The Post-Election Challenges to Afghan Transition: 2014-2015

Anthony H. Cordesman
The Post-Election Challenges of Transition

- Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government
- Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
- Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption
- Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and “layered defense”
- Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations’ personnel
- Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste
- Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight
- Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco-economy
- Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia
The Challenge of Coping Without US Leadership, Plan, a Credible US Plan and Budget, and US Public Support
The first section in this report focuses on the lack of US leadership, planning, budgeting, and public support.

It lists the areas where the US government – as well as the Afghan government and other powers – have failed to provide leadership, planning, and transparency, and create the institutions necessary for success.

It warns that past failures to sustain successful transitions have been the rule and not the exception.

It shows the need for leadership that can win congressional and popular US support, and that goes far beyond empty rhetoric about terrorism. That provides a clear strategic justification for US action, and provides a credible path forward.

It shows the rate at which US spending has already been cut, and the lacking of any meaningful budget panning and details in the President’s FY2015 budget request.
The BSA is Only One Aspect of Transition

- Leadership and transparency to win public and Congressional support
- Integrated civil-military plan for post-2014 US presence and aid
  - A clear US and allied plan for an on-going advisory presence and aid funding of ANSF
  - A clear US and allied plan for governance and economic assistance and aid funding.
- A clear plan for setting conditions for Afghan reforms and other actions
- A plan for US relations with – and aid to – Pakistan and Central Asia nations, as well as other key transit and neighboring states
- US leadership in creating replacements for ISAF, NTM-A, UNSCOM
- Follow-ons to Tokyo and Chicago conferences
History is a Warning: Declare Victory and Leave?

Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions

Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.

Loss of US Public Support - I

Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. What is your overall opinion of Afghanistan? Is it very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

Loss of US Public Support - II

Thinking now about U.S. military action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not?

- % Yes, made a mistake
- % No, did not

Loss of US Public Support - III

Negative Views of U.S. Efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan

In achieving its goals in Iraq/Afghanistan, U.S. has ...

- Iraq:
  - Mostly failed: 52
  - Mostly succeeded: 37

- Afghanistan:
  - Mostly failed: 52
  - Mostly succeeded: 38

Don't know responses not shown.

Views of Decisions to Use Military Force in Afghanistan, Iraq

Decision to use military force in Afghanistan ...

- Right decision: 69
  - 61
- Wrong decision: 20
  - 41

Decision to use military force in Iraq ...

- Right decision: 72
  - 50
- Wrong decision: 22
  - 50

PEW RESEARCH CENTER/USA TODAY


CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2014 ($ BILLIONS)

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 72.

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 73.
Aid Needs International Coordination that UNAMA Has Not Provided

The World Bank has reported that from 2002 to December 21, 2013, 33 donors had pledged more than $7.03 billion, of which nearly $6.91 billion had been paid.

According to the World Bank, donors had pledged approximately $916.70 million to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1392, which ran from December 21, 2012 to December 20, 2013.

Source: Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 82.
ASFF Disbursements for the ANA & ANP by Category

**Source:** Special Inspector general for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, March 31, 2014, p. 75.
No US DoD Plan and Hollow Placeholder OCO Budget

$75B in FY2015 to $30B in FY2016

Focus Only On Base Budget For Remainder Of Briefing
No FY 2015 OCO Budget Yet

State FY2015 Budget Request Down to $2.1 Billion with no Clear Plan for Transition

• $2.6 billion of the State Department FY2015 budget request is allocated to Afghanistan under conditions where State cautions that “the Administration has not yet determined the size and scope of any post-2014 US presence.”

• State indicates that the United States will sustain “our diplomatic platform and security operations in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat, while assuming selective reductions in personnel in preparation for transition.”

• The budget prioritizes technical assistance and channels more aid through Afghan institutions, while holding the Government of Afghanistan accountable for undertaking concrete reforms and improving efficiency and sustainability.

• FY2015 funds will sustain gains in health and education, economic self-sufficiency through improved agricultural production, good governance, rule of law, and women’s rights as laid out in the strategic Partnership agreement.

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, FY2015, p. 3.
Facing a Continuing War Zone Without Eliminating Pakistani Sanctuaries or Major Progress in Security
The Uncertain Structure of Security

• Conflicting polls and US intel estimates of on Taliban support and influence

• NATO/ISAF has stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco.

• No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited mapping of 10 worst areas of tactical encounters.

• No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.

• Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.

• No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.
World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative and Rising

Rule of Law

Political Stability and Absence of Violence / Terrorism

Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq

Enemy-Initiated Attacks Recovered Before ISAF Ceased to Report

Shift from Tactical clashes to High Profile Attacks in 2012-2014

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>EIAs</th>
<th>HPA</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED Events</th>
<th>IED/Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/Coordinated Attack</th>
<th>IDF</th>
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<tr>
<td>% YoY Change</td>
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<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
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<td>5%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
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<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED Events</th>
<th>IED/Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/Coordinated Attack</th>
<th>IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% YoY Change</td>
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<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
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</table>

UNAMA documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a seven per cent increase in deaths and a 17 per cent increase in injuries compared to 2012.

The rise in civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan’s armed conflict in 2013 reverses the decline reported in 2012 and is similar to record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. Since 2009, the armed conflict has claimed the lives of 14,064 Afghan civilians and injured thousands more.

…while improvised explosive devices used by Anti-Government Elements remained the biggest killer of civilians in 2013, increased ground engagements between Pro-Government Forces and Anti-Government Elements emerged as the number-two cause of civilian casualties with rising numbers of Afghan civilians killed and injured in cross-fire. Both factors drove the escalation of civilian casualties in 2013.
Taliban and Insurgent Killing Power Rising

UNAMA’s report found that Anti-Government Elements continued to deliberately target civilians across the country and carried out attacks without regard for civilian life, causing 6,374 civilian casualties (2,311 civilian deaths and 4,063 injured), up four per cent from 2012.

Indiscriminate use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements increased in 2013 and remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. UNAMA recorded 2,890 civilian casualties (962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injured) from IEDs, up 14 per cent from 2012.

Within civilian casualties from IEDs, UNAMA noted an 84 per cent rise in civilian deaths and injuries from radio-controlled IEDs and a 39 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from indiscriminate victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs. Anti-Government Elements continued to detonate IEDs in public areas used by civilians such as roads, markets, Government offices, bazaars, in and around schools, and bus stations.

Suicide and complex attacks caused 1,236 civilian casualties (255 killed and 981 injured) in 73 incidents in 2013. While the number of attacks was similar to 2012, an 18 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from these attacks was noted.
Taliban and Insurgent Tactics Become More Challenging

UNAMA’s report documented 1,076 civilian casualties (743 deaths and 333 injured) from targeted killings by Anti-Government Elements who increasingly targeted and killed civilian Government officials and workers, community leaders, judicial authorities, tribal elders, election workers and persons supporting the peace process.

Targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government and in mosques tripled in 2013.

Throughout 2013, UNAMA noted increased public messaging by the Taliban on civilian casualties. However, the situation on the ground for Afghan civilians did not improve. The Taliban increased their indiscriminate use of IEDs and continued to attack civilians.

The UNAMA report observed that the Taliban claimed responsibility for 153 attacks which caused 944 civilian casualties (302 civilians killed and 642 injured) in 2013, marking an increase of 292 per cent in such claims by the Taliban, and a 136 per cent increase in civilian casualties for which the Taliban claimed responsibility compared with 2012.

Most of these Taliban attacks used indiscriminate tactics such as IED detonations in public areas or directly targeted civilians or civilian objects, particularly civilian Government personnel and buildings.

Layered Defense and the Challenge of Security
The second section of this report focuses on the Challenge of Security and the fact that Afghanistan is still a nation at war.

There is some hope that an adequately resourced ANSF layered defense and US “four quarter” advisory strategy could succeed in providing the necessary security in key populated areas and for key lines of communication, even if Pakistan continues to provide Taliban sanctuaries and comes to dominate less populated areas in the east and South.

Afghanistan is, however, very much a nation at war and success is uncertain.

ISAF and the US government have stopped all detailed reporting on actual success in war for more than a year. ISAF no longer reports maps or metrics, and the semi-annual Department of Defense 1230 report stopped such reporting in late 2012 and has not been updated since July 2013.

It is clear from a wide range of media reporting, however, that the transition to Afghan forces in 2013 gradually extended ANSF responsibility to many areas still dominated by the Taliban and other insurgents.

There has been no meaningful net assessment of the success of Afghan government/ANSF efforts versus those of the Taliban and other threats.

The ANSF will have to cover a large country with a highly dispersed population and 12 primary population clusters. Success is not for certain.
Protecting key lines of communication will be a major challenge – both in terms of available forces, force quality and loyalty, and the ability to maintain key routes.

Both security and post-transition trade patterns present serious uncertainties.

The World Bank already ranks Afghanistan as having some of the worst challenges in terms of violence and rule of law of any country in the world.

The ANSF must start with none of the internal resources Iraq had from its oil revenues, and with nothing like the success the surge in Iraq presented before Transition.

Even the ISAF’s carefully chosen metric – enemy initiated attacks – failed to reflect significant success before ISAF ceased to report all metrics on the success of the fighting.

The ANSF has, however, increased significantly in total force strength, and began to bear the brunt of enemy attacks and casualties by October 2012.

Past reports show that the ANSF still faces key problems in the MoD and MoI, sustainment, and with corruption. It is also important to note that only roughly half of the 352,000 personnel often cited as the force goal are actual military and serious paramilitary forces. Force composition and force quality present far more critical problems than the issue of total manning.
The ANSF also suffers from rapidly changing force goals, rapid turnover in advisors, overambitious efforts to force it to “do it our way,” a force-rush to meet the transition deadline of end-2014, and sudden peaks and cuts in funding.

The only meaningful recent reporting on the ANSF has been by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR). That reporting is too complex to summarize, but has identified many continuing weaknesses first identified in past public ISAF and DoD reporting. A key example of critical shortfalls in reliable reporting on actual manning makes this clear.

The Afghan police present critical problems in leadership, force quality, corruption, actual manning, and turnover.

Surveys do, however, indicate that the elements of the ANSF are winning far more support in most areas than the Taliban and other insurgents.
Layered Defense: A Concept that May Work with Adequate US and Allied support

• Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defense population and key lines of communication.

• ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.

• Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,

• Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.

• Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.

• German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.

• Support with governance and economic aid.
Layered Defense May Work, But Formal Transfers of Security Do Not Mean Real ANSF Security Capability
Layered Defense: 
Afghanistan is Still Very Much at War

- Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.
- No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.
- Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.
- US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.
- ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.
- Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.
- Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below $4 billion annually uncertain. May need $6-7 billion.
Uncertain Future CIA Support for US Military

• Press reports indicate CIA will withdraw operational elements in Afghanistan by end 2014. Quotes US officials as saying,

"CIA Director John Brennan informed U.S. military commanders in March that his agency would start to shutter Afghan operations outside Kabul, the capital, removing CIA clandestine officers and analysts as well as National Security Agency specialists responsible for intercepting insurgents' communications, which have been a rich source of daily intelligence, the officials said. ...Pentagon officials warn that the CIA drawdown is coming at a time when insurgent attacks normally intensify, after a winter lull. As a result, the plan has strained relations between the agency and military commanders in Kabul...

"The CIA footprint is entirely dependent on the military's," a senior U.S. official said Thursday. "There is no stomach in the building for going out there on our own," said a former CIA operator who has spoken to current officers about the pullback. "We are not putting our people out there without U.S. forces."

John Maguire, who retired from the CIA in 2005 after 23 years as a case officer, noted that CIA officers on horseback were the first U.S. forces into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept.11, 2001. He criticized the spy service for the current drawdown. "There is ample evidence and a long historical record of the agency working alone in any number of difficult and dangerous places, and if they can't do it by themselves without the military, then they should close the organization," he said.

The CIA also plans this summer to stop paying the salaries of Afghan paramilitary forces that it has armed and trained for more than a decade to help fight the Taliban-led insurgency in the country's east, near the Pakistani border. It is unclear what will happen to the militias. The Pentagon is trying to persuade the CIA to slow its withdrawal, arguing that keeping CIA and NSA operators in the field as long as possible would help prevent a surge in militant attacks before the end of the year, when most U.S. troops are due to leave.

...The spy service already has sharply cut the pace of lethal drone strikes in Pakistan, flown from airfields in Afghanistan. One official said the agency was making plans to continue operating the armed drones on a much smaller scale, from Bagram.

“Layered Defense” – Where is the Population for the ANA, ANP, and ALP to Protect?

AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013

The Population Estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).

Data Source: Estimated Population Data
Provided by: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Afghanistan

The accuracy of the data represented in this map remains subject to the source. IMMAP or USAID/OFDA does not accept any responsibility for the accuracy of these figures.

The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement by IMMAP or USAID/OFDA.

Data Source: Afghan Central Statistic Office
“Layered Defense” – From “New Silk Road” to LOC Survival

Source: Google, Search “Map of Afghan Road System,” Accessed April 8, 2014
The Challenge of Shifting the Burden to the ANSF
In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.

This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.

In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.

Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.

Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.
ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2010-March 2013

ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.
The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Has Shifted to the ANSF

ANSF and ISAF killed in action, January 2010 – March 2013

Percentage of Security Incidents Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces

Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) involving ISAF and EIAs involving the ANSF, Jan 2011 – Feb 2014

ISAF Assessment of Transition Stages, March - December 2013

Stage 1 - Local Support
Stage 2 - Tactical Support
Stage 3 - Operational Support
Stage 4 - Strategic Support

ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that will build the ANSF’s long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been made to date enduring.

At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence service—at all levels.

In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment.

Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address gaps in 1) the aviation enterprise, 2) the intelligence enterprise, 3) special operations, and 4) the security ministries’ capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after Resolute Support concludes.
ANA Attrition by Corps/Division
March 2014

- High attrition rate continues to be a challenge, but has remained stable over 2013.
- Causes of attrition are assessed as high op tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/quality of life, and leave issues.
- Though combat losses are a relatively low percentage of total attrition— it likely contributes to morale issues.

*ANA attrition decreased slightly from 3.3 percent (Feb) to 1.8 percent (March) in Solar Month March 14.

***EAC- Echelon Above Corps includes a number of organizations; MP Guard Brigade; HSSB; Army support Command; Logistics Command; ANATC; ANAREC; Medical Command; ANDU; Ministry of Defense; General Staff; Ground Forces Command; and Mobile Strike Force.

ANA Attrition & Recruitment
March 13- Feb 14

# ANA Ethnicity - Tajik Impact: February 2014

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
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<td>Officer Delta</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
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<td>Soldier</td>
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<td>30.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Force</td>
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<td>32.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
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<td>Delta</td>
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<td>ANA Ethnic Breakout Goal</td>
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ANP Attrition & Recruitment
March 13- Feb 14

# ANP Ethnicity - January 2014

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<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Tajik</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<td>10%</td>
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## Weapons & Equipment Summary

### Part I

#### ANA Weapon: Status Summary

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<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Total Acquired</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
<td>Enabler/AR2VP</td>
<td>ASFF Acquired</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Individual Weapons</td>
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<td>493</td>
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<td>NATO Indirect Fire Weapons</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>921</td>
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<td>Non-NATO Standard Weapons</td>
<td>7,453</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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#### LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

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<td>Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
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<td>Light Tactical Vehicle</td>
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<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicles</td>
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<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
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#### LOCATION OF VEHICLES DELIVERED

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<td>US PORT READY TO BE CALLED FWD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicles</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Tactical Vehicle</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMMWV Variants</td>
<td>1260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heavy Vehicles &amp; Fire Equipment</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Equipment</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Handling Equipment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Haulers</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

## Weapons Status Summary

### Part II

#### ANA Comm: Status Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Enable/AR2VP</th>
<th>Total Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tashk1 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>12,268</td>
<td>(1,681)</td>
<td>12,101</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF Radios</td>
<td>72,082</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>71,538</td>
<td>(665)</td>
<td>71,337</td>
<td>1,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF/UHF Radios</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>3,318</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Vision Device</td>
<td>9,896</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>12,497</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>10,830</td>
<td>252</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Comm</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,093</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,160</strong></td>
<td><strong>99,904</strong></td>
<td><strong>651</strong></td>
<td><strong>97,869</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,828</strong></td>
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#### ANA EOD: Status Summary

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<tr>
<th>ANA EOD Item</th>
<th>Total Required</th>
<th>Enable/AR2VP</th>
<th>Total Acquired</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
<th>Total Delivered</th>
<th>Over/Under (Required)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tashk1 1391v2 (plus float)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15,430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blasting Machine M34</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD Bomb Suit (SM + MED) w/Helmet</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firing Cable &amp; Reel</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 Crimper</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Detector (Vallon &amp; CEIA)</td>
<td>5,748</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pigstick w/Stand</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMP-30 Robot</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symphony Jammer</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test Set, M51 Blasting Cap</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hook &amp; Line Kit PT 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Tripod</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIPPERS</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,202</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Rollers</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,866</strong></td>
<td><strong>552</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,575</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,157</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,914</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
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### Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)</th>
<th>Corps/Div HQ</th>
<th>IN Bde</th>
<th>Corps ENG KDK</th>
<th>Corps SIG KDK</th>
<th>Corps DIV KDK</th>
<th>Corps/Div MI KDK</th>
<th>OCC-R</th>
<th>AUP Type-A HQ</th>
<th>ABP Zone HQ</th>
<th>ANCOP Bde HQ</th>
<th>MSF KDK*</th>
<th>Total RASR Assessed Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Capable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Not Assessed</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awaiting Fielding</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OCC-R: Operational Coordination Center- Regional**
**MSF: Mobile Strike Force**
**ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police**

ISAF and ANSF Unilateral Operations

ISAF and ANSF Led Operations

Total ISAF and ANSF Led Operations

But, Only Half of ANSF is a Fighting Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Element</th>
<th>Manpower Goal End 2012</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>172,055</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>14,451?</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>110,279</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>23,090</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>2,986?</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP-Militias</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>11,000-23,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. subject matter experts.
Ongoing Cuts in US Aid to ANSF – No Clear Plan for FY2015 and Beyond

• The 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 appropriated nearly $4.73 billion for the ASFF for FY 2014, increasing total cumulative funding to more than $57.50 billion.

• As of December 31, 2013, more than $47.88 billion of total ASFF funding had been obligated, of which nearly $45.38 billion had been disbursed.

SIGAR and 1230 Reports Contain Key Warnings on Readiness & Sustainability

• CSTC-A stated that “the ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’”

• This explains the low present-for-duty numbers for Corps actively engaged in operations. This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% (215th Corps) to 20.5% (209th Corps). About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.

• Although details to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter were limited, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:
  • Present-for-Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)
  • Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave but not AWOL): 54,862 (43%)
  • Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)

Police Pose a Critical Challenge in Terms of Corruption and Effectiveness – As Do ALP

![ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE](chart)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Component</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Quarterly Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2013</td>
<td>Q4 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Q3 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>110,369</td>
<td>110,369</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>23,090</td>
<td>23,090</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>14,541</td>
<td>14,541</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISTA²</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Total</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP + CNPA Total</td>
<td>156,247</td>
<td>156,243</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.

UN Warnings About ANSF Abuses

With Afghan national security forces leading military operations country wide, UNAMA reinforced the need for improved implementation of directives and rules of engagement mandating civilian protection, and for permanent structures in the Ministries of Defence and Interior to investigate reports of civilian casualties by Afghan forces, initiate remedial measures and take follow-up action. UNAMA’s report also called on the Government of Afghanistan to investigate any allegations of human rights violations by Afghan forces as required under Afghan and international law.

Despite reports of improved security due to the presence of Afghan Local Police (ALP), from many communities across Afghanistan, UNAMA recorded 121 civilian casualties (32 civilian deaths and 89 injured) by ALP, almost tripling civilian casualties attributed to ALP from 2012. Most of these involved ALP members in certain areas committing summary executions and punishments, intimidation, harassment and illegal searches.

The ALP Directorate in the Ministry of Interior reported it investigated more than 100 cases against ALP members in 2013, referring 59 cases to military prosecutors. Despite these encouraging steps, information on any prosecutions, convictions, suspensions or other action taken was not available. UNAMA called for increased efforts to provide accountability for violations by Afghan Local Police.

The UNAMA 2013 report recorded 39 incidents of human rights abuses including killings carried out by Pro-Government armed groups resulting in 55 civilian casualties (18 civilian deaths and 37 injured). The majority of incidents occurred in areas where armed groups held considerable power and influence, including in Uruzgan, Kunduz, Faryab, Baghlan and Jawzjan provinces.

The report urged the Afghan Government to speed up efforts to disband and disarm such groups.

State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - I

The most significant human rights problems were torture and abuse of detainees; increased targeted violence and endemic societal discrimination against women and girls; widespread violence, including armed insurgent groups’ killings of persons affiliated with the government and indiscriminate attacks on civilians; and pervasive official corruption.

Other human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces; poor prison conditions; ineffective government investigations of abuses and torture by local security forces; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of women accused of so-called moral crimes; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and ineffectiveness...

There were several credible reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that in January an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander and several ALP members broke into a home in the Chardara District of Kunduz Province and killed a 65-year-old man and two women before stealing valuables from the home and fleeing. NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated extrajudicial killings.

There were widespread reports that government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police committed abuses. NGOs reported that security forces continued to use excessive force, including torturing and beating civilians.

NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated the torture of detainees. UNAMA reported systematic torture at several ANP detention facilities and one Afghan Border Police Station in Kandahar Province. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) found multiple individuals detained by the ANP in...
State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - II

Kandahar who claimed mistreatment and torture while in ANP custody. Detainees reportedly were tortured at official and unofficial locations, including ANP check posts, ANP headquarters, and other ANP facilities in Kandahar. Methods of torture included beatings with fists and electric cables; kicking; choking; electric shock; and squeezing of testicles.

UNAMA reported that it found “sufficiently reliable and credible” incidents of torture at 10 National Directorate of Security (NDS) facilities as well as at 15 ANP facilities. For example, UNAMA reported systematic torture at the NDS detention facility in Kandahar Province and NDS Department 124 (counterterrorism) in Kabul. A government delegation assigned to investigate the claims made by UNAMA in its January report also found that officials tortured detainees at NDS Department 124, including with electric shocks, beatings, and threats of sexual violence. During its monitoring visits, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also continued to find instances of torture and abuse of detainees who were held at NDS Department 124.

UNAMA also found instances of torture or other mistreatment of detainees held in Afghan National Army (ANA) and ALP custody prior to transfer to the NDS or ANP. Similarly, the government found that 48 percent of detainees interviewed for its investigation (284) had been tortured.

…. Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted, and observers criticized the inadequate preparation and lack of sensitivity of local security forces. Human rights institutions expressed concerns about the limited oversight and accountability that existed for security institutions, especially the ALP, although the Ministry of Interior took some measures at the end of the year to increase accountability of the ALP. For example, the Ministry of Interior worked with the ICRC to increase human rights training for ALP recruits.
Progress in some Areas of Human Development, *But* Progress is Often Grossly Exaggerated and Lags Other Poorest Countries in the Region
The Uncertain State of Progress

• UN Human development data reflect real progress, but also serious limits to that progress, and input data are very uncertain.

• Far too much US, NGO, and other reporting accepts “best case” estimates and polls without validating data or methodology.

• Progress in life expectancy, education, medical services raises massive questions about quality of data.

• More than a decade of war has gone on with no meaningful estimates of the effectiveness of aid and only suspect accounting.

• Military and aid spending has often been driving factors in increase in corruption and distorting economy to dependence on outside spending.
Afghanistan has made real progress in many areas, although more as a result of improved security and massive in-country spending and subsides to its budget than through development or successful aid.

Dealing with Transition requires realism as to Afghanistan’s real situation and needs. After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the State Department and USAID has never developed credible measures of the effectiveness of aid, or of how much spending actually reaches Afghanistan and the needed aid effort.

Claims are made without any public explanation or transparency as to the uncertainties in the data and controversies over the claims being made. Best case data for trends in Afghanistan are taken out of context, and credit is taken for developments unrelated to aid or only affected by it to a limited degree. World Bank economic update reports in 2011 ands 2012 that state aid has has only a marginal impact on most Afghans and the Afghan economy are ignored. The impact of civil efforts on an ongoing war and any assessment of needs and priorities of Transition is ignored.

Key issues in developing honest estimates of progress and the ability to sustain it include:

- **Economic growth and increases in GDP/GNI per capita; Five-Fold Increase in Per Capita GDP**: Claims take credit for the impact of favorable rains which are a driving force in the Afghan GDP and stopped in 2012. GDP per capita data ignore gross uncertainties in population estimates and PPP estimates of trends in economy. No assessment of impact of narcotics share of economy, macro-economic impact of corruption and capital outflows.

- **Agriculture**: Extremely high impact assessments for programs limited in scope, implied gains in output that are largely a matter of favorable rains. No estimate of uncertainty in the data

- **Education**: Uncertainties in population, existence of ghost or ineffective schools and teachers, quality of Afghani government reporting, tendency to exaggerate time and years of schooling, uncertain reporting on education by sex.
Exaggerated and Un-validated State Department and USAID Claims of Success –II

- **Democracy and governance**: Estimates only cover output of aid programs. Have stopped reporting on effectiveness of governance by by district. Ignore ISAF and NGO estimates of scale of corruption. Do not explicitly assess shortfalls in government personnel in the field and its impact. Ignore far more negative World Bank assessments.

- **Infrastructure**: Take credit for construction, but do not address corruption, effectiveness, or sustainability – already a critical problem with roads.

- **Stabilization**: Ignore UNAMA assessments of trends in civilian killed and wounded, do not map areas of relative success.

- **Dramatic Growth in Afghan Government Revenue Collection**: some reporting ignores recent negative trends, serious shortfalls in projections. Failure to assess corruption and government’s ability use revenues effectively. No public assessment of current and projected gaps between revenues and needed post-Transition expenditures.

- **Exceptional Advances for Women**: Real gains and their sustainability are overstated. No mapping of critical problem areas, and areas where legal protection does not exist in real world. Failure to note regressive aspect of Afghan law.

- **New Silk Road, Promoting Regional Connections**: Exaggeration of current and future economic impact, problems in sustaining current roads, political and security problems with Pakistan.

- **Electric power**: Generation capacity is tied estimates of consumers where credibility of data are unclear. Failure to create real world prices and sustainable problems is understated.

- **Medical services and life expectancy**: Use of controversial best case data. No attempt to resolve widely differing estimates of life expectancy.

World Bank Warnings As Early as November 2011 - I

The extremely high level of current annual aid (estimated at $15.7 billion in 2010) is roughly the same dollar amount as Afghanistan’s GDP and cannot be sustained. Aid has funded the delivery of essential services including education and health, infrastructure investments, and government administration. There have been substantial improvements in the lives of Afghans over the last 10 years as a result of this effort. But these inflows, most outside the Afghan budget, have been so high that inevitable waste and corruption, aid dependency and use of parallel systems to circumvent limited Government absorptive capacity have impeded aid delivery and the building of a more effective Afghan state.

The level of public spending – both on and off budget – that has been financed by such high aid flows will be fiscally unsustainable for Afghanistan once donor funds decline. Lesser amounts, matched by more effective aid delivery could, in the end, lead to some more positive outcomes. The key issue is how to manage this change and mitigate the adverse impacts, and put aid and spending on a more sustainable path for the longer-term. International experience and Afghanistan’s history after the Soviet military withdrawal in 1989 demonstrate that violent fluctuations in aid, especially abrupt aid cutoffs, are extremely damaging and destabilizing.

Large financial inflows outside the Afghan budget and fragmented aid in a situation of weak governance have been major sources of rents, patronage, and political power. This has inadvertently exacerbated grievances and conflicts as the relative strength of elite groups in Afghan society shifted. As aid declines, reliance on the opium economy and other illicit activities could increase. Ensuring that increasingly constrained public funds are well used reinforces the need to maintain and improve upon the significant progress made by the Finance Ministry in establishing public financial management systems and a robust Afghan budget process.

The impact of declining aid on economic growth may be less than expected. Why? Because most international spending “on” Afghanistan is not spent “in” Afghanistan, and much of what is spent in Afghanistan leaves the economy through imports, expatriated profits and outward remittances. Nevertheless, projections suggest that, under even favorable assumptions, real GDP growth may fall from 9% a year over the past decade to 5-6% during 2011–18. Given Afghanistan’s annual population growth of 2.8%, this would mean only limited improvement in average per capita income, continuing high rates of underemployment and little progress in reducing poverty. Only growth at the very maximum of the range of plausible scenarios would enable Afghanistan to achieve meaningful reductions in poverty and higher average per capita incomes. For example, with real GDP growth of 6% a year, average per capita income – currently one of the world’s lowest at $528 dollars – would take 22 years or about a generation to double.

Economic growth is much slower under less favorable scenarios. The growth projections are based on a set of assumptions (scenarios) related mainly to security, sources of growth, aid levels, and changes in investment climate. If the assumptions in the less favorable scenarios come to pass —for example, if agriculture performance is poor, if major mining investments (Aynak for copper and Hajigak for iron ore) do not materialize, or if aid declines precipitously over the period – then growth could drop to 3-4%. Deteriorating security and governance would lead to further economic decline. The underdeveloped financial sector and low rates of financial intermediation leave little scope for helping Afghan businesses adjust to slowing growth. Conversely, the decline could be
Underemployment will increase because the activities affected by declining financial inflows (services, construction) are relatively labor-intensive. Unemployment and especially underemployment in Afghanistan—respectively estimated at 8% and 48%—are already high, even with today’s rapid economic growth. Roughly 6–10% of the working population has benefited from aid-financed job opportunities, most of these in short-term employment. Declining aid, therefore, can be expected to exacerbate underemployment levels (with fewer casual labor opportunities and lower pay for skilled employees).

The impact of the decline will affect some groups more than others. Aid has not been evenly spread across the country. Because of the choices made by donors, and the predominant role of stabilization and military spending, the conflict-affected provinces have had significantly higher per capita aid than the more peaceful (and often poorer) provinces. As a result, the slowdown in aid will be felt more acutely in the conflict-affected areas and in urban centers. If aid declines gradually so that it can be partly offset by growth of the security, mining, and civilian public sectors, the impact could be softened and spread over time. This would allow labor markets more time to adjust.

The direct poverty impact of declining international spending might be limited if aid becomes more equally distributed across provinces and the composition shifts toward development programs rather than short-run stabilization activities. Aid disproportionately devoted to the more conflict-affected provinces has had only a modest impact on poverty. Households in the conflict-affected provinces were less poor on average to begin with, so this concentration of aid inadvertently increased inequality amongst provinces and between groups. National programs delivered through the Government, such as NSP [National Solidarity Program], have benefitted Afghans more equitably.

The worst impact of transition will be on the fiscal situation with a projected financing gap of 25% of GDP by 2021/22. Even assuming ambitious targets for robust growth in domestic revenue are met (with a projected rise from 10% of GDP to more than 17% of GDP a decade from now), there will be an unmanageable fiscal gap. This gap arises primarily as a result of operations and maintenance (O&M) spending and the wage bill for security that together will be 17.5% of GDP by 2021. The civilian wage bill will increase to 9%, the non-security operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditure to 4%, other operating spending to 2.5%, and the core development budget to 10% of GDP.

UN Human Development Indicator Ranking
(175th in the World in 2013)

Trends 1980 - Present

- Health
  Life expectancy at birth (years)
  49.1

- Education
  Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years)
  3.1

- Income
  GNI per capita in PPP terms (constant 2005 international $) (Constant 2005 international $)
  1,000
  Inequality-adjusted HDI value

UN Human Development Progress by Category: 1980-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita (2005 PPP$)</th>
<th>HDI value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,002</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,271</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.948</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>0.241</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.236</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.371</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Afghan Perceptions of Key Challenges

Percentage of adult population considering selected issues to be the most important for their country, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

Since 2009 Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing the level of corruption in the public sector.

While 59 per cent of the adult population had to pay at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, 50 per cent had to do so in 2012, and whereas 52 per cent of the population paid a bribe to a police officer in 2009, 42 per cent did so in 2012.

However, worrying trends have also emerged in the past three years: the frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 per cent increase in real terms.

Education has emerged as one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption, with the percentage of those paying a bribe to a teacher jumping from 16 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2012.

In general, there has been no major change in the level of corruption observed in the judiciary, customs service and local authorities, which remained high in 2012, as in 2009.
UN Human Development Progress Lags by Comparison With Other Poor States: 1980-2012

The Challenge of Demographics and Constant Population Pressure on Governance, the Economy, and Security
Afghanistan’s Uncertain Demographic Pressure

**Population Estimates in Millions**

- Afghan CSO: 27.0 (2013)
- Census Bureau: 31.823 (2014)
- CIA: 32.6 (mid 2014)
- World Bank: 29.82 (2012)
- IMF: 32.28 (2014)
- Countrymeters: 34.92 (2014)

**Life Expectancy in Years**

- World Bank = 64
- UN WFP = 44 to 44.5
- CIA = 50.49
- WHO = 59.60
- Wikipedia = 48.68 (2011)
- UNICEF = 60.5 (2011)

Sources: [http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php](http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php) and [http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm](http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm)
CIA Estimate of Afghanistan’s Divisive Demographics

- Total population: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)
  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- Population 0-14 years: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)
- Urban population: 23.5% of total population (2011)
- Rate of urbanization: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)
- Young men and women reaching employment age annually: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008
- Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?
- Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?

The Challenge of Governance and Corruption
The third section of this report focuses on the critical challenges in governance that will follow even the most successful outcome of the election in producing a clear result, popular acceptance, and support by Afghanistan’s key power brokers and factions.

The post election period will be a race to establish a new pattern of effective governance, and deal with critical challenges in governance at every level, planning, budget execution, and dealing with the economy in addition to security.

US reporting on progress in governance and the economy has never had real credibility. As the previous budget summary shows, there is no evidence of a credible US government economic risk assessment, aid plan, effort to advance the reform goals set at the Tokyo governance, or deal with the problems of a system where the president controls most appointments and funds down to the District level.

Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt and incompetent governments in the world.
It must now adjust to radical cuts in the outside spending that supported its budget and the market and urban sector portions of its economy.
– problems disguised by a lack of meaningful current reporting, and dishonest modeling that ignore the impact of corruption, real-world narcotics economics, and capital flight.
Revenues may be partially protected by the carry over in aid funds, but past projections seem exaggerated, to ignore corruption and waste, sometimes be based on unrealistic forecasts of development.
The ability of government’s to spend money has never been a measure of effectiveness in showing what that spending accomplishes, but Afghanistan lags badly even in the ability to spend at a time many NGOs are leaving, PRTs will be gone, and it is supposed to manage a far larger share of aid funds.
Again, a Long List of Key Uncertainties

• When will a new President take office?
• Can the new President win popular support... and lead?
• How long will it take to form a functional government at all levels – national, provincial, district?
• How will the mix of power brokers change?
• What security challenges will emerge and when? How will the MoD and MoI function and respond?
• Who will take charge of budgeting, economic planning, and use of international aid?
• What will be mix of corruption versus relative honesty?
• What will be the mix of capabilities – e.g., war-fighting versus security? How will Afghan leaders reshape the rule of law?
• How will layered defense actually interact with governance?
• Accommodation? Search for peace?
• Role of neighboring powers?
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators: Approaching the World’s Worst

Voice and Accountability

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism

Government Effectiveness

Regulatory Quality

Rule of Law

Control of Corruption

The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.
World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Government Effectiveness

Voice and Accountability
The data is for 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (Daykundi, Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Khowst, Logar, Wardak, Nimroz, Nuristan, Uruzgan, Paktiya, Paktika, and Zabul). Kabul was not included because several of the cells show zero for number of employed civil servants. The amounts for the Independent Directorate of Local Governance include personnel who work for provincial municipalities.

DOD’s latest district assessment report, completed in February 2014, found that …of the 47 districts where the Coalition provided oversight and support to VSO, 53% had “adequate” or “effective” governance. The remaining 47% had “poor” or “ineffective” governance. All districts in the report showed the same status for governance over the past year, except for one that improved from “adequate” to “effective.”… At the same time, DOD noted that it found much of the quarterly VSO survey data to be untrustworthy because of fraudulent or fabricated data.
Budget Execution Has Been a Major Problem

- Operating expenditures:
  - Increased during the first six months of 2013, as more spending moved on-budget. Yet execution rates remain low, particularly for the development budget.
  - Increased to Afs 82.1 billion in the first six months in 2013, compared to Afs 75.4 billion over the same period in 2012.
  - Development expenditures declined to Afs 23.7 billion in the first half of 2013, compared to Afs 27 billion in the first half of 2012.
  - Low budget execution continues to be a problem in Afghanistan, particularly affecting development expenditures in 2013.
  - Budget execution was only 36.4% of the operating budget and 17% of the development budget in the first half of 2013, compared to 50% and 24%, respectively, in the first half of 2012.
  - Among ministries with development budgets of more than $50 million, only three (ministries of health, finance, and rural development) have executed more than 20% through the first half of 2013.

Revenues Went Down in 2013

Total revenue collected in each month in 2013 was less than collections in the same month of 2012.

**World Bank Estimate of Growing Financing Gap**

**Core Government Expenditures as % of GDP**

- Economic Governance & PSD: 2.2%
- Social Protection: 3.5%
- Agriculture & Rural Development: 3.3%
- Health: 2.8%
- Education: 10.4%
- Infrastructure & Natural Resources: 2.2%
- Governance: 11.5%
- Security: 3.6%

**Financing Gap in domestic Revenues as % of GDP**

Transition Financing Critically Dependent on No Increase in Security Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013Bgt*</th>
<th>2013Act</th>
<th>2014Bgt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent budget</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>3,575</td>
<td>5,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary development</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-discretionary development</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>1,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total core budget</strong></td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>5,025</td>
<td>7,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic revenues</td>
<td>2,488</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign grants</td>
<td>4,022</td>
<td>3,307</td>
<td>4,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External loans/credits</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total financing</strong></td>
<td>6,656</td>
<td>5,307</td>
<td>7,277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2013Bgt figures are initial budgeted figures.*

...domestic revenues declined to 9.6% of GDP in 2013, one of the lowest in the world. Afghanistan’s commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework call for it to increase revenues to 15% of GDP by 2016 and to 19% by 2025.

The Bank warned that the current decline in revenue poses risks to long-term sustainability and to achieving Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework targets, upon which donor assistance is predicated.
The Challenge of Corruption

- 175th most corrupt country out of 177 ranked by Transparency International. Budget openness is minimal.
- Bad rating on World Bank’s “Control of corruption index” bad. Improvement is driven by aid donors.

Who Takes Bribes: The ANA Got Worse

Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them.

But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official.

According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens.

While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years.

Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army.
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively, and there were reports that officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. There were some reports of low-profile corruption cases successfully tried at the provincial level. The government made several commitments to combat corruption, including President Karzai's 2012 decree, but little progress had been made towards implementation at year’s end. At the beginning of the year, the Attorney General's Office created a monitoring department, as required by the decree, and it began accepting referred cases. There was no progress on the cases reported as of year’s end.

On June 30, a new law organizing the judiciary weakened the Control and Monitoring Department of the Supreme Court. The department had been considered effective in dealing with corruption within the judiciary in the districts and provinces. The new law eliminated the department’s authority to conduct investigations, make arrests, and prosecute violators as well as some of its key positions.

Reports indicated corruption was endemic throughout society, and flows of money from the military, international donors, and the drug trade continued to exacerbate the problem. Reports indicated that many Afghans believed the government had not been effective in combating corruption. Corruption and uneven governance continued to play a significant role in allowing the Taliban to maintain its foothold in the east-central part of the country (the five provinces surrounding Kabul) and maintain influence in some parts of the southern provinces.

Prisoners and local NGOs reported that corruption was widespread across the justice system, particularly in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases and “buying” release from prison. There were also reports of money being paid to reduce prison sentences, halt an investigation, or have charges dismissed outright. The practice of criminalizing civil complaints was commonly used to settle business disputes or extort money from wealthy international investors.

During the year reports indicated a rise in incidents of “land grabbing” by both private and public actors. The most common type occurred when businesses illegally obtained property deeds from corrupt officials and sold the deeds to unsuspecting “homeowners,” who would then get caught in criminal prosecutions. Other reports indicated that government officials grabbed land without compensation in order to swap the land for contracts or political favors. Occasionally, provincial governments illegally confiscated land without due process or compensation to build public facilities.
State Department Reports Growing Afghan Government Corruption in 2013 – II

There were reports that the Attorney General’s Office was unwilling or unable to pursue corrupt officials and that high-level officials who were arrested on corruption-related charges were released subsequent to political pressure. In addition there was anecdotal evidence that accusations of corruption on the part of others were used by corrupt officials to damage their opponents’ reputations or to deflect attention from their own misdeeds. There were also reports that the Attorney General’s Office compelled international contractors to settle claims made by Afghan subcontractors, regardless of the merits of the commercial disputes involved, and detained foreign employees of the contractors as leverage in the disputes (see section 1.d.).

Provincial police benefited financially from corruption at police checkpoints and from the narcotics industry. It was reported that ANP officers paid higher-level Ministry of Interior officials for their positions and to secure promotions. The justice system rarely pursued corruption cases, especially if they involved police, although authorities arrested and detained a provincial chief of police on drug trafficking charges. During the year the minister of interior also removed more than 40 police officers on charges of corruption, poor performance, and abuse of power, reportedly following a 10-month investigation.

In addition to official impunity issues, low salaries exacerbated government corruption. The international community worked with the national and provincial governance structures to address the problem of low salaries, but implementation of grade reform remained slow.

Credible sources reported that local police in many areas extorted a “tax” and inflicted violence at police checkpoints for nonpayment. Truck drivers complained that they had to pay bribes to security forces, insurgents, and bandits to allow their trucks to pass.

Police also reportedly extorted bribes from civilians in exchange for release from prison or to avoid arrest. Citizens also paid bribes to corrections and detention officials for the release of prisoners who had not been discharged at the end of their sentences.

- See more at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper

Since 2003, levels of distrust and corruption have increased to the point where corruption is endemic across Afghanistan. In a survey of the population that was reported in October 2013, 80 percent of Afghans described corruption as a major problem, with 73 percent reporting that corruption was “a part of daily life” and 65 percent saying it was worse than the year before. Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of those polled felt GIRoA, as a whole, was corrupt to some degree. When asked why, the most common reasons cited were that GIRoA was a generally weak government and officials took bribes.

In the same poll, Afghans were questioned about various governance bodies and whether they abused their authority and power. More than half of respondents felt that every level of government and every office abused its power. Notably, President Karzai, who was viewed as corrupt by “only” 38 percent of respondents, experienced a rise in the number of people who felt he abused his authority, to the highest level since an August 2011 poll.
The Challenge of Demographics
The fourth section of this report warns just how serious ethnic, regional, and sectarian divisions are among the population and shows how critical sheer population pressure is in terms of total population, pressure on the land and water, urbanization and demand for jobs.

- Population estimates are very uncertain and many of the statistics commonly used have no reliable source or level of accuracy.
- The UN and US Census Bureau agree, however, that Afghanistan is under extreme population pressure for a very poor country with limited arable land and water and uncertain rainfall. (p. 46) 7.5-8.2 million in 1950 to 13.2 to 15.0 million at time of Soviet invasion to 27+ to 32+ million in 2014.
- Ethnic and sectarian differences are a problem, compounded by competition between power brokers and officials.
- An extremely young population creates a high dependency ratio and will put major pressure on the land, water, and job creation for at least a decade.
- Population pressure, water, and economic incentives have led to a sharp rise in urbanization, much uncounted or underestimated, and in the form of slums, poverty, and subsistence.
- The rate of young men reaching job age alone seems to exceed creation of real jobs.
- Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?
- Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP? After Transition and coming cuts in aid and military spending?
Afghanistan’s Demographic Pressure

Population Estimates in Millions

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- Census Bureau: 31.823 (2014)
- CIA: 32.6 (mid 2014)
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  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%

- **Population 0-14 years**: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)

- **Urban population**: 23.5% of total population (2011)

- **Rate of urbanization**: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

- **Young men and women reaching employment age annually**: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008

- **Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP**?

- **Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP**?

The Challenge of Economic Stability and Development
Economic Challenges

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent.

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.

• No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank

• Service sector may leave, export capital, collapse.

• Major barriers to private development

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.

The Challenge of Economic Stability and Development
The final section highlights the potential seriousness of economic risk.

- There are at least nine major challenges that are not war related.
- Past reporting on GDP growth has been dishonest in that it took figures shaped by the agriculture sector, and gains determined by peak rainfall, and implied these were the result of development and aid.
- Transition and cuts in military and aid spending may have a critical impact on both the service and industries sector during transition. The lack of a comparable estimate of the impact of the narcotics sector is analytically absurd.
- In spite of these problems, there seems to have been real progress in human development in spite of gross exaggeration of improvement in medical services, and in students actually in school versus expected years of schooling.
- This still, however, has left Afghanistan far behind other poor Asian state like Bangladesh and Nepal.
- Transition will make the major barriers to doing business in Afghanistan – which ranks only 164th out of 189 countries – far more serious.
- There are no credible estimates of just how dependent Afghanistan has been on outside military spending and aid, but the World Bank and CIA warn that Afghan imports were 17 time exports in 2012.
Economic Challenges

• Massive current dependence on outside war spending and aid

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent.

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.

• No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank

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• Major barriers to private development

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.

A Budget and Economy Driven by Aid, Military Spending, and Narcotics

Outside Aid Spending Drives GDP After 2003/2004

Only 10% of Afghan Budget is Self-Funded

- 64% is US aid
- 26% is from other donors
- 10% is Afghan funded

Real GDP growth (excluding opium production) was 14.4% in 2012, which represented a sharp uptick from 6.1% in 2011.

This strong performance was in large part due to an exceptional agricultural harvest supported by favorable weather conditions.

Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of GDP (excluding opium). As a result, economic growth is influenced heavily by the volatile agricultural sector.
Status in 2013

- $GDP = $20.5 billion
- Population = 29.82 million
- GDI per capita = $680
- Poverty % of Population = 36%
- Life expectancy = 61 years
- Improved water = 61%

Country: Afghanistan
Created from: Global Economic Prospects
Created on: 05/05/2014
World Bank Estimate of Comparison with Rest of South Asia

Annual GDP Growth (%)

The national poverty rate in Afghanistan was around 36 percent in 2011-12, the same level measured in 2007-08…

Furthermore, the results showed that inequality edged up. In particular, the Gini coefficient increased to 31.6 in 2011-12 from 29.7 in 2007-08, while the growth rate of per capita expenditure of the richest 20 percent of the population was three times as high as that of the poorest 20 percent…

…In addition, the bottom forty percent of the population commands only 21 percent of total consumption and more than 50 percent of the population is still vulnerable to becoming poor.

A number of factors could be contributing to the measured trends. First, the volatility of agricultural production would affect measured poverty trends since agriculture accounts for more than half of employment. It is worth noting that 2010 and 2011, the two years preceding the 2011-12 survey, both featured negative growth in the agricultural sector. Second, pervasive underemployment likely affects the poverty impact of growth. Afghanistan faces a daunting demographic challenge, with around 400,000 new entrants into the labor force expected in the next few years.

…Finally, the high dependency ratio, low levels of female labor force participation, and low labor productivity all contribute to shaping Afghanistan’s poverty profile. High economic dependency due to demographic pressure is further aggravated by extremely low levels of female labor force participation (19 percent) and the overwhelming prevalence of vulnerable forms of employment in informal and low productivity jobs (81 percent).
Challenge of Post Transition Trade Balance

World Bank Trend Graph
CIA reports $6.39 billion in imports in 2012 versus $376 million in exports (17:1)

Pakistan 32.2%, India 27%, Tajikistan 8.5%, US 6.2% (2012)

World Bank Estimate of Major Barriers to Doing Business and Private Development (164th Out of 189 Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCOME CATEGORY</td>
<td>Low income</td>
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<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>29,824,536</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI PER CAPITA (USD)</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY COVERED</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DOING BUSINESS 2014 RANK
- **Starting a Business**: 24
- **Dealing with Construction Permits**: 167
- **Getting Electricity**: 104
- **Registering Property**: 175
- **Getting Credit**: 130
- **Protecting Investors**: 189
- **Paying Taxes**: 98
- **Trading Across Borders**: 184
- **Enforcing Contracts**: 168
- **Resolving Insolvency**: 115

### DOING BUSINESS 2013 RANK
- **Starting a Business**: 31
- **Dealing with Construction Permits**: 170
- **Getting Electricity**: 111
- **Registering Property**: 176
- **Getting Credit**: 154
- **Protecting Investors**: 189
- **Paying Taxes**: 95
- **Trading Across Borders**: 181
- **Enforcing Contracts**: 170
- **Resolving Insolvency**: 118

### CHANGE IN RANK
- **Starting a Business**: +7
- **Dealing with Construction Permits**: +3
- **Getting Electricity**: +7
- **Registering Property**: +1
- **Getting Credit**: +24
- **Protecting Investors**: No change
- **Paying Taxes**: -3
- **Trading Across Borders**: -3
- **Enforcing Contracts**: +2
- **Resolving Insolvency**: +3

Both opium production and area under poppy cultivation increased considerably in 2013, although this is not reflected in estimated non-opium GDP growth figures for 2013. According to UNODC data, opium production increased by almost 50 percent to 5,500 tons in 2013, while the total area under poppy cultivation expanded by 36 percent to 209,000 hectares (Figure 5). Opium production in 2013 appears to have recovered from the decline in 2012 triggered by adverse weather and disease. While the total value of opium production at farm-gate prices remained at about 4 percent of GDP (or $950 million) in 2013 due to a decline in the farm-gate price, the Export value of opiates (including drugs) increased from 11 percent of GDP in 2012 to 15 percent of GDP – or $3.1 billion – in 2013.

The UNODC estimates that the net value of the domestic market for opiates is far smaller, worth approximately 1 percent of GDP or $200 million, compared to the net export value of opiates which is around $2.9 billion. Despite substantial financial flows from opium production, analysis suggests that the contribution of opium to economic growth in the past ten years has been minimal, although it is likely to be an important source of livelihood for a segment of the rural population.
### UDOC Estimate of Rising Afghan Opium Production

2012 vs. 2012-2013 – Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Change from 2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net opium poppy cultivation (after eradication) in hectares (ha)</td>
<td>154,000 ha (125,000–189,000)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>209,000 ha (173,000–238,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of poppy free provinces</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of provinces affected by poppy cultivation</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eradication</td>
<td>9,672</td>
<td>-24%</td>
<td>7,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average opium yield (weighted by cultivation)</td>
<td>23.7 kg/ha</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26.3 kg/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential production of opium</td>
<td>3,700 (2,800 – 4,200 tons)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5,500 (4,500 – 6,500 tons)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 1: Opium cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994-2013 (Hectares)

Source: UNODC (1994-2002), MCN/UNODC (since 2003). The high-low lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval.

### UDOC Estimate of Rising Afghan Opium Production 2012 vs. 2012-2013 – Part II
(Production in Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Production 2012</th>
<th>Production 2013</th>
<th>Change 2012-2013 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>251%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>290%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-eastern</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>252%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>2,520</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (rounded)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,700</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>49%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>