Africa in the Wider World

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Preface

The U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit, hosted by President Barack Obama in August 2014, acknowledges the increasing strategic, economic, and diplomatic importance of Africa and signals a desire by the United States to step up its engagement with one of the world’s fastest-growing regions.

The summit provides a timely opportunity to take stock of some of the dynamic changes that have been taking place in Africa’s 54 countries and examine the shifting contours of its relations with the rest of the world.

In this collection of essays, regional and functional experts from CSIS consider the main themes of the summit, including trade and investment, peace and security, and democracy and good governance. They consider how Africa’s transformation is changing the way the continent is viewed externally and driving new types of engagement on security, development, and economic issues.
The U.S.-Africa Leaders’ summit, to be hosted by President Obama in Washington, D.C., from August 4 to 6, will bring welcome, high-profile attention to a continent that has always struggled for sufficient attention from U.S. policymakers. More than 40 heads of state have been invited for a series of discussions organized around the themes of boosting trade and investment, peace and security, and development. The big emphasis will be on showcasing the investment climate in Africa and building links between U.S. companies and prospective new business partners on the continent. The summit is not intended to rival the likes of China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on African Development, regular gatherings that generate splashy new aid pledges and offer African leaders one-on-one audiences with their hosts’ heads of state. Instead, the Washington summit has the more general aim of profiling the rising importance of Africa to the United States and signaling a commitment (without dollar amounts attached) to increase the frequency and level of engagement.

These are laudable objectives but the summit has faced criticism for trying to tackle too much in too short a space of time, instead of focusing on the trade and investment agenda that was originally proposed following President Obama’s trip to Africa last summer. Similar criticisms have been leveled at the Obama administration’s policy toward Africa for lacking a grand narrative, an overarching framework for engaging with the continent. However, the idea of fashioning a policy that is relevant to an entire continent—never mind the most diverse continent in the world—is increasingly redundant. Sweeping statements about Africa, or continental summits for that matter, must be accompanied with caveats and qualifiers. The summit guest list reflects this. Invitations have been withheld from nations currently suspended from the African Union, although Morocco, which is not even a member of the African Union, will be welcomed. Leaders including Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan have been excluded because they are not “in good standing” with the United States. Democracy and human rights activists have asked why value judgments have been suspended for a set of other authoritarian leaders who have received invitations.


The reality is that Africa in 2014 is becoming more, not less, diverse, and the region—and U.S. interests in the region—harder to pigeonhole than ever before. Africa is neither the “hopeless continent” dismissed by the Economist magazine at the turn of the century; nor is it “rising” in the uniform way the current froth from some media commentators and investors would suggest.

Africa is diverging along all the key trajectories:

- **Economically:** Speeches by U.S. officials on Africa invariably include the line that 7 of the 10 fastest-growing world economies are in Africa. Some countries, like Kenya and Rwanda, are indeed doing well, and will continue their growth surge thanks to smart fiscal stewardship and efforts to improve their investment climates. Others, such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea, are recording impressive growth built on shaky foundations, based overwhelmingly on the performance of their natural-resource sectors. Others still, such as Uganda and Zambia, are growing at a steady pace but failing to make the economic and governance reforms to keep pace with growing populations. A final group including Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Central African Republic are falling farther and farther behind due to factors including economic mismanagement, corruption, and conflict.

- **Governance:** Some African states enjoy increasingly solid, technocratic governance, particularly in the economic realm. But institutional performance across the continent is patchy, with weak legislatures and judiciaries failing to stand up to over-powerful executives. Civil society, increasingly under pressure, is nevertheless finding and using its voice more effectively. While Africa remains on a democratic trajectory, progress has stalled in recent years. The annual Freedom in the World Survey for 2014 ranks 10 countries as “free,” 22 as “partly free,” and another 22 as “not free.”\(^3\) In some countries, such as Ghana and Senegal, democratic governance has been consolidated and governments alternate between rival parties at election time. At the other end of the spectrum, autocratic leaders in countries like Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, and Cameroon cling to power at all costs. In between, many countries fumble their way through the messy, contentious process of democratization. Most of these countries hold elections, but in too many, they are mere window-dressing for continued rule by the incumbent or an anointed successor. Frustrated losers instinctively challenge electoral outcomes, often with justification.

- **Security:** While parts of the continent have enjoyed long periods of peace, particularly in southern Africa, other regions have seen a regression. State-on-state conflict is no longer an African problem; instead conflicts are subnational, pitting nonstate armed groups of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals against central governments or each other. Civilians bear the brunt of the casualties. The Sahel is a particularly vulnerable region where weak, under-resourced governments struggle to contain armed opponents.

Given this bewildering diversity, is it even possible to classify Africa as a meaningful unit for policy engagement, or is it simply too unwieldy? Certainly the task is becoming harder, but at the same time, there are some common challenges and opportunities worth noting that should help guide the choices policymakers make as they consider their engagement in Africa:

- Poor governance is Africa’s Achilles’ heel, a shortcoming that is at the heart of virtually all the continent’s problems. African governments from the national down to the local must approach leadership with more seriousness and dedication or face growing challenges from their increasingly emboldened, empowered, and interconnected citizens. The United States can assist governments that are serious about reform; and in those that are not, help civil society improve its ability to hold leaders to account.

- Wealth inequality is a looming concern, particularly in resource-rich, poorly governed states. Impressive headline GDP growth figures in many countries fail to capture the anger and desperation rising among the have-nots.

- African-led solutions to the continent’s problems are desirable but the capacity to provide them is still lagging. This is particularly true in the security sector, where too few African countries have the desire, the professionalism, or the ability to meet the challenges of terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime. At the subregional and continental level, governing institutions like African Union must step up to the challenge or face growing irrelevance.

- Africa’s fast-growing youth population will define Africa’s path in the coming decades, becoming the dynamo for transformative growth in some countries and a locus for instability where governments are unable to meet their aspirations for jobs and opportunities.

For the United States to be relevant in Africa, a long-term, sustained commitment will be required to meet the headline challenges and capitalize upon the opportunities. This commitment must not only be a “whole of government” one, involving the deployment of skilled diplomats (sorely lacking right now in the State Department’s under-resourced Bureau of African Affairs), development professionals, and security personnel. More importantly, it must be a “whole of society” approach that brings in U.S. businesses large and small, professionals, academics, and skilled Americans of all stripes to give Africa the sustained attention and seriousness its growing global importance merits. For one thing is clear: Africa is not short of suitors. Plenty of other countries have long-recognized Africa’s importance and are lining up to offer partnership. As the continent surges forward in the coming decades, the United States must keep pace with Africa’s dynamism and diversity or risk being sidelined. By avoiding the temptation to paint grand narratives and by instead devising nimble, flexible, multifaceted policies, the United States can position itself to grasp the opportunities and face down the challenges of this complex, diverse continent.
2 | African Security

Time for a Change in Doctrine?

William M. Bellamy

Africa’s robust economic growth will be a cause for celebration at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ summit in August. Only East and South Asia have grown faster than sub-Saharan Africa since 2002. Surging commodity prices, new resource discoveries, long-overdue improvements in infrastructure, a telecoms boom, and the emergence of new, consumption-minded middle classes have sparked unprecedented investor interest in the continent. During a visit to Africa last May, Secretary of State John Kerry hailed this progress and promised the United States would be a “catalyst in this continued transformation.”

Yet there is darker side to Africa’s economic modernization, and one of its most worrisome features is an escalation of political violence. While big wars causing huge civilian losses are rarer in Africa today than before, smaller conflicts involving rebels, insurgents, and jihadists have proliferated in recent years. Alongside Africa’s older, seemingly intractable conflicts in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan/South Sudan, newer armed movements are generating insecurity even in Africa’s most democratic and prosperous states.

A short list of Africa’s most pressing conflict situations today includes:

- South Sudan, where the government fractured in December 2013 along ethnic lines, leading to an ongoing civil war with heavy humanitarian costs.

- The Central African Republic, whose feeble government collapsed in 2013 under attacks from rebel and mercenary bands and where exceptionally violent sectarian fighting has ensued, creating another major humanitarian crisis.

- The Democratic Republic of Congo, whose eastern provinces remain largely ungoverned and where civilians remain prey to roving militias and ill-disciplined government forces.

- Mali, where a weak government supported by French forces has been struggling to wrest control of half the country from Islamist and separatist militants.

- Somalia, where Al-Shabaab insurgents have retreated from population centers but remain a potent terrorist threat for an ineffective government and for neighboring states.

- Kenya, one of Africa’s stronger and more prosperous democracies, where a wave of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks have triggered heavy-handed, and largely ineffective, security force responses that many predict will only further radicalize Muslim youth.
Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, where the Boko Haram insurgency has killed perhaps 5,000 and displaced 300,000 civilians since 2009, turning northeastern Nigeria into a virtual war zone bereft of functioning government institutions. Nigerian forces have both failed to contain the rebellion and alienated many communities with their scorched-earth counterinsurgency tactics.

One troubling conclusion from these conflicts is that violent nonstate actors are increasingly better armed, more mobile, more motivated, and at least as well networked internationally as the government forces opposing them. A spectacular example was the quick defeat in 2012 of Mali's Western-trained army by fast-moving, well-equipped, and multinational Tuareg rebels and Islamist forces. Likewise, the battle of relatively wealthy and well-armed states like Nigeria and Kenya to contain rapidly metastasizing terrorist threats on their territory shows violent nonstate actors are evolving the capacity to disrupt and terrorize faster than states are learning to defend their territory and populations.

Alarmed by the spread of insurgencies and government breakdowns, the African Union (AU) has redoubled its call for Africa to develop its own intervention capabilities. And while AU military forces have performed well in Somalia, the overall record of member states responding to AU calls for concerted action is not promising. The AU is years behind its original 2010 target date for creating regional intervention brigades to address crises such as those in Mali and the Central African Republic, where only France's intervention prevented outright state collapse.

Building Africa’s defensive capacities is a longstanding U.S. priority. President Obama’s June 2012 Africa strategy again highlighted this goal, noting that the United States would “expand efforts to build African military capabilities through low-cost and small-footprint operations.” From its base in Djibouti and through stepped-up, brief visits by Special Forces personnel, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has made training of African militaries the centerpiece of its strategy. In addition, the State Department has funded and the Department of Defense has executed military support operations in Africa ranging from training, equipping, and paying the salaries of AU forces in Somalia, to airlifting African troops to crisis zones such as the Central African Republic and Mali, to sharing with African and European partners intelligence on hostile forces such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A small contingent of U.S. Special Forces has supported Ugandan and other forces attempting to hunt down the remnants of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

President Obama’s recent promise at West Point to add another $5 billion to worldwide counterterrorism partnerships means the United States will likely be further ramping up military support programs in Africa. What will not change, however, is the fundamental principle of keeping U.S. forces out of direct combat roles in Africa except for infrequent, brief interventions where U.S. lives or vital interests are at stake.

Regardless of how much security assistance is poured into Africa, near-term prospects for containing rebel and insurgent violence are uncertain at best. Across Africa, the critical missing ingredient is not a lack of funding, training, or equipment. Of course, many African militaries (and police forces) are chronically under-resourced and staffed by underpaid and demoralized personnel. But these shortages are symptoms of a deeper...
flaw, which is the reluctance of many African governments to undertake urgently needed reforms of their security forces.

Whether it is tight budgets, or high-level corruption, or institutional fears of powerful armies, or just official indifference, far too many African governments have for years dodged the need to align their security forces with the actual threats their nations face. Thus most African military and police forces continue to focus exclusively on regime protection and maintenance of public order. Protecting civilian populations—against armed gangs, insurgents, or even ordinary criminals—is a secondary mission, and one few African security forces perform well.

This is why Nigeria’s military, for years considered one of Africa’s strongest, has been completely outmatched by an elusive and ruthless Boko Haram. Embattled civilians in northern Nigeria have come to fear the indiscriminate rampages of Nigerian troops almost as much as the attacks of Boko Haram. Kenya’s police forces, for whom the Kenya public has low regard, lack the capacity to investigate even ordinary crime, much less comprehend and counter growing terrorist attacks inside Kenya. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s armed forces, despite years of training by Western militaries, are rightly viewed by Congolese civilians as ill-disciplined predators, not protectors.

Where publics distrust governments, fear security forces, and are reluctant to cooperate with authorities, rebellions and insurgencies take root more easily. For historically “strong” African states like Nigeria and Kenya this is a painful discovery in a time of crises.

At the August summit American officials are not likely to lecture their African guests on their shortcomings as security providers. However, the urgency of Security Sector Reform, especially in those states facing acute crises, is worth more than just a passing mention. Without changes in doctrine to make civilian protection their highest security priority, many African states will be hard pressed to counter violence from increasingly sophisticated and determined nonstate actors.
3 | The Unfinished Health Agenda in Africa

J. Stephen Morrison and Talia Dubovi

Some of the United States’ most vital and impactful relationships with African nations are in the health sector. In the past decade, over $50 billion has been committed to addressing HIV/AIDS through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the investment of significant additional resources has led to dramatic advances in the prevention and treatment of infectious disease; improvements in maternal, newborn, and child health; better training of health workers and management of health systems; and progress on outbreak control. This expansive, historic engagement has earned the United States considerable good will, and it has prompted partner governments, international institutions, foundations, and other donors to increase their own commitments to health. It has also put a spotlight on the considerable unfinished health agenda in Africa and the need for the United States and others to look for new and innovative ways to expand affordable, equitable health services on the continent, including better leveraging the potential of the private sector to achieve future substantial gains in health in Africa.

The tenor of recent discourse in U.S. policy circles regarding the future of U.S. development assistance—and health in particular—might give the impression that a transition to African countries taking predominant responsibility for managing, financing, and delivering health services is imminent, and that the United States will soon be able to substantially draw down its investments in the health sector. However, this proposition is mistaken and misses one critical question: will African states realistically acquire the capacity in the near to medium term to take ownership of their health systems? In a very few instances—South Africa, Botswana, Namibia—there is reason to be hopeful; in the majority of cases, there is much more work to be done, and a true transition to country ownership remains a distant aspiration.

The question of capacity has many facets. The first and most obvious is funding. While levels of U.S. and international development assistance for health have been resilient—and have in fact grown slightly between 2011 and 2013 in spite of the global financial crisis and austerity measures—there is general consensus that future aid budgets will be flat at best. Expansion of services—to reach more people, address additional diseases, improve infrastructure and technology, and expand training—will have to come from increased efficiencies, enhanced private-sector participation, and higher budgetary commitments by national governments. Economic growth on the continent is promising, but it is not universal. And even in countries that have experienced 3–6 percent growth

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over the past decade, there has not been in most cases a commensurate expansion of health budgets. Former prime minister Raila Odinga of Kenya recently highlighted how African leaders must always balance health needs with other competing priorities, from infrastructure and transportation to public safety and education. The United States and other international donors cannot assume that economic growth will automatically lead to robust investments in health systems.

In the meantime, African nations also face the growing economic and health burden of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), such as diabetes, hypertension, respiratory ailments, and cancer. Dr. Thomas Frieden, director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has called NCDs the “unstarted agenda”—a formidable challenge that has yet to be addressed meaningfully by national governments or international donors. Driven by obesity, dietary and lifestyle changes, tobacco and alcohol use, and environmental contamination, NCDs have the potential to derail economic gains while dramatically increasing the demands on health systems. Transitioning to country ownership will thus require not only assuming responsibility for managing the infectious disease and maternal, newborn, and child health infrastructure created by international donors but also expanding systems to be able to prevent, diagnose, and treat NCDs. It requires changing public behavior, and better engaging the private sector to address chronic illnesses.

A second facet is human capacity. The World Health Organization estimates that there is a global shortage of 7.2 million health care workers who are needed to adequately address the health needs of the population. Countries that have tried to address this gap through voluntary health worker programs face serious questions about how long volunteers can be expected to stay on the job, and paid programs, such as Ethiopia’s Health Extension Program, face equally serious questions about how long funding can be sustained. In addition, health workers need to be educated and trained, and countries must address longstanding problems with the quality of work environments that threaten retention rates. Building the necessary workforce will require serious political dedication along with significant budgetary commitments.

Third, a lack of adequate infrastructure limits many countries’ health-sector capacity. This shortfall takes two forms: the need for physical infrastructure, including roads, electricity, and water, and a lack of public health infrastructure. Power Africa, the Obama administration’s major development initiative on the continent, was created because two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africans lack reliable electricity supplies. Basic reporting and surveillance systems that allow for decisionmaking, health monitoring, evaluation, and accountability are severely lacking. Combined, these gaps in infrastructure pose significant challenges to building sustainable health systems.

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3 Ibid.
4 Raila Odinga, keynote speech at “Health in Africa: The Unfinished Agenda,” conference hosted by CSIS, CARE, and World Affairs Council of Atlanta, Atlanta, May 19, 2014.
5 Thomas Frieden, keynote speech at “Health in Africa: The Unfinished Agenda,” conference hosted by CSIS, CARE, and World Affairs Council of Atlanta, Atlanta, May 19, 2014.
8 Frieden, keynote speech at “Health in Africa.”
Finally, governance and leadership are the ultimate arbiters of the future. When corruption siphons health dollars into off-shore accounts,\(^9\) when laws against homosexuality impede access and threaten the safety of entire populations,\(^{10}\) and when failures in governance lead to governments that are not responsive to the needs of their citizens, health outcomes suffer.\(^{11}\)

This is not to undermine the real and important gains that have been made or the potential of countries across the continent to eventually take full ownership of their health systems. But prematurely transitioning to country ownership threatens to roll back the important health gains that have been achieved in the last decade.

The United States and the international community can and should play a role in addressing these barriers and helping African governments develop the capacity to assume the cost and management of providing health care to their citizens. The Obama administration should use the occasion of this summit to emphasize the role that the private sector can play in health, and to push hard for corporate leaders to engage more fully to find new ways to bring affordable, quality services on an equitable basis to all African citizens.

Most importantly, it is the African leaders gathering in Washington who must decide if they have the political will to advance the health agenda. Without their commitment—to expand budgets, end corruption, engage the private sector, build and sustain community-level primary health care delivery, improve conditions for health workers, and delegitimize homophobia and human rights violations—countries cannot progress toward sustainable health systems. The future of health in Africa is in their hands.

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\(^9\) Odinga, keynote speech at “Health in Africa.”
\(^{11}\) Odinga, keynote speech at “Health in Africa.”
Linking Trade and Development in Africa

Daniel F. Runde and Conor M. Savoy

The U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit will focus on trade and investment opportunities in Africa, while highlighting America’s commitments to security and democratic governance on the continent. Although the administration has prioritized relations with sub-Saharan Africa, it remains unclear what “deliverables” will be offered up at the summit; this can be rectified and there is a big opportunity at the nexus of trade and development for the United States to transform its relationship with Africa from one based primarily on assistance into a true economic partnership of equals. This can be achieved with the deployment of some focused resources and by renewing—and reenergizing—the flagship trade agreement between the United States and Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

The August summit takes place at a critical moment for the United States and its trade and development relationship with the continent. This relationship is defined by two critical, but at the moment unlinked, agreements: AGOA and the recently concluded Bali agreement on trade facilitation. AGOA provides duty-free, quota-free entry for more than 6,000 products into the United States, although, in practice the vast majority of goods that enter the United States under AGOA have been oil and other petroleum products. AGOA eligibility is determined annually for sub-Saharan countries based on improvement of labor rights and movement toward a market-based economy. Currently, 39 Africa countries are included in the program. AGOA is due for renewal when it expires in September 2015; it was renewed in 2004 with relatively few changes. Simply renewing AGOA as it currently stands would be a missed opportunity that would fail to advance U.S.-Africa trade and economic relations; rather, the administration must explore ways to link a new agreement with the recently concluded Bali agreement.

The Bali agreement on trade facilitation, reached in December 2013 following nine years of negotiations, offers significant potential for both developing and developed countries.

Trade facilitation, as defined by the Doha Agreement, is “further expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity building in this area.” It is estimated that trade facilitation could provide the world economy with more than $1 trillion of additional trade, evenly split between developed and developing countries. USAID estimates that reducing global trade costs by just 1 percent will lead to an approximately $40 billion increase in world income.

Bali seeks to finish the job of earlier agreements by identifying what needs to be done to help countries meet their obligations to remove bottlenecks to trade. By signing the Bali agreement, countries committed themselves to making the necessary reforms and improvements to meet trade facilitation obligations. Countries must designate which
parts of the agreement they can implement immediately, after a transition period, and after a period during which they receive technical support and capacity-building assistance. Some African countries are already pursuing implementation through existing programs, but far more will need technical assistance from donors to become fully compliant with the agreement. Implementation costs of the agreement will vary from country to country and there will of course be an initial burden on all involved including regulatory, institutional, coordination, training, and infrastructure costs, among others.

The Obama administration should use the opportunity presented by the visit of so many African heads of state in August to pursue a multipronged strategy around the Bali agreement. First, it must have an expansive conversation with African leaders about the kinds of assistance they require to become compliant with the Bali agreement. This discussion should then lead to a convening by Washington of bilateral and multilateral donors to determine how to meet these requests. Additionally, the summit offers an opportunity for the administration to host a broad discussion with African leaders on how to shape a new AGOA that would be of mutual benefit to both parties. President Obama should begin work with the U.S. Congress as soon as possible to identify funding to support a new trade facilitation program that could be integrated into the AGOA renewal.

The Obama administration has the opportunity to fundamentally transform U.S.-Africa relations. Since decolonization the primary means of interaction between the United States and Africa has been foreign assistance, but this is an outdated approach that does not reflect present-day realities. U.S. companies see the economic potential that exists in sub-Saharan Africa and foreign direct investment has grown in recent years, yet significant barriers remain to further trade with, and investment in, the region. Overcoming these barriers will require efforts to transform AGOA from a trade preference program to one that seeks to improve trade facilitation and ultimately build trade capacity across Africa. This summit offers the best opportunity to begin this process.
China and Africa

Is the Honeymoon Over?

Jennifer Cooke

China’s commercial and diplomatic surge into Africa some 15 years ago was greeted by many in Africa with exuberant expectations of what expanded engagement could bring to the continent in trade, investment, and growth. The China-Africa partnership has delivered on many fronts, and for many African economies the relationship has been truly transformative. But as Chinese engagement with Africa grows broader and more diverse, the initial euphoria has begun to subside. African governments and citizens are taking a more skeptical and pragmatic look at the costs and benefits of their partnerships with China. And the Chinese government is recognizing that it will need a more nuanced and differentiated approach to its African partners if it is to maximize the political and economic opportunities of engagement.

The initial exuberance around China’s expansion was understandable. African governments welcomed an economically powerful alternative to traditional Western donors. The package deals of aid, loans, and investment that China brought to many of its new commercial partners were equally welcome, and China was in a number of cases willing to pay premiums well over market price to seal deals and secure its foothold. The high-visibility construction projects—stadiums, hospitals, ministries—that China was willing to build (albeit most often with Chinese labor) were likewise happily accepted. And China’s “respect for sovereignty” and policy of noninterference in domestic African affairs didn’t hurt either.

For China, Africa is a relatively low priority in the country’s broader foreign policy agenda, but expansion into the continent was an important part of its global “Going Out” strategy and its aspirations as a rising global power. Access to new energy sources was a critical driver of China’s push, and today 16 percent of China’s oil imports come from Africa (largely Angola, with a smaller portion from Sudan). Crude oil makes up 64 percent of China’s overall imports from Africa. Africa is the source of 6 percent of China’s iron ore imports (largely from South Africa) and 8.3 percent of its imports of copper (mostly from Zambia). Beyond commodities, Africa is seen as a market for relatively low-cost goods and textiles that have been at the heart of China’s export strategy. Concessional loans to African governments have often been structured to provide Chinese contracting companies with privileged access to lucrative construction and infrastructure deals. On the political front, Africa’s 54 states offer the possibility of a powerful bloc of support for China’s positions in global institutions and debates.

The China-Africa partnership has remained strong and the benefits that the relationship has brought to African economies are widely acknowledged. Chinese lending has allowed many African countries to build sorely needed infrastructure, and Chinese commodity demand has driven high average growth rates in Africa for more than a decade. These new revenues have in turn opened up possibilities for diversification into
other sectors. Chinese trade with Africa—$210 billion in 2013—now exceeds that of the United States.

But as the relationship has matured and the realities of more protracted interaction set in, both China and African governments are stepping back from a largely uncritical embrace toward a more pragmatic and realistic assessment of the costs and benefits of partnership.

For African governments a number of factors are behind the shift.

First, domestic constituencies, including civil society groups, unions, and business owners, have increasingly pressed their respective governments on the more controversial aspects of China’s commercial engagement, including environmental damage, worker compensation and safety standards, the glut of Chinese textiles that have undercut African textile producers, employment quotas, and local content requirements.

Second, African governments are thinking more strategically about their global engagement and commercial diplomacy. Countries like Angola have recognized the need to maintain a diverse portfolio of investment partners, and are aware that a slow-down in China’s growth could have serious repercussions on their own economic prospects. A number of governments, including South Africa, have become more vocal in protesting the lopsided nature of their trade relationship with China, and many are beginning to chafe at the extraction of natural resources (by China and others) without benefit of local processing or value addition.

Third has been the expanding presence of a broad swathe of private Chinese citizens in Africa—over 1 million, by some estimates—including small traders, private businesses and entrepreneurs, and workers. Many have successfully set up shop and are integrated into local economies. But instances of worker safety violations, bribes to local officials, and tensions with local communities have tainted perceptions of China and pose a reputational risk to the Chinese government (although it has very little control over these diaspora populations). In 2013, Ghana expelled more than 4,500 Chinese nationals accused of operating in illegal gold mines. A growing area of controversy has been unabated popular demand in China for ivory and rhinoceros horn, which has fueled a poaching pandemic across Africa. Wildlife trafficking has generated increasingly sophisticated criminal syndicates operating across the continent.

For its part, China is beginning to acknowledge the limitations of its noninterference policy. After investing more than $20 billion in Sudan’s oil sector, it saw the bulk of the country’s oil assets ceded to the newly independent South Sudan, and then watched as South Sudan disintegrated into civil war, reducing production by more than one-third. With its commercial interests seriously at risk, China has taken on a far more direct diplomatic role in supporting regional mediation efforts. In Zimbabwe, China’s long-standing relationship with the government is beginning to fray, as corruption, mismanagement, and uncertainty around presidential succession have caused the Chinese government to reconsider the wisdom of its unconditional support for Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) regime. In April, the Chinese government rebuffed the Zimbabwe government’s plea for a $10 billion economic rescue package, citing high political risk and an uncertain commercial return. As China’s investments expand, so too does its stake in protecting those investments.
against insecurity. China has for the first time deployed combat troops to Africa to join the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, a departure from its usual contribution of engineers and noncombat personnel.

China is also beginning to appreciate the importance of public opinion in building long-term partnerships in Africa. In 2013, President Xi Jinping sought to reassure his Tanzanian audience that China would continue to help African countries “transform their advantages in energy resources into advantages in development.” Prime Minister Li Keqiang has acknowledged “growing pains” in the relationship, and was careful to emphasize the importance of “inclusive growth” during his 2014 Africa tour.

Areas of friction in the China-Africa relationship are important, but they are unlikely to fundamentally derail China’s expanding engagement within Africa. China’s demand for energy resources will only rise over the long term, and some of its partnerships may shift, as new natural gas producers in East Africa come on stream. Rather, the tensions reflect a relationship that is becoming less infused with hyperbole and hope and more grounded in economic and political realities. African governments are beginning to demand more from their Chinese partnerships, and China appears more attuned to public perceptions and the need to extend beyond its traditional government-to-government engagement.

A bigger challenge to the relationship may be approaching, as China’s economic growth slows and as its economy moves beyond the frenzy of construction that has sustained high commodity demand. Already, China’s demand for iron ore has waned, with stockpiles at Chinese ports at a record high. A series of recent financing scandals, involving the use of imported minerals to secure loans, may suggest that Chinese commodity demand has been artificially inflated, and the scandals may make commercial banks more cautious in financing Chinese mining investments. A drop in China’s mineral commodity demand would be a major setback to a number of China’s African partners and underscores the urgency of broadening their economic base and capitalizing on the opportunities that Chinese engagement has delivered.
India’s Africa Story
Richard M. Rossow

One hundred years ago Mahatma Gandhi left South Africa, returning to India to the movement for Indian independence. Today, India’s largest companies are reversing this course and beating a path back to sub-Saharan Africa, flush with capital and expertise in creating opportunity in uncertain conditions—skills honed through dealing with a similar environment at home. There will be growing competition with American firms for business success in Africa, but also some potential areas for collaboration.

There is a colloquial Hindi word—jugaad—which roughly translates into “workaround.” Jugaad is the overriding principle of doing business in India. The system for launching and operating a business has many obstacles, and the most successful businesses are those that have been able to find ways to work around the existing system. This frame of mind for building a business will make India’s multinationals—of which there are many—poised for success in emerging markets. In fact, India is already one of the largest investors into, and traders with, sub-Saharan Africa.

By most measures, India ranks among the top five investors into Africa. Between 2003 and 2012 Indian firms concluded 133 deals valued at around $15 billion.\(^1\) In 2013, India invested in 49 projects in Africa, up from 41 the previous year.\(^2\) This represented the largest percent-growth in new investment projects of any of the top six investors in Africa. More importantly, India’s investments have punched above their weight in terms of job creation. While India ranks as the fourth-largest investor, it is the third-largest job creator in Africa of any foreign investor, accounting for 7.1 percent of all jobs created through foreign investment in the last five years.\(^3\)

Over the last 25 years, India’s trade with Africa has increased nearly 6,000 percent. That growth rate is a bit behind its trade increase with Latin America or Asia, but well ahead of its trade growth with Europe and North America. Total trade between India and Africa in fiscal 2013 was about $43 billion, compared to $65 billion with North America, $103 billion with the European Union, and $204 billion with the rest of Asia.\(^4\)

There are key reasons why Indian firms gravitate toward Africa. There are some natural affinities, particularly with Anglophone Africa, where a shared language and elements of retained British influence on society and governance serve to create a basic comfort level. In addition, some of the difficulties of doing business in sub-Saharan Africa—

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\(^3\) Ibid.

getting approvals, poor infrastructure, and weak contract enforcement—are prominent features of doing business in India, and many Indian companies have devised methods to work around such obstacles.\(^5\) A third reason is that Indian firms have witnessed a deterioration in the business environment in their own country over the last 10 years and been looking for high-growth opportunities outside their border.

The United States also ranks among the largest investors in Africa, typically ranking either first or second in terms of total number of projects. Much like India, it is often less of a resource grab, and more about becoming deeply involved in a high-growth part of the world. The United States has created the second-highest number of jobs in Africa since 2007 through its investments, at 8.3 percent of the total.\(^6\) Overall, investment from all U.S. sources in Africa is expected to increase to $60.4 billion in 2014, up from $56.6 billion in 2013.\(^7\)

For U.S. policymakers and business leaders, this leads to a critical question: will the United States and India become direct competitors in Africa? Both sides have strengths—while the United States has powerful global brands and deep pockets, Indian firms are more acclimated to this type of business environment, and have already created products and services that target large consumer segments found both in their home market as well as Africa. Only time will tell which model will prove more successful.

But there is another lesson to be learned here—there is likely going to be a high degree of complementarity between American and Indian firms. These potential complementarities should be targeted by business leaders, and accentuated by government leaders to maximize the economic benefits for both countries as well as African consumers. EY paints an excellent portrait of how this may work. IBM has had a presence in Africa for decades, but revenue from Africa was only a fraction of the company's global revenue.\(^8\) In 2010, a major Indian client of IBM, Bharti Airtel, acquired an African telecommunications provider and promptly contracted IBM to oversee infrastructure and systems integration across 16 markets in Africa. This one deal helped expand IBM's footprint and investment activities in Africa.

There are similar examples of American and Indian firms collaborating to find new markets. One famous example is the American pharmaceutical firm Gilead. Through its novel access program, it has contracted with 17 low-cost pharmaceutical producers—16 of them in India—to reduce prices by 80 percent, and dramatically expand the availability of Gilead's HIV therapy (the other producer is based in South Africa). The net result—about 5.4 million people\(^9\) in low-income countries are taking Gilead's HIV therapies produced by these licensing partners. This type of innovative partnership can mean more than profits and enables greater access to life-saving medicines in places like sub-Saharan Africa, home to two-thirds of the world's HIV-positive population.

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\(^6\) EY, Africa 2014.


\(^8\) EY, Africa 2014.

Africa is no longer simply the “market of the future.” Indian companies view the region as a natural market for their products and services, and have some familiarity with its business practices. As the United States expands its own investments into Africa, there will certainly be a growing competition between American and Indian firms, but also some important synergies that can hopefully lead to success for all parties—particularly Africans themselves.
The Three Faces of African Energy

Sarah O. Ladislaw

Africa’s place in the energy world is defined by its growing population and energy consumption, its legacy and new resource endowment, and its strategic location. In recent years excitement over newfound natural gas resources in East Africa has dominated headlines, heralding speculation about an emerging age of African energy. At the same time, however, increasing discoveries and development of U.S. shale gas and tight oil resources and the reality of the continued turmoil in historically large producing areas like Nigeria and Libya have put a damper on the “rise of Africa” narrative. As a consequence, Africa’s energy landscape is far more complicated than any one narrative might suggest. In fact, there are at least three faces of African energy that will have strategic implications for the continent’s place in the global energy landscape for the next several decades. Each one requires careful public, private, domestic, and international attention.

Traditional Oil Exporters: Production Challenges and Changing Patterns of Trade

Several African suppliers have been and remain important contributors of energy resources to the global market. In 2012, the North and West Africa regions together were responsible for around 13 percent of total crude and product exports. Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and Libya all ranked among the top 15 oil-exporting countries in the world. Together they represented 9 percent of global oil production. However, production in all four countries has been flat or declining since 2010. Libya has experienced the most dramatic fluctuations, due in large part to ongoing political turmoil. Current production is estimated at less than 200,000 barrels per day. In Nigeria, theft and sabotage continue to hold production below 2 million barrels per day. Algerian and Angolan production are in a state of marginal decline with both countries needing more investment to bring on greater supplies. These major African oil producers and exporters all traditionally serviced U.S. and European markets. With the onset of domestic tight oil production, U.S. imports of African crude oil have declined. Looking forward, African oil producers also see challenging and declining markets for their crude in Europe as well. Increasingly these supplies will likely find their way to markets in Asia.

New Resource Development: Big Finds, Uncertain Future

Several promising oil and natural gas resource discoveries in recent years have created optimism about Africa’s overall resource potential. In West Africa, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and other countries have undertaken significant offshore development programs to assess the resource potential of their deepwater resources. According to the

U.S. Geological Survey, Western Africa’s offshore deepwater could hold 71.7 billion barrels of oil, 187.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 10.9 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Given the right investment frameworks this potential could be attractive compared to other international investment opportunities. On the east coast of Africa in Mozambique and Tanzania, major world-class natural gas finds have created a great deal of excitement and investor interest. So far three notable oil and gas finds in these two countries alone have revealed an estimated 127–160 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas resources. That said, the development of these resources faces significant challenges, notably the immature and uncertain investment terms over the long run, the lack of domestic capacity and infrastructure to develop, transport, and utilize these resources, as well as governance and institutional capacity issues. All of this is on top of the very dynamic international gas market investment landscape that makes development of costly greenfield projects all the more uncertain.

Finally, several African countries are home to potentially significant unconventional oil and gas resources. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and South Africa were all assessed as part of a recent global Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas study commissioned by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Of the 137 shale formations assessed in 41 countries, Libya ranked fifth in terms of shale oil potential and Algeria and South Africa ranked third and eighth respectively in terms of shale gas potential. Resource potential by no means guarantees development, and each country is at the very early stages of evaluating the possible commercial opportunities. Development of these prospective resources can be an important contributor to African economic growth but also the global oil and gas market picture. Africa is expected to account for 10 percent of global oil and 9 percent of global gas production by 2035, as well as 23 percent of interregional gas exports and 10 percent of interregional oil exports in that same year.

Africa the Energy Consumer

Africa’s energy demand is growing faster than any other region of the world and its share of energy exports is expected to decline from 51 percent of production today to 36 percent by 2035 as demand for energy on the continent grows by over 90 percent over that same time period. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to half of the 1.2 billion people who lack electricity, and 17 of the 20 countries with the lowest electricity consumption in the world are in Africa. Addressing this gap is not only important for meeting broader societal development goals but it can also provide enormous investment and technological opportunities for investors. Countries around the world are simultaneously investing in the development of African energy resources and the modern infrastructure (transportation, telecommunications, and electricity) requirements that will underpin future economic growth and investment opportunities. The U.S. government launched its own strategic Power Africa Initiative in 2013 designed as a multigovernment agency, public-private partnership to catalyze investment opportunities starting in six key countries in the region. The initiative brought together

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6 Ibid.
35 partners from various regions to commit $14 billion of funding (not all of it new) to investments that will increase generation capacity, improve electricity connection, boost cross-border electricity trade, and enhance domestic resource management capabilities. The energy infrastructure investment need in Africa far exceeds any single country’s efforts or capabilities but it does appear that a new strategic game is afoot to capture not only the resource-development potential in Africa but also the new market for consumption of goods and services.

Conclusion

Africa's energy landscape is dynamic and important to regional and global supplies. Part of the exuberance over Africa's economic rise has focused on the new energy discoveries that could serve as engines for growth and sources for energy if developed in a profitable and sustainable manner—big “ifs” over the near to medium term. But African countries without significant energy resources are growing as well, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zambia. Moreover, energy development is not necessarily a guarantor of a sustainable economic growth and development trajectory and, if mismanaged, can actually serve to undermine economic and political stability goals.

This growth and its implications have garnered a great deal of attention. As the world economy is “shifting east,” eastern focus is shifting west. The growing interest of Asian nations—including China and India, but also Middle Eastern countries—in both Africa's resources and growth opportunities is making the Indo-Pacific region one of the most interesting geopolitical areas of growth, opportunity, and possible tension going forward.

The competitive field for Africa's natural resources is well trodden by global entrepreneurs and governments from around the world. The key for many African nations is to encourage development of a natural resource base to fuel an era of sustainable economic growth and development.

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When one thinks of the relationship between Europe and Africa today, two images that come to mind are of French military forces intervening in the Sahel region and Libyan immigrants attempting to reach the Italian island of Lampedusa on unnavigable vessels. While increased instability in Africa and migration from Africa to Europe are important dynamics, perhaps an even more profound driver of today’s evolving European-African relationship is the dramatically shifting demographic picture in both continents.

When African countries became independent in the 1960s, Africa’s entire population was half the size of Europe’s, which stood at 277 million. Today, the proportion is now the exact opposite. Africa has twice as many inhabitants as Europe, and its population is expected to increase to 1.9 billion people by 2050. As Africa’s population explodes, Europe’s is set to decline from 740 million to 726 million within that same timeframe. This population reversal has and will continue to shape all aspects of the relationship, including security, development, and migration issues, with consequences—both positive and negative—that will influence both continents.

On the positive side of the ledger, Africa’s population growth will elevate its future geo-economic importance and potential, as the continent has experienced an average GDP growth of 5.2 percent over the period 2003 to 2011. In the last decade alone, six of the world’s fastest-growing economies have come from Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, and Rwanda). Due to its proximity and historical ties, Europe has traditionally been a strong economic partner to Africa in terms of both trade (responsible for 28 percent of African imports and 31 percent of African exports) and official development assistance (representing 45 percent of ODA to Africa). Europe remains Africa’s top trading partner and its volume of trade has increased.

Yet Europe is not alone in its increased interest in strengthening economic ties with Africa. China’s increased economic engagement in Africa has progressively reduced Europe’s share in African markets. Trade between China and the continent surpassed US$200 billion in 2013, up from $10 billion in 2000. This trend is expected to persist in the coming years as Europe faces increased global economic competition in Africa, and African countries expand their economic ties with a broader set of trading partners, some of whom place less emphasis in their relationships on human rights, transparency, or good governance.

Africa’s dramatic population spike—combined with increased political and sectarian unrest and climate change-related stresses—have contributed to an increase in migration to Europe. Although most African migrants remain in Africa as they move from one country to another, beyond Africa European countries are their most sought-after destinations abroad. It is estimated that 7 million African migrants currently reside
in Europe, providing their countries of origin with a vital source of income through remittances. Remittance flows in fact have become so great that in 2012, they constituted the largest wealth flows to Africa ahead of foreign direct investment and official development assistance.

While European remittances have been a financial boon for Africa, the presence of increasing numbers of migrants has created a significant political backlash in Europe. Europe's ongoing economic woes have caused a growing number of Europeans to blame immigrants for the lack of jobs (unemployment in some countries has exceeded 25 percent, with youth unemployment hovering near 60 percent in countries such as Greece and Spain). As migration issues rise to the forefront of political debate, xenophobic parties are on the rise, as evidenced by the outcome of recent European Parliamentary elections. Greece's neo-fascist Golden Dawn Party won an impressive 9.4 percent of the vote; however, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and France's Front National earned the most votes, with 26.8 percent and 24.9 percent respectively, soundly defeating parties currently in government.

Changing demographic dynamics, economic insecurity, and rising anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe have led some governments to call for enhanced border controls in recent years. Many European leaders blame the European Union for failing to develop a pan-European immigration policy, and in 2012 the EU home affairs ministers unanimously voted to allow countries to temporarily reinstate border restrictions in the face of extreme security risks. At the present time, the EU country through which the immigrant first enters the bloc must provide humanitarian and refugee assistance, placing an extraordinary burden on southern European states that have been most deeply impacted by the ongoing economic crisis. Immigrant reception centers, particularly in the economically devastated south, are overcrowded well beyond their maximum capacity. Spain's immigrant reception facility in Melilla, for example, houses nearly 2,000 people, four times the number it was designed to accommodate. Meanwhile, Italy has received approximately 50,000 refugees in the first six months of 2014 alone, well in excess of the 40,000 it counted over the whole of the preceding year.

Political unrest, terrorism, and sectarian strife that stretch from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East have significantly contributed to these migration outflows. In part to counter this trend, the European Union and several other European nations have concentrated their efforts on development and security cooperation with countries that are considered the primary sources of these migration flows. The task is daunting as many of these countries or regions contain “gray zones” that harbor criminal networks, drug and human traffickers, and, in some cases, terrorists. Nonetheless, the European Union has conducted 15 peacekeeping missions and invested more than €1.2 billion in peace support operations in Africa through the African Peace Facility (APF). France in particular has played a leading role in several of these crises by sending 4,500 and 1,600 ground troops to Mali and the Central African Republic, respectively, under the auspices of a UN mandate; providing €976 million in development assistance; and rallying support from other European countries. The French and European military and development response is grounded in the conviction that allowing extremists and terrorists to establish safe havens in these gray zones will lead to the progressive expansion of these areas of instability, creating even larger outflows of migrants to Europe and ultimately posing a direct security threat to Europe.
As violence has spread across the Sahel and parts of the Horn of Africa, security issues have come to dominate the EU-Africa agenda. In April 2014, leaders from over 60 European and African nations agreed to expand cooperation between EU and African institutions and to operationalize the African Standby Force that is designed to enhance the African Union’s ability to internally respond to conflicts. Similarly, at the December 2013 Paris Summit on Peace and Security in Africa, the European Union and its African partners committed to increase their cooperation toward addressing the root causes of conflict, including poverty, radicalization, and trafficking; and supporting international and African efforts to combat them. In particular, European heads of state and government called for a major international mobilization to increase the level and predictability of financing for African peacekeeping operations.

The kidnapping of more than 200 girls in Nigeria by Boko Haram, the shelling of innocent civilian enclaves by militias in Libya, and Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya serve as important reminders of the high costs paid by African civilians caught in the midst of conflict as well as the causal links between regional instability and immigration outflows to Europe. In order for Europe to both reap the economic benefit of a growing Africa while confronting growing security challenges in the region, future European policy toward Africa must better integrate the interdependency between security, development, demography, and good governance. As Africa increasingly opens itself toward a more globalized and networked world, Europe has the tools to contribute to African security, encourage human development, and foster economic prosperity in Africa. Should rampant anti-immigrant sentiment and political demagoguery in Europe remain unchecked, however, Europe may seek to limit its engagement with Africa while still being forced to confront the humanitarian and security consequences of African instability via increased immigration and amplified security threats.
State Building Challenges in Africa

Robert D. Lamb

Many in the United States consider much of sub-Saharan Africa to be outside of U.S. strategic interests. Yet the United States often finds itself drawn into conflicts associated with what is often called Africa’s “state failure” problem. But it is increasingly questionable whether the standard approaches to strengthening fragile states and preventing state failure are based on sound assumptions. The natural response is to try to strengthen state institutions. But when the groups in control of those institutions are part of the problem, the standard approaches would seem inadequate to the task at hand.

Two years ago, a half-hour documentary, “Kony 2012,” was viewed by more than a hundred million people in a week, as individual recommendations to watch it grew exponentially through social networks worldwide. The documentary was criticized for oversimplifying a complicated issue, but it had the effect of raising awareness of the atrocities perpetuated by Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) against innocent people in significant parts of central Africa. U.S. military personnel were already working with Uganda in the hunt for Kony, but in 2012 that effort was escalated and incorporated into an African Union regional task force, which today the United States supports with personnel, aircraft, advice, and aid.

This international effort—to find and neutralize a shadowy group operating in areas with little or no state presence—has met with some success, as LRA activities have receded. But even as progress was being made there, another shadowy group operating in areas outside of state control in Africa was on the rise. An Islamist group called Boko Haram has increased its activities against targets mainly in northern Nigeria and the surrounding region. Most notoriously it kidnapped nearly 300 schoolgirls in April 2014, shocking news that raised awareness worldwide about this insurgent group that the United States designates as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The girls’ whereabouts remain unknown and Boko Haram continues to operate in remote regions.

In the Central African Republic, a rebel coalition took the capital city and deposed the president last year in a civil war that continues today. South Sudan earned hard-won independence from its northern neighbor in 2011 but later fell to in-fighting that resulted in civil war. Mali saw armed conflict break out in its north in early 2012, followed a couple of months later by a coup in the capital (in the south) and further conflict, to which French troops eventually responded.

What all of these events have in common is violence emerging from areas that are not controlled by any state entities. Such areas are sometimes called “ungoverned” but that is not often an accurate description. Certainly national governments are not in control. But in many such places, local authorities have always existed—they just have not been
incorporated into national institutions. In fact, an important reason there is such a weak state presence in such areas is the historically fraught relationships between the groups that control the capital city (and therefore enjoy international recognition as state actors) and the groups that control territories far removed from the capital (and therefore are afforded no such recognition, dismissed as “nonstate” actors). Partnering with the Ugandan and Nigerian militaries might seem a reasonable way to counter the LRA or Boko Haram, but strengthening those militaries cannot resolve the underlying fact that they have been abusive against their own populations and therefore risks furthering conflicts.

The United States is almost certain to continue to be drawn into Africa’s conflicts. According to CSIS data, the United States does not intervene in 80 percent of the dozens of foreign crises that emerge every year. But about every two months, on average, it does take concrete steps to try to influence the outcomes of conflicts becoming or threatening to become violent. Most of the time, the U.S. assets brought to bear are not military, but civilian—diplomacy, aid, trade, and finance. How the United States uses these assets has long been a subject of concern. Civilian power is not always deployed as strategically as global demands require, and there are questions whether the capabilities and cultures of civilian agencies (and the support offered to civilian staff and their families) are appropriate to challenges such as preventing or stabilizing complex conflicts, managing difficult relationships, and building resilience against violent ideologies and attacks.

The problem is that many of these conflicts involve tensions between state and nonstate actors, and U.S. civilian agencies are generally set up to engage with state actors—a bias that does not always help and sometimes harms the ability to influence events constructively. In the absence of more inclusive political settlements, standard development approaches, including institutional capacity building, do not generally contribute to stable political or economic systems. There is a need, therefore, to take a less reactive approach to these conflicts and to improve the way the United States engages with countries and peoples faced with fragility, corruption, ethnic conflict, regional tensions, or violence.
For several decades, the Americas have actively sought to engage other regions of the world. A significant component of this outward push is the proliferation of global partnerships, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership being negotiated between the United States and the European Union; the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which links countries from Asia, Oceania, and the Americas; the proposed Mercosur (Common Market of the South)-European Union trade agreement; and the Pacific Alliance, a Latin American bloc that currently includes a number of Asian, African, Oceanic, and European countries as observers and is opening joint diplomatic offices in Ghana, Algeria, and Vietnam. These agreements are important tools because they serve not only to intensify commercial relations, but also to promote stronger political engagement between the regions involved. When it comes to Africa, however, similar initiatives are surprisingly scarce, considering the regions' historical ties. Economic relations between both regions have also been modest: in 2009, trade between Africa and Latin America amounted to approximately US$23 billion, which accounted for less than 2 percent of Africa’s total imports and exports. This trend, however, seems to be shifting, as the value of trade between Africa and South America alone amounted to more than US$39 billion in 2011.

The Africa-South America Summit, initiated in 2006 by a joint Brazil-Nigeria initiative, is still one of the few forums established to promote greater cooperation between Africa and the Americas. Since its inception, the ASA has hosted three summits, the latest of which was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in early 2013. With an agenda focused on trade, energy, and infrastructure, the summit hopes to sponsor different projects and programs and to promote investment in both regions. But despite its ambitions, the summit lacks a proper funding mechanism and a formal institutional structure and has yet to yield any tangible results for its member states. The inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), in 2010, and the establishment of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue before that are further indications of how Brazil, in particular, acknowledges Africa’s strategic importance.

As Latin America’s largest economy, Brazil has largely led the region’s efforts to engage the continent over the past decade, and may provide an initial model for enhancing regional ties. Brazil has long-standing ties with Africa, particularly with Angola, to which it is historically and tragically linked through the slave trade and Portuguese colonial rule. With half of its population considered black or of African descent and the influence of African culture palpable in several aspects of Brazilian culture—ranging from religious traditions to traditional cuisine—Brazil is perhaps the country in the Americas with the closest natural ties to Africa.
Over the past decade, these ties have had a clear impact in Brazilian foreign policy, as seen by the country's 37 embassies in the African continent—half of which have been inaugurated since 2003. Today, Brazil accounts for over two-thirds of South America's trade with Africa.

More important has been Brazil's expanding investment in Africa. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to date has invested over US$5 billion in Africa, including Angola, Mozambique, Ghana, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe. The bank has financed various infrastructure projects in the continent, for example, the construction of the Nacala Airport in Mozambique and a biofuel processing plant in Ghana, among many others. Currently, 5 percent of the bank's annual US$10 billion budget for foreign trade and investment is directed at African countries. Brazil, however, is hoping to increase those numbers in the future and has recently opened a BNDES office for Africa in Johannesburg. With help from BNDES, the private sector has also served as an important tool for strengthening Brazilian ties with the continent. The Brazilian metals and mining company Vale—which operates the Moatize Coal Mine in Mozambique—is the biggest Brazilian investor in Africa; and Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht is currently Angola's largest private employer. Likewise, state-owned Petrobras currently operates in Angola, Benin, Gabon, Libya, Namibia, Nigeria, and Tanzania, exploring oil and gas reserves.

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) has also been an important partner in the continent—between 2012 and 2014, ABC will disburse more than half of its US$134 million global aid budget in African countries. The agency acts alongside Brazilian ministries and governmental agencies that offer their expertise on particular areas in the implementation of projects. The establishment in Mozambique of an antiretroviral production site is an example of successful ABC collaboration. The facility, which began operations in July 2012, was the result of a partnership with the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, a research institution associated with the Brazilian Health Ministry. Brazil has also been particularly active in Guinea-Bissau, offering assistance on a wide range of issues. Most notably, in 2011 Brazil inaugurated the Joao Landim Security Forces Training Center in the country. Operations were suspended following a 2012 coup d'état, but are expected to resume, under UN auspices. The Brazilian Superior Electoral Court, TSE, has also sent numerous electoral cooperation missions to Guinea-Bissau, and even assisted the country in organizing its most recent national elections.

More broadly, Brazil's ongoing transition from a developing country to a wealthier, more assertive, global player provides a powerful example for African countries to follow. Brazil has shared many of the challenges that now confront African states, including widespread poverty, high rates of HIV/AIDS, stagnant agricultural sectors, unchecked urban growth, and wealth inequality. In some of these areas—particularly in HIV treatment and revitalizing its agriculture sector—Brazil has made significant progress and as a result has useful expertise to share with its African partners.

Brazil's efforts to strengthen ties with Africa have not been limited to aid and investment. The establishment of TV Brazil International is evidence of that. Launched in 2010 as an effort to further promote Brazil in the continent, the Brasilia-based channel is rebroadcast—via Maputo, in Mozambique—to 49 African nations. Brazil shares a language (and colonial history) with Africa's five lusophone states—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. This shared
language has helped foster cultural ties and has been a significant advantage in facilitating business and trade. The Community of Portuguese Language Countries, whose membership also includes Portugal and Timor Leste as well as Brazil and the African lusophones, has also been serving as an important cooperation channel. The community’s agenda focuses on diverse areas, including health, education, poverty, and governance.

Brazil’s expanding engagement with Africa is, of course, motivated by its own national interests. As it pursues a more prominent international role and expanded economic benefits, Brazil sees Africa as a source of opportunity. Africa’s sustained growth rates, and its growing demand for goods and services, have made it an attractive target of engagement for Brazil and for emerging market states around the world. China has been the major player but Brazil, along with India, Malaysia, Russia, Turkey, and others, are also seizing the opportunity.

China remains the continent’s largest bilateral trading partner, but as the Chinese investment model slows, African countries may look to diversify their partners. And as growth in the Americas slows down, it may be time for the region to explore new markets. Africa just might be the best place to start looking.
The Maghreb is looking south to secure its future. Though ties between sub-Saharan and North Africa are deep and go back centuries, after independence in the 1950s and 1960s, Maghreb countries primarily viewed sub-Saharan Africa as an arena for competition among themselves. Europe was Maghreb states’ primary strategic economic and diplomatic partner, and their relations with sub-Saharan Africa were seldom a priority. Now, changing regional and global dynamics make sub-Saharan Africa a vital region for every country in the Maghreb.

Africa’s strategic importance to the Maghreb rests on the pillars of economics and security. Economically, sub-Saharan Africa provides growing markets of over 870 million people for trade and investment at a time when Maghreb governments need to diversify their economic base and trading partners. On the security side, regional unrest triggered by the Arab uprisings in 2011 and expanding ungoverned spaces in Libya, Mali, and other countries creates urgency to strengthen security cooperation with partners in the Sahel and West Africa. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and even Libya have renewed their outreach to sub-Saharan Africa and are defining new priorities for their respective Africa strategies. Each of these countries sees sub-Saharan Africa playing a vital role in enhancing its own economic and security interests in the coming years.

Morocco’s Africa strategy has been the most comprehensive and strategic. King Mohammed VI has personally led the initiative, touring African capitals on several high-profile visits and signing numerous bilateral trade and investment agreements. Morocco is also collaborating with several African countries to expand and improve agricultural production in an effort to increase food security on the continent. It also launched a high-profile effort to train religious scholars and imams from other countries to help combat religious extremism. Tunisia sees important economic opportunities to the south as well, and its president has commented that turning toward Africa is key to Tunisia’s post-revolution strategy.1 In June 2014 Tunis hosted over 350 African senior officials and business leaders for an economic forum, and Tunisia’s government is working with the African Development Bank—which is moving back to Abidjan from its temporary headquarters in Tunis—to help facilitate trade and investment in Africa. Algeria also quietly supports aid and development projects with African partners, while its private sector seeks new investment opportunities to the south. Even Libya, which is enmeshed in internal conflict, is reassessing its Africa policy and looking for opportunities to invest funds from its $5 billion Africa-focused sovereign wealth fund.

Sub-Saharan Africa provides an attractive and growing market for North African states seeking to expand manufacturing. Between 2009 and 2012, the Maghreb’s total exports to sub-Saharan Africa nearly doubled, going from approximately $1 billion to nearly $2

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billion. While the growth is significant for the Maghreb, overall trade remains low. The Maghreb states combined exported less than half of what Turkey exported to sub-Saharan Africa and a third of what Brazil did in 2012.

Beyond exports, Morocco and Tunisia in particular both see themselves as hubs for U.S. and European firms entering and operating in Africa. They share a common language with Francophone Africa, have a better understanding of the business culture, have longstanding networks, and are geographically well positioned. The challenge ahead will be for Maghreb governments to expand their manufacturing base sufficiently to increase exports to sub-Saharan Africa. They will also have to find a comparative advantage in niche markets in order to remain competitive against bigger exporting countries.

Security is another driving force in Maghreb interaction with its southern neighbors. Ungoverned spaces in the Sahel combined with a security vacuum in Libya have created new threats from violent extremist groups and criminal gangs operating along the borders of every country in the region. Greater security cooperation with Sahelian states will be crucial to help stop militant operations, movements, extremist recruiting, smuggling, and financing. Weak governments and poorly trained security forces in many neighboring sub-Saharan states deepen the Sahel’s security crisis and undermine Maghreb security.

While some Maghreb states have assisted their southern neighbors, the challenges of building durable institutions in the Sahel remain monumental, and they are likely beyond the capacity of any single state to resolve. Algeria has sought a role coordinating security operations with its southern neighbors to address cross-border threats. It also helped stabilize Mali after French military operations in 2013. Morocco has assisted in training military officers in neighboring African countries, and it has expanded cooperation on counterpiracy, narcotics trafficking, and disarmament. All of these projects are important, but because they lack coordination and institutional capacity-building mechanisms, their impact will likely remain limited.

More than at any point in the last half-century, sub-Saharan Africa today is crucial to the Maghreb’s future economic prosperity and security. Growing economic ties and shifting security challenges create an opportunity for Maghreb states to reinforce their soft power strategies in the region. Growing consumer markets provide an important and unique opportunity for Maghreb economies to expand their manufacturing base, create local jobs, and boost economic growth. A risk for the Maghreb, though, is that Africa may not accord as much importance to its northern neighbors. The crucial challenge for Maghreb states is to remain relevant for Africa at a time when the continent has multiple suitors vying for markets, investment, and cooperation. This will require not only expanding current trade partnerships but building new ones, and developing competitive products and services. If they work together rather than compete the nations of the Maghreb can build on their historic links with the south to help forge a more integrated and prosperous African continent.

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As Africa’s heads of states convene at the White House with President Obama to build stronger relationships, increase trade and investment in the continent, and partner for the development of their future, let us hope youth are central to the conversation. Why? Of Africa’s over 1 billion citizens, roughly 60 percent are below the age of 30; and the number of youth on the continent is expected to double to 600 million by 2050. They are and will be Africa’s doctors, teachers, lawyers, entrepreneurs, engineers, farmers, journalists, and political leaders. We know of extraordinary young Africans such as William Kamkwamba, whose clean-technology innovations are changing Africa’s energy landscape; Ola Orekunrin, who identified an urgent medical need and started Flying Doctors Nigeria Ltd; and Alengot Oromait, who at age 20 is Uganda’s—and Africa’s—youngest parliamentarian. While they are not alone in displaying the creativity, tenacity, talent, and courage many of this generation possess, far too few of Africa’s youth are being given the opportunity to realize their potential. At the same time, too many young people live in adversity, insecurity, and poverty, and face social, political, or technological disenfranchisement—putting their and their communities’ future at risk. More often than not, the quality of life of their parents, siblings, and children rests with them and they hold the key to breaking or sustaining cycles of poverty.

If the continent is to see more Williams, Olas, and Alengots, Africa’s youth population cannot be sidelined, for without improving their wellbeing, the continent and the world at large are in jeopardy of missing their economic, security, and development goals. There is an opportunity for Africa’s youthful and large labor force to spearhead higher productivity, increased consumption, and an economic dividend—just as East Asia’s rapid and sustained “miracle” growth in the 1980s and 1990s was attributed in part to its large, youthful, educated, and highly productive workforce.

But demography does not ensure this destiny.

To realize a “demographic dividend,” population ratios must not only result in a boon to the labor supply, but fertility rates must also decline, thereby lowering the burden placed upon the workforce by the very young and old. Although fertility rates are decreasing in Africa, according to the World Health Organization, the proportion of births that take place during adolescence is still roughly 50 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with about 2 percent in China and 18 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.

At the same time, it is an open question whether African economies will be able to successfully absorb and maximize the productive capacity of their youth.

Africa needs to generate 1 million new jobs a month just to keep up with new entrants to the jobs’ market and at the same time improve the supply side of the labor market by providing young people with good-quality education and training. For example, there
are still gaps in secondary school services, particularly for girls, and in a survey of labor market experts in 36 African countries by the African Economic Outlook, 54 percent identified skills mismatches as a significant constraint to employment and economic growth.

What we know from the study of youth development, however, is that the spheres of their lives are interdependent—if they are healthy, they will learn more; if they learn more, they are more likely to earn more (especially young women, who are then likely to delay marriage and have fewer children); if they have decent employment and a sense of purpose and value, they are more likely to be “good” citizens and less likely to engage in risky or damaging behavior.

Thus, to seize the demographic opportunity and mitigate the challenges, African leaders and their global partners must understand and address youth wellbeing holistically. The recently released inaugural Global Youth Wellbeing Index\(^1\) shows that Africa faces pockets of challenges and ample opportunities to improve youths’ current status and chances of future prosperity. For example, though Uganda places in the lowest tier of youth wellbeing, Ugandan youth are faring well in entrepreneurship.

This first Index measures the standing of young people in 30 countries on 40 indicators across six domains of youth wellbeing: citizen participation, economic opportunity, education, health, information and communications technology, and safety and security. Of the 30 countries, eight represent Africa: Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. Given that a number of indicators are resource or infrastructure oriented, it may not be surprising that overall the African countries fall into the lower tiers of youth wellbeing. Indeed of the eight, only Morocco and Ghana land above the bottom tier of youth wellbeing, and Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Nigeria hold the bottom four ranks respectively. However, when looking at each domain, the lower-income sub-Saharan countries, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, rise to the top of the citizen participation domain, suggesting they are societies that place a high value on community participation. Further, when looking at indicators assessing youths’ perceptions, African youth are, in most cases, feeling optimistic while their peers in wealthier countries are feeling the opposite. This optimism, coupled with the massive size of the youth population and the potential talent they hold, is an explosive combination that can transform the continent.

In conflict-affected environments, understanding and responding to youth dynamics and demands may be an even more pressing need. In terms of consolidating peace and stability, young people—who are often both victims and perpetrators—must be party to reconciliation, peacebuilding, and political transitions with constructive and meaningful channels in which to participate. Similarly, economic and social recovery efforts must recognize that the unique developmental needs of youth are often interrupted by conflict. They must provide second-chance learning platforms, networks, and inclusive economic and financial systems. African youth can be an asset in rebuilding families and communities beset with conflict, violence, or crime, or if left on the margins, a source of insecurity.

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Investing in youths’ needs such as increasing access to information and communications technology, equipping youth with the education and skills demanded by today’s job market, ending child marriage and improving healthcare—especially sexual and reproductive health—will help improve their current status and build a stronger foundation for adulthood.

The White House summit serves as an important platform for provoking thought and informing a new era of development cooperation and diplomacy—one that ensures that youth are not only on the agenda, but present at the table to contribute to the policies and development of their own nations. Africa presents the world with great opportunities for political engagement and investment, neither of which will be realized if its young cohort is left behind. A sustainable approach to meeting the aspirations of Africa’s youth will require a systems view, one that ensures that policies, institutions, infrastructure, and services are inclusively serving the needs of young people in a meaningful way.

Currently, some 500 young African professional and civil society leaders are embarking on an academic, practical, and cultural learning journey at universities across the United States as Washington fellows, the new flagship of the Obama administration’s reimagined Young African Leader’s Initiative (YALI). As someone who helped launch YALI in 2010 from the State Department, led the First Lady’s Young African Woman Leaders Forum in 2011, and personally observed the 2012 Mentoring Partnership in action, I firmly believe in and know the importance to our collective interests of identifying, supporting, and building a relationship with the continent’s emerging business, civic, and political leaders. However, while recognizing and nurturing a promising cadre of young African leaders, the United States and its African partners must also take bigger strides to ensure that all of Africa’s roughly 350 million youth are given the opportunity to follow their footsteps. This means serious policy dialogue and the allocation of resources to address youth employment, education, health, safety, and rights at scale. The warning by former secretary of state Hillary Clinton that “the world ignores youth at its peril” is as true for Africa as anywhere. Investing in young Africa’s promise is a far better course of action for us all.
Africa Opening or Closing?

Sarah Mendelson

All but unknown and little discussed by the foreign policy community in Washington are two related phenomena playing out in Africa and other parts of the Global South: the opportunities of the open agenda and the formidable challenges of closing space around civil society.

While many inside and outside government focus on big-ticket items such as “Power Africa” and “Feed the Future,” these initiatives will be footnotes to history depending how opening and closing play out—especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In a world of greater opening, we could witness a wave of justice and prosperity sweep from the beaches of Mombasa across the continent to the mountains above Cape Town. Or alternatively, the closing space means the slow, drip-drip of stagnation, interrupted by spasms of violence, with citizens’ voices repressed and leaders who choose not to lead but never leave office.

President Obama recognized the seriousness of the situation last September in New York at an event the White House called “Stand for Civil Society!” While the main focus of the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit will be heads of state, trade, and investments, it is an excellent opportunity for him to again elevate the merits of the open agenda and draw attention to the dangers of closing space for African prosperity and peace.

The Open Agenda Opportunity

The open agenda is a twenty-first-century approach to fighting corruption that among other things harnesses technology, holds governments accountable, and is generally beginning to change how mayors, governors, and even presidents govern and how citizens expect to be governed. The open agenda has traversed the globe, from Brazil to Indonesia, from Mexico to Ukraine.

Emblematic of the open agenda is the Open Government Partnership (OGP), launched by President Obama in September 2011 with 8 other countries and with a membership that today numbers 64. What is especially unique about the OGP is that it gives civil society an equal status with governments. While South Africa was one of the founding countries in the OGP, African states have been slow to embrace this movement even as their citizens have been catalytic in it, demanding more openness from their leaders. The transparency and accountability community is alive and well among African nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but its champions inside governments, unlike in many parts of Asia and Latin America, are few and far between.

Core to the open agenda are budgetary and legislative transparency, access to information, open data, and openness in extractives. While threatening to those who embezzle or rule by dictat, this approach holds the promise of transforming Africa. In many ways, it already is; openness is fueled in part by game-changing, affordable information and communication technologies that have come to market. Any Silicon
Valley entrepreneur would be right at home in Nairobi’s iHub. Platforms like South Africa's Mxit elevate the voice of Africans on issues of social justice. Having been in a “cyber café” in an African village that had neither cyber connectivity nor coffee, but an abundance of enthusiastic young activists wanting to make a difference, the open agenda has champions that do not even know they are part of a movement. That is another form of “power Africa.”

The Closing Space Challenge

Not surprisingly, there is also a backlash. Even as the open agenda is catching on—or perhaps in response—a contagion is growing. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, in the last two years alone, worldwide 64 new laws restricting freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and expression have been introduced, with about 20 already enacted into law. The targets: NGOs and media organizations that help raise citizens’ voices on issues such as transparency, accountability, and a range of human rights abuses. This phenomenon is known as “the closing space around civil society.” Eleven of these laws have been introduced in Africa, by governments whose head of state will be in Washington.

Specifically, as citizens find new ways to organize and express themselves through the use of affordable technology, governments have found new ways to restrict public political space, suppress information, and label anything that they do not like as “foreign.” Lateral learning has taken off—with laws being copied from Russia to Zimbabwe, from Ethiopia to Kenya. It is not an exaggeration to say that this countermovement is affecting the entire global community advancing social justice and human rights. Especially problematic, draconian laws affecting the rights of minority populations in many parts of the world, with Uganda's law criminalizing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and any companies or organizations that support LGBT rights, standing out as especially heinous but not unique.

Why should the Washington foreign policy community care and why should African leaders rethink their approach to civil society? Closing space has multiple foreign and domestic policy ramifications ranging from health and humanitarian assistance to climate change and conflict prevention. Imagine, for example, that Kenya ultimately adopts laws that make it difficult for NGOs to receive funding from foreign sources. How do NGOs engage in vaccination campaigns when there is an epidemic? How do NGOs function when the next famine occurs? What will the next national election cycle look like if the hundreds of organizations that helped create citizen demand for a nonviolent election in 2013 no longer exist? If peaceful protest is made illegal, will individuals resort to violence?

Wanted: Role Models

In the lead-up to the summit, activists from across Africa have descended on Washington worried what their leaders will take away from a meeting that is mainly focused on trade and investment. They fear that closing space, corruption, and a range of abuses will be papered over. They know, even as we discuss what the United States can do to help support civil society in Africa, that ultimately it is up to Africans to grow environments in which civil society thrives, with African leaders having particular responsibility. Simply put, they want leaders who follow the rule of law and after serving
their term, leave office. There is even an incentive: the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership rewards (handsomely) those who rule democratically and then step down rather than stay in office for decades. That the prize, established in 2007, has only been awarded sporadically and not in the last two years despite many elections and aging presidents is just one indicator of the governance gap; the longer a leader is in power, apparently the more virulent the laws pertaining to civil society.

This is the continent that gave the world Nelson Mandela. If the open agenda brings a wave of justice and prosperity, it will depend not only on this generation of leaders but on whether a next generation of Nelson Mandelas emerges. As long as closing space trumps open, stagnation, war, and famine threaten to overtake the vibrancy we see today in many parts of Africa. President Obama can help shape the choices and legacies that this generation of leaders will leave their successors—hopefully sooner rather than later—if he raises these issues and does not just focus on the good news of trade and investment.
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Africa in the Wider World

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