The Challenges to Afghan Transition: 2014-2016

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Introduction
Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan’s other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include:

• Going from an uncertain election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity.

• Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution.

• Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business.

• Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan’s border.

• Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.
Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot succeed unless the ANSF meets the wide range of security challenges which are the subject of this briefing. Many of these challenges are ones that all governments face in shaping an effective security response to major extremist and insurgent threats. Others are unique to Afghanistan.

It should be clear from this list and the briefing that follows that the ANSF faces problems that make a successful Transition a high risk effort even if the ANSF is the only factor considered in supporting an effective Transition. This risk is highlighted in much of the data that follow, and in virtually all of the narratives describing the current state of the ANSF.

At the same time, the briefing shows that there are positive as well as negative trends. The ANSF may be able to succeed if it receive suitable outside support, and particularly if it has a substantial advisory and enable presence from the US, if other key ISAF states like Germany and Italy provide a presence in in key areas, and if the donors provide the funds necessary for the ANSF to develop, operate, and mature.
A Long List of Key Uncertainties

• When will a new President take office?
• Can the new President win popular support… and lead?
• How long will it take to form a functional government at all levels – national, provincial, district?
• How will the mix of power brokers change?
• What security challenges will emerge and when? How will the MoD and MoI function and respond?
• Who will take charge of budgeting, economic planning, and use of international aid?
• What will be mix of corruption versus relative honesty?
• What will be the mix of capabilities – e.g., war-fighting versus security? How will Afghan leaders reshape the rule of law?
• How will layered defense actually interact with governance?
• Accommodation? Search for peace?
• Role of neighboring powers?
The Afghan Government Can Be as Serious a “Threat” as the Insurgents: The Other Challenges of Transition

- Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government
- Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
- Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption
- Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and “layered defense”
- Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations’ personnel
- Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste
- Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight
- Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco-economy
- Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia
World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Government Effectiveness

Voice and Accountability
The Post-Election Challenges of Transition

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• Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
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• Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia
Key Military Challenges

- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
- Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
- Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD.
- Evolution of effective overall command structure.
- Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
- Redefining force structure and force plans.
- Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R.
- Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law.
- Promotion, enlistment, pay, medical, food, housing, security, retirement.
- Leave and recovery, AWOL and attrition.
- National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
- Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
- Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”
Economic Challenges

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent.

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.

• No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank.

• Service sector may leave, export capital, collapse.

• Major barriers to private development.

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.

The President’s Transition “Plan” of May 27, 2014
The Obama Transition “Plan:” May 27, 2014

... Our objectives are clear: Disrupting threats posed by al Qaeda; supporting Afghan security forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.

Here’s how we will pursue those objectives. First, America’s combat mission will be over by the end of this year. Starting next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their country. American personnel will be in an advisory role. We will no longer patrol Afghan cities or towns, mountains or valleys. That is a task for the Afghan people.

Second, I’ve made it clear that we’re open to cooperating with Afghans on two narrow missions after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda.

Today, I want to be clear about how the United States is prepared to advance those missions. At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 98,000 U.S. -- let me start that over, just because I want to make sure we don’t get this written wrong. At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq.

Now, even as our troops come home, the international community will continue to support Afghans as they build their country for years to come. But our relationship will not be defined by war -- it will be shaped by our financial and development assistance, as well as our diplomatic support. Our commitment to Afghanistan is rooted in the strategic partnership that we agreed to in 2012. And this plan remains consistent with discussions we’ve had with our NATO allies. Just as our allies have been with us every step of the way in Afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be with us going forward.

Third, we will only sustain this military presence after 2014 if the Afghan government signs the Bilateral Security Agreement that our two governments have already negotiated. This Agreement is essential to give our troops the authorities they need to fulfill their mission, while respecting Afghan sovereignty. The two final Afghan candidates in the run-off election for President have each indicated that they would sign this agreement promptly after taking office. So I’m hopeful that we can get this done.
The White House Transition “Fact” Sheet: May 27, 2014

Afghans Taking the Security Lead

At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Afghanistan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations agreed to transfer full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014. This transition process has allowed the international community to responsibly draw down our forces in Afghanistan, while preserving hard-won gains and setting the stage to achieve our core objectives — disrupting threats posed by al-Qa’ida; supporting Afghan Security Forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Afghanistan and ISAF nations reaffirmed this framework for transition and agreed on a milestone in mid-2013 when the ISAF mission would begin to shift from combat to support. Last June, the Afghans reached that milestone as the ANSF assumed the lead for security across the whole of Afghanistan and our coalition forces shifted their focus to the training, advising, and assisting of Afghan forces.

Today, Afghan forces provide security for their people and plan and lead the fight against the insurgency. The most recent example of this transition was the effective security provided by the ANSF to enable the April presidential and provincial elections. The ANSF will maintain its current surge strength of 352,000 to reinforce this progress and provide for a secure environment in Afghanistan.

Commitment to the U.S.-Afghanistan Partnership

In May 2012, the President signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that defined a future in which Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation. The two countries pledged to build an equal partnership between two sovereign states premised on mutual respect and shared interests. U.S. commitments to support Afghanistan’s social and economic development, security, and institutions and to promote regional cooperation are matched by Afghan commitments to strengthen accountability, transparency, and oversight and to protect the human rights of all Afghans — men and women. The Strategic Partnership Agreement includes mutual commitments in the areas of: protecting and promoting shared democratic values; advancing long-term security; reinforcing regional security and cooperation; social and economic development; and strengthening Afghan institutions and governance.

The United States continues to support a sovereign, stable, unified, and democratic Afghanistan and will continue our partnership based on the principles of mutual respect and mutual accountability. We remain fully supportive of our partners in the Afghan security forces, and we continue to proudly work side-by-side with the many Afghans who work to ensure the stability and prosperity of their fellow citizens.

International Support for Afghanistan

The United States’ support is part of an international effort to assist Afghanistan as it enters the “Transformation Decade” of 2015-2024. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Afghanistan and NATO reaffirmed its commitment to further develop an enduring partnership that would last beyond the transition of full security responsibility for Afghanistan from ISAF to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. This commitment is a clear message to the Afghan people that they will not stand alone as they take responsibility for their security. At the 2012 Tokyo Conference, Afghanistan and the international community also committed to support the sustainable growth and development of the Afghan economy. Afghanistan’s fiscal capacity is projected to be depleted by 2017 and will be unable to cover shortfalls.
Political Transition

As the Afghans took control for their security, they also worked to usher in a historic transfer of power in Afghanistan. We congratulate the millions of Afghans who voted in the presidential elections in April, and we look forward to the inauguration of their next president later this summer. The United States affirms its support for a fair, credible, and Afghan-led election process and does not support any candidate in the elections -- the choice of who leads Afghanistan is for Afghans alone.

The United States also believes that an Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process is the surest way to end violence and ensure lasting stability for Afghanistan and the region. As the President has said, the United States will support initiatives that bring Afghans together with other Afghans to discuss the future of their country. The United States and the Afghan government have called upon the Taliban to join a political process. We have been clear that the outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process must be for the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with al-Qa'ida, and accept Afghanistan's constitution, including its protections for the rights of all Afghan citizens, both men and women.

We believe that a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can only be possible in a stable and prosperous region. We endorse Afghanistan’s vision for building strong, sustainable bilateral and multilateral relationships with its neighbors and regional partners. We encourage Afghanistan’s further economic integration into the region and support the principles of good-neighborly relations, which include non-interference and respect for sovereignty.

Economic Transition

- Afghanistan has experienced rapid economic growth and remarkable improvements in key social indicators:
- Afghanistan’s gross domestic product has grown an average of 9.4 percent per year from 2003 to 2012.
- In the last decade, life expectancy at birth has increased by 20 years to over 62 years.
- In 2002, an estimated 900,000 boys were in school and virtually no girls. Now there are 8 million students enrolled in school, more than a third of whom are girls.
- In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. Today, 28 percent of the population has access to reliable electricity, including more than 2 million people in Kabul who now benefit from electric power 24 hours a day.

However, challenges remain, and Afghanistan will require continued international assistance to sustain its gains and further meet its development goals. In January 2013, the President reaffirmed the conclusions of the Tokyo Conference, including that the U.S. commitment to align 80 percent of our aid with Afghan priorities and channel at least 50 percent of development assistance through the national budget of the Afghan government as part of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.

The Challenge of Coping Without a Credible Plan and Budget, and Public Support
The first section in this report focuses on the lack of adequate leadership planning, budgeting, and public support.

It lists the areas where the US government – as well as the Afghan government and other powers – have failed to provide leadership, planning, and transparency, and create the institutions necessary for success.

It warns that past failures to sustain successful transitions have been the rule and not the exception.

It shows the need for leadership that can win congressional and popular US support, and that goes far beyond empty rhetoric about terrorism. That provides a clear strategic justification for US action, and provides a credible path forward.

It shows the rate at which US spending has already been cut, and the lacking of any meaningful budget panning and details in the President’s FY2015 budget request.
The BSA is Only One Aspect of Transition

- Leadership and transparency to win public and Congressional support
- Integrated civil-military plan for post-2014 US presence and aid
  - A clear US and allied plan for an on-going advisory presence and aid funding of ANSF
  - A clear US and allied plan for governance and economic assistance and aid funding.
- A clear plan for setting conditions for Afghan reforms and other actions
- A plan for US relations with – and aid to – Pakistan and Central Asia nations, as well as other key transit and neighboring states
- US leadership in creating replacements for ISAF, NTM-A, UNSCOM
- Follow-ons to Tokyo and Chicago conferences
History is a Warning: Declare Victory and Leave?

Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions

Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.

Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. What is your overall opinion of Afghanistan? Is it very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

Loss of US Public Support - II

Thinking now about U.S. military action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not?

% Yes, made a mistake  % No, did not

Loss of US Public Support - III

Negative Views of U.S. Efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan

In achieving its goals in Iraq/Afghanistan, U.S. has ...

- **Iraq**
  - Mostly failed: 52
  - Mostly succeeded: 37

- **Afghanistan**
  - Mostly failed: 52
  - Mostly succeeded: 38


Overview of Recent US Polls - I


"When it comes to Afghanistan, do you think the war was worth it or not worth it?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Worth it</th>
<th>Not worth it</th>
<th>Depends (vol.)</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/11-15/14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/12-15/13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
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"Obama has said he will reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 9,800 by the end of this year, half of that next year and near zero by 2016. Do you support or oppose this troop-reduction plan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
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<tr>
<td>5/29 - 6/1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
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"Most U.S. troops are expected to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. From what you know, how likely do you think it is that Afghanistan will be a stable country after U.S. troops leave: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not at all likely?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very likely</th>
<th>Somewhat likely</th>
<th>Not very likely</th>
<th>Not at all likely</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
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<tr>
<td>3/20-23/14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


"Looking back, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Afghanistan in 2001?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/6-9/14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/7-10/13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
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"In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Afghanistan, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Afghanistan, or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</table>
Overview of Recent US Polls - II


"Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Right decision</th>
<th>Wrong decision</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/15-19/14</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/30 - 11/6/13</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<td>3/20-23/14</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<td>30%</td>
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<td>56%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<td>6/15-19/11</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/25 - 9/6/10</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/7-11/09</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/20-24/08</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/6-10/06</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-8/06</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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"Overall, do you think the United States has mostly succeeded or mostly failed in achieving its goals in Afghanistan?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mostly succeeded</th>
<th>Mostly failed</th>
<th>Unsure/Refused</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>38%</td>
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Overview of Recent US Polls - III


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</table>


"All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not?"

10/09: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan was / has been worth fighting, or not?" — "was" and "has been" each asked of half the sample.

9/09 & earlier: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan WAS worth fighting, or not?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worth fighting</th>
<th>Not worth fighting</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/12-15/13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66</td>
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</table>

Source: [http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm](http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm)

Cumulative Appropriations by Funding Category, as of March 31, 2014 ($ Billions)

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 72.

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 73.
The World Bank has reported that from 2002 to December 21, 2013, 33 donors had pledged more than $7.03 billion, of which nearly $6.91 billion had been paid.

According to the World Bank, donors had pledged approximately $916.70 million to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1392, which ran from December 21, 2012 to December 20, 2013.
ASFF Disbursements for the ANA & ANP by Category

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–MAR 31, 2014 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $30.90

- Infrastructure: $5.03
- Equipment and Transportation: $11.33
- Sustainment: $11.54
- Training and Operations: $2.72

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–MAR 31, 2014 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $15.39

- Infrastructure: $3.61
- Equipment and Transportation: $3.37
- Sustainment: $5.70
- Training and Operations: $3.00

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 75.
No US DoD Plan and Hollow Placeholder OCO Budget

$75B in FY2015 to $30B in FY2016

Focus Only On Base Budget For Remainder Of Briefing
No FY 2015 OCO Budget Yet

State FY2015 Budget Request Down to $2.1 Billion with no Clear Plan for Transition

- $2.6 billion of the State Department FY2015 budget request is allocated to Afghanistan under conditions where State cautions that “the Administration has not yet determined the size and scope of any post-2014 US presence.”

- State indicates that the United States will sustain “our diplomatic platform and security operations in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat, while assuming selective reductions in personnel in preparation for transition.”

- The budget prioritizes technical assistance and channels more aid through Afghan institutions, while holding the Government of Afghanistan accountable for undertaking concrete reforms and improving efficiency and sustainability.

- FY2015 funds will sustain gains in health and education, economic self-sufficiency through improved agricultural production, good governance, rule of law, and women’s rights as laid out in the strategic Partnership agreement.

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, FY2015, p. 3.
Reduces Totals with No Break Out for Afghanistan: $58.6 billion for DOD OCO activities, which is $20.9 billion less than the $79.4 billion placeholder for DOD OCO in the FY 2015 Budget. It would also provide $1.4 billion for State/OIP OCO activities, which is in addition to the $5.9 billion for State/OIP included in the FY 2015 Budget. Overall, these amendments would decrease the total OCO funding requested for FY 2015 by $19.5 billion.

The United States' goals in Afghanistan beyond 2014 are to continue to support the Afghan National Security Forces, support economic development and governance efforts, and pursue U.S. counterterrorism goals against al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. As you announced in May, the United States will conclude combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of this calendar year. The United States will draw down to approximately 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan by early 2015, which, together with NATO allies and other partners, will allow the United States to continue advising key Afghan forces and to sustain counterterrorism operations. By the end of 2015 the United States will have reduced that presence by roughly half and consolidated its military and diplomatic presence to Kabul and Bagram Airfield. By the end of 2016, DOD will draw down to a more conventional embassy-based security assistance presence in Kabul.

In support of OEF and related follow-on activities, DOD OCO funding would support several key efforts, including:
President Finally Makes OCO Budget Recommendation for State and DoD on June 27, 2014 - II

- concluding the combat mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 and positioning U.S. military and intelligence forces in Afghanistan for their post-2014 mission;
- drawing down to approximately 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in the country by early 2015 from an average of 38,000 in FY 2014;
- continuing to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as they assume full responsibility for security in Afghanistan after December 2014;
- sustaining the fight against transnational terrorists who seek to undermine the United States and its allies;
- providing warfighters with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support that has proven essential for mission success in Afghanistan and around the region;
- providing support to Coalition allies in Afghanistan and the surrounding region;
- disposing of unexploded ordnance in Afghanistan and continuing to support Coalition and partner efforts to counter improvised explosive devices;
- returning thousands of cargo containers and pieces of equipment from Afghanistan to their home stations;
- replenishing or replacing expended munitions and ammunition as well as combat-damaged equipment, including helicopters, ground vehicles, and unmanned aerial systems; and
- supporting a portion of temporary Army and Marine Corps end strength that currently supports OEF, but will not be required under the defense strategy articulated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Although the FY 2015 OCO request reflects a transition as the United States concludes combat operations in Afghanistan partway into the fiscal year, most costs will not decline precipitously. For example, DOD will still incur significant costs to transport personnel, supplies, and equipment back to their home stations. Funding to sustain the ANSF will continue to be needed to ensure that Afghan forces can provide sufficient security. There will be
OCO Funding for ANSF: June 27, 2014 - II

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (Overseas contingency operations) FY 2015 Budget Appendix Page: 264

FY 2015

Proposed Amendment: $4,109,333,000

Revised Request: $4,109,333,000

For the "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund", $4,109,333,000, to remain available until September 30, 2016: Provided, That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, or the Secretary's designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding:

• Provided further, That the authority to provide assistance under this heading is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations: Provided further, That contributions of funds for the purposes provided herein from any person, foreign government, or international organization may be credited to this Fund, to remain available until expended, and used for such purposes:

• Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing upon the receipt and upon the transfer of any contribution, delineating the sources and amounts of the funds received and the specific use of such contributions: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than 15 days prior to obligating from this appropriation account, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of any such obligations: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any proposed new projects or transfer of funds between budget sub-activity groups in excess of $25,000,000:

• Provided further, That equipment procured using funds provided under this heading in this or prior acts, and not yet transferred to the security forces of Afghanistan or transferred to the security forces of Afghanistan and returned by such forces to the United States, may be treated as stocks of the Department of Defense upon notification to the congressional defense committees:

• Provided further, That such amount is designated by the Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That such amount shall be available only if the President designates such amount for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A).

This amendment would provide the funding and authorities needed to adequately sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It continues the shift from growth to the professionalization of the This funding and the associated authorities are essential to support the ANSF as they work toward self-sufficiency. This funding and the associated authorities are essential to support the ANSF as they work toward self-sufficiency.

Facing a Continuing War Zone Without Eliminating Pakistani Sanctuaries or Major Progress in Security
The Uncertain Structure of Security

• Conflicting polls and US intel estimates of on Taliban support and influence

• NATO/ISAF has stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco.

• No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited mapping of 10 worst areas of tactical encounters.

• No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.

• Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.

• No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.
The Need to Deal with an Ongoing War

- Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.
- No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.
- Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.
- US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.
- ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.
- Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.
- Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below $4 billion annually uncertain. May need $6-7 billion.
World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative and Rising

The Failure of the US Surge in Afghanistan
United Nations Department of Safety and Security
Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month

Number of Security Incidents per Month

Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq

Enemy-Initiated Attacks Recovered Before ISAF Ceased to Report

Shift from Tactical clashes to High Profile Attacks in 2012-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>EIAs</th>
<th>HPA</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED Events</th>
<th>IED/Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/Coordinated Attack</th>
<th>IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% YoY Change</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>EIA</th>
<th>HPA</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED Events</th>
<th>IED/Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/Coordinated Attack</th>
<th>IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% YoY Change</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The US/ISAF Focus on 10 Most Violent Districts Does Not Provide an Honest Picture of a Steadily More Intensifying Conflict
Ten Most Violent Districts 1/4/13 to 9/15/13
(Most Recent US Report issued in 4/2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>% of National EIA in Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nahr-e Saraj</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sangin</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nad 'Ali</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Musa Qal'ah</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Panjwai</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sayyidabad</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Now Zad</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maiwand</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pul-e 'Alam</td>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Darah-ye Pech</td>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013
Total: 3.1% 31%

“But, This was irrelevant”

• Long war
• War for control of space and population, not tactical outcomes
• Taliban can pick and choose area and method of attack. Strike weakest link.
• Win if dominate people and/or allies and NGOs leave.
• Value of Pakistani sanctuary/ISI support
• Morale, public support, leadership critical.
• Peace negotiations can be war by other means

Taliban and Insurgent Tactics Have Actually Become Lethal and More Challenging

- ISAF/US reporting on cover tactical events, not outcomes and is essentially meaningless, if not dishonest, in showing relative areas of government and insurgent presence and influence.

- UNAMA reporting shows casualty levels never dropped significantly as a result of the surge and got far worse in the first six months of 2014 as ISAF forces withdrew.

- UNAMA reports that targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government and in mosques tripled in 2013 and rose again in the first six months of 2014.

- In the first half of 2014, the armed conflict in Afghanistan took a dangerous new turn for civilians. For the first time since 2009 when UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties in Afghanistan, more civilians were found to have been killed and injured in ground engagements and crossfire between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces than any other tactic. In previous years, the majority of civilians were killed and injured by improvised explosive devices.

- Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured) recording a 17 per cent increase in civilian deaths, and a 28 per cent increase in civilians injured for a 24 per cent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.

- UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party.

- UNAMA attributed four per cent of civilian casualties to explosive remnants of war, and the remaining one per cent to cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

- Compared with the first six months of 2009, when UNAMA began to monitor civilian casualties, the number of civilians killed by Anti-Government Elements doubled in 2014 (from 599 to 1,208), while the number of civilians killed by Pro-Government forces has been cut by half (from 302 to 158), almost entirely due to reduced civilian casualties from aerial operations of international military forces.

In spite of “Surge,” Civilian Killed and Wounded Rose Through End 2013

UNAMA documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a seven per cent increase in deaths and a 17 per cent increase in injuries compared to 2012.

- The rise in civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan’s armed conflict in 2013 reverses the decline reported in 2012 and is similar to record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. Since 2009, the armed conflict has claimed the lives of 14, 064 Afghan civilians and injured thousands more.

- While improvised explosive devices used by Anti-Government Elements remained the biggest killer of civilians in 2013, increased ground engagements between Pro-Government Forces and Anti-Government Elements emerged as the number-two cause of civilian casualties with rising numbers of Afghan civilians killed and injured in cross-fire. Both factors drove the escalation of civilian casualties in 2013.

Taliban and Insurgent Killing Power Has Been Rising

UN Estimate of Civilian deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to December 2009-2013


- UNAMA’s report found that Anti-Government Elements continued to deliberately target civilians across the country and carried out attacks without regard for civilian life, causing 6,374 civilian casualties (2,311 civilian deaths and 4,063 injured), up four per cent from 2012.

- Indiscriminate use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements increased in 2013 and remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. UNAMA recorded 2,890 civilian casualties (962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injured) from IEDs, up 14 per cent from 2012.

- Within civilian casualties from IEDs, UNAMA noted an 84 per cent rise in civilian deaths and injuries from radio-controlled IEDs and a 39 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from indiscriminate victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs. Anti-Government Elements continued to detonate IEDs in public areas used by civilians such as roads, markets, Government offices, bazaars, in and around schools, and bus stations.

- Suicide and complex attacks caused 1,236 civilian casualties (255 killed and 981 injured) in 73 incidents in 2013. While the number of attacks was similar to 2012, an 18 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from these attacks was noted.
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Rise in Number of Wounded Much Sharper than in Civilian Deaths (January-End June 2009-2014)

Steadily Increasing Impact of Taliban and Insurgents with 24% Rise in 2014

Expanding National Coverage of Taliban Attacks Goes Far Beyond 10 Districts

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region
January to June 2009 - 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Highlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing Lethality of Targeted Attacks

Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties in the first half of 2014. UNAMA documented 263 civilian deaths and 165 injured (428 civilian casualties) from targeted killings, a 10 per cent drop from the same period in 2013.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, 95 per cent – 405 civilian casualties (247 deaths and 158 injured) – were attributed to Anti-Government Elements. These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 39 separate incidents of targeted killings which resulted in 82 civilian casualties (54 civilian deaths and 28 injured), more than doubling the civilian casualties claimed by the Taliban in 2013.

The sharp increase in civilian deaths and injuries in 2014 resulted from escalating ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces particularly in civilian-populated areas. In the first half of 2014, increasing numbers of Afghan civilians were killed and injured in ground combat. For example, civilian deaths from mortars, rockets and grenades more than doubled from the same six-month period in 2013.

UNAMA documented 1,901 civilian casualties (474 civilian deaths and 1,427 injured) from ground engagements alone, up 89 per cent from 2013. Ground combat was the leading cause of civilian casualties in the first half of 2014, accounting for 39 per cent of all civilian deaths and injuries. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements – the second highest cause of civilian casualties – also killed and injured Afghan civilians at unprecedented levels.

Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 1,463 civilian casualties (463 civilian deaths and 1,000 injured) a seven per cent decrease from the first six months of 2013. Suicide and complex attacks caused 583 civilian casualties which killed 156 civilians and injured 427, a seven per cent decrease in civilian casualties from such attacks compared to the first six months of 2013. Suicide and complex attacks were the third leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries in the first half of 2014, after ground engagements and IEDs.

Together, ground engagements and IED tactics, which included suicide and complex attacks, accounted for 81 per cent of all civilian casualties in the first six months of 2014. Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (263 civilian deaths and 165 injured) from targeted and wilful killings (or attempts to kill), a 10 per cent decrease from the same period in 2013. These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.
Ground Combat Continues to Intensify - II

Civilian Deaths and Injuries:
All Ground Engagements by region
January to June 2009 - 2014

Layered Defense and the Growing Challenge of Post-2014 Security
Key Warfighting Challenges

- Acceptance that as long as Taliban and others have sanctuary in Pakistan, war will last as long as it lasts.
- End focus on tactical clashes, focus on political-military control and protection of key populated areas and LoCs.
- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
  - Tests of 2015 campaign season: “Coming out of the sanctuary closet.”
  - Threat ability to choose time and place, intensity and persistence of operations.
  - New forms of high profile attacks, political-military structures at urban and district level, focus on ANSF, officials, advisors, and NGOs.
  - LOC and commercial threats.
  - New role of narcotics, power brokers, corruption in poorer economy
- Ensuring popular support of government and ANSF is critical. Deal with Security vs. hearts and minds dilemmas on Afghan terms.
  - Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers” to win popular support.
There is some hope that an adequately resourced ANSF layered defense and US “four quarter” advisory strategy could succeed in provide the necessary security in key populated areas and for key lines of communication, even if Pakistan continues to provide Taliban sanctuaries and comes to dominate less populated areas in the east and South. 

Afghanistan is, however, very much a nation at war and success is extremely uncertain given the limited size and duration of the US advisory effort.

ISAF and the US government have stopped all detailed reporting on actual success in war for more than a year. ISAF no longer reports maps or metrics, and the semi-annual Department of Defense 1230 report stopped such reporting in late 2012 and has not been updated since July 2013.

It is clear from a wide range of media reporting, however, that the transition to Afghan forces in 2013 gradually extended ANSF responsibility to many areas still dominated by the Taliban and other insurgents.

There has been no meaningful net assessment of the success of Afghan government/ANSF efforts versus those of the Taliban and other threats.

The ANSF will have to cover a large country with a highly dispersed population and 18 major population clusters. Some do not face major threats, but many do face serious risks.
Protecting key lines of communication will be a major challenge – both in terms of available forces, force quality and loyalty, and the ability to maintain key routes.

Both security and post-transition trade patterns present serious uncertainties.

The World Bank already ranks Afghanistan as having some of the worst challenges in terms of violence and rule of law of any country in the world. The ANSF must start with none of the internal resources Iraq had from its oil revenues, and with nothing like the success the surge in Iraq presented before Transition.

Even the ISAF’s carefully chosen metric – enemy initiated attacks – failed to reflect significant success before ISAF ceased to report all metrics on the success of the fighting.

The ANSF has, however, increased significantly in total force strength, and began to bear the brunt of enemy attacks and casualties by October 2012. Past reports show that the ANSF still faces key problems in the MoD and MoI, sustainment, and with corruption. It is also important to note that only roughly half of the 352,000 personnel often cited as the force goal are actual military and serious paramilitary forces. Force composition and force quality present far more critical problems than the issue of total manning.
The ANSF also suffers from rapidly changing force goals, rapid turnover in advisors, overambitious efforts to force it to “do it our way,” a force-rush to meet the transition deadline of end-2014, and sudden peaks and cuts in funding.

The only meaningful recent reporting on the ANSF has been by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR). That reporting is too complex to summarize, but has identified many continuing weaknesses first identified in past public ISAF and DoD reporting. A key example of critical shortfalls in reliable reporting on actual manning makes this clear.

The Afghan police present critical problems in leadership, force quality, corruption, actual manning, and turnover. Surveys do, however, indicate that the elements of the ANSF are winning far more support in most areas than the Taliban and other insurgents.
General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission

• In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.

• This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.

• In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.

• Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabul-centric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.

• Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.
Layered Defense: A Concept that May Work with Adequate US and Allied support

• Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defense population and key lines of communication.

• ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.

• Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,

• Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.

• Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.

• German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.

• Support with governance and economic aid.
Layered Defense May Work, But Formal Transfers of Security Do Not Mean Real ANSF Security Capability

Source: ISAF, March 2013.
Layered Defense: Afghanistan is Still Very Much at War

- Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.
- No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.
- Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.
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- Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below $4 billion annually uncertain. May need $6-7 billion.
Afghanistan’s Divisive Demographics

- **Total population**: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)
  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%

- **Population 0-14 years**: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)

- **Urban population**: 23.5% of total population (2011)

- **Rate of urbanization**: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

- **Young men and women reaching employment age annually**: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008

- **Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?**
- **Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?**

“Layered Defense” – Where is the Population for the ANA, ANP, and ALP to Protect?

AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013

The population estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).

The settled population of the country, by civil divisions, urban, rural, and sex is estimated which covers 34 provinces and 398 districts. The total population of the country in 1381 (2012-13) is estimated to be about 27 million. Around 13.8 million of the said figure are men and 13.2 million women. The settled population of the country (excluding nomads) is estimated at 25.5 million, of which 17.4 million (49%) are females and 13.1 million (51%) males. Similarly, out of 25.5 million settled population, 18.4 million (76.1%) live in rural areas and 6.1 million (23.9%) in urban areas.

Data Source: Estimated Population Data
Provided by: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Afghanistan

Provinces: Afghanistan

Population: 27,000,000

Male - 13.1 million (51%)
Female - 12.4 million (49%)

Rural (76.1%)
Urban (23.9%)

Source: Afghan Central Statistic Office
Layered Defense: Ethnicity and Population


66
“Layered Defense” – From “New Silk Road” to LOC Survival

Source: Google, Search “Map of Afghan Road System,” Accessed April 8, 2014
The Impact of ISAF Cuts and Shifting the Burden to the ANSF Through Spring 2014
General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission

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• Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.
ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2010-March 2013

ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.

The troop surge that the President announced at West Point in December 2009 set the conditions that allowed us to push back the Taliban and build up Afghan forces. In June 2011, the President announced that we had completed the surge and would begin drawing down our forces from Afghanistan from a peak of 100,000 troops. He directed that troop reductions continue at a steady pace and in a planned, coordinated, and responsible manner. As a result, 10,000 troops came home by the end of that year, and 33,000 came home by the summer of 2012. In February 2013, in his State of the Union address, the President announced that the United States would withdraw another 34,000 American troops from Afghanistan within a year -- which we have done.

Today the President announced a plan whereby another 22,000 troops will come home by the end of the year, ending the U.S. combat mission in December 2014. At the beginning of 2015, and contingent upon the Afghans signing a Bilateral Security Agreement and a status of forces agreement with NATO, we will have 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we would reduce that presence by roughly half, consolidating our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, we will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, as we have done in Iraq. Beyond 2014, the mission of our troops will be training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda.
ISAF Forces as of June 1, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>968</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic</td>
<td>152</td>
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<tr>
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<td>146</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>200</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>67</td>
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Source: ISAF Public affairs, June 1, 2014
The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Has Shifted to the ANSF

(But High Casualties are not a Measure of Merit)

Percentage of Security Incidents Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces

Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) involving ISAF and EIAs involving the ANSF, Jan 2011 – Feb 2014

The Declining Role of US Airpower

Combined Forces Air Component Commander
2010-2014 Airpower Statistics

As of 30 Apr 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Enduring Freedom/International Security Assistance Force</th>
<th>Close Air Support</th>
<th>Number of Weapon Releases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sorties</td>
<td>Sorties with at least one weapon release</td>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>34,514</td>
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<td></td>
<td>170</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>193</td>
<td>297</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>114</td>
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- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States Air Forces Central Command Combined Air and Space Operations Center</th>
<th>Combined Data</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airlift Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Airlift Passengers</td>
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<td>OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tanker Sorties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)</td>
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<td>Aircraft Refuelings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation Sorties</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saves</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assists</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>31,049</td>
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POC: AFCENT (CAOC) Public Affairs – DSN 318-436-1624
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>154</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>739</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>272</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>610</td>
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<td>174</td>
<td>5411</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>116</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>4084</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>337</td>
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<td>114</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>115</td>
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<td>337</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AFCENT, Public Affairs, 4.30.14
Steadily Dropping Impact of Airpower on Civilian Casualties

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Operations
1 January to 30 June 2009 - 2014

ISAF Assessment of Transition Stages, March-December 2013

Stage 1: Local Support

Stage 2: Tactical Support

Stage 3: Operational Support

Stage 4: Strategic Support

Uncertain Future CIA Support for US Military

- Press reports indicate CIA will withdraw operational elements in Afghanistan by end 2014. Quotes US officials as saying,

  "CIA Director John Brennan informed U.S. military commanders in March that his agency would start to shutter Afghan operations outside Kabul, the capital, removing CIA clandestine officers and analysts as well as National Security Agency specialists responsible for intercepting insurgents' communications, which have been a rich source of daily intelligence, the officials said. ...Pentagon officials warn that the CIA drawdown is coming at a time when insurgent attacks normally intensify, after a winter lull. As a result, the plan has strained relations between the agency and military commanders in Kabul...

  "The CIA footprint is entirely dependent on the military's," a senior U.S. official said Thursday. "There is no stomach in the building for going out there on our own," said a former CIA operator who has spoken to current officers about the pullback. "We are not putting our people out there without U.S. forces."

John Maguire, who retired from the CIA in 2005 after 23 years as a case officer, noted that CIA officers on horseback were the first U.S. forces into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He criticized the spy service for the current drawdown. "There is ample evidence and a long historical record of the agency working alone in any number of difficult and dangerous places, and if they can't do it by themselves without the military, then they should close the organization," he said.

The CIA also plans this summer to stop paying the salaries of Afghan paramilitary forces that it has armed and trained for more than a decade to help fight the Taliban-led insurgency in the country's east, near the Pakistani border. It is unclear what will happen to the militias. The Pentagon is trying to persuade the CIA to slow its withdrawal, arguing that keeping CIA and NSA operators in the field as long as possible would help prevent a surge in militant attacks before the end of the year, when most U.S. troops are due to leave.

...The spy service already has sharply cut the pace of lethal drone strikes in Pakistan, flown from airfields in Afghanistan. One official said the agency was making plans to continue operating the armed drones on a much smaller scale, from Bagram.

The Challenge of Shifting the Burden to the ANSF
Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in Page 37.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that Pages 38 and 39 show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in Pages 40-43.
General Dunford on Key Challenges to ANSF

ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that will build the ANSF’s long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been made to date enduring.

At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence service— at all levels.

In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment.

Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address gaps in 1) the aviation enterprise, 2) the intelligence enterprise, 3) special operations, and 4) the security ministries’ capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after Resolute Support concludes.
UNAMA observed that the stark rise in civilian deaths and injuries in crossfire and ground engagements in the first six months of 2014 was mainly attributed to the changing dynamics of the conflict. Women and children casualties rose significantly as ground fighting between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan security forces in 2014 increasingly concentrated in civilian-populated areas.

The closure and transfer of more than 86 ISAF bases in the last half of 2013 also had an impact on civilian protection. In the first half of 2014, UNAMA observed a direct correlation between closures and a rise in civilian casualties in some areas – particularly from ground engagements. In previous years, the robust and well-armed presence of hundreds of ISAF Forward Operating Bases and Command Outposts often prevented the movement of Anti-Government Elements into the more populated areas of districts.

In response to an increased presence of Anti-Government Elements in some districts, Afghan forces initiated their own operations to protect territory, notably increasing check points and patrols, as well as responding to attacks launched against them. This resulted in an increase in fighting in civilian-populated areas, which often led to civilian casualties.

UNAMA also noted that the closure of international military bases and subsequent heavy demands placed on Afghan security forces, exacerbated by an environment of political uncertainty – pending electoral results and an unsigned Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and the Government of Afghanistan – opened up space for Anti-Government Elements in some areas to challenge Afghan forces for control of key routes and terrain. In some areas the perceived lack of control by Afghan security forces appeared to encourage Anti-Government Elements to bring together larger attack groups which resulted in higher civilian casualties. In other areas, Afghan forces were able – for a range of reasons – to hold territory after the closure of ISAF bases which resulted in fewer civilian casualties in those areas.

Both conflicting parties also increasingly relied on stand-off tactics such as mortars and rockets to avoid their own losses and repel the opposite side, which also resulted in civilian casualties.
# Weapons & Equipment Summary Part I

## ANA Weapon: Status Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Total Acquired</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
<td>Enabler/ AR2VP</td>
<td>ASFF Acquired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Individual Weapons</td>
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<td>1,788</td>
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<td>NATO Indirect Fire Weapons</td>
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<td>921</td>
<td>1,168</td>
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<td>Non-NATO Standard Weapons</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>54,518</td>
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<td><strong>278,741</strong></td>
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## Item

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Total Acquired</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
<td>Enabler/ AR2VP</td>
<td>ASFF Acquired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Tactical Vehicle</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>18,781</td>
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<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicles</td>
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<td>623</td>
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<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
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<td>7,447</td>
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<td>HMMWV Variants</td>
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<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
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<td>People Haulers</td>
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<td>1,351</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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## Location of Vehicles Delivered

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<th>JAX Port</th>
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<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>HMMWV Variants</td>
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<td>Heavy Vehicles &amp; Fire Equipment</td>
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## Weapons Status Summary Part II

### ANA Comm: Status Summary

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<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
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<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tashk1 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
<td>Enabler/AR2VP</td>
<td>ASFF Acquired</td>
<td>Over/Under</td>
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<td>HF Radios</td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>12,268</td>
<td>(1,681)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VHF Radios</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>71,538</td>
<td>(665)</td>
<td>71,337</td>
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<td>VHF/UHF Radios</td>
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<td>3,318</td>
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<td>12,497</td>
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<td>Other Comm</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>283</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>3,160</td>
<td>99,904</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>97,869</td>
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### ANA EOD: Status Summary

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<td>15,430</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,430</td>
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<td>Blasting Machine M34</td>
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<td>470</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>470</td>
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<td>EOD Bomb Suit (SM + MED) w/Helmet</td>
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<td>676</td>
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<td>669</td>
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<td>2,088</td>
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<td>298</td>
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<td>707</td>
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<td>Symphony Jammer</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>552</td>
<td>37,575</td>
<td>3,157</td>
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Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR)

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<th>Corps/Div HQ</th>
<th>IN Bde</th>
<th>Corps ENG KDK</th>
<th>Corps SIG KDK</th>
<th>Corps/DIV MI KDK</th>
<th>OCC-R</th>
<th>AUP Type-A HQ</th>
<th>ABP Zone HQ</th>
<th>ANCOP Bde HQ</th>
<th>MSF KDK*</th>
<th>Total RASR Assessed Units</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Awaiting Fielding</td>
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OCC-R: Operational Coordination Center- Regional
MSF: Mobile Strike Force
ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police

ISAF and ANSF Unilateral Operations

ISAF and ANSF Led Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep 13</th>
<th>Oct 13</th>
<th>Nov 13</th>
<th>Dec 13</th>
<th>Jan 14</th>
<th>Feb 14</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA Led Partnered</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Enabled</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Led Enabled</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110</td>
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Total ISAF and ANSF Led Operations

## Shifting Pattern of Partnership

**3/2013-9/2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Apr-13</th>
<th>May-13</th>
<th>Jun-13</th>
<th>Jul-13</th>
<th>Aug-13</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Unilateral Military Ops</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,458</td>
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<td>ISAF Unilateral Police Ops</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Unilateral</td>
<td>13,492</td>
<td>23,601</td>
<td>16,798</td>
<td>13,059</td>
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<td>18,440</td>
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<td><strong>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</strong></td>
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<td>39,073</td>
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<td>48,502</td>
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<td>198</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Combined (ANP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>394</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Combined</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>591</td>
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<td>189</td>
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<td>245</td>
<td>340</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP Led Enabled</td>
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<td>442</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>427</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
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<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>778</td>
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<td><strong>Total Ops</strong></td>
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<td>52,551</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>35,126</td>
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<td>Total ISAF Led Ops</td>
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<td>Total ANSF Led Ops</td>
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<td>32,702</td>
<td>49,775</td>
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<td>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</td>
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<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
<th>Oct-13</th>
<th>Nov-13</th>
<th>Dec-13</th>
<th>Jan-14</th>
<th>Feb-14*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Unilateral Military Ops</td>
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<td>654</td>
<td>496</td>
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<td>ISAF Unilateral Police Ops</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>261</td>
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<td>ANA Unilateral</td>
<td>28,006</td>
<td>22,167</td>
<td>34,606</td>
<td>29,446</td>
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<td>29,707</td>
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<td>97</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Partnered Ops (Total)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Partnered</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Enabled</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Partnered/Enabled Ops</td>
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<td>274</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>220</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP Led Partnered/Enabled Ops</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Ops                         | 50,565 | 43,845 | 55,050 | 52,479 | 55,853 | 42,951 |
| Total ISAF Led Ops                | 1,533  | 1,411  | 1,209  | 734    | 593    | 300    |
| Total ANSF Led Ops                | 49,032 | 42,434 | 53,841 | 51,745 | 55,260 | 42,651 |
| % of Total Ops that are ISAF Led  | 3%     | 3%     | 2%     | 1%     | 1%     | 1%     |
| % of Total Ops that are ANSF Led  | 97%    | 97%    | 98%    | 99%    | 99%    | 99%    |

But, Only Half of ANSF is a Fighting Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Element</th>
<th>Manpower Goal End 2012</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<td>MOD</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>51%</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>14,451?</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>110,279</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
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<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<td>ALP-Militias</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>11,000-23,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. subject matter experts.
Ongoing Cuts in US Aid to ANSF – No Clear Plan for FY2015 and Beyond

- The 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 appropriated nearly $4.73 billion for the ASFF for FY 2014, increasing total cumulative funding to more than $57.50 billion.

- As of December 31, 2013, more than $47.88 billion of total ASFF funding had been obligated, of which nearly $45.38 billion had been disbursed.

DoD Funding: ANA vs. ANP

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–DEC 31, 2013 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $30.11
- Infrastructure $4.83
- Equipment and Transportation $11.30
- Sustainment $11.07
- Training and Operations $2.91

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–DEC 31, 2013 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $14.92
- Infrastructure $2.62
- Equipment and Transportation $3.60
- Sustainment $5.35
- Training and Operations $3.35

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Transitioning Out: Who Had What Areas. Racing to the Exits in Real World Terms

Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in other charts in this section.
Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in Page 37.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that Pages 38 and 39 show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in Pages 40-43.
Key Force-wide Challenges

- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
- Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
- New Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD to District level.
- Evolution of effective overall command structure.
- Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
- Redefining force structure and force plans.
- Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R, ensuring force cohesion and responsiveness
- Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law
- Promotion, enlistment
- Leave and recovery. AWOL and attrition.
- National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
- Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
- Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”
The Challenge of the ANA
Key ANA Transition Challenges

- Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. Effective pay, contracting, fiscal management
- Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Converting from force generation mode to war fighting capability mode.
  - Combat effectiveness and order of battle vs. resource measures
  - Top down strategic focus as well as bottom up tactical forces.
  - Intelligence-based, civil-military operations. Limiting impact of power brokers.
  - Sustainability, O&M, repair, supply push vs. demand pull, medical, mobility.
- Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.
  - AWOL, attrition, stable personnel.
  - Recruitment, promotion, pay and privileges.
  - Role of junior officers and NCOs.
  - Civil-military interface.
  - Medical services/medvac, post-trauma support.
- Shifting to effective training/recovery and leave cycles.
- Creating fully effective MOD, Corps, other higher command, procurement, logistic, training structures.
### CM RATINGS

4 The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

3 Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.

2B Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.

2A Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.

1B Coalition oversight

1A Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

---

**MoD Readiness: December 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessed Area</th>
<th>Current CM Rating</th>
<th>Expected Date of CMIB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>1Q 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Deputy MoD</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD S&amp;P (Proc &amp; Analysis)</td>
<td>CM5</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Strategy &amp; Policy (S&amp;P)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>4Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Intelligence</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Acquisition Tech &amp; Logistics</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition Agency</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Personnel</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>3Q 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Education</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Reserve Affairs</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMoD Chief of Legal Dept.</td>
<td>CM5</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Chief, Finance</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD Chief, Construction &amp; Property Management Division (CPMD)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Inspector General</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>2Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Strategic Communications</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>1Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD Chief, Parl. Soc. &amp; Public Affairs</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>1Q 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Gender Integration</td>
<td>CM5</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Civilization</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice CoGS</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCQS-Air</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major of the Army</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of General Staff (DoGS)</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG1 Personnel</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG2 Intelligence</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>2Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG3 Operations</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG Engineer</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG4 Logistics</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG5 Policy &amp; Planning</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>1Q 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG6 Communications</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>4Q 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG6 Comm. Support Unit</td>
<td>CM1A</td>
<td>1Q 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG7 Force Structure, Training &amp; Doctrine</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSG8 Finance</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Religious &amp; Cultural Affairs (RCA)</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>3Q 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Inspector General</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Legal Department</td>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>Post 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)</td>
<td>CM1B</td>
<td>4Q 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regular Forces Pose Manpower Challenges for Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSF Component</th>
<th>Current Target</th>
<th>Status as of 12/2013</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>187,000 personnel by 12/2012</td>
<td>178,816</td>
<td>-8,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>157,000 personnel by 2/2013</td>
<td>149,466</td>
<td>-7,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>8,000 personnel by 12/2014</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>-1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Total</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>334,852</td>
<td>-17,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core Force Structure Very Light, Few Enablers

Afghan National Army (ANA) 179,000
5 regional comd.

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops div (1 SF gp; 2 cdo bde (total: 5 cdo bn))

MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
2 mech bde HQ
5 mech inf bn (2 more forming)
Light
1 (201st) corps (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bde, 1 mech bde, 1 EOD coy)
3 (207th, 209th & 215th) corps (1 cdo bn, 3 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)
2 (203rd & 205th) corps (1 cdo bn, 4 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)
1 (111st Capital) div (2 inf bde)

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 int bn
1 sigs bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 673
APC (T) 173 M113A2†
APC(W) ε500 MSFV (inc variants)

TOWED 109: 122mm 85 D-30†; 155mm 24 M114A1†
MOR 82mm 105 M-69†
MSL • SSM SS-1 Scud†
MW Bozena

Afghan Air Force (AAF) 6,800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
TPT 37: Medium 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 35: 6 Cessna 182; 26 Cessna 208B; 3 PC-12
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros†

HELICOPTERS
ATK 11 Mi-35
MRH 46+: 6 MD-530F; 40+ Mi-17

Paramilitary 152,350
Afghan National Police 152,350
Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes 85,000 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 15,000 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 23,000 Afghan Border Police (ABP), Police Special Forces (GDPSU) and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2014, p. 222
SIGAR and 1230 Reports Contain Key Warnings on Readiness & Sustainability

• CSTC-A stated that “the ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’”

• This explains the low present-for-duty numbers for Corps actively engaged in operations. This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% (215th Corps) to 20.5% (209th Corps). About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.

• Although details to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter were limited, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:
  • Present-for-Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)
  • Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave but not AWOL): 54,862 (43%)
  • Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)

ANA Attrition by Corps/Division
March 2014

- High attrition rate continues to be a challenge, but has remained stable over 2013.
- Causes of attrition are assessed as high op tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/quality of life, and leave issues.
- Though combat losses are a relatively low percentage of total attrition-it likely contributes to morale issues.

*ANA attrition decreased slightly from 3.3 percent (Feb) to 1.8 percent (March) in Solar Month March 14.

****EAC- Echelon Above Corps includes a number of organizations; MP Guard Brigade; HSSB; Army support Command; Logistics Command; ANATC; ANAREC; Medical Command; ANDU; Minstry of Defense; General Staff; Ground Forces Command; and Mobile Strike Force.

ANA Attrition & Recruitment
March 13-Feb 14

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment, • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

### ANA SOF: February 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)</th>
<th>HQs</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total Units &amp; HQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Capable</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
<th>Oct-13</th>
<th>Nov-13</th>
<th>Dec-13</th>
<th>Jan-14</th>
<th>Feb-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU &amp; ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF-Led ISAF Enabled Ops</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF-Led Partnered Ops</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ops</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ISAF Led Ops</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Ops</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops Led by ISAF</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops Led by ANSF</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Special operations recorded above include operations carried out by ISAF SOF, GDPSU, and ANASF/CDO units, but do not include operations conducted by TF 94-7.1 Effective May 2013 ANA SF CDO ops were added to this table. Previously, only ISAF SOF and GDPSU ops were included. Effective June 2013, National Directorate of Police Security (NDS) were added into this table.

NDS = National Directorate of Security; GDPSU = General Directorate of Police Special Units; CDO = commandos; Ktah. Khas = specialized Afghan commandos in the ANASF.

Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

Key ANA Political Challenges

- Ensuring key elements like SOF and ANCOPs and best units do not become either coup-oriented or tools of President and political control.
- Limiting corruption and role of power brokers.
- Preventing emergence of local “war lords.”
- Ensuring tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective civil-military relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil casualties, tensions, and conflicts.
  - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Lead role in making layered defense effective – relations and controls over with elements of police and ALP.
- Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.
- Forcing effective cooperation, combined operations across unit and command lines.
- Accountability
## ANA Ethnicity- Tajik Impact: February 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Delta</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>-5.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Ethnic Breakout Goal</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Challenge of the ANAF
The Challenge of the ANAF

The ANAF presents the problem that it was never supposed to be ready before 2016. It also raises the issue that close air support is one of the few rapid reaction tools that can deal with a crisis in land combat, land medvac can be too slow in many areas, and air mobility is another asset that save a unit under fire, provide a key tactical advantage. Or deal with serious terrain distance issues.

There is no current public plan for dealing these issues or to indicate whether any US and other ISAF air enablers will be present after 2014. There is no indication of how the afghan could manage air assets effectively, or deal with the problem of civilian casualties that became serious for ISAF. ANAF contracts have also been a source of corruption and waste in the past.

The key challenges affecting the ANAF are listed on Page 74.

The status of the ANAF as of December 2013 is summarized on Page 75.
Key ANAF Transition Challenges

- Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.
  - Real-world close-air support, rear area, interdiction needs.
  - IS&R, Targeting damaging assessment.
  - Civil-military impact and rules of engagement.
  - Role of air mobility, Medevac.
  - Revised command and C3I/BM system.
  - Affordable readiness, sustainment, and procurement
  - Defining rotary and fixed wing roles and modernization
- Workable and responsive structure for joint warfare.
- Limits to corruption and waste.
- Command effectiveness and accountability.
The Challenge of the ANP
The ANP makes up roughly half of the ANSF, but only the small ANCOP portion of the force is fully trained and equipped to lay a paramilitary role in COIN. The MoI and most elements of the ANP – except for the ANCOPs – also present major problems in terms of overall competence, corruption, leadership, extortion and civil abuses, and ties to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers. Some elements make deals with insurgents.

The ANP presents additional problems because it is not supported by an effective justice system in most of the country, courts are also corrupt, the legal system is slow and unresponsive, detention methods lead to abuses, and detention facilities are poor or lacking.

These issues are addressed in depth in the DoD 1230 report and various SIGAR reports, as well as in human rights and other reports. The corruption and inefficiency within elements of afghan Border Police also limits the flow of a key source of revenue to the government. However, it is unclear what overall structure the ANP will have after the end of 2014, what kind of training efforts will exist after Transition, and what types of outside aid will be provided. Key issues involve:

• The range of challenges to ANP forces are shown.
• The trends in Afghan’s low ranking in terms of the rule of law and stability.
• The structure and manning of the ANP.
• The highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI.
• The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness.
• As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited.
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities.
Key ANP Challenges

- Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management.
- Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 para-military military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, relations with ANA and controls over with elements of police and ALP.
- Redefine role of police in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.
  - Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration
- Accept that police will go “local.” But, set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.
  - Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.
- Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.
  - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.
## Mol Readiness: July 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Interior Overall Rating</th>
<th>CM2B</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM 1B Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; Human Rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Management</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
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<td>Finance and Budget</td>
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<td>3Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilities and Installation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Info, Coms and Tech</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquisition and Procurement</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Deputy Minister of Admin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy Minister of Admin</th>
<th>2B</th>
<th>3Q, 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Management</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Command</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deputy Minister of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy Minister of Security</th>
<th>2A</th>
<th>1Q, 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Fire Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Crime Police</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>4Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP-(G)</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans &amp; Operations</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Readiness</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deputy Minister, APPF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy Minister, APPF</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3Q, 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANP Manning & Attrition: July 31, 2014

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

ANP Readiness by Location 9/13

Police Pose a Critical Challenge in Terms of Corruption and Effectiveness – As Do ALP

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.

## ANP Ethnicity: July 31, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>42%</th>
<th>27%</th>
<th>9%</th>
<th>9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Target</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Delta*</td>
<td>-25.7%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force Delta*</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Delta represents the difference between the ethnic target and the actual percentage.

## ANP Ethnicity - January 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pashtu</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total % of Force</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Target</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Challenge of the ALP
The ALP

The use of local forces is always a high risk given the problems in controlling them, making them effective, dealing with abuses and corruption, and their potential to turn on the government or create links with insurgents.

The 1230 report indicated in October 2013 that ALP expansion was expected to reach 28,500 by February, 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. It reported that the ALP appeared to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It was heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF.

As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel. There were 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.

Capability varied sharply by area, and there were reports of civil abuses and tensions with the ANP and Government. The ALP with US SOF training did, however, generally make ALP units at least somewhat and all ALP units were to fully transfer to the Afghan government by October 2014.

It is not clear how the Afghan Local police or other paramilitary forces like the APPF will be integrated into a post 2-104 structure or what their effectiveness will be.
ALP Locations and Development: 2/2014

Key ALP Challenges

• Accept that the key is to pay for support and loyalty where it is most needed. “Bribe your way to victory.”
• Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, and controls over with elements of police and relations with ANA.
• Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management, Provincial and District civil-interface.
• Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 para-military military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
• Redefine role of ALP in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.
  • Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration
• Set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.
  • Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.
• Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  • Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.
  • “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
• Limit internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions.
The Challenge of ANSF Corruption and Abuses
World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative

Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them.

But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official.

According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens.

While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years.

Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army.
UN Warnings About ANSF Abuses

With Afghan national security forces leading military operations country wide, UNAMA reinforced the need for improved implementation of directives and rules of engagement mandating civilian protection, and for permanent structures in the Ministries of Defence and Interior to investigate reports of civilian casualties by Afghan forces, initiate remedial measures and take follow-up action. UNAMA’s report also called on the Government of Afghanistan to investigate any allegations of human rights violations by Afghan forces as required under Afghan and international law.

Despite reports of improved security due to the presence of Afghan Local Police (ALP), from many communities across Afghanistan, UNAMA recorded 121 civilian casualties (32 civilian deaths and 89 injured) by ALP, almost tripling civilian casualties attributed to ALP from 2012.

Most of these involved ALP members in certain areas committing summary executions and punishments, intimidation, harassment and illegal searches.

The ALP Directorate in the Ministry of Interior reported it investigated more than 100 cases against ALP members in 2013, referring 59 cases to military prosecutors. Despite these encouraging steps, information on any prosecutions, convictions, suspensions or other action taken was not available. UNAMA called for increased efforts to provide accountability for violations by Afghan Local Police.

The UNAMA 2013 report recorded 39 incidents of human rights abuses including killings carried out by Pro-Government armed groups resulting in 55 civilian casualties (18 civilian deaths and 37 injured). The majority of incidents occurred in areas where armed groups held considerable power and influence, including in Uruzgan, Kunduz, Faryab, Baghlan and Jawzjan provinces.

The report urged the Afghan Government to speed up efforts to disband and disarm such groups.
The most significant human rights problems were torture and abuse of detainees; increased targeted violence and endemic societal discrimination against women and girls; widespread violence, including armed insurgent groups’ killings of persons affiliated with the government and indiscriminate attacks on civilians; and pervasive official corruption.

Other human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces; poor prison conditions; ineffective government investigations of abuses and torture by local security forces; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of women accused of so-called moral crimes; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and ineffectiveness...

There were several credible reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that in January an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander and several ALP members broke into a home in the Chardara District of Kunduz Province and killed a 65-year-old man and two women before stealing valuables from the home and fleeing. NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated extrajudicial killings.

There were widespread reports that government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police committed abuses. NGOs reported that security forces continued to use excessive force, including torturing and beating civilians.

NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated the torture of detainees. UNAMA reported systematic torture at several ANP detention facilities and one Afghan Border Police Station in Kandahar Province. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) found multiple individuals detained by the ANP in
Kandahar who claimed mistreatment and torture while in ANP custody. Detainees reportedly were tortured at official and unofficial locations, including ANP check posts, ANP headquarters, and other ANP facilities in Kandahar. Methods of torture included beatings with fists and electric cables; kicking; choking; electric shock; and squeezing of testicles.

UNAMA reported that it found “sufficiently reliable and credible” incidents of torture at 10 National Directorate of Security (NDS) facilities as well as at 15 ANP facilities. For example, UNAMA reported systematic torture at the NDS detention facility in Kandahar Province and NDS Department 124 (counterterrorism) in Kabul. A government delegation assigned to investigate the claims made by UNAMA in its January report also found that officials tortured detainees at NDS Department 124, including with electric shocks, beatings, and threats of sexual violence. During its monitoring visits, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also continued to find instances of torture and abuse of detainees who were held at NDS Department 124.

UNAMA also found instances of torture or other mistreatment of detainees held in Afghan National Army (ANA) and ALP custody prior to transfer to the NDS or ANP. Similarly, the government found that 48 percent of detainees interviewed for its investigation (284) had been tortured.

Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted, and observers criticized the inadequate preparation and lack of sensitivity of local security forces. Human rights institutions expressed concerns about the limited oversight and accountability that existed for security institutions, especially the ALP, although the Ministry of Interior took some measures at the end of the year to increase accountability of the ALP. For example, the Ministry of Interior worked with the ICRC to increase human rights training for ALP recruits.
Russian Military Scenario Analysis of Probability of Success or Failure
The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

REPORT
made by Lieutenant General Igor Sergun

SUBJECT:
"Probable scenario of further developments in Afghanistan after foreign military withdrawal"
Major contingencies in Afghanistan after 2014

- Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence
- Seizure of power by the Taliban
- Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclave
Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The Taliban

The Islamic Party of Afghanistan

"Al-Qaeda"
Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

The Taliban

The Islamic Party of Afghanistan

"Al-Qaeda"
Seizure of power by the Taliban

Map symbol
- Terrorist training camps (total - about 200 camps)
- Main directions of infiltration by the fighters
Seizure of power by the Taliban

Map symbol
- Terrorist training camps (total - about 200 camps)
- Main directions of infiltration by the fighters
Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves

Areas with prevalence of nonpashtun population

Areas with prevalence of pashtun population

Uzbek emirate

Great Kandahar

Great Paktika
Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves
ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:

- about 40,000 personnel;
- over 40,000 units of materiel incl. armored vehicles and transport;
- over 300 helicopters

Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF

Northern LOC

Central LOC

Southern LOC

As scheduled

ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:

- about 40,000 of personnel;
- over 40,000 units of materiel incl. armored vehicles and transport;
- over 300 helicopters

Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdraw ISAF

Northern LOC
Central LOC
Southern LOC

As scheduled
As is
If Central LOC blocked
If Northern LOC blocked

To withdraw before 2015:

- about 40,000 personnel;
- over 40,000 units of materiel incl. armored vehicles and transport;
- over 300 helicopters

Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdraw ISAF

- Northern LOC
- Central LOC
- Southern LOC

As scheduled
As is
If Central LOC blocked
If Northern LOC blocked
If Southern LOC blocked

Progress in Some Areas of Human Development, *But* Progress is Often Exaggerated and Lags Other Poorest Countries in the Region
The Uncertain State of Progress

• UN Human development data reflect real progress, but also serious limits to that progress, and input data are very uncertain.

• Far too much US, NGO, and other reporting accepts “best case” estimates and polls without validating data or methodology.

• Progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raises massive questions about quality of data.

• More than a decade of war has gone on with no meaningful estimates of the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.

• Military and aid spending has often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
The Human Development Challenge

- **Access and learning in Schools**
  - 8 million students are enrolled in schools (female students make only 37% of this number) and an estimated 4 million children are out of school in Afghanistan.

- **Early Childhood Development**
  - ECD is very weak in Afghanistan and the country has one of the highest levels of stunting: 1 in 2 children under the age of 5 is stunted.

- **Access and Quality Health Care**
  - Only 57 percent of the population have access to health services. Afghanistan has some of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates: under 5 mortality rate is 97 per 1,000 births and maternal mortality is 327 per 100,000 births.

- **Improving conditions for access and learning for all by building strong and accountable education system.**
  - → enhance focus on quality of learning through doing regular learning assessments
  - → continue to enhance access and equity as demand for education increases

- **Employability and Skills**
  - Out of 200 thousand high school graduates each year, only 60,000 of them are enrolled at universities and 30,000 of them are enrolled in TVET. The remaining directly enter the labor market as unskilled workers.

- **Promoting employability and productivity of the workforce through skills-building and facilitating labor market transition.**
  - → link TVET and higher education to market needs to improve skills and employability of graduates
Exaggerated and Un-validated State Department and USAID Claims of Success –I

Afghanistan has made real progress in many areas, although more as a result of improved security and massive in-country spending and subsides to its budget than through development or successful aid.

Dealing with Transition requires realism as to Afghanistan’s real situation and needs. After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the State Department and USAID has never developed credible measures of the effectiveness of aid, or of how much spending actually reaches Afghanistan and the needed aid effort.

Claims are made without any public explanation or transparency as to the uncertainties in the data and controversies over the claims being made. Best case data for trends in Afghanistan are taken out of context, and credit is taken for developments unrelated to aid or only affected by it to a limited degree. World Bank economic update reports in 2011 and 2012 that state aid has has only a marginal impact on most Afghans and the Afghan economy are ignored. The impact of civil efforts on an ongoing war and any assessment of needs and priorities of Transition is ignored.

Key issues in developing honest estimates of progress and the ability to sustain it include:

- **Economic growth and increases in GDP/GNI per capita; Five-Fold Increase in Per Capita GDP**: Claims take credit for the impact of favorable rains which are a driving force in the Afghan GDP and stopped in 2012. GDP per capita data ignore gross uncertainties in population estimates and PPP estimates of tends in economy. No assessment of impact of narcotics share of economy, macro-economic impact of corruption and capital outflows.

- **Agriculture**: Extremely high impact assessments for programs limited in scope, implied gains in output that are largely a matter of favorable rains. No estimate of uncertainty in the data.

- **Education**: Uncertainties in population, existence of ghost or ineffective schools and teachers, quality of Afghani government reporting, tendency to exaggerate time and years of schooling, uncertain reporting on education by sex.
Exaggerated and Un-validated State Department and USAID Claims of Success –II

- **Democracy and governance**: Estimates only cover output of aid programs. Have stopped reporting on effectiveness of governance by by district. Ignore ISAF and NGO estimates of scale of corruption. Do not explicitly assess shortfalls in government personnel in the field and its impact. Ignore far more negative World Bank assessments.

- **Infrastructure**: Take credit for construction, but do not address corruption, effectiveness, or sustainability – already a critical problem with roads.

- **Stabilization**: Ignore UNAMA assessments of trends in civilian killed and wounded, do not map areas of relative success.

- **Dramatic Growth in Afghan Government Revenue Collection**: some reporting ignores recent negative trends, serious shortfalls in projections. Failure to assess corruption and government’s ability use revenues effectively. No public assessment of current and projected gaps between revenues and needed post-Transition expenditures.

- **Exceptional Advances for Women**: Real gains and their sustainability are overstated. No mapping of critical problem areas, and areas where legal protection does not exist in real world. Failure to note regressive aspect of Afghan law.

- **New Silk Road, Promoting Regional Connections**: Exaggeration of current and future economic impact, problems in sustaining current roads, political and security problems with Pakistan.

- **Electric power**: Generation capacity is tied estimates of consumers where credibility of data are unclear. Failure to create real world prices and sustainable problems is understated.

- **Medical services and life expectancy**: Use of controversial best case data. No attempt to resolve widely differing estimates of life expectancy.

The extremely high level of current annual aid (estimated at $15.7 billion in 2010) is roughly the same dollar amount as Afghanistan’s GDP and cannot be sustained. Aid has funded the delivery of essential services including education and health, infrastructure investments, and government administration. There have been substantial improvements in the lives of Afghans over the last 10 years as a result of this effort. But these inflows, most outside the Afghan budget, have been so high that inevitable waste and corruption, aid dependency and use of parallel systems to circumvent limited Government absorptive capacity have impeded aid delivery and the building of a more effective Afghan state.

The level of public spending -- both on and off budget -- that has been financed by such high aid flows will be fiscally unsustainable for Afghanistan once donor funds decline. Lesser amounts, matched by more effective aid delivery could, in the end, lead to some more positive outcomes. The key issue is how to manage this change and mitigate the adverse impacts, and put aid and spending on a more sustainable path for the longer-term. International experience and Afghanistan’s history after the Soviet military withdrawal in 1989 demonstrate that violent fluctuations in aid, especially abrupt aid cutoffs, are extremely damaging and destabilizing.

Large financial inflows outside the Afghan budget and fragmented aid in a situation of weak governance have been major sources of rents, patronage, and political power. This has inadvertently exacerbated grievances and conflicts as the relative strength of elite groups in Afghan society shifted. As aid declines, reliance on the opium economy and other illicit activities could increase. Ensuring that increasingly constrained public funds are well used reinforces the need to maintain and improve upon the significant progress made by the Finance Ministry in establishing public financial management systems and a robust Afghan budget process.

The impact of declining aid on economic growth may be less than expected. Why? Because most international spending “on” Afghanistan is not spent “in” Afghanistan, and much of what is spent in Afghanistan leaves the economy through imports, expatriated profits and outward remittances. Nevertheless, projections suggest that, under even favorable assumptions, real GDP growth may fall from 9% a year over the past decade to 5-6% during 2011–18. Given Afghanistan’s annual population growth of 2.8%, this would mean only limited improvement in average per capita income, continuing high rates of underemployment and little progress in reducing poverty. Only growth at the very maximum of the range of plausible scenarios would enable Afghanistan to achieve meaningful reductions in poverty and higher average per capita incomes. For example, with real GDP growth of 6% a year, average per capita income – currently one of the world’s lowest at $528 dollars – would take 22 years or about a generation to double.

Economic growth is much slower under less favorable scenarios. The growth projections are based on a set of assumptions (scenarios) related mainly to security, sources of growth, aid levels, and changes in investment climate. If the assumptions in the less favorable scenarios come to pass —for example, if agriculture performance is poor, if major mining investments (Aynak for copper and Hajigak for iron ore) do not materialize, or if aid declines precipitously over the period — then growth could drop to 3-4%. Deteriorating security and governance would lead to further economic decline. The underdeveloped financial sector and low rates of financial intermediation leave little scope for helping Afghan businesses adjust to slowing growth. Conversely, the decline could be partly mitigated by reducing aid in a gradual, planned manner and by increasing the amount of aid that is actually spent within Afghanistan that would result if more aid channeled through the Afghan budget.
Underemployment will increase because the activities affected by declining financial inflows (services, construction) are relatively labor-intensive. Unemployment and especially underemployment in Afghanistan—respectively estimated at 8% and 48%—are already high, even with today’s rapid economic growth. Roughly 6–10% of the working population has benefited from aid-financed job opportunities, most of these in short-term employment. Declining aid, therefore, can be expected to exacerbate underemployment levels (with fewer casual labor opportunities and lower pay for skilled employees).

The impact of the decline will affect some groups more than others. Aid has not been evenly spread across the country. Because of the choices made by donors, and the predominant role of stabilization and military spending, the conflict-affected provinces have had significantly higher per capita aid than the more peaceful (and often poorer) provinces. As a result, the slowdown in aid will be felt more acutely in the conflict-affected areas and in urban centers. If aid declines gradually so that it can be partly offset by growth of the security, mining, and civilian public sectors, the impact could be softened and spread over time. This would allow labor markets more time to adjust.

The direct poverty impact of declining international spending might be limited if aid becomes more equally distributed across provinces and the composition shifts toward development programs rather than short-run stabilization activities. Aid disproportionately devoted to the more conflict-affected provinces has had only a modest impact on poverty. Households in the conflict-affected provinces were less poor on average to begin with, so this concentration of aid inadvertently increased inequality amongst provinces and between groups. National programs delivered through the Government, such as NSP [National Solidarity Program], have benefitted Afghans more equitably.

The worst impact of transition will be on the fiscal situation with a projected financing gap of 25% of GDP by 2021/22. Even assuming ambitious targets for robust growth in domestic revenue are met (with a projected rise from 10% of GDP to more than 17% of GDP a decade from now), there will be an unmanageable fiscal gap. This gap arises primarily as a result of operations and maintenance (O&M) spending and the wage bill for security that together will be 17.5% of GDP by 2021. The civilian wage bill will increase to 9%, the non-security operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditure to 4%, other operating spending to 2.5%, and the core development budget to 10% of GDP.

UN Human Development Indicator Ranking
(175th in the World in 2013)

UN Human Development Progress by Category: 1980-2012

![Graph showing human development progress by category from 1980 to 2012.

### Table: Life Expectancy, Education, GNI per capita, and HDI (1980-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2005 PPP$)</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0,948</td>
<td>0.246</td>
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<tr>
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<td>43.8</td>
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<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0,435</td>
<td>0.236</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0,750</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0,953</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0,979</td>
<td>0.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Still Very Low Education Levels Compared to Other Countries

Decades of conflict have had a long-lasting impact on the human capital stock of the country.

Despite significant improvements in school enrollment rates and education achievement in younger (urban) cohorts, the education gap remains substantial by international standards, also taking into account country’s level of development.

In each sector of the economy, the education level of the Afghan labor force is the lowest among South Asia countries.

Particularly challenging are education gaps in sectors crucial for future economic growth and development such as agriculture, mining, construction, commerce and manufacturing.

Since 2009 Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing the level of corruption in the public sector. While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per cent did so in 2012.

However, worrying trends have also emerged in the past three years: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms.

Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012. In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.
UN Human Development Progress Lags by Comparison With Other Poor States: 1980-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI value</th>
<th>HDI rank</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (PPP US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2,566</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low HDI</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Challenge of the Quality of Governance
The third section of this report focuses on the critical challenges in governance that will follow even the most successful outcome of the election in producing a clear result, popular acceptance, and support by Afghanistan’s key power brokers and factions.

The post election period will be a race to establish a new pattern of effective governance, and deal with critical challenges in governance at every level, planning, budget execution, and dealing with the economy in addition to security.

US reporting on progress in governance and the economy has never had real credibility. As the previous budget summary shows, there is no evidence of a credible US government economic risk assessment, aid plan, effort to advance the reform goals set at the Tokyo governance, or deal with the problems of a system where the president controls most appointments and funds down to the District level.

Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt and incompetent governments in the world. It must now adjust to radical cuts in the outside spending that supported its budget and the market and urban sector portions of its economy.

– problems disguised by a lack of meaningful current reporting, and dishonest modeling that ignore the impact of corruption, real-world narcotics economics, and capital flight.

Revenues may be partially protected by the carry over in aid funds, but past projections seem exaggerated, to ignore corruption and waste, sometimes be based on unrealistic forecasts of development.

The ability of government’s to spend money has never been a measure of effectiveness in showing what that spending accomplishes, but Afghanistan lags badly even in the ability to spend at a time many NGOs are leaving, PRTs will be gone, and it is supposed to manage a far larger share of aid funds.
Again, a Long List of Key Uncertainties

• When will a new President take office?
• Can the new President win popular support… and lead?
• How long will it take to form a functional government at all levels – national, provincial, district?
• How will the mix of power brokers change?
• What security challenges will emerge and when? How will the MoD and MoI function and respond?
• Who will take charge of budgeting, economic planning, and use of international aid?
• What will be mix of corruption versus relative honesty?
• What will be the mix of capabilities – e.g., war-fighting versus security? How will Afghan leaders reshape the rule of law?
• How will layered defense actually interact with governance?
• Accommodation? Search for peace?
• Role of neighboring powers?
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: Approaching the World’s Worst

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.
World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Government Effectiveness

Voice and Accountability

IMF Estimate of Governance Problems

Sources: World Bank Doing Business Report (2014); World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; and IMF staff calculations.
1/ Low income countries;
2/ Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan;
3/ Emerging market economies;
4/ Worldwide Governance Indicators include government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption; trend line is based on cross-country regression.
Poor Governance Compared to South Asia Average

Declining Quality of Governance in Critical Areas: 2007-2012

the governance situation appears to have regressed in important areas...While ratings improved for government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and regulatory quality due to the government’s laudable progress with PFM reforms, investment climate improvements and government transparency initiatives, control of corruption, rule of law and political stability have fallen back to lower levels.

For a country with such a low starting point as Afghanistan, it can be expected to experience slippage in governance achievements over time. However, there is an urgent need associated with Afghanistan’s governance situation: not only is better governance necessary to reduce violence and conflict in the country, but better governance will be absolutely critical for securing the country’s financing needs.

Afghanistan will remain aid-dependent for years to come, and although donors have committed sufficient funds to sustain development throughout 2016, the flow of funds is by no means guaranteed. It is, rather, subject to – among other conditions – improvements in governance. Accelerating governance reforms, therefore, is not just a development option for Afghanistan, but is essential for the country to survive.
The data is for 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (Daykundi, Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Khowst, Logar, Wardak, Nimroz, Nuristan, Uruzgan, Paktiya, Paktika, and Zabul). Kabul was not included because several of the cells show zero for number of employed civil servants. The amounts for the Independent Directorate of Local Governance include personnel who work for provincial municipalities.

DOD’s latest district assessment report, completed in February 2014, found that …of the 47 districts where the Coalition provided oversight and support to VSO, 53% had “adequate” or “effective” governance. The remaining 47% had “poor” or “ineffective” governance. All districts in the report showed the same status for governance over the past year, except for one that improved from “adequate” to “effective.” … At the same time, DOD noted that it found much of the quarterly VSO survey data to be untrustworthy because of fraudulent or fabricated data.

The Financing of Governance Challenge
Budget Execution Has Been a Major Problem

• Operating expenditures:
  • Increased during the first six months of 2013, as more spending moved on-budget. Yet execution rates remain low, particularly for the development budget.
  • Increased to Afs 82.1 billion in the first six months in 2013, compared to Afs 75.4 billion over the same period in 2012.
  • Development expenditures declined to Afs 23.7 billion in the first half of 2013, compared to Afs 27 billion in the first half of 2012.
  • Low budget execution continues to be a problem in Afghanistan, particularly affecting development expenditures in 2013.
  • Budget execution was only 36.4% of the operating budget and 17% of the development budget in the first half of 2013, compared to 50% and 24%, respectively, in the first half of 2012.
  • Among ministries with development budgets of more than $50 million, only three (ministries of health, finance, and rural development) have executed more than 20% through the first half of 2013.

A Budget and Economy Driven by Aid, Military Spending, and Narcotics

Outside Aid Spending Drives GDP After 2003/2004

Only 10% of Afghan Budget is Self-Funded

• 64% is US aid
• 26% is from other donors
• 10% is Afghan funded

World Bank Estimate of Growing Financing Gap

Core Government Expenditures as % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Agriculture &amp; Rural Development</th>
<th>Social Protection</th>
<th>Economic Governance &amp; PSD</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012-12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transition Financing Critically Dependent on No Increase in Security Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013Bgt*</th>
<th>2013Act</th>
<th>2014Bgt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent budget</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td>5,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary development</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-discretionary development</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,746</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total core budget</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,809</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,025</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,649</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic revenues</td>
<td>2,488</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign grants</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>4,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External loans/credits</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total financing</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,565</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,307</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,277</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2013Bgt figures are initial budgeted figures.
...domestic revenues declined to 9.6% of GDP in 2013, one of the lowest in the world. Afghanistan’s commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework call for it to increase revenues to 15% of GDP by 2016 and to 19% by 2025.

The Bank warned that the current decline in revenue poses risks to long-term sustainability and to achieving Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework targets, upon which donor assistance is predicated.
Afghanistan’s aid dependence is predominantly a fiscal issue. While most civilian and military aid has been delivered in the form of development projects outside of the government’s budget system, on-budget aid is an important financing source. While domestic revenues increased to an impressive 11.4 percent of GDP in 2011, Afghanistan can today only finance about 40 percent of its total expenditures on its own.

Moreover, expenditures are expected to increase, as the government will assume more financial responsibilities over the military apparatus and the operation and maintenance of public assets which were built outside of the budget and have not yet been factored into the budget. Finally, Afghanistan will need to continue to invest in expanding public service delivery and physical infrastructure in order to safeguard the gains of the reconstruction process and further support the growth process. Public investment will continue to play a dominant role in Afghanistan’s economy, at least until the security situation and the investment climate improves.

Current projections see a financing gap of 20 percent of GDP in 2025, on the assumption that the government manages to increase domestic revenue to 17 percent. This renders government operations unsustainable without additional external financing. Continued, strong donor engagement in Afghanistan will therefore be of paramount importance to Afghanistan’s future development, if not its survival as a state.

Macroeconomic stability has relied heavily on large aid flows. Afghanistan’s export base is currently very small and the country receives little foreign direct investment. At the same time, the country is highly dependent on food and oil imports. Consequently, the balance of payment showed a persistently high deficit in the current accounts. So far, the high level of aid have helped to keep the overall balance of payments in surplus and even contributed to a sizable accumulation of international reserves over the years. However, with aid declining, an alternative source of financing will be required to balance payments for imports.

The implications of the transition process, therefore, give urgency to Afghanistan’s need for a growth model that provides not only high numbers of jobs but also high levels of fiscal income and foreign exchange earnings to finance Afghanistan’s development process. Aged in wage-earning employment. At the same time, the fertility rate is very high, at 5.1 percent in 2011/12. Increasing the share of female labor market participation will key to reducing fertility and reducing demographic pressures in the future.
Agriculture, together with services, is still the largest contributor to economic growth. In spite of the structural shift in Afghanistan’s economy, agriculture remains one of the largest contributors to economic growth. In 2012, for instance, it contributed over half of the 14.4 percent of GDP growth, thanks to favorable weather conditions and an exceptionally rich harvest. Depending on the harvest in any given year, agriculture accounts for one-fourth to one-third of GDP.

Figure 1.8: Sector Contributions to Real GDP Growth (percentage points)

Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CSO data

Afghanistan’s economy is dominated by agriculture in more than one dimension. Aside from its direct contribution to GDP, agricultural production feeds into the economic growth process through its impact on aggregate demand and significance in manufacturing. In 2011/12, 49 percent of all households derived their income from agriculture; for 30 percent of all households agriculture constitutes the main income source. Not surprisingly, private aggregate demand is highly correlated with agricultural production (Figure 1.9). Moreover, 96 percent of the manufacturing sector depends on agricultural products for inputs (food and beverages, textiles, and leathers).
Much of civilian and military aid has been delivered outside of the budget through external, budget contributions. Of the US$15.7 billion in aid to Afghanistan in 2010/11, only a small portion, roughly 11 percent, was delivered on-budget. Nevertheless, on-budget aid is an important financing source. While domestic revenues significantly increased between from 3 percent in 2002 to 11.4 percent in 2012, they have been insufficient to sustain the government’s operation and investment. In 2012, domestic revenues only financed 40 percent of total expenditures; the remainder was financed by foreign grants. The fiscal sustainability ratio, which measures domestic revenue over operating expenditures, was only 60 percent in 2012, which means that Afghanistan can currently not even fully meet the recurrent costs of its public service provision. This renders the operations of the government unsustainable without additional external financing.

The analysis projects revenues to reach more than 17 percent of GDP by 2025 (from current levels of 11 percent), assuming good performance in revenue collection and continued development of extractive Industries. However, on-budget expenditures are expected to grow much faster, largely as a result of rising security spending for both operations and maintenance (O&M) and wages for the army and police, which were historically funded by donors outside of the budget. But it will also be driven by non-security spending, which will increase due to additional O&M liabilities associated with the handover of donor-built assets and with a rising government payroll as civil service reforms unfold.

Security spending is projected to be more than 15.2 percent of GDP in 2021 (about as much as total projected domestic revenue in that year), the civilian wage bill 4.8 percent, and the civilian nonwage O&M bill 7.2 percent. Depending on how many of the O&M liabilities the government takes on, total government spending could assume between 38 percent and 54 percent of GDP by 2025. This would result in a total financing gap of 20 percent of GDP in 2025, and even higher levels in the intermediate years.
Afghanistan needs to move toward fiscal sustainability to reduce its dependence on donor support. This will entail revenue mobilization, and better expenditure management including better prioritization and service delivery to assure security and development. Domestic revenues have stagnated due to the economic slowdown, faltering efforts, and leakages, and are expected to rise only slowly, while operating budget expenditures, which were at 15 percent of GDP in 2010 are projected to increase to over 29 percent of GDP by 2018 as part of the security transition. The combination of these factors generates large fiscal vulnerabilities.

Afghanistan has one of the lowest domestic revenue collections in the world, with an average of about 9 percent of GDP in 2006–13 compared to about 21 percent in low-income countries. Factors behind this poor performance include a very low starting point, low compliance, opposition to new taxes, and a limited set of taxes.

IMF Estimate of Impact of Domestic Revenue Limits and Dependence on Outside Funding

The Challenge of Corruption
The Challenge of Corruption

- 175th most corrupt country out of 177 ranked by Transparency International. Budget openness is minimal.
- Bad rating on World Bank’s “Control of corruption index” bad. Improvement is driven by aid donors.

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them.

But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official.

According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens.

While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years.

Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army.
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively, and there were reports that officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were some reports of low-profile corruption cases successfully tried at the provincial level. The government made several commitments to combat corruption, including President Karzai’s 2012 decree, but little progress had been made towards implementation at year’s end. At the beginning of the year, the Attorney General's Office created a monitoring department, as required by the decree, and it began accepting referred cases. There was no progress on the cases reported as of year’s end.

On June 30, a new law organizing the judiciary weakened the Control and Monitoring Department of the Supreme Court. The department had been considered effective in dealing with corruption within the judiciary in the districts and provinces. The new law eliminated the department’s authority to conduct investigations, make arrests, and prosecute violators as well as some of its key positions.

Reports indicated corruption was endemic throughout society, and flows of money from the military, international donors, and the drug trade continued to exacerbate the problem. Reports indicated that many Afghans believed the government had not been effective in combating corruption. Corruption and uneven governance continued to play a significant role in allowing the Taliban to maintain its foothold in the east-central part of the country (the five provinces surrounding Kabul) and maintain influence in some parts of the southern provinces.

Prisoners and local NGOs reported that corruption was widespread across the justice system, particularly in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases and “buying” release from prison. There were also reports of money being paid to reduce prison sentences, halt an investigation, or have charges dismissed outright. The practice of criminalizing civil complaints was commonly used to settle business disputes or extort money from wealthy international investors.

During the year reports indicated a rise in incidents of “land grabbing” by both private and public actors. The most common type occurred when businesses illegally obtained property deeds from corrupt officials and sold the deeds to unsuspecting “homeowners,” who would then get caught in criminal prosecutions. Other reports indicated that government officials grabbed land without compensation in order to swap the land for contracts or political favors. Occasionally, provincial governments illegally confiscated land without due process or compensation to build public facilities.

State Department Reports Growing Afghan Government Corruption in 2013 – II

There were reports that the Attorney General’s Office was unwilling or unable to pursue corrupt officials and that high-level officials who were arrested on corruption-related charges were released subsequent to political pressure. In addition there was anecdotal evidence that accusations of corruption on the part of others were used by corrupt officials to damage their opponents’ reputations or to deflect attention from their own misdeeds. There were also reports that the Attorney General’s Office compelled international contractors to settle claims made by Afghan subcontractors, regardless of the merits of the commercial disputes involved, and detained foreign employees of the contractors as leverage in the disputes (see section 1.d.).

Provincial police benefited financially from corruption at police checkpoints and from the narcotics industry. It was reported that ANP officers paid higher-level Ministry of Interior officials for their positions and to secure promotions. The justice system rarely pursued corruption cases, especially if they involved police, although authorities arrested and detained a provincial chief of police on drug trafficking charges. During the year the minister of interior also removed more than 40 police officers on charges of corruption, poor performance, and abuse of power, reportedly following a 10-month investigation.

In addition to official impunity issues, low salaries exacerbated government corruption. The international community worked with the national and provincial governance structures to address the problem of low salaries, but implementation of grade reform remained slow.

Credible sources reported that local police in many areas extorted a “tax” and inflicted violence at police checkpoints for nonpayment. Truck drivers complained that they had to pay bribes to security forces, insurgents, and bandits to allow their trucks to pass.

Police also reportedly extorted bribes from civilians in exchange for release from prison or to avoid arrest. Citizens also paid bribes to corrections and detention officials for the release of prisoners who had not been discharged at the end of their sentences.

- See more at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper

Since 2003, levels of distrust and corruption have increased to the point where corruption is endemic across Afghanistan.

In a survey of the population that was reported in October 2013, 80 percent of Afghans described corruption as a major problem, with 73 percent reporting that corruption was “a part of daily life” and 65 percent saying it was worse than the year before. Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of those polled felt GIRoA, as a whole, was corrupt to some degree. When asked why, the most common reasons cited were that GIRoA was a generally weak government and officials took bribes.

In the same poll, Afghans were questioned about various governance bodies and whether they abused their authority and power. More than half of respondents felt that every level of government and every office abused its power. Notably, President Karzai, who was viewed as corrupt by “only” 38 percent of respondents, experienced a rise in the number of people who felt he abused his authority, to the highest level since an August 2011 poll.

The Challenge of Demographics
Transition must deal with serious ethnic, regional, and sectarian divisions are among the population and critical population pressure in terms of total population, pressure on the land and water, urbanization and demand for jobs.

- Population estimates are very uncertain and many of the statistics commonly used have no reliable source or level of accuracy.
- The UN and US Census Bureau agree, however, that Afghanistan is under extreme population pressure for a very poor country with limited arable land and water and uncertain rainfall. (p. 46) 7.5-8.2 million in 1950 to 13.2 to 15.0 million at time of Soviet invasion to 27+ to 32+ million in 2014.
- Ethnic and sectarian differences are a problem, compounded by competition between power brokers and officials.
- An extremely young population creates a high dependency ratio and will put major pressure on the land, water, and job creation for at least a decade.
- Population pressure, water, and economic incentives have led to a sharp rise in urbanization, much uncounted or underestimated, and in the form of slums, poverty, and subsistence.
- The rate of young men reaching job age alone seems to exceed creation of real jobs.
- Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?
- Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP? After Transition and coming cuts in aid and military spending?
Afghanistan’s Divisive Demographics

- Total population: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)
  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- Population 0-14 years: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)
- Urban population: 23.5% of total population (2011)
- Rate of urbanization: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)
- Young men and women reaching employment age annually: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008
- Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?
- Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?
Afghanistan’s Demographic Pressure

Population Estimates in Millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimate (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan CSO</td>
<td>27.0 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census Bureau</td>
<td>31.823 (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>32.6 (mid 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>32.007 (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>29.82 (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: [http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php](http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php) and [http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm](http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm)
The country is facing huge demographic challenges which will add pressures to the labor market. The Afghan labor market is characterized by a young and fast-growing workforce. Decades of conflict, international migration and relatively high fertility rates make Afghanistan – together with Pakistan and Nepal – one of the youngest countries in South Asia. The proportion of population aged 15 or below is as high as 51.3 percent, meaning that more than one in every two Afghans is economically dependent.

Afghanistan’s population pyramid is characterized by a wide base that will maintain a sustained rate of growth in the number of new labor-market entrants for decades to come. Between 2010/11 and 2015/16 alone, the labor force is expected to increase by 1.7 million people, and by an additional 4 million by 2025/26, not accounting for any return migration or changes in participation rates. This means that every year 400,000 to 500,000 will potentially seek jobs.

Afghanistan has one of the highest fertility rates in the world – 5.1 percent in 2011/12. Unless the fertility rate decreases, demographic pressures will continue to rise and reduce the demographic dividend. A high fertility rate, coupled with declining mortality rates, tends to produce a "youth bulge”. Normally, a youth bulge presents an opportunity for growth in the impending years, since it would lower the age dependency ratio, i.e., the population younger than 15 or older than 64 as a share of the number of people of working age.

A decreasing dependency ratio means that a higher proportion of the population contributes to productive, income-raising work, relative to non-active dependents (e.g., elderly and children) which would consequently increase domestic savings and GDP per capita growth. But, a youth bulge could also pose a risk to stability if young people are left without viable jobs or other economic opportunities.
The Challenge of Economic Stability and Development
Nine Major Challenges that are not War Related

- Past reporting on GDP growth has been dishonest in that it took figures shaped by the agriculture sector, and gains determined by peak rainfall, and implied these were the result of development and aid.
- Transition and cuts in military and aid spending may have a critical impact on both the service and industries sector during transition. The lack of a comparable estimate of the impact of the narcotics sector is analytically absurd.
- In spite of these problems, there seems to have been real progress in human development in spite of gross exaggeration of improvement in medical services, and in students actually in school versus expected years of schooling.
- This still, however, has left Afghanistan far behind other poor Asian state like Bangladesh and Nepal.
- Transition will make the major barriers to doing business in Afghanistan – which ranks only 164th out of 189 countries – far more serious.
- There are no credible estimates of just how dependent Afghanistan has been on outside military spending and aid, but the World Bank and CIA warn that Afghan imports were 17 time exports in 2012.
Economic Challenges

• Massive current dependence on outside war spending and aid

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent.

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.

• No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank

• Service sector may leave, export capital, collapse.

• Major barriers to private development

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.

While initial progress in producing development outcomes was very encouraging in the immediate post-Taliban era, recent trends point to rising insecurity, deteriorating governance, a stagnant poverty rate, and mounting challenges to employment:

- **The security situation deteriorated after 2009** and the level of violence remains high. Annually, between 2,000 and 3,000 civilians are harmed or killed in violent incidences related to the ongoing insurgency.

- **Economic growth has not been pro-poor.** Poverty levels are high, with 36 percent of the population living below the national poverty line in 2011/12 and more than 50 percent vulnerable to becoming poor. Recent data suggests that overall poverty levels have not declined between 2007 and 2011, despite rapid growth in this period. At the same time, inequality measured by the Gini coefficient appears to have increased somewhat.

- **Unemployment is relatively low,** at 8.2 percent in 2011/12 but underemployment is a serious issue, with 16.8 percent of the employed population working less than 40 hours per week. At the same time, labor participation is low, at 60 percent, due mainly to a very low participation of women in the labor market.

- **The governance deficit relative to other low-income countries is still very large.** Reforms in areas that could have improved rule of law and control of corruption have been very slow. Corruption is pervasive and widespread. In 2012 Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 174th out of 176 countries, joint last with North Korea and Somalia. But most concerning is that the governance situation appears to have regressed, especially in areas such as control of corruption, rule of law and political stability.

- **In addition, the country is facing huge demographic challenges.** The Afghan labor market is characterized by a young and fast-growing workforce. Decades of conflict, international migration and staggeringly high fertility rates make Afghanistan – together with Pakistan and Nepal – one of the youngest countries in South Asia. Between 2010/11 and 2015/16 alone, the labor force is expected to increase by 1.7 million people, and by an additional 4 million by 2025/26. These trends pose significant risks to social cohesion in a situation that is already characterized by strong political, regional, and ethnic tensions.
World Bank Estimate of Afghan GDP Growth 2004-2013
(Annual % Growth in Constant $US 2010 Dollars)
Real GDP growth (excluding opium production) was 14.4% in 2012, which represented a sharp uptick from 6.1% in 2011.

This strong performance was in large part due to an exceptional agricultural harvest supported by favorable weather conditions.

Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of GDP (excluding opium). As a result, economic growth is influenced heavily by the volatile agricultural sector.
World Bank Estimate of Afghan GDP Growth
2010-2016
(In Constant $US 2010 Dollars)

Status in 2013
• GDP = $20.5 billion
• Population = 29.82 million
• GDI per capita = $680
• Poverty % of Population = 36%
• Life expectancy = 61 years
• Improved water = 61%
World Bank Estimate of GDP Growth in Comparison with Rest of South Asia

IMF Estimate of Imports vs. Exports

Challenge of Post Transition Trade Balance

World Bank Trend Graph
CIA reports $6.39 billion in imports in 2012 versus $376 million in exports (17:1)

Pakistan 32.2%, India 27%, Tajikistan 8.5%, US 6.2% (2012)

World Bank Estimate of Major Barriers to Doing Business and Private Development (164th Out of 189 Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>DOING BUSINESS 2014 RANK</th>
<th>DOING BUSINESS 2013 RANK***</th>
<th>CHANGE IN RANK</th>
<th>IMPROVEMENT IN DTF** (% POINTS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCOME CATEGORY</td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>↑ 6</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>29,824,536</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI PER CAPITA (US$)</td>
<td>622</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY COVERED</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>42.45</td>
<td>41.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>DB 2014 Rank</th>
<th>DB 2013 Rank</th>
<th>Change in Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starting a Business</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>↑ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with Construction Permits</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>↑ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Electricity</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>↑ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registering Property</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>↑ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Credit</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>↑ 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting Investors</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>↑ -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading Across Borders</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>↑ -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing Contracts</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>↑ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolving Insolvency</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>↑ 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Poverty Challenge
Growth has so far failed to produce more jobs and income for the poor: First, the volatility of agricultural growth likely hampers prospects for poverty reduction since agriculture accounts for more than half of employment. Poor households in Afghanistan, especially those who subsist on s than richer, wage-earning households. This would explain why growth has not benefited the poor and also perhaps why inequality has increased. Second, the persistent high level of un- and underemployment implies that growth in Afghanistan did not produce sufficient employment opportunities, which might have reduced the poverty impact. Finally, the increase in violence over the same period might have disproportionally affected the poor. Deterioration in the security situation limits the possibilities for public service delivery, the outreach of humanitarian development efforts, and access to markets for the poor. Moreover, insecurity also restricts access to public services, especially for women and children who might refrain from visiting clinics or going to school.

The report identifies four main population segments that have been largely excluded from the growth process and are at risk of being disadvantaged in future:

- **The low-skilled workforce.** Literacy levels in the Afghan working population are extremely low, especially among adults and women. Both literacy and education level tends to correlate with lower levels of poverty in Afghanistan.

- **The rural poor.** Agriculture provides income for around half of Afghanistan’s population; for 30 percent of households it constitutes the most important source of income. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and subsistence for 70-80 percent of the rural population in Afghanistan. Employment in agriculture is characterized mainly by small family businesses that produce mainly for subsistence.

- **Youth.** The proportion of population aged 15 or below is as high as 51.3 percent, meaning that more than one in every two Afghans is economically dependent. Young people tend to be better educated on average, especially in urban areas. However, they are also less likely to find paid employment.

- **Women.** While almost every man in the age range of 25-50 is economically active, only one in every two women participates in the labor market. While the female participation rate does not appear very low within the South Asian cultural context, women in Afghanistan are much less engaged in wage-earning employment. At the same time, the fertility rate is very high, at 5.1 percent in 2011/12. Increasing the share of female labor market participation will key to reducing fertility and reducing demographic pressures in the future.

Given Afghanistan’s annual population growth of 2.8 percent, this would mean only limited improvement in average per-capita income, continuing high rates of un- and underemployment, and little progress in reducing poverty. For example, at a rate of 4.8 percent GDP growth per year, it would take Afghanistan more than 20 years to increase real GDP per capita from its current estimated level to that of the South Asian region (2011), which is US$786. Convergence to South Asian income levels would then become an even further distant goal. Only growth at the upper level of the range of plausible scenarios would enable Afghanistan to meaningfully reduce poverty and achieve higher per-capita incomes.
World Bank: Limited Growth in GDP per Capita and Personal Consumption

Source: CSO
The national poverty rate in Afghanistan was around 36 percent in 2011-12, the same level measured in 2007-08…

Furthermore, the results showed that inequality edged up. In particular, the Gini coefficient increased to 31.6 in 2011-12 from 29.7 in 2007-08, while the growth rate of per capita expenditure of the richest 20 percent of the population was three times as high as that of the poorest 20 percent.

…In addition, the bottom forty percent of the population commands only 21 percent of total consumption and more than 50 percent of the population is still vulnerable to becoming poor.

…A number of factors could be contributing to the measured trends. First, the volatility of agricultural production would affect measured poverty trends since agriculture accounts for more than half of employment. It is worth noting that 2010 and 2011, the two years preceding the 2011-12 survey, both featured negative growth in the agricultural sector. Second, pervasive underemployment likely affects the poverty impact of growth. Afghanistan faces a daunting demographic challenge, with around 400,000 new entrants into the labor force expected in the next few years.

…Finally, the high dependency ratio, low levels of female labor force participation, and low labor productivity all contribute to shaping Afghanistan’s poverty profile. High economic dependency due to demographic pressure is further aggravated by extremely low levels of female labor force participation (19 percent) and the overwhelming prevalence of vulnerable forms of employment in informal and low productivity jobs (81 percent).
... there are indicators as to why growth has failed to produce more jobs and income for the poor. First, the volatility of agricultural growth likely affects prospects for poverty reduction since agriculture accounts for more than half of employment. Although agriculture grew by 45 percent in 2009, it actually contracted in 2008, 2010, and 2011, with limited irrigation and dependence on rain-fed crops contributing to volatility. Poor households in Afghanistan, especially those who subsist on agriculture, have only few risk-coping mechanisms and are more strongly affected by agricultural output contractions than richer, wage-earning households. In many cases, livelihood risks are being managed by disposing household assets or deferring expenditures for health and education services which, in turn, have negative dynamic effects for future income. This would not only explain why growth has not benefited the poor but could also explain the increase in inequality.

Second, the persistent high level of un- and underemployment implies that growth in Afghanistan did not produce sufficient employment opportunities, especially for the poor and underprivileged segments of the population. Finally, the increase in violence over the same period might have disproportionately affected the poor. A deteriorated security situation restricts public service delivery, the reach of humanitarian development efforts, and access to markets for the poor. Moreover, insecurity also restricts access to public services, especially for women and children who might refrain from visiting clinics or going to school.
Cannot Meet Food Needs

Notwithstanding agriculture’s importance to the economy, Afghanistan is not able to fully meet its food needs. Before the conflicts, Afghanistan was self-sufficient in cereals – and in some years was able even to be a small exporter. Today, however, and despite the large area devoted to cultivation of the primary staple (wheat), Afghanistan remains a highly food-insecure country (Table 1.3). High year-to-year fluctuations in domestic cereal production make the country dependent on food imports and have exposed the economy to external food-price shocks. For example, wheat demand in 2011 stood at 4.69 million tons, while national production was only 3.46 million tons, leaving a food deficit of more than 1.20 million tons. Adding to this a seed demand of 626,000 tons, the overall wheat deficit in 2011 was nearly 1.86 million tons.

Cereal Production in Afghanistan (thousands of tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total wheat production</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>2,767</td>
<td>5,064</td>
<td>4,532</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>5,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated wheat demand</td>
<td>4,330</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>4,505</td>
<td>4,595</td>
<td>4,687</td>
<td>4,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed demand and losses</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus/shortfall</td>
<td>-721</td>
<td>-2,326</td>
<td>-247</td>
<td>-816</td>
<td>-1,857</td>
<td>-422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Food Program (2012); Agriculture Commodity Price Bulletin (year 8, vol. 7), and Agriculture Prospects Report, July 2012
The Challenge of a Narco-Economy
Both opium production and area under poppy cultivation increased considerably in 2013, although this is not reflected in estimated non-opium GDP growth figures for 2013. According to UNODC data, opium production increased by almost 50 percent to 5,500 tons in 2013, while the total area under poppy cultivation expanded by 36 percent to 209,000 hectares (Figure 5). Opium production in 2013 appears to have recovered from the decline in 2012 triggered by adverse weather and disease. While the total value of opium production at farm-gate prices remained at about 4 percent of GDP (or $950 million) in 2013 due to a decline in the farm-gate price, the Export value of opiates (including drugs) increased from 11 percent of GDP in 2012 to 15 percent of GDP – or $3.1 billion – in 2013.

The UNODC estimates that the net value of the domestic market for opiates is far smaller, worth approximately 1 percent of GDP or $200 million, compared to the net export value of opiates which is around $2.9 billion. Despite substantial financial flows from opium production, analysis suggests that the contribution of opium to economic growth in the past ten years has been minimal, although it is likely to be an important source of livelihood for a segment of the rural population.
Opium Production in Afghanistan

In terms of production and share of GDP, opium’s importance has been declining since 2007, when it reached a record production of 8,200 tons. Nowadays, production is closer to 3,700 tons (UNODC, 2012), which amounts to 3.3 percent of GDP in farm-gate value, or 10 percent in export value – compared to 13 percent of GDP by farmgate value in 2007. However, measuring opium production as part of the national income is not straightforward. While the nominal difference between opium-GDP and non-opium-GDP is relatively small – an average of US$500 million each year – non-opium and opium GDP growth can differ by more than 5 percentage points in some years. However, average opium GDP growth has been only slightly higher than non-opium GDP growth: 9.4 percent compared to 9.2 percent, which suggests that between 2003 and 2012 opium has not been an important driver of economic growth.

That said, opium is still Afghanistan’s single most important cash crop and therefore has significant implications for income and consumption of rural, poor households. The average cash income of poppy-growing households is 52 percent higher than that of households that had never grown poppy. Poppy-growing households also tend to be farther away from markets. This, in turn, adds to the complexity of finding the right approach to reducing opium production, which ultimately hinges on the development of alternative and competitive agricultural supply chains.

Drug production and trafficking are macro-relevant in Afghanistan. Production includes opium, heroin, morphine, and cannabis. In 2013, the farm-gate value of potential opium production was estimated at 4 percent of GDP. The potential net value of opiates and the value of opiates potentially available for export were estimated at 15 percent and 14 percent of GDP, respectively.\(^1\) The combination of high opium prices and Afghanistan’s significant involvement in its cultivation exposes the country to risks of economic instability, as a number of factors could trigger a shock to production and prices which would transmit to the formal economy, including through farmers’ incomes. These include climate and water supply, eradication campaigns, external demand, change in policies (e.g., Taliban’s ban in 2000), border controls, and conflicts in neighboring countries.

There could be significant distorting effect of the drug industry on the formal economy.\(^2\) Resources devoted to drug cultivation and trafficking are diverted from other productive opportunities, decreasing activity in others sectors of the economy. It is also possible that spillovers from the drug sector may increase activity in other sectors.

IMF Estimate of Value of Opium vs. Other Exports

UDOC Estimate of Rising Afghan Opium Production
2012 vs. 2012-2013 – Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Change from 2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication) in hectares (ha)</td>
<td>154,000 ha (125,000–189,000)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>209,000 ha (173,000–238,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of poppy free provinces</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eradication</td>
<td>9,672</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>7,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average opium yield (weighted by cultivation)</td>
<td>23.7 kg/ha</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26.3 kg/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential production of opium</td>
<td>3,700 (2,800 – 4,200 tons)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5,500 (4,500 – 6,500 tons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994-2013 (Hectares)**

Source: UNODC (1994-2002), MCN/UNODC (since 2003). The high-low lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.

UDOC Estimate of Rising Afghan Opium Production
2012 vs. 2012-2013 – Part II
(Production in Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Production 2012</th>
<th>Production 2013</th>
<th>Change 2012-2013 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>251%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>290%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-eastern</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>252%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (rounded)</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The global area under illicit opium poppy cultivation in 2013 was 296,720 hectares (ha), the highest level since 1998 when estimates became available. An increase in cultivation was seen in both Afghanistan and Myanmar. The main increase was observed in Afghanistan, where the area of opium poppy cultivation increased 36 per cent, from 154,000 ha in 2012 to 209,000 ha in 2013. The main area of cultivation in Afghanistan was in nine provinces in the southern and western part of the country, while the major increase was observed in Helmand and Kandahar.

The potential production of opium in 2013 is estimated at 6,883 tons, which is a return to the levels observed in 2011 and 2008. The opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 per cent of the global opium production (5,500 tons). The potential production of heroin (of unknown purity) has also increased to 560 tons, comparable to 2008 estimates of 600 tons.

The Challenge of Investment, Mining and LoCs
Low Rankings in Critical Areas of Doing Business
(The higher the number the worse the country ranking out of 189 countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>DB 2014 Rank</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Starting a Business</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dealing with Construction Permits</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting Investors</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying Taxes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading Across Borders</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing Contracts</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolving Insolvency</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data points indicate ranking for 189 countries surveyed.
Sources: World Bank Doing Business Report (2014); World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey; and IMF staff calculations.

1/ Low income countries;
2/ Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan;
3/ Emerging market economies;
4/ Worldwide Governance Indicators include government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption; trend line is based on cross-country regression.
Agricultural development meets this requirement as it would directly improve income for the majority of households in Afghanistan. And as the large volatility in agriculture output demonstrates, the sector still has potential to grow even within the existing parameters of insecurity and violence. The large international interest and successful outcome of the recent tenders for the exploration and production in Amu Darya, Aynak, and Hajigak indicate a similar “conflict resilience” for extractive industries. However, international experience shows that not only does natural resource exploitation have limited job creation potential, but that it also carries large risks, especially for governance, social cohesion, and conflict. With the development of the extractive industries, Afghanistan is now adding another stress factor to its already-vulnerable country context. In fact there is ample empirical evidence that natural resource endowment can be detrimental to the development prospects of a country – even under more favorable circumstances than those found in Afghanistan.

The phenomenon of countries endowed with natural wealth producing low development outcomes is described as the “natural resource curse” which is usually a result of (i) a decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors due to an appreciation of the real exchange rate as resource revenues enter an economy (the “Dutch disease” effect), (ii) volatility of revenues from the natural resource sector due to exposure to global commodity market swings, (iii) governmental mismanagement of resources, and/or (iv) weak institutions, rent-seeking behavior, and redistributive struggles.

Most critical for Afghanistan is the notion that natural resources can undermine governance and spur conflict by challenging livelihoods, threatening the environment, and raising disputes over rights to control the resources; feelings of relative deprivation arise from the distribution of revenues from resource exploitation or providing financing to insurgent groups. In this sense, the development of extractive industries poses a serious threat to Afghanistan’s weak governance environment.
World Bank: Key Messages

- Afghanistan’s economy remains largely agrarian. Manufacturing contributed very little to economic growth over the past decade with the economy dependent primarily on agricultural output. The service sector is relatively unsophisticated and mainly informal.

- Structural changes observed over the past ten years have come from reconstruction and recovery activities financed predominantly by donors.

- Private-sector investment, hampered by persistent and increasing violence, has been very small. Growth over the past decade was driven mainly by demand from public sector activities.

- There have been some important achievements. However, development challenges are still very large. In spite of strong economic growth, poverty remains pervasive and has not decreased in the past five years.

- With 400,000-500,000 young people entering the labor market annually, Afghanistan faces an unprecedented demographic challenge. Without drastic changes in the country’s security situation to enable greater private investment, labor market pressures will continue to rise, and in turn increase the risk of conflict and violence.

- Enhancing the impact of growth on poverty and shared prosperity in the post-transition period will require steps to ensure that growth is strong and steady, accompanied by greater job creation.
Critical Importance of Uncertain LoC Security and $7-9 Billion in Added Investment Funds