Improving the US-GCC Security Partnership
Planning for the Future

By Anthony H. Cordesman
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Request for comments:
This draft was prepared for the ACRPS Conference on Arab-U.S. Relations and is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to acordesman@gmail.com.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
acordesman@gmail.com
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Over the years since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Southern Gulf states and the US have developed a de facto strategic partnership based on a common need to deter and defend against any threat from Iran, deal with regional instability in countries like Iraq and Yemen, counter the threat of terrorism and extremism, and deal with the other threats to the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

This strategic partnership is experiencing a steady improvement in the quality of its weapons, but suffers badly from internal divisions within the GCC, a failure to develop integrated and interoperable forces and force plans, and a failure to set priorities for force development based on key missions. There is no coherent effort within the GCC to manage force modernization, to create integrated command and control and intelligence capabilities and to exploit potential capabilities of US, Gulf, and other allied forces through effective interoperability, sustainment, and training.

National tensions within the Southern Gulf states have limited such progress and several of these tensions have grown worse in recent years. The GCC states, the US, and key allies like Britain and France would all benefit from improved military cooperation. An analysis of the regional balance, and the resources involved demonstrates this fact. Moreover, there are many ways that improved cooperation could be accomplished without challenging national prerogatives and sovereignty.

**Building on Today’s Changing Security Threats and Military Balances**

The GCC states, the US, Britain, and France must all deal collectively with the fact there is no single military balance that shapes the need for military cooperation. The GCC states face a complex mix of national security threats only some of which a military and can be address on an alliance basis:

- **Internal stability:** The internal tensions and instability within each GCC state are a threat that each Gulf state must address largely on a national basis. Economic growth, distribution of wealth, demographic pressures and major problems in employing young men and women, the role of foreign labor, the impact of social change and hyper-urbanization, and the role of religion and religious extremism within the state are very real issues that compete for resources with military forces.

- **Violent Islamist and other extremist groups and terrorism:** Each GCC state must assume primary responsibility for dealing with violent extremism and terrorism. However all benefit – as do the US and other external allies – from intelligence cooperation, common training in counterterrorism, cooperation in border security, expert outside advisory groups, and emergency deployment of outside security forces are increasingly critical areas of security cooperation and have led to massive increase in the size and spending on paramilitary and internal security forces since 2003. The civil conflict in Yemen, the civil war in Syria, sectarian and ethnic conflict in Iraq, and the broader tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite and mainstream Islam and extremists are all areas where security cooperation has become steadily more important.

- **The “Shi’ite Crescent” and Iranian black and covert operations:** While some reporting exaggerates the threat, Iran has steadily attempted to increase its security
role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza and has used its Al Quds force and MOIS to provide at least some support to Shi’ite movements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. There is also some evidence of planning for sabotage operations. These operations not only increase the incentive for cooperation with the GCC states and with the US, Britain, and France, but help create regional tensions that also breed Sunni extremism and violent opposition movements that impact GCC security.²

- **The Iran asymmetric sea-missile-air build-up in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea:** As the following Figures show, Iran has built-up a major and growing capability to threaten the flow of shipping and petroleum exports through the Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. This includes a wide range of patrol craft, mine warfare capabilities, submersibles, submarines, and land-air-sea-based anti-ship missiles. It also includes Revolutionary Guard and other forces that can attack offshore facilities in the Gulf, and raid or attack coastal facilities and targets.³

- **Iranian conventional land, naval, and air forces:** The following Figures also show that Iran has never fully recovered from the massive losses of combat equipment it suffered during the final battles of the Iran-Iraq war, and the losses its navy suffered during its “tanker war” with the United State in 1987-1988. It has also suffered since 1980 from an inability to import the parts for its Western supplied aircraft, land weapons and ship and major modernization programs. It has only had limited imports of advanced weapons from Russia, and most of its claims to producing advanced areas have resulted in very limited production of systems where Iran has often grossly exaggerated their effectiveness. The Figures show that GCC states have a massive lead in air and surface-to-air systems; more advanced command, control and communications and intelligence systems; more modern combat ships, and more modern land force systems which is massively reinforced by US, British, and French power projection capabilities. Iran’s advantage in land force weapons numbers is limited by their quality and Iran’s lack of ability to carry out sustained maneuvers and air cover/air defense for its land forces.⁴

- **Iranian artillery rocket and ballistic missile forces:** Iran has built up a growing force of longer-range ballistic missiles that can strike at any target in the GCC and neighboring states, as well as a massive force of shorter-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles that can hit targets in the coastal areas across the Gulf. At present, these rockets and missiles lack the accuracy and lethality to hit critical military and infrastructure target like desalination plants, but Iran is seeking to give them far more accuracy and terminal guidance capability as well as to develop UCAVs and cruise missiles.⁵ They would also radically change their lethality if equipped with nuclear warheads, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported as early as November 2011 that there were indications Iran was developing such warheads.⁶

- **Iranian weapons of mass destruction:** Iran is a declared chemical weapons state and it is unclear that it has destroyed its stockpiles of weapons and precursors and capability to produce such weapons. Iran has the technology and production capability to make biological weapons but no source indicate it has done so. Iran
has clearly reached the point of becoming a nuclear threshold state, and has shown
that it could produce fissile uranium while the design of its heavy water reactor at
Arak could give it the ability to produce fissile plutonium. Reporting by the IAEA
has raised serious questions about Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons design
information, neutron initiators, development of the explosive lenses for implosion
weapons, machining of uranium, possible non-fissile testing of nuclear weapons
designs at a facility at Parchin, and other weapons related activities. P5+1
negotiations with Iran may halt any further weapons development, but seem
unlikely to roll back any of its current capabilities or prevent all further weapons
development efforts.

**The Current Military Balance in the Gulf**

Even a brief overview of the Gulf military balance shows that a combination of the GCC
states, the US, and other power projection forces like those of Britain and France already
have the capability to deter a power like Iran and meet virtually any security challenge in
the region:

- **Figure One provides a summary of the total forces in each country.** It shows that
  the GCC states have a lead over Iran in virtually every category. Iran’s only
  meaningful leads are in total manpower and artillery. These are leads that might
  have value in any invasion of Iran, but have only limited value in an Iranian attack
  on the Gulf since Iran lacks the ability to provide air cover and effective air defense,
  lacks more than minimal forced entry amphibious capability, and does not train or
  shape its land forces for long distance, sustained maneuvers and operations outside
  the country.

- **Figure Two shows comparative manpower by service.** It illustrates the need for
  integrated and interoperable GCC operations. Many GCC countries have very small
  forces suitable only for self-defense purposes and even Saudi Arabia has limited
  land force manpower. The totals for the GCC does, however, add up to comparatively
  large forces and show that the GCC has far more potential collective
  strength than even its largest national force can independently bring to bear.

- **Figure Three shows total major armored weapons strength.** The GCC has a major
  advantage in numbers and in modern armored weapons of all types. Iran is heavily
  dependent on weapons transferred before the fall of the Shah and low to medium
  grade Russian and other export systems. Much of its inventory saw severe wear

- **Figure Four shows comparative artillery strength.** Iran built up a massive pool of
towed tube artillery weapons, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and mortars
during the Iran-Iraq War, which was fought in something approaching a World War
I-like mix of largely static lines and trench warfare. This inventory could have great
value in defending against an invasion and static, slow moving warfare, but Iran
only has a limited number of self-propelled weapons, is not trained or equipped for
rapid artillery and combined arms maneuver, lacks effective air cover, and would
face serious problems in exploiting its lead in artillery in attacks on the GCC states.
Figure Five shows comparative strength in major combat vessels. The GCC states have party or superiority in every category except for submarines even without US, British, and French reinforcements. Iran also generally has to rely on older surface ships and upgrades with uncertain weapons, sensor, and C3I/BM integration. GCC navies, however, lack readiness and sustainability; particularly Saudi forces that also badly need further modernization and a better focus on real world missions. They lack meaningful tactical integration and exercise experience except for operations with the US Navy and 5th Fleet. Overall mission focus, sensor coverage and integration, joint warfare capability, and interoperability is poor to mediocre and affected by national tensions and bickering.

Figure Six shows the massive Iranian advantage in asymmetric warfare capability that is compounded by land and air-based anti-ship missile capabilities, and Iranian Special Forces and marines. GCC navies have tended to focus on the “glitter factor” in buying ship rather than creating effective fighting forces and focusing on the key threats Iran presents.

Figure Seven shows comparative combat air strength. The GCC countries have a decisive lead in numbers that is much greater than shown. Iran has found many “work arounds” to deal with its inability to import the parts, upgrades, and software necessary keep its older Western supplied aircraft operating, along with the aircraft it seized from Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991. GCC forces also have readiness and combat sortie sustainability problems, but they are much less serious than Iran’s problems that severely limit its ability to service and operate some 40-60% of its total inventory in sustained air combat.

Figure Eight shows that the GCC states – especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE – have a decisive advantage in modern aircraft performance. Iran has no real modern aircraft since its Su-24s and MiG-29s are early export versions and the other aircraft shown are US aircraft dating back to the time of the Shah that have never have multi-stage improvement programs (MISP) since 1979. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE alone have more modern combat effective aircraft than Iran, and these figures do not show US and other allied reinforcements. Once again, however, much of the GCC’s effectiveness is lost due to a lack of integration and interoperability, advanced training, common munitions and rules of engagement, and focus on sustained readiness and sortie generation capability. US C3I/BM capabilities can partially compensate, but are not a substitute for effective GCC-wide action.

Figure Nine shows the GCC states have an equal advantage in Reconnaissance, Major Intelligence, & Air Control and Warning (AEW/ AWACS) Aircraft. Once again, training and integration present serious problems, as does the lack of full exploitation of the capabilities of GCC aircraft, particularly in joint warfare and intelligence missions. The US again can provide partial substitutes, but is not a substitute for effective GCC-wide action.

Figure Ten shows the GCC has a major advantage in armed helicopters. GCC helicopter forces are generally far more modern, have better avionics and weapons, and have a major advantage over Iran’s worn and aging combat helicopters in readiness and sustainability. The GCC badly needs, however, to be able to allocate
combat helicopters effectively across national boundaries, improve interoperability and sustainability, conduct large-scale realistic joint warfare training, and develop coherent approaches to deconflicting fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, and land-based air defenses.

- **Figure Eleven shows total strength in major surface-to-air and anti-ballistic missile launchers.** The GCC states have a massive advantage in both numbers and system effectiveness backed by US provision of missile and rocket launch warning from its satellite detection systems and US ability to rapidly deploy ballistic missile defense ships, and airlift surface-to-air missile and ballistic missile defense ships. The US has also offered wide area theater defense systems like THAAD and Standard and Qatar and the UAE have shown an interest in purchasing such systems. Iran is limited to aging Vietnam War vintage systems and early models of the Hawk. Iran has upgraded some aspects of its capability, but lacks an advanced C³I/BM/sensor system to integrate its defenses and is vulnerable to countermeasures. However, the lack of any effective integration of GCC C³I/BM/sensor system and an integrated GCC-wide air and missile defense architecture sharply reduces the effectiveness of national assets.

- **Figure Twelve shows overall land-based air defense strength.** Iran’s land forces are heavily dependent on aging SHORADs of different types, and their mobile air defenses are no substitute for effective air cover and better and stronger land-based air defenses.

- **Figure Thirteen illustrates the rising density of the threat posed by Iranian ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.** While the West and Israel focus on longer-range threats, a wide variety of Iranian systems have the range to reach targets in the Gulf. Such systems help Iran compensate for its lack of effective airpower and to deter GCC and US air strikes on Iran. The Iranian systems lack the lethality and accuracy to pose more than a terror threat to area targets except in cases like Kuwait where volleys of missiles could be more effective. They would become radically more lethal, however, with nuclear warheads and/or the acquisition of terminal guidance systems that would allow conventional warheads to destroy key petroleum, electric power, desalination and other critical infrastructure targets. Iran is also pursuing the development of accurate cruise missiles and UCAVs.

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**Figure One: Summary Force Tables, Land Forces, Army, Navy, and Air Forces Equipment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Troops</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>GCC Total</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>193,400</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>362,900</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy/ Marine</strong></td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force/ Defense</strong></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>50,040</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserves</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123,700</td>
<td>350,000</td>
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### Paramilitary

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<th>15,500</th>
<th>11,260</th>
<th>7,100</th>
<th>4,400</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>38,260</th>
<th>165,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Troops:</strong></td>
<td>137,900</td>
<td>201,040</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>19,460</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>32,600</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>602,200</td>
<td>913,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Army

#### MBT

- 880
- 336
- 600
- 180
- 293
- 117
- 30
- 471
- 2,027
- 1,663

#### LT TK/RECCE

- 130
- 73
- 300
- 30
- 11
- 192
- 68
- 181
- 855
- 115

#### APC

- 258
- 3,688
- 1,563
- 375
- 260
- 279
- 226
- 1,642
- 8,033
- 640

#### AIFV

- 200
- 188
- 780
- 25
- 432
- 40
- 605
- 2,027
- 855
- 115

#### Artillery

- 1,307
- 1,386
- 771
- 151
- 218
- 239
- 89
- 561
- 3,415
- 610

#### Total Land Forces:

- 2,775
- 5,671
- 4,014
- 761
- 1,214
- 827
- 453
- 3,460
- 16,400
- 11,826

### Navy & Coast Guard

#### Amphibious

- 4
- 8
- 10
- 4
- 6
- 1
- 29
- 58
- 28

#### Mine Warfare/Countermeasures

- 1
- 0
- 7
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 2
- 9
- 5

#### Patrol and Coastal Combatants

- 22
- 32
- 69
- 62
- 49
- 46
- 22
- 25
- 305
- 182

#### Principle Surface Combatants

- 0
- 0
- 7
- 1
- 0
- 1
- 0
- 0
- 9
- 0

#### Submarines

- 0
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 2
- 0
- 10
- 12
- 29

#### Support

- 2
- 0
- 17
- 3
- 2
- 10
- 2
- 4
- 38
- 50

#### Total Naval Forces:

- 29
- 32
- 108
- 76
- 55
- 65
- 25
- 70
- 431
- 294

### Air Force, Navy & Army Aviation

#### Fighter

- 10
- 0
- 81
- 12
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 103
- 184

#### Fighter/Grnd Attack

- 65
- 0
- 172
- 21
- 39
- 24
- 12
- 138
- 471
- 124

#### Transport

- 13
- 32
- 56
- 10
- 3
- 23
- 12
- 60
- 209
- 134

#### Training

- 36
- 33
- 100
- 9
- 27
- 36
- 6
- 99
- 346
- 151

#### Support Helicopters

- 14
- 0
- 12
- 27
- 13
- 47
- 4
- 22
- 139
- 207

#### ISR

- 0
- 10
- 14
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 0
- 7
- 31
- 6

#### Total Air Forces:

- 138
- 75
- 435
- 79
- 82
- 130
- 34
- 326
- 1,299
- 806

**Figure Two: Comparative Total Manpower**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Army/ Nat’l Guard/ IRGC</th>
<th>Navy/ Marine</th>
<th>Air Force/ Defense</th>
<th>Reserves</th>
<th>Paramilitary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>193,400</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>4,040</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>11,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,200</td>
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<td>4,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC Total</td>
<td>462,900</td>
<td>27,300</td>
<td>50,040</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>38,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure Three: Comparative Major Armored Weapons

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Garrett Berntsen from IISS, Military Balance, 2014 and IHS Jane’s Sentinel series.
Figure Four: Comparative Artillery Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>GCC Total</th>
<th>Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>292</td>
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<tr>
<td>Towed</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>299</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1,476</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>5000</td>
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**Figure Five: Comparative Naval Combat Vessels - Part One**

*Major Combat Ships*

![Chart showing comparative naval combat vessels - Part One: Major Combat Ships](chart)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Figure Five: Comparative Naval Combat Vessels - Part Two**

**Asymmetric Warfare Ships**

Figure Seven: Comparative Total Combat Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fighter</th>
<th>Fighter/Gmd Attack</th>
<th>ISR</th>
<th>Support Helicopters</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Transport</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>138</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>GCC Total</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure Eight: Comparative “Modern” Fighter Aircraft

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman and Garrett Berentsen from IISS, Military Balance, 2014 and IHS Jane’s Sentinel series.
Figure Eight: Comparative Reconnaissance, Major Intelligence, & Air Control and Warning (AEW/ AWACS) Aircraft

### Figure Ten: Attack, Armed, and Naval Combat Helicopters

![Bar chart showing the distribution of attack, armed, and naval combat helicopters for various countries and models.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helicopter Model</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>GCC Total</th>
<th>Iran</th>
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<td>SA-341/342 HOT</td>
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<td>Mk-300 Super Lynx</td>
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Figure Eleven: Comparative Major Surface-to-Air and Ballistic Missile Defense Launchers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Major SAM</th>
<th>Light SAM</th>
<th>AA Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>6: Hawk MiM-23B</td>
<td>60: R BS-70</td>
<td>24 Guns:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18: FIM-92A Stinger</td>
<td>12 Oerlikon 35mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7: Crotale</td>
<td>12 L/70 40mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>16/150: I Hawk</td>
<td>SA-7/14/16,HQ-7</td>
<td>1,122 Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3/10: SA-5</td>
<td>29 SA-15</td>
<td>ZSU-23-4 24mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10: SA-5 Gammon</td>
<td>Some QW-1 Misaq</td>
<td>ZPU-2/4 14.5mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45: SA-2 Guideline</td>
<td>29 TOR-M1</td>
<td>ZU-23 23mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some HN-5</td>
<td>M-1939 37mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5/30 Rapier</td>
<td>S-60 57mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 Pantsyr (SA-22)</td>
<td>80 ZSU-57-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250 FM-80 (CH Crotale)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Tigercat</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some FIM-92A Stinger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>5/24 I Hawk Phase III</td>
<td>12 Aspide</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4/30 Patriot PAC-2</td>
<td>12 Starburst Aspide Stinger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>Blowpipe 8 Mistral 2SP</td>
<td>26 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Pantsys S1E</td>
<td>4 ZU-23-2 23mm</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34 SA-7</td>
<td>10GDF-005 Skyguard 35</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Blindfire S713 Martello</td>
<td>12 L-60 40mm</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 Javelin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40 Rapier</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>10 Blowpipe</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>12FIM-92A Stinger</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Roland II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 Mistral</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 SA-7</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(NG)</td>
<td>16/ 128 I Hawk</td>
<td>40 Crotale</td>
<td>1,220 guns</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-6/16-24 Patriot 2</td>
<td>500 Stinger (ARMY)</td>
<td>92: M-163 Vulcan 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17/73 Shahine Mobile</td>
<td>500 Mistral (ADF)</td>
<td>M-167 Vulcan 20mm</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16/96 PAC-2 Launchers</td>
<td>400 FIM-43 Redeye</td>
<td>50 AMX-30SA 30mm</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 ANA/FPS-117 radar</td>
<td>500 Redeye (ADF)</td>
<td>128 GDF Oerlikon 35mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73/68 Crotale/ Shahine</td>
<td>73-141 Shahine static</td>
<td>150 L-70 40mm (in store)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400 FIM-92A Avenger</td>
<td>130 M-2 90mm (NG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>26/36 I Hawk</td>
<td>20 + Blowpipe</td>
<td>62 guns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patriot PAC-3</td>
<td>20 Mistral</td>
<td>42 M-3VDA 20mm SP</td>
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<td>Some Rapier</td>
<td>20 GCF-BM2 30mm</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some Crotale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some RB-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Some Javelin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Some SA-18 Grouse</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Some SA-2, 3</td>
<td>Some 800 SA-7</td>
<td>530 guns</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Some SA-6 Sp</td>
<td>Some SA-9 SP</td>
<td>20 M-163 Vulcan 20mm</td>
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<td>Some SA-13 SP</td>
<td>50 Z SU-23-4 2 SP 23mm</td>
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<td>Some SA-14</td>
<td>100 ZSU-23-2 23mm</td>
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<td>150 M-1939 37mm</td>
<td>50M-167 20mm</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>120 S-60 57mm</td>
<td>40M-1939 KS-12 85mm</td>
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</table>
Figure Thirteen: Illustrative Map of Iranian Artillery Rocket and Ballistic Missile Coverage of the Gulf

Source: Adapted from Mark Gunzinger and Christopher Dougherty, *Outside-In Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats*, CBSA, Washington DC, 2011.
**The US Commitment to the Gulf**

GCC forces, however, are only part of the story. The previous comparisons of the military balance in the Gulf region do not show US forces or capabilities. The US does have major assets in the region, a naval command and base in Bahrain, a major air command and base in Qatar, bases and facilities in Kuwait and the UAE, and prepositioning and contingency facilities in Oman. There is, however, no simple way to calculate the scale of the power the US would project to the Gulf and the rest of the region in a given scenario. The key to measuring the US impact on each aspect of the Gulf military balance does not lie in the forces the US projects into the Gulf at any given moment in peacetime or before a crisis, but rather in the level of forces the US can project into the Gulf in a given contingency.

This is particularly true in the case of air power. It takes time to project and deploy combat-ready land power, even with prepositioning. It can take days to weeks to project major increases in US sea power. The GCC states, however, have some of the most advanced air bases and airports in the world, and can rapidly support massive US air reinforcements and air shipments. Many have also made at least some of the purchases of US aircraft and weapons to sustain US combat and others support of US prepositioning. All have the airbases, airports, and seaports to immediately support US airlift of troops and supplies, and support US naval as well as air operations.

- **Figure Fourteen** shows the current global deployments of US land forces and deployment in the Gulf. The forces in Afghanistan will be largely withdrawn at the end of 2014.

- **Figure Fifteen** shows the current global deployments of US naval and Marine Corps forces.

- **Figure Sixteen** shows the current pool of US combat aircraft that the US air Force can draw upon. US Naval and US Marine Corps Forces could add substantial reinforcements to this total.

The US forces that defend the Gulf and cover the western IOR, focus on the entire for the Middle East and are assigned to USCENTCOM. They include the forces the US deploys in support of the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, and the Red Sea states.

The level of these forces varies with the level of tension or conflict in the region, and is drawn from US forces in the US, in Europe and in the Pacific. The forces actually and deployed by USCENTCOM vary according to the contingency commitments the US makes in the CENTCOM region at any give time – a region which goes far beyond the IOR and extends from Egypt to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

These contingency commitments have changed steadily over the last decade and US forces are now phasing out of active combat. The size of troop deployments, for example, has been steadily cut since the last US combat troops left Iraq at the end of 2011, and is dropping further as the US transitions combat forces out of Afghanistan – with all to be removed by the end of 2014.
The US does, however, still maintain a major air-sea force as part of its 5th Fleet, which is headquartered in Bahrain. The US Navy has maintained a presence in the Gulf since 1949, has had facilities in Bahrain since 1971, and created the 5th Fleet in in 1995. In January 2014, the 5th Fleet had the following task forces:\(^9\)

- **CTF-50 Strike Forces**: 1 carrier, 1 cruiser, 1 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 replenishment ship.
- **CTF-51 Contingency Response**: 1 LHD, 1 LHA, 2 LSDs, 1 AV-8B squadron, 2 helicopter units, one AH-1W attack helicopter unit.
- **CTF-52 Mine Warfare**: 1 MCM, 1 MH-53 helicopter unit.
- **CTF-53 Logistics**: 1 ammo ship, 1 logistic stores ship, 1 fast combat support ship, 1 dry cargo/ammo ship, 1 fleet replenishment oiler.
- **CTF-54**: 1 Ohio-class guided missile submarine, 1 Los Angeles-class submarine,
- **CTF-55 Surface forces**: US Navy and US Coast Guard patrol ships.
- **CTF-56 Expeditionary Forces**: support for rapid power projection. EOD, marine mammals, inshore boats, riverine warfare,
- **CTF-57 Maritime Patrol Aircraft**: P-3C Orion and ASW aircraft.

The overall US Army and US Air Force presence in the Gulf/Western IOR region is harder to quantify. The US had approximately 25,000 personnel in the area for all services in 2013, and major air facilities in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. It also has a major air base and command facility at Al Udeid Air Force Base in Qatar called the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (COAC), and prepositioning and contingency facilities in Oman.\(^10\) The USAF had six air wings deployed in or near the IOR and two groups:\(^11\)

- **376th Air Expeditionary Wing Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan**
- **379th Air Expeditionary Wing, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar**
- **380th Air Expeditionary Wing, Undisclosed Location, Southwest Asia**
- **386th Air Expeditionary Wing, Undisclosed Location, Southwest Asia**
- **438th Air Expeditionary Wing, Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.**
- **455th Air Expeditionary Wing, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan**
- **609th Air and Space Operations Center, Undisclosed Location, Southwest Asia**
- **1st Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group, Undisclosed Location, Southwest Asia**

It is not possible to separate out aircraft numbers or activity levels for the Gulf from the entire range of USAF air activity in the Central Region – which included Afghanistan. Total AFCENT activity in Afghanistan in 2013 does, however, provide a rough indication of US power projection and surge capabilities. The US flew over 21,000 close air support sorties, 31,000 IS&R sorties, 32,000 airlift sorties, and 12,000 tanker sorties – levels far lower than in the peak of the Iraq and Afghan Wars. These numbers illustrate the fact that airpower in the Gulf area at any given time is not a measure of US capability for a rapid deployment force.\(^12\)
Figure Fourteen: US Army – Part One

### Figure Fourteen: US Army – Part Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Current (starting point)</th>
<th>Future (per QDR ’14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>10 Regular, 8 Guard</td>
<td>10 regular Army, 8 National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Brigades</td>
<td>13 Regular, 11 Guard, 1 Reserve (with lots of cats and dogs in the USAR which will be organized into an Avn Bde)</td>
<td>10 Regular Army, 2 U.S. Army Reserve, 10 National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot and Missile Defense Battalions</td>
<td>15 Regular</td>
<td>15 Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense batteries</td>
<td>6 Regular (approved), but only 2 fielded and 1 in the process of being fielded</td>
<td>7 Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>As of 14 Mar 14, Army component end strengths are 523K Regular, 197K Reserve, and 355K Guard. The previously approved size was 490K Regular, 205K Reserve, and 350K Guard (2012 defense strategic guidance) to be achieved by the end of FY 15 (previously to be achieved by the end of FY 17, but accelerated 2 years to garner savings more quickly)</td>
<td>440,000-450,000 Regular Army, 195,000 Reserve, 335,000 National Guard (this is in the President’s FY 15 budget request, but will not be achieved until the end of FY 17).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure Fifteen: US Naval Force Deployments –Part One

Figure Fifteen: US Naval Force Deployments – Part Two

Source: US Navy, March 7, 2014
### Figure Sixteen: US Air Force Global Strength

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Total Aircraft</th>
<th>Aircraft by Function</th>
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<td>Fighter Aircraft</td>
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<td>AC130</td>
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<td>B1</td>
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<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B52</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>C12</td>
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<tr>
<td>C130H</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C130J</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>F16C</td>
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<td>F16D</td>
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<td>F22</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
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<td>F35</td>
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</table>

Source: US Air Force, March 8, 2014. The figures in yellow background include the forces counted in detail in the 2014 QDR Force Table.
US Strategic Priorities in the Gulf

The US gives high priority to the security of the Middle East and the defense of its Gulf allies, but there is considerable confusion about this in the Gulf. The US issued new strategic guidance in early 2012 that resulted in several speeches talking about a “US pivot to Asia.” This led some analysts to confuse a limited US redeployment of air and naval assets from Europe to the US West Coast and Pacific with a US strategic focus on Asia to the exclusion of the Gulf.

This does not reflect any aspect of US strategy. The US has made both the Middle East and Asia its two key strategic priorities for power projection ever since it issued its revised strategic guidance in January 2012. The US stated this priority repeatedly in the new Defense Strategic Guidance, and has done so every year since that time.13

US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made this clear at the Manama Conference in Bahrain in the fall of 2013,14

We have a ground, air and naval presence of more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the Gulf. Two years after our drawdown from Iraq, the U.S. Army continues to maintain more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers in the region, along with heavy armor, artillery, and attack helicopters to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against aggression.

We’ve deployed our most advanced fighter aircraft throughout the region, including F-22s, to ensure that we can quickly respond to contingencies. Coupled with our unique munitions, no target is beyond our reach.

We’ve deployed our most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to provide a continuous picture of activities in and around the Gulf. And we have fielded an array of missile defense capabilities, including ballistic missile defense ships, Patriot batteries, and sophisticated radar.

As part of our efforts to ensure freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf, we routinely maintain a naval presence of over 40 ships in the broader region, including a carrier strike group, and conduct a range of freedom of navigation operations. These operations include approximately 50 transits of the Strait of Hormuz over the past six months.

Earlier this year, we ramped up our minesweeping capabilities and added five coastal patrol ships to our fleet in this region. We are currently working on a $580 million construction program to support the expansion of Fifth Fleet capabilities.

Yesterday, I visited the Navy's new afloat forward staging base, the USS Ponce, a unique platform for special operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in areas where we do not have a permanent fixed presence. I’ll also be meeting with U.S. personnel stationed at the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, where we have representatives from our GCC partners training and working together with us. We also maintain forces and assets at home and around the world ready to deploy to the region on a moment’s notice.

The United States military has made this commitment in resources, personnel and capabilities because of our nation's deep and enduring interest in the Middle East. That will not change. Although the Department of Defense is facing serious budget constraints, we will continue to prioritize our commitments in the Gulf, while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. Even with new budgetary constraints, the United States will continue to represent nearly 40 percent of global total spending. The U.S. military will remain the most powerful in the world, and we will honor our commitments, and the United States is not retreating, not retreating from any part of the world.

A key vehicle for increasing partner capabilities is foreign military sales and financing. Over the
last 20 years, the sale of advanced weapons has helped to shift the military balance in the region away from Iran and in favor of our Gulf partners, and this shift is accelerating. DOD has approved more than $75 billion in U.S. arms sales to GCC states since 2007. These sales during the past six years are worth nearly as much as those made previously totally in the previous 15 years.

During my last trip to the region, we finalized agreements with nearly $11 billion that will provide access to high-end capabilities, including F-15s, F-16s, and advanced munitions, such as standoff weapons. These are the most advanced capabilities we have ever provided -- ever provided to this region. We'll continue to ensure that all of our allies and partners in the region, including both Israel and the Gulf states, have these advanced weapons.

Upgrades in military hardware have enabled the United States military to work more closely, more effectively with our partners and allies in a wide variety of joint exercises, training, and collaborative planning. American men and women in uniform, serving alongside the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of our partners in the region, are staring down the same threats, which is why we take these activities very seriously.

This year, our successful training efforts have included: Our Eagle Resolve exercise, which began as a seminar in 1999. This year, hosted by Qatar, it included naval, land and air components. It included 12 nations, 2,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and 1,000 of their counterparts. Our Eager Lion exercise in Jordan this year involved 8,000 personnel from 19 nations, including 5,000 Americans from across the services. And here in Bahrain in May, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command hosted the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise, which included 40 nations, 6,000 service members, and 35 ships across 8,000 nautical miles, stretching from the Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz.

… The United States supports this vision and is committed to supporting the GCC as an anchor for regional stability. The United States will continue to work closely with each of our partners in the GCC, but we must remain together, and we must do more to strengthen multilateral defense cooperation...In support of that goal today, I’m announcing several new initiatives.

First, in addition to our Gulf-wide joint exercises and training, DOD will work with the GCC on better integration of its members' missile defense capabilities. We applaud the efforts of many Gulf states to acquire new and enhanced missile defense capabilities in the face of growing regional missile threat.

But the United States continues to believe that a multilateral framework is the best way to develop interoperable and integrated regional missile defense. Such defenses are the best way to deter and, if necessary, defeat coercion and aggression.

To encourage this, we propose upgrading our regular air and air defense chiefs conference to include missile defense cooperation as a very distinct agenda item. We believe doing so will allow for continued progress in missile defense and will open the door to broader cooperation and burden-sharing within the GCC.

Second, we would like to expand our security cooperation with partners in the region by working in a coordinated way with the GCC, including through the sales of U.S. defense articles through the GCC as an organization. This is a natural next step in improving U.S.-GCC collaboration, and it will enable the GCC to acquire critical military capabilities, including items for ballistic missile defense, maritime security, and counterterrorism.

And, third, building on both this event and the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, I’m inviting our GCC partners to participate in an annual U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial. This ministerial will affirm the United States’ continued commitment to Gulf security, and it will allow the U.S. and GCC member nations to take the next step in coordinating our defense policies and enhancing our military cooperation. I propose that our inaugural ministerial take place within the next six months. All of these new and ongoing initiatives will help strengthen the GCC and strengthen regional security.

As Secretary Hagel states, the US has built up its naval capabilities in the Gulf to deal with the asymmetric threat from Iran in 2013. It is reshaping its naval forces in the Gulf to deal
with the asymmetric threat from Iran, providing improved missile defense capabilities, and making major improvements in its air and cruise missile attack capabilities -- which include upgrading much of its strike fighters to the stealth capabilities of the F-35.

The end result is that the US will be able to rapidly deploy massive amounts of air and cruise missile power, can base B-2 stealth bombers forward in areas like Diego Garcia, is upgrading much of its tactical airpower to F-35 stealth strike fighters, is introducing the Littoral Combat Ship to deal with threats like Iran, offered THAAD anti-missile defenses to states like Qatar and the UAE, and Secretary Clinton had offered the same “extended deterrence” guarantees to the Gulf states that the US had once offered to Europe during the Cold War – an offer that remains on the table.

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and the US FY2015 Budget

These are US commitments that General Lloyd Austin III, commander - in - chief of the head of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) described in detail in his posture statement to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees in March 2014.15 The US further strengthened these commitments in both its FY2015 defense budget request and in the Quadrennial Defense Review it uses for longer term planning. The FY2015 budget overview issued by the Department of Defense stated that,16

The 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific to preserve peace and stability in the region; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. The 2014 QDR builds on these priorities and incorporates them into a broader strategic framework.

The US FY2015 budget overview also stated that US force planning and strategy was based upon three pillars, one of which was to,17

Build security globally, to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. In practice, this means continuing to rebalance our posture and presence to the Asia-Pacific while maintaining a focus on the Middle East.

…As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia. The United States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our allies and partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region – one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies – while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats.

The US 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was issued the same day as the US FY2015 budget request. The QDR is the main planning document the US issues every four years to shape its long-range strategy – in this case through FY2019 and beyond. The document repeated the US strategic emphasis on both Asian and the Middle East repeatedly through the document,

…the 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance…These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability in the region; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the
Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships.\textsuperscript{18}

… In striving to achieve our three strategic objectives, the Department will also continue to rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests... The United States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region – one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies and partners – while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats.\textsuperscript{19}

… Friction points also endure in the Middle East. Religious differences, particularly a widening Sunni-Shi'a divide, are among the sources of trans-national division in the region. Competition for resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions in the coming years and could escalate regional confrontations into broader conflicts – particularly in fragile states.

In the region, Iran remains a destabilizing actor that threatens security by defying international law and pursuing capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons. Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran's other destabilizing activities will continue to pose a threat to the Middle East, especially to the security of our allies and partners in the region and around the world. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are undergoing significant political and social change.

People in countries including Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt are seeking a greater voice in their governance, upending traditional power centers in the process. Terrorist groups seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their influence. Internal strife in Syria continues amid sectarian friction, at great cost to human life. Syria has become a magnet for global jihad – a situation that is likely to persist as long as the current leadership remains in power. Ongoing, severe spillover effects include an influx of foreign fighters and a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. These difficult political transitions are a reminder that events in the region will take years – perhaps decades – to develop fully.\textsuperscript{20}

US strategy and force deployments have steadily adapted to deal with the full range of threats described earlier. These range from aid in counterterrorism, deploying new patrol boats, mine warfare and Special Forces elements, to the deployment of new missile defense ships and the offer of the US’s most advanced theater missile defense systems like THAAD and Standard. They have also included Secretary Clinton’s offer of “extended deterrence,” and the same kind of nuclear guarantees to the GCC states that the US once offered to NATO.

Secretary Clinton stated as early as 2009 that,\textsuperscript{21}

"We want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the United States extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support military capacity of those in the Gulf, it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer, because they won't be able to intimidate and dominate as they apparently believe they can once they have a nuclear weapon..."

\textbf{The Real World Impact of US “Energy Independence”}

It is also important to understand that the US does not officially project that new sources of fossil fuels will give “independence” from direct imports of liquid fuels or that it can achieve any serious degree of freedom from the overall health of the global economy and the need for the free and stable flow of petroleum exports from the Gulf. While US
domestic politics have called for energy independence since the Nixon Administration, serious US analysts and policy makers know that the reality is very different:

- The US pays world prices for petroleum and petroleum products. Any global energy emergency that raises global prices raises US domestic prices and has a major negative impact on the US economy.

- Any energy crisis that affects the world economy affects the US economy.

- The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the Department of Energy is the group within the US government charged with projecting the level of US dependence on the import of petroleum liquids – which are critical to every aspect of the US transportation sector. The EIA recognizes the level of uncertainty in projecting US energy dependence and has put forth scenarios ranges from 60% US dependences to 8% exports. In the reference case projection it made for the US Annual Energy Outlook in 2014, the EIA estimated that,

  “U.S. use of imported petroleum and other liquid fuels continues to decline in AEO2014 mainly as a result of increased domestic oil production. Imported petroleum and other liquid fuels as a share of total U.S. use reached 60% in 2005 before dipping below 50% in 2010 and falling further to 40% in 2012. The import share continues to decline to 25% in 2016 and then rises to about 32% in 2040 in the AEO2014 reference case, as domestic production of tight oil begins to decline in 2022….”

- Direct US energy Imports are, however, a relatively minor aspect of US dependence on the free flow of petroleum exports. The CIA World Factbook summarizes the flow of US imports in 2013 as follows, “agricultural products 4.9%, industrial supplies 32.9% (crude oil 8.2%), capital goods 30.4% (computers, telecommunications equipment, motor vehicle parts, office machines, electric power machinery), consumer goods 31.8% (automobiles, clothing, medicines, furniture, toys).” The total percentage of US imports that involve manufactured goods is 86.9% and some 35-40% come from Asian states that are critically dependent on Gulf petroleum exports. The US trade equaled $2.3 trillion in imports and $1.6 trillion in exports, or 23% of the US GDP of $16.7 trillion. This clearly illustrates the degree of US dependence on the security of the global economy.

### US Budget Cuts and US Force Plans

The US is cutting its defense budget and will spend substantially less on defense than it did during the period in which it was fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This does not mean, however, that the US will lose its ability to project massive amounts of air and sea power into the Gulf region in a short period of time, and the 2014 Quadrennial Review made it clear that US forces are planned to be capable of “defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region.”

US plans will steadily enhance one of the most critical aspects of US power projection capability in the Gulf: The ability to combine space-based assets with the most advanced and battle proven mix of theater-wide and tactical command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the world – assets no other power now comes close to possessing.
The US also has tailored its forces to project power forward and sustain them in combat, work directly with allied forces, and provide common training and tactical experience based on decades of actual combat experience. As the Gulf War showed in 1990-1991, these “softer” aspects of US military power can give its Gulf allies force multipliers that no threat can possess, and they would be far more valuable if the GCC states made serious progress in interoperability, creating common and effective training for joint warfare, and integrating their command and control, sensor, communications/data, and intelligence systems.

The US also now plans to maintain its current level of baseline defense spending – the level of spending not related to the Iraq and Afghan wars -- indefinitely into the future. President Obama has request a baseline level of $496 billion in FY2015 in current dollars and US plans call for this spending to increase to $559 billion in FY2019 – as far as the US projects defense spending.26 This level of spending will exceed the spending of any other military power by several times, and be vastly larger than the spending of Iran and any combination of Gulf and Middle Eastern states. It also will sustain the massive global force structure shown in Figure Seventeen.
**Figure Seventeen: The US Force Plan for 2020 in the 2014 Quadrennial Review**

**Department of the Army**
- 18 divisions (10 Regular Army; 8 Army National Guard)
- 22 aviation brigades (10 Regular Army, 2 U.S. Army Reserve, and 10 Army National Guard)
- 15 Patriot air and missile defense battalions, 7 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense batteries (all Regular Army)

**Department of the Navy**
- 11 aircraft carriers (CVNs) and 10 carrier air wings (CVWs)
- 92 large surface combatants (68 DDG-51s, 3 DDG-1000s, and 21 CG-47s with 10-11 cruisers in temporary lay-up for modernization)
- 43 small surface combatants (25 LCS, 8 MCMs, and 10 PCs)
- 33 amphibious warfare ships (10 LHAs/LHDs, 11 LPDs, and 12 LSDs, with 1 LSD in temporary lay-up for modernization)
- 51 attack submarines (SSNs) and 4 guided missile submarines (SSGNs)

Personnel end strength: 323,200 Active Component (AC); 58,800 Naval Reserve

**Marine Corps**
- 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces organized in 3 AC and 1 Reserve Component (RC)
- Division/Wing/Logistics Group teams
- 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Elements
- 7 Marine Expeditionary Unit Command Elements

Personnel end strength: 182,000 AC; 39,000 RC

**Department of the Air Force**
- 48 fighter squadrons (26 AC; 22 RC) (971 aircraft)
- 9 heavy bomber squadrons (96 aircraft: 44 B-52, 36 B-1B, 16 B-2)
- 443 aerial refueling aircraft (335 KC-135, 54 KC-46, 54 KC-10)
- 211 strategic airlift aircraft (39 C-5, 172 C-17)
- 300 tactical airlift aircraft (C-130)
- 280 ISR aircraft (231 MQ-9, 17 RC-135, 32 RQ-4)
- 27 Command and Control Aircraft (18 E-3, 3 E-4, 6 E-8)
- 6 operational satellite constellations (missile warning, navigation and timing, wideband & protected SATCOM, environmental monitoring, multi-mission)

Personnel end strength: 308,800 AC; 66,500 Air Force Reserve; 103,600 Air National Guard

The Resources Available

The US does not budget by region and there is no clear way to allocate a given portion of its budget to US contingency capabilities for the Gulf. In spite of recent budget cuts, however, the total US budget request for FY2015 is $578 billion and the US projects that it will still be spending some $589 billion in current dollars in FY2019.\(^{27}\)

GCC Military Spending vs. Iran and Other Neighboring Powers

The military spending by the Gulf states is somewhat easier to quantify, although there are serious difference between international estimates and some countries do not officially report their spending. In many cases, estimates of military spending generally does not include increasingly massive expenditures on paramilitary and security forces in Ministries of the Interior and other spending outside the Ministry of Defense, and Iran’s reporting on its nuclear, missile, and other aspects of its effort to increase its military industrial base is uncertain or lacking. The International Institute for Strategic Studies also notes that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – do not release total figures for military spending.\(^{28}\)

It is clear, however, that the GCC states alone spend far more than Iran, and that if they used their resources as wisely as possible they can create a mix of deterrent and defense capabilities that can deal with any regional threat with only limited US, British, French and other allied aid.

While the numbers in Figure Eighteen are questionable and show important differences between sources, the broad trends and ratios of military spending are not. It is clear that the GCC states regular spend three to five times what Iran spends and that Saudi Arabia alone underpins a major GCC-wide effort.

- Part One of Figure Eighteen shows that SPIRI data indicate that the total military spending of the GCC was 3.7 to nearly 10 times that of Iran in constant dollars during 2003-2013.
- Saudi spending alone varied from three to more than six times that of Iran.
- UAE spending alone was equal to or twice that of Iran during the entire period from 2003 to 2013.
- During 2003 to 2013, total GCC spending ($477.3 billion) was 3.7 times that of Iran ($128.0 billion).
- Part Two of Figure Eighteen shows that IISS data indicates that Iranian military spending was only 14% to 37% of total GCC spending during 2009-2013.
- Total GCC spending ($368.2 billion) was 4.2 times that of Iran ($88.5 billion) during the entire period from 2009-2013.
Figure Eighteen: Gulf Military Expenditures by State – Part One
SIPRI Estimate ($US in Constant 2011 Dollars)

Source: Adapted from SIPRI data as of 8.4.14
Figure Eighteen: Gulf Military Expenditures by State – Part Two

**IISS estimate**

(In SUS Current Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GCC</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Saudi as % of Total GCC</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<th>Iraq</th>
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<td>60,585</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<td>8,640</td>
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<td>2011</td>
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<td></td>
<td>70,583</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<td>82,110</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>67%</td>
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<td>17,700</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Iran as % of Total GCC:
- 14%
- 16%
- 37%
- 31%
- 20%

Source: Adapted from various editions of the IISS *Military Balance*. 
Figure Eighteen: Gulf Military Expenditures by State – Part I

IISS estimate
(In US Current Millions)

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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Saudi as % of Total GCC: 68% 68% 69% 68% 67% -

Other

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Iran as % of Total GCC: 14% 16% 37% 31% 20% -

Source: Adapted from various editions of the IISS Military Balance.

GCC Arms Transfers vs. Iran and Other Neighboring Powers

The disparity in arms transfer is even more dramatic. The declassified US intelligence estimates in Figure Nineteen and Figure Twenty show that the GCC states imported some $75.6 billion in new arms purchases during 2008-2011, and now have over $70 billion worth of new arms in delivery. These include large numbers of modern multirole fighters and improve air and missile defenses. They also include more advanced land and naval weapons than Iran and any potential threat state is able to import. The GCC states not only have a massive advantage in overall spending, but in the quality of the arms and technology they can import and the range of countries they can import from.

GCC arms imports do, however, lack any effective effort at integrated planning and interoperability at many critical levels. The GCC emphasis on air power has meant it has not made equal improvements in its naval forces, and its lack of any coherent effort at joint warfare, doctrine, planning, and advanced, real-world training means that it remains a mix of largely independent national forces.
The GCC states still tend to compete in buying the most advanced weapons possible for what some outside observers call their “glitter factor,” rather than the most effective force mix. They emphasize investment in weapons numbers over force sustainability in combat and effective sensor, command and control, communications, and intelligence systems. They also emphasize force numbers over training and readiness.

There are many areas where the GCC states could greatly improve their capabilities to defend and deter, and reduce their dependence on the US and other outside forces, without compromising their national sovereignty. There are obvious political barriers to such progress – barriers that have existed ever since the formation of the GCC. At the same time, much of the investment by individual GCC states will be wasted or lose its effectiveness if such improvements are not made.

Furthermore, the US and other key outside powers like Britain and France can be far more effective allies if the GCC states take such action, and such actions can serve as a key step in guarding against the kind of budget and forces cuts that increasingly affect their real world power projection capabilities. Moreover, the US is the only power that can enhance GCC capabilities with space-based and global command and control, intelligence, and warning assets – much of this advance depends on the willingness of GCC states to create integrated and interoperable military capabilities.
Figure Nineteen – Part One: New Arms Transfer Agreements in Millions of Current US Dollars

<table>
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### Figure Nineteen – Part Two: New Arms Transfer Agreements by Buyer Country and Source

(In Millions of Current US Dollars)

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**Notes:** 0=data less than $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.
a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

**Figure Twenty - Part One: New Arms Deliveries**
In Millions of Current US Dollars

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**Notes:**
0=data less than $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million.

a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

**Figure Twenty – Part Two: New Arms Deliveries by Buyer Country and Source**

(In Millions of Current US Dollars)

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a. Major West European category includes France, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Forging a Stronger Alliance

There are many areas were the US could be a better ally. It has often failed to consult effectively with its allies, or to listen to them when it did consult. The Iraq War and the way the US handled the P5+1 negotiations with Iran are cases in point. The US arms sales and technology release procedures have been a time consuming mess since the Carter Administration, and the US has sometimes compounded the problems in the tendency of GCC states to emphasize the “glitter factor” over military effectiveness by focusing on the dollar value of arms sales rather than their impact on deterrence and defense. These are problems that Britain and France share to some degree, along with every other major provider of arms transfers.

The fact remains, however, that the GCC states remain locked in national rivalries that keep their military efforts divided in many ways, and limit their willingness to create the kind of institutions within the GCC that would emphasize integration and interoperability. If anything, these tensions became even more public in 2013 and 2014, and the resulting lack of unity is both a recipe for massive waste in military spending, and for a lack of effectiveness in building the level of internal security and external deterrence and defense capabilities that a combination of GCC, US, British, French, and other allied forces should be able to provide.

Outside powers have an obligation to add to their allies’ strength. They do not have an obligation to compensate for their allies political divisions and bickering. Moreover, global powers do have other priorities, and the GCC states should be able to handle most of the threats summarized early in their analysis on their own. Indulging in conspiracy theories, accusing the US of somehow turning to Iran, and talking about US weakness at and decline at a time the US is actually building up key elements of its force in the Gulf and steadily improving its power projection capabilities relative to Iran is no substitute for more effective action within the GCC.

Focusing on Improved Coordination

Creating an effective alliance does not have to mean compromising national interests. As NATO has shown, it is also possible to make substantial progress in all the necessary areas without sacrificing national sovereignty. Focusing on the most meaningful missions and creating the institutions necessary to encourage – rather than force – coordination, integration, and interoperability can achieve major gains and make major improvements in military effectiveness.

Given the level of waste inherent in the GCC’s current lack of coordination and interoperability, a rough estimate would indicate that either the GCC is wasting something approaching a third of its military expenditures or a third of its military effectiveness. Put differently a more effective military alliance might also be able to free resources from investment in conventional military forces to deal with other threats like terrorism and funding the civil side of internal stability.

It is not possible in summary analysis to explore all of the options and issues involved, but Figure Twenty-One provides a summary list of the areas where improved coordination is needed both within the GCC and between the GCC and the US and other outside allies:
Figure Twenty-One: Key Areas for Improved Coordination

- Integrated force planning and coordination with US, UK, France
- Improved standardization and interoperability.
- C4I: Integrated IS&R, AC&W, land-based air and missile defense, maritime surveillance,
- Coordinated approach to Iran’s nuclear and WMD efforts and to arms control
- Coordinated logistics, sustainability, and readiness
- Reshaping training and exercises ensure best use on a GCC-wide basis
- GCC-wide intelligence effort for counterterrorism and dealing with popular unrest
- Internal security, border and coastal security, and counterterrorism cooperation.
- Coordination of support of state and non-state actors outside GCC.

Focusing on Key Areas of Mission Effectiveness

The GCC states need to give equal priority to focusing on collective efforts at creating real world mission capabilities to deal with the major threats outlined earlier in this analysis. Mission effectiveness cannot be accomplished on a national level in a military arena where a range of states are spread out along the entire length of the Gulf. In this region only Saudi Arabia has serious strategic depth, Oman must cover the Strait of Hormuz and is the only GCC state with Indian Ocean ports, Yemen presents a potential threat to both Saudi Arabia and Oman, and Saudi Arabia is the only state with a Red Sea Coast. Instability in Iraq presents special problems for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and Jordan plays a critical role in the West that affects all of the GCC states.

The GCC states also need to look beyond air power and pointless glitter factor buys of ships like submarines, and develop effective naval forces to deal with Iran’s overall mix of asymmetric threats. This requires more mine warfare capability, better ability to deal with missile patrol boats and other smaller surface threats, and an integrated air-sea sensor system and the capability to manage air-sea operations. Saudi Arabia in particular needs to improve its naval strength and readiness and transform its Red Sea forces into a more effective fleet.

The GCC states also need more strategic focus on Iraq and to compete more actively in trying to win influence in Iraq and counter Iran. At the same time, they need to recognize that Kuwait and the Saudi border area with Iraq – the “Kuwaiti hinge” – are the area most vulnerable to any Iranian land operation and the use of artillery rockets and short-range missiles. Cooperation with Jordan is critical to both checking any pressure from Syria and containing any conflict or flow of extremists out of Iraq.

Counterterrorism has become a steadily more international challenge to each GCC state. Missile and air defense require full integration of sensor systems and at least the option of integrated missile and air defense operations. Dealing with Iran’s complex mix of asymmetric naval, air, and missile forces in the Gulf requires every GCC state to cooperate
in naval surveillance, and operations against mine warfare and Iran’s ability to disperse asymmetric assets. If the P5+1 negotiations with Iran fail, the GCC will need to develop collective policies to deter and contain Iran, and to approach the US to define the best form of “extended deterrence.”

Once again it is not possible to analyze all of the options and issued involved in depth, but Figure Twenty-Two provides a clear illustration of the level of effort required.

**Figure Twenty-Two: Key Areas for Common Areas in Improving Mission Capability**

**Internal Security**

- Security of Gulf and Coastal Facilities, Raids
- Effective Border and Coastal Security
- Counter-terrorism, Sabotage, Infiltration, Extremism, Insurgency.
  - Rapid Reaction Forces for Counterterrorism and Dealing with Violent Unrest
  - Identity Cards and Passport Data
  - Intelligence Effort for Counterterrorism and Dealing with Popular Unrest
  - Internal Security Center
  - Counterterrorism Training
  - Police and Crowd Control Standards and Training
- **Encouraging Stability Through Economic, Educational, and Social Measures**
  - Rehabilitation, conversion, reassimilation

**Passive Defense**

- Efforts and standards for the passive and active defense of critical infrastructure and key energy facilities.
  - Border defenses, fences
  - Common stockpiling of critical parts and components to allow rapid repair of sabotage and combat damage without waiting for long-lead items.
  - Integrating power and water systems so the GCC can compensate for a breakdown or damage to a critical power or desalination facility.
  - Creating a broader range of pipelines that bypass the Straits and go through Oman, to Yanbu and possibly through Jordan.
  - Improving roads and possibly creating a rail capability to move bulk cargo broadly through the Gulf from ports in Oman and from Jeddah.
  - Reducing the growth of water and power use through conservation and realistic pricing.
  - Applying the same efforts to reduce wasteful use of domestic fuel, gasoline and natural gas.

**Regular Military Missions**

- Integrated Approach to Air-Sea Operations in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabia Sea
- Focus on Key Contingency Capabilities:
• Integrated Air, Surface-to-Air Missile, Missile Defense System
• Integrated Maritime Surveillance System
• Mine, Anti-Submarine and Naval Asymmetric Warfare.
• Extended Air Sea Coverage of Strait/Gulf of Oman/Indian Ocean/Red Sea/Horn of Africa
• Iraq, the Iraqi Border and Kuwaiti “Hinge”
• Yemen Border Security and Threats
• Security of Gulf and Coastal Facilities, Raids
• Counter-sabotage, Infiltration, Extremism, Insurgency.

- Planning for more effective cooperation with power projection forces outside the GCC

**Nuclear and Missile Threat**

- Create lasting negotiated limits on Iran
  - Develop an effective US-GCC dialogue
  - Develop common GCC approach to P5+1
- Explore options for preventive strikes versus containment
- Develop joint, integrated missile defense system
- Extended Deterrence and/or Gulf options.
- Confidence building measures
- Move forwards to a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

It should be stressed that some key steps involve the civil sector in each GCC state as well as the military sector. They require cooperation with the US and states outside the GCC. And, they involve the defense and repair critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities. Effective coordination must go beyond the boundaries of Ministries of Defense and Ministries of the Interior.

**The Need for Institution Building**

Making real progress does not require progress in every effort, or quick progress in several areas. NATO is perhaps the most successful example of a collective military effort in modern history and it took years to develop a structure that could discuss force plans, interoperability, sustainability, and move towards integrated air defense. National differences have affected every stage of NATO activity, and progress has always been evolutionary.

NATO also shows that key to success in alliances is not the sacrifice of national sovereignty, but rather creating staffs and systems where countries can work out agreed solutions where progress is possible and lay the groundwork for improved coordination over time. It is also to create working military and civil staffs within the GCC that have national representation and can focus on practical and technical issues that do not require Ministerial attention and can move things forward at the working level, **Figure Twenty-Three** illustrates some of the institutions the need to be built or strengthened:
Figure Twenty-Three: GCC Institution Building

- **GCC Force Planning Exercise:**
  - Annual defense planning report covering new five years.
  - Defense Planning Committee to review and discuss interoperability, modernization, mission emphasis etc.
  - GCC staffs to work with member country staffs in improving planning and coordination.

- **Joint Intelligence Center**
  - Annual net assessment of GCC forces relative to given threats, key threat development.
  - Working center to coordinate national intelligence.
  - Operational Center for crisis management ands support.

- **GCC-wide Intelligence Effort for Counterterrorism and Dealing with Popular Unrest**
  - GCC Internal Security Center
  - Common Counterterrorism Training
  - Clearing house and coordination function.
  - Surveys and risk assessment of popular attitudes; analysis of levels and cause of popular unrest.

- **Standardization and Interoperability Committee and Staff for GCC and Partnership with US, UK, and France**
  - Research and development coordination.
  - Modernization and procurement coordination and review.
  - Technology and Procurement Committee and Staffs

- **Working Group on Arms Control**
  - Weapons of mass destruction free zone
  - Confidence building measures.
  - Future conventional force agreements.
  - Hotline equivalent.

- **Common Training and Exercise Staff to Coordinate Activity on a GCC-Wide Basis**
  - Specialized GCC-wide training facilities.
  - Exchange programs
  - Exercise coordination and preparation.

**Create a GCC Force Planning Exercise**

One of the highest priority activities is to create a Defense Planning Committee similar to that in NATO, and take steps to create a common defense planning system that annually surveys and examines each member’s current forces and force plans for the coming five
years to evaluate areas where it may be possible to improve mission capability, interoperability and standardization, and supplement national C4I on a GCC-wide basis. Such a committee could combine civil and military expertise to support top-level decision makers. It would meet regularly to review the force plans of each nation to find ways to better coordinate them and create steadily more interoperable forces.

There is a solid precedent for such efforts. NATO developed a Defense Planning Questionnaire in the 1960s where every member submitted a standard and regularly updated report on its current forces, manpower, major weapons, munitions, and five-year plans – plus a longer-term supplement on procurement.

This does not require any compromise of sovereignty, and allows the civilian and military experts to develop informal and formal recommendations to ministers to develop better-integrated plans, as well as to make tangible suggestions as to ways to both create more effective force mixes over time, and make forces more interoperable.

**Create a Joint Intelligence Center**

Sharing intelligence at the military, counterterrorism, and popular unrest levels is a difficult aspect of alliance operations. Once again, however, there are successful precedents. The Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – have held conferences on cooperation in counterterrorism that examined options for cooperation, even in some of the most sensitive areas of intelligence. The NATO MC-161 process involved semi-annual meetings of national intelligence experts supported by the NATO civil and military staffs, and produced an annual threat assessment to present to ministers.

Creating an expanded GCC joint intelligence center to handle military tasks and then expand into counterterrorism and sources of popular unrest could be a way of slowly building up both added GCC capabilities and trust, and common joint collection and analysis capabilities. Creating a GCC-wide annual threat assessment would be one way to begin to tie intelligence cooperation to policy in a way that reinforces unity.

Effective security planning requires more than a threat assessment. It requires an analysis of the trends in the balance relative to key threats and mission areas, and the analysis of current capabilities and priorities for improving them. One option that would bridge the gap between military planning and intelligence at the civil-military level would be to create a GCC Net Assessment group that could address internal and external extremist and asymmetric threats.

Such an effort could focus on Iran and common threats from violent extremism. The group could report on GCC-wide patterns to avoid spotlighting Bahrain or other states, but give common legitimacy to efforts to check such threats. It could aid the defense planning effort by providing annual threat assessments highlighting key threats and showing how the GCC states are moving to deal with them.

**Create a Technology and Procurement Directorate and Committee**

The GCC needs to create a directorate, supported by a high-level committee of member country representatives within the GCC headquarters, to analyze military technology and procurement needs with a focus on technical issues, develop common test and evaluation
methods, and do as much as possible to coordinate the other aspects of military procurement that would help develop common approaches to acquiring weapons systems and technology.

The directorate should have a matching mandate to focus on ways to develop immediate interoperability, provide common support and sustainability for power projection and redeployment capability, and set common standards for stockpiling and sharing munitions and key supplies.

It should be supported by an expert staff at GCC headquarters and designated centers of excellence in defense colleges and research centers in member states to assist in national implementation efforts and coordinate in planning and reporting.

Create a Logistics, Sustainability, and Readiness Directorate and Committee

The GCC needs to stop emphasizing weapons numbers and quality over the ability to actually use and sustain its military forces in combat. It needs to create a matching directorate within the GCC, supported by a high-level committee of member country representatives within the GCC headquarters, to develop plans to create common levels of logistics support, sustainability, and readiness.

It should give the practical and material aspects of war fighting capability the same emphasis as equipment procurement. Set common standards, require common reporting, and put meeting real-world military readiness standards on a competitive basis equal to the glitter factor in making major prestige-oriented arms buys.

The GCC should give the directorate a matching mandate focus on ways to develop immediate interoperability, provide common support and sustainability for power projection and redeployment capability, and set common standards for stockpiling and sharing munitions and key supplies.

Once again, it should support the directorate with an expert staff at GCC headquarters and designate centers of excellence in defense colleges and research centers in member states to assist in national implementation efforts and coordinate in planning and reporting. Use these capabilities to develop proposals for GCC country action and analyze common needs and cost-effective approaches to meeting them.

Building Common Training and Exercise Capacity

The GCC states already have some exceptional training facilities at the national level, and do cooperate in military exercises, but there are gaps. Many states do relatively little large-scale training that simulates real combat, and member states still have limited cross and common training. There also is a need for joint training that cuts across service lines.

There are several measures that the GCC staff could examine on a civil-military level to improve cooperation and develop interoperability:
Survey Training Facilities to Determine How to Make Best Use on a GCC-wide Basis:

The GCC could create a commission of civilian staff and senior military officers to survey training facilities and methods by service and mission focus to determine where creating a common specialized facility is necessary, how to improve joint and common training, ways to increase cross training of officers and other ranks from other countries, and options for large-scale air and land combat training. Such a commission could report annually to ministers on proposals and progress.

Focus on Key Contingencies:

The GCC could encourage expanded field and command post training at the GCC level, with a focus on key missions and contingencies like operations to secure the borders with Yemen, deal with efforts to “close the Strait,” and deploy joint forces to deal with a contingency directed against Kuwait and secure the Iraqi-Saudi border.

Create a Directorate to Coordinate the Creation of GCC-wide Training Facilities and Standards and Centers of Excellence:

Create a directorate and staff to develop and manage an integrated approach to training and exercise activity. Develop plans to create GCC-wide facilities in member countries. Work with key partners like the US, the UK, and France to develop outside centers of excellence for training, educating, and exercise activity that stress sending mixes of member country students and teams for outside training, and for obtaining outside partners to help improve GCC training and education programs and facilities.

Create a Working Group on Arms Control

The GCC and its member states have supported the creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, and they need to examine options for reducing tensions with Iran and other potential threat states by using confidence building measures and limits on forces. The GCC should create a small staff to examine such options and play an active role in encouraging studies and diplomatic activity.

Coordination with the United States, France, Britain, and Other Allies

The GCC states should grant key allies observer status in such GCC meetings and staffs by asking them to provide representatives in key areas, and by organizing joint planning and review activities. Limiting allies to observer status would ensure that the GCC states preserved their control over all activity.

There is also a strong case for going further and creating joint command and control facilities. These might initially build upon the 5th Fleet capabilities in Bahrain and the USAF air force facilities at the Combined Air Operations Center in Bahrain as well as the similar facility in Saudi Arabia. The GCC might go further and creating some form of central operations center the GCC headquarters with a military and intelligence staff to
both provide a coordinated watch over military developments and provide support to member countries in a crisis.


13 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. i, 1, 2, 4


17 US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview, March 5, 2014, p. 2-2


