Shaping the Uncertain Future of the ANSF

Anthony H. Cordesman
Introduction

Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan’s other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond.

The five other key challenges include:

- Going from an election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity.
- Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution.
- Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business.
- Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan’s border.
- Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot succeed unless the ANSF meets the wide range of security challenges summarized in Page 7, and which are the subject of this briefing. Many of these challenges are ones that all governments face in shaping an effective security response to major extremist and insurgent threats. Others are unique to Afghanistan.

It should be clear from this list and the briefing that follows that the ANSF faces problems that make a successful Transition a high risk effort even if the ANSF is the only factor considered in supporting an effective Transition. This risk is highlighted in much of the data that follow, and in virtually all of the narratives describing the current state of the ANSF.

At the same time, the briefing shows that there are positive as well as negative trends. The ANSF may be able to succeed if it receive suitable outside support, and particularly if it has a substantial advisory and enable presence from the US, if other key ISAF states like Germany and Italy provide a presence in in key areas, and if the donors provide the funds necessary for the ANSF to develop, operate, and mature.
The Afghan Government Can Be as Serious a “Threat” as the Insurgents: The *Other* Challenges of Transition

- Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government
- Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
- Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption
- Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and “layered defense”
- Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations’ personnel
- Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste
- Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight
- Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco-economy
- Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia
A Long List of Key Uncertainties

• When will a new President take office?
• Can the new President win popular support… and lead?
• How long will it take to form a functional government at all levels – national, provincial, district?
• How will the mix of power brokers change?
• What security challenges will emerge and when? How will the MoD and MoI function and respond?
• Who will take charge of budgeting, economic planning, and use of international aid?
• What will be mix of corruption versus relative honesty?
• What will be the mix of capabilities – e.g., war-fighting versus security? How will Afghan leaders reshape the rule of law?
• How will layered defense actually interact with governance?
• Accommodation? Search for peace?
• Role of neighboring powers?
World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Government Effectiveness

Voice and Accountability
Key Military Challenges

• Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
• Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
• Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD
• Evolution of effective overall command structure.
• Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
• Redefining force structure and force plans.
• Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R
• Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law
• Promotion, enlistment, pay, medical, food, housing, security, retirement
• Leave and recovery. AWOL and attrition.
• National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
• Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
• Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”
The Challenge of Money and Corruption
Money and Corruption

Afghanistan faces major problems in avoiding a major recession and economic crisis in the course of Transition. In spite of optimistic and sometimes grossly exaggerated expectations and claims by some Afghan officials and outside NGOs and aid donors, Afghanistan has not made serious progress towards economic development, has a market economy dependent on military spending and outside flow of aid, cannot finance its budget, and has no near to mid-term prospects of major increases in revenues through panaceas like mining and the “New Silk Road.”

Page 12 shows that its overall economic growth and critical agricultural sector have been shaped far more by an unstable level of annual rainfall in recent years than by any pattern of aid or market-driven economic growth. Page 13 provides a rough indication of just how important Page 14 warns that its critical market-oriented service sector could be crippled by the cuts in military spending and aid that have sustained its growth since the early 2000s.

Pages 15-18 show the the Afghan government already faces major problems in funding its entire budget, not just the ANSF.

The critical Service sector of its economy faces massive problems in adjusting to cuts in outside spending. According to an article in the Washington Post, its government revenues fall far short of previous expectations and its budget needs, and are projected

Worse, **Page 19** shows that international organizations like the World Bank, NGOs like Transparency International, and US government organization like SIGARs and the US Department of Defense 1230 report have found many past military and civil aid efforts to have had little or no overall impact, involve massive waste and corruption, and reflect a serious inability to plan and execute both effective security and civil budgets.

At the same time, **Pages 20-23** show that aid spending – most of which went to the ANSF, has been erratic, poorly managed, lack basic fiscal controls, involved high levels of dependence on contractors which have sometime been corrupt, and lack meaningful measures of effectiveness. This is particularly true of the US which have never developed meaningful effectiveness measures for either civil or security aid, which had no clear budget plans for funding aid in the future, and where the US congress cut a $2.1 billion aid request for financial assistance nearly in half for this year.
Afghanistan desperately needs to reduce corruption, create a more effective systems for planning, managing, and executing its budget, and real world economic and aid plans focused on its overall needs and real priorities.

Donors need to understand, however, that Afghanistan will remain grossly corrupt, inefficient, and lacking in keys of competence through at least 2016. **THE REALITY IS THAT IT WILL TAKE MONEY TO COMPENSATE DURING THE MOST CRITICAL YEARS OF TRANSITION.**

This is particularly true of the security sector. Afghanistan cannot manage to both fight an ongoing war and continue to develop its capabilities unless donors accept the reality that its efforts will not be efficient and that power brokering and corruption will continue at some level indefinitely into the future. They must be prepare for this reality and accept the fact that money will be the real world answer to many of the problems in Afghan security and the ANSF in the near term. A fantasy based on unrealistic standards will defeat the Afghan government more effectively than the Taliban.
Economic Challenges

• “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.

• Still at war and highly aid dependent.

• Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.

• No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.

• The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.

• Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank

• Service sector may leave, export capital, collapse.

• Major barriers to private development

• At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.

Challenge of Economic Impact of Transition: 12% to 3-4%

- Poverty level = 37%
- GNI per Capita = $680
- Life expectancy = 50.5 years

The Trade Balance: A Rough Indication of Challenge of Post Transition Funding

World Bank Trend Graph
CIA reports $6.39 billion in imports in 2012 versus $376 million in exports (17:1)

Pakistan 32.2%, India 27%, Tajikistan 8.5%, US 6.2% (2012)

Rainfall and Outside Spending, Not Aid or Development, Drive GDP Growth

- Uncertainty surrounding the political and security transition in Afghanistan has led to a slowdown in economic growth in 2013, despite strong growth in 2012.

- Real GDP growth (excluding opium production) was 14.4% in 2012, which represented a sharp uptick from 6.1% in 2011.

- This strong performance was in large part due to an exceptional agricultural harvest supported by favorable weather conditions.

- Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of GDP (excluding opium). As a result, economic growth is influenced heavily by the volatile agricultural sector.

Budget Execution Has Been a Major Problem

- Budget execution was only 36.4% of the operating budget and 17% of the development budget in the first half of 2013, compared to 50% and 24%, respectively, in the first half of 2012.

- Among ministries with development budgets of more than $50 million, only three (ministries of health, finance, and rural development) have executed more than 20% through the first half of 2013.

- Operating expenditures:
  - Increased during the first six months of 2013, as more spending moved on-budget. Yet execution rates remain low, particularly for the development budget.
  - Increased to Afs 82.1 billion in the first six months in 2013, compared to Afs 75.4 billion over the same period in 2012.
  - Development expenditures declined to Afs 23.7 billion in the first half of 2013, compared to Afs 27 billion in the first half of 2012.
  - Low budget execution continues to be a problem in Afghanistan, particularly affecting development expenditures in 2013.

Source: World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2013, pp. 9-10
An Economy Driven by Aid, Military Spending, and Narcotics

Outside Aid Spending Drives GDP After 2003/2004

Only 10% of Afghan Budget is Self-Funded

- 64% is US aid
- 26% is from other donors
- 10% is Afghan funded

Revenues Went Down in 2013

Total revenue collected in each month in 2013 was less than collections in the same month of 2012.

Source: World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2013, pp. 8-9
Revenue-Military Spending Mismatch

Total revenue collected in 2013 = $2.62 billion
Total military spending = $2.9 billion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Afghan Afghani Afs</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Afs</td>
<td>1.01tr</td>
<td>1.1tr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>19.9bn</td>
<td>21bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt *</td>
<td>Afs</td>
<td>106bn</td>
<td>152bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>2.08bn</td>
<td>2.9bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US$1=Afs

50.92

52.57

The Challenge of Corruption

- 175th most corrupt country out of 177 ranked by Transparency International. Budget openness is minimal.
- Bad rating on World Bank’s “Control of corruption index” bad. Improvement is driven by aid donors.


Cumulative Appropriations by Funding Category, as of January 17, 2014 ($ Billions)


Ongoing Cuts in US Aid to ANSF – No Clear Plan for FY2015 and Beyond

• The 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 appropriated nearly $4.73 billion for the ASFF for FY 2014, increasing total cumulative funding to more than $57.50 billion.

• As of December 31, 2013, more than $47.88 billion of total ASFF funding had been obligated, of which nearly $45.38 billion had been disbursed.

No US DoD Plan and Hollow Placeholder OCO Budget

$75B in FY2015 to $30B in FY2016

Focus Only On Base Budget For Remainder Of Briefing
No FY 2015 OCO Budget Yet

The Warfighting Challenge of Transition
Warfighting Challenges

Afghanistan is still very much a nation at war, and the Taliban and other insurgent have not been defeated.

**Pages 28-31** show that ISAF has not provide any convincing metrics showing that the surge in Afghanistan has had any of the success of the fighting in Iraq, and it has virtually stopped reporting on the progress in the war.

ISAF and the US government also have has never provide maps or other useful metrics that show area of Taliban political control or influence, or matching maps of the areas and district where the government lack effective governance and security activity. They gave focused on tactical encounters and never publically addressed the political-military realities of an insurgency and COIN campaign.

**Pages 32-33** show that Transition plans to date have been phased to reduced the strain on the ANSF, but every meaningful source -- including NATO/ISAF -- agree that the ANSF will face a major warfighting challenge during Transition, that the Afghan government major lose control of territory in the process, and that it could face serious defeats without major outside aid through at least 2016 and probably well beyond.
Key Warfighting Challenges

• Acceptance that as long as Taliban and others have sanctuary in Pakistan, war will last as long as it lasts.

• End focus on tactical clashes, focus on political-military control and protection of key populated areas and LoCs.

• Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
  • Tests of 2015 campaign season: “Coming out of the sanctuary closet.”
  • Threat ability to choose time and place, intensity and persistence of operations.
  • New forms of high profile attacks, political-military structures at urban and district level, focus on ANSF, officials, advisors, and NGOs.
  • LOC and commercial threats.
  • New role of narcotics, power brokers, corruption in poorer economy

• Ensuring popular support of government and ANSF is critical. Deal with Security vs. hearts and minds dilemmas on Afghan terms.
  • Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers” to win popular support.
Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq

Enemy-Initiated Attacks Recovered Before ISAF Ceased to Report

Uncertain Improvement Year-to-Year from April 1 to September 15 in 2012 vs. 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>EIAs</th>
<th>HPA</th>
<th>Direct Fire</th>
<th>IED Events</th>
<th>IED/Mine Explosions</th>
<th>Complex/Coordinated Attack</th>
<th>IDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% YoY Change</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EIAs have decreased by six percent from April 1 through September 15, 2013, as compared to the same period last year. The majority of attacks were comprised of direct fire attacks and IED attacks. Additionally, insurgents continue to conduct high profile and complex attacks against influential individuals, population centers, and remote outposts. The insurgency conducted 10 HPAs in Kabul this reporting period and assassinated a number of influential GIRoA officials. While the resulting media coverage has promoted local and international perceptions of insecurity, such attacks have not generated operational or strategic momentum for the insurgency.

Violence remains highly concentrated. From April 1 through September 15, 2013, 80 percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where only 24 percent of the population lives. As seen in Figure 3, the 10 most violent districts account for 3.1 percent of the population, but over 30 percent of the violence nationwide.

Ten Most Violent Districts 1/4/13 to 9/15/13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Districts in EIA</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>% of National EIA in Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nahr-e Saraj</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sangin</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nad’ Ali</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Musa Qal‘ah</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Panjwa‘i</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sayyidahab</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Now Zad</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maiwand</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pul‘e ‘Alam</td>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Darah-y Pech</td>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013
Total: 3.1% 31%

“But, This was irrelevant”

- Long war
- War for control of space and population, not tactical outcomes
- Taliban can pick and choose area and method of attack. Strike weakest link.
- Win if dominate people and/or allies and NGOs leave.
- Value of Pakistani sanctuary/ISI support
- Morale, public support, leadership critical.
- Peace negotiations can be war by other means

Transitioning Out: Who Had What Areas. Racing to the Exits in Real World Terms

Transitioning: ANSF vs. ISAF – August 1, 2013 – and Still No Agreed Plans for Future US, German, and Italian role

The slide does not count personnel deployed to Afghan ministries, military headquarters, training centers and airbases.

Note: This slide shows the approximate number of Afghan Army and ISAF troops in the field. They should be taken as indicative as they change frequently.

The Challenge in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF
Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in Page 37.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that Pages 38 and 39 show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in Pages 40-43.
The ANSF’s growing casualties, however, are not a measure of military merit. (Page 41).

The data on the ANA and ANP led operations also do not explain what kind of operations are involved, or indicate that most forces are aggressive, actively patrol, and can conduct serious offensives against insurgents. (Page 44.)

There are, however, some polling data that show Afghan forces are winning increase support and confidence from the Afghan people. (Page 45.)
Key Force-wide Challenges

• Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
• Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
• New Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD to District level.
• Evolution of effective overall command structure.
• Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
• Redefining force structure and force plans.
• Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R, ensuring force cohesion and responsiveness
• Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law
• Promotion, enlistment
• Leave and recovery. AWOL and attrition.
• National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
• Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
• Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”
Only Half of ANSF is a Fighting Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Element</th>
<th>Manpower Goal End 2012</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>172,055</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>7,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>14,451?</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>110,279</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>23,090</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>157,000</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>2,986?</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP-Militias</td>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>11,000-23000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. subject matter experts.
Regular Forces Pose Manpower Challenges for Transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSF Component</th>
<th>Current Target</th>
<th>Status as of 12/2013</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>187,000 personnel by 12/2012</td>
<td>178,816</td>
<td>-8,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>157,000 personnel by 2/2013</td>
<td>149,466</td>
<td>-7,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>8,000 personnel by 12/2014</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>-1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Total</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>334,852</td>
<td>-17,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core Force Structure Very Light, Few Enablers

Afghan National Army (ANA) 179,000
5 regional comd.

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**SPECIAL FORCES**
1 spec ops div (1 SF gp; 2 cdo bde (total: 5 cdo bn))

**MANOEUVRE**

**Mechanised**
2 mech bde HQ
5 mech inf bn (2 more forming)

**Light**
1 (201st) corps (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bde, 1 mech bde, 1 EOD coy)
3 (207th, 209th & 215th) corps (1 cdo bn, 3 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)
2 (203rd & 205th) corps (1 cdo bn, 4 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)
1 (111st Capital) div (2 inf bde)

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
1 int bn
1 sigs bn

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**APC** 673
**APC (T) 173 M113A2†
**APC(W) ε500 MSFV (inc variants)**

**ARTY** 214
**TOWED** 109: 122mm 85 D-30†; 155mm 24 M114A1†
**MOR** 82mm 105 M-69†
**MSL • SSM** SS-1 Scud†
**MW** Bozena

Afghan Air Force (AAF) 6,800

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
**TPT** 37: Medium 2 C-130H Hercules; Light 35: 6 Cessna 182; 26 Cessna 208B; 3 PC-12
**TRG** 2 L-39 Albatros†

**HELICOPTERS**
**ATK** 11 Mi-35
**MRH** 46+: 6 MD-530F; 40+ Mi-17

**Paramilitary** 152,350

Afghan National Police 152,350
Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes 85,000 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 15,000 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 23,000 Afghan Border Police (ABP), Police Special Forces (GDPSU) and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Has Shifted to the ANSF
(But High Casualties are not a Measure of Merit)

ANSF and ISAF killed in action, January 2010 – March 2013

Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) involving ISAF and EIAs involving the ANSF, March 2011 – March 2013

ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.
Shift in Roles in Security Incidents

ISAF’s primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.

## Shifting Overall Pattern of Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Apr-13</th>
<th>May-13</th>
<th>Jun-13</th>
<th>Jul-13</th>
<th>Aug-13</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Unilateral Military Ops</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Unilateral Police Ops</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,192</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Unilateral</td>
<td>13,492</td>
<td>23,601</td>
<td>16,798</td>
<td>13,059</td>
<td>23,432</td>
<td>28,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Unilateral</td>
<td>16,391</td>
<td>25,025</td>
<td>22,275</td>
<td>18,440</td>
<td>25,565</td>
<td>20,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</strong></td>
<td>29,883</td>
<td>48,626</td>
<td>39,073</td>
<td>31,499</td>
<td>48,997</td>
<td>48,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Combined (ANA)</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Led Combined (ANP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>394</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Combined</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Led Enabled</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Led Combined</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Led Enabled</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>427</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</strong></td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Ops</strong></td>
<td>34,055</td>
<td>52,551</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>35,126</td>
<td>51,255</td>
<td>50,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ISAF Led Ops</strong></td>
<td>2,739</td>
<td>2,692</td>
<td>2,886</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>1,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ANSF Led Ops</strong></td>
<td>31,316</td>
<td>49,859</td>
<td>40,343</td>
<td>32,702</td>
<td>49,775</td>
<td>49,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perceptions of ANSF Are Improving on a National Average Level

Q: DOES THE NATIONAL ARMY NEED THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN FORCES OR IS IT CAPABLE OF OPERATING ON ITS OWN?
A: Capable as it is / Capable, but needs resources

Sep 2008

Mar 2013

Q: HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE THE POLICE IN YOUR MANTAQA?
A: Every day / Once a week

Sep 2008

Mar 2013

Note: “Mantaqa” is Pashto for “local area”.

The Challenge of Transitioning with No Approved Plan

Layered Defense and “Four Corner” Support?
Transitioning Without An Approved Plan

The ANSF has no approved Transition plan and the US have not made any public decisions about the level of future manning and support that it will provide. The US has generated countless possible options from a “zero option” to some 13,500 military and other personnel, but has never described their cost, a clear aid plan, what the personnel would do, and what future role it would play in COIN or enabling.

The President and NSC have failed to provide any meaningful leadership and the Afghan government is incapable of such planning and cannot execute a plan without knowing the level of aid it will receive. No one follows where no one leads, so little is left that time itself is reaching the crisis point, and the failure of clear US leadership may ultimately provide to be as much of a threat as the insurgency.

ISAF has, however, developed a concept of layered defense that would tie together all of the elements of the ANSF to protect key populated areas and key lines of communication (LOCs). The basic data involved are uncertain, but are shown in broad terms in Pages 48 to 52, along with the ISAF commander’s assessment of the key challenges involved, and the minimal level of advisory support that would be needed.

The is no public indication of how forces would be layered and deployed for such operations, or of the areas the ANSF might have to give up to execute such a plan.
There are maps that provide a rough illustration of the nature and scale of the challenges involved. These maps are shown in Pages 52 to 59.

Nominal annual costs for the entire ANSF have been provided in the past by ISAF, NTM-A and other sources that range from $3.6 billion to $4.1 billion to over $7 billion, but there is no public evidence of serious planning and cost analysis to justify any figure, no detailed ISAF or NTM-A plan, no ANSF plan, and no US military aid plan.
The Need to Deal with an Ongoing War

• Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.

• No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.

• Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.

• US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.

• ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.

• Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.

• Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below $4 billion annually uncertain. May need $6-7 billion.
“Layered Defense:” A Concept that May Work with Adequate US and Allied support

- Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defense population and key lines of communication.
- ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.
- Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,
- Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.
- Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.
- German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.
- Support with governance and economic aid.
In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.

This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.

In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.

Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.

Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.
ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that will build the ANSF’s long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been made to date enduring.

At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars—army, police, and intelligence service—at all levels.

In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment.

Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address gaps in 1) the aviation enterprise, 2) the intelligence enterprise, 3) special operations, and 4) the security ministries’ capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after Resolute Support concludes.
Layered Defense May Work, But Formal Transfers of Security Do Not Mean Real ANSF Security Capability
Key Areas of Tactical Violence (But No Maps of Areas of Insurgent Influence and Control or Level of ANSF Presence and Government Control) (Ten Most Violent Districts 1/4/13 to 9/15/13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Districts in EIA</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>RC</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
<th>% of National EIA in Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Nahr-e Saraj</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sangin</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nad ‘Ali</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Musa Qal’ah</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Panjwâ’i</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Sayyidabad</td>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Now Zad</td>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>RC-SW</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Maiwand</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Pul-e ‘Alam</td>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Darah-ye Pech</td>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>RC-E</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013
Total: 3.1% 31%

“But, This was irrelevant”

• Long war
• War for control of space and population, not tactical outcomes
• Taliban can pick and choose area and method of attack. Strike weakest link.
• Win if dominate people and/or allies and NGOs leave.
• Value of Pakistani sanctuary/ISI support
• Morale, public support, leadership critical.
• Peace negotiations can be war by other means

“Layered Defense” – Where is the Population for the ANA, ANP, and ALP to Protect?

AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013

The Population Estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).

ESTIMATED POPULATION BY DISTRICT

Source: Afghan Central Statistic Office
Afghanistan’s Divisive Demographics

- **Total population**: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)
  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- **Population 0-14 years**: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)
- **Urban population**: 23.5% of total population (2011)
- **Rate of urbanization**: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)
- **Young men and women reaching employment age annually**: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008
- **Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?**
- **Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?**

Layered Defense: The Ethnic Challenge
Layered Defense: Ethnicity and Population

“Layered Defense” – From “New Silk Road” to LOC Survival

Source: Google, Search “Map of Afghan Road System,” Accessed April 8, 2014
The Challenge of the ANA
The Challenge of the ANA

The ANA is still shifting from the force generation to a war fighting mode, but is the most advanced element of the ANSF. History shows that the initial ability to Transition from force generation and outside support to sustained warfighting competence can take several years to establish and have to be proven in combat over time.

The key factors involved are listed in Page 63

There are. However, some indicators of what may happen:

• The ANA has received far more funding that the ANP. (Page 64)

• The MoD still has serious weaknesses even using an ISAF rating system that sharply understates its real world weaknesses. (p. 65).

• ISAF and US reporting on ANA manpower has serious problems and uncertainties. (p. 66.)

• Even so, the data show that the ANA still has serious attrition problems, often of experienced fighters. (page 67.)

• Readiness ratings reflect force generation assessments, not warfighting capability, but still show sharp variations by major combat unit. (p. 68.)
• These sharp variations by major combat unit affect the cohesion and capability of corps level forces in key regions. (p. 69.)

• The ANA also faces important political challenges. (p. 70)

• History warns this can have a critical impact on elite forces like SOF if the new Afghan government uses the ANA to increase internal political power and control. (p. 71.)
Key ANA Transition Challenges

- Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. Effective pay, contracting, fiscal management.
- Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Converting from force generation mode to war fighting capability mode.
  - Combat effectiveness and order of battle vs. resource measures.
  - Top down strategic focus as well as bottom up tactical forces.
  - Intelligence-based, civil-military operations. Limiting impact of power brokers.
  - Sustainability, O&M, repair, supply push vs. demand pull, medical, mobility.
- Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.
  - AWOL, attrition, stable personnel.
  - Recruitment, promotion, pay and privileges.
  - Role of junior officers and NCOs.
  - Civil-military interface.
  - Medical services/medvac, post-trauma support.
- Shifting to effective training/recovery and leave cycles.
- Creating fully effective MOD, Corps, other higher command, procurement, logistic, training structures.
DoD Funding: ANA vs. ANP

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–DEC 31, 2013 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $30.11

- Infrastructure: $4.83
- Equipment and Transportation: $11.30
- Sustainment: $11.07
- Training and Operations: $2.91

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,
FY 2005–DEC 31, 2013 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $14.92

- Infrastructure: $2.62
- Equipment and Transportation: $3.60
- Sustainment: $5.35
- Training and Operations: $3.35

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

### MoD Readiness: July 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOO #1: Support to Operations</th>
<th>LOO #3 National Logistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMoD Intel Policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>AMoD Acquisition Tech &amp; Logistics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM4</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMoD Reserve Affairs</strong></td>
<td><strong>Acquisition Agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMoD Dir Disaster Response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Logistics Command (LOGCOM)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>CM1A (Achieved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MoD Chief Health Affairs</strong></td>
<td><strong>GS G4 Logistics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM3 (3Q, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MoD Chief Cntr &amp; Prop Mgmt Div (CPMD)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Army Support Command</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM2A (2Q, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G2 Intelligence</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOO #4: Exec Leadership &amp; Def Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM2A (Achieved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G3 Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Minister of Defense</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G5 Policy &amp; Planning</strong></td>
<td><strong>1st Deputy Minister of Defense</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G6 Communications</strong></td>
<td><strong>AMoD Strategy &amp; Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM2A (4Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G6 Comm Support Unit</strong></td>
<td><strong>MoD Chief, ParL Soc. &amp; PubAffs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G7 Force Struc., Training &amp; Doctrine</strong></td>
<td><strong>MoD Chief of Legal Department</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM3 (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS Inspector General</strong></td>
<td><strong>MoD Inspector General</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM2B (2Q, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS Legal Department</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dir Strategic Communications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM2B (1Q, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Forces Command (GFC)</strong></td>
<td><strong>(CFA) Transparency &amp; Accountability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B (2Q, 14)</td>
<td>CM3 (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA Special Ops Command (ASOC)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chief of the General Staff (CoGS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM3 (3Q, 14)</td>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Command (AAF)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCoGS)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B (Post 2014)</td>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical Command (MEDCOM)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Vice Chief of General Staff-Air (VCoGS-Air)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (4Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM3 (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOO #2: Personnel Management</strong></td>
<td><strong>Director of GS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
<td>CM2A (4Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMoD Personnel</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOO #5: Resource Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2A</td>
<td>CM2B (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMoD Education</strong></td>
<td><strong>MoD Chief, Finance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B (3Q, 14)</td>
<td>CM2B (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Gender Integration</td>
<td>(CFA) Civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM4 (Post 2014)</td>
<td>CM2B (1Q, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CFA) Civilization</td>
<td><strong>AMoD S&amp;P (Prog. &amp; Analysis )</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B (1Q, 14)</td>
<td>CM3 (Post 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS G1 Personnel</strong></td>
<td><strong>GS G8 Finance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B</td>
<td>CM2A (3Q, 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief Religious &amp; Cultural Affairs (RCA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM2B (4Q, 13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA Training Command (ANATC)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM1B (Achieved)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM3 (3Q, 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SIGAR and 1230 Reports Contain Key Warnings on Readiness & Sustainability

• CSTC-A stated that “the ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’”

• This explains the low present-for-duty numbers for Corps actively engaged in operations. This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% (215th Corps) to 20.5% (209th Corps). About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.

• Although details to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter were limited, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:
  • Present-for-Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)
  • Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave but not AWOL): 54,862 (43%)
  • Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)

ANA Manning & Attrition: July 31, 2014

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

Key ANA Political Challenges

• Ensuring key elements like SOF and ANCOPs and best units do not become either coup-oriented or tools of President and political control.

• Limiting corruption and role of power brokers.

• Preventing emergence of local “war lords.”

• Ensuring tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective civil-military relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  • Rules of engagement. Limit civil casualties, tensions, and conflicts.
  • “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.

• Provincial and District civil-interface.

• Lead role in making layered defense effective – relations and controls over with elements of police and ALP.

• Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.

• Forcing effective cooperation, combined operations across unit and command lines.

• Accountability
## ANA SOF: July 31, 2014

### ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)</th>
<th>HQs</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIV/BDEs</td>
<td>KDKs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Capable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Operational Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Category</th>
<th>Apr-13</th>
<th>May-13</th>
<th>Jun-13</th>
<th>Jul-13</th>
<th>Aug-13</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU &amp; ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF - Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF-Led ISAF Enabled Ops</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF - Led Partnered Ops</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Op</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ISAF Led Ops</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF Led Ops</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Total Ops Led by ISAF</th>
<th>Apr-13</th>
<th>May-13</th>
<th>Jun-13</th>
<th>Jul-13</th>
<th>Aug-13</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Total Ops Led by ANSF</th>
<th>Apr-13</th>
<th>May-13</th>
<th>Jun-13</th>
<th>Jul-13</th>
<th>Aug-13</th>
<th>Sep-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Challenge of the ANAF
The Challenge of the ANAF

The ANAF presents the problem that it was never supposed to be ready before 2016. It also raises the issue that close air support is one of the few rapid reaction tools that can deal with a crisis in land combat, land medvac can be too slow in many areas, and air mobility is another asset that save a unit under fire, provide a key tactical advantage. Or deal with serious terrain distance issues.

There is no current public plan for dealing these issues or to indicate whether any US and other ISAF air enablers will be present after 2014. There is no indication of how the afghan could manage air assets effectively, or deal with the problem of civilian casualties that became serious for ISAF. ANAF contracts have also been a source of corruption and waste in the past.

The key challenges affecting the ANAF are listed on Page 74.

The status of the ANAF as of December 2013 is summarized on Page 75.
Key ANAF Transition Challenges

- Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.

- Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.
  - Real-world close-air support, rear area, interdiction needs.
  - IS&R, Targeting damaging assessment.
  - Civil-military impact and rules of engagement.
  - Role of air mobility, Medevac.
  - Revised command and C3I/BM system.
  - Affordable readiness, sustainment, and procurement
  - Defining rotary and fixed wing roles and modernization

- Workable and responsive structure for joint warfare.
- Limits to corruption and waste.
- Command effectiveness and accountability.
Between FY 2010 and FY 2012 alone, the United States provided more than $5 billion to support and develop the 6,529-person Afghan Air Force—including over $3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested an additional $2.9 billion—including $1.24 billion for equipment and aircraft—in FYs 2013 and 2014 for the Afghan Air Force.

According to CENTCOM, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 103 aircraft:

- 58 Mi-17 transport helicopters (18 more than last quarter)
- 6 Mi-35 attack helicopters (of which 5 are flight capable)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- 6 C-182 fixed wing training aircraft
- 5 MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- 2 C-130H medium transport

The Challenge of the ANP
The Challenge of the ANP

The ANP makes up roughly half of the ANSF, but only the small ANCOP portion of the force is fully trained and equipped to lay a paramilitary role in COIN. The MoI and most elements of the ANP – except for the ANCOPs – also present major problems in terms of overall competence, corruption, leadership, extortion and civil abuses, and ties to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers. Some elements make deals with insurgents.

The ANP presents additional problems because it is not supported by an effective justice system in most of the country, courts are also corrupt, the legal system is slow and unresponsive, detention methods lead to abuses, and detention facilities are poor or lacking.

These issues are addressed in depth in the DoD 1230 report and various SIGAR reports, as well as in human rights and other reports. The corruption and inefficiency within elements of afghan Border Police also limits the flow of a key source of revenue to the government. However, it is unclear what overall structure the ANP will have after the end of 2014, what kind of training efforts will exist after Transition, and what types of outside aid will be provided.

• The range of challenges the ANP forces are shown on Page 80.
• The trends in Afghan’s low ranking in terms of the rule of law and stability is shown in Page 81.
• The structure and manning of the ANP is shown in Page 82.
• A highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI is shown in Page 83.
• The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP are shown in Page 84. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness. (Page 85.)
• As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited. (Page 86).
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities. (Page 87)
Key ANP Challenges

- Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.
  Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management
- Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 para-military military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, relations with ANA and controls over with elements of police and ALP.
- Redefine role of police in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.
  - Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration
- Accept that police will go “local.” But, set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.
  - Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.
- Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.
    - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.
World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative

Police Pose a Critical Challenge in Terms of Corruption and Effectiveness – As Do ALP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISTA²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP + CNPA Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.

## MoI Readiness: July 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Interior Overall Rating</th>
<th>CM2B</th>
<th>Current CM</th>
<th>CM 1B Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector General</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>3Q, 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Policing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender &amp; Human Rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>1Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Development</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Management</td>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Minister of Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>1Q, 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Budget</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>3Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and Installation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon Medical</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>2Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info, Coms and Tech</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>4Q, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition and Procurement</td>
<td>2B</td>
<td>20, 14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Deputy Minister of Admin
- **Personnel Management**: 2B, 3Q, 14
- **Civil Service**: 2A, 1Q, 14
- **Training Management**: 2B, 4Q, 14
- **Recruiting Command**: 2B, 4Q, 14

### Deputy Minister of Security
- **Afghan Uniform Police**: 2A, 1Q, 14
- **Afghan Fire Services**: 3, 2Q, 14
- **Afghan Border Police**: 2A, 4Q, 13
- **GDPSU**: 2A, 3Q, 13
- **Anti-Crime Police**: 2A, 4Q, 13
- **ANCOP-(G)**: 1A, Achieved
- **ALP**: 2A, 1Q, 14
- **Plans & Operations**: 2A, 3Q, 13
- **Force Readiness**: 1B, Achieved
- **C-IED**: 3, 2Q, 14

**Deputy Minister, APPF**: 3, 3Q, 14

ANP Manning & Attrition: July 31, 2014

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition.
## ANP Ethnicity: July 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Hazara</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Target</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>49.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrolmen</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Delta*</td>
<td>-25.7%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force Delta*</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Delta represents the difference between the ethnic target and the actual percentage.

ANP Readiness by Location 9/13

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2013, p. 78,
The Challenge of the ALP
The Challenge of the ALP

The use of local forces is always a high risk given the problems in controlling them, making them effective, dealing with abuses and corruption, and their potential to turn on the government or create links with insurgents.

The 1230 report indicated in October 2013 that ALP expansion was expected to reach 28,500 by February, 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. It reported that the ALP appeared to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It was heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF.

As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel. There were 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.

Capability varied sharply by area, and there were reports of civil abuses and tensions with the ANP and Government. The ALP with US SOF training did, however, generally make ALP units at least somewhat and all ALP units were to fully transfer to the Afghan government by October 2014.

Key challenges and data are shown in Pages 90-91. It is not clear how the Afghan Local police or other paramilitary forces like the APPF will be integrated into a post 2-104 structure or what their effectiveness will be.
Key ALP Challenges

- Accept that the key is to pay for support and loyalty where it is most needed. “Bribe your way to victory.”
- Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, and controls over with elements of police and relations with ANA.
- Set real-world Afghan limits limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management, Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 para-military military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Redefine role of ALP in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.
  - Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration
- Set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.
  - Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.
- Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.
  - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Limit internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions.