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SHAPING IRAQ’S SECURITY FORCES

Security forces, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and repression cannot compensate for Iraq’s need for political change and for a more national government that has been stressed in earlier chapters. Iran cannot deal with the internal threats it faces without better politics and better governance. Iraq also, however, does need to make major improvements in its approach to security and stability. Iraq must create far more effective and less sectarian and repressive security forces.

Some elements of Iraq’s security forces are making progress but most still face massive problems in terms of their effectiveness, they suffer badly from corruption, their ties to the office of the Prime Minister and Shi’ite factions, and the way they are used to repress legitimate political opposition. The end result is that their operations are often ineffective and have become a key source of Sunni violence and support for Al Qaeda and other extremist movements.

As a result, the Iraq’s security forces have become both part of the path to stability and security and a threat to that same stability and security. They will remain so until Iraq has a more unified and truly national government. Moreover, unless outside aid take full account of the degree to which they are both a potential solution to Iraq’s violence, and its cause, increased effectiveness may push Iraqi towards deeper civil conflict.

The US and other outside powers must do what they can to improve this situation in spite of the past failure to create a meaningful strategic partnership that survived the departure of its combat forces. As has been discussed earlier, the US and many other states retain critical national security interests in Iraq. These interests center on giving Iraq a successful political and economic structure and making it a securer source of petroleum exports, eliminating civil violence and the risk of a return to a serious civil war, reducing or eliminating the threat of Sunni and Shi’ite terrorist elements, limiting Iranian influence over Iraq’s Shi’ite factions. They can best be served by supporting Iraqi governance and security forces by providing such support presents critical challenges.

The Impact of A Destabilizing Early US Departure

The last active US combat forces left Iraq in August 2010, marking the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation New Dawn. Some 49,000 advisory troops, four advisor assistance brigades, and a limited number of special operations forces (SOF) remained to train, advise, and assist Iraq’s security forces after that date, including the military, intelligence, and police. Until the end, these US troops continued to serve a number of other important security functions: carrying out kinetic operations against Iranian-backed and other militant groups; providing training to the ISF; taking part in joint patrols along the borders of the Kurdish provinces and helping integrate ISF and Kurdish forces; and acting as a deterrent to Iraq’s neighbors – in particular Iran.

The US and Iraqi forces never planned for this departure of most US advisors and enablers at the end of 2011. Many elements in the American and Iraqi leadership wanted the US troops to remain in Iraq, leading up to the withdrawal deadline. The US command in Iraq and many senior Iraqi officers and officials felt that US forces should continue to play such role after December 2011 as part of the Security Framework Agreement. Moreover, several US allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, voiced concerns that withdrawing all US troops would leave Iraq open to Iranian influence.
Nevertheless, implementing a meaningful Strategic Framework Agreement and extending a US troop presence after December 2011 proved to present major problems for both sides. On the Iraqi side, many Iraqis saw the US as an invading and occupying power that had failed to bring security, functioning democracy, effective governance, and effective economic aid. Public opinion influenced all Iraqi politicians. A majority of Iraqis supported withdrawing US troops by the end of 2011. According to a 2009 ABC News poll, 46% of Iraqis felt that US troops should leave sooner than the end of 2011, with only 16% wanting them to stay longer, and 35% feeling that the withdrawal timetable was right. Sunnis were particularly opposed, with 61% in favor of a faster timetable and only 4% wanting troops to stay longer.\textsuperscript{vi}

The power struggles between Maliki and Allawi -- that divided Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd and became the key source of Iraq’s rising level of violence – made it difficult to achieve unity on any divisive issue, and Iran opposed a lasting US presence. Iraqi politics had created a deeply divided and semi-paralyzed government. Prime Minister Maliki had to deal with Sadr, Iranian pressure, and accusations that he was an American stooge, and at the same time he had to fend off accusations of being too close to Iran, and many around Maliki did not trust the US. Whatever his private views may have been, he ruled out extending the US troop presence, stating, “The last American soldier will leave Iraq…this agreement is not subject to extension, not subject to alteration. It is sealed.”\textsuperscript{vii} Any plan to extend the US troop presence would also have to be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, which would prove difficult.

On the US side, support for maintaining troops in Iraq was uncertain. Budgetary concerns and public weariness over the Iraq war incentivized the withdrawal of all US troops. Indeed, even the most modest plans that called for civilian control of the US effort through the State Department and USAID faced growing budget pressures. Additionally, the cost of leaving even a fairly small number of US troops in Iraq created a significant financial burden.

A slight rise in American combat deaths in Iraq in 2011 did not help matters. Neither did the perception that Iraqi security forces were not doing enough to go after the Shi’ite groups attacking Americans.\textsuperscript{viii} Publically, neither President Obama nor President Maliki were backing plans to keep US troops in Iraq after 2011.

While the full details of Iran’s actions and role remain unclear, it is still all too clear that the US underestimated Iran’s influence. Iranian Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Suleimani was able to exert considerable pressure on Iraqi Shi’ite leaders to bar any US presence in Iraq after 2011, according to a September, 2013 profile of the Iranian general by New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins.\textsuperscript{ix}

A number of senior US experts in the US national security community indicate that Major General Suleimani’s personal influence was critical to the formation of a viable coalition government under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in 2010, and that a firm refusal to allow for a long-term American presence on the order of 10,000-15,000 troops was required in order to prevent an increase in Iranian sponsored attacks in Iraq.

All these issues became steadily more critical to politicians and policymakers in both the US and Iraq as the deadline for removing US forces approached. In May 2001, Maliki had stated that a request for US troops might be considered if a 70% concurrence among Iraq’s political blocs were reached.\textsuperscript{a} On August 3, 2011, the major factions, excluding the Sadrists, gave Maliki their backing to negotiate,\textsuperscript{x} and in September, the US publically acknowledged negotiations were taking place.\textsuperscript{xii}

As a result, both sides continued to examine options for extending the presence of US troops. The senior US commander in Iraq, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, originally recommended some 14,000-18,000 troops,
while other reports speculated leaving 10,000 troops. In September 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed keeping a smaller force of 3,000-4,000 as what one senior official called, “a small, temporary military presence,” as part of a plan to create a major American Embassy presence in five different parts of Iraq that would support security contractors in a police advisory effort. This plan also included a strong Office of Security Cooperation staffed by civilians and military personnel to support training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces.\

NATO also agreed to keep a small force in Iraq for training purposes; as of September 2011, there were 160 NATO staff conducting training operations in Iraq, 12 of which were American. Military and intelligence officials also pushed for greater CIA involvement following the withdrawal US troops to counter Iranian influence and thwart arms smuggling. In February 2012, reports again suggested that the CIA would maintain a large clandestine presence in Iraq long after the withdrawal of US troops in order to monitor the activity of the Iraqi government, suppress al-Qaeda’s affiliates, and counter the influence of Iran.

By September, however, the total force the US and NATO continued to seek had become far smaller than the force desired by top US military officials, and the failure to plan for a larger force drew growing criticism from many US experts and several US politicians. Iraqis across the sectarian spectrum also voiced their discomfort with such a small US force, while others still remained adamantly opposed to any presence at all. Many Iraqis remained conflicted over a desire for the US to withdraw and feelings of mistrust and fear towards Iraqi institutions.

The situation reached the crisis point in early October 2011. Iraq’s political leaders finally agreed to keep US military trainers in Iraq past the December deadline, but the agreement came too late for effective planning and they failed to agree that US troops could operate with immunity from Iraqi law. The US could not deploy forces without such immunity in a country where charges against US forces offered hostile factions so many political opportunity, and had previously made it clear that any such restriction would prevent it from keeping US forces in Iraq. As a result, the Obama administration decided to withdraw all forces aside from a small office linked to the US Embassy.

This did not mean that the US lost the ability to aid Iraq in an emergency. The US did keep significant forces in the Gulf that could aid Iraq if it faced a threat from Iran. The US announced that it would work with Kuwait to keep US forces stationed at Kuwaiti bases that could react to crisis scenarios in Iraq. The US had 23,000 military personnel in Kuwait as of January 2012. While these forces were later cut around half that level, the US maintained a major air presence and rapid deployment cap-ability in the Gulf, and continued to deploy at least a combat battalion in Kuwait – sometimes reaching a full combat brigade.

The US also propositioned supplies for a larger force if one had to be deployed to the region. As of late-December 2011, there was reportedly a Brigade Combat Team from the US Army’s 1st Cavalry Division in Kuwait, in addition to a Marine Expeditionary Unit likely headed to Kuwait for the foreseeable future. In addition, there are approximately 7,500 US troops in Qatar, 5,000 in Bahrain, and 3,000 in the UAE, with very small numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman. There are also forces deployed at least one and often two aircraft carrier task forces in or near the Gulf.

**The Uncertain Post-2011 Development of Iraq’s Security Forces**

There are no reliable data on the current operational strength of Iraq’s forces and even the totals for authorized manning are suspect. The 2013 edition of the *IISS Military Balance* indicates, however, that Iraq had 271,400 active military personnel in the spring of 2013, with 193,400 in the Army, 3,600 in a
small coastal navy, and Navy, and 5,050 in a still developing air force. The Ministry of Interior had another 531,000 personnel, although most were in regular police units.

**Iraqi Forces at the Time of Transition**

US forces left behind a mix of Iraqi security forces (ISF) with many strengths and many weaknesses. As Figure 35 shows, the Iraqi security forces had considerable manpower at the time US forces left, but they included an awkward mix of real military forces and police forces, were structured around internal security operations with very limited ability to defend against foreign threats, and were still very much in transition to a largely US-designed force structure that different and conflicted with Iraq’s part military structure and culture.

The various elements of the ISF had some combat units with considerable capability, but also many units that were not yet ready for independent operations. The army lacked many of the support and command structures it needed, effective IS&R assets, effective mobility and artillery capability, and was not supported by an effective Ministry of Defense. The police forces has some strong paramilitary elements but were an awkward mix of regular police and security forces and units with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism elements, none of which were supported by effective courts, a fully functioning criminal justice system and effective detention facilities. The Ministry of the Interior was also substantially less ready than the Ministry of Defense and far more politicized.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the ISF could not prevent violence from rising steadily through 2013, particularly given the fact the ISF was limited by Iraq’s deep sectarian and ethnic divisions, its political power struggles at the top, the civil war in neighboring Syria and an ensuing spillover of Sunni extremist groups into Iraq, and an increase in Iranian military influence due to the large presence of Iranian military advisors supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.
**Figure 35: Iraqi Security Forces as of October 10, 2011**

**Total Security Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>ASSIGNED PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MOD</strong></td>
<td><strong>279,103</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MOI</strong></td>
<td><strong>649,800</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-Terrorism Force</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,200</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>933,103</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comparative size of Active Military Forces:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,285,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,477,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,020,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>545,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>233,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>100,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

Iraqi Forces in 2013

The formal command structure of Iraq forces does seem to have stayed close to the structure that existed when the US left in 2011. Jane’s reports that,\textsuperscript{xxiii}

The Prime Minister of Iraq, currently Nuri al-Maliki, is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In 2007, al-Maliki set up a 24-member body, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, to advise him on military matters. The chain of command runs from the prime minister, through the minister of defence, to the chief of staff (CoS) of the armed forces. The CoS, who heads up the Joint Headquarters, is supported by a Vice-CoS and a number of deputy chiefs of staff. In recent years the Joint Staff had a number of departments or directorates including Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, Communications, Training and Comptroller.

From an operational point of view, there is an Iraqi National Command (INC) at the National Operations Centre (NOC) in Baghdad, which is under the control of the prime minister as commander-in-chief. The NOC oversees the Iraqi Joint Forces Command (JFC) which in turn commands the single service commands, the Ground Forces Command (which commands the divisions and brigades etc.), the Air Force Command and the Navy Command, as well as the Support Command, the Corps of Engineers and the Training and Doctrine Command. The latter controls the National Defence University, which comprises the military academy and other institutions, and the Tactical Training Command (TDC) that controls the training bases and other training centers. Also under the INC is the Iraq Counter-Terrorism Service, which commands the Special Operations Forces.

In practice, however, Prime Minister Maliki and his office steadily consolidated the Prime Minister’s control over Iraq force and security services and made them as much a force the Prime Minister used for political control and repression as a force that helped create security and stability on a national level. Maliki became the de facto Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior and his office regularly bypasses the form chain of command, and make interim senior appointments without confirmation by the Majlis or full consultation with senior officials and commanders. The Prime Minister’s office now controls key military and paramilitary forces directly, Iraqi intelligence, and national elements of the police and some elements of Iraq’s judiciary.

The Iraqi military now has a powerful intelligence branch that includes internal security operations. Military Intelligence (M2) is part of the Joint Headquarters of the Iraqi armed forces, and the army, the air force and the counter-terrorism command have their own intelligence gathering elements. There also are the equivalent of political commissars to ensure the loyalty of Iraqi forces.

The IISS reported in its Military Balance for 2013 that the Maliki government had introduced the equivalent of untrained political commissars called dimaj into the force structure, and that, “a broad set of problems continue to plague the Iraqi Army...The first involves weaknesses in management, logistics and strategic planning. The unwillingness, of senior military officials to delegate responsibility down, the chain of command also stifles innovation and independent decision-making at a junior level.”\textsuperscript{xxiv}

Military Spending

Iraq’s oil revenues allow it finance a major set of security forces without dependence on US or other outside aid. The IISS reports that Iraq’s military spending – which may include the spending of Ministry of Interior forces, rose from 14.1 trillion dinars ($12 US billion) in 2011 to 17.2 trillion dinars ($14.7 US billion) in 2012, and 19.9 trillion dinars ($17.1 US billion) in 2013. Jane’s has a much lower estimate. It puts Iraqi spending at $5.5 US billion in 2011, $6.1 US billion in 2012, and $8.2 US billion – but the Jane’s figures seem to exclude significant amounts of Iraqi arms orders and capital spending.\textsuperscript{xxv}
Furthermore, the Jane’s figure is still high for a largely counterinsurgency force that has not yet imported anything like the numbers of major weapons imported by some neighboring regional powers.

**Force Strength**

Figure 36 summarizes the IISS estimates of Iraq’s forces strength in 2013 and shows that Iraqi security forces remained relatively large in numbers, and had acquired a growing strength of conventional land weapons, but still fell far short of Iran’s holding, had no meaningful air combat capabilities, and no surface-to-air missiles or real land-based air defense capabilities. The bulk of the manpower also remained in police units with little or no serious combat, counter-insurgency, or counter-terrorism capabilities or in even lower grade units that were largely poorly trained and equipped local security guards.

Iraq was actively seeking more advanced arms from the US as well as Russia, China and other sources, but the US was slow in deliveries and Iraqi orders often seemed more political and an effort to rush into increasing weapons strength than part of a well structure effort at force development.

As events since 2011 have made all too clear, however, Iraq still lacks the security forces it needs for both internal security and external security. Moreover, the sudden departure of most US advisors, trainers, and partners has seen Iraqi security forces become increasingly politicized and placed under the control of Prime Minister Maliki and Shi’ite factions, and helped lead to a growing level of corruption, politicization, and deterioration in some elements of these forces and within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior described earlier in this report.
Figure 36: Key Elements of Iraqi Security Forces in 2013

Army

*Manpower:* 193,400 actives

*Combat Units:* 1 armored division, 8 motorized rifle divisions, 3 infantry divisions, 2 special forces brigades, 2 presidential motorized brigades, 1 Baghdad brigade

*Main Battle Tanks:* 336: 140 M1A1 Abrams; 120+ T-72; 76 T-55

*Other Armored Fighting Vehicles:* 193: 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 20 Fuchs NBC, 100 BMP-1; 20 BTR-4

*Armored Personnel Carriers:* 2,799+: 100 FV 103 Spartan; 400+ M113A2; 61 MT-LB; 44 Talha; 570 Akrep/Scorpion; 60 AT-105 Saxon; 100 BTR-80; 10 Cobra; 50 M3 Panhard; 60 Mohafiz; 10 VCRFT, 12 Barracuda; 600 Dzik-3; 607 ILAV Cougar; 115 Mamba

*Artillery* 1,386+

- 48 self-propelled tube+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24M109A5
- 138+ towed tube: 130mm 18+ M-46; 155mm 120 M198
- Multiple rocket launchers: some 122mm BM-21
- 1,200 mortars: 81mm 650 M252; 120mm 550 M120

*Helicopters:*

- Armed: 26 Mi-17 Hip H; 4+ SA342 Gazelle
- ISR: 10 OH-58C Kiowa
- Transport & Utility: **Medium** 8 Mi-171Sh; **Light** 29: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell T407

Navy

*Manpower:* 3,600 actives

29 Patrol and Coastal Combatants:

- Ocean-Patrol 2 RiverHawk
- Coastal Patrol 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
- Patrol Boats 17: 9 Swiftships 35 (6 additional vessels under construction); 5 Predator (PRC-27m); 3 Al Faw
- 6 Riverine Patrol Boats 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010

Air Force

*Manpower:* 5,050 actives

*Combat Aircraft:* 3 armed Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan* plus 2 SB7L-360 Seeker

*Transport Aircraft:* 10: 3 C-130E Hercules; 1 C-130J-30 Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline 6 Beech 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna 172

*Training Aircraft* 33+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A

Ministry of Interior Forces

- **Iraqi Police Service:** 302,000
- **Iraqi Federal Police:** 44,000
- **Facilities Protection Service:** 95,000
- **Border Enforcement:** 60,000
- **Oil Police:** 30,000

Source: Adapted from the data in the *IISS Military Balance, 2013*, pp. 381-382.
The Failure to Provide Iraq With Effective Forces for External Defense

While the ISF now suffers from the self-inflicted wounds Iraq’s politicians have forced upon their country, some major wounds were also inflicted by the US-led invasion and the occupation that followed. Iraq must also cope with the fact that Iran has skillfully managed to establish its influence over Iraqi Forces at key political levels, and -- as Figure 37 Parts 1 through 5 demonstrate all too clearly -- Iran is still by far the more dominant military power.

Iraq’s current lack of conventional warfare capability is the result of the fact that the US effort to build up the Iraqi Security forces during 2003-2011 focused largely on creating forces that could effectively confront terrorism, extremism, and civil conflict under the assumption that a continuing US presence would act as a substitute. As a result, did little to bring Iraqi security forces to the point where they could defend the country against Iraq’s neighbors.

As a result, Iraq is probably a decade away from creating the kind of conventional forces that can stand on their own against Iran, and it must buy and absorb large numbers of conventional weapons to create such forces in spite of its present problems in dealing with AQI/ISIS and the serious economic problems described in the next chapter.

It is also important to note that Iranian influence is far from Iranian control, and that Iraq continues to try to balance Iran off against the US. Even though the Maliki government has ties to Iran, it now is seeking to create far stronger conventional forces at the same time it faces a steadily growing level of internal violence. This explains its search for modern fighter like the F-16, for M-1 tanks, and a wide variety of other major conventional weapons. It explains why Maliki keeps his ties to the US open, but also why Iraq has turned to Russia and other states for such weapons.

At the same time this situation presents the problem that the US now must make hard choices as to whether to provide such weapons to a state with which it does not have a meaningful security agreement, which has links to Iran, and is caught up in serious internal political violence. So far, the US has continued plans to provide such weapons – although scarcely at the rate the Maliki government has pressed for. The rise in AQI/ISIS activity has also led the Maliki government to revive its interest in the Strategic Framework Agreement that went into force on January 2009.

The Strategic Framework Agreement contained the following key statements regarding cooperation in security: xxvi

Section I: Principles of Cooperation

This Agreement is based on a number of general principles to establish the course of the future relationship between the two countries as follows:

1. A relationship of friendship and cooperation is based on mutual respect; recognized principles and norms of international law and fulfillment of international obligations; the principle of non-interference in internal affairs; and rejection of the use of violence to settle disputes.

2. A strong Iraq capable of self-defense is essential for achieving stability in the region.

3. The temporary presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is at the request and invitation of the sovereign Government of Iraq and with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq.

4. The United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea, and air as a launching or transit point for attacks against other countries; nor seek or request permanent bases or a permanent military presence in Iraq.
Section III: Defense and Security Cooperation

In order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability, and to enhance the ability of the Republic of Iraq to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.

Such security and defense cooperation shall be undertaken pursuant to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

The agreement also makes provisions for revisions by mutual agreement and set up a Higher Coordinating Committee (HCC) to “monitor the overall implementation of the Agreement and develop the agreed upon objectives that “shall meet periodically and may include representatives from relevant departments and ministries.” It states that, “The Parties shall seek to establish additional Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs), as necessary, responsible for executing and overseeing this Agreement.”

This provide a basis for greatly enhanced security cooperation between Iraq and the US, but there is no status of force agreement that would allow the US to securely deploy forces, the US would have to have guarantees that such cooperation would simply empower the Maliki regime to repress the Sunnis and other dissidents, and the US would have to act in an environment where it is caught between Maliki’s ability to exploit his links to Iran, and his ability to use Iraq’s oil revenues to buy arms from other states.
Figure 37-Part 1: Iraq vs. Iran Main Battle Tank and Combat Aircraft Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main Battle Tanks</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>1,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 37-Part 2: Iraq vs. Iran Summary Force Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>193,400</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/ Marine</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,050</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves/ Support</td>
<td>69,350</td>
<td>390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para/ IRGC/ MOI</td>
<td>531,000</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Troops:</strong></td>
<td>802,400</td>
<td>953,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 37-Part 3: Iraq vs. Iran Summary Land Forces Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT TK/RECCE</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>3,688</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFV</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>8,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Forces:</td>
<td>5,671</td>
<td>11,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 37-Part 4: Iraq vs. Iran Naval Forces

#### Iraq vs. Iran: Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy &amp; Coast Guard</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Warfare/ Countermeasures</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol and Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle Surface Combatants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Naval Forces</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 37-Part 5: Iraq vs. Iran Summary Air Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force, Navy &amp; Army Aviation</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter/Grnd Attack</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR/UAV</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Air Forces:</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi Dependence and the Role of the US after 2011

The Iraqi political decisions that forced an early departure of US forces and advisors have left a legacy of serious problems. Iraq has not been able to find effective ways to replace its past dependence on US advice, enablers, and help in planning and managing its security funds. The US had taken the lead in the development of the Iraqi security forces and creating a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior after 2003 – although it benefit from British other allied and NATO support. From 2003-2011, it trained, armed and equipped Iraqi forces, and increasingly fought beside them. The US provided a significant portion of the funding for the war effort in Iraq through 2011, and a large portion of the security forces during Iraq’s civil struggles between 2005 and 2011.

This US role in creating post-invasion Iraqi security forces from 2004-2011 gave the US influence over the shape of Iraqi security forces, and developed important relationships between the US and the leaders of Iraqi forces at the time. In addition, Western intelligence agencies developed close ties to the Interim Government’s Defense Minister, Hazem Sha’alan; Interior Minister, Falah al-Naqib; and the head of Iraq’s intelligence services, General Muhammed Shahwani, each of who warned of the influence of Iran.xxvii

The Impact of Early US Departure

By the end of December 2011, however, the US military was reduced to a steadily more token—sized advisory role for the Iraqi military forces. Support to the Iraqi police was largely eliminated, and the small Office of Military Cooperation that remained in the US Embassy team was limited to supporting arms sales and transfers, and providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) aid to the Iraqi forces.

The decisions of a Shi’ite and Maliki-dominated Iraqi government after 2011 then increasingly limited Iraq’s support of a meaningful strategic partnership with the US. As early as December 2011, General Frank Helmick, Deputy Commander of US forces in Iraq, stated that Iraqi security forces were unable to maintain their capabilities and equipment, let alone meet new challenges. He also highlighted the fact that US training missions are exclusively for Iraqi police, and there are no training agreements for the Iraqi military post-withdrawal.xxviii

Even before the US left, Maliki used temporary command appointments to put loyalists in key top positions ranging from combat unit comments to intelligence. Since 2011, he has taken de facto control of the Iraqi Federal Police, Special Forces elements, and counterinsurgency forces. Once the US left, Maliki’s political power struggles, and the deep sectarian and ethnic divisions inside the Iraq government, changed Iraq’s military leadership in ways that steadily increased the number of officers loyal to the Prime Ministers and that had limited ties to US advisors and introduced the political commissar system described earlier.

Iraqi forces also developed growing problems at lower levels the moment that were no longer under US advisors. Even before all the US advisory forces left Iraqi units, American advisors found military commissions and positions were for sale in many units. Their loyalties divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, and US efforts to build up a strong mix of junior officers and non-commissioned officers often reverted to the past Iraqi military culture where junior officers and NCOs were allowed little initiative and authority.

Corruption became a growing problem at every level, but corruption in the police, and police ties to power brokers, and ties to local political leaders became a growing problem. These problems were
compounded by the fact that the outside advisory effort and Iraqi government had failed to create effective links between the police, judiciary, and the courts and the abuses of detention and confession based justice. Iraqi units also showed limited willingness to maintain the facilities transferred by the US.

The Uncertain Legacy of Trying to Impose a US Military Culture on Iraq

In fairness, part of the problems the ISF faced after US withdrawal were the result of the fact that the US had tried to impose too many of its own approaches to military development on an Iraqi structure, and Iraq lacked the internal incentives -- and checks and balances -- necessary to make them function once US advisors were gone. As in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US accomplished a great deal, but it tried to do far too much too quickly with more emphasis on numbers than quality, and grossly exaggerated unit quality in many cases.

Many elements of Iraqi forces did become effective while US forces were present and some stayed effective after they left. However, successful force building takes far longer than the US military was generally willing to admit and US efforts to transform – rather than improve – existing military cultures and systems have often proved to be counterproductive and a waste of effort.

Tactical proficiency, while a critical core competency for any military unit, is often also the easiest to instill. Indeed, training at the platoon and company level by American Military Transition Teams during the war were often highly effective at training their partnered Iraqi units the fundamentals of small-unit tactics and urban operations. Creating a US-shaped process of logistics and upper-echelon planning capabilities, and a command culture that supported initiative and decision-making at junior levels proved far more difficult and many aspects could not survive the departure of US advisors and the loss of US influence.

More broadly, Iraq had developed its own military culture and systems and refined them through eight bloody years of the Iran-Iraq War and two wars with US-led coalitions. The ISF often found it easier revert to the past than accept US military models, particularly when Iraq’s political leadership insisted on repeating Saddam Hussein’s efforts to micromanage every aspect of security operations, enforce political control, bypass the formal chain of command, and limit initiative at every level of command.

This reversion, however, was often partial and ineffective in an environment where the Maliki government lacked anything approaching Saddam’s level of violent ruthlessness. Iraqi forces became caught half way between the US system and their own system at a time they were increasingly politicized and lacked effective military leadership.

Even in units with a uniform sectarian makeup, divided tribal and familial loyalties regularly trumped loyalty to the State and to the military chain of command. Additionally, Iraqi command culture is not conducive to independent operations. Military leadership positions are opportunities for senior personnel to solidify power bases and dispense patronage in the form of military supplies, including ammunition, food, water, and vehicle repair parts. As a result, senior commanders hoard supplies in order to maintain their power and influence, and military sustainment is held hostage to bureaucratic infighting.

Like the US experience in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Iraq came to illustrate that the US needed to be much less ambitious in trying to change Iraq, and far more willing to do things the Iraqi way. It needed to be far more sensitive to the fact that military force building efforts are inevitably tied to the political struggles in a country. It needed to make a much clearer separation between military and police forces and
recognize that efforts to build a Western-style police force can only succeed if the police are made part of a functioning mix of a justice system and government that have the loyalty of its people.

**Reliance on a Limited US Effort and a Small Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I)**

Overambitious US plans and their cost presented additional problems. Some aspects of the US FY2012 budget request—such as the police development program—quickly proved to be far too ambitious in terms of US aid capability and Iraqi desire for the program. They also ignored both the corruption and politicization of the police.

The GAO reported in February 2012 that, xxxii

Iraqi government data indicate that security spending under the Ministries of Defense and Interior increased from $2.0 billion in 2005 to an estimated $8.6 billion in 2009. In addition, these ministries set aside about $5.5 billion over this period for the purchase of equipment, training, and services under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In certain instances, the United States has provided an incentive for these ministries to increase their security spending by leveraging U.S. funds to supplement Iraq’s FMS purchases. The Iraqi government also funded the Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program and assumed responsibility for the salaries of almost 90,000 Sons of Iraq—nongovernmental security contractors hired by U.S. and Coalition forces to help maintain security in their local communities. While security spending has increased, GAO’s analysis of data for the Iraqi government, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Trade Bank of Iraq showed that the ministries did not spend or set aside between $2.5 billion and $5.2 billion of their 2005 through 2009 budgeted funds—funds that could have been used to address security needs.

In April 2010, Ministry of Defense officials received Ministry of Finance approval to use $143 million of their unspent 2009 funds for FMS purchases. Ministry of Interior officials planned to use more than $300 million of their unspent 2009 funds for similar purposes.

In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, the administration requested more than $2.4 billion in U.S. funding to support the training and equipping of forces under Iraq’s security ministries. Specifically,

- **State requested $1 billion for Foreign Military Financing to purchase training and equipment for Iraqi security forces. According to State, this request for Iraq is a replacement for DOD’s Iraq Security Forces Funding and is in addition to the $25.5 billion that has already been provided since 2003. In the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $1.102 billion for Foreign Military Financing for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism. The Conference Agreement accompanying the act explains that the amount is for the extraordinary costs of contingency operations, including in Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen.**

- **State also requested $886 million to fund its new Police Development Program in Iraq, of which 15.5 percent ($137 million) will be used to deploy approximately 190 police advisors and 82 percent ($723 million) will be used for security and support costs. These funds are in addition to the $757 million that was available in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, for the Police Development Program’s start-up and initial operating costs. Congress appropriated $983,605,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism. The conference Agreement accompanying the act explained that the amount is for the extraordinary costs of contingency operations, including in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and for African counterterrorism partnerships.**

- **DOD requested $524 million to establish its Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, which will be responsible for administering Iraq’s FMS and Foreign Military Financing program, among other responsibilities. Congress authorized that from the funds made available to DOD for Operation and Maintenance, Air Force, up to $524 million could be used to fund the operations and activities of**
the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and security assistance teams, including life support, transportation and personal security, and facilities renovation and construction.

Iraq generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1 billion through December 2009. Adjusting for outstanding advances, at least $11.8 billion of this surplus was available for future spending. In light of these resources, Iraq has the potential to further contribute toward its security needs, even as it addresses other competing priorities. GAO recommended in September 2010 that Congress should:

- Consider Iraq’s available financial resources when it reviews future budget requests for additional funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces.

Additional clarity is needed on Iraq’s outstanding advances to determine the financial resources Iraq has available for future spending. To this end, GAO recommended in September 2010 that the Secretaries of State and the Treasury should:

- Work with the Iraqi government to identify these resources by assisting Iraq in completing International Monetary Fund-required review of outstanding advances.

The President’s request for the FY2013 budget was for $4,019 million – which compared with $4,802 million in FY2012. The request for the Department of Defense for FY2013 was for $2,855 million versus $9,604 million in FY2012 and $45,044 million in FY2011. It was clear at the time this request was submitted that both the State Department and Defense Department requests for FY2013 faced major further cuts as Congress acts on the request. These funding drops are partially offset by a major increase in Foreign Military Sales dollars from $14.6 million in FY12 to $39.3 million in FY13, bringing the total expenditure on military engagement to $40 million.

As for the limited US military presence that remained part of the US the Embassy after all US combat forces left Iraq at the end of December 2001, the US effort came to depend on a relatively small the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I) as the main channel for all military ties between the US and Iraq in the coming years. The OSC-I was given the responsibility of managing military sales, training the ISF on weapons systems, conducting joint military exercises, and leads additional trainings and exchange programs.

The US failed, however, to initially given the OSC-I the proper priority, The July 2011 SIGIR Quarterly Report stated that plans for OSC-I were “significantly behind schedule.” By January 2012, the OSC-I was expected to support no more than 763 Security Assistance Team (SAT) members at 10 sites in Iraq, and administer nearly 600 Foreign Military Sales cases valued at approximately $9.9 billion.

The April 2012 SIGIR Quarterly report to Congress echoed the July 2011 report, expressing that in regards to OSC-I managed program funding, “the commitment of available funding to projects and programs in Iraq slowed considerably over the past year”. This is in large part due to uncertainty over future budgets and funding, and the significant reduction in US presence.

Reporting in August 2013 showed that OSC-I had approximately 175 American military personnel, supported by some 3,500 contractors, who provide security cooperation and assistance for approximately who have managed some 231 US-funded FMS cases totaling $2.5 billion, and a further 201 Iraqi funded cases totaling $7.9 billion.

This was a token level of US personnel to support the numbers of Iraqi security forces shown in Figure 35 – particularly since the US now only played an extremely limited role in supporting the various element in the Ministry of the Interior. The US did, however, still provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and air support to the ISF. This was critical because --
ability of the ISF to integrate the effects of artillery, armor, and attack aviation with infantry against a conventional force was “really at the beginning stage, and will take some years to develop.”

Cuts in US Security Assistance to Iraq in FY2014

US security assistance funding for Iraq continued to decline in Fiscal Year 2014. The DoD budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for OSC-I requested $200 million, down 60% from the $500 million that was enacted for FY13. The DoD OCO request specified that OSC-I, the primary vehicle for bilateral security cooperation, would use this funding for “joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior level visits, and other forms of bilateral engagement.” It did not specify how this military-to-military engagement should take place given the lack of a SOFA between the US and Iraq which would allow for joint training between US and Iraqi troops.

As shown in Figure 38, an additional $525 million was requested for intelligence sharing, equipment support, and other “in theater activities,” bringing the total DoD expenditure in Iraq to $770 million, down 59% from $1.9 billion in FY2013. This declining trend in aid to Iraq also affected the State Department’s FY2014 Foreign Operations budget request, which declined from $1.2 billion in FY2012 to approximately $570 million in FY2014. This resulted in Iraq dropping from the fifth largest aid recipient to the seventh, behind Nigeria and Jordan, as shown in Figure 39.

The Congressional Research Service reported that initial plans for US assistance to Iraq were over-ambitious, and that Iraq had sought to demonstrate independence from the US, which resulted in decreased expenditures in US aid even as violence in Iraq increased along with spillover of Islamist violence from the civil war in Syria.

These cuts did precede the US transfers of new weapons in December 2013, but took place in spite of the fact that Iraqi leaders expressed major concerns about the increase in violence in Western Iraq, and reportedly requested additional weapon system purchases, as well as the possible return of counterterrorism advisors and intelligence professionals to Iraq. These requests may still provide an opening for improved counterterrorism cooperation between US and Iraqi security forces, but the current budgetary realities in the US and reluctance of some members of Congress to trust the Maliki regime’s restraint in using force against its legitimate political opponents make this uncertain.
### Figure 38: OCO Expenditures by Function/Category Breakout by Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCO Budget</th>
<th>FY 2013 Enacted $</th>
<th>OEF</th>
<th>Iraq Activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>FY 2014 Request $</th>
<th>OEF</th>
<th>Iraq Activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Delta FY13 - FY14</th>
<th>Percent Change FY13 - FY14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Force Protection</td>
<td>27,847,591</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27,847,591</td>
<td>25,899,242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,899,242</td>
<td>-1,748,349</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Theater Support</td>
<td>22,817,919</td>
<td>145,724</td>
<td>22,963,639</td>
<td>21,659,206</td>
<td>120,089</td>
<td>21,779,295</td>
<td>-1,184,046</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint IED Defeat</td>
<td>1,822,514</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,822,514</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>-822,514</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program</td>
<td>4,433,838</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4,434,838</td>
<td>3,770,310</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>3,789,310</td>
<td>-45,528</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
<td>5,124,167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,124,167</td>
<td>7,726,720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,726,720</td>
<td>2,602,553</td>
<td>51%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Infrastructure Fund</td>
<td>325,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>325,500</td>
<td>279,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>279,000</td>
<td>-46,500</td>
<td>-14%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>-140,000</td>
<td>-70%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Support</td>
<td>2,030,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>1,950,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,950,000</td>
<td>-150,000</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force for Business Stability Operations</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>121,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>121,300</td>
<td>-57,700</td>
<td>-32%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>-299,000</td>
<td>-50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/Equipment Rest</td>
<td>9,906,208</td>
<td>1,243,539</td>
<td>11,149,747</td>
<td>8,456,240</td>
<td>422,786</td>
<td>8,879,026</td>
<td>-2,270,721</td>
<td>-20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Temporary End Strength</td>
<td>4,844,990</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,844,990</td>
<td>4,318,276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,318,276</td>
<td>-526,714</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps End Strength</td>
<td>1,004,739</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,004,739</td>
<td>757,164</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>757,164</td>
<td>-247,575</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>150,768</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150,768</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-150,768</td>
<td>-100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(^x)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,982,634</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,983,854</td>
<td>3,983,854</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>80,286,434</td>
<td>1,968,263</td>
<td>82,253,331</td>
<td>79,997,458</td>
<td>770,875</td>
<td>70,722,167</td>
<td>-8,151,444</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior-Year Cancellations</strong></td>
<td>-2,010,820</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2,010,820</td>
<td>-1,279,252</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1,279,252</td>
<td>731,568</td>
<td>-36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total including Prior-Year Cancellations</strong></td>
<td>78,275,614</td>
<td>1,968,263</td>
<td>87,226,511</td>
<td>74,716,208</td>
<td>770,875</td>
<td>79,442,915</td>
<td>-7,783,776</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\) FY 2013 Enacted includes prior-year cancellations totaling $2,010,820,000 and excludes sequestration reductions

\(^{2}\) FY 2014 Request includes prior-year cancellations totaling $1,279,252,000

\(^{3}\) Includes non-war amounts provided by Congress and certain classified activities

**Figure 39: Top Ten Recipients of State Department Foreign Operations Funds**

*(Dollar Amount in Millions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>FY2012 Actual</th>
<th>FY2014 Req. Est.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>$3,075</td>
<td>$3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>$2,286</td>
<td>$2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>$1,821</td>
<td>$1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>$1,597</td>
<td>$1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>$1,270</td>
<td>$693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>$776</td>
<td>$671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>$707</td>
<td>$573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>$647</td>
<td>$564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>$620</td>
<td>$553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>$542</td>
<td>$456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** FY2014 data from the Executive Summary, International Affairs Budget, FY2014. FY2012 data is calculated from data provided in FY2014 budget materials provided by the State Department as well as www.foreignassistance.gov.

**Note:** FY2013 estimates are not included because country-level funding data is not yet available.


### The Role of US Arms Sales

US arms transfers have remained a key area of military cooperation in spite of the problems in US-Iraqi military relations, and Iraqi forces are still highly dependent on US arms imports. By 2012, Iraq had placed $1.1 billion worth of arms orders during 2004-2007 and $4.8 billion during 2008-2011, as well as received major transfers of US surplus equipment during the US withdrawal.\(^{xlvi}\) At the same time, they present serious problems because of the risk the Maliki government will use them to suppress legitimate opposition, and because of potential Iranian access to US technology.

As **Figure 40** shows, Iraq has placed major new orders since that time. Moreover, **Figure 40** shows that Iraq plans to increase that dependence in the future -- although the Maliki government has turned to Russia and other states for other arms and has found it can sometimes get delivery more quickly and with far fewer political problems.

The US remains the major supplier of key systems like combat aircraft and land-based air defense systems although such transfers have scarcely been without problems. A SIGIR report to Congress on the future of US-funded Defense programs in Iraq issued in April 2012 stated that, “Two things remain clear: New FMS (Foreign Military Sales) have slowed” in relation to previous periods, and the “ISFF (Iraqi Security Forces Fund) program execution is behind schedule”, with almost 86% yet to be obligated. SIGIR also stated that: \(^{xlvii}\)
OSC-I also has execution authority over Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which in FY 2012 was made available to Iraq for the first time. Of the $1.1 billion that the Congress appropriated to the FMF in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), DoS allocated approximately $850 million for operations in Iraq. The Administration requested an additional $911 million in FMF for Iraq in FY 2013.

The SIGIR report did not address the political problems in supporting the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and the various elements of the Iraqi security forces, or the problem posed by corruption, politicization, and sectarian and ethnic divisions within every element of these forces. Congress had already begun cutting US funding requests and has shown increasing resistance to large amounts of future aid. In April 2011, Congress appropriated just $3.7 billion for FY2011 to Iraq, as opposed to a requested amount of $5.05 billion.

Nevertheless, the summer of 2013 saw a heavy increase in US arms sales to Iraq, reflecting Iraq’s precarious political situation and the growing tensions in the Gulf and Levant over the Syrian civil war. In July 2013 it was reported that Iraq was seeking $1.9 billion worth of military equipment, specifically helicopters, light armored reconnaissance vehicles, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons response equipment. In April 2011, Congress appropriated just $3.7 billion for FY2011 to Iraq, as opposed to a requested amount of $5.05 billion.

The following month it was reported that the US was preparing to sell $4.3 billion worth of equipment to Iraq, including a major air defense package on top of the previously agreed-upon reconnaissance and CBRN equipment. As Figure 40 shows in more detail, the weapons and equipment items requested for sale to Iraq 2011 included:

- 36 F-16I fighter aircraft.
- 53,936 155mm howitzer shells for Iraqi artillery, including a mix of high explosive and illumination rounds.
- An ASR-11 Air Traffic Control Radar.
- 75 Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite data communications systems.
- 200 mobile backscatter scanning systems.
- 50 M1135 Stryker CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicles.
- 12 Bell 412 Helicopters.
- 19 Troposcatter Radio Systems.
- An integrated air defense system comprising 40 AVENGER missile firing units, 681 Stinger missiles, 13 Sentinel radars, 7 Forward Area Air Defense command, control, and intelligence systems, 3 Hawk missile batteries, 6 High Powered Illumination radars, 2 Mobile Battalion Operation Centers, 10 medium range radars, long range radars, and an Omnyx-10 Air Command and Control system.

Deliveries from the US and other foreign sources from the third quarter of 2011 included: 8 Russian Helicopters, 36 Abram Tanks, 41 Howitzers, 31 Heavy Equipment trucks/trailers, and 16 Armored Security Vehicles.

Newspaper articles in late December 2013 also made it clear that the US was providing direct aid in Iraqi attacks on threats like Al Qaeda. The New York Times reported that the US was providing Hellfire air-to-ground missiles for Iraq’s Cessna turboprop aircraft, and 10 low technology Scan Eagle drones to help the Iraqi forces deal with Al Qaeda.

The US responded to the realities on the ground in spite of public US statements by figures like Anthony J. Blinken in 2012 that, “Iraq today is less violent than at any time in recent history.” The article noted that the US was sending 75 more Hellfire missiles after delivering an unstated number of systems earlier,
that it planned to send 48 Raven reconnaissance drones before the end of 2014, and that the Iraqi Foreign Minister had discussed asking for armed Predator and Reaper drones. The US also made it clear that Iraq’s F-16s were still on track and that it planned to deliver the first in the fall of 2014.

The US acted in part because Al Qaeda had expanded its presence in the area around Mosul and in Diyala to the point where it was able to drive the ISF out of some areas and gain local control. Iraq did, however, turned to Russia for Mi-35 attack helicopters after members of the US Senate held up a request for the lease of six US AH-64 Apache attack helicopters over concerns that might be used against Maliki’s opposition rather than violent extremists. For similar reasons, the US agreed to sell Iraq 500 additional AGM-114K/R Hellfire missiles when the fighting in Anbar reached the crisis point in late January 2014.\textsuperscript{xii}

The US agreement to sell Iraq air traffic control systems in February had potential importance in a different area because it gave Iraq the ability to monitor flights like Iranian aircraft delivering arms to Syria on its own for the first time, and to control its own air space once it took delivery on its F-16s and put them into service.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{iraq_arms_sales.png}
\caption{Iraq Arms Sales Requests and Deliveries from the US: 2003-2014}
\end{figure}


The Government of Iraq has requested commercially available FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) Equipment Suite and Airfield Navigational Aids Suites to be installed at four bases (Tikrit, Al Basra, Al Kut, and Taji). The ATC Equipment Suite includes 4 ASR-11 Airport Surveillance Radars, 10 ATC Automation system with 10 controller consoles, 4 AutoTrac II Airfield Support and Navigation Suites, 2 Primary Search Radars and 2 Mono-pulse secondary surveillance radars. The Airfield Navigation Aids Suite includes 2 Very High Frequency Omni-directional Range (VORTAC) and 3 Instrument Landing Systems with Distance Measuring Equipment, 2 Airfield Lighting Systems with Flush Mounted Lights for the runway and taxiways, Air Traffic Control Tower Equipment Suite. Also provided are site surveys, system integration, installation, testing, repair and return, facilities, warranties, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $700 million.


and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is $1.37 billion.

- **January 27, 2014** - The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AH-64E APACHE LONGBOW Attack Helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $4.8 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested 24 AH-64E APACHE LONGBOW Attack Helicopters, 56 T700-GE-701D Engines, 27 AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27 AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component), 28 AN/AAR-57(V)7 Common Missile Warning Systems, 28 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR-39A(V)4 or APR-39C(V)2 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/ALQ-136A(V)5 Radar Jammers, 52 AN/AVS-6, 90 Apache Aviator Integrated Helmets, 60 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers, and 480 AGM-114R HELLFIRE Missiles. Also included are AN/APR-48 Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometers, AN/APX-117 Identification Friend-or-Foe Transponders, Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation with Multi Mode Receiver, MXF-4027 UHF/VHF Radios, 30mm Automatic Chain Guns, Aircraft Ground Power Units, 2.75 in Hydra Rockets, 30mm rounds, M211 and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions flares, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, design and construction, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $4.8 billion.

- **January 23, 2014** -- The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for AGM-114K/R Hellfire Missiles and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $82 million. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 500 AGM-114K/R Hellfire missiles, Hellfire missile conversion, blast fragmentation sleeves, and installation kits, containers, transportation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $82 million.

- **August 5, 2013** -- The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Mobile Troposcatter Radio Systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $339 million. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 19 Mobile Troposcatter Radio Systems, 10 Mobile Microwave Radio Systems, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is $339 million.

- **August 5, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of an Integrated Air Defense System and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $2.403 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 40 AVENGER Fire Units, 681 STINGER Reprogrammable Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I 92H Missiles, 13 AN/MPQ-64F1 SENTINEL Radars, 7 AN/YSQ-184D Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence (FAAD C2I) Systems, 75 AN/VRC-92E SINCgars Radios, 3 HAWK XXI Batteries (6 Fire Units) which include 6 Battery Fire Direction Centers, 6 High Powered Illuminator Radars, 216 MIM-23P HAWK Tactical Missiles, 2 Mobile Battalion Operation Centers (BOC), 3 HAWK XXI BOC Air Defense Consoles (ADCs), 1DS/1G Shop 20, 1 DS/1G Shop 21, 1 Mini-Certified Round Assembly Facility (MCRAF), Air Command and Control (C2) systems and surveillance radars for the Integrated Air Defense Systems that includes TPS-77 Long-Range Radars (LRR) and Omnyx-I0 Air Command and Control System, and 10 Medium Range Radars. Also included: Ground Air Transmit Receive Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency radio capability, facilities and construction for one (1) underground Air Defense Operations Center and two (2) Air Defense Sector Operations Centers, spare and repair parts, repair and return, software support, systems integration, long haul communication technical integration, communications equipment, support equipment and
sustainment, tools and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor representative engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $2.403 billion.

- **July 25, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Multi-Platform Maintenance and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $750 million. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale to provide for a five year follow-on maintenance support for the M88A1 Recovery Vehicle, M88A2 Hercules, M113 Family of Vehicles, M109A5 Howitzers, M198 Howitzers, M1070 Heavy Equipment Trailer and Truck (HETT), M977 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), and the Tactical Floating River Bridge System (TFRBS) Including, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, site surveys, Quality Assurance Teams, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated cost is $750 million.


- **Feb. 28, 2013** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Feb. 27 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for 200 RAPISCAN cargo inspection systems and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $600 million. The Government of Iraq has requested the possible sale of 90 M45 RAPISCAN Mobile Eagle High Energy Mobile System Vehicles, 40 M60 RAPISCAN Mobile Eagle High Energy Mobile System Vehicles, 70 American Science and Engineering brand Z Backscatter Vans. The Z Backscatter vans will be used to scan vehicle interiors and will provide the Government of Iraq a tool to restrict the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to operate by detecting contraband movement through borders and checkpoints.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) operations and maintenance services, equipment installation services, upgrade VSAT managed and leased bandwidth, video teleconferencing equipment, 75 VSAT Equipment Suites (consisting of 1.8m VSAT terminals, block up converters (BUCs), low-noise down converters (LNBs), required cables and components, iDirect e8350 modem, network operation and dynamic bandwidth equipment, and iMonitor software), spares and repair parts, tools, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor representative technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a proposed sale of commercially available Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control and Landing System/Navigational Aids. The system will include an ASR-11 Radar, Autotrac II simulator, Instrument Landing System, and Airfield Lighting System, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, site survey, installation, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)11 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 6 AN/TPQ-37(V)9 FIREFINDER Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 86 AN/VRC-92 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 12 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, 63 M1152A1 and 3 M1151A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, 12 M1083A1 Family of Medium Tactical Utility Vehicles, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 18 F-16IQ aircraft, 24 F100PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, 120 LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, 24 APG-68(V)9 radar sets, 19 M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, 100 AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, 150 AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, 200 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), 50 GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 50 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 22 ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS), or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic System (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), 20 AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/ Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), 20 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, 4 F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), 22 AN/ALE- 47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS), 20 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs), 120 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 20...
AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 10,000 PGU-27A/B Ammunition, 30,000 PGU-28 Ammunition, 230 MK-84 2000 lb. General Purpose Bombs, and 800 MK-82 500lb General Purpose Bombs. Also included: LAU-117 Maverick Launchers, site survey support equipment, Joint Mission Planning System, Ground Based Flight Simulator, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of follow-on support and maintenance of multiple aircraft systems that include TC-208s, Cessna 172s, AC-208s, T-6As, and King Air 350s. Included are ground stations, repair and return, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles and 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination projectiles; also included are, M231 Propelling charges, M232A1 155mm Modular Artillery Charge System Propelling charges, M739 Fuzes, M762A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, M82 Percussion primers, M767A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, 20-foot Intermodal Containers for transporting ammunition, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 3, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq of various radios and communication equipment, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $67 million.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)10 FIREFINER Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 36 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 6 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Nov. 30, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress November 29 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth
approximately $68 million.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 14,010 TP-T M831A1 120mm Cartridges, 16,110 TPCSDS-T M865 120mm Cartridges, and 3,510 HEAT-MP-T M830A1 120mm Cartridges.


- **Sept. 24, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of contractor logistics support for Mobile Communications Centers and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth approximately $57 million.

- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 14, of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for the refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $131 million.

- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 13 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 18 F-16IQ Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $4.2 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (18) F-16IQ aircraft, (24) F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, (36) LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, (24) APG-68(V)/9 radar sets, (19) M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, (200) AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, (150) AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, (50) AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, (200) GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), (50) GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (50) GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (22) Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), (20) AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), (20) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), (20) AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, (4) F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), (22) AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS); (20) Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs). Also included: site survey, support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Aug. 5, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of contractor logistics support for various helicopters for an estimated cost of $152 million. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of two years of contractor logistics support for Mi-17 Helicopters and two years of logistics support for US-origin rotary wing aircraft not in DoD’s inventory.

Nov. 19, 2009 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 18 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 15 helicopters with associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately $1.2 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of up to 15 Agusta Westland AW109 Light Utility Observation helicopters, or alternatively, 15 Bell Model 429 Medical Evacuation and Aerial Observation helicopters, or 15 EADS North America UH-72A Lakota Light Utility helicopters; and, up to 12 Agusta Westland AW139 Medium Utility helicopters, or alternatively, 12 Bell Model 412 Medium Utility helicopters, or 12 Sikorsky UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters equipped with 24 T700-GE-701D engines. Also included: spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, US Government and contractor provided technical and logistics support services, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

Dec. 10, 2008 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (64) Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters (DRASH), (1,500) 50 watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station Radios, (6,000) VHF Tactical Handheld Radios, (100) VHF Fixed Retransmitters, (200) VHF Vehicular Radios, (30) VHF Maritime 50 watt Base Stations, (150) 150 watt High Frequency (HF) Base Station Radio Systems, (150) 20 watt HF Vehicular Radios, (30) 20 watt HF Manpack Radios, (50) 50 watt Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 150 watt VHF/UHF Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 5 watt Multiband Handheld Radio Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $485 Million.

Dec. 10, 2008 – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (80,000) M16A4 5.56MM Rifles, (25,000) M4 5.56MM Carbines, (2,550) M203 40MM Grenade Launchers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $148 million.

Dec. 10, 2008 – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 26 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters, 26 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, 26 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 26 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box, 26 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $366 million.

Dec. 10, 2008 – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers, 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers, 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles, 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances, and 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are
exercised, could be as high as $2.160 billion.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (20) 30-35 meter Coastal Patrol Boats and (3) 55-60 meter Offshore Support Vessels as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.010 billion.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (20) 30-35 meter Coastal Patrol Boats and (3) 55-60 meter Offshore Support Vessels, each outfitted with the Seahawk MS1-DS30MA2 mount using a 30 x 173mm CHAIN gun and short range Browning M2-HB .50 cal machine gun, spare and repair parts, weapon system software, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (20) T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) as well as associated equipment. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $210 million.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with CMA-4124 GNSSA card and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) spares, ferry maintenance, tanker support, aircraft ferry services, site survey, unit level trainer, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (400) M1126 STRYKER Infantry Carrier Vehicles as well as associated equipment. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.11 billion.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (400) M1126 STRYKER Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs), (400) M2 HB 50 cal Browning Machine Guns, (400) M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), (8) Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (36) AT-6B Texan II Aircraft as well as associated support. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $520 million.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft, (6) spare PT-6 engines, (10) spare ALE-47 Counter-Measure Dispensing Systems and/or (10) spare AAR-60 Missile Launch Detection Systems, global positioning systems with CMA-4124, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, tanker support, ferry services, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 31, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of M1A1 and Upgrade to M1A1M Abrams Tanks as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.16 billion.

M1102 Light Tactical trailers, 92 635NL Semi-Trailers, 4 5,500 lb. Rough Terrain Forklifts, 20 M1A1 engines, 20 M1A1 Full Up Power Packs, 3 spare M88A2 engines, 10 M1070 engines, 20 HEMTT engines, 4 M577A2 spare engines, 2 5-ton truck engines, 20 spare HMMWV engines, ammunition, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Helicopters and related munitions as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.4 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 24 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters or 24 Boeing AH-6 Helicopters, 24 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, 565 M120 120mm Mortars, 665 M252 81mm Mortars, 200 AGM-114M HELLFIRE missiles, 24 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers, 16 M36 HELLFIRE Training Missiles, 15,000 2.75-inch Rockets, 24 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 24 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box, 24 M134 7.62mm Mini-Guns, 81mm ammunition, 120mm ammunition, test measurement and diagnostics equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.6 billion. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 392 Light Armored Vehicles which include 352 LAV-25, 24 LAV-CC, and 16 LAV-A (Ambulances); 368 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); 24 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS; and 26 M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons. The following are considered replacements to vehicles/weapons requested in the Military Table of Equipment (MTOE): 5 LAV-R (Recovery), 4 LAV-L (Logistics), 2 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, 41 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), 2 MK19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, 773 9mm Pistols, 93 M240G Machine Guns, and 10 AR-12 rifles. Non-MDE includes ammunition, construction, site survey, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $206 million.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 160 M2 .50 caliber Machine Guns, 160 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), 4 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, 160 Harris Vehicular Radio Systems, 144 MK19 MOD3 40mm Grenade Machine Guns with Bracket, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

**July 25, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of C-130J-30 Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.5 billion.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 C-130J-30 United States Air Force baseline aircraft and equipment, 24 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engines, 4 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 spare engines, 6 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 2 spare AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 6 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems, 2 spare AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems. Also included are spare and repair parts, configuration updates, integration studies, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, technical services, personnel training and training equipment, foreign liaison office support, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, construction, and other related elements of logistics support.

**May 7, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $450 million.

**March 21, 2008** – On March 12, 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms and ammunition, communication equipment, medical equipment, and clothing and individual equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.389 million.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (700) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Armored Gun Trucks, (4,000) AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Devices, and (100,000) M16A4 Assault Rifles. Also included are: (200) Commercial Ambulances, (16) Bulldozers, (300) Light Gun Trucks, (150) Motorcycles, (90) Recovery Trucks, (30) 20 ton Heavy Trailer, (1,400) 8 ton Medium Trailers, (3,000) 4X4 Utility Trucks, (120) 12K Fuel Tank Trucks, (80) Heavy Tractor Trucks, (120) 10K Water Tank Trucks, (208) 8 ton Heavy Trucks, (800) Light Utility Trailers, (60) Heavy Recovery Vehicles, (16) Loaders, (300) Sedans, (200) 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, (1,500) 1 ton Light Utility Trailers, (50) 40 ton Low Bed Trailers, (40) Heavy Fuel Tanker Trucks, (20) 2000 gal Water Tanker Trucks, (2,000) 5 ton Medium Trailers, (120) Armored IEDD Response Vehicles, (1,200) 8 ton Medium Cargo Trucks, (1,100) 40mm Grenade Launchers, (3,300) 9mm Pistols with Holsters, (400) Aiming Posts, (140,000) M16A4 Magazines, (100,000) M4 Weapons, (65) 5K Generators, (5,400) hand-held VHF radio sets, (3,500) vehicular VHF radio sets, (32) Air Conditioner Charger kits, (32) Air Conditioner Testers, (4,000) binoculars, (20) electrician tool kits, (600) large general purpose tents, (700) small command general purpose tents, medical equipment, organizational clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

**Sept. 25, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms ammunition, explosives, and communications equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.257 billion.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of the following: MDE includes: (980) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and (123,544) M16A4 Rifles.

Also included are: Upgrade and refurbishment of 32 additional UH-I configuration; Armored Land Cruisers (189); Armored Mercedes (10); Light utility trucks (1,815); Fire trucks (70); Fuel trucks (40);
Septic truck (20); Water truck (45); Motorcycles (112); Sedans (1,425); 5 Ton Trucks (600); Medium Trucks (600); BTR 3E1 (336); 8 Ton Trucks (400); 12 Ton Trucks (400); 16-35 Ton Trucks (100); 35 Ton Trucks (20); Ambulances (122); Bulldozers (33); Excavators (10); Wheeled Loader (20); Variable Reach Forklifts (10); 5Kw generators (447); ILAV Route Clearing Vehicle (55); Wrecker w/Boom (19); Fuel Pumps (34); 11 Passenger Bus (127); 24 Passenger Bus (207); 44 Passenger Bus (80); Contact Maintenance Trucks (105); communication towers, troposcatter and Microwave radios, IDN, DPN, VSAT Operations and Maintenance, (1,518) VHF Wheeled Tactical and Base Station Radios, (4,800) VHF hand-held radios, (6,490) VHF man pack radios, clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; Quality Assurance Team support services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 21, 2007** – On September 21, 2007, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $172 million. The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, electronic warfare support, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Aug. 17, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of UH-1 HUEY repair parts as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $150 million.

- **May 24, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of medical supplies, equipment, and training as well as associated support equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, will be less than $1.05 billion.

- **May 18, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Technical Assistance for Construction of Facilities and Infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $350 million.

- **May 4, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various small arms ammunition, explosives, and other consumables as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $508 million.

- **Dec. 07, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq to provide funds for Trucks, Vehicles, Trailers, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $463 million. Major Defense Equipment (MDE): 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or 276 Infantry Light Armored Vehicles (I-LA Vs), eight Heavy Tracked Recovery Vehicles – either Brem Tracked Recovery and Repair or M578 Recovery Vehicles, six 40-Ton Trailer Lowboy – either M871 or Commercial, 66 8-Ton Cargo Heavy Trucks – either M900 series or M35 series or MK23 Medium Tactical Vehicles or Commercial Medium Trucks.

  Also included: logistics support services/equipment for vehicles (Armored Gun Trucks; Light, Medium, and Heavy Vehicles; trailers; recovery vehicles; and ambulances) supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of King Air 350ER and potentially other aircraft, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $900 million.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of:

- 24 King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance role with L-3 Wescam
- MX-15 Electro Optics/Infrared (EO/IR) system, plus 1 of the following Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR/ISAR)/Inverse Synthetic: APS-134 Sea Vue or APS-143 Ocean Eye or RDR-1700 or Lynx II (APY-8) or APS144 or APY-12 Phoenix
- 24 Data Link Systems (T-Series Model-U or T-Series Model-N or ADL850 or TCDL or BMT-85)
- 24 King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck Aircraft for light transport role
- 48 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems
- 48 ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems
- 6,000 M-206 Flare Cartridges
- 50 Global Positioning System (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)

Also included: support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, US Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $142 million.

  - The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, publications and technical data, US Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of helicopters, vehicles, weapons and support as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $500 million.

  Also included: logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems, on-job-training, laser pointers, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for Helicopters, Vehicles, Weapons as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $250 million.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems including on-job-training, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **March 10, 2005** – On 10 March 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $132 million.
The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics.


The Ongoing US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Armed Forces

The US role in shaping the Iraqi Security Forces is now limited by both the lack of aid funds and the limited size of the US presence in Iraq. Nevertheless the US military does maintain an important presence in Iraq, can use arms sales to build more informal forms of strategic relations and partnerships, and -- as Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service reports -- has corrected many of the initial problems in the OSC-I: An Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, would continue to train and mentor the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). OSC-I has grown substantially in strength up from 1,000 personnel reported in 2012 to 3,500 total personnel, of which about 175 are U.S. military personnel and the remainder are mostly contractors. The office, working out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and 10 locations around Iraq, helps train and mentor the Iraqis, and manages some 441 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases totaling over $9 billion worth of pending arms sales to Iraq. The largest FMS case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12, 2011 (Transmittal No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all parts, training, and weaponry are included.

- The United States continues to cooperate with Iraq on counter-terrorism, naval and air defense, and cooperation through joint exercises.
- U.S. personnel (mostly contractors) continue to be “embedded” with Iraqi forces as trainers not only tactically, but at the institutional level (by advising Iraqi security ministries and its command structure). Ongoing discussions with the Iraqis will determine whether these personnel would accompany Iraqi forces on counter-terrorism missions.

Iraqi Military Modernization and the US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army continues to lack adequate logistical and intelligence capabilities – areas that OSC-I will focus on improving. It suffers from political interference in command positions, the sale of other positions at every level and other forms of corruption, a failure to maintain the facilities and systems transferred by the US, and a host of other issues.

Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army (IA) has made some progress in its ability to defend Iraq’s borders, due in part to a concerted effort in 2011 by US military advisors towards more traditional defensive operations. It is now a force of 13 motorized infantry divisions, one armored division with two independent Special Forces Brigades. It has a growing aviation command and artillery and fire support capability. It is slowly making progress in creating the logistic and support capabilities it needs, as well as effective intelligence, communications, training and other key enablers.

Much will depend on the success of the OSC-I and the nature and scale of future US arms transfers. Earlier plans for the US sale of some $4.2 billion in arms to Iraq included land force weapons, naval
systems, reconnaissance equipment, and several air force weapons systems, but these plans are increasingly uncertain.lxvi

The Iraqi Army is beginning to build up units with modern heavy weapons. In the third quarter of 2010, Iraq’s 9th Armored Division received 11 US M1A1SA tanks specially configured for desert warfare.lxvii Another 129 more arrived by December 2011, but this still only produced a total strength of less than one armored division’s worth of modern main battle tanks – or 35 per regiment. lxviii Iraq also trained its instructors under an FMS package where their instruction came for General dynamics contractors rather than US military personnel.

According to Jane’s, Iraq also has bought some 1,026 US M113A2 armored personnel carriers (APCs) as well as 420 BTR-4s, including 350 amphibious versions with Parus remote turrets and 80 command vehicles fitted with US communications gear from the Ukraine to equip 10 of its mechanized battalions as well as 26 BTR-4 8 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) with Parus turrets, and seems to have ordered more.lxix

Jane’s reports Iraq has also bought 487 mine-resistant ILVA 4X4 vehicles for its light forces, and may order over 1,000. It is also considering the purchase of 353 LAV-25 AIFVs with a two-man turret armed with a 25 mm M242 cannon; 24 LAV-Command and Control (LAV-CC); and 17 LAV-Ambulances (LAV-A). It seems to be buying other light armored vehicles like 500 MTLBs from Bulgaria. This is a good mix of armored systems for counterinsurgency and light combat, but not for a serious conventional conflict with Iran.lxx

Iraq also remains light in artillery. As of early 2013, its holdings of modern US weapons consisted of 24 ex-US forces 155 mm M109 self-propelled howitzers, and 120 ex-US forces 155 mm M198 towed howitzers plus orders of six AN/TPQ- 36(V)10 Firefinder Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar radars. lxxi

Iraq is acquiring combat helicopters. Again according to Jane’s, Iraq’s present total helicopter strength and orders include 24 Bell 407 armed reconnaissance helicopters with a goal of acquiring 50. They are armed with.50 cal (12.7 mm) machine guns, 2.75-inch (70 mm) air-to-surface rockets, and AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, and equipped with fitted with the L-3 Wescam MX-15Di forward-looking infrared sensor and laser designator. Its most advanced attack helicopters seem to consist of an order of 30 Russian Mi-28NE ‘Havoc’ attack helicopters equipped with modern anti-tank weapons.

Iraq also has 24 Eurocopter EC 635 light utility/training helicopters some of which may have 12.7mm machine guns and 20mm cannon. It has 22 modernized Mil Mi-17 ‘Hip’ transport helicopters, and has ordered 16 more, for a total of 38. It is upgrading 4 to 16 Bell UH-1H Iroquis utility helicopters and has some Bell 206B Jet Ranger helicopters it received from the UAE and US. It may have 10 US OH-58A Kiowas in delivery.lxxi

The Army will evidently also operate Iraq’s Hawk surface-to-air missiles if these are delivered. DSCA has announced the Iraq has requested an integrated air defense network using HAWK medium-range surface-to-air (SAM) systems and very-short-range Avenger SAMs. Jane’s reports that this system would include three batteries of HAWK XXI SAMs, each with two fire units; 216 MIM-23P HAWK missiles; 40 Avenger fire units, which are Humvees with a roof-mounted launcher for eight Stinger missiles; and 681 FIM-92H Stingers. It would also include Lockheed AN/TPS-77 transportable long-range surveillance radars. lxxiii
Nations like Russia and China are becoming important suppliers – although they are no more immune to the uncertainties of Iraqi politics than the US. Jane’s reports that Iraq government signed a contract with Russia worthy some $.2 billion for various items of military equipment in October 2012. Russia made a document public following a meeting between Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that reported Russia would supply Iraq with 30 Mi-28NE ‘attack helicopters and 42 Pantsir-S1 self-propelled short-range surface-to-air missile systems.

In November 2012, however, Maliki’s office announced the deal had been cancelled because of “suspicions of corruption”. This announcement was then contradicted by Iraq’s acting Defense Minister Sadun al-Dulaymi, who said the deal would require renegotiation. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari then announced in March 2012 that the deal would proceed, with some deliveries that year. Iraq has previously gone through a major scandal over potential corruption in a $236 million arms deal with Serbia in 2007.

Iraq’s still limited air force means that it will need to continue to depend on outside power for air power and air defenses for some years into the future in any serious emergency. The US had laid out plans to help Iraq acquires its own modern air forces in 2009-2011, but as is the case with many other Iraqi national security issues, the political infighting and late formation of Iraq’s government after the March 2010 elections made it difficult to clearly define the US role in improving the Iraqi Air Force once US combat forces withdrew at the end of the 2011 US transition. As a result, progress developing Iraqi air capabilities has been slow.

In June 2011, the US Army Corps of Engineers completed construction of the $5.38 million Ali Air Base in southern Iraq, which could help Iraq’s Air Force to secure its borders against air attack.

In July 2011, Maliki expressed interest in purchasing 36 F16s, double the original number. Iraq has indicated that it wants 96 of the F-16s, along with Sidewinder missiles to arm them.

This is also an area where Maliki still seems to feel he needs US support. He called for a “deeper security relationship” with the United States and the acceleration of weapons deliveries to help his country curb its escalating insurgent violence during a visit in October 2013, and stressed the need to speed up delivery of the F-16, land-based air defenses, and other systems given the rising level of violence in Iraq and the impact of the Syrian civil war.

As a result, the core of Iraqi air force modernization remains the $4.2 billion security package mentioned earlier. It includes reconnaissance equipment, and 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 strike fighters, along with 120 LAU-129/A common rail launchers; 24 AN/APG-68(V)9 radar sets; 19 M61 20 mm Vulcan cannons (plus 40,000 rounds of ammunition); 100 AIM- 9L/M-8/9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; 150 AIM-7M-F1/H Sparrow medium-range missiles; 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K Maverick air-to-surface missiles (plus LAU-117 launchers); 200 500 lb. (226.8 kg) GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs; 50 2,000 pound GBU-10 Paveway II laser-guided bombs; 50 2,000 lb. GBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bombs; 230 Mk 84 2000 pound and 800 Mk 82 500 pound general-purpose bombs. I

The package also includes 20 AN/AAQ-33 Sniper or AN/AAQ-28 Lightning targeting pods, four F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 reconnaissance pods; 22 AN/ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic
Systems (ACES), and 22 AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing systems. The F-16 is not, however, Iraq’s only option. Russia has offered Iraq the MiG-29 and would probably sell it more advanced fighters. Jane’s also reports that there is some question about past orders of armed trainers. DSCA notified Congress in December 2008 of a possible sale of 36 AT-6Bs as well as 20 T-6A. So far, Iraq has only bought 15 aircraft of the 20 T-6As.

Jane’s and other sources indicate that other key aspects of Iraqi Air Force modernization include:

- Three US Air Force donated C-130E Hercules transport aircraft and six C-130J-30 Super Hercules with AN/AAR-47 missile approach warning systems and AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing systems.
- Up to 24 Hawker Beechcraft King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck aircraft. Orders have been placed and delivered one King Air 350ER transport and five King Air 350ER ISR aircraft.
- Iraq also placed an order for six Antonov An-32B ‘Cline’ twin-turboprop medium transports.
- Iraq is seeking 12 Bell 412EP helicopters for uses as search-and-rescue (SAR) platforms, equipped with Star SAFIRE III electro-optic infrared (EO/IR) systems night vision imaging system-compatible cockpit lighting, search lights, as well as communications and navigation gear.
- A new command-and-control system that began operating in August 2010, and connects Iraq’s air bases and to the Iraqi defense and intelligence network called the Iraqi Information Infrastructure Program (I3P). It is intended to serve as a foundation for the development of nationwide command-and-control and communications among security forces and allow them to perform air traffic management and strategic reconnaissance through direct communication with aircraft and the Iraqi Operations Center.
- Two Seeker SB7L-360 light reconnaissance aircraft.
- SAMA CH2000 surveillance aircraft. And 24 modified Beech King Air 350ER special mission platforms fitted with the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc Lynx II synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) system, which operates in conjunction with Control of Lynx and Analysis (CLAW) software and an L-3 Communications West high-bandwidth datalink.
- 20 new Serbian Utva Lasta 95 piston-engined primary trainers now deployed at the Al Sahra training base.
- Possible orders for up to 24 Czech-built Aero Vodochody L-159 advanced trainer/light-attack aircraft.

If the Iraqi Air Force does continue to seek support from the US, much will depend on US willingness to help Iraq train personnel, develop logistics, and strategize on the use of the Air Force. The July 2011 SIGR report suggested that one of the main objectives of a continued US presence in Iraq should be to provide an air-defense umbrella for Iraq while the Iraqi Air Force develops its capacity to conduct independent operations.

The US Iraqi pilot training program has trained more than 60 Iraqi pilots and 30 instructor pilots since its inception in 2008. Currently, 10 Iraqi pilots are being trained in the US to fly the first set of F-16s due to arrive by 2014. As of September 30, 2011, the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Air (ITAM-Air) had nearly 1,200 personnel directly engaged with Iraq’s air force personnel. Iraqi General Zibari emphasized that, “an army without an air force is exposed” and stated that Iraq will not be able to defend its own air space until 2020, at the earliest.

On December 12, 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for 18 F-16IQ aircraft and associated equipment, parts, weapons, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $2.3 billion, increasing the total number of F-16s being purchased by Iraq to 36. The sale also includes requests for Sidewinder missile, various air-to-ground...
missiles, laser guided bomb units, and a variety of other equipment.\textsuperscript{xxxv} The sale is widely seen as part of a US focus on increasing the capabilities of the Iraqi air force.

Additionally, the 2013 sale request by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to delivery Iraq’s integrated air defense system, will, in conjunction with the delivery of Iraq’s F-16I fighter aircraft, provide the Iraqi Air Force an anti-air capability on par with those of other states in the region. These weapons compliment the systems being sold by other Gulf States, which include an AN/TPY-2 radar from the UAE, and a THAAD missile defense system from Qatar. This combination of air defense systems suggests that a major US motivation remains its desire to provide Iraq the capacity to interdict Iranian flights overflying its soil bring weapons to Syria. As of October 2013, Iraq is still not able to prevent these flights, and Iran has been able to cross Iraqi airspace en route to Syria at will.

**Iraqi Military Modernization and the US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Navy**

The US role in shaping the Iraqi navy affects both Iraq’s security and Iranian and US military competition. US support is critical to securing the flow of Iraqi commerce and deterring against external threats. The Iranian threat to Gulf energy exports is a key reason the US often deploys two US aircraft carrier groups in the Gulf region.\textsuperscript{xxxvi} According to the Department of Defense, Iraq’s oil infrastructure is vulnerable to the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN)\textsuperscript{xxxvii} and Iraq’s offshore oil loading points are vulnerable to attack.

An ongoing series of naval incidents serves as a reminder that Iranian and Western relations in the Gulf remain tense. The IRGC captured 15 British soldiers in Iraqi waters in March 2007. On January 6, 2008, five armed Iranian speedboats maneuvered aggressively towards and issued radio threats against three American Navy warships in international waters while entering the Strait of Hormuz.\textsuperscript{xxxviii} According to Pentagon officials, the American commander was close to issuing an order to fire on one of the speedboats which came within 200 yards of the warship – and within range of one of the machine guns aimed at it – before it suddenly veered away.\textsuperscript{xxxix}

In 2007, Iraq had a 1200-man navy, two afloat squadrons, and four marine companies. It was also adding offshore support vessels, patrol ships and boats, and smaller vessels.\textsuperscript{x} In October 2010, the Iraqi navy inaugurated the first of 15 $20 million US-built Swift Class patrol boats.\textsuperscript{xci} It bought two more in August 2011, to bring the total to 5 of 12 ordered.\textsuperscript{xcii} Iraq also received two $70 million US-built offshore support vessels in 2011.\textsuperscript{xciii} In July 2011, SIGIR reported Iraq’s navy had grown to over 3,600 assigned personnel.\textsuperscript{xxiv} One of OSC-I planned ten locations will be in Umm Qasr, the primary location of Iraq’s Navy.

As part of the transition to State Department lead in Iraq, the US Coast Guard Maritime Security Advisory Team (MSAT) began oversight of maritime training and reports to the US Embassy. In partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, OSC-I Basra, and INL, MSAT will develop Iraq’s capacity to secure, regulate, and manage its coastal water and rivers. This includes developing legislative and regulatory authorities and instructing courses on small-boat operations.\textsuperscript{xcv}

In July 2013, Jane’s reported that the Iraqi Navy still had a strength of 3,600 personnel, including some 1,500 marines and had increased its equipment to 56 patrol craft of various sizes, 24 fast assault craft, and 3 offshore support vessels. These vessels began actively patrolling the al-Basra and Khawr al Amaya oil terminals as well as offshore oil platforms.\textsuperscript{xcvi} The Navy is also pursuing a 26-15-4-2 acquisition program
the will give it a total of 26 Defender-class craft, 15 30-35 m craft, four 390-ton Fateh-class patrol ships and two 55-60 m offshore support vessels xcvi

The exact holdings and order book of the Iraqi Navy are unclear. Jane’s reported the following progress in Iraqi Naval modernization activities in its 2013 Sentinel report on Iraq: xcviii

- Procurement of 26 patrol boats as part of a ‘26-15-4-2’ acquisition program.
- Transfer of two Type 200 15 m inshore patrol craft, built in 1977-1981. The UAE also provided 24 fast assault boats.
- Plans for procurement of 15 30-35 meter craft and offshore support vessels through US Foreign Military Sales.
- Provision by the UAE of 24 Fast Assault Boats to patrol the rivers of southern Iraq and counter smuggling.
- Acquire two new Fast Sea Frames offshore support vessels (OSVs) from US-based RiverHawk in 2012: Al Basrah (OSV 401) and Al Fayhaa (OSV 402).
- Other new assets comprise 26 Defender 2710 fast response boats, 15 Swiftships-built
- 35 meter coastal patrol boats, and four Fincantieri-built Fateh-class 53 m patrol boats.
- Offshore support ship Al-Shams was reported in service in 2011.
- Delivery of the first of four new Fateh-class Saettia Mk 4 patrol ships from Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri in May 2009. The 53 meter, 390-ton Fateh is intended to become the flagship of the resurgent navy. The second – Nasir -- was delivered to the navy in October 2009. The final two vessels, Majed and Shimookh, were delivered in December 2009. The Fateh-class is based on the Italian Coast Guard’s Diciotti-class, but instead of a helicopter deck, the Iraqi ships have an open stern ramp for the launch and recovery of a 10 m high-speed interceptor. Each is equipped with an Oto Melara 30 mm turret gun and 30 mm automatic cannon.
- In October 2009, Swiftships Shipbuilders secured a contract for design and construction of nine patrol craft. In March 2011, the contract was amended to cover an additional three boats, with an option three more. The first vessel, P-301, carried out its first patrol in January 2011. The second and third ships were delivered in January 2011, and deliveries were completed in July 2013 with the activation and arrival of a seventh ship.
- Fifteen 34 meter P340 patrol craft are being acquired from Malaysian marine consultancy ISD and Associates. Each will have a 20 mm gun forward, a 12.5 mm machine gun and two GPMGs behind the bridge.
- Delivery of three Al-Uboor (Al Faw)-class patrol boats.
- Delivery of 10 7.7 meter Defender fast patrol boats by in mid-2009 - providing the navy with 26 boats, completing the first phase of the 26-15-4-2 procurement plan.
- Possible order of two support ships, to be used for troop transport, interdiction tasks and patrol boat replenishment, with a ship’s company of 26, plus accommodation for 14 fast attack boat (FAB) crew members and six divers, and seating for 40 troops.

Much is still undetermined regarding the future of US-Iraq maritime security ties. Like its air force, Iraq’s navy remains underdeveloped and critically deficient compared to its neighbors. Budgetary issues are concerns for both the US and Iraq; however, the US willingness to deter Iran and secure the Gulf is constant. Furthermore, the fact that the maritime domain has seen far less militant activity than the land domain means that Iraqi naval capability will likely remain a low priority compared to ground force units for the foreseeable future.

As is the case with airpower, however, the US can provide significant naval aid to Iraq. The US Navy’s ability to deploy out of installations in Bahrain. Ideally, Kuwait will allow Navy personnel to conduct joint training with their Iraqi counterparts despite the lack of a SOFA. Possible avenues for expanded
naval cooperation and training include deployments of US Navy coastal patrol, riverine, and special warfare craft under the cognizance of the US Navy Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command, which provides training and advisory packages for small-boat combat operations, port operations and security, and anti-terrorism and force-protection operations.\textsuperscript{cix}

US Navy Pacific Command’s Cooperative Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises offer another model for maritime security cooperation with Iraq. These exercises focus on training in maritime security, visit board search and seizure operations (VBSS), and combined naval operations at sea.\textsuperscript{c}

The US Navy Special Warfare Command has created its own dedicated detachment for security force assistance with its Special Warfare Anchor Detachments, which provide regionally focused teams to partner with host-nation military units in a manner similar to US Army Special Forces teams.\textsuperscript{ci} These units will be ideal for developing an Iraqi maritime and riverine special operations capability.

**Military Training and Education**

Military training and education are additional tools the US can use in exercising influence and improving Iraq’s ability to achieve security and political stability. The 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service on engagement with Iraq notes that US efforts to provide effective training for Iraqi security forces along the Foreign Internal Defense model that was utilized until December, 2011, is hindered by the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement which is necessary for the return of even small numbers of US advisors on a rotational basis.\textsuperscript{cii} This places a heavy constraint on the level of tactical and operational military engagement that the US can pursue with Iraq.

The current Memorandum of Understanding between the two nations -- signed in December 2012 -- focused primarily on high-level exchanges and professional military education.\textsuperscript{ciii} Indeed, the State Department reported that while just over $40 million was spent on military engagement with Iraq in FY13, it was spent primarily on Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training programs that trained only 77 students.\textsuperscript{civ} While these activities are no doubt highly beneficial for the strategic relationship, they engage only small numbers of Iraqi personnel, and then only in educational rather than active training environments.

Much now depends on the Joint-Combined Education and Training missions designed to bring together key Iraqi units with specialized American trainers who can provide customized training packages required to improve Iraqi capabilities on a broad scale. This would also allow for US-Iraqi military engagement with a far greater number of Iraqi military personnel, allowing the US to extend training and influence over junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, and not just small numbers of mid-rank officers hand-picked to attend US military schools.

A possible solution to allow this -- without broaching the issue of a long term SOFA with Iraq -would be to engage in regular Joint Combined Education and Training missions at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) in Jordan, with Marine units operating from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and as attached units in joint training with other Persian Gulf states.

**Cooperation in Counter Terrorism**

Iraq’s problems in cooperating with the US remain serious, but the increasing levels of Sunni-extremist violence in Iraq in 2012 and early 2013 did lead the GoI to rethink some of its policies towards US military support. In March 2013, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the CIA was taking over the leading role in training and supporting the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service, which will allow the US to get
around the issue of the SOFA as it will be conducted under the CIA’s covert action authorities rather than by the military.\textsuperscript{sv}

In August 2013, Iraqi leadership began actively discussing the possibility of inviting the US military to support Iraqi counterterrorism efforts with advisors and even with targeted strikes from remotely piloted aircraft.\textsuperscript{cv} Foreign Policy magazine quoted Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari saying that Iraqi would be interested in hosting US drones for kinetic strikes so to “target al-Qaeda and their bases” so long as they could do so “without collateral damage.”\textsuperscript{cvii} Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Lukman Faily was also quoted saying that “The reason we’re now considering drone support is because we need to get better control of the sky so we can track and destroy al-Qaeda camps in the country.”\textsuperscript{cviii}

As is described later, Maliki also visited the United States in November to seek weapons Iraq could use in dealing with Al Qaeda and other armed extremists. These included Hellfire missile and drones, and a request for attack helicopters.

This Iraqi need for US military assistance has increased sharply as a result of the AQI/ISIS gains in Anbar in late 2013, and may lead to a significant increase in American military advisers to Iraq to help it in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, as well as increased US support for training Iraqi forces in countries like Jordan. This would enable broader support to more Iraqi units than is possible through the use of a small OSC-I and through CIA covert assistance. Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker noted in an interview with Defense One that effective counterterrorism operations in Iraq,\textsuperscript{cix}

Don’t require Apache helicopters or lots of troops. But it does require good Special Forces and intelligence support. As David Petraeus and I discovered when we were in Baghdad, you can’t achieve progress on the political front until you improve security. So priority number one should be working with the Iraqis to figure how Al Qaeda is moving men and material, what rat lines they are using, where their safe houses are and how we can penetrate its ranks. And then you have to go after them.

It was still unclear in early 2014, however, that PM Maliki wanted a larger US presence for counterterrorism support or would accept some form of SOFA. His focus remained on obtaining weapons he could use for both suppress terrorism and control Iraqi Sunnis and other opposition, as well as the acquisition of high-end US weapon systems such as F-16s, AH-64 Apaches, and air defense systems.

As a result, his focus on new systems for “counterterrorism” owed as much to his search for power – and for Shi’ite dominance over Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds – as to any serious concern with real counterterrorism. As the Iraqi security operations in December 2013 discussed in earlier chapters made all too clear, any rise in his cooperation with the US was as much the result of his efforts to control the state as to deal with the growing threat from Al Qaeda and extremism.\textsuperscript{cx}

The Iraqi Police and Security Forces

The Ministry of the Interior, Iraqi paramilitary forces, and the Iraqi police forces continue to be a critical part of Iraq’s counterterrorism and internal security forces, but are also the most corrupt and repressive element of Iraq’s security forces. There is far less official reporting on such forces since 2011, but the 2013 edition of the IISS Military Balance reported that the Ministry of Interior Forces had a total authorized strength of 531,000 in early 2013, with 302,000 in the Iraqi Police Service), 44,000 in the paramilitary Iraqi Federal Police 44,000, 60,000 in Border Enforcement, and 95,000 in the Facilities Protection Service and 60,000 in the Oil Police – two sets of forces which were little more than security guards.
These forces are generally far less effective than the regular Iraqi military in dealing with the threat of terrorism and extremist groups. They lack the proper leadership, training, and equipment and many tend to remain passive and stay in safe facilities or areas unless pushed hard to act, while others retreat or leave when they come under pressure. This has been a particular problem in the Mosul area, some areas near Baghdad, and particularly in Anbar.

When serious Sunni uprisings began in late December 2013, Prime Minister Maliki attempted to correct for his past repression in Ramadi, Fallujah, and other areas by withdrawing the army and leaving the police. The end result was that the security forces quickly collapsed, empowering Al Qaeda and other extremists and armed groups in the process, and Maliki quickly had to respond by trying to bring back the Army.

Even before the fighting in Anbar that began in December 2013, attacks on police stations in Fallujah, Ramadi, and in Rawa in West Anbar; attacks in the Al Malahima area of Anbar; another attack in the largely Sunni town of Tarmiya, north of Baghdad; and the deployment of ISIS fighters into the Abu Gharib area 22 kilometers south of Baghdad; all showed that the police and regular MoI security forces could not cope with trucks filled with armed Sunni fighters. The fact Maliki had also offered some concessions to Sunni protesters, and possible reforms to the anti-terrorism laws also came too late to have an impact. Reuters reported that, “The governor of Anbar Ahmed Khalaf appealed to the Prime Minister to keep the army in Anbar because Al Qaeda fighters managed to enter on Wednesday and controlled some parts of the province.”

US Role in Supporting the Iraqi Police Force and Ministry of Interior

Since 2003, the United States has spent approximately $8 billion to train, staff, and equip Iraq’s police forces. However, the US now faces serious problems in supporting the Iraqi police force and Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior – where the analysis of Iraqi security and politics earlier in this report indicate that political divisions and corruption are now more the rule than the exception, the force is reverting to a passive, confessions-based force, and key supporting institution in the courts, legal, and detention systems present major problems. The Ministry of the Interior has also become steadily more political after the 2010 election and never eliminated serious problems with corruption, and the Prime Minister’s office and provincial power brokers also continued to bypass the formal command chain.

Until the collapse of the SFA negotiations, the US planned for the transfer of support to the MOI and various elements of the Iraq police from the Department of Defense to the Department of State once US combat operations halted in Iraq although this present major political problems in terms of Congressional funding, State was not staffed for the task, and virtually all of the personnel involved had to be contractors.

The Department of State launched a Police Development Program (PDP) on October 1, 2011, with over 100 senior trainers and advisors from various government and civilian agencies with the goal of supporting the scale of effort shown in Figure 41. The program included working directly with senior Iraqi Interior Ministry and police officials to increase a variety of capabilities, ranging from forensics to explosive ordnance disposal. The program was designed on a “hub and spoke” model, with 350 advisors located at major training hubs in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, overseeing satellite centers in each of their respective regions.

According to the July, 2012 SIGIR report on the PDP.
The advisors would travel to approximately 50 spoke sites across the provinces, conducting programs at Iraqi training academies and other key police facilities. DoS-provided secure ground transportation would enable travel to approximately half of the sites, while dedicated air transportation would support the remaining sites. However, establishing credible oversight, management, and transparency continues to be the broad, primary objective. These US advisors conducted baseline assessments of Iraqi capabilities as of December 2011.\textsuperscript{cxv}

The State effort soon had to be downsized to a total of 115 rather than 350 personnel. Moreover, SIGIR reported in October 2011 that State lacked a viable assessment of Iraqi police force capabilities, has not drafted a detailed plan providing specifics on what is to be accomplished, or outlined costs and performance outcomes. In addition, it stated that only 12\% of current spending plans would directly assist the Iraqi police and State had yet to secure commitments from Iraq regarding its planned financial commitments to police programs.\textsuperscript{cxvi}

The State Department has continued to try to create the bilateral relationships outlined under the Strategic Framework Agreement, but GAO and other reporting quoted indicates that it still lacks clear parameters, personnel requirements, or funding to be affective on its own. State’s mission will rely on consulates in Basra and Irbil, though embassy branch offices in Mosul and Kirkuk were cut due to budget constraints. In addition, the ten OSC-I sites will be responsible for most military-to-military cooperation.

State’s heavy reliance on private security contractors has also created another set of issues and their use has been a sensitive issue among Iraqis that has led to a steady down scaling of the State effort. The July 2011 SIGIR Report noted that a system for monitoring serious incidents involving private security contractors was still absent. SIGIR reported that this will likely remain unchanged through 2011 and the State Department would not provide SIGIR any information on how they would likely govern PSCs.\textsuperscript{cxvii}

SIGIR’s follow-on report of July 2012 noted that the PDP was still plagued by a lack of Iraqi buy-in, and that without more extensive support it is unlikely to succeed.\textsuperscript{cxviii} It also noted that these issues had resulted in some $200 million being wasted on PDP infrastructure that went unused due to the lack of an Iraqi commitment and to the failure by both sides to properly assess the roles and capabilities of Iraqi police forces before beginning the program. Continuing violence in Iraq, as well as budgetary concerns about continued US funding of the program, led DoS to slow implementation of the PDP by adopting a phased approach, and only beginning training at some 23 of the 50 planned spoke sites.\textsuperscript{cxix}

The Congressional Research Service also reported in its analysis of the State Department FY2014 Foreign Operations request that the PDP has been terminated completely, which largely accounts for the significant drop in funding to Iraq from $1.2 billion in FY2012 to $500 million in FY2014.\textsuperscript{cxx} The last advisors were withdrawn from Iraq in March 2013.\textsuperscript{cxxi}
Iraqi Federal Police Service (IFP)

The success of future US efforts, and of Iraqi efforts to create effective paramilitary forces, will be critical to bring stability and security to Iraq. The Iraqi Federal Police Service (IFP) is the key paramilitary element of Iraq's security services and is composed of specialized elements for counter-insurgency operations. It was formerly known as the Iraqi National Police (INP). The name was changed in August 2009 because of major sectarian abuses by a largely Shi’ite force, and the force became far more national while US forces stayed in country. It has since reverted in part to being a Shi’ite dominated force under the control of the Prime Minister.

Its forces are equipped with body armor, small-arms, medium machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. There are motorized units with some light armor, as well as pick-up trucks and sports utility vehicles (SUVs). It has teams specializing in disposing of explosive devices.

Jane’s reports that recent times the IFP was organized into four divisions and 17 brigades, including a mechanized brigade, and other elements, including a sustainment brigade. Both Jane’s and others sources indicate that the 1st and 2nd Motorized Division, were headquartered in Baghdad were created out of the former Commando Division and the Public Order Division. The IFP’s 3rd Motorized Division had its headquarters in Mosul and the 4th Motorized Division was is headquartered in Basra.
A Baghdad-based 1st IFP Mechanized Brigade was under the IFP command headquarters. It had begun operating in early 2005 and had a special troop’s battalion and four mechanized battalions. Its equipment included M117 armored security vehicles; armored personnel carriers derived from the BTR-80 and South African-manufactured Reva APCs.

One key problem, however, is that a number of reports indicate that the IFP has become a steadily more Shi’ite dominated force and one that Maliki has used against Sunnis that are not tied to AQI/ISIS. As is the case with this and all the other elements of the police and security forces, efforts to strengthen it have to betide to a less repressive treatment of the Sunnis and more respect for human rights and the rule of law.

The State Department Iraq Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, (issued February 2014), made the following comments about the Iraqi police:cxiii

Police throughout the country continued to use abusive and coerced confessions as methods of investigation. The IKR antiterrorist law allows abusive interrogation under certain conditions, and such practices reportedly occurred in some detention facilities of the Asayish and of the Kurdistan regional government intelligence services, the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Parastin, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s (PUK) Zanyari.

Local and international human rights organizations as well as government officials documented credible cases of torture and abuse in Ministry of Interior and to a lesser extent in Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defense, and Kurdistan regional government detention facilities, including Interior and Justice Ministry facilities that held women.

As in previous years, credible accounts of abuse and torture during arrest and investigation, in pretrial detention, and after conviction, particularly by police and army, were common. According to former prisoners, detainees, and human rights groups, methods of torture and abuse included putting victims in stress positions, beatings, broken fingers, suffocation, burning, removing fingernails, suspending victims from the ceiling, overextending victims’ spines, beatings on the soles of the feet with plastic and metal rods, forcing victims to drink large quantities of water while preventing urination, sexual assault, denial of medical treatment, and death threats. There were also reports during the year of detainees dying of “electric shock” torture while under interrogation, and local human rights organizations posted unconfirmed videos of electric shock torture in detention centers in Muthanna Province.

There were indications that government authorities initiated some investigations of security forces accused of committing human rights abuses, although authorities did not make public any investigation reports. The Human Rights Ministry reported that it received and investigated numerous complaints of torture inside prisons and detention centers throughout the country during the year and forwarded the complaints to its “prisons team” to follow up. The ministry noted in its May report that in some cases investigations by the prisons team confirmed severe human rights abuses and a “systematic use of torture.”

**Federal Intelligence and Investigative Agency (FIIA)**

Jane’s reports that the Federal Intelligence and Investigative Agency (FIIA) is, “the leading intelligence/investigative agency of the Ministry of the Interior and has been described as an Iraqi version of the FBI.” It is a largely Shi’ite force operating under the direction of the Prime Minister and was formerly known as the National Intelligence and Investigative Agency (NIIA). It was renamed in November 2011.

It has a national role in criminal intelligence analysis and investigations and providing national intelligence support to the police, as well as in counter-insurgency role and in dealing with crimes like the kidnapping and assassination attempts on senior Iraqi officials.
It had more than 9,000 personnel in 2007 but its current manning is unclear, Jane’s reports that it seemed to have an organization comprising 15 provincial bureaus, 56 district offices and 13 Point of Entry (PoE) offices in 2013, and has a large new national headquarters and a National Training Centre opened in Baghdad. It also has a Cyber Crimes Unit, and the agency’s Technical Affairs General Directorate has branches for wire-tapping and intercepting cell phone calls. Jane’s reports its head is Major General Hussein Ali Kamal who had taken courses at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia in Counter-Terrorism, Organized Crime and Money Laundering.

**Iraqi Police Service**

Jane’s reported in August 2013 that the regular Iraqi Police Service had a total of 303,000 personnel. The force was organized largely into provincial police forces and included patrol police, traffic police, police station staff, and several special units. The IPS role is to enforce the rule of law, provide local security. There was a central Criminal Evidence Directorate, and the General Directorate of Crime Affairs. A national Iraqi Highway Patrol was established in 2004 to provide law enforcement and security for Iraq’s highways and major roadways, but was later merged with the provincial police departments. The police also had some 30 Company Special Weapons and Tactics (CSWAT) units in the provinces.

These forces became increasingly politicized at the provincial and local levels after the departure of US combat forces at the end of 2011. Positions and promotions were often based on local, national, and sectarian alignments rather than competence and increase sold. Some elements were highly corrupt, and others were relatively passive – effectively staying in station and collecting their pay. The regular police had a nominal eight weeks of training, but large elements still lacked effective real world training for their role. Moreover, police activity often favor local power brokers or those who could pay for investigations and police activity.

The State Department Iraq Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (issued February 2014) made the following comments about mass detentions by the Iraqi police and security forces:

According to HRW, prior to the Shia holiday of Ashura on November 14, the government detained and held thousands of Sunni males in “precautionary detention” aimed at curbing violent attacks during the holiday, previous years’ commemorations of which had been targeted by AQI. HRW stated that dozens of witnesses reported that security forces, including special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and Counterterrorism Service (CTS) agents, raided homes and arrested individuals en masse in Baghdad’s Dora and Adhamiya neighborhoods in the week prior to Ashura. A resident of Dora told HRW that, on November 7, “a huge number” of SWAT forces dressed in black surrounded the neighborhood at 10 a.m., raided “every single house,” and arrested at least 50 men in an operation that lasted until 5 p.m. CTS officials denied raiding every house and maintained that the operation targeted specific operatives who intended to attack events commemorating Ashura.

**Iraqi Correctional Service**

The Iraqi Correctional Service has the role of ensuring prison security and the welfare of prisoners. Its reputation is poor and its effectiveness is limited.

**Border Guards**

James’s estimates that Iraq’s Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and border guards had a total authorized strength of 39,330 in 2013. It is charged with monitoring and controlling the movement of persons and goods to, from and across the borders of Iraq, and this includes some counterterrorism roles. It has 12 brigades and 42 battalions, covering five regions.
• Border Region 1: Turkey/Iran border
• Border Region 2: Jordan, Syria, western Saudi border
• Border Region 3: Iranian border
• Border Region 4: Kuwait, Iran border
• Border Region 5: Saudi border

It mans over 270 border posts and forts and controls 17-21 land points of entry into Iraq. These points of entry are equipped maintain Z Backscatter Van (ZBV) X-ray equipment. The force has been steadily strengthened along the Syria border since the Syrian civil war began, but has does far more to try to control the flow of Sunnis than Shi’ites.

There are some high quality elements of the DBE, but it has been increasingly politicized and brought under the de facto control of the Prime Minister’s office. Corruption, political influence and the sale of positions and promotions is a problem. It also lacks the mobility, intelligence support, and firepower to adequately secure Iraq’s borders – particularly its border with Syria.

**Iraqi Coast Guard**

The Iraqi Coast Guard, with an authorized strength of somewhere around 500, It is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and Jane’s report in August 23013 that it was commanded by Brigadier General Hakim Jassam. Its main role is to patrol the Shatt al Arab waterway and waterways running to Basra. One of its roles is to combat smuggling, but its effectiveness remains unclear. Efforts have been made in the past to merge it with the Iraqi Navy.

**General Commission for Customs**

The General Commission for Customs (GCC) is controlled by the Ministry of Finance, and Jane’s estimate it has some 41,000 personnel. It is supposed to assist in collecting customs revenue and preventing smuggling, importation of illegal drugs and obscene material, and controlling the import/export of currency.

The service is organized on the basis of three territorial areas - middle area around Baghdad; north area, around Mosul; and south area around Basra. Its effectiveness and professional integrity seem to be limited. Customs present major problems in both efficiency and corruption, and many source report bribes are necessary to get timely action.

**Facilities Protection Service**

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is a relatively low grade force charged with providing armed, trained and uniformed security guards to ministry and governorate offices, government infrastructure, and fixed sites. Most units are subordinate to the individual ministries whose facilities they protect on a day to day basis, but are under the formal control of the interior ministry. Their normal strength is around 100,000 personnel.

The FPS has moderate effectiveness, but security guards have obvious limits in country with Iraq’s problem with terrorism and violent sectarian and ethnic divisions.

**Oil Police**

The oil police is charged with protecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and guarding oil fields, refineries, pipelines and convoys. It originally was under the oil ministry but was placed under the direct control of the interior ministry in 2008. It had some 28,700 at the time US forces left Iraq.
This force is more effective than the FPS and has an Intelligence Department and three regional commands – Central (Baghdad); Northern (Kirkuk); Mid-Euphrates (Amara) and Southern (Basra). Its effectiveness varies by area, but it does seem to work relatively effectively with the military and other MOI forces in at least some areas.

**Electrical Installation Police**

This force had the role of guarding Iraq’s electrical supply system and infrastructure. Its current status is unclear.

**Railway Police**

This force is a dedicated force to guard the Iraqi railway system. Its status is also unclear.

**Iraqi Intelligence Services**

The US does still provide active – if quiet – support to the several different elements of Iraqi intelligence. US experts report that some had an Iranian presence or are under Iranian influence but there is no way to validate such reports or put them into perspective. It is clear that such service now report largely to the Prime minister and have been used to spy on or repress peaceful opposition as well as violent security threats.

**The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS)**

The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was formally established in April 2004. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator nominally operates under the Interior Ministry of the Iraqi, but is effectively controlled by the office of the Prime Minister. It was established with the help of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Jane’s reports that it had roughly 1,000 members by 207 and was looking to expand to around 3,000. Junior and mid-level officers from Saddam’s disbanded security apparatus were recruited to the service. By 2009, it had t 6,000 personnel. Its current strength is unclear.

Its initial leader was Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani - a Turkoman – who had a strained relationship with certain Shia members of the Iraqi government and who left after clashes with Maliki in 2009. He was succeeded by General Zuheir Fadel, a Maliki loyalist.

**Ministry of National Security (MoNS)**

The MoNS, was created in 2006 at a time when the CIA still had close ties to Iraqi Intelligence. It since became a Shi’ite controlled service. The first director was Sheerwan al-Waeli, who held the position of Minister of State for National Security. Jane’s indicates received training in Iran. Estimates of the strength of the agency varied in 2007 from 1,200 to 5,500.

By late 2008, it carried out liaison functions with the Iraqi intelligence and security services on behalf of the Prime Minister, and Jane’s reported that intelligence cells had been set up with the participation of the MoNS, the INIS, and the intelligence services of the interior ministry

Jane’s also notes that al-Waeli said in an in an interview in September 2011, that the liaison between the different Iraqi security services had resulted in the apprehension of dozens of Al Qaeda activists and the foiling of several, and claimed that the MoNS was the only branch of Iraqi intelligence that did not receive support from the US or other countries.
Office of Information and Security and Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS)

Maliki has further strengthened his control over Iraqi intelligence by establishing the Office of Information and Security that reports to the prime minister, and the Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS), which is part of the Ministry of Defense. The DGIS effectively reports to Maliki in his de facto position as Iraq’s real Minister of Defense. It has its own headquarters at a new headquarters in Baghdad and Jane’s reports that its missions include the gathering and dissemination of intelligence, the development of imagery and mapping capabilities, and supporting the security forces with Arabic-language maps and imagery products.

In addition, as indicated above, the Oil Police has an intelligence department. The Ministry of Health has an intelligence section, and there is an intelligence department attached to universities. There is a police intelligence unit specializing in tourism and antiquities.

Peshmerga Forces and Intelligence services of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

It is important to note that Iraq also has a separate set of forces called the Peshmerga under the control of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The various military and paramilitary elements of this force are overseen by the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, which acts as the KRG’s ministry of defense. They combine the past militias of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- located in the provinces of Arbil and Dahuk - and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) located in As Sulaymaniyah province. The KDP and PUK have feuded in the past but now seem to cooperate.

These Peshmerga forces have elements that participated in operations with the central government forces in the past, but have not merged with them as planned. They now operate independently in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Arbil and Dahuk.

The prospects for any future merger also became far more doubtful in June 2013, when some 1,000 career ethnic Kurdish solders defected from the 16th Armored Brigade of the regular Iraqi Army, and refused orders to support a military operation against Sunnis in Sulaiman Bek and requested to join the KRG’s forces. Sulaiman Bek is part of the area where the Iraqi central government and the KRG have disputed claims. At the same time, the Iraqi Federal Government has resisted KRG efforts to have Peshmerga forces funded out of central government funds.

The current strength of Peshmerga forces is unclear. As past reporting by SIGIR and Jane’s has shown, estimates of the strength of Peshmerga forces have varied widely. US estimates that the fighting strength of the Peshmerga at around 70,000 to 80,000 in 2011, but if all security and police forces are counted, some other estimates go as high 190,000.

Jane’s reports that the PUK created a 1,000 man Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) based in As Sulaymaniyah-based with US that led by Lahur Talibani, nephew of the Iraqi president. There also are a KDP’s intelligence service called the Parastin, and a PUK intelligence agency, known as Zanyari. Efforts to merge the two under the title of the Kurdistan Security Service do not seem to have succeeded, but they do seem to cooperate.

Sunni Awakening Councils (Sons of Iraq - SOI)

Iraq has already come to regret Prime Minister Maliki’s failure to integrate the Son of Iraq and members of the Awakening into Iraq’s security forces – as well as his discrimination against other Sunni elements
in the security forces. The Sunni Awakening Councils militias, or Sons of Iraq (SOI), were once a major paramilitary force that could have done much to stabilize Iraq and defeat Al Qaeda and other extremist groups if they had not been put aside or marginalized by the Maliki government.

By late 2013, many elements had aligned themselves with Al Qaeda while others became Sunni militias with few ties or loyalty to the Shi‘ite dominated central government. Iraqi Sunnis report that many have since been pushed out of their positions, marginalized or not been paid.

Counterterrorism experts warned that this was becoming a major and growing Iraqi security problem by mid-2012, and Maliki may have come to understand just how destructive his actions were. Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service issued a report in December 2013, which indicated that Maliki might have at least tried to correct the situation as it became clear he was creating a crisis in dealing with Iraq’s Sunnis:

One Sunni grievance aside from those discussed above has been the slow pace with which the Maliki government implemented its pledge to fully integrate the approximately 100,000 “Sons of Iraq” fighters. Also known as “Awakening” fighters, these are former insurgents who in 2006 began cooperating with U.S. forces against AQ-I/ISIS. The Iraqi government later promised them integration into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or government jobs. To date, about 70,000 have been integrated into the ISF or given civilian government jobs, while 30,000-40,000 continue to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and are paid about $300 per month by the government. In part to preserve the loyalty of the Sons of Iraq as an opponent—rather than supporter—of AQ-I/ISIS, in early 2013 the government increased their salaries by about 66% to $500 per month. The effort appears to have succeeded somewhat, in that few Sons of Iraq fighters have joined AQ-I/ISIS or other Sunni insurgent groups since Sunni anti-government activities escalated.

Any such actions by Maliki came far too late to be effective, however, and became almost meaningless when his efforts to use Iraqi Army forces to suppress Sunni protests, close a protest camp near Ramadi, and attack a senior Iraqi Sunni politician triggered the crisis in Anbar at the end of December and open the way for an AQI/ISIS takeover of Fallujah and Ramadi.

Once that happened, Maliki was forced to try to win the loyalty of the use Sunni tribal and other Sunni local forces he had largely alienated and weakened to the point where less than 1,000 AQI/ISIS fighters could take two cities and become a major problem in the West.

The Iraqi Army was not able to retake Fallujah and Ramadi after AQI/ISIS took control of major parts of both cities in late December 2013 without the kind of fight that would have caused major civilian casualties and collateral damage and risked an open split with Iraq’s Sunnis. It was clear that a straight up fight between the Army and AQI/ISIS would do major damage to both cities and kill or displace large numbers of civilians.

Maliki did threaten to use the Army and Air Force in this way if local Sunni forces did not drive AQI/ISIS out of both cities. Partly at US urging, however, Maliki soon went shifted his position. He made major payments to the tribes and fighters that still opposed AQI/ISIS, and used Iraqi Special Forces and the Iraqi Air Force to work with Sunni tribal forces in joint operations. By the 19th of January, a mix of Sunni fighters and Iraqi military forces attempted to drive AQI/ISIS and its supporters out of both cities. The initial attempts failed, and the Sunni fighters stated that AQI/ISIS had a major advantage in heavy machine guns and mortars while they were largely limited to small arms.

The willingness of the Maliki government to use Sunni fighters was, however, a major step forward and one that might mean better future treatment of the Sunnis if the government could free the cities and defeat AQI/ISIS forces in Sunni areas. Media reporting indicated that a mix of helicopter gunships, pro-
government tribesmen, Iraqi Special Forces and police had made some initial gains in Ramadi, although they could not hold onto their gains.

Other reporting indicated that Maliki had agreed elements of Sunni forces could get better arms and training in Jordan. Maliki still denied that his government was responsible for the growing sectarian divisions in Iraq, and said that Sunni violence had been exported to Iraq by another Arab country, and that, “Al-Qaeda is the one using sectarian issues...The purpose is to drag Sunnis and Shiites into fighting with each other.” He also said, however, that he was cooperating with Sunni leaders in Anbar and that, “We are going to use the sons of these provinces to take care of security in their provinces. To do that, trust definitely needs to be rebuilt.”

According to reports in the New York Times, Maliki promised tribal fighters permanent jobs, as well as pensions and death benefits for their families if they die on the battlefield. He has hinted at amnesty for any tribal fighters with a history of armed resistance against the government. The times reported that Maliki had begun to reach out to the Sunni tribes in the summer of 2013 and had rapidly increased his support after AQI/ISIS seized the city of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, the provincial capital at the end of December 2013.

The key issue remained as to how far Maliki would go and if his actions came too late. The Times also quoted Osama al-Nujaifi, the speaker of Parliament and one of the most important Sunni politicians in Iraq, as saying, “From 2006 to 2008, tribesmen were able to beat Al Qaeda with the cooperation of American forces and the support of the Iraqi government...After gaining victory over Al Qaeda, those tribesmen were rewarded with the cutting of their salaries, with assassination and displacement. (Sunnis) were left alone in the street facing revenge from Al Qaeda and neglect by the government. Paying and arming Sunnis to secure their own homes and territory may not be a road to any lasting form of progress.

An article in the Washington Post by Loveday Morris noted just how alienated some Sunnis had become. Morris reported that Maliki had said in January that said there was no limit on arming and equipping tribal fighters, and a government spokesman -- Ali al-Moussawi -- had said the Iraqi cabinet has approved $3.4 million for payments to tribesmen and more than $17 million for infrastructure projects in Anbar: “We are supplying them with more weapons and whatever they need...They will be treated like any troop in the Iraqi army. They will have salaries and pensions and any right a troop in the Iraqi army has.” He noted that the combination of Sunni and central government fighters had made gains in Ramadi in the third week of January and that the Sunni fighters had been given some 3,000 Russian machine guns and more than 2,000 Kalashnikovs.

Morris also, however, quoted Dhafer al-Ani -- a spokesman for the Sunni Mutahidun political party -- as saying that, “No one can face the terrorists without the help of the Sunnis. The Americans couldn’t eliminate them without the Sunnis, and nor can the government,” and as saying the government had broken such promises before and left the Sawa or Sons, “stuck in the middle between al-Qaeda’s hammer and Maliki’s neglect...We reject our sons being rentals. They are used like a disposal tissue, to wipe up the problems and then throw away...” Maliki has pushed the Sunnis so hard he’s lost them.

He reported that Ahmed Abu Risha, a former Sahwa leader, was again fighting on the central governments side, but had said that he had only gotten arms, not money, for his support. He also quoted Risah as saying that, “We still obviously have our issues with the government...But at the moment, al-Qaeda is the biggest problem.”
In a telling warning of what might happen, Morris quote an unnamed army officer as saying that, “We are not fighting shoulder to shoulder…They don’t attack us, we don’t attack them and they just provide security in their areas.” He also quoted a former Iraqi official involved in Iraq’s reconciliation efforts as saying that, “It’s too late; the Sahwa is dead… pouring money and weapons at the problem is not enough to build trust.”

It was also clear that the Sunni tribes in the West remained divided. Morris quoted Sheikh Rafai Mishhin al-Jumaili, a leader of the Jumaili tribe, as saying his men with fighting government forces near Fallujah and part of the alliance of tribesmen and AQI/ISIS. Jumaili’s father had been a leader of the Sahwa in the Garma area of Fallujah, and had fought along with US troops. In the interview, however, he accused the Maliki government of being anti-Sunni and treating all rebel tribesmen as al-Qaeda to justify attacks on them, “If the army moves forward to kill you, are you going to receive him with flowers?” No. We are going to defend ourselves.” As for the Sunnis who supported the government, they were turncoats: “They are serving personal interests.”

**The Iraqi Security Forces as the Threat Rather than the Solution**

As the discussion of the Maliki government’s abuses of human rights, the rule of law, and the security services in Chapter V has shown, the US cannot decouple aid to the Iraqi Security forces from the fact that they have often contributed to Iraq’s rising violence. Since US forces left, there have been many cases where Iraqi forces have used extreme and unnecessary violence and repression, and where policing reverted to the passive, confessions-based system that existed before the invasion.

There are reports that Shi’ite militias have been involved in anti-Sunni operations by the regular Iraqi security forces. As cited earlier, there are extensive reports of violence against civilians – including human rights reporting by the US State Department and UN. In addition, Human Rights Watch issued a detailed report in February 2014 – *No One is Safe: Abuses of Women in Iraq’s Criminal Justice System*. This report provides a grim description of broad problems in terms of arbitrary arrests, torture, and misuse of the justice system.

Additional problems are caused by the conduct of Iraqi courts, by a lack of clear laws and regulations, and by the lack of competence in the various protection forces in the Ministry of Interior that are supposed to provide day-to-day security for commercial operations. The end result is a failed justice system tied to major human rights abuses.

Like reporting by the UN, Amnesty International, and the Crisis Group; The US State Department annual human rights report for 2013, issued in February 2014, painted a grim picture of the role of both the Iraqi Security Forces and every element of the Iraqi justice system in dealing with legitimate opposition and ordinary Iraqi citizens. It noted that,

The Iraqi Security Force consists of internal security forces administratively organized within the Interior Ministry, external security forces under the control of the Defense Ministry, and the CTS. Interior Ministry responsibilities include domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order relying on the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, and Department of Border Enforcement. Conventional military forces under the Defense Ministry are responsible for external defense; however, they often work with elements of the Interior Ministry to carry out counterterrorism operations and internal security. The CTS reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes the three Special Operations Forces brigades.

The government rarely investigated reported human rights violations committed by Iraqi Security Force personnel and rarely punished perpetrators. There were continued accounts of torture and abuse throughout the country in Interior Ministry police stations and Defense Ministry facilities, reportedly primarily during
detainee interrogations. The Interior Ministry did not release the number of officers punished during the year, and there were no known court convictions for abuse. The government did not take widespread action to reform security forces to improve human rights protection.

Problems persisted with the police regarding sectarian divisions, corruption, ties to tribes, and unwillingness to serve outside the areas from which they were recruited. The army and federal police recruited nationwide and deployed soldiers and police to various areas, reducing the likelihood of corruption related to personal ties to tribes or militants.

In some instances security forces failed to prevent or respond to societal violence. For example, security forces did not take sufficient measures to respond to threats of violence, some of which were carried out, against perceived lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals despite the public posting of targeted individuals’ names.

The two main Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, maintained their own security apparatuses organized along military lines and dating from the struggle against the regime of Saddam Hussein and earlier. There were approximately 22 Peshmerga (Kurdish militia) brigades, all originally under the control of the two main Kurdish political parties. Under the constitution the KRG has the right to maintain regional guard brigades, supported financially by the central government but under KRG control. Accordingly, the KRG established a Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. Four additional regional guard brigades were formed during the year, bringing the number of regional guard brigades under the authority of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to 12, although most units maintained allegiance to either the KDP or the PUK. The central government did not financially support to Peshmerga units not a part of the regional guard brigades.

KRG security forces and intelligence services detained suspects in KRG-controlled areas. The poorly defined administrative boundaries between the IKR and the rest of the country resulted in continuing confusion about the jurisdiction of the security forces and the courts. The KDP maintained its own internal security unit, the Asayish, and its own intelligence service, the Parastin. The PUK maintained its own internal security unit, also known as the Asayish, and its own intelligence service, the Zanyari. The PUK and the KDP took some steps during the year toward unifying their internal and external security organizations, but these organizations remained separate in practice and effectively controlled by political leaders through political party channels.

Article 136(b) of the criminal procedure code, which previously gave ministers the opportunity to review and prevent the execution of arrest warrants issued by judges presiding over criminal investigations of employees in their ministries, was repealed in June 2011. While this repeal was viewed as a dramatic improvement in fighting corruption when it was enacted, at year’s end the repeal had not led to significant changes in the number and pattern of arrests.

…The constitution prohibits “unlawful detention” and mandates that authorities submit preliminary documents to a competent judge within 24 hours of arrest, a period that can be extended by one day. In practice this period was often extended to 72 hours. For offenses punishable by death, authorities can legally detain the defendant for as long as necessary to complete the judicial process.

The government arbitrarily detained individuals and often did not inform detainees promptly of charges against them. The government periodically released detainees, usually after concluding that it had insufficient evidence for the courts to convict them. The law allows release on bond for criminal (but not security) detainees; however, detainees were rarely considered for release on bail. The KRG internal security units held some suspects incommunicado without an arrest warrant and transported detainees to undisclosed detention facilities.

The law provides for judges to appoint paid counsel for the indigent, and they did so in practice. However, attorneys appointed to represent detainees frequently complained that poor access to their clients after their appointment hampered adequate attorney-client consultation.

Arbitrary Arrest: Police and army personnel frequently arrested and detained individuals without judicial approval, although there were no reliable statistics available regarding the number of such acts. Authorities often failed to notify family members of the arrest or location of detention, resulting in incommunicado detention. For example, the Ninewa Bar Association reported that in December 2011, army personnel detained three lawyers without judicial approval for attempting to represent individuals charged with
terrorism; the association staged a sit-in to protest the arbitrary arrest. Two of the lawyers were released the same day. The Supreme Criminal Court ordered that the third lawyer be released three months after his arrest. All three lawyers reported being tortured while in custody.

Pretrial Detention: Pretrial detainees represented one-half of the total population of those incarcerated in Justice Ministry ICS facilities, according to ICS data. By law other ministries, including the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, may hold pretrial detainees. In October the government reported that 13,247 pretrial detainees were in ICS custody, the Defense Ministry held 296 pretrial detainees, and the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry held 487. The Interior Ministry held 11,600 pretrial detainees, according to the Ministry of Human Rights. Lengthy detentions without due process and without judicial action were a systemic problem. The lack of judicial review resulted from a number of factors that included large numbers of detainees, undocumented detentions, slow processing of criminal investigations, an insufficient number of judges and trained judicial personnel, authorities’ inability or reluctance to utilize bail or other conditions of release, lack of information sharing, bribery, and corruption. overcrowding of pretrial detainees remained a problem in many detention facilities. There were allegations of detention beyond judicial release dates as well as unlawful releases.

Many detainees were held for months or years after arrest and detention, sometimes incommunicado, without access to defense counsel or without being formally charged or brought before a judge within the legally mandated period. For example, in March, during a routine visit to a detention center in Kirkuk, a detainee told representatives of an international organization that he had been detained for 4½ years under terrorism charges and had not yet been brought to trial.

…The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, certain articles restricted independence. Although the judicial system was credited with efforts to maintain independence, the security situation in the country, as well as the political history of the country, left the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government. Court orders, with the exception of those concerning national security, were sometimes not respected due to widespread corruption. For example, the COR’s Integrity Committee reported that court-issued detainee-release orders were not consistently enforced, and that MOI and MOJ employees demanded payment from detainees in order to be released.

Threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist, and criminal elements impaired judicial independence in many places. Judges and their family members frequently faced death threats and attacks. For example, on June 30, unidentified gunmen using machine guns shot and killed Judge Abdul Lattif Mohammed, chief of the Ninewa Criminal Court, while he was driving near Mosul; his driver was also injured in the attack. On July 22, the AQI announced a new operation specifically targeting judges and judicial investigators. During the year eight judges were killed, and there were 10 other unsuccessful attempts.

Judges were generally vulnerable to intimidation and violence. Some judges presiding over criminal cases at the trial level or on appeal to the Court of Cassation reportedly were influenced by corruption or intimidation.

…There were multiple reports that government officials conducted extrajudicial killings, but confirmation was rare. Members of the security forces tortured detainees to death, according to reports from multiple government officials; one government official told the press that families sometimes received the bodies of their relatives who died in government custody only days after their arrest. Official investigations were infrequent, and the outcomes of investigations were often unpublished, unknown, or incomplete, and rarely credible in high-profile cases.

…A December 2011 arrest warrant was issued for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi on terrorism charges. Local television stations broadcast alleged confessions of Hashimi’s bodyguards who were arrested and detained. Hashimi insisted that the charges were politically motivated and that the evidence was fabricated. Human rights groups noted that broadcasting the confessions violated the principle of a fair trial for Hashimi and his guards; some of the bodyguards stated that they were tortured (see section 1.a.).

On September 9, a criminal court found Hashimi guilty on two of the three counts of murder and sentenced him to death by hanging, along with his son-in-law and chief of staff Ahmed al-Ubaidi. Hashimi was found guilty on additional charges and given multiple death sentences on November 1, November 4, and December 13. Before the trial began, Hashimi first fled to the IKR and then to Turkey. Hashimi and his
supporters claimed that the trial and the verdicts were politically motivated and the judicial process flawed. At year’s end Hashimi told the press he planned to appeal his case to the UN or to another international human rights body. Neither Hashimi nor his supporters planned to launch an appeals process through the Iraqi courts, claiming a lack of confidence in the judicial system’s independence.

Similar factors operated in the IKR to obscure a reliable assessment concerning possible political prisoners and detainees. For example, on May 8, hundreds of Kurdish demonstrators massed in front of the parliament building and the Zagros TV station in Erbil to protest an article they deemed offensive to the Muslim faith, which was written by Norwegian Kurdish expatriate writer Halmat Goran and published on May 2 in a local magazine, Chrpa. Authorities arrested a number of demonstrators as well as several religious leaders affiliated with the Kurdistan Islamic Group and detained them for four weeks without charges before release.

…Vice President Tariq al-Habimi’s bodyguard, Amir Sarbut Zaidan al-Batawi, died in custody three months after being arrested in December 2011 on terrorism charges. After receiving his body on March 20, Batawi’s family reported that the body displayed signs of torture, including burn marks and various wounds. Hashimi and many of his supporters claimed that Batawi and others were tortured to force confessions implicating Hashimi and to coerce statements linking other political figures to the Hashimi case (see section 1.e.). Authorities denied allegations of torture and stated that Batawi died of kidney failure and other complications after refusing treatment while in detention.

Violence by illegal armed groups against the general population, security forces, government officials, and civilian infrastructure remained a significant problem during the year, and bombings, executions, and killings were regular occurrences throughout the country. On July 21, the AQI announced a new offensive to recover previous strongholds. Two days later, a wave of 28 coordinated attacks across 18 cities killed 113 persons and injured more than 250. The deadliest attack occurred in Taji in Baghdad Province, where a series of roadside bombs, a car bomb, and a suicide bombing targeting emergency personnel killed 42 persons.

Overall casualty estimates of violence during the year varied. For example, Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported that according to the Iraqi government 1,358 civilians, 440 police officers, and 376 soldiers were killed during the year, compared with 1,578 civilians, 609 police officers, and 458 soldiers in 2011. Direct monitoring by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) indicated that at least 3,238 civilians were killed during the year. In 2011 UNAMI reported 2,771 civilian deaths.

At year’s end the government had not made public the results of an investigation into the military’s deadly April 2011 incursion into Camp Ashraf in Diyala Province, despite assurances that it would do so.

There were accounts of attacks by persons believed to have falsely presented themselves as ISF personnel. For example, on March 5, dozens of gunmen wearing military uniforms, carrying forged arrest warrants, and riding in vehicles similar to ones used by security officials, killed 26 police officers in a series of targeted killings and attacks on police checkpoints in Haditha, approximately 150 miles northwest of Baghdad.

There were also regular incidents of the AQI’s targeting Sunni tribal leaders and Sunnis cooperating with the government, including against the Sons of Iraq, also known as the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. On November 28 in Tarmiyah, in Baghdad Province, gunmen broke into the house of a Sahwa member and killed him and six members of his family, including three young children, while they were sleeping. According to AFP, at least 25 members of the Sahwa movement were killed throughout the country between July and the end of December, and at least another 13 were injured.

In Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk, the three Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) provinces referred to as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), there were press reports and credible accounts that KRG security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. On February 16, an Arab resident of Kirkuk was
kidnapped, and his body was found the following day. Arab residents of Kirkuk and local media claimed that elements of the Kurdish internal security organization, the Asayish, were responsible for the kidnapping and killing. Kurdish authorities denied the accusations.

There were significantly fewer reports of sectarian violence in the IKR than elsewhere in the country, although some members of religious minority groups reported sectarian discrimination and harassment by the KRG, including threats of physical harm.

On several occasions throughout the year, the Turkish government used military aircraft to attack areas where the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization, was active in the north; at times these attacks caused civilian casualties. For example, on November 7, local officials claimed that a missile fired from a Turkish warplane killed two Iraqis and injured another two near the village of Qala-Dizza in Sulaymaniyah. Turkey denied responsibility for the deaths.

Iranian forces regularly bombarded Kurdish areas along the Iranian-Iraqi border, targeting the Free Life Party of Kurdistan, the Iranian affiliate of the PKK. Iranian shelling resulted in civilian casualties. For example, on September 1, Iranian shelling near the town of Sidakan killed one woman and injured two others.

Spillover from the conflict in Syria affected Iraq. For example, on September 8, four rockets fired from Syria landed in a residential area in the town of al-Qaim near the border and killed a five-year-old girl.

… Local and international human rights organizations and government officials continued to document credible cases of torture and abuse in Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and Ministry of Defense (MOD) detention facilities, including MOI and MOJ facilities where women were held, as well as in some KRG security forces’ detention facilities. For example, the COR Human Rights Committee documented cases of torture, as well as poor prison conditions and a lack of due process, during a June 25 inspection of the MOJ’s Taji Prison in Baghdad Province. The international NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) also contended that widespread torture continued, including in detention facilities under the control of the prime minister’s counterterrorism service and the army’s 54th and 56th brigades. Local NGOs also made similar accusations about these units.

As in previous years, credible accounts of abuse and torture during arrest and investigation, in pretrial detention, and after conviction, particularly by police and army, were common. According to former prisoners, detainees, and human rights groups, methods of torture and abuse included stress positions, beatings, broken fingers, electric shocks, suffocation, burning, removal of fingernails, suspension from the ceiling, overextending the spine, beatings on the soles of the feet with plastic and metal rods, forcing victims to drink large quantities of water then preventing urination, sexual assault, denial of medical treatment, and death threats.

… In 2010 the local and international media reported the discovery of a secret detention facility in the International Zone operated by security forces under control of the Prime Minister’s Office containing more than 400 Sunni detainees, of whom more than 100 were reportedly tortured. Although the government announced the closure of the detention facility in March 2011, HRW on May 18 reported that the facility had remained in use as late as March 2012. Government officials reported that the facility was used to hold detainees alleged to be Baath Party and Saddam Hussein loyalists in late October 2011, and then during another round of arrests before the March 29 Arab League Summit in Baghdad, as well as pretrial detainees during the year (see section 1.d.). The government contended that the facility remained closed at the end of the year, although there were reports that the facility remained available for use.

There were some indications that authorities began some administrative disciplinary action against security forces accused of having committed human rights abuses as well as judicial action in some torture cases. Specifically, the MOHR received and investigated 500 complaints of torture inside prisons and detention centers throughout the country during the year and had transferred all of the cases to the judiciary by year’s end. The MOHR reported that arrest warrants were issued for perpetrators in some cases, but there were no known judicial developments in the cases at year’s end.
Apart from the creation and transfer of some dossiers for possible action by the judiciary, there were no known developments in cases of torture and related incidents of abusive treatment or punishment reported in 2011.

Five separate entities—the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Defense, Labor, and Social Affairs, plus the Prime Minister’s Counterterrorism Service—operated prisons, detention centers, and temporary holding facilities. Conditions at some facilities were harsh and life threatening, and there were unexplained deaths, riots, hunger strikes, and escapes. The AQI claimed responsibility for a September 27 prison break from the MOI-operated Tasfarat Prison in Tikrit, in Salah ad-Din Province, in which 102 prisoners, of 303 total inmates, escaped and 16 police officers and seven inmates were killed. Of the escaped prisoners, 47 were affiliated with the AQI and had been sentenced to death. According to government officials, the escape resulted from collusion between prison officials and inmates. At year’s end 68 former inmates remained at large. After an initial investigation, the Salah ad-Din police chief was fired.

There were also documented cases of abuse and torture in some facilities. Government officials and local and international human rights organizations alleged that both the government and the KRG operated secret prisons and detention facilities.

It is unclear that these problems in the ISF can be reversed unless a truly functional national government can be created, and it is all too clear that they cannot be quickly reversed. Far too many elements suffer from control by the Prime Minister’s office that ties them to Shi’ite factions, and has made them instruments of political repression that violate the basic elements of the rule of law and breed Sunni extremism and terrorism.

Many—especially in the police—suffer from limited effectiveness, waste, and corruption. A July 2012 study by the Office of the Special Investigator for Iraq Reconstruction on problems with the Department of State’s Iraq Police Development Program (PDP) revealed many existing challenges. Massive waste continued to plague Iraqi police. SIGIR reports that upwards of $206 million were wasted on construction of PDP facilities where the MOI “decided to terminate training.”


The State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices issued in 2104 outlined many of the challenges Iraq faced, including human rights abuses carried out by its state security forces.

On the Iraqi Security Forces:

Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Security forces and armed militias committed serious human rights abuses as rising levels of terrorist violence, corruption, and organizational dysfunction undermined effective protection of human rights.

Severe human rights problems persisted. The three most important were: politically motivated sectarian and ethnic killings, including by the resurgent terrorist network led by al-Qaeda and its affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); torture and abuses by government actors and illegal armed groups; and a lack of governmental transparency, exacerbated by widespread corruption at all levels of government and society.

During the year the following other significant human rights problems were also reported: disappearances; harsh and life-threatening conditions in detention and prison facilities; arbitrary arrest and lengthy pretrial detention, sometimes incommunicado; continued impunity for security forces; denial of fair public trials; insufficient judicial institutional capacity; ineffective implementation of civil judicial procedures and remedies; delays in resolving property restitution claims; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; violence against and harassment of journalists; limits on
religious freedom due to extremist threats and violence; restrictions on freedom of movement; large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; discrimination against and societal abuses of women and ethnic, religious, and racial minorities; trafficking in persons; societal discrimination and violence against individuals based on perceived sexual orientation and gender identity; and limited exercise of labor rights.

A culture of impunity largely protected members of the security services, as well as those elsewhere in the government, from investigation and successful prosecution for human rights violations. Corruption among officials across government agencies was widespread and contributed to significant human rights abuses…

On Casualty Levels:

Estimates varied regarding the number of fatalities resulting from arbitrary and unlawful government action and from terrorist, sectarian, and ethnic violence. Civilian fatalities more than doubled from 2012 totals; police and security forces were also increasingly targeted by terrorist groups. Agence France-Presse, relying on government data, reported that 5,137 civilians, 754 police officers, 447 soldiers, and 226 militants were killed during the year, compared with 1,358 civilians, 440 police officers, and 376 soldiers in 2012. Monitoring by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which included nonofficial sources, indicated at least 7,818 civilian fatalities during the year, compared with 3,238 in 2012.

Security forces reportedly fired on and killed protesters. The outcomes of infrequent official investigations were often unpublished, unknown, or incomplete and rarely approached credibility in high-profile cases.

For example, early in the morning on April 23, the country’s Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, elements of the 12th Division of the Iraqi Army, and the Federal Police stormed a sit-in camp of Sunni antigovernment protesters in the northern city of Hawija, reportedly in response to an attack on a nearby police checkpoint. Press reports and UN officials estimated that 44 civilians and three soldiers died in ensuing clashes between the security forces and demonstrators…

On Reporting from International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs):

The international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) concluded that security officials used excessive and lethal force. The government convened investigatory panels to assess the violence in Hawija, as it did in prior Iraqi Security Forces killings of protesters in Fallujah and Mosul in January and March. The government did not make public the results of any investigations, and the judiciary had brought no charges by year’s end. The country’s independent High Commission for Human Rights (HCHR) investigated the events and condemned the loss of life. Prime Minister Maliki said the dead were “martyrs” and ordered the establishment of a special commission to provide compensation to the families of the victims, but there was no information available to confirm that the families had received compensation by year’s end.

On May 3, according to HRW, the Federal Police’s “Belt of Ninewa” Brigade, a unit of the Third Division, arrested 60 individuals, including at least four minors, without warrants south of Mosul as part of a crackdown on Sunni protesters. On May 11, the bodies of five of the arrested individuals, including that of a 15-year-old boy, were found in a field less than two miles from East Mustantiq village. According to HRW, witnesses said the bodies had multiple gunshot wounds…

Options for Policy

It is not yet clear what role the problems in Iraq’s mix of security services played in uprisings in Anbar, and AQI/ISIS’s gains in Fallujah and Ramadi in late December 2102. Maliki’s systematic marginalization of legitimate Sunni political opposition, and mix of repression followed by efforts at conciliation in dealing with Sunni protests during 2012-2013, were policies that challenged any security force. So was his decision to withdraw the army and rely on the police when protests exploded into a violent crisis late December that created a power vacuum at the worst possible moment.
What is clear is that the US, other Western states, and Arab states face severe limits to their ability to influence the future direction and capability of Iraq’s complex mix of security forces.

The failure of the Obama Administration and the Maliki government to agree on keeping adequate levels of US troops in Iraq after December 31, 2011 dealt a major blow to both the prospects for effective Iraqi force development and to America’s interests in the region that Iraq will now have great difficulty in overcoming. It left Iraqi police and military without the level of training and support they needed, and allowed subversive elements to resume destabilizing sectarian violence that has risen to levels not seen since the height of the insurgency.

The situation has since been made far worse by actions by the Maliki government that included steadily increasing levels of political interference, discrimination against Sunnis, role of local power brokers interfering in ISF operations, internal corruption, sale of positions and promotions, reversion to a confessions-based approach to policing, lack of effective courts and adequate detention facilities, long-tensions between the police and the courts, and ethnic issues between Arab and Kurd.

The US and outside powers cannot help Iraq deal with any of these issues unless that Iraqi government both seeks such aid and acts upon it, and it remains questionable whether the Maliki government or any successor will seek to make serious changes in this situation.

The Maliki Visit to Washington in October 2013

These problems were all too clear by the fall of 2013. As has been discussed earlier, Prime Minister Maliki visited Washington in late October and early November for discussions with the Obama Administration on the future of the US-Iraqi relationship. The overt focus of these discussions was an increase in military aid and weapons sales to Iraq to help counter the rise in violence in Iraq spilling over from the Syrian civil war.

A somewhat Panglossian statement issue by a Senior Administration Official in the Office of the Spokesperson in the Department of State via Teleconference on October 30, 2013 put Maliki’s visit in the following terms – summarizing US official goals in dealing with Iraq in the process:

We’re focused on five core areas in Iraq, and these are areas that are tied to our own core U.S. interests. And first is to promote a unified and federal Iraq, and that is really focused on making sure that Iraq’s territorial integrity remains intact, that the three principal communities are generally working together. And a lot of that effort is focused on Arab-Kurd tensions that tend to rise up every now and then. So number one, a unified and federal Iraq.

And number two is promoting the further increase in production and export of Iraq’s oil resources. And that is critical both for Iraq’s ability to withstand the many pressures that it is under, and it is also essential to global economic stability as well as our own U.S. vital interests both in the region and globally.

Third is to counter the reemergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq. And al-Qaeda in Iraq is no longer known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. They’re now the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant. They have the same leader they’ve had since about 2006. That’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who we believe is now based in Syria. And this is now really a transnational threat network.

Fourth is to facilitate Iraq’s regional integration, and there’s been a great deal of effort there over the last six months, which I’ll discuss briefly.

And then finally is to support Iraq’s overall democratic development and with a key focus there on elections. They just had provincial elections over the last few months, and then they’re going to – they’re scheduled to have national elections in April of 2014. And I can talk about that.
The number one – there was really agreement in terms of the overall vision for the visit in terms of strengthening the overall strategic partnership. This is something we talk about all the time. But that means developing ties in a number of areas, of not only security but also economics, diplomacy, culture, trade, education. So there was a great deal of discussion on how we can enhance those areas that we’re deeply focused on.

Second was really this emerging threat of the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant and how we can combat that network and help the Iraqis against it and working together. And to do that it’s not only a security focus, and the Iraqis are actually quite – they went into some detail about the fact that we’ve done this in the past and that this requires a multipronged effort – meaning security, political, and economic lines of operation – and the Iraqis have discussed that in some detail. So I’ll leave it to them throughout the visit to kind of discuss what they intend to do and how within that our mutual efforts with them. And obviously, weapons sales is one piece of this, but it’s only a minor piece.

So that was kind of the overall focus. We have this al-Qaeda reemergence. How do we go about it? How do we go about it in terms of security cooperation? And how do the Iraqis go about it in terms of political reconciliation initiatives and also economic outreach?

If I can just give an update on the five areas of which I kind of briefly said our policy’s focused on, because I just think it’s useful to kind of put this whole situation into a broader lens…

First, in terms of a unified and federal Iraq, if you go back to six months when the Secretary was in Iraq, the Kurds were boycotting the central government, the Peshmerga forces were lined up against the Iraqi army on an area known as the green line of disputed territories, and at one point actually exchanged fire with one another.

If you look at the situation now over the last six months, Prime Minister Maliki has visited Erbil and President Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region visited Baghdad for the first time really in two and half years. The relationship between Baghdad and Erbil has really made a great deal of progress over the last six months, and in particular, we’re seeing increased security cooperation in some of the disputed areas, which is really critical to isolating the al-Qaeda networks which cooperate there. We’re also, of course, engaged in detailed discussions with them about revenue sharing and other issues which remain the focus of both the Prime Minister but also the Kurdish leadership in the North.

On the oil question, despite terrorist hits to pipelines, despite weather problems, and despite a number of platforms coming off due to maintenance and other things, Iraqi production remains around 3 million barrels a day. We expect that to increase over the next couple months, but most importantly we’re focused with the Iraqis on a longer term vision for their strategic infrastructure. And the problems that plague Iraq are not problems that developed over the last year or 10 years, there are problems that really go back hundreds of years. And it’s not only in Iraq, but regionally. And the Iraqis are focused on how they can use their strategic infrastructure to align these many disparate interests into a stable, unified, and federal Iraq. And that has to do with utilizing their strategic infrastructure in a way that takes oil not only, for example, from Basra in the south through the Gulf, but also with a pipeline from Basra to Haditha, which is in Anbar province where there is a refinery, and then from Haditha through Jordan to the Red Sea.

So we’ve been in detailed discussions with the Jordanians and the Iraqis on that, and then also extending that pipeline network up through Turkey to the Mediterranean and having the Kurdish pipelines plug into that system in an overall, coherent way. That’s a long-term focus, but we’ve also made some progress on that over the last six months.

In terms of regional integration, if you look at the relationship between Baghdad and Ankara six months ago ‘til now, you’ll see for the first time really in some time we’ve had an exchange of high-level visits between Baghdad and Ankara, and Iraq’s Foreign Minister just visited Ankara last week, I believe. And I’m happy to talk about that relationship.
Kuwait. Iraq this summer finally settled issues with Kuwait that have been outstanding since the first Gulf War, and that really was quite a breakthrough and required a lot of political risk both from the Iraqi leadership and also the Kuwaiti leadership. But that was really significant. And then last week, the Iraqi cabinet approved for the first time a – Kuwaiti consulates in Basra and Erbil, and anyone who has followed the Iraq-Kuwait relationship really all the way back to 1991, I think, can recognize the significance of that.

The relationship with Jordan, as I said, has increasingly strengthened, and the Iraqis are also reaching out to UAE and some other Gulf states, which I’m happy to talk about.

Democratic trajectory, Iraq did have provincial elections over the last six months. The elections were delayed in Anbar and Nineveh provinces. We were very vocal about that. We did not think the delay was a good idea. The elections then did happen. You have new provincial councils formed in Anbar and Nineveh provinces. And in fact, Prime Minister Maliki just recently met with the Governor of Anbar province to discuss some efforts in terms of counterterrorism and trying to isolate the increasingly strengthening al-Qaeda networks in Anbar province.

In terms of democratic trajectory, as I said, the Iraqis are heading towards national elections by – they’ve set a date – no later than the end of April 2014. I just got back from Baghdad; I was there this weekend. They’re now negotiating the kind of final clauses on the election law to govern those elections, but the date has been set, the money has been transferred to the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission, and we are working as appropriate, as we do, with that commission, also the United Nations to make sure those elections are technically prepared and that they happen on time and lead to a genuine and credible result.

So that leads really to the final point, which is countering the reemergence of al-Qaeda and the reemergence of the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant. This is really a major and increasing threat to Iraq’s stability, its increasing threat to our regional partners, and it’s an increasing threat to us. As I said, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant is a globally designated terrorist under our laws; there’s a $10 million bounty for anyone who leads – gives information leading to his arrest or capture. So this is something we’re focused on really quite directly with the Iraqis and will really be a focus of the conversation over the course of the week.

I don’t have to go through the violence statistics, but just last month alone we had 40 – actually, 38 suicide bombers. Nearly all these suicide bombers – actually, all of them – we think come from the Islamic State of the Iraq in the Levant network. They’re mostly targeting Shia civilians. They’re targeting playgrounds, weddings, funerals, and this is having a devastating psychological impact, as you can imagine, on the country.

So the Prime Minister and his delegation are intensely focused on this problem. We in turn are intensely focused on how to encourage and then to combat it in an effective way with an overall strategic approach, which we found at the breakfast they were very much prepared to discuss. So with that, I think I’ll turn it over to [Moderator] and for questions.

In reality, Iraq’s internal security was the key focus of Maliki’s visit, and PM Maliki was said to be particularly concerned by the fact that Anbar Province had become a haven for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams, where they have camps, training facilities, and staging areas that the Iraqi Army is unable to target. He reportedly requested AH-64 Apache helicopters in order to enable air-mobile assaults into ISIS strongholds, as well as support from US military advisers and intelligence officers to help train and coordinate Iraqi counterterrorism forces.

By the time Maliki arrived in late October, it was all too clear that his actions were a serious threat to Iraqi stability that greatly aided Al Qaeda and other violent extremists. He had repeatedly used Iraqi Security forces to repress legitimate opposition as well as terrorists. In fact, the same senior Obama Administration official noted later that much of the discussions between US and Iraqi leaders centered on
developing a strategic approach to counterterrorism which would draw moderate Sunni tribes closer to the national government and “making sure that they have the mass of the population on their side.”

Other US officials commented on background that the Sunni Sahwa militias that drove the “Anbar Awakening” in 2006-2007 had come under heavy attack from ISIS throughout 2013. It was clear that if the Maliki Government would exacerbate sectarian tensions and strengthen Sunni extremist groups if it failed to reach out to the Sahwa and other moderate Sunnis.

Members of the US Congress expressed their concerns as well. A number of leading US policymakers expressed concern that PM Maliki’s sectarian feuding was a key source of Iraq’s internal violence, and that the US should be cautious about extending further military aid. These concerns were based on the perception that the Maliki government is exclusively favoring Shi’ite groups and marginalizing Sunni moderates. They are also based on the reality that US support for the Iraqi security forces can only be effective—in dealing with the rising level of internal violence in Iraq, if Iraq’s leaders address its far deeper internal problems.

In an open letter to President Obama published the week of PM Maliki’s visit, Senators John McCain, Carl Levin, James Inhofe, Robert Menendez, Bob Corker, and Lindsey Graham, stated that “Prime Minister Maliki’s mismanagement of Iraqi politics is contributing to the recent surge in violence.” These Senators further stated that they expected to see “more evidence from Prime Minister Maliki that U.S. security assistance and arms sales are part of a comprehensive Iraqi strategy that addresses the political sources of current violence” if they were to support increased arms sales and counterterrorism assistance to the Maliki government.

The December 2013 Crisis

As has been explained throughout this analysis, the December 2013 crisis in Iraq showed that such concerns were all too valid. The actions of the Iraq government following Maliki’s visit to Washington often did much to create terrorism as to defeat it. It also was apparent by late December 2013 that the US arms transfers the Maliki had asked for during his November visits to Washington could be used in Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian power struggles.

The US delivered 75 Hellfire missiles at precisely the time Iraqi Security Forces had committed abuses that had led to massive protests in Anbar and led the Sunni ministers and member of the Majlis to consider resigning. These deliveries were scarcely a sign that US arms sales could produce a more stable Iraq, particularly after new reports emerged during the fighting in early January 2014 that Iraq was conducting air attacks in Ramadi and Fallujah that seemed to have uncertain targeting and that the Iraqi Army was shelling civilian areas. The also announced that Iraq had carried out air attacks in Sunni cities that killed some 25 AQI fighters in one such attack – claimed that would have been far more credible if the Iraqi Air force had had anything approaching a credible targeting capability.

The end result left the US with unpleasant choices, and ones where it emphasized dealing with the immediate threat posed by AQI. Secretary of State John Kerry initially reacted to AQI’s seizure of much of Fallujah and growing ability to exploit Sunni anger against the Maliki regime by stating on January 5, 2013 that, We are very, very concerned about the efforts of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, who are trying to assert their authority not just in Iraq, but in Syria...These are the most dangerous players in that region. Their barbarism against the civilians in Ramadi and Fallujah and against Iraqi security forces is on display for everyone in the world to see.”
We will stand with the government of Iraq and with others who will push back against their efforts to destabilize... We are going to do everything that is possible. I will not go into the details. We are not contemplating putting boots on the ground... This is a fight that belongs to the Iraqis. That is exactly what the president and the world decided some time ago when we left Iraq, so we are not obviously contemplating returning. We are not contemplating putting boots on the ground. This is their fight. ... We will help them in their fight, but this fight, in the end, they will have to win and I am confident they can."

Kerry confronted the reality that the US had to deal with Iraq on the basis of choosing the least bad alternatives. There was no near-term prospect for a more effective government or for national reconciliation. The best of the bad options at a moment of crisis may well have been to offer limited aid. It is hard to think of US actions that could have been more of disaster than provoking Sunni and other Iraqi resistance by attempting to reintroduce US troops.

The same motives led the US to notify Congress in January that it wanted to sell Iraq a total of 500 more AGM-114K/R Hellfire missiles, to work with Jordan to step up the training of Iraq forces, and to quite add a number of US Special Forces advisors. Iraq forces had not been able to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants out of Ramadi and Fallujah, and Baghdad was dealing with attacks like a night prison break, car bombings and mortar fire.

It is equally hard to think of US action that could do more damage than backing Maliki without regard to his search for power, repression and misuse of the Iraqi security forces, and exploitation of Iraq’s sectarian divisions between Shi’ite and Sunni. It is clear that any longer-term success must be linked to serious efforts to make Maliki and his successor to move towards national conciliation and the creation of a real unity government. It is not an argument against such arms transfers to Iraq, a strong OSC-I, or aid in legitimate counterterrorism (and now, possibly counterinsurgency). The Obama Administration did seem to recognize this point as it dealt with the ongoing crisis. A readout of a phone call between Deputy National Security Advisor Blinken’s and Iraqi National Security Advisor Faleh al-Fayyad stated that,

Deputy National Security Advisor Blinken spoke with Iraqi National Security Advisor Faleh al-Fayyad today. Blinken expressed the United States’ support for ongoing operations by the Iraqi Security Forces in coordination with local and tribal movements in Anbar province to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Fayyad affirmed the Iraqi government’s commitment to work cooperatively with local leaders and communities in Anbar province, as well as national leaders from all political blocs, to isolate ISIL from the population and respond to the urgent needs of the Iraqi people in areas affected by terrorism. Both confirmed the strong U.S.-Iraq security partnership under the Strategic Framework Agreement, and the need for greater cooperation among Iraq’s neighboring countries to combat the regional terrorist threat. Senior officials from the White House, the State Department, and the United States Embassy in Baghdad remain in regular communication with a wide range of Iraqi officials to support ongoing efforts against ISIL, and to encourage coordination between Iraqi Security Forces and the people they serve.

Choosing the Least Bad Option

The obvious problem with the least bad option is that it is still a bad option. However, there are severe limits to what the US can do. Maliki will not compromise his own power or survival willingly, and Shi’ite and Sunni factions seem unwilling to compromise at a level that can produce an effective national government. Baghdad does not need -- or get -- serious US aid money, and can always play Iran off against the US. Iraq has many other sources of army and the US does not have major leverage in using arms transfers and advisory/intelligence aid in counterinsurgency and building up Iraq’s regular forces.

As Prime Minister Maliki’s October 2013 visit to Washington made clear, US support of Iraq’s security efforts is one of the only areas where the US retains major leverage in dealing with Iraq and countering...
both AQI and Iranian influence. As Figures 35 and Figure 36 have shown, Iraq does need major deliveries of advanced combat equipment some country if it is to have any serious defense capabilities against Iran, and it is far from clear that Iraqi Arab Shi‘ites want an accommodation with Iran that leaves Iraq as weak as it is today.

The new Iraqi orders of US arms announced in November, and the further sales and deliveries it announced in January 2014, show some elements of a meaningful Iraqi-US strategic partnership may still be possible. A major IMET effort could supplement these sales, and possibly a US military or contract support effort in country -- although the problems in security and immunity would have to find some quiet solution.

Nevertheless, arms and stronger Iraqi security forces are no substitute for Iraqi political unity, reconciliation, and proper restraint in the use of force. As is the case throughout the region, the US may have to choose arms sales and military aid as the least bad alternative in dealing with Iraq’s present government, but the US should stop endorsing Maliki and praising a level of Iraqi progress and democracy that simply does not exist. It needs to be far more careful to ensure that US arms transfers and aid are tied to Iraq’s use of force against real threat and not its people, that they are used to try to influence Iraq’s leaders to deal with its deeper problems and that Iran does not gain access to advanced US equipment -- a problem that has already led to Iranian inspection of US sales to Iraq.

At a minimum, the US and its Western and Arab allies must do what they can to ensure that the Maliki government does not use US and other sources of weapons against its legitimate Sunni and Shi‘ite opposition, the Kurds, and above all against peaceful Sunni demonstrators. This can be a major challenge given the current size of the US military advisory group in Iraq, and the pressures on Maliki or any future Shi‘ite leader that does not create a true national government. It also means actively competing with Russia and China on relatively unfavorable terms unless the US can reduce the long delays in the approval of US sales -- a failure in US national security efforts that has resisted more than 30 years of effort at reform and change.

The US seemed to clearly recognize these issues in reacting to events in Iraq in early 2014. As has been described in Chapter VIII, Brent McGurk, the Deputy Assistant for Iran and Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, testified on the situation in Iraq to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 5, 2014. He not only provided the provided the first detailed official US view of what had happened, and of AQI/ISIS’s actions in perspective relative to both the Maliki government and other violent factions, but made the US view on aiding Iraq’s counter insurgency efforts clear and tied them directly to Iraqi government efforts to reduce Sunni grievances and restore national unity.

Political and economic initiatives are necessary for defeating a network like ISIL. But they are not sufficient. From our own experience, we know that while success is impossible without mobilizing the population, such popular mobilization will not last absent focused and persistent security operations. The tribes will fight, but they must be confident that they are going to win and be rewarded when the fighting is over – not left to the mercy of ISIL reprisals. For this to happen, ISIL networks must be constantly pressured, and their safe havens destroyed.

Consistent with ISIL’s rise last summer, a series of armed camps – staging areas, and training grounds – were spotted in western Iraq. The existence of these camps demonstrated a shortfall in the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Even where camps could be located, through persistent ISF reconnaissance platforms, such as manned King Air platforms, they lacked the ability to target effectively, thereby providing ISIL safe haven just miles from populated areas.
Iraq’s lack of armored helicopters was a glaring example. Iraqi pilots, over the course of 2013, often flew thin-skinned helicopters towards ISIL camps defended by PKC machine guns and anti-aircraft platforms. The result was helicopters shot up and crews (many of whom we had trained) suffering grievous wounds. This situation was not sustainable, and the GOI requested our urgent assistance.

I want to thank this Committee, in particular, for working so closely with us over the past six months to approve the Apache helicopter lease and sale through our Foreign Military Sales program. While this is not an immediate remedy to the current problem, they will provide the ISF with the most effective platform possible for denying ISIL a safe haven in the remote western deserts of Iraq. They will also ensure that we can provide effective oversight on the end use of attack helicopter systems, as well as influencing planning and operations.

Similarly, the Iraqis have recently proven effective at deploying Hellfire missiles against remote ISIL targets from a Caravan aircraft. The ISF have three Caravans equipped to launch Hellfire strikes, but overall supply of Hellfire missiles was not adequate to the threat and number of targets they had located and surveyed. Again, thanks to close coordination with this Committee in recent months, this situation has begun to change. We delivered 75 Hellfire missiles in December, and have notified Congress of a potential sale of up to 500 more. Our objective is to ensure that ISIL can never again gain safe haven in western Iraq to train, stage, and plan.

Consistent with this strategy, we will deliver 10 Scan Eagle surveillance UAVs this spring, and 48 Raven UAVs later this year, all of which, when used in combination with other platforms, can provide regular surveillance of the Jazeera region and the Iraq-Syria border. As Director of National Intelligence Clapper noted in recent testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the “greater two way flow of Sunni extremists between Syria and Iraq” has a direct bearing on ISIL’s ability to conduct high-profile attacks in Iraq. To be successful, thus, a long-term strategy must focus on security and surveillance in these areas.

Finally, we have increased bilateral and regional training opportunities for Iraqi counterterrorism (CT) units, and expedited deliveries of key CT-related equipment for Iraq’s highest-end and most disciplined units. U.S. trainers with the Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation are also conducting non-operational training with these high-end Iraqi operators, and Iraq and Jordan have discussed the possibility of advanced training for Iraqi forces in Jordan. We fully support this initiative.

All of this assistance comes in the context of the holistic strategy discussed above, short of which, long-term stability will not be possible. This was a point General Austin pressed home with Prime Minister Maliki and other key leaders in a visit to Baghdad last week. Security, economics, and politics, must be fused together.

Vital U.S. interests are at stake in Iraq. While my testimony today has focused on the threat from ISIL, the issues of oil, regional stability, and Iranian influence, are also central to our policy during this pivotal new year. I look forward to working closely with this Committee to ensure that we are doing all we can to protect and advance U.S. interests month-to-month.

At the same time, outside analysts and media need to be more realistic and objective in evaluating the fact there is only so much the Administration and Congress can do. Sending in US forces would mean taking sides in what threatens to become a far more intense Sunni vs. Shi’ite civil conflict. Providing counterterrorism aid without tight controls on the weapons involved would enable the Maliki government to use them against the Iraqi people.

These risks were so serious that Iraq’s Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq asked the US administration to halt weapons sales to the government in Baghdad in the midst of the January 2014 crisis with AQI, ISIS, and hired an influential lobbyist to try to stop the delivery of the US weapons to Baghdad. The president of the KRG, Massoud Barzani, also expressed his fears about the sale of the US
weapons to Iraq, and both Kurds and Sunni political figures accuse Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki of potentially using them to enforce an increasingly authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{clvii}

The Administration clearly realized these risks in making its initial response to the crisis that began in December 2013. Sending in a few precision-guided Hellfire missiles with limited lethality and value only against point targets -- plus some limited-performance reconnaissance drones that left the Maliki government dependent on broader and quieter US intelligence aid -- was such an approach. So was trying to find ways a US advisory team could control later transfers of systems like the AH-64 -- weapons that could only be delivered and operated months after the December/January crisis peaked, as well as sending in small advisory teams whose mission was focused as much on the causes of terrorism as on counterterrorism.

The US government faced -- and faces -- the dilemma that cannot stand by and let AQI/ISIS gain more power, and has to provide some aid in counterterrorism. It also has to deal with the reality that Iraq can buy from Europe, Russia, China and other state, and that Iran is another arms supplier. This latter risk became all too clear in January 2014, when the Iranian ambassador to Iraq -- Muhammad Majid al-Sheikh -- announced that, “Iraq has signed an agreement with Iran to purchase weapons and military equipment because Iraq’s defense ministry trusts the effectiveness of the Iranian weapons...It’s crucial for the Iraqi army to receive a part of its weapons from arms produced in Iran.” The US could scarcely ignore that fact that. Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi had signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen defense and security agreements with Iran on September 2013, and that the previous Iranian government also offered a comprehensive military and security package in 2012, without concluding an agreement.\textsuperscript{clviii}

At the same time, US government efforts need to do everything this is practically possible to push the Maliki government towards reform and equity in dealing with Sunnis and Kurds, and to laying the ground work for demanding an honest outcome from Iraq’s coming election and an outcome that moved back toward the level of national unity called for in the Erbil agreement.

This requires the US to take the risk of making aid far more conditional on Maliki making major efforts to correct the mistakes that have brought Iraq to the edge of a new round serious sectarian conflict, restoring a proper degree of sectarian and ethnic balance to the Iraqi security forces, to stop using these forces his personal and Shi’ite ends, ad to give the Sawa and other Sunni fighters in the West and Sunni-dominated areas, the political incentives, money, and arms to actively support and defend the central government. Every arms delivery and form of aid should be conditional on real-world Iraqi efforts, and the US should make it clear that it support a national Iraqi government and will not support a sectarian government not only now, but after the coming election.

These also are actions that require the best possible reporting in the media, and equal depth of analysis from outside analysts and NGOs. During 2010 to the end of 2013, far too much of the output from both had a narrow focus on counterterrorism and the threat from AQI/ISIS as time when the Maliki “threat” was becoming at least – if not more – important.
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xxiv Adapted from the data in the IISS Military Balance, 2013, pp. 381-382.


Interview with Captain Casey Doyle, USMC, October 20, 2013. Captain Doyle previously deployed as the Executive Officer of a Military Transition Team supervising the Iraqi Border Police.

Interview with Captain Casey Doyle, USMC, October 20, 2013.


Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2011, 76.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2011, 76.


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xciv Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2011, 75.

Cxiv M. Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “US Department of State: Preserving Progress in Iraq, Part III: Iraq’s Police Development Program,” Statement before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 30, 2011.


Loveday Morris and Ernesto Londoño, “Iraq’s Maliki says he has asked for weapons from U.S., will also seek training for troops,” *Washington Post,* January 16, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-maliki-says-he-has-asked-for-weapons-from-us-will-also-seek-training-for-troops/2014/01/16/0f369ed6-7ea0-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcb84_story.html


Human Rights Watch, No One is Safe: Abuses of Women in Iraq’s Criminal Justice System, February 2014.


