to militias and Iraqi forces abusing other factions, POWs.
Provide and Sustain an Adequate and Conditions-Based US Military Presence

• Accept the fact that no US ground combat units can be committed for the foreseeable future, but,

• Commit an adequate mix of Special Forces, US military Advisors, Agency experts, and area experts if the Iraqi government makes suitable reform and progress.

  • Put Special Forces and military/CIA advisors into forward combat units and key police elements to target, advise, create bridges between Iraqi government, Sunni, and Kurdish forces.

  • Put Special Forces and military/CIA advisors to Sunni tribal forces if this becomes possible.

  • Reexamine past contingency plans to provide a limited forward presence and advisory role with moderate Syrian rebel forces.

  • Do not plan for “30 days.” Adopt an intelligent, phased rotation policy rewarding longer deployments.
Combat Capability, Not Force Generation, Approach to Aiding Iraqi Forces

- Focus on current order of battle, immediate SOF and other advisory efforts to aid and strengthen good and more effective units.
  - Aid them in doing it their way; not our way.
- Seek to insert SOF elements into Sunni forces if they develop; find mechanism for SOF or intel monitoring of any Shi’ite militias that are active and linked to government,
- Work with new Iraqi government to withdraw and rebuild worst units that have committed sectarian abuses, or have gone sour.
- Limited SOF presence or role in stepping up transfers for sensitive weapons like MANPADs, SHORADS, ATGMs.
- Use SOF embeds in forwards to aid in targeting air/missile strikes, provide focused intelligence in ways that have tactical value.
- Use SOF embeds to identify areas where action risks creating conflicts with Sunnis and Kurds. Forward “civil-military observers.”
Don’t Nickel and Dime: Size the US Presence to the Need if the Iraqi Government Reforms

“Fusion” Effort in Dealing with Regional Partners

• Effective US support of Iraqi government and forces depends on “fusion” of uncertain efforts with local allies.

• Syria as important as Iraq: Need to strengthen US-Jordanian-Saudi-UAE support of moderate rebel factions in Syria as much as possible.

• Need to get Jordanian-Saudi-UAE support of new Iraqi government if it truly becomes national, and funds and arms to push it towards unity with Sunnis and Kurds.

• Turkey can play key political and economic role in sealing off Islamic State access to the North.

• Need every possible US effort to get Arab and European support to sanction Islamic state in terms of money and trade. Shut off volunteers and financing.

• Need Arab and Turkish ideological support of US role and British role; efforts to bring Sunnis and Shi’ites together, counter Islamic State religious arguments and indoctrination.

• Need to create US civil-military coordination effort: Top policy levels to Special Forces and operators in the field.
No One Follows Where No One Leads: Need to Sustain Uncertain US Domestic Support

No meaningful support for conventional ground troops

Public divides on providing arms and ammunition to the Kurdish military forces who are opposing the insurgents, with 45 percent in favor, 49 percent opposed.

Increase in support for U.S. military action among Democrats and political independents – up by 10 and 8 points, respectively, while remaining largely stable and higher among Republicans. Similarly, support has increased by 8 to 12 points among liberals, moderates and those who say they’re “somewhat” conservative, while holding steady among strong conservatives.

Two-thirds of Democrats and 63 percent of liberals approve of the president’s handling of the situation, falling among political independents and moderates (to 37 and 44 percent, respectively) and plummeting to a quarter of conservatives and two in 10 Republicans.

In June, among Democrats who opposed air strikes, 74 percent also approved of his work on the issue; today it’s only 56 percent.

ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST POLL: Iraq
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AFTER 7 a.m. Wednesday, Aug. 20, 2014
Rise in Support from June to August

**POLL**

*Washington Post-ABC News poll*

**Q:** Overall, do you support or oppose U.S. airstrikes against Sunni insurgents in Iraq?

- **June:** 45%
- **August:** 54%
- **Now:** Support 71%

**SITUATION WITH ISLAMIC STATE**

**Q:** How much do you see the Islamic State as a threat to the vital interests of the United States?

- **Very serious threat:** 59%
- **Somewhat serious:** 31%
- **Not so serious:** 5%
- **Not serious at all:** 2%
- **No opinion:** 2%

**Q:** Overall, do you support or oppose . . . (% who support each)

- **U.S. airstrikes against Sunni insurgents in Iraq:**
  - All: 71%
  - Republicans: 83%
  - Democrats: 67%
  - Independents: 67%

- **Expanding strikes against insurgents in Syria:**
  - All: 65%
  - Republicans: 74%
  - Democrats: 60%
  - Independents: 64%

- **U.S. arming Kurdish military forces, who oppose the insurgents:**
  - All: 58%
  - Republicans: 66%
  - Democrats: 62%
  - Independents: 53%

Back-Up Data
Islamic State Map - BBC

Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria Needs Analysis Project
Iraq: Fighting in August 2014

Iraq Population Density

Source: "Iraq: Country Profile," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) map found in "Iraq: Population Density," Map Collection, Perry-Castañeda Library (PCL) at the University of Texas at Austin Jan. 2003
Iraq Sectarian and Ethnic Map

Iraq Sectarian and Ethnic Map

Iraq: Rise in Civil War Casualties

The number of civilians killed in July was 1,186 (including 106 civilian police), while the number of civilians injured was 1,511 (including 177 civilian police). A further 551 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including Peshmerga and SWAT, were killed and 467 were injured (not including casualties from Anbar operation). According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the total civilian casualties in Anbar up to 31 July inclusive were 198 killed and 611 injured, with 71 killed and 179 injured in Ramadi and 127 killed and 432 injured in Fallujah.

Iraq: Civilian Casualties as of 8/2014

Baghdad, 1 September 2014 – According to casualty figures released today by UNAMI, a total of at least 1,420 Iraqis were killed and another 1,370 were injured in acts of terrorism and violence in August*.

The number of civilians killed was 1,265 (including 77 civilian police), while the number of civilians injured was 1,198 (including 105 civilian police). A further 155 members of the Iraqi Security Forces were killed, and 172 were injured (not including casualties from Anbar operation).

“In August alone the UN estimates that 600,000 people have been displaced while thousands continue to be targeted and killed by ISIL and associated armed groups simply on account of their ethnic or religious background”, said the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG), Mr. Nickolay Mladenov. “The true cost of this human tragedy is staggering”, he added.

“Despite the difficult conditions, urgent measures are being taken by the Government of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the international community to alleviate the suffering of those fleeing the violence and to secure the return of displaced people to their places of origin in safety and dignity”, Mr. Mladenov added.

CAVEATS: Data do not take into account casualties of the current conflict in Anbar, for which we report separately the figures received from our sources, but which remain unverified by UNAMI. In general, UNAMI has been hindered in effectively verifying casualties from conflict areas and areas under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and associated armed groups. In some cases, UNAMI could only partially verify certain incidents. In addition to the verified figures provided below, UNAMI has also received, without being able to verify, reports of hundreds of casualties along with a large number of reports of civilians who have died from secondary effects of violence, having fled their homes but who perished from lack of access to water, food, medicines and health care in extreme weather conditions. These cases have not been included in the final tally. For these reasons, the figures reported are the absolute minimum number of casualties for the month of August - the actual figures could be significantly higher.

Civilian Casualties (killed and injured) per governorate
Anbar excluded, Baghdad was the worst affected Governorate with 857 civilian casualties (246 killed, 611 injured), followed by Nineveh (625 killed, 70 injured), Kirkuk (95 killed, 248 injured), Diyala (140 killed, 94 injured), Salahadin (105 killed, 103 injured).

Operations in Anbar
According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the total civilian casualties in Anbar up to 31 August, inclusive, were 268 killed and 796 injured, with 53 killed and 360 injured in Ramadi and 215 killed and 436 injured in Fallujah.

Source: UNAMI: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?pli=1#inbox/148310bf4a3a12f0
Iraq: The IDP Effect as of June

Source: UNHCR
30 August 2014: A comprehensive count carried out jointly by the Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) and the United Nations indicates that some 850,000 Iraqis have been displaced and sought refuge in all three Kurdistan Region Governorates since January 2014. According to the Kurdistan Region Ministry of Planning and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) the vast majority of the recently displaced people – 64 per cent - have sought refuge in the Duhok Governorate.

Of the 1.8M Iraqis displaced nationwide, it is estimated that over 600,000 people were displaced this month alone. This increase is due to an upsurge of violence in various parts of the country, particularly Ninewa, Diyala and Anbar.

The latest figures compiled by the KRG under the leadership of the Minister of Planning and IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix, show that the displaced population are now living in more than 1,000 sites in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq alone.

The latest waves of IDPs to the KR-I, more than 850,000 in 2014, plus some 216,000 Syrian refugees registered by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and previous large population movements of around 335,000 which took place prior to 2014, brings the total number of people who sought refuge in the KR-I to 1.4 million. These latest waves add to the very heavy burden borne by the people and government of the KR-I.

Duhok Governorate’s seven districts now host over half a million people seeking shelter, food, water, medicine and protection after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory in Sinjar and neighbouring communities prompting them to flee. Since
Iraq: 1.5 Million of Concern as of August
Iraq: Humanitarian Snapshot as of 8.28.14

SITUATION OVERVIEW
As a result of massive displacement to northern Iraq since 3 August, the United Nations has increased its planning number of people displaced in Iraq to 1.8 million. This is an increase of 250,000 from the previous planning figure of 1.2 million. The IDP number does not include people displaced in Iraq before 2014, nor does it include the 225,000 Syrian refugees in northern Iraq. Population movement to Erbil and Dahuk governorates (Kurdistan Region) has been stabilizing. Local authorities in Dahuk report that there are now over 400,000 IDPs in the Governorate. Displacement from Ninewa and Anbar continues to central and southern governorates (Kerbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, Baghdad, Basra), where local authorities are overstretched and unable to respond to increasing demands in basic services.

DISPLACEMENT SINCE 9 JUNE

TIMELINE OF EVENTS
January
Approximately 65,000 people are internally displaced due to fighting in Anbar Governorate.

February
Continued fighting increases the number of IDPs to approximately 140,000.

March
Intense fighting centres in Anbar Governorate; cities of Fallujah and Ramadi: increases the number of IDPs to 380,000.

June
The conflict increases the number of IDPs from Anbar to 650,000 and in central and northern parts of Iraq to 650,000.

July
Access to basic services in areas controlled by armed groups deteriorating.

August
Violence in northern Iraq and several regions of the county has resulted in an increase in the number of displaced Iraqis.

DISPLACEMENT
1.8 M estimated displaced since 1 Jan 2014

Estimated displaced by destination (in thousands)
- Dahuk: 520,4
- Anbar: 370,4
- Erbil: 184,0
- Kirkuk: 126,0
- Baghdad: 106,1
- Sulaymaniyah: 95,2
- Ninewa: 90,3
- Najaf: 74,7
- Kerbala: 50,3
- Diwaniya: 58,4
- Salah al-Din: 38,3
- Wasit: 22,6
- Babylon: 16,5
- Qadisiya: 15,4
- Thi-Qar: 6,4
- Misan: 4,3
- Muthanna: 3,6
- Basra: 3,6

Source: OCHA Iraq @OCHAIraq, Aug 31, 2014 pic.twitter.com/FbMSBXC1c9
Source: Political Geography Now: http://www.polgeonow.com/search/label/syria
Syria: Civil War Map – Early 2014

Iraq: Sunni Protests 2013

Protests in Iraq
Week 3: January 5 - January 11, 2013

Overview: As anti-government protests continued in Anbar, Nineawa, and Salah ad-Din, pro-government counter-protests were held in the southern cities of Karbala, Kut, Diwaniyah, Samawa, Najaf, and Basra. Additional military cordons were established in Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad-Din, and Nineawa to contain the anti-government demonstrations.

Claude: Since week one of the protests, forces from the Ninevah Operations Command attempted on numerous occasions to close Al-Farik Street, the site of the anti-government demonstrations in Mosul.

On January 7, army vehicles ran over and wounded four people in an attempt to disperse protesters. On January 8, army forces opened fire, wounding four more demonstrators. In response, the Iraqi Federal Police 3rd Division was ordered to take over security of the west side of Mosul.

Grodus: On January 11, the Tigrit Operations Command deployed the 11th Iraqi Army Division north of Tikrit to prevent demonstrations in Hawija.

Reports from January 11 state that Iraqi Army forces closed the Baghdad-Mosul highway near Taji.

Grodus: On January 7, forces from the Baghdad Operations Command established a cordon in Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad in order to prevent protesters from blocking the highway north. On January 11, security was heightened in Adhamiya to deter protests.

Bassam: On January 9, forces from the 29th Mechanized Brigade of the Iraqi 7th Army Division closed the Tibril border crossing between Jordan and Iraq, citing unspecified security concerns.

On January 9, the Baghdad Operations Command deployed a force on the eastern edge of Fallujah.

Major Highway

Anti-government protest
Pro-government protest

The report considers documented killings … This report finds that when the fully identified records from four documentation groups plus the Syrian Government were combined and duplicates identified, these five databases identified 191369 unique killings.

• Sex of the Victims: Of the 191369 documented killings in this report, 85.1% are male, 9.3% are female, and 5.6% of records do not indicate the sex of the victim.

• Age of the Victims: Age is unknown for 83.8% of all records…However, the full enumeration does include 2165 records of victims 0-9 years old, and 6638 records of victims 10-18 years old.

• Location of Killing: The three comprehensive non-governmental sources included in this report (the Syrian Center for Statistics and Research, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, and the Violations Documentation Centre) all record more killings in Rural Damascus than in other governorates.

• Combatant and Non-Combatant Status: the status of the victims as combatants or non-combatants is unknown for all but a few records, and consequently, combatant status is not assessed in this report.
Syria: 9.3 Million of Concern: 2.9 Million Refugees Outside Country; 6.5+ Million IDPs = 52% of Total of 17.9 Million

Syrian Refugees in Iraq as of August 2014

Syria: Refugee & IDP Map 1/2014