Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces

US-Iranian Competition Series

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Request for comments:
This report is a draft that will be turned into an electronic book. Comments and suggested changes would be greatly appreciated. Please send any comments to Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, at acordesman@gmail.com.

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SHAPING IRAQ’S SECURITY FORCES

The last active US combat forces left Iraq in August 2010, marking the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation New Dawn.¹ Some 49,000 advisory troops, four advisor assistance brigades, and a limited number of special operations forces (SOF) remained to train, advise, and assist Iraq’s security forces after that date, including the military, intelligence, and police.² Until the end, these US troops continued to serve a number of other important security functions: carrying out kinetic operations against Iranian-backed and other militant groups; providing training to the ISF; taking part in joint patrols along the borders of the Kurdish provinces and helping integrate ISF and Kurdish forces; and acting as a deterrent to Iraq’s neighbors – in particular Iran.³

They left behind a mix of Iraqi security forces (ISF) with many strengths and many weaknesses. As Figure 1 shows, the Iraqi security forces or ISF had considerable manpower at the time US forces left, but they were an awkward mix of real military forces and police forces, were structured around internal security operations with very limited ability to defend against foreign threats, and were still very much in transition to a largely US-designed force structure that different and conflicted with Iraq’s part military structure and culture.

The various elements of the ISF had combat units with considerable capability, but many units that were not yet ready for independent operations. The army lacked many of the support and command structures it needed, effective IS&R assets, effective mobility and artillery capability, and was not supported by an effective Ministry of Defense. The police forces have some strong paramilitary elements but were an awkward mix of regular police and security forces and units with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism elements, none of which were supported by effective courts, a fully functioning criminal justice system and effective detention facilities. The Ministry of the Interior was also substantially less ready than the Ministry of Defense and far more politicized.

It is not surprising, therefore, that violence levels have risen steadily through 2013, exacerbated by Iraq’s deep sectarian and ethnic divisions, its political power struggles at the top, the civil war in neighboring Syria and an ensuing spillover of Sunni extremist groups into Iraq, and an increase in Iranian military influence due to the large presence of Iranian military advisors supporting the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

The US must do what it can to improve this situation in spite of the failure of its effort to create a true strategic partnership that would survive the departure of its combat forces. As has been discussed earlier, the US retains critical national security interests in Iraq. These interests center on giving Iraq a successful political and economic structure and making it a securer source of petroleum exports, eliminating civil violence and the risk of a return to a serious civil war, reducing or eliminating the threat of Sunni and Shi’ite terrorist elements, limiting Iranian influence over Iraq’s Shi’ite factions. They can best be served by supporting Iraqi governance and security forces by providing such support presents critical challenges.
Figure 1: Iraqi Security Forces as of October 10, 2011

Total Security Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Assigned Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>5,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Corps</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Support</td>
<td>89,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Federal Police</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Police</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>649,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Force</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>933,103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparative size of Active Military Forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,285,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,477,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>545,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>279,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>233,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>100,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

Sources: GOI, MOI IG, information provided to SIGIR, 1/12/2012; SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30r 30, 2011, p 68; GlobalFirepower.com, “Active Military Manpower by Country”, www.globalfirepower.com/active-military-manpower.asp, accessed, 12/12/2011; GOI, MOI IG, information provided to SIGIR, 10/10/2011
A Destabilizing Early US Departure

The US and Iraqi forces never planned for the departure of most US advisors and enablers at the end of 2011. Moreover, many elements in the American and Iraqi leadership wanted the US troops to remain in Iraq, leading up to the withdrawal deadline. The US command in Iraq and many senior Iraqi officers and officials felt that US forces should continue to play such role after December 2011 as part of the Security Framework Agreement. Moreover, several US allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, voiced concerns that withdrawing all US troops would leave Iraq open to Iranian influence.

Nevertheless, implementing a meaningful Strategic Framework Agreement and extending a US troop presence after December 2011 proved to present major problems for both sides.

On the Iraqi side, many Iraqis saw the US as an invading and occupying power that had failed to bring security, functioning democracy, effective governance, and effective economic aid. Public opinion influenced all Iraqi politicians. Most Iraqis supported withdrawing US troops by the end of 2011. According to a 2009 ABC News poll, 46% of Iraqis felt that US troops should leave sooner than the end of 2011, with only 16% wanting them to stay longer, and 35% feeling that the withdrawal timetable was right. Sunnis were particularly opposed, with 61% in favor of a faster timetable and only 4% wanting troops to stay longer.

The power struggles between Maliki and Allawi -- and that divided Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd -- made it difficult to achieve unity on any divisive issue, and Iran opposed a lasting US presence. Iraqi politics had created a deeply divided and semi-paralyzed government. Prime Minister Maliki had to deal with Sadr, Iranian pressure, and accusations that he was an American stooge, and at the same time he had to fend off accusations of being too close to Iran, and many around Maliki did not trust the US. Whatever his private views may have been, he ruled out extending the US troop presence, stating, “The last American soldier will leave Iraq...this agreement is not subject to extension, not subject to alteration. It is sealed.” Any plan to extend the US troop presence would also have to be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, which would prove difficult.

In the case of the US, public support for maintaining troops in Iraq was uncertain. Budgetary concerns and public weariness over the Iraq war incentivized the withdrawal of all US troops. Indeed, even the most modest plans that called for civilian control of the US effort through the State Department and USAID faced growing budget pressures. Additionally, the cost of leaving even a fairly small number of US troops in Iraq created a significant financial burden.

A slight rise in American combat deaths in Iraq in 2011 did not help matters. Neither did the perception that Iraqi security forces were not doing enough to go after the Shi’ite groups attacking Americans. Publically, neither President Obama nor President Maliki were backing plans to keep US troops in Iraq after 2011.

While the full details of Iran’s actions and role remain unclear, it is still all too clear that the US underestimated Iran’s influence. Iranian Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Soleimani was able to exert considerable pressure on Iraqi Shi’ite leaders to bar any US presence in Iraq after 2011, according to a September, 2013 profile of the Iranian general by New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins.

A number of senior US experts in the US national security community indicate that Major General Soleimani’s personal influence was critical to the formation of a viable coalition government under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in 2010, and that a firm refusal to allow for a long-term American
presence on the order of 10,000-15,000 troops was required in order to prevent an increase in Iranian sponsored attacks in Iraq.

These issues became steadily more critical to politicians and policymakers in both the US and Iraq as the deadline for removing US forces approached. In May 2001, Maliki had stated that a request for US troops might be considered if a 70% concurrence among Iraq’s political blocs were reached. On August 3, 2011, the major factions, excluding the Sadrists, gave Maliki their backing to negotiate, and in September, the US publically acknowledged negotiations were taking place.

Both sides continued to examine options for extending the presence of US troops. The senior US commander in Iraq, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, originally recommended some 14,000-18,000 troops, while other reports speculated leaving 10,000 troops. In September 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta endorsed keeping a smaller force of 3,000-4,000 as what one senior official called, “a small, temporary military presence,” as part of a plan to create a major American Embassy presence in five different parts of Iraq that would support security contractors in a police advisory effort. This plan also included a strong Office of Security Cooperation staffed by civilians and military personnel to support training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces.

NATO also agreed to keep a small force in Iraq for training purposes; as of September 2011, there were 160 NATO staff conducting training operations in Iraq, 12 of which were American. Military and intelligence officials also pushed for greater CIA involvement following the withdrawal US troops to counter Iranian influence and thwart arms smuggling. In February 2012, reports again suggested that the CIA would maintain a large clandestine presence in Iraq long after the withdrawal of US troops in order to monitor the activity of the Iraqi government, suppress al-Qai’da’s affiliates, and counter the influence of Iran.

By September, however, the total force the US and NATO continued to seek had become far smaller than the force desired by top US military officials, and the failure to plan for a larger force drew growing criticism from many US experts and several US politicians. Iraqis across the sectarian spectrum also voiced their discomfort with such a small US force, while others still remained adamantly opposed to any presence at all. Many Iraqis remained conflicted over a desire for the US to withdrawal and feelings of mistrust and fear towards Iraqi institutions.

The situation reached the crisis point in early October 2011. Iraq’s political leaders finally agreed to keep US military trainers in Iraq past the December deadline, but the agreement came too late for effective planning and they failed to agree that US troops could operate with immunity from Iraqi law. The US could not deploy forces without such immunity in a country where charges against US forces offered hostile factions so many political opportunity, and had previously made it clear that any such restriction would prevent it from keeping US forces in Iraq. As a result, the Obama administration decided to withdraw all forces aside from a small office linked to the US Embassy.

This did not mean that the US lost the ability to aid Iraq in an emergency. The US did keep significant forces in the Gulf that could aid Iraq if it faced a threat from Iran. The US announced that it would work with Kuwait to keep US forces stationed at Kuwaiti bases that could react to crisis scenarios in Iraq. The US had 23,000 military personnel in Kuwait as of January 2012. While these forces were later cut around half that level, the US maintained a major air presence and rapid deployment capability in the Gulf, and continued to deploy at least a combat battalion in Kuwait – sometimes reaching a full combat brigade.
The US also propositioned supplies for a larger force if one had to be deployed to the region.\textsuperscript{20} As of late-December 2011, there was reportedly a Brigade Combat Team from the US Army’s 1st Cavalry Division in Kuwait, in addition to a Marine Expeditionary Unit likely headed to Kuwait for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, there are approximately 7,500 US troops in Qatar, 5,000 in Bahrain, and 3,000 in the UAE, with very small numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman. There are also forces deployed at least one and often two aircraft carrier task forces in or near the Gulf.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{The Uncertain Development of Iraq’s Security Forces}

There are no reliable current data on the strength of Iraq’s forces and even the totals for authorized manning are suspect. The 2013 edition of the \textit{IISS Military Balance} indicates, however, that Iraq had 271,400 active military personnel in the spring of 2013, with 193,400 in the Army, 3,600 in a small coastal navy, and Navy, and 5,050 in a still developing air force. The Ministry of Interior had another 531,000 personnel, although most were in regular police units.

The formal command structure of Iraq forces seems to have stayed close to the structure that existed when the US left in 2011. Jane’s reports that,\textsuperscript{23}

The Prime Minister of Iraq, currently Nuri al-Maliki, is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In 2007, al-Maliki set up a 24-member body, the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, to advise him on military matters. The chain of command runs from the prime minister, through the minister of defence, to the chief of staff (CoS) of the armed forces. The CoS, who heads up the Joint Headquarters, is supported by a Vice-CoS and a number of deputy chiefs of staff. In recent years the Joint Staff had a number of departments or directorates including Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, Communications, Training and Comptroller.

From an operational point of view, there is an Iraqi National Command (INC) at the National Operations Centre (NOC) in Baghdad, which is under the control of the prime minister as commander-in-chief. The NOC oversees the Iraqi Joint Forces Command (JFC) which in turn commands the single service commands, the Ground Forces Command (which commands the divisions and brigades etc.), the Air Force Command and the Navy Command, as well as the Support Command, the Corps of Engineers and the Training and Doctrine Command. The latter controls the National Defence University, which comprises the military academy and other institutions, and the Tactical Training Command (TDC) which controls the training bases and other training centres. Also under the INC is the Iraq Counter-Terrorism Service, which commands the Special Operations Forces.

In practice, Prime Minister Maliki and his office have steadily consolidated his personal control over Iraq force and security services. Maliki is the de facto Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior and his office regularly bypasses the form chain of command, and make interim senior appointments without confirmation by the Majlis or full consultation with senior officials and commanders. The Prime Minister’s office now controls key military and paramilitary forces directly, Iraqi intelligence, and national elements of the police and some elements of Iraq’s judiciary.

The IISS reported in its Military Balance for 2013 that that the Maliki government had introduced the equivalent of untrained political commissars called dimaj into the force structure, and that, “a broad set of problems continue to plague the Iraqi Army...The first involves weaknesses in management, logistics and strategic planning. The unwillingness, of senior military officials to delegate responsibility down, the chain of command also stifles innovation and independent decision-making at a junior level.”\textsuperscript{24}
It is also important to note that the Iraqi military has a powerful intelligence branch that also includes internal security operations. Military Intelligence (M2) is part of the Joint Headquarters of the Iraqi armed forces, and the army, the air force and the counter-terrorism command have their own intelligence gathering elements. There also are the equivalent of political commissars to ensure the loyalty of Iraqi forces.

Iraq’s oil revenues have allowed it finance a major set of security forces without dependence on US or other outside aid. The IISS reports that Iraq’s military spending – which may include the spending of Ministry of Interior forces, rose from 14.1 trillion dinars ($12 US billion) in 2011 to 17.2 trillion dinars ($14.7 US billion) in 2012, and 19.9 trillion dinars ($17.1 US billion) in 2013. Jane’s has a much lower estimate. It puts Iraqi spending at $5.5 US billion in 2011, $6.1 US billion in 2012, and $8.2 US billion – but the Jane’s figures seem to exclude significant amounts of Iraqi arms orders and capital spending. Furthermore, the Jane’s figure is still high for a largely counterinsurgency force that has not yet imported anything like the numbers of major weapons imported by some neighboring regional powers.

Figure 2 summarizes the IISS estimates of Iraq’s forces strength in 2013 and shows that Iraqi security forces remained relatively large in numbers, and had acquired a growing strength of conventional lad weapons, but still fell far short of Iran’s holding, had no meaningful air combat capabilities, and no surface-to-air missiles or real land-based air defense capabilities. The bulk of the manpower also remained in police units with little or no serious combat, counter-insurgency, or counter-terrorism capabilities or in even lower grade units that were largely poorly trained and equipped local security guards.

Iraq was actively seeking more advanced arms from the US as well as Russia, China and other sources, but the US was slow in deliveries and Iraqi orders often seemed more political and an effort to rush into increasing weapons strength than part of a well structure effort at force development.
Figure 2: Key Elements of Iraqi Security Forces in 2013

Army

Manpower: 193,400 actives

Combat Units: 1 armored division, 8 motorized rifle divisions, 3 infantry divisions, 2 special forces brigades, 2 presidential motorized brigades, 1 Baghdad brigade

Main Battle Tanks: 336: 140 M1A1 Abrams; 120+ T-72; 76 T-55
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles: 193: 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 20 Fuchs NBC; 100 BMP-1; 20 BTR-4
Armored Personnel Carriers: 2,799+: 100 FV 103 Spartan; 400+ M113A2; 61 MT-LB; 44 Talha; 570 Akrep/Scorpion; 60 AT-105 Saxon; 100 BTR-80; 10 Cobra; 50 M3 Panhard; 60 Mohafiz; 10 VCR TT, 12 Barracuda; 600 Dzik-3; 60 ILAV Cougar; 115 Mamba

Artillery 1,386+
- 48 self-propelled tube+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24 M109A5
- 138+ towed tube: 130mm 18+ M-46; 155mm 120 M198
- Multiple rocket launchers: some 122mm BM-21
- 1,200 mortars: 81mm 650 M252; 120mm 550 M120

Helicopters:
- Armed: 26 Mi-17 Hip H; 4+ SA342 Gazelle
- ISR: 10 OH-58C Kiowa
- Transport & Utility: Medium 8 Mi-171Sh; Light 29: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell T407

Navy

Manpower: 3,600 actives

29 Patrol and Coastal Combatants:
- Ocean-Patrol 2 RiverHawk
- Coastal Patrol 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
- Patrol Boats 17: 9 Swiftships 35 (6 additional vessels under construction); 5 Predator (PRC-27m); 3 Al Faw
- 6 Riverine Patrol Bosts 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010

Air Force

Manpower: 5,050 actives

Combat Aircraft: 3 armed Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan* plus 2 SB7L-360 Seeker
Transport Aircraft: 10: 3 C-130E Hercules; 1 C-130J-30 Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline 6 Beech 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 8 Cessna 172
Training Aircraft 33+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A

Ministry of Interior Forces

- Iraqi Police Service: 302,000
- Iraqi Federal Police: 44,000
- Facilities Protection Service: 95,000
- Border Enforcement: 60,000
- Oil Police: 30,000

Source: Adapted from the data in the IISS Military Balance, 2013, pp. 381-382
As events since 2011 have made all too clear, however, Iraq lacks the security forces it needs for both internal security and external security. Moreover, the sudden departure of most US advisors, trainers, and partners has seen Iraqi security forces become increasingly politicized and placed under the control of Prime Minister Maliki and Shi’ite factions, and helped lead to a growing level of corruption, politicization, and deterioration in some elements of these forces and within the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior described earlier in this report.

**Iraqi Dependence and the Failure to Create a Lasting US Presence**

Iraq has not been able to find effective ways to replace its past dependence on US advice, enablers, and help in planning and managing its security funds. The US had taken the lead in the development of the Iraqi security forces and creating a new Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior after 2003 – although it benefit from British other allied and NATO support. From 2003-2011, it trained, armed and equipped Iraqi forces, and increasingly fought beside them. The US provided a significant portion of the funding for the war effort in Iraq through 2011, and a large portion of the security forces during Iraq’s civil struggles between 2005 and 2011.

This US role in creating post-invasion Iraqi security forces from 2004-2011 gave the US influence over the shape of Iraqi security forces, and developed important relationships between the US and the leaders of Iraqi forces at the time. In addition, Western intelligence agencies developed close ties to the Interim Government’s Defense Minister, Hazem Sha’alan; Interior Minister, Falah al-Naqib; and the head of Iraq’s intelligence services, General Muhammed Shahwani, each of who warned of the influence of Iran.26

By the end of December 2011, however, the US military was reduced to a steadily more token-sized advisory role for the Iraqi military forces. Support to the Iraqi police was largely eliminated, and the small Office of Military Cooperation that remained in the US Embassy team was limited to supporting arms sales and transfers, and providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) aid to the Iraqi forces.

The decisions of a Shi’ite and Maliki-dominated Iraqi government after 2011 then increasingly limited Iraq’s support of a meaningful strategic partnership with the US. As early as December 2011, General Frank Helmick, Deputy Commander of US forces in Iraq, stated that Iraqi security forces were unable to maintain their capabilities and equipment, let alone meet new challenges. He also highlighted the fact that US training missions are exclusively for Iraqi police, and there are no training agreements for the Iraqi military post-withdrawal.27

Even before the US left, Maliki used temporary command appointments to put loyalists in key top positions ranging from combat unit comments to intelligence. Since 2011, he has taken de facto control of the Iraqi Federal Police, Special Forces elements, and counterinsurgency forces. Once the US left, Maliki’s political power struggles, and the deep sectarian and ethnic divisions inside the Iraq government, changed Iraq’s military leadership in ways that steadily increased the number of officers loyal to the Prime Ministers and that had limited ties to US advisors and introduced the political commissar system described earlier.

Iraqi forces also developed growing problems at lower levels the moment that were no longer under US advisors. Even before all the US advisory forces left Iraqi units, American advisors found military commissions and positions were for sale in many units. Their loyalties divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, and US efforts to build up a strong mix of junior officers and
non-commissioned officers often reverted to the past Iraqi military culture where junior officers and NCOs were allowed little initiative and authority.

Corruption became a growing problem at every level, but corruption in the police, and police ties to power brokers, and ties to local political leaders became a growing problem. These problems were compounded by the fact that of the outside advisory effort and Iraqi government had failed to create effective links between the police, judiciary, and the courts and the abuses of detention and confession based justice. Iraqi units also showed limited willingness to maintain the facilities transferred by the US.

**The Uncertain Impact of Imposing a US Military Culture on Iraq**

In fairness, part of the problem was that the US had tried to impose too many of its own approaches to military development on an Iraqi structure that had no internal checks and balances to make them function once US advisors were gone. As in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US accomplished a great deal, but it tried to do far too much too quickly with more emphasis on numbers than quality, and grossly exaggerated unit quality in many cases.

Many elements of Iraqi forces did become effective while US forces were present and stayed effective after they left, but successful force building takes far longer than the US military was generally willing to admit and US efforts to transform – rather than improve – existing military cultures and systems have often proved to be counterproductive and a waste of effort.

The US learned even before Iraqi failed to grant US advisors immunity that tactical level proficiency, while a critical core competency for any military unit, is often also the easiest to instill. Indeed, training at the platoon and company level by American Military Transition Teams during the war were often highly effective at training their partnered Iraqi units the fundamentals of small-unit tactics and urban operations. Creating a US-shaped process of logistics and upper-echelon planning capabilities, and a command culture that supported initiative and decision-making at junior levels proved far more difficult and many aspects could not survive the departure of US advisors and the loss of US influence.

Iraq had developed its own military culture and systems and refined them through eight bloody years of the Iran-Iraq War and two wars with US-led coalitions. It was easier to revert to the past than accept a US military model, particularly when Iraq’s political leadership insisted on repeating Saddam Hussein’s efforts to micromanage every aspect of security operations, enforce political control, bypass the formal chain of command, and limit initiative at every level of command. This reversion, however, was often partial and ineffective in an environment where the Maliki government lacked anything approaching Saddam’s level of violent ruthlessness. Iraqi forces became caught half way between the US system and their own system at a time they were increasingly politicized and lacked effective military leadership.

Even in units with a uniform sectarian makeup, divided tribal and familial loyalties regularly trumped loyalty to the State and to the military chain of command. Additionally, Iraqi command culture is not conducive to independent operations. Military leadership positions are opportunities for senior personnel to solidify power bases and dispense patronage in the form of military supplies, including ammunition, food, water, and vehicle repair parts. As a result, senior commanders hoard supplies in order to maintain their power and influence, and military sustainment is held hostage to bureaucratic infighting.
Like the US experience in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Iraq came to illustrate that the US needed to be much less ambitious in trying to change Iraq, and far more willing to do things the Iraqi way. It needed to be far more sensitive to the fact that military force building efforts are inevitably tied to the political struggles in a country. It needed to make a much clearer separation between military and police forces and recognize that efforts to build a Western-style police force can only succeed if the police are made part of a functioning mix of a justice system and government that have the loyalty of its people.

**A Focus that Did Not Provide Iraq With Effective Forces for External Defense**

Iraq also is still coping with the fact that Iran has skillfully managed to establish its influence over Iraqi Forces at key political levels, and as Figure 3 shows, is still by far the more dominant military power. The US effort also focused almost exclusively on creating forces that could effectively confront terrorism, extremism, and civil conflict under the assumption that a continuing US presence would act as a substitute. As a result, did little to bring Iraqi security forces to the point where they could defend the country against Iraq’s neighbors.

As a result, Iraq is probably a decade away from creating the kind of conventional forces that can stand on their own against Iran, and must buy and absorb large numbers of conventional weapons in spite of its present problems. It is also important to note that Iranian influence is far from Iranian control, and that Iraq continues to try to balance Iran off against the US.

Even though the Maliki government has ties to Iran, it now is seeking to create far stronger conventional forces at the same time it faces a steadily growing level of internal violence. This explains its search for modern fighter like the F-16, for M-1 tanks, and a wide variety of other major conventional weapons. It explains why Maliki keeps his ties to the US open, but also why Iraq has turned to Russia and other states for such weapons.

At the same time this situation presents the problem that the US now must make hard choices as to whether to provide such weapons to a state where it does not have a meaningful security agreement, that has links to Iran, and is caught up in serious internal political violence. So far, the US has continued plans to provide such weapons – although scarcely at the rate the Maliki government has pressed for. The end result is another open ended question about the security agreement – an agreement where the US is now not only caught between Maliki’s links to Iran versus the US, but ability to use Iraq’s oil revenues to buy arms from other states.


There is no current way to know how much Iraq will depend on the US, what Iran’s role will be, or what role other arms suppliers will come to play – although Russia is already becoming a serious supplier. What is clear is that if the Obama Administration and the US Congress do decide to support a strong US advisory effort and encourage US military sales where Iraq comes to pay for most purchase in the future, such a US effort will now have to depend on a relatively small the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq (OSC-I) that will be the main channel for all military ties between the US and Iraq in the coming years. The OSC-I now manages military sales, trains the ISF on weapons systems, conducts joint military exercises, and leads additional trainings and exchange programs.  

The July 2011 SIGIR Quarterly Report stated that plans for OSC-I were “significantly behind schedule.” By January 2012, the OSC-I was expected to support no more than 763 Security
Assistance Team (SAT) members at 10 sites in Iraq, and administer nearly 600 Foreign Military Sales cases valued at approximately $9.9 billion.

The April 2012 SIGIR Quarterly report to Congress echoed the July 2011 report, expressing that in regards to OSC-I managed program funding, “the commitment of available funding to projects and programs in Iraq slowed considerably over the past year”.33 This is in large part due to uncertainty over future budgets and funding, and the significant reduction in US presence.

Reporting in August 2013 showed that OSC-I had approximately 175 American military personnel, supported by some 3,500 contractors, who provide security cooperation and assistance for approximately who have managed some 231 US-funded FMS cases totaling $2.5 billion, and a further 201 Iraqi funded cases totaling $7.9 billion.34

This is a token level of US personnel to support the numbers of Iraqi security forces shown in Figure 2 – particularly since the US now plays only an extremely limited role in supporting the various element in the Ministry of the Interior. The US does, however, still provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, logistics, and air support to the ISF. According to USF-I, the ability of the ISF to integrate the effects of artillery, armor, and attack aviation with infantry against a conventional force is “really at the beginning stage, and will take some years to develop.”35
Figure 3: The Iran-Iraq Military Balance in 2003 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Manpower</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>4:5</td>
<td>271,400</td>
<td>523,000</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Manpower</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>19:10</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>7:5</td>
<td>336+</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFVs</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>8:5</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1:3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>2:3:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>9:10</td>
<td>138+</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>1:14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Propelled Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>48+</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Rocket Launchers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1:5</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1:112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6:5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from IISS, The Military Balance 2013, various editions and Jane’s Sentinel series.
The Uncertain Future of the US Effort

The growing size of Iraqi arms buys is increasingly interacting with the political uncertainties affecting US relations with Iraq, funding of the US presence in Iraq, and other problems in the US effort. In spite of the problems in US and Iraqi security relations, the Iraqi forces are still highly dependent on US arms imports, and Figure 4 shows that they are planned to increase that dependence in the future in spite of the fact the Maliki government has turned to Russia and other states for major arms and has found it can often get delivery far more quickly and with far fewer political problems.

The GAO reported in February 2012 that, 36 Iraqi government data indicate that security spending under the Ministries of Defense and Interior increased from $2.0 billion in 2005 to an estimated $8.6 billion in 2009. In addition, these ministries set aside about $5.5 billion over this period for the purchase of equipment, training, and services under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In certain instances, the United States has provided an incentive for these ministries to increase their security spending by leveraging U.S. funds to supplement Iraq’s FMS purchases. The Iraqi government also funded the Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program and assumed responsibility for the salaries of almost 90,000 Sons of Iraq—nongovernmental security contractors hired by U.S. and Coalition forces to help maintain security in their local communities. While security spending has increased, GAO’s analysis of data for the Iraqi government, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Trade Bank of Iraq showed that the ministries did not spend or set aside between $2.5 billion and $5.2 billion of their 2005 through 2009 budgeted funds—funds that could have been used to address security needs. 4 Department of State (State) and DOD officials cited overly centralized decision making and weak procurement capacity as reasons for the ministries’ inability to spend these funds. In April 2010, Ministry of Defense officials received Ministry of Finance approval to use $143 million of their unspent 2009 funds for FMS purchases. Ministry of Interior officials planned to use more than $300 million of their unspent 2009 funds for similar purposes.

In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, the administration requested more than $2.4 billion in U.S. funding to support the training and equipping of forces under Iraq’s security ministries. Specifically,

- State requested $1 billion for Foreign Military Financing to purchase training and equipment for Iraqi security forces. According to State, this request for Iraq is a replacement for DOD’s Iraq Security Forces Funding and is in addition to the $25.5 billion that has already been provided since 2003. In the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress appropriated $1.102 billion for Foreign Military Financing for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism. 5 The Conference Agreement accompanying the act explains that the amount is for the extraordinary costs of contingency operations, including in Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yemen.

- State also requested $886 million to fund its new Police Development Program in Iraq, of which 15.5 percent ($137 million) will be used to deploy approximately 190 police advisors and 82 percent ($723 million) will be used for security and support costs. These funds are in addition to the $757 million that was available in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, for the Police Development Program’s start-up and initial operating costs. Congress appropriated $983,605,000 for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism. The conference Agreement accompanying the act explained that the amount is for the extraordinary costs of contingency operations, including in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and for African counterterrorism partnerships.

- DOD requested $524 million to establish its Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, which will be responsible for administering Iraq’s FMS and Foreign Military Financing program, among other responsibilities. Congress authorized that from the funds made available to DOD for Operation and Maintenance, Air Force, up to $524 million could be used to fund the operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq and security assistance teams, including life support, transportation and personal security, and facilities renovation and construction.

Iraq generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1 billion through December 2009. Adjusting
for outstanding advances, at least $11.8 billion of this surplus was available for future spending. In light of these resources, Iraq has the potential to further contribute toward its security needs, even as it addresses other competing priorities. GAO recommended in September 2010 that Congress should:

- Consider Iraq’s available financial resources when it reviews future budget requests for additional funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces.

Additional clarity is needed on Iraq’s outstanding advances to determine the financial resources Iraq has available for future spending. To this end, GAO recommended in September 2010 that the Secretaries of State and the Treasury should

- Work with the Iraqi government to identify these resources by assisting Iraq in completing International Monetary Fund-required review of outstanding advances.

Some aspects of the US FY2012 budget request – such as the police development program – proved to have been far too ambitious in terms of US aid capability and Iraqi desire for the program. They also ignored both the corruption and politicization of the police

The President’s request for the FY2013 budget was for $4,019 million – which compared with $4,802 million in FY2012. The request for the Department of Defense for FY2013 was for $2,855 million versus $9,604 million in FY2012 and $45,044 million in FY2011. It was also clear at the time this request was submitted that both the State Department and Defense Department requests for FY2013 faced major further cuts as Congress acts on the request. These funding drops are partially offset by a major increase in Foreign Military Sales dollars from $14.6 million in FY12 to $39.3 million in FY13, bringing the total expenditure on military engagement to $40 million.

**Figure 4: Iraq Arms Sales Requests and Deliveries from the US: 2003-2013**


  The Z Backscatter vans will be used to scan vehicle interiors and will provide the Government of Iraq a tool to restrict the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to operate by detecting contraband movement through borders and checkpoints.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) operations and maintenance services, equipment installation services, upgrade VSAT managed and leased bandwidth, video teleconferencing equipment, 75 VSAT Equipment Suites (consisting of 1.8m VSAT terminals, block upconverters (BUCs), low-noise down converters (LNBs), required cables and components, iDirect e8350 modem, network operation and dynamic bandwidth equipment, and iMonitor software), spares and repair parts, tools, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor representative technical support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

The Government of Iraq has requested a proposed sale of commercially available Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control and Landing System/Navigational Aids. The system will include an ASR-11 Radar, Autotrac II simulator, Instrument Landing System, and Airfield Lighting System, spare and repair parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, site survey, installation, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)11 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 6 AN/TPQ-37(V)9 FIREFINDER Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 86 AN/VRC-92 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 12 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, 63 M1152A1 and 3 M1151A1 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, 12 M1083A1 Family of Medium Tactical Utility Vehicles, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 18 F-16IQ aircraft, 24 F100PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, 120 LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, 24 APG-68(V)9 radar sets, 19 M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, 100 AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, 150 AIM-7M-FI/H SPARROW Missiles, 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, 200 GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), 50 GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 50 GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), 22 ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS), or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic System (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), 20 AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/ Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), 20 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, 4 F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE), 22 AN/ALE- 47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS), 20 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs), 120 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 20 AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 10,000 PGU-27A/B Ammunition, 30,000 PGU-28 Ammunition, 230 MK-84 2000 lb. General Purpose Bombs, and 800 MK-82 500lb General Purpose Bombs. Also included: LAU-117 Maverick Launchers, site survey support equipment, Joint Mission Planning System, Ground Based Flight Simulator, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of follow-on support and maintenance of multiple aircraft systems that include TC-208s, Cessna 172s, AC-208s, T-6As, and King Air 350s. Included are ground stations, repair and return, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

Military Sale to the Government of Iraq for various explosive projectiles and charges, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $82 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 44,608 M107 155mm High Explosive Projectiles and 9,328 M485A2 155mm Illumination projectiles; also included are, M231 Propelling charges, M232A1 155mm Modular Artillery Charge System Propelling charges, M739 Fuzes, M762A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, M82 Percussion primers, M767A1 Electronic Time Fuzes, 20-foot Intermodal Containers for transporting ammunition, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 3, 2011** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq of various radios and communication equipment, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $67 million.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 AN/TPQ-36(V)10 FIREFINDER Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48 Light Weight Counter-Mortar Radars, 3 Meteorological Measuring Sets, 36 export variant Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, 6 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, 3 Position and Azimuth Determining Systems, government furnished equipment, common hardware and software, communication support equipment, tools and test equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.


  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 14,010 TP-T M831A1 120mm Cartridges, 16,110 TPCDS-T M865 120mm Cartridges, and 3,510 HEAT-MP-T M830A1 120mm Cartridges.


- **Sept. 24, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign
Military Sale to Iraq of contractor logistics support for Mobile Communications Centers and associated parts and equipment for a complete package worth approximately $57 million.

- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 14, of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for the refurbishment of 440 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carriers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $131 million.

- **Sept. 15, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress on September 13 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 18 F-16IQ Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $4.2 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (18) F-16IQ aircraft, (24) F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines, (36) LAU-129/A Common Rail Launchers, (24) APG-68(V)9 radar sets, (19) M61 20mm Vulcan Cannons, (200) AIM-9L/M-8/9 SIDEWINDER Missiles, (150) AIM-7M-F1/H SPARROW Missiles, (50) AGM-65D/G/H/K MAVERICK Air to Ground Missiles, (200) GBU-12 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (500 pound), (50) GBU-10 PAVEWAY II Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (50) GBU-24 PAVEWAY III Laser Guided Bomb Units (2000 pound), (22) Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES) (ACES includes the ALQ-187 Electronic Warfare System and AN/ALR-93 Radar Warning Receiver), (20) AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems (without Mode IV), (20) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), (Standard Positioning Service (SPS) commercial code only), (20) AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING Targeting Pods, (4) F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECE), (22) AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS); (20) Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs). Also included: site survey, support equipment, tanker support, ferry services, Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD), repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, construction, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, ground based flight simulator, and other related elements of logistics support.


The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of two years of contractor logistics support for Mi-17 helicopters and two years of logistics support for US-origin rotary wing aircraft not in DoD’s inventory.

- **March 5, 2010** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress March 4 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various communication equipment, associated parts and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately $142 million.


- **Nov. 19, 2009** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress Nov. 18 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 15 helicopters with associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package worth approximately $1.2 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of up to 15 Agusta Westland AW109 Light Utility Observation helicopters, or alternatively, 15 Bell Model 429 Medical Evacuation and Aerial Observation helicopters, or 15 EADS North America UH-72A Lakota Light Utility helicopters; and, up to 12 Agusta
Westland AW139 Medium Utility helicopters, or alternatively, 12 Bell Model 412 Medium Utility helicopters, or 12 Sikorsky UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters equipped with 24 T700-GE-701D engines. Also included: spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, US Government and contractor provided technical and logistics support services, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (64) Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters (DRASH), (1,500) 50 watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station Radios, (6,000) VHF Tactical Handheld Radios, (100) VHF Fixed Retransmitters, (200) VHF Vehicular Radios, (30) VHF Maritime 50 watt Base Stations, (150) 150 watt High Frequency (HF) Base Station Radio Systems, (150) 20 watt HF Vehicular Radios, (30) 20 watt HF Manpack Radios, (50) 50 watt Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 150 watt VHF/UHF Ground to Air Radio Systems, (50) 5 watt Multiband Handheld Radio Systems as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $485 Million.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (80,000) M16A4 5.56MM Rifles, (25,000) M4 5.56MM Carbines, (2,550) M203 40MM Grenade Launchers as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $148 million.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 26 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters, 26 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, (140) M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers, 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers, 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles, 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances, and 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $366 million.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of (20) 30-35meter Coastal Patrol Boats and (3) 55-60 meter Offshore Support Vessels as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.010 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (20) 30-35meter Coastal Patrol Boats and (3) 55-60 meter Offshore Support Vessels, each outfitted with the Seahawk MS1-DS30MA2 mount using a 30 x 173mm CHAIN gun and short range Browning M2-HB .50 cal machine gun, spare and repair parts, weapon system software, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $210 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft, 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with CMA-4124 GNSSA card and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) spares, ferry maintenance, tanker support, aircraft ferry services, site survey, unit level trainer, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign...
Military Sale to Iraq of 400 M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles as well as associated equipment. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.11 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 400 M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs), 400 M2 HB 50 cal Browning Machine Guns, 400 M117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), 8 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Dec. 10, 2008** – On Dec. 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft as well as associated support. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $520 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft, 6 spare PT-6 engines, 10 spare ALE-47 Counter-Measure Dispensing Systems and/or 10 spare AAR-60 Missile Launch Detection Systems, global positioning systems with CMA-4124, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, tanker support, ferry services, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 31, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of M1A1 and Upgrade to M1A1M Abrams Tanks as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.16 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles, 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers, 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers, 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles, 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances, and 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters. Also included are: 35 M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Truck Tractors, 40 M978A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Tankers, 36 M985A2 HEMTT Cargo Trucks, 4 M984A2 HEMTT Wrecker Trucks, 140 M1085A1 5-ton Cargo Trucks, 8 HMMWV Ambulances w/Shelter, 8 Contact Maintenance Trucks, 32 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, 16 2500 gal Water Tank Trucks, 16 Motorcycles, 80 8 ton Heavy/Medium Trailers, 16 Sedans, 92 M1102 Light Tactical trailers, 92 635NL Semi-Trailers, 4 5,500 lb. Rough Terrain Forklifts, 20 M1A1 engines, 20 M1A1 Full Up Power Packs, 3 spare M88A2 engines, 10 M1070 engines, 20 HEMTT engines, 4 M577A2 spare engines, 2.5-ton truck engines, 20 spare HMMWV engines, ammunition, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of M1A1 Abrams tanks as well as associated munitions as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.4 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 24 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters or 24 Boeing AH-6 Helicopters, 24 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines, 565 M120 120mm Mortars, 665 M252 81mm Mortars, 200 AGM-114M HELLFIRE missiles, 24 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers, 16 M36 HELLFIRE Training Missiles, 15,000 2.75-inch Rockets, 24 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 24 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box, 24 M134 7.62mm Mini-Guns, 81mm ammunition, 120mm ammunition, test measurement and diagnostics equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.6 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of technical assistance to ensure provision of adequate facilities and infrastructure in support of the recruitment, garrison, training, and operational facilities and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will provide engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other
technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure (repair, rehabilitation, and new construction) in support of the training, garrison, and operational requirements of the ISF. The scope of the program includes provision of technical assistance for Light Armored Vehicles, Range Facilities, Training Facilities, Tank Range Complex Facilities, and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Facilities in support of Government of Iraq (GoI) construction projects throughout the country of Iraq. The facilities and infrastructure planned include mission essential facilities, maintenance and supply buildings, company and regimental headquarters, and utilities systems (including heating, water, sewer, electricity, and communication lines). Services include support, personnel training and training equipment, acquisition of engineer construction equipment, technical assistance to Iraqi military engineers, other technical assistance, contractor engineering services, and other related elements of logistic support.

- **July 30, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Light Armored Vehicles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $3 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 392 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) which include 352 LAV-25, 24 LAV-CC, and 16 LAV-A (Ambulances); 368 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS); 24 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS; and 26 M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons. The following are considered replacements to vehicles/weapons requested in the Military Table of Equipment (MTOE): 5 LAV-R (Recovery), 4 LAV-L (Logistics), 2 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, 41 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), 2 MK19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, 773 9mm Pistols, 93 M240G Machine Guns, and 10 AR-12 rifles. Non-MDE includes ammunition, construction, site survey, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 28, 2008** – On July 24th, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of Armored Security Vehicles as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $206 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 160 M2 50 caliber Machine Guns, 160 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs), 4 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks, 160 Harris Vehicular Radio Systems, 144 MK19 MOD3 40mm Grenade Machine Guns, 773 9mm Pistols, 93 M240G Machine Guns, and 10 AR-12 rifles. Non-MDE includes ammunition, construction, site survey, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **July 25, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of C-130J-30 Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.5 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of 6 C-130J-30 United States Air Force baseline aircraft and equipment, 24 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engines, 4 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 spare engines, 6 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 2 spare AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 6 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems, 2 spare AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems. Also included are spare and repair parts, configuration updates, integration studies, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, technical services, personnel training and training equipment, foreign liaison office support, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, construction, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **May 7, 2008** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $450 million.

- **March 21, 2008** – On March 12, 2008, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms and ammunition, communication equipment, medical equipment, and clothing and individual equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1,389 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of (700) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Armored Gun Trucks, (4,000) AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Devices, and (100,000)
M16A4 Assault Rifles. Also included are: (200) Commercial Ambulances, (16) Bulldozers, (300) Light Gun Trucks, (150) Motorcycles, (90) Recovery Trucks, (30) 20 ton Heavy Trailer, (1,400) 8 ton Medium Trailers, (3,000) 4X4 Utility Trucks, (120) 12K Fuel Tank Trucks, (80) Heavy Tractor Trucks, (120) 10K Water Tank Trucks, (208) 8 ton Heavy Trucks, (800) Light Utility Trailers, (8) Cranes, (60) Heavy Recovery Vehicles, (16) Loaders, (300) Sedans, (200) 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, (1,500) 1 ton Light Utility Trailers, (50) 40 ton Low Bed Trailers, (40) Heavy Fuel Tanker Trucks, (20) 2000 gal Water Tanker Trucks, (2,000) 5 ton Medium Trucks, (120) Armored IEDD Response Vehicles, (1,200) 8 ton Medium Cargo Trucks, (1,100) 40mm Grenade Launchers, (3,300) 9mm Pistols with Holsters, (400) Aiming Posts, (140,000) M16A4 Magazines, (100,000) M4 Weapons, (65) 5K Generators, (5,400) hand-held VHF radio sets, (3,500) vehicular VHF radio sets, (32) Air Conditioner Charger kits, (32) Air Conditioner Testers, (4,000) binoculars, (20) electrician tool kits, (600) large general purpose tents, (700) small command general purpose tents, medical equipment, organizational clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 25, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of various vehicles, small arms ammunition, explosives, and communications equipment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.257 billion.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of the following: MDE includes: (980) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and (123,544) M16A4 Rifles.

Also included are: Upgrade and refurbishment of 32 additional UH-I configuration; Armored Land Cruisers (189); Armored Mercedes (10); Light utility trucks (1,815); Fire trucks (70); Fuel trucks (40); Septic truck (20); Water truck (45); Motorcycles (112); Sedans (1,425); 5 Ton Trucks (600); Medium Trucks (600); BTR 3E1 (336); 8 Ton Trucks (400); 12 Ton Trucks (400); 16-35 Ton Trucks (100); 35 Ton Trucks (20); Ambulances (122); Bulldozers (33); Excavators (10); Wheeled Loader (20); Variable Reach Forklifts (10); 5Kw generators (447); ILAV Route Clearing Vehicle (55); Wrecker w/Boom (19); Fuel Pumps (34); 11 Passenger Bus (127); 24 Passenger Bus (207); 44 Passenger Bus (80); Contact Maintenance Trucks (105); communication towers, troposcatter and Microwave radios, IDN, DPN, VSAT Operations and Maintenance, (1,518) VHF Wheeled Tactical and Base Station Radios, (4,800) VHF hand-held radios, (6,490) VHF man pack radios, clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; Quality Assurance Team support services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 21, 2007** – On September 21, 2007, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $172 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, electronic warfare support, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Aug. 17, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of UH-I HUEY repair parts as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $150 million.

- **May 24, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of medical supplies, equipment, and training as well as associated support equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, will be less than $1.05 billion.

- **May 18, 2007** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military
Sale to Iraq of various small arms ammunition, explosives, and other consumables as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $508 million.

- **Dec. 07, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq to provide funds for Trucks, Vehicles, Trailers, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $463 million.

  Major Defense Equipment (MDE): 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or 276 Infantry Light Armored Vehicles (I-LAVs), eight Heavy Tracked Recovery Vehicles – either Brem Tracked Recovery and Repair or M578 Recovery Vehicles, six 40-Ton Trailer Lowboy – either M871 or Commercial, 66 8-Ton Cargo Heavy Trucks – either M900 series or M35 series or MK23 Medium Tactical Vehicles or Commercial Medium Trucks.

  Also included: logistics support services/equipment for vehicles (Armored Gun Trucks; Light, Medium, and Heavy Vehicles; trailers; recovery vehicles; and ambulances) supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of King Air 350ER and potentially other aircraft, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $900 million.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of:
  
  - 24 King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance role with L-3 Wescam
  - MX-15 Electro Optics/Infrared (EO/IR) system, plus 1 of the following Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR/ISAR)/Inverse Synthetic: APS-134 Sea Vue or APS-143 Ocean Eye or RDR-1700 or Lynx II (APY-8) or APS144 or APY-12 Phoenix
  - 24 Data Link Systems (T-Serie Model-U or T-Serie Model-N or ADL850 or TCDL or BMT-85)
  - 24 King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck Aircraft for light transport role
  - 48 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems
  - 48 ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems
  - 6,000 M-206 Flare Cartridges
  - 50 Global Positioning System (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)

  Also included: support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, US Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 27, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $142 million.

  The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar, support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, publications and technical data, US Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of helicopters, vehicles, weapons and support as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $500 million.

  Also included: logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems, on-job-training, laser pointers, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support,
software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **Sept. 19, 2006** – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of logistics support for Helicopters, Vehicles, Weapons as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $250 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems including on-job-training, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

- **March 10, 2005** – On 10 March 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $132 million.

The Government of Iraq has requested a possible sale of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, US Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics.


**US Security Assistance to Iraq for FY2014**

US security assistance to Iraq continued to decline in Fiscal Year 2014. The DoD budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for OSC-I requested $200 million, down 60% from the $500 million that was enacted for FY13. The DoD OCO request specified that OSC-I, the primary vehicle for bilateral security cooperation, would use this funding for “joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior level visits, and other forms of bilateral engagement.” It did not specify how this military-to-military engagement should take place given the lack of a SOFA between the US and Iraq which would allow for joint training between US and Iraqi troops.

As shown in Figure 5, an additional $525 million was requested for intelligence sharing, equipment support, and other “in theater activities,” bringing the total DoD expenditure in Iraq to $770 million, down 59% from $1.9 billion in FY2013. This declining trend in aid to Iraq also affected the State Department’s FY2014 Foreign Operations budget request, which declined from $1.2 billion in FY2012 to approximately $570 million in FY2014. This resulted in Iraq dropping from the fifth largest aid recipient to the seventh, behind Nigeria and Jordan, as shown in Figure 6.

The Congressional Research Service notes that initial plans for US assistance to Iraq were likely over-ambitious, and that Iraq has sought to demonstrate independence from the US, which has resulted in decreased expenditures in US aid even as violence in Iraq has been increasing with spillover of Islamist violence from the civil war in Syria.

Iraqi leaders have expressed major concerns about the increase in violence in Western Iraq, and have reportedly requested additional weapon system purchases, as well as the possible return of
counterterrorism advisors and intelligence professionals to Iraq. While this could provide an opening for improved counterterrorism cooperation between US and Iraqi security forces, the current budgetary realities in the US, and the desire by US leadership to “rebalance” military commitments towards East Asia make it unlikely that monetary support will be significantly increased in the future.

Figure 5: OCO Expenditures by Function/Category Breakout by Operation

![Table](image)

The US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Security Forces

The future US role in shaping the Iraqi Security Forces is now limited by the failure of Iraqi and US officials to agree to terms extending the Security Agreement’s mandate over US troop presence, the restrictive terms of the existing Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), and a decline in US funding. It is also increasingly affected by the political struggles at the top of the Iraqi government, Iran’s influence, and by the failure of Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf states to try to compete with Iran and/or deal meaningfully with the Maliki government.

As Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service reports, however, the US military does still maintain an important presence in Iraq:45

• An Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, would continue to train and mentor the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). OSC-I has grown substantially in strength up from 1,000 personnel reported in 2012 to 3,500 total personnel, of which about 175 are U.S. military personnel and the remainder are mostly contractors. The office, working out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and 10 locations around Iraq, helps train and mentor the Iraqis, and manages some 441 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases totaling over $9 billion worth of pending arms sales to Iraq. The largest FMS case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12, 2011 (Transmittal No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all parts, training, and weaponry are included.

• The United States continues to cooperate with Iraq on counter-terrorism, naval and air defense, and cooperation through joint exercises.
U.S. personnel (mostly contractors) continue to be “embedded” with Iraqi forces as trainers not only tactically, but at the institutional level (by advising Iraqi security ministries and its command structure). Ongoing discussions with the Iraqis will determine whether these personnel would accompany Iraqi forces on counter-terrorism missions.

A SIGIR report to Congress on the future of US-funded Defense programs in Iraq issued in April 2012 stated that, “Two things remain clear: New FMS (Foreign Military Sales) have slowed” in relation to previous periods, and the “ISFF (Iraqi Security Forces Fund) program execution is behind schedule”, with almost 86% yet to be obligated. SIGIR also stated that: 46

OSC-I also has execution authority over Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which in FY 2012 was made available to Iraq for the first time. Of the $1.1 billion that the Congress appropriated to the FMF in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), DoS allocated approximately $850 million for operations in Iraq. The Administration requested an additional $911 million in FMF for Iraq in FY 2013.

The SIGIR report did not, however, address the political problems in supporting the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and the various elements of the Iraqi security forces, or the problem posed by corruption, politicization, and sectarian and ethnic divisions within every element of these forces. Congress has already begun cutting US funding requests and has shown increasing resistance to large amounts of future aid. In April 2011, Congress appropriated just $3.7 billion for FY2011 to Iraq, as opposed to a requested amount of $5.05 billion.

The summer of 2013 also saw a heavy increase in US arms sales to Iraq, due primarily Iraq’s precarious political situation and the growing tensions in the Gulf and Levant over the Syrian civil war. Specifically, in July 2013 it was reported that Iraq was seeking $1.9 billion worth of military equipment, specifically helicopters, light armored reconnaissance vehicles, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons response equipment.47 The following month it was reported that the US was preparing to sell $4.3 billion worth of equipment to Iraq, including a major air defense package on top of the previously agreed-upon reconnaissance and CBRN equipment.48 As Figure 4 shows, the weapons and equipment items requested for sale to Iraq 2011 include:

- 36 F-16I fighter aircraft.49
- 53,936 155mm howitzer shells for Iraqi artillery, including a mix of high explosive and illumination rounds.50
- An ASR-11 Air Traffic Control Radar.51
- 75 Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) satellite data communications systems.52
- 200 mobile backscatter scanning systems.53
- 50 M1135 Stryker CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicles.54
- 12 Bell 412 Helicopters.55
- 19 Troposcatter Radio Systems.56
- An integrated air defense system comprising 40 AVENGER missile firing units, 681 Stinger missiles, 13 Sentinel radars, 7 Forward Area Air Defense command, control, and intelligence systems, 3 Hawk missile batteries, 6 High Powered Illumination radars, 2 Mobile Battalion Operation Centers, 10 medium range radars, long range radars, and an Omnyx-10 Air Command and Control system.57

Deliveries from the US and other foreign sources from the third quarter of 2011 included: 8 Russian Helicopters, 36 Abram Tanks, 41 Howitzers, 31 Heavy Equipment trucks/trailers, and 16 Armored Security Vehicles.58
Iraqi Military Modernization and the US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Army

In spite of all its problems, the Iraqi Army (IA) has made progress in its ability to defend Iraq’s borders, due in part to a concerted effort in 2011 by US military advisors towards more traditional defensive operations. It is now a force of 13 motorized infantry divisions, one armored division with two independent Special Forces Brigades. It has a growing aviation command and artillery and fire support capability. It is slowly making progress in creating the logistic and support capabilities it needs, as well as effective intelligence, communications, training and other key enablers.

However, the Iraqi Army continues to lack logistical and intelligence capabilities – areas that OSC-I will focus on improving. Political interference in command positions, the sale of other positions at every level and other forms of corruption, a failure to maintain the facilities and systems transferred by the US, and a host of other issues also increase the challenge.

Modernization and Arms Sales

Many Iraqi security experts and military officers still believe Iraq should depend on the United States to provide a counterbalance against Iran due to existing tensions between Iraq and Iran, particularly over the Shatt al-Arab, and Iranian incursions into northern parts Iraq.

Much will depend on the actual nature and scale of future US arms transfers. Earlier plans for the US sale of some $4.2 billion in arms to Iraq included land force weapons, naval systems, reconnaissance equipment, and several air force weapons systems, but these plans are increasingly uncertain.

The Iraqi Army is only beginning to build up units with modern heavy weapons. In the third quarter of 2010, Iraq’s 9th Armored Division received 11 US M1A1SA tanks specially configured for desert warfare. Another 129 more arrived by December 2011, but this still only produced a total strength of less than one armored division’s worth of modern main battle tanks – or 35 per regiment. Iraq also trained its instructors under an FMS package where their instruction came for General dynamics contractors rather than US military personnel.

According to Jane’s, Iraq also has bought some 1,026 US M113A2 armored personnel carriers (APCs) as well as 420 BTR-4s, including 350 amphibious versions with Parus remote turrets and 80 command vehicles fitted with US communications gear from the Ukraine to equip 10 of its mechanized battalions as well as 26 BTR-4 8 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) with Parus turrets, and seems to have ordered more.

Jane’s reports Iraq has also bought 487 mine-resistant ILVA 4X4 vehicles for its light forces, and may order over 1,000. It is also considering the purchase of 353 LAV-25 AIFVs with a two-man turret armed with a 25 mm M242 cannon; 24 LAV-Command and Control (LAV-CC); and 17 LAV-Ambulances (LAV-A). It seems to be buying other light armored vehicles like 500 MTLBs from Bulgaria. This is a good mix of armored systems for counterinsurgency and light combat, but mot for a serious conventional conflict with Iran.

Iraq also remains light in artillery. As of early 2013, its holdings of modern US weapons consisted of 24 ex-US forces 155 mm M109 self-propelled howitzers, and 120 ex-US forces 155 mm M198 towed howitzers plus orders of six AN/TPQ-36(V)10 Firefinder Radar Systems, 18 AN/TPQ-48
Light Weight Counter-Mortar radars.  

Iraq is acquiring combat helicopters. Again according to Jane’s, Iraq’s present total helicopter strength and orders include 24 Bell 407 armed reconnaissance helicopters with a goal of acquiring 50. They are armed with 50 cal (12.7 mm) machine guns, 2.75-inch (70 mm) air-to-surface rockets, and AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, and equipped with fitted with the L-3 Wescam MX-15Di forward-looking infrared sensor and laser designator. Its most advanced attack helicopters seem to consist of an order of 30 Russian Mi-28NE 'Havoc' attack helicopters equipped with modern anti-tank weapons.

Iraq also has 24 Eurocopter EC 635 light utility/training helicopters some of which may have 12.7mm machine guns and 20mm cannon. It has 22 modernized Mil Mi-17 'Hip' transport helicopters, and has ordered 16 more, for a total of 38. It is upgrading 4 to 16 Bell UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters and has some Bell 206B Jet Ranger helicopters it received from the UAE and US. It may have 10 US OH-58A Kiowas in delivery.

The Army will evidently also operate Iraq’s Hawk surface-to-air missiles if these are delivered. DSCA has announced the Iraq has requested an integrated air defense network using HAWK medium-range surface-to-air (SAM) systems and very-short-range Avenger SAMs. Jane’s reports that this system would include three batteries of HAWK XXI SAMs, each with two fire units; 216 MIM-23P HAWK missiles; 40 Avenger fire units, which are Humvees with a roof-mounted launcher for eight Stinger missiles; and 681 FIM-92H Stingers. It would also include Lockheed AN/TPS-77 transportable long-range surveillance radars.

Nations like Russia and China are becoming important suppliers – although they are no more immune to the uncertainties of Iraqi politics than the US. Jane’s reports that Iraq government signed a contract with Russia worthy some $.2 billion for various items of military equipment in October 2012. Russia made a document public following a meeting between Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki that reported Russia would supply Iraq with 30 Mi-28NE 'attack helicopters and 42 Pantsir-S1 self-propelled short-range surface-to-air missile systems.

In November 2012, however, Maliki's office announced the deal had been cancelled because of "suspicions of corruption". This announcement was then contradicted by Iraq’s acting Defense Minister Sadun al-Dulaymi, who said the deal would require renegotiation. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari then announced in March 2012 that the deal would proceed, with some deliveries that year. Iraq has previously gone through a major scandal over potential corruption in a $236 million arms deal with Serbia in 2007.

**Iraqi Military Modernization and the US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Air Force**

Iraq’s undeveloped air force means that it will need to continue to depend on outside power for air power and air defenses for some years into the future. The US had laid out plans to help Iraq acquires its own modern air forces in 2009-2011, but as is the case with many other Iraqi national security issues, the political infighting and late formation of Iraq’s government after the March 2010 elections made it difficult to clearly define the US role in improving the Iraqi Air Force once US combat forces withdrew at the end of the 2011 US transition. As a result, progress developing Iraqi air capabilities has been slow.
In June 2011, the US Army Corps of Engineers completed also completed construction of the $5.38 million Ali Air Base in southern Iraq, which could help Iraq’s Air Force to secure its borders against air attack.\(^7^1\)

In July 2011, Maliki expressed interest in purchasing 36 F16s, double the original number.\(^7^2\) Iraq has indicated that it wants 96 of the F-16s, along with Sidewinder missiles to arm them.\(^7^3\)

This is also an area where Maliki still seems to feel he needs US support. He called for a "deeper security relationship" with the United States and the acceleration of weapons deliveries to help his country curb its escalating insurgent violence during a visit in October 2013, and stressed the need to speed up delivery of the F-16, land-based air defenses, and other systems given the rising level of violence in Iraq and the impact of the Syrian civil war.

As a result, the core of Iraqi air force modernization remains the $4.2 billion security package mentioned earlier. It includes reconnaissance equipment, and 36 Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 strike fighters, along with 120 LAU-129/A common rail launchers; 24 AN/APG-68(V)9 radar sets; 19 M61 20 mm Vulcan cannons (plus 40,000 rounds of ammunition); 100 AIM- 9L/M-8/9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; 150 AIM-7M-F1/H Sparrow medium-range missiles; 50 AGM-65D/G/H/K Maverick air-to-surface missiles (plus LAU-117 launchers); 200 500 lb (226.8 kg) GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs; 50 2,000 pound GBU-10 Paveway II laser-guided bombs; 50 2,000 lb GBU-24 Paveway III laser-guided bombs; 230 Mk 84 2000 pound and 800 Mk 82 500 pound general-purpose bombs.

The package also includes 20 AN/AAQ-33 Sniper or AN/AAQ-28 Litening targeting pods, four F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems (AARS) or DB-110 reconnaissance pods; 22 AN/ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites or Advanced Countermeasures Electronic Systems (ACES), and 22 AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing systems.\(^7^4\)

The F-16 is not, however, Iraq’s only option. Russia has offered Iraq the MiG-29 and would probably sell it more advanced fighters. Jane’s also reports that there is some question about past orders of armed trainers. DSCA) notified Congress in December 2008 of a possible sale of 36 AT-6Bs as well as 20 T-6A. So far, Iraq has only bought 15 aircraft of the 20 T-6As.\(^7^5\)

Jane’s and other sources indicate that other aspects of Iraqi Air Force modernization include:\(^7^6\)

- Three US Air Force donated C-130E Hercules transport aircraft and six C-130J-30 Super Hercules with AN/AAR-47 missile approach warning systems and AN/ALE-47 countermeasures dispensing systems.
- Up to 24 Hawker Beechcraft King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck aircraft. Orders have been placed and delivered for one King Air 350ER transport and five King Air 350ER ISR aircraft.
- Iraq also placed an order for six Antonov An-32B 'Cline' twin-turboprop medium transports.
- Iraq is seeking 12 Bell 412EP helicopters for uses as search-and-rescue (SAR) platforms, equipped with Star SAFIRE III electro-optic infrared (EO/IR) systems night vision imaging system-compatible cockpit lighting, search lights, as well as communications and navigation gear.
- A new command-and-control system that began operating in August 2010, and connects Iraq’s air bases and to the Iraqi defence and intelligence network called the Iraqi Information Infrastructure Program (I3P). It is intended to serve as a foundation for the development of nationwide command-and-control and communications among security forces and allow them to perform air traffic management and strategic reconnaissance through direct communication with aircraft and the Iraqi Operations Center
- Two Seeker SB7L-360 light reconnaissance aircraft.
- SAMA CH2000 surveillance aircraft. And 24 modified Beech King Air 350ER special mission platforms fitted with the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc Lynx II synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) system, which operates in conjunction with Control of Lynx and Analysis (CLAW) software and an L-3 Communications West high-bandwidth datalink.
- 20 new Serbian Utva Lasta 95 piston-engined primary trainers now deployed at the Al Sahra training base.
- Possible orders for up to 24 Czech-built Aero Vodochody L-159 advanced trainer/light-attack aircraft.

If the Iraqi Air Force continues to seek support from the US, much depends on US willingness to help Iraq train personnel, develop logistics, and strategize on the use of the Air Force. The July 2011 SIGR report suggested that one of the main objectives of a continued US presence in Iraq should be to provide an air-defense umbrella for Iraq while the Iraqi Air Force develops its capacity to conduct independent operations.

The US Iraqi pilot training program has trained more than 60 Iraqi pilots and 30 instructor pilots since its inception in 2008. Currently, 10 Iraqi pilots are being trained in the US to fly the first set of F-16s due to arrive by 2014. As of September 30, 2011, the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Air (ITAM-Air) had nearly 1,200 personnel directly engaged with Iraq’s air force personnel. Iraqi General Zibari emphasized that, “an army without an air force is exposed” and stated that Iraq will not be able to defend its own air space until 2020, at the earliest.

On December 12, 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Iraq for 18 F-16IQ aircraft and associated equipment, parts, weapons, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $2.3 billion, increasing the total number of F-16s being purchased by Iraq to 36. The sale also includes requests for Sidewinder missile, various air-to-ground missiles, laser guided bomb units, and a variety of other equipment. The sale is widely seen as part of a US focus on increasing the capabilities of the Iraqi air force.

Additionally, the 2013 sale request by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to delivery Iraq’s integrated air defense system (discussed in Figure 6 above), will, in conjunction with the delivery of Iraq’s F-16I fighter aircraft, provide the Iraqi Air Force an anti-air capability on par with those of other states in the region. These weapons compliment the systems being sold by other Gulf States, which include an AN/TPY-2 radar from the UAE, and a THAAD missile defense system from Qatar. This combination of air defense systems suggests that a major US motivation remains its desire to provide Iraq the capacity to interdict Iranian flights overflying its soil bring weapons to Syria. As of October 2013, Iraq is still not able to prevent these flights, and Iran has been able to cross Iraqi airspace en route to Syria at will.

**Iraqi Military Modernization and the US Role in Shaping the Iraqi Navy**

The US role in shaping the Iraqi navy inevitably affects Iranian and US military competition. US support is critical to securing the flow of Iraqi commerce and deterring against external threats. The Iranian threat to Gulf energy exports is a key reason the US often deploys two US aircraft carrier groups in the Gulf region. According to the Department of Defense, Iraq’s oil infrastructure is vulnerable to the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) and Iraq’s offshore oil loading points are vulnerable to attack.

An ongoing series of naval incidents serves as a reminder that Iranian and Western relations in the Gulf remain tense. The IRGC captured 15 British soldiers in Iraqi waters in March 2007. On
January 6, 2008, five armed Iranian speedboats maneuvered aggressively towards and issued radio threats against three American Navy warships in international waters while entering the Strait of Hormuz. According to Pentagon officials, the American commander was close to issuing an order to fire on one of the speedboats which came within 200 yards of the warship – and within range of one of the machine guns aimed at it – before it suddenly veered away.

In 2007, Iraq had a 1200-man navy, 2 afloat squadrons, and 4 marine companies. It was also adding offshore support vessels, patrol ships and boats, and smaller vessels. In October 2010, the Iraqi navy inaugurated the first of 15 $20 million US-built Swift Class patrol boats. It bought two more in August 2011, to bring the total to 5 of 12 ordered. Iraq also received two $70 million US-built offshore support vessels in 2011. In July 2011, SIGIR reported Iraq’s navy had grown to over 3,600 assigned personnel. One of OSC-I planned ten locations will be in Umm Qasr, the primary location of Iraq’s Navy.

As part of the transition to State Department lead in Iraq, the US Coast Guard Maritime Security Advisory Team (MSAT) began oversight of maritime training and reports to the US Embassy. In partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, OSC-I Basra, and INL, MSAT will develop Iraq’s capacity to secure, regulate, and manage its coastal water and rivers. This includes developing legislative and regulatory authorities and instructing courses on small-boat operations.

In July 2013, Jane’s reported that the Iraqi Navy still had a strength of 3,600 personnel, including some 1,500 marines and had increased its equipment to 56 patrol craft of various sizes, 24 fast assault craft, and 3 offshore support vessels. These vessels began actively patrolling the al-Basra and Khawr al Amaya oil terminals as well as offshore oil platforms. The Navy is also pursuing a 26-15-4-2 acquisition program – the will give it a total of 26 Defender-class craft, 15 30-35 m craft, four 390-ton Fateh-class patrol ships and two 55-60 m offshore support vessels.

The exact holdings and order book of the Iraqi Navy are unclear. Jane’s reported the following progress in Iraqi Naval modernization activities in its 2013 Sentinel report on Iraq:

- Procurement of 26 patrol boats as part of a ‘26-15-4-2’ acquisition program.
- Transfer of two Type 200 15 m inshore patrol craft, built in 1977-1981. The UAE also provided 24 fast assault boats.
- Plans for procurement of 15 30-35 meter craft and offshore support vessels through US Foreign Military Sales.
- Provision by the UAE of 24 Fast Assault Boats to patrol the rivers of southern Iraq and counter smuggling.
- Acquire two new Fast Sea Frames offshore support vessels (OSVs) from US-based RiverHawk in 2012: Al Basrah (OSV 401) and Al Fayhaa (OSV 402).
- Other new assets comprise 26 Defender 2710 fast response boats, 15 Swiftships-built 35 meter coastal patrol boats, and four Fincantieri-built Fateh-class 53 m patrol boats.
- Offshore support ship Al-Shams was reported in service in 2011.
- Delivery of the first of four new Fateh-class Saettia Mk 4 patrol ships from Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri in May 2009. The 53 meter, 390-ton Fateh is intended to become the flagship of the resurgent navy. The second – Nasir – was delivered to the navy in October 2009. The final two vessels, Majedand Shimookh, were delivered in December 2009. The Fateh-class is based on the Italian Coast Guard’s Diciotti-class, but instead of a helicopter deck, the Iraqi ships have an open stern ramp for the launch and recovery of a 10 m high-speed interceptor. Each is equipped with an Oto Melara 30 mm turret gun and 30 mm automatic cannon.
In October 2009, Swiftships Shipbuilders secured a contract for design and construction of nine patrol craft. In March 2011, the contract was amended to cover an additional three boats, with an option three more. The first vessel, P-301, carried out its first patrol in January 2011. The second and third ships were delivered in January 2011, and deliveries were completed in July 2013 with the activation and arrival of a seventh ship.

Fifteen 34 meter P340 patrol craft are being acquired from Malaysian marine consultancy ISD and Associates. Each will have a 20 mm gun forward, a 12.5 mm machine gun and two GPMGs behind the bridge. Delivery of three Al-Uboor (Al Faw)-class patrol boats.

Delivery of 10 7.7 meter Defender fast patrol boats by in mid-2009 - providing the navy with 26 boats, completing the first phase of the 26-15-4-2 procurement plan.

Possible order of two support ships, to be used for troop transport, interdiction tasks and patrol boat replenishment, with a ship’s company of 26, plus accommodation for 14 fast attack boat (FAB) crew members and six divers, and seating for 40 troops.

Much is still undetermined regarding the future of US-Iraq maritime security ties. Like its air force, Iraq’s navy remains underdeveloped and critically deficient compared to its neighbors. Budgetary issues are concerns for both the US and Iraq; however, the US willingness to deter Iran and secure the Gulf is constant. Furthermore, the fact that the maritime domain has seen far less militant activity than the land domain means that Iraqi naval capability will likely remain a low priority compared to ground force units for the foreseeable future.

As is the case with airpower, however, the US can provide significant naval aid to Iraq. The US Navy’s ability to deploy out of installations in Bahrain Kuwait will ideally allow Navy personnel to conduct joint training with their Iraqi counterparts despite the lack of a SOFA. Possible avenues for expanded naval cooperation and training include deployments of US Navy coastal patrol, riverine, and special warfare craft under the cognizance of the US Navy Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command, which provides training and advisory packages for small-boat combat operations, port operations and security, and anti-terrorism and force-protection operations.

US Navy Pacific Command’s Cooperative Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises offer another model for maritime security cooperation with Iraq. These exercises focus on training in maritime security, visit board search and seizure operations (VBSS), and combined naval operations at sea.

The US Navy Special Warfare Command has created its own dedicated detachment for security force assistance with its Special Warfare Anchor Detachments, which provide regionally focused teams to partner with host-nation military units in a manner similar to US Army Special Forces teams. These units will be ideal for developing an Iraqi maritime and riverine special operations capability.

Military Training and Education

Military training and education also remain important tools both in terms of US influence and Iraq’s ability to achieve security and political stability. The 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service on engagement with Iraq notes that US efforts to provide effective training for Iraqi security forces along the Foreign Internal Defense model that was utilized until December, 2011, is hindered by the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement which is necessary for the return of
even small numbers of US advisors on a rotational basis. This places a heavy constraint on the level of tactical and operational military engagement that the US can pursue with Iraq.

The current Memorandum of Understanding between the two nations -- signed in December 2012 -- focused primarily on high level exchanges and professional military education. Indeed, the State Department reports that while just over $40 million was spent on military engagement with Iraq in FY13, it was spent primarily on Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training programs which trained only 77 students. While these activities are no doubt highly beneficial for the strategic relationship, they engage only small numbers of Iraqi personnel, and then only in educational rather than active training environments.

Much still depends, however, on Joint-Combined Education and Training missions designed to bring together key Iraqi units with specialized American trainers who can provide customized training packages required to improve Iraqi capabilities on a broad scale. This would also allow for US-Iraqi military engagement with a far greater number of Iraqi military personnel, allowing the US to extend training and influence over junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, and not just small numbers of mid-rank officers hand-picked to attend US military schools.

A possible solution to allow this -- without broaching the issue of a long term SOFA with Iraq -- would be to engage in regular Joint Combined Education and Training missions at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) in Jordan, with Marine units operating from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and as attached units in joint training with other Persian Gulf states.

### Cooperation in Counter Terrorism

Iraq’s internal political problems in cooperating with the US remain serious in many other areas, but the increasing levels of Sunni-extremist violence in Iraq in 2013 may result in the GoI rethinking some of its policies towards US military support. In March 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that the CIA was taking over the leading role in training and supporting the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service, which will allow the US to get around the issue of the SOFA as it will be conducted under the CIA’s covert action authorities rather than by the military.

In August 2013, Iraqi leadership began actively discussing the possibility of inviting the US military to support Iraqi counterterrorism efforts with advisors and even with targeted strikes from remotely piloted aircraft. Foreign Policy magazine quoted Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari saying that Iraqi would be interested in hosting US drones for kinetic strikes so to “target al-Qaeda and their bases” so long as they could do so “without collateral damage.” Iraqi Ambassador to the United States Lukman Faily was also quoted saying that “The reason we’re now considering drone support is because we need to get better control of the sky so we can track and destroy al-Qaeda camps in the country.”

The Iraqi desire for increased US military assistance may indicate an opening for a return of American military advisers to Iraq. This would enable broader support to more Iraqi units than can be reached through CIA covert assistance alone.

Former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker noted in an interview with Defense One that effective counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Don’t require Apache helicopters or lots of troops. But it does require good Special Forces and intelligence support. As David Petraeus and I discovered when we were in Baghdad, you can’t achieve progress on the
political front until you improve security. So priority number one should be working with the Iraqis to figure how al Qaeda is moving men and material, what rat lines they are using, where their safe houses are and how we can penetrate its ranks. And then you have to go after them.

It is still unclear, however, that PM Maliki will accept revisions to the SOFA in order to allow a sustained US presence for counterterrorism support. His focus remains on acquisition of high-end US weapon systems such as F-16s, AH-64 Apaches, and air defense systems, even though these are not optimal for targeted counterterrorism operations.

**The Iraqi Police and Security Forces**

The Ministry of the Interior, Iraqi paramilitary forces, and the Iraqi police forces continue to be a critical part of Iraq’s counterterrorism and internal security forces. There is far less official reporting on such forces since 2011, but the 2013 edition of the IISS Military Balance reported that the Ministry of Interior Forces had a total authorized strength of 531,000 in early 2013, with 302,000 in the Iraqi Police Service, 44,000 in the paramilitary Iraqi Federal Police 44,000, 60,000 in Border Enforcement, and 95,000 in the Facilities Protection Service and 60,000 in the Oil Police – two sets of forces which were little more than security guards.

The Ministry of the Interior had become steadily more political after the 2010 election and never eliminated serious problems with corruption. The Prime Minister’s office and provincial power brokers also continued to bypass the formal command chain.

**Iraqi Federal Police Service (IFP)**

The **Iraqi Federal Police Service (IFP)** is the key paramilitary element of Iraq’s security services and is composed of specialized elements for counter-insurgency operations. It was was formerly known as the Iraqi National Police (INP). The name was changed in August 2009 because of major sectarian abuses by a largely Shi’ite force, and the force became far more national while US forces stayed in country. It has since reverted in part to being a Shi’ite dominated force under the control of the Prime Minister.

Its forces are equipped with body armor, small-arms, medium machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. There are motorized units with some light armor, as well as pick-up trucks and sports utility vehicles (SUVs). It has teams specializing in disposing of explosive devices.

Jane’s reports that recent times the IFP was organized into four divisions and 17 brigades, including a mechanized brigade, and other elements, including a sustainment brigade. Both Jane’s and others sources indicate that the 1st and 2nd Motorized Division, were headquartered in Baghdad were created out of the former Commando Division and the Public Order Division. The IFP’s 3rd Motorised Division had its headquarters in Mosul and the 4th Motorized Division was is headquartered in Basra.

A Baghdad-based 1st IFP Mechanized Brigade was under the IFP command headquarters. It had begun operating in early 2005 and had a special troop’s battalion and four mechanized battalions. Its equipment included M117 armored security vehicles; armored personnel carriers derived from the BTR-80 and South African-manufactured Reva APCs.
**Federal Intelligence and Investigative Agency (FIIA)**

Jane’s reports that the Federal Intelligence and Investigative Agency (FIIA) is, “the leading intelligence/investigative agency of the Ministry of the Interior and has been described as an Iraqi version of the FBI.” It is a largely Shi’ite force operating under the direction of the Prime Minister and was formerly known as the National Intelligence and Investigative Agency (NIIA). It was renamed in November 2011.

It has a national role in criminal intelligence analysis and investigations and providing national intelligence support to the police, as well as in counter-insurgency role and in dealing with crimes like the kidnapping and assassination attempts on senior Iraqi officials.

It had more than 9,000 personnel in 2007 but its current manning is unclear, Jane’s reports that it seemed to have an organization comprising 15 provincial bureaus, 56 district offices and 13 Point of Entry (PoE) offices in 2013, and has a large new national headquarters and a National Training Centre opened in Baghdad. It also has a Cyber Crimes Unit, and the agency’s Technical Affairs General Directorate has branches for wire-tapping and intercepting cell phone calls. Jane’s reports its head is Major General Hussein Ali Kamal who had taken courses at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia in Counter-Terrorism, Organized Crime and Money Laundering.

**Iraqi Police Service**

Jane’s reported in August 2013 that the regular Iraqi Police Service had a total of 303,000 personnel. The force was organized largely into provincial police forces and included patrol police, traffic police, police station staff, and several special units. The IPS role is to enforce the rule of law, provide local security. There was a central Criminal Evidence Directorate, and the General Directorate of Crime Affairs. A national Iraqi Highway Patrol was established in 2004 to provide law enforcement and security for Iraq's highways and major roadways, but was later merged with the provincial police departments. The police also had some 30 Company Special Weapons and Tactics (CSWAT) units in the provinces.

These forces became increasingly politicized at the provincial and local levels after the departure of US combat forces at the end of 2011. Positions and promotions were often based on local, national, and sectarian alignments rather than competence and increase sold. Some elements were highly corrupt, and others were relatively passive – effectively staying in station and collecting their pay. The regular police had a nominal eight weeks of training, but large elements still lacked effective real world training for their role.

**Iraqi Correctional Service**

The Iraqi Correctional Service has the role of ensuring prison security and the welfare of prisoners. Its reputation is poor and its effectiveness is limited.

**Border Guards**

Janes’s estimates that Iraq’s Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and border guards had a total authorized strength of 39,330 in 2013. It is charged with monitoring and controlling the movement of persons and goods to, from and across the borders of Iraq, and this includes some counterterrorism roles. It has 12 brigades and 42 battalions, covering five regions.

- Border Region 1: Turkey/Iran border
- Border Region 2: Jordan, Syria, western Saudi border
• Border Region 3: Iranian border
• Border Region 4: Kuwait, Iran border
• Border Region 5: Saudi border

It mans over 270 border posts and forts and controls 17-21 land points of entry into Iraq. These points of entry are equipped maintain Z Backscatter Van (ZBV) X-ray equipment. The force has been steadily strengthened along the Syria border since the Syrian civil war began, but has does far more to try to control the flow of Sunnis than Shi’ites.

The are some high quality elements of the DBE, but it has been increasingly politicized and brought under the de facto control of the Prime Minister’s office. Corruption, political influence and the sale of positions and promotions is a problem. It also lacks the mobility, intelligence support, and firepower to adequate secure Iraq’s borders – particularly its border with Syria.

Iraqi Coast Guard

The Iraqi Coast Guard, with an authorized strength of somewhere around 500, It is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and Jane’s report in August 23013 that it was commanded by Brigadier General Hakim Jassam. Its main role is to patrol the Shatt al Arab waterway and waterways running to Basra. One of its roles is to combat smuggling, but its effectiveness remains unclear. Efforts have been made in the past to merge it with the Iraqi Navy.

General Commission for Customs

The General Commission for Customs (GCC) is controlled by the Ministry of Finance, and Jane’s estimate it has some 41,000 personnel. It is supposed to assist in collecting customs revenue and preventing smuggling, importation of illegal drugs and obscene material, and controlling the import/export of currency.

The service is organized on the basis of three territorial areas -middle area around Baghdad; north area, around Mosul; and south area around Basra. Its effectiveness and professional integrity seem to be limited. Customs present major problems in both efficiency and corruption, and many source report bribes are necessary to get timely action.

Facilities Protection Service

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is a relatively low grade force charged with providing armed, trained and uniformed security guards to ministry and governorate offices, government infrastructure, and fixed sites. Most units are subordinate to the individual ministries whose facilities they protect on a day to day basis, but are under the formal control of the interior ministry. Their normal strength is around 100,000 personnel.

The FPS has moderate effectiveness, but security guards have obvious limits in country with Iraq’s problem with terrorism and violent sectarian and ethnic divisions.

Oil Police

The oil police is charged with protecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and guarding oil fields, refineries, pipelines and convoys. It originally was under the oil ministry but was placed under the direct control of the interior ministry in 2008. It had some 28,700 at the time US forces left Iraq.

This force is more effective than the FPS and has an Intelligence Department and three regional commands – Central (Baghdad); Northern (Kirkuk); Mid-Euphrates (Amara) and Southern
(Basra). Its effectiveness varies by area, but it does seem to work relatively effectively with the military and other MOI forces in at least some areas.

**Electrical Installation Police**

This force had the role of guarding Iraq’s electrical supply system and infrastructure. Its current status is unclear.

**Railway Police**

This force is a dedicated force to guard the Iraqi railway system. Its status is also unclear.

**Iraqi Intelligence Services**

There are several different elements of Iraqi intelligence. US experts report that some had an Iranian presence or are under Iranian influence but there is no way to validate such reports or put them into perspective.

**The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS)**

The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was formally established in April 2004. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator nominally operates under the Interior Ministry of the Iraqi, but is effectively controlled by the office of the Prime Minister. It was established with the help of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Jane’s reports that it had roughly 1,000 members by 207 and was looking to expand to around 3,000. Junior and mid-level officers from Saddam’s disbanded security apparatus were recruited to the service. By 2009, it had t 6,000 personnel. Its current strength is unclear.

Its initial leader was Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani - a Turkoman – who had a strained relationship with certain Shia members of the Iraqi government and who left after clashes with Maliki in 2009. He was succeeded by General Zuheir Fadel, a Maliki loyalist.

**Ministry of National Security (MoNS)**

The MoNS, was created in 2006 at a time when the CIA still had close ties to Iraqi Intelligence. It since became a Shi’ite controlled service. The first director was Sheerwan al-Waeli, who held the position of Minister of State for National Security. Jane’s indicates received training in Iran. Estimates of the strength of the agency varied in 2007 from 1,200 to 5,500.

By late 2008, it carried out liaison functions with the Iraqi intelligence and security services on behalf of the Prime Minister, and Jane’s reported that intelligence cells had been set up with the participation of the MoNS, the INIS, and the intelligence services of the interior ministry.

Jane’s also notes that al-Waeli said in an in an interview in September 2011, that the liaison between the different Iraqi security services had resulted in the apprehension of dozens of Al Qaeda activists and the foiling of several, and claimed that the MoNS was the only branch of Iraqi intelligence that did not receive support from the US or other countries.

**Office of Information and Security and Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS)**

Maliki has further strengthened his control over Iraqi intelligence by establishing the Office of Information and Security which reports to the prime minister, and the Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS), which is part of the Ministry of Defense. The DGIS effectively
reports to Maliki in his de facto position as Iraq’s real Minister of Defense. It has its own headquarters at a new headquarters in Baghdad and Jane’s reports that its missions include the gathering and dissemination of intelligence, the development of imagery and mapping capabilities, and supporting the security forces with Arabic-language maps and imagery products.

In addition, as indicated above, the Oil Police has an intelligence department. The Ministry of Health has an intelligence section, and there is an intelligence department attached to universities. There is a police intelligence unit specializing in tourism and antiquities.

**Peshmerga Forces and Intelligence services of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)**

It is important to note that Iraq also has a separate set of forces called the Peshmerga under the control of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The various military and paramilitary elements of this force are overseen by the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, which acts as the KRG’s ministry of defense. They combine the past militias of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) -- located in the provinces of Arbil and Dahuk - and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) located in As Sulaymaniyah province. The KDP and PUK have feuded in the past but now seem to cooperate.

These Peshmerga forces have elements that participated in operations with the central government forces in the past, but have not merged with them as planned. They now operate independently in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Arbil and Dahuk.

The prospects for any future merger also became far more doubtful in June 2013, when some 1,000 career ethnic Kurdish soldiers defected from the 16th Armored Brigade of the regular Iraqi Army, and refused orders to support a military operation against Sunnis in Sulaiman Bek and requested to join the KRG’s forces. Sulaiman Bek is part of the area where the Iraqi central government and the KRG have disputed claims. At the same time, the Iraqi Federal Government has resisted KRG efforts to have Peshmerga forces funded out of central government funds.

The current strength of Peshmerga forces is unclear. As past reporting by SIGIR and Jane’s has shown, estimates of the strength of Peshmerga forces have varied widely. US estimates of the fighting strength of the Peshmerga at around 70,000 to 80,000 in 2011, but if all security and police forces are counted, some other estimates go as high 190,000.

Jane’s reports that the PUK created a 1,000 man Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) based in As Sulaymaniya-based with US that led by Lahur Talabani, nephew of the Iraqi president. There also are a KDP’s intelligence service called the Parastin, and a PUK intelligence agency, known as Zanyari. Efforts to merge the two under the title of the Kurdistan Security Service do not seem to have succeeded, but they do seem to cooperate.

**Sunni Awakening Councils (Sons of Iraq - SOI)**

The largely Sunni Awakening Councils militia, or Sons of Iraq (SOI), were once a major paramilitary force but have largely been put aside or marginalized by the Maliki government, and some elements have aligned themselves with Al Qas’ida while others are now effectively Sunni militias with few ties or loyalty to the Shi’ite dominated central government.
US official reported in June 2012, that about 70,000 SOI had been integrated into the ISF or given civilian government jobs, while 30,000 continued to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and were paid about $US 300 per month by the government. Iraqi Sunnis report that many have since been pushed out of their positions, marginalized or not been paid. Counterterrorism experts indicate that this is a major and growing Iraqi security problem.

**US Role in Supporting the Iraqi Police Force and Ministry of Interior**

Since 2003, the United States has spent approximately $8 billion to train, staff, and equip Iraq’s police forces. However, the US now faces far more serious problems in supporting the Iraqi police force and Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior – where the analysis of Iraqi security and politics earlier in this report indicate that political divisions and corruption are now more the rule than the exception, the force is reverting to a passive, confessions-based force, and key supporting institution in the courts, legal, and detention systems present major problems.

The original plan called for the transfer of support to the MOI and various elements of the Iraq police from the Department of Defense to the Department of State once US combat operations halted in Iraq although this present major political problems in terms of Congressional funding, State was not staffed for the task, and virtually all of the personnel involved had to be contractors.

The Department of State launched its Police Development Program (PDP) on October 1, 2011, with over 100 senior trainers and advisors from various government and civilian agencies with the goal of supporting the scale of effort shown in Figure 7. The program included working directly with senior Iraqi Interior Ministry and police officials to increase a variety of capabilities, ranging from forensics to explosive ordinance disposal. The program was designed on a “hub and spoke” model, with 350 advisors located at major training hubs in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil, overseeing satellite centers in each of their respective regions.

According to the July, 2012 SIGIR report on the PDP, the advisors would travel to approximately 50 spoke sites across the provinces, conducting programs at Iraqi training academies and other key police facilities. DoS-provided secure ground transportation would enable travel to approximately half of the sites, while dedicated air transportation would support the remaining sites. However, establishing credible oversight, management, and transparency continues to be the broad, primary objective. These US advisors conducted baseline assessments of Iraqi capabilities as of December 2011.

The State effort soon had to be downsized to a total of 115 rather than 350 personnel. Moreover, SIGIR reported in October 2011 that State lacked a viable assessment of Iraqi police force capabilities, has not drafted a detailed plan providing specifics on what is to be accomplished, or outlined costs and performance outcomes. In addition, it stated that only 12% of current spending plans would directly assist the Iraqi police and State had yet to secure commitments from Iraq regarding its planned financial commitments to police programs.

Other reporting since that time – which has not been formally published – indicates a steady decline in the police effort, with growing corruption and internal political divisions. This reporting is confirmed by discussions with US experts and with observers in country.

The State Department is seeking to continue bilateral relationships outlined under the Strategic Framework Agreement, but GAO and other reporting quoted indicates that it still lacks clear parameters, personnel requirements, or funding to be affective on its own. State’s mission will rely on consulates in Basra and Irbil, though embassy branch offices in Mosul and Kirkuk were
cut due to budget constraints. In addition, the ten OSC-I sites will be responsible for most military-to-military cooperation.

State’s heavy reliance on private security contractors has also created another set of issues and their use has been a sensitive issue among Iraqis that has led to a steady down scaling of the State effort. The July 2011 SIGIR Report noted that a system for monitoring serious incidents involving private security contractors was still absent. SIGIR reported that this will likely remain unchanged through 2011 and the State Department would not provide SIGIR any information on how they would likely govern PSCs.113

SIGIR’s follow-on report of July 2012 noted that the PDP was still plagued by a lack of Iraqi buy-in, and that without more extensive support it is unlikely to succeed.114 It also noted that these issues had resulted in some $200 million being wasted on PDP infrastructure that went unused due to the lack of an Iraqi commitment and to the failure by both sides to properly assess the roles and capabilities of Iraqi police forces before beginning the program. Continuing violence in Iraq, as well as budgetary concerns about continued US funding of the program, led DoS to slow implementation of the PDP by adopting a phased approach, and only beginning training at some 23 of the 50 planned spoke sites.115

The Congressional Research Service also reports in its analysis of the State Department FY2014 Foreign Operations request that the PDP has been terminated completely, which largely accounts for the significant drop in funding to Iraq from $1.2 billion in FY2012 to $500 million in FY2014.116 The last advisors were withdrawn from Iraq in March 2013.117

**Figure 7: Police Development Program Sites as of May 2012**

American Policy Constraints

In summary, the failure of the Obama administration and the Maliki government to reach agreement on the size and scope of US troops in Iraq after December 31, 2011 dealt a considerable blow to both the prospect for effective Iraqi force development and America’s interests in the region. It leaves Iraqi police and military without the training and support they need, and allowed subversive elements to wait out the US withdrawal before resuming destabilizing sectarian violence, which has risen in recent months to levels not seen since the height of the insurgency.118

US experts, GAO, and media reporting continue to note serious problems in efforts to stem corruption and enforce rule-of-law that are necessary to give the Iraqi government legitimacy while building the foundation for security. The US continued efforts to improve this situation and USAID requested $263 million for governance and anti-corruption programs in FY2012.119 However, fraud, nepotism, intimidation, and corruption remain rampant in Baghdad. Iraqi oversight bodies, like the Commission of Integrity, remain incapable of doing their job, while senior officials lack the incentives to correct their actions.

The State Department has been forced to reduce the size of its mission in Iraq by half. The US embassy in Baghdad, which has swelled to a size of 16,000 personnel and a budget of $6 billion, is facing significant cuts, according US Department of State officials as recently as February 2012. These cuts will significantly curtail the State Department’s ability to continue to fund training and support of Iraqi police and military.

Finally, political interference, the role of power brokers, corruption, sale of positions and promotion, reversion to a confessions-based approach to policing, the lack of effective courts and adequate detention facilities, long-standing tension between the police and the courts, and sectarian and ethnic issues all present future challenges. The US and its allies had major problems with all of these issues before US withdrawal, and - in general – contract advisors performed poorly at massive expense. It is unclear that the State Department can meet these challenges even if Iraq gives it the opportunity to try.

The Maliki Visit of November 2013

The key question for both Iraq and the US is whether the Maliki government or any successor will seek to make serious changes in this situation – either to deal with the rising level of internal violence in Iraq or the problems and threats outside it.

In November 2013, Prime Minister Maliki visited Washington for discussions with the Obama Administration on the future of the US-Iraqi relationship. One key focus of these discussions was an increase in military aid and weapons sales to Iraq to help counter the rise in violence in Iraq spilling over from the Syrian civil war.

PM Maliki was particularly concerned by the fact that Anbar Province had become a haven for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shams, where they have camps, training facilities, and staging areas that the Iraqi Army is unable to target.120 He reportedly requested AH-64 Apache helicopters in order to enable air-mobile assaults into ISIS strongholds, as well as support from US military advisers and intelligence officers to help train and coordinate Iraqi counterterrorism forces.121 Such a transfer presents the problem it could be used in Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian power struggles, but – with proper controls on the transfer – it might provide an opening for a return of US
counterterrorism advisors and intelligence support personnel to support an Iraqi targeted counterterrorism capability of the sort that Ambassador Crocker has called for, as noted above.

A senior Obama Administration official noted that much of the discussions between US and Iraqi leaders centered on developing a strategic approach to counterterrorism which would draw moderate Sunni tribes closer to the national government and “making sure that they have the mass of the population on their side.” Throughout 2013 the Sunni Sahwa militias which drove the “Anbar Awakening” in 2006-2007 have come under heavy attack from ISIS. If the Maliki Government is unable to reach out to the Sahwa and other moderate Sunnis, it will exacerbate sectarian tensions and strengthen Sunni extremist groups.

Immediately prior to PM Maliki’s arrival in Washington, a number of leading US policymakers did, however, expressed concern that PM Maliki’s sectarian feuding was a key source of Iraq’s internal violence, and that the US should be cautious about extending further military aid. These concerns were based on the perception that the Maliki government is exclusively favoring Shi’ite groups and marginalizing Sunni moderates.

In an open letter to President Obama published the week of PM Maliki’s visit, Senators John McCain, Carl Levin, James Inhofe, Robert Menendez, Bob Corker, and Lindsey Graham, stated that “Prime Minister Maliki’s mismanagement of Iraqi politics is contributing to the recent surge in violence.” These Senators further stated that they expect to see “more evidence from Prime Minister Maliki that U.S. security assistance and arms sales are part of a comprehensive Iraqi strategy that addresses the political sources of current violence” if they will support increased arms sales and counterterrorism assistance to the Maliki government.

**Options for US Policy**

As Prime Minister Maliki’s November 2013 visit to Washington made all too clear, US support of Iraq’s security efforts has become one of the few areas where the US retains major leverage in dealing with Iraq and countering Iranian influence. Figure 3 shows that Iraq still needs major deliveries of advanced combat equipment if it is to have any serious defense capabilities against Iran. Figure 6 shows the stream of US arms orders that had been announced before his visit, and the potential scale of the Iraq dependence on US support that could result. A major IMET effort could supplement these sales, and possibly a US military or contract support effort in country -- although the problems in security and immunity would have to find some quiet solution.

The practical problem is that the US will need to be very careful to ensure Iran does not gain access to advanced US equipment – a problem that has already led to Iranian inspection of US sales to Iraq. It is also to ensure that the Maliki government will not use US weapons against his opposition, the Kurds, and peaceful Sunni demonstrators. This can be a major challenge given the current size of the US military advisory group in Iraq, and the pressure on Maliki or any future Shi’ite leader that does not create a true national government. It also means competing with Russia and China on relatively unfavorable terms unless the US can reduce the long delays in the approval of US sales – a failure in US national security efforts that has resisted more than 30 years of effort at reform and change.

Nevertheless, it is an area where Iraq not only has current needs but draw on a much larger pool of US supplied arms imports than is always apparent from its order of battle. By 2012, Iraq had placed $1.1 billion worth of arms orders during 2004-2007 and $4.8 billion during 2008-2011, as
well as received major transfers of US surplus equipment during the US withdrawal. As Figure 6 shows, Iraq has placed major new orders since that time.

The Obama Administration should also urge Iraqi leadership to focus less on heavy weapon systems and equipment that it can acquire from the US, and looking more towards advanced training for its elite units, intelligence sharing, and advisory programs for senior military leadership. This would reflect the fact that the major US successes in Iraq in 2006-2008 were not the result of new weapon systems, but rather resulted from paradigm shifts in operational thinking and organization. This allowed the US military to capitalize on the Awakening movement while also conducting highly focused counterterrorism targeting which decimated much of the insurgent leadership and infrastructure. Following a similar course would also allow PM Maliki to demonstrate a focus on counterterrorism rather than on cracking down on sectarian opponents.

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10 Aaron Davis, “Maliki Seeking Consensus on Troops,” Washington Post, May 12, 2011. This decision took place following a series of high-level US visits,


Adapted from the data in the IISS Military Balance, 2013, pp. 381-382.


Interview with Captain Casey Doyle, USMC, October 20, 2013. Captain Doyle previously deployed as the Executive Officer of a Military Transition Team supervising the Iraqi Border Police.

Interview with Captain Casey Doyle, USMC, October 20, 2013.

Interview with Captain Casey Doyle, USMC, October 20, 2013.

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33 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report To Congress, April 30, 2012, 57.
37 “Overseas Contingency” FISCAL YEAR 2013, Budget of the US Government, FY2023, OMB, February 2012
38 Department of State. *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: FY12-13, Near East.* http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2013/in

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This section draws heavily on “Security and foreign forces, Iraq,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – The Gulf States, Posted: 08-Aug-2013, and interviews with US personnel serving in Iraq after 2011. All detailed force and statistical data are taken from Jane’s for security reasons.


Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report To Congress, October 30, 2011, 2, 3.


