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The Realities that Should Shape US Strategy and US Military Forces for FY2013 and the Next Decade

- Concepts are not a strategy. Broad outlines do not set real priorities. A strategy requires a plan with concrete goals, numbers, schedules, and costs for procurement, allocation, manpower, force structure, and detailed operational capabilities.

- For all the talk of 10 years of planned spending levels and cuts, the President and Congress can only shape the actual budget and defense program one year at a time. Unpredicted events and realities will intervene. There is a near zero real world probability that the coming plan and budget will shape the future in spite of changes in the economy, politics, entitlements, and threats to the US.

- Strategy will, however, be driven as much by changes in the national economy, national resource and cost constraints, and entitlements pressures, as by threats.

- Real world forces and mission capabilities will be budget and cost driven—barring unexpected existential threat. The command and JCS must develop resource-constrained joint plans and budgets.

- New threats, strategies, and tactics—cyberwarfare, space, cost-oriented asymmetric warfare—will pose a growing challenge putting constant additional new pressures on force plans and resources.

- But, the global emergence of new economic powers and economic competition will be as important as military threats.

- A valid national strategy must increasingly consider the actions of potential allies and threats, global economic changes, domestic spending needs, foreign policy and aid, homeland defense,

- Non-traditional alliances and relations will continue to become steadily more important.

- The military aspects of strategic choices should be joint choices made by major mission and command. The services should not be strategic planners, only enablers. Interservice rivalry will be self-destructive.

- The quality of execution and cost control is critical, and must have top down Secretarial and Service Chief responsibility.
America’s Long-Term Deficit Trajectory
Even Assuming Sequestration and Present Laws

As the debate continues over tax increases vs. spending cuts to balance the budget, it is important to keep in mind past levels of outlays and revenues and their future trajectory. Just prior to 2010, the US experienced a sharp increase in outlays as a percentage of GDP coupled with a decrease in revenues relative to average levels. By 2012 however, the gap between revenues and outlays had started to close, with increases in revenue and drops in outlays forecasted under current law.

America’s Growing Federal Debt Rises $8.8 Trillion in FY2012 to FY2023 Even Assuming Sequestration and Present Laws

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt Held by the Public at the Beginning of the Year</td>
<td>10,128</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>12,229</td>
<td>12,937</td>
<td>13,462</td>
<td>14,025</td>
<td>14,642</td>
<td>15,316</td>
<td>16,092</td>
<td>16,957</td>
<td>17,876</td>
<td>18,902</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changes in Debt Held by the Public Deficit</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other means of financing</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>1,041</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year</td>
<td>11,280</td>
<td>12,229</td>
<td>12,937</td>
<td>13,462</td>
<td>14,025</td>
<td>14,642</td>
<td>15,316</td>
<td>16,092</td>
<td>16,957</td>
<td>17,876</td>
<td>18,902</td>
<td>19,944</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Memorandum: Debt Held by the Public at the End of the Year (As a percentage of GDP)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debt Held by the Public Excluding Financial Assets(^a)</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In billions of dollars</td>
<td>10,392</td>
<td>11,243</td>
<td>11,833</td>
<td>12,241</td>
<td>12,695</td>
<td>13,211</td>
<td>13,794</td>
<td>14,482</td>
<td>15,259</td>
<td>16,091</td>
<td>17,024</td>
<td>17,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a percentage of GDP</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Federal Debt(^b)</td>
<td>16,048</td>
<td>17,068</td>
<td>17,886</td>
<td>18,501</td>
<td>19,166</td>
<td>19,938</td>
<td>20,793</td>
<td>21,736</td>
<td>22,754</td>
<td>23,810</td>
<td>24,937</td>
<td>26,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Subject to Limit(^c)</td>
<td>16,027</td>
<td>17,047</td>
<td>17,864</td>
<td>18,479</td>
<td>19,143</td>
<td>19,915</td>
<td>20,769</td>
<td>21,711</td>
<td>22,729</td>
<td>23,784</td>
<td>24,911</td>
<td>26,052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mandatory or “entitlement” outlays will increase by 5.1% in 2011 and by an average of 4.4% annually between 2012 and 2020, compared with an average growth rate of 6.4% between 1999 and 2008.

They will average 17% to 20% of the GDP during FY2012 to FY2020.

Defense spending will average only 3.3% to 4.3%, dropping from a peak war year level of 4.7% in FY2010.

All other discretionary federal spending will equal 4.1% to 3.1% of the GDP.*

The defense share of federal spending is so low as a percentage of total federal spending, GDP, and rising entitlements costs that no feasible amount of cuts in US national security spending can have a major impact on the US deficit and debt problems.

The most serious single threat the US faces to its national security does not come from foreign threats, but from the pressures on defense spending created by these domestic social and economic trends, and the rising cost of US federal entitlements spending.

These rises in total spending are driven by two critical factors that cannot be addressed simply by altering the federal budget.

- Cost of mandatory retirement and spending on the aging
- Medical costs that extend far beyond government spending

CBO’s 2/2013 Estimates Show There is a Real Federal Spending, Deficit, and Debt Crisis
Defense Spending and Other Discretionary Spending Drop as Economic Burden Relative to Mandatory Outlays Assuming Present Laws & Sequestration

Entitlements vs. Defense is a Crisis Burden on the National Budget Even without Sequestration

Outlays for Defense vs. Two Major Entitlement Programs (In USD, 2012 - 2017 Estimated)

-Graph reflects data from OMB in 2012.
But, the Underlying Cause is a National Crisis is a Failure to Save for Retirement and Rising Medical Spending
An Aging Population Threatens National Security by Lacking Pensions and Savings

- In 1940, the life expectancy of a 65-year-old was almost 14 years; today it's almost 20 years. By 2036, there will be almost twice as many older Americans as today – from 41.9 million today to 78.1 million.

- The proportion of Americans with a any pension plan with defined benefits is steadily shrinking, and the funding of such plans, adjustments for inflation, and medical coverage are highly uncertain.

- 401K and other programs are steadily losing employer contributions, and most Americans either do not fund them or fund them far below retirement level.

- There are currently 2.9 workers for each Social Security beneficiary. By 2036, there will be 2.1 workers for each beneficiary.

- In 2011, 9% of Americans over 65 had no retirement savings and did not receive Social Security benefits. Three out five families headed by someone over 65 had no retirement savings.

- In addition, 8.4 million disabled Americans and 2 million of their dependents (19% of total benefits) depended on Social Security, plus 6.3 million survivors of deceased workers (12% of total benefits). (Social Security Administration)

- It is projected that there will be growth in the number of Social Security beneficiaries from 56 to 91 million between now and 2035. By 2033, only ¾ of benefits will be financed unless taxes are increased or the system is reformed.

More and More Americans Are at Risk

National retirement risk index

Percentage of households at risk of being unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living during retirement.

Note: The national retirement risk index compares projected retirement income as a percentage of pre-retirement income of working households with target rates that would allow them to maintain their standard of living. It is the percentage at risk of falling more than 10 percent short of this target, based on data from the triennial Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances.

Growing US Income Inequality Adds to the Pressure:
Distribution Trends: 1968-2010

Distribution of U.S. Household Income by Quintile, Selected Years (1968-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bottom</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Fourth</th>
<th>Fifth</th>
<th>Top 5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


“The bottom fifth of households in 2010 accounted for much less than the one-fifth of total income it would have gotten if the distribution were perfectly equal. The top 20%, in contrast, accounted for more than twice what it would have gotten in an equal distribution. The top 5%, which is within the top fifth, accounted for more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution.” (Table and text from Linda Levine, “The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and International Comparisons,” Congressional Research Service, R42400, pp. 3-4.)
Growing US Income Inequality Adds to the Pressure:  
Gini Index: 1968-2010

“[The Gini coefficient] is a single number that can range between zero (a perfectly equal distribution) and one (a perfectly unequal distribution). The historical trend in the United States is one of almost steadily increasing income inequality (from 0.386 in 1968 to 0.477 in 2011)... During the 2007-2009 recession, the Gini coefficient fell slightly from its previous peak in 2006 of 0.470. Its level since then indicates an income distribution that is much more unequal than in most years since 1968.”

The Limits of Social Security and 401Ks Increase the Pressure for Future Increases in Entitlements Spending

Social Security:

- According to a 2012 fact sheet, 53% of elderly married couples and 74% of elderly unmarried individuals rely on Social Security for at least 50% of their income (Social Security Administration).
- About 23% of married couples and 46% of unmarried persons receiving benefits relied on Social Security for at least 90% of their income.
- Average payment per year is $14,400 vs. poverty level of $10,890 (NYT, Sullivan).

401K:

- $3.3 trillion is assets, seven times large than two decades ago, but:
  - “The typical worker” had $54,000 invested in a 401(k) in 2010, an anemic amount for one to retire off of. Moreover, Under half of the U.S. private-sector workforce participates in these programs, and those that do grossly underinvest.
  - Even twice the savings – $120,000 – would be under ¼ of the recommend minimal savings for retirement and pay some $7,000 a year.
  - Many participants empty accounts when laid off, use to buy houses or education for children.
  - Relatively high fees, and those who do save often take excessive risks: 38% of participants between the ages of 55 and 64 keep over 80% of 401K invested in stocks (NYT, Greenhouse).

Rise in National Medical Costs is Another “Threat” to National Security

- The entire pattern of federal spending will be driven by the rising cost of Medicare, Medicaid (and potentially national medical care under the Affordable Care Act as of 2014).

- By 2021, health care will account for nearly 20% of the U.S. economy, the report found, up from 5.2% in 1950, 7.2% in 1980, 12.5% in 1990, 13.8 percent in 2000 and 17.9% in 2010.

- Expenditures in the United States on health care surpassed $2.3 trillion in 2008, more than three times the $714 billion spent in 1990, and over eight times the $253 billion spent in 1980. Without major changes in cost, they will equal some 25% of the GDP in 2025.

- They are costs for which roughly one quarter of Americans have no insurance, and many only partial insurance coverage. Even so, the average health insurance premium for family coverage has more than doubled over the past decade to $13,770 a year.

- Some 45.1% of the workforce from ages 18 to 64 had no coverage as of September 2011, and many retirees lacked the savings to pay for any additional payments above Medicare. These figures did no include Americans who had not worked in the last 12 months, and coverage had dropped substantially since 2008. If one includes self-financed medical insurance, some 50 million Americans or 16% of the population had no coverage in 2010.

- In 2010, 31% of Americans relied on the government for health insurance, up from 24.2% in 1999. A total of 9.8% of children under age 18 are uninsured despite the government programs. (US Census Bureau, Kaiser Family Foundation, CNN Money)
Why Medical Care is Headed Toward 20% of GDP

- By 2021, health care will account for nearly 20 percent of the U.S. economy, the report found, up from 5.2% in 1950, 7.2% in 1980, 12.5% in 1990, 13.8 percent in 2000 and 17.9% in 2010.

- By the beginning of the next decade, health care spending will be growing roughly 2 percentage points faster than the overall economy, "which is about the same differential experienced over the past 30 years," said the report from Medicare's nonpartisan Office of the Actuary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Health Expenditures and Selected Economic Indicators, Levels and Annual Percent Change: Calendar Years 2006-2021</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Health Expenditures (billions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Health Expenditures as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Health Expenditures Per Capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (billions)</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product (billions of 2005 $)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index (CPI-W) - 1862-1984 base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population age less than 65 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age 65 years and older</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 7500 Security Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21244. USA. Department of Health and Human Services;
Medicare in Particular Poses Serious Challenges to Reducing the Budget Deficit

- As with Social Security, it is forecast that there will be growth in the number of Medicare recipients in the long term – a jump of 15 million recipients from 2010-2021.

- Government healthcare is also complicated by the rising cost of healthcare. Health related costs per capita have been rising at a greater rate than per capita GDP.

- Participation in Medicare is also forecast to increase by over 30% during the same period.

- As a result of these phenomenon, the CBO estimated that there will be a nearly twofold increase in Medicare outlays from 2010-2021 ($520 billion-1.021 trillion) without sequestration. A more recent CBO assessment concludes that even with sequestration, Medicare outlays will surge from $560 billion in 2011 to $956 billion in 2021 and $1.064 trillion in 2022.

Our Strategy is Shaped Strategy by Constraints on Topline Defense Spending

Even Without Sequestration
Topline in FY2012-FY2017 in FY2012
Budget Without Sequestration

- $525 topline (Baseline) billion for FY2013, rising to $567 billion in FY2017 in current dollars. Down from $531 billion in FY2011.
- Wartime (OCO) account drops from $115 billion in FY2011 to $88.4 billion in FY2012.
- Conforms to 2011 Budget Control Act requirement to reduce future DoD expenditures by $487 billion over next decade (a cut of nearly 9%), or $259 billion over next five years.
- The new budget level for the Defense Department will rise from FY 2013 to FY 2017; however, total U.S. defense spending, including both base funding and war costs, will drop by about 22% from its peak in 2010, after accounting for inflation.
- By comparison, the 7 years following the Vietnam and Cold War peak budgets saw a similar magnitude of decline on the order of 20 to 25%.
- Cuts are a continuation of the effort begun in 2010, which identified more than $150 billion in savings over five years allocated among the three military departments, the defense agencies, combatant commands, and the Secretary’s staff. This left less room for additional reductions to meet the new target of $259 billion over FY13-17.
- Nonetheless, DoD found about $60 billion in new projected savings over FY13-17.
How Much Should Be Enough? FY2012 Budget Still Called for Roughly 4% of GDP in FY2001-FY2017:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Billions</th>
<th>FY01</th>
<th>FY02</th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY10</th>
<th>FY11</th>
<th>FY12</th>
<th>FY13*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>296.9</td>
<td>328.1</td>
<td>364.9</td>
<td>376.5</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>410.5</td>
<td>431.4</td>
<td>479.0</td>
<td>513.2</td>
<td>527.9</td>
<td>528.2</td>
<td>530.6</td>
<td>525.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO/Supplements</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>166.2</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>145.6</td>
<td>162.3</td>
<td>158.8</td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>316.2</td>
<td>345.0</td>
<td>437.4</td>
<td>467.6</td>
<td>478.9</td>
<td>534.4</td>
<td>600.9</td>
<td>665.9</td>
<td>666.3</td>
<td>690.9</td>
<td>687.0</td>
<td>645.7</td>
<td>613.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data is discretionary budget authority. FY 2001 through FY 2011 are actual levels. The FY 2012 is the appropriated or enacted amount.

* Budget Request.

** Non-war supplemental appropriations, e.g. funding needed in base budget for fuel costs, hurricane relief, and other disaster relief.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Billions</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY13 – 17 TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2012 PB</td>
<td>570.7</td>
<td>586.4</td>
<td>598.2</td>
<td>610.6</td>
<td>621.6</td>
<td>2,987.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2013 PB</td>
<td>525.4</td>
<td>533.6</td>
<td>545.9</td>
<td>555.9</td>
<td>567.3</td>
<td>2,728.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>-45.3</td>
<td>-52.8</td>
<td>-52.3</td>
<td>-54.7</td>
<td>-54.3</td>
<td>-259.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Growth</td>
<td>*-2.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>+0.8%</td>
<td>+0.2%</td>
<td>+0.2%</td>
<td>**-0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Real growth calculated from the FY 2012 appropriation ($530.6 billion).


Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
Economic Impact of Government Spending Cuts to Date: Cuts in Defense Spending Alone Cut Growth by 1.3% in 4Q 2012

Military Spending Trends Before the Current Sequestration Debate

FY2013-FY2017 Budget Remained High If Exclude Wartime Spending

($US in Current or “Nominal” Billions)

Source: Adapted from DoD Factsheet issued by OSD (PA) on 26.1.12
Baseline Cuts Were Limited Even in Constant Dollars
($US in Current vs. Constant Billions)

Source: Adapted from DoD Factsheet issued by OSD (PA) on 26.1.12
Secretary Panetta on the Risks of Letting Budget Limits Drive Strategy

“The risks come with the fact that … we will have a smaller force…when you have a smaller force, there are risks associated with that in terms of our capability to respond … We think we've dealt with those risks because the combination of the forces we have in place and the ability, if we have to, to mobilize quickly will give us the capability to deal with any threat.”

“We’re depending a great deal on being at the technological edge of the future …Can we develop the kind of technology we're going to need to confront the future? I’m confident we can, but there are risks associated with that.”

“The reality is that as we draw down from Iraq and Afghanistan, we still face a number of very important threats in the world …Obviously we're continuing to fight a war in Afghanistan, and we continue to face the threat of terrorism.”

“We see the threats coming from Iran, and a nuclear-capable Iran represents a threat to us and to the world …Weapons of mass destruction and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a concern. North Korea is a concern because they, too, are developing a nuclear capability.”

“You can see the vast array of threats that we have to confront with the force that we've designed here … So it's all of those that are my concern for the future.”

Hagel to SASC on Existing Budget Cuts

“Part 1 of the Budget Control Act (BCA) enacted on August 2, 2011 established budget caps designed to realize $917 billion in budget savings in federal discretionary spending over the period from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2021. As a result, the administration’s DoD current budget plan for fiscal years 2012 to 2021 is $487 billion lower than the $6.14 trillion it had projected a year earlier for the same ten-year period. This reduction amounts to nearly 8 percent compared to the previous plan. Do you believe that defense spending reductions of this magnitude (absent a sequester) can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

“Based on my review to date, my answer is yes. I believe the Department’s strategy can be accomplished within the constraints of the Budget Control Act. But only if the Department has to retain the flexibility to adjust the size of its forces and infrastructure, and take steps to control its costs, in accordance with the Administration’s present strategy and budget.

“How would you assess the national military strategy to deal with the changed budget environment?

“I believe the Department has taken a hard look at the new security environment and developed a strategy that appropriately allocates reduced defense resources to the highest priority needs and ensures our national security objectives are met. If confirmed, I will further assess the strategy according to changes in the security environment and continued fiscal pressure.”

Chairman Dempsey on FY2013 Baseline Risks

“The greater risk would be had we decided that we would just wish away any particular capability or any particular form of conflict... So, say, ‘no, ... we're just never going to do that.’ What you're expressing here is the recognition that we are retaining our full-spectrum capability, and that we didn't take any risk with that.”

“At the same time, we put national security above parochial interest -- exactly what the American people should expect of us.”

“Capability is more important than size... We get leaner. But this budget does not lead to a military in decline. It leads to a joint force that is global and networked, that is versatile and innovative, that is ably led and that is always ready.”

 “[aforementioned joint force] can win any conflict, anywhere,”

According to Karen Parrish of the American Forces Press Service, “There are no proposed pay freezes or reductions, and department officials will not change health care benefits for active-duty troops, those with combat injuries or service members who have medically retired [...]” As Chairman Dempsey stated, “But we cannot – we cannot – ignore some hard realities...Pay and benefits are now roughly one-third of defense spending. ... pay will need to grow more slowly in the future.”

“We’ll take the time to determine how to enact any retirement reforms over the next year.”

“It represents responsible investment in our national security...But make no mistake, the tradeoffs were tough. The choices were complex.”

“The primary risks lie not in what we can do, but in how much we can do and how fast we can do it. [...] The risks, therefore, are in terms of time and capacity.”

“I am convinced we can properly manage them by ensuring we keep the force in balance, investing in new capabilities and preserving a strong reserve component...As I’ve said before, we will face greater risks if we do not change the way we’ve been doing things.”

“Much will be said and written about the individual decisions underlying this budget...Some may be tempted to view them through the prism of a zero-sum game, parsing through each cut, each change, to look for a winner and a loser. That is actually the least-productive way to assess this budget...I’m confident it meets our nation’s needs in our current fights and for our future.”

Uncertain Strategic Impact of Gates-Panetta Cuts Without Sequestration: FY 2001–FY 2017
The Myth of Efficiency: “More Disciplined Use of Resources” = DoD Wide Cuts Worth $30.8 Billion in FY2013-FY2017

☐ Civilian Pay Raises ($10.4 billion). The civilian pay increase for FY 2013 was limited to 0.5 percent.

☐ Defense Agency/Office of the Secretary of Defense ($10.7 billion). Initiatives include reducing overhead, staffing, and expenses; more efficient contracting and acquisition; and more.

☐ Better Buying Power ($5.3 billion). obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending by improving the way the Department acquires critical defense goods and services.

☐ Ensure Compliance with the Executive Order on Promoting Efficient Spending ($0.5 billion). Reductions were made to travel, printing and reproduction by leveraging technology to teleconference and provide information in electronic form.

☐ Reduce Combatant Command Support Costs ($1.5 billion). Initiatives include reducing overhead and support costs.

☐ Reduce Defense Working Capital Fund Rates ($1.1 billion). Reduce rates for supplies and printing provided by the Defense Logistics Agency, financial services provided by the DoD Finance and Account Service, and Pentagon space as a result of cost reductions.

☐ Delay and restructure various facility projects ($0.6 billion)
“More Disciplined Use of Resources”
Budget Cuts by Service: FY2013-FY2017 – $30.8 Billion

Department of Army ($18.5 billion)
- Streamline installation support functions and reduce installation support ($5.3 billion)
- Consolidate information technology enterprise services ($1.4 billion)
- Streamline management headquarters and administrative support functions ($0.7 billion)
- Reduce civilians supporting overhead functions ($0.9 billion)
- Reduce recruiting, advertising and enlisted incentives as a result of economic conditions ($0.7 billion)
- Defer training range revitalization projects ($1.3 billion)
- Delay MILCON projects and facility restoration and modernization ($5.8 billion)
- Reduce equipment technical support and ammunition sustainment ($1.7 billion)
- Streamline Personnel Security administration ($0.4 billion)
- Other streamlining efficiencies ($0.3 billion)

Department of Navy ($5.7 billion)
- Implement strategic sourcing of commodities and services ($2.2 billion)
- Consolidate information technology enterprise services ($1.6 billion)
- Streamline organizations ($0.7 billion)
- Reduce procurement modifications ($0.3 billion)
- Increase buying power ($0.7 billion)
- Other streamlining efficiencies ($0.2 billion)

Department of Air Force ($6.6 billion)
- Consolidate information technology enterprise services ($1.1 billion)
- Reduce service support contractors ($1.2 billion)
- Reduce administrative travel and permanent change of station travel ($0.5 billion)
- Streamline contracting ($0.4 billion)
- Reduce inventories ($0.3 billion)
- Reduce accessions and force development and training ($0.5 billion)
- Delay MILCON projects ($2.4 billion)
- Other streamlining efficiencies ($0.2 billion)
$60B More Identified by DoD for Savings

According to the Department of Defense:

“This was a continuation of the effort begun in 2010, which identified more than $150 billion in savings over five years allocated among the three military departments, the defense agencies, combatant commands, and the Secretary’s staff. This left less room for additional reductions to meet the new target of $259 billion over FY13-17. Nonetheless, did find about $60 billion in new projected savings over FY13-17.”

The Department specifies the following specific areas for savings:

- More skillful contracting practices to increase competition, reduce costs, and increase buying power
- Better use of information technology
- Better use of business and enterprise systems
- Streamlined staff
- Limitations on official travel
- Better inventory management
- Reductions in contract services
- Deferral of some military construction to align our facilities more closely with the size and posture of our future force
- Reductions in planned civilian pay raises

“Beyond the roughly $60 billion in efficiencies and overhead savings, we eliminated a number of poorly performing programs” described earlier.

Senate Markups to the FY 2013 Defense Budget

The Senate Committee on Armed Services passed a $631.4 billion budget on May 24, which included approximately 150 amendments. Analysis of the draft bill is limited as of yet, but according to one observer, the draft bill includes:

- Restricting assistance to the Pakistani military while Pakistan continues to prohibit the movement of supplies to Afghanistan;
- Eliminating many of the funding decreases planned for the Air National Guard;
- Sustaining M1 Abrams production;
- Eliminating higher TRICARE fees;
- Cutting the number of civilians within DOD by 5% within 5 years.


Amendments offered by the Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, the only subcommittee to hold a markup session open to the public, include:

- Eliminating approximately $500 million from O&M and over $600 million from military construction;
- Increasing funding for the DOD Inspector General ($59 million increase) and the DOD Corrosion Control Initiative ($21 million increase);
- Improving contracting to enhance the accountability of contractors and the efficiency of programs;
- Proposing that a risk assessment be conducted prior to cutting a key Marine Corps squadron;
- Improving efficiency in supplying the mission in Afghanistan through the Northern Supply Route;
- Eliminating base realignments and closures (BRACs) for FY 2013.

As the FY2013 Defense Budget Goes Through The Legislature, Congressionally-Driven Spending Could Cause Other Friction With the Obama Administration

The House of Representatives recently passed a defense budget worth $642 billion, including billions more than what was proposed by the President. It is reported by the Washington Post that the President may veto the budget. Key issues include:

- The House does not support the closing of bases in the US in FY 2013;
- Representatives have stipulated that US troops would remain in Afghanistan until 2014 with a combat force 68,000 strong. An accelerated withdrawal amendment failed in the House;
- An additional $100 million was included for a missile defense shield on the US East Coast.


Key political issues in the budget going forward:

- BASE CLOSURES: Both the House and the Senate are seemingly in agreement with regards to closing bases in the US. The decisions against the closings on both sides appear to be driven by the costliness of past closings;
- BUDGET INCREASES: The House bill and Senate draft bill call for spending in excess of what is permitted under the Budget Control Act of 2011. In fact, the House has approved a budget that adds several billion dollars to the Obama Administration’s planned expenditures. Significantly more expenditures than planned by the administration raises the prospect of a presidential veto;
- MISSILE DEFENSE: A key point of disagreement in reconciling the bills will be the missile defense shield on the US East Coast, which is supported by the House but not the Senate. In terms of overseas defenses, both the House and the Senate are in agreement on strengthening missile defense in Israel;
- INDEFINITE DETENTION: Both the House bill and the draft bill that left the Senate Committee on Armed Services do not alter the section of the defense budget that allows for indefinite detention, although it is reported that Senator Udall will propose an amendment for the Senate floor when the bill is debated in June or July.

Other Key Issues in the FY2013 House Authorization and Draft Senate Authorization Bills

- **FACILITY UPKEEP AND OVERHAUL:** The House authorization bill contains just under $600 million (just over $770 million in the appropriations bill) for facility upkeep and overhaul. This has been described by a defense budget analyst as a “slush fund” for de facto pork barrel spending on programs yet to be defined. Republicans in the House however say it is necessary due to the administration’s attempts to save money on maintenance by simply extending the lifespan of facilities.

- **AIR NATIONAL GUARD:** Both the House and the Senate bills eliminate planned scale-backs for the Air National Guard.

- **VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINE:** Procurement of a second vessel has been supported by both the House and Senate. This sub class was identified by SECDEF as playing a key role in advancing US area-denial penetration capabilities in East Asia.

- **TRICARE:** Rises in fees have been eliminated by the House and Senate.

- **M1 ABRAMS:** The House and Senate call for sustaining production.

- **MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN:** Assistance is restricted in both the House and Senate bills. In both cases, the restrictions were the result of Pakistan continuing to prohibit the movement of supplies to Afghanistan. The House restriction puts a hold on $650 for Pakistan – this hold is incumbent upon the supply route being closed.

Recent Updates on FY 2013 NDAA and FY 2014 PPBE

- FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) approved by President Obama in early January 2013 – worth $633 billion and including a 1.7% pay increase for the military, a $527.5 billion base budget and $88.5 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO).

- DoD given “passback guidance” in late January 2013 for FY 2014 budget. It is expected that DoD may submit it FY 2014 budget request to Congress toward the end of March 2013 – more than a month later than it is typically submitted, likely due to late passback guidance from OMB.

- FY 2014 request will reportedly include:
  - a 1% increase in pay for military personnel – a level which is below the rate of inflation and lower than levels recently seen
  - A continuation of plans to bring Army and Marine Corps force levels down to 490,000 and 182,000, respectively.
  - $487 billion in spending reductions
  - Emphasis in developing special operations and cyber capabilities

General Dynamics: Case Study in Impact of Existing Drop in Government Spending

Sources: General Dynamics, OMB, George Mason University Center for Regional Analysis
Implementing Budget Control Act and Sequestration on Defense Spending Would Have a Far more Serious Impact on Defense Resources
Sequestration in Broader Perspective

Both defense and non-defense discretionary spending were expected to decrease in 2012 (before sequestration) by 4%, while mandatory spending is expected to increase by 1%. It is expected that the DoD reduction in 2012 outlays will be $3 billion more than all non-defense discretionary reductions combined.

Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid alone are anticipated to reach 55% of federal expenditures – 12.2% of GDP – by 2022, even with sequestration. Sequestration does not adequately address growth in mandatory spending, but rather forces disproportionate cuts to discretionary spending.

While the CBO groups together sequestration and the expiration of tax cuts as one scenario, policymakers may not consider these issues in tandem when legislating on the budget. The decision to continue the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 cuts could cost the budget $2.7 trillion in potential revenue from 2013-2022 – offsetting the $1 trillion in savings incurred from sequestration by over two-and-a-half times. Sequestration cannot be expected to balance the deficit in the event that revenue-generating measures are not supported by Congress.

By the same token, sequestration will trigger significant damage to the American economy without making a considerable impact on shrinking the deficit if enacted. Sequestration – coupled with the expiration of tax cuts – is forecast to trigger a an unemployment rate climbing to 9.1%, -0.5 real GDP growth, and a possible recession in 2013.

The grouping together of sequestration and the expiration of tax cuts by the CBO makes it difficult to decipher the macroeconomic consequences of sequestration alone. A thorough assessment of sequestration – including an evaluation of what programs would be impacted, how large that impact would be, and what the macroeconomic fallout would be on the US economy – is necessary by the CBO to gain better perspective.


“[U]nder the fiscal policies embodied in current law, output is expected to remain below its potential (or maximum sustainable) level until 2017…CBO projects that the total loss of output, relative to the economy’s potential, between 2007 and 2017 will be equivalent to nearly half of the output that the United States produced last year.

“…CBO expects that economic activity will expand slowly this year, with real GDP growing by just 1.4 percent... That slow growth reflects a combination of ongoing improvement in underlying economic factors and fiscal tightening that has already begun or is scheduled to occur—including the expiration of a 2 percentage-point cut in the Social Security payroll tax, an increase in tax rates on income above certain thresholds, and scheduled automatic reductions in federal spending. That subdued economic growth will limit businesses’ need to hire additional workers, thereby causing the unemployment rate to stay near 8 percent this year…

“After the economy adjusts this year to the fiscal tightening inherent in current law, underlying economic factors will lead to more rapid growth, CBO projects—3.4 percent in 2014 and an average of 3.6 percent a year from 2015 through 2018…[and a better-performing housing market will in part] spur a virtuous cycle of faster growth in employment, income, consumer spending, and business investment over the next few years.”

Sequestration Cuts in Defense Spending as % of GDP Relative to Mandatory and Other Discretionary Outlays: 2012-2023

- “[T]otal [Federal] outlays are projected to decline slightly relative to GDP between 2014 and 2017 and then to rise in most years through 2023—averaging 22.1 percent over the decade, slightly above the 21.0 percent of GDP that has been the average for the past 40 years.

- “…outlays for Social Security will total 5.1 percent of GDP this year and stay near that percentage for the next few years but reach 5.5 percent of GDP by 2023.

- “Outlays for the major health care programs—Medicare (net of receipts from premiums), Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and subsidies offered through new health insurance exchanges and related spending—will soon be even greater than outlays for Social Security.

- “Spending for major health care programs will be nearly 5 percent of GDP in 2013, and such spending is projected to grow rapidly when provisions of the Affordable Care Act are fully implemented by middecade, reaching 6.2 percent of GDP in 2023.

- “Net interest is currently equal to 1.4 percent of GDP, but, in CBO’s baseline, rising interest rates push that total to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2023.

- “…discretionary outlays would fall to 5.5 percent of GDP by 2023, more than 3 percentage points below their average from 1973 to 2012.

- “Specifically, defense outlays in 2023 would equal 2.8 percent of GDP, compared with a 40-year average of 4.7 percent, and nondefense outlays in 2023 would equal 2.7 percent of GDP, compared with a 40-year average of 4.0 percent.”

The Unstable Economy and its Toll on Actual vs. Potential Output

Debt Reduction Through Sequestration, the BCA, and Other Measures - I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How They Were Accomplished</th>
<th>Budget appropriations</th>
<th>Budget Control Act caps</th>
<th>&quot;Fiscal cliff&quot; deal</th>
<th>Sequestration</th>
<th>Interest savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$635 billion</td>
<td>$910</td>
<td>$720</td>
<td>$995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals reflect 10-year savings from 2014 to 2023. They do not include savings from 2011 through 2013 that resulted from the above measures.

*Set up as a part of the Budget Control Act in Aug. 2011.

Debt Reduction Through Sequestration, the BCA, and Other Measures - II

Spending Cuts vs. Revenue Increases

A majority of the $3.9 trillion in reductions comes from spending cuts. Republicans have resisted raising revenues, but agreed to $680 billion in increased taxes on the wealthiest as a part of the fiscal cliff deal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending cuts</th>
<th>New revenue</th>
<th>Interest savings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the Spending Cuts Come From

Discretionary spending on military and domestic programs bears nearly all of the impact of the cuts, though those categories make up less than a third of all federal spending (not including interest payments).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of cuts</th>
<th>Nonmilitary discretionary</th>
<th>Military discretionary</th>
<th>Health entitlements*</th>
<th>Other mandatory†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of cuts</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of federal spending</th>
<th>Nonmilitary discretionary</th>
<th>Military discretionary</th>
<th>Health entitlements</th>
<th>Other mandatory</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflects share of all federal spending (not including interest payments) from 2014 to 2023.

*Category includes Medicare, Medicaid and health insurance subsidies.
†Category includes agricultural programs, unemployment benefits and federal worker benefits.

Debt Reduction Through Sequestration, the BCA, and Other Measures - III

Impact on the Debt

The reductions trim annual deficits by about 36 percent over the next 10 years.

But the reductions don’t do much to address the fastest growing contributors to the debt: health care and Social Security.

While the savings reduce the public debt, the debt is projected to begin to grow again as a share of the economy by 2019, mostly because of the retirement of baby boomers and rising medical costs.

OMB and CBO Estimate of Broader Impact on Federal and Defense Spending
OMB Assessment on the Implementation of Sequestration

Reporting by the OMB sheds light on the breakdown of the cuts called for by the BCA. The report highlights the disproportionate emphasis placed on both mandatory and discretionary defense cuts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending Category</th>
<th>Cuts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-exempt defense mandatory</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-exempt defense discretionary</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-exempt nondefense discretionary</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-exempt nondefense mandatory</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial OMB Estimate of Cut for FY2013: Reduction in Defense Function Baseline in $Billions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Discretionary</th>
<th>Direct Spending</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Base for allocating reduction</td>
<td>546.000</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td>546.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage allocation of reductions</td>
<td>99.88%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Allocation of total reduction</td>
<td>54.699</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>54.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage allocation of reductions</td>
<td>99.88%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Sequestration percentages calculation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sequestrable base</td>
<td>580.073</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sequestration percentage</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The calculation involves the following steps:
Step 1. Pursuant to section 251A(5), the total reduction of $54.667 billion is allocated proportionately between discretionary appropriations and direct spending. The total base is the sum of the FY 2013 revised discretionary spending limit for the security category ($546 billion) and OMB’s baseline estimates of sequestrable direct spending outlays ($0.679 billion) in the defense function in FY 2013 and FY 2014 from new direct spending budget authority in FY 2013. Discretionary appropriations comprise more than 99 percent of the total base in the defense function.
Step 2. Total defense function spending must be reduced by $54.667 billion. As required by section 251A(5)(A), allocating the reduction based on the ratio of the revised discretionary spending limit to the total base yields a $54.599 billion reduction required for discretionary appropriations. Under section 251A(5)(B), the remaining $0.068 billion is the reduction required for budget accounts with direct spending.
Step 3. As required by section 251A(7)(A), the discretionary percentage reduction for FY 2013 is calculated by dividing the discretionary reduction amount calculated in step 2 ($54.599 billion) by the sequestrable budgetary resources ($580.073 billion) for budget accounts with discretionary appropriations in the defense function, which yields a 9.4 percent sequestration rate for budget accounts with non-exempt discretionary appropriations. A similar calculation is required by section 251A(8) for the sequestration of direct spending. Dividing the direct spending reduction amount ($0.068 billion) by the sequestrable budgetary resources ($0.679 billion) for budget accounts with direct spending yields a 10.0 percent sequestration rate for budget accounts with non-exempt direct spending.”

## OMB Assessment of Impact of Sequestration on FY 2013 Defense Budget: Procurement, RDT&E, and O&M Cuts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement Category</th>
<th>FY 2013 Sequestration (% Cut)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Aircraft</td>
<td>$2.240 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (Other)</td>
<td>$2.226 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Shipbuilding and Conversion</td>
<td>$2.141 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Aircraft</td>
<td>$2.010 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense-wide</td>
<td>$705 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (Other)</td>
<td>$692 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Missile</td>
<td>$668 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Weapons</td>
<td>$369 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>$366 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund</td>
<td>$314 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund</td>
<td>$296 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RDT&amp;E Category</th>
<th>FY 2013 Sequestration (% Cut)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$2.717 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense-wide</td>
<td>$2.007 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$1.777 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$954 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations and Maintenance Category</th>
<th>FY 2013 Sequestration (% Cut)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>$6.867 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>$4.291 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>$4.267 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense-wide</td>
<td>$3.879 billion (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>$854 million (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Military personnel not subject to sequestration according to OMB report.

CBO Estimate in 2/2013 was Sequestration will Cut Defense Spending by 7.8 to 7.9%, or by $42.7 Billion in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reduction in Budgetary Resources (Billions of dollars)</th>
<th>Percentage Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>42.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondefense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discretionary</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td><strong>9.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare spending subject to 2 percent limita</td>
<td><strong>9.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>42.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Congressional Budget Office

*Notes: Budgetary resources subject to sequestration include new budget authority, unobligated balances for defense programs, and direct spending authority. These estimates use CBO’s baseline projections for 2013 as a basis for allocating the reductions among categories. However, the Office of Management and Budget will make the official calculations, using its own numbers; as a result, the actual percentage reductions could differ from those shown here by a few tenths of a percentage point in either direction. **= between zero and $50 million. “a. The sequestration cannot exceed 2 percent for payments made for individual services covered under Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Medical Insurance) and monthly contractual payments for Part C (Medicare Advantage plans) and Part D (prescription drug benefit plans). According to the rules for sequestration, reductions in Medicare will begin in the month after the sequestration order is issued, thereby delaying some of the effect on outlays until the following fiscal year.”


(Billions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defense</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase discretionary appropriations for 2013 subject to the caps at the rate of inflation(^a)</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<td>Reduction to meet the caps</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-24</td>
<td>-29</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-38</td>
<td>-42</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlays under the caps</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic spending reductions(^b)</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-52</td>
<td>-53</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlays under the caps with automatic spending reductions(^b)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Adjustments to the caps</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-related spending</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency designation</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal, Adjustments</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, Defense</strong>(^c)</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>6,455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Source: Congressional Budget Office.
“Note: n.a. = not applicable; * = between zero and $500 million.
“a. Funding for overseas contingency operations, emergencies, disaster relief, and certain program integrity initiatives (which identify and reduce overpayments in certain benefit programs) is not constrained by the statutory caps established by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Such caps were specified through 2021; CBO has extrapolated the totals for 2022 and 2023 on the basis of its projected rate of inflation.
“b. Automatic spending reductions are slated to further reduce the caps for 2014 through 2021.
“c. Because the caps on discretionary appropriations do not extend beyond 2021, CBO has extrapolated the totals for 2022 and 2023 on the basis of its projections of inflation.”

CRS Estimate of March 1 and March 27 Impacts
### Impact of March 2013 Sequestrations on Defense 050 Account

In Billions of Dollars and Percentage Reduction

#### Estimated Total Effect of the March 1, 2013 Sequester on National Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enacted/ Budgetary Resources</th>
<th>FY2013 Continuing Resolution</th>
<th>Budgetary Resources Subject to a Sequester</th>
<th>Sequester Amount</th>
<th>Post-Sequester Funding</th>
<th>Cut to all accounts</th>
<th>Cut to affected accounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Budget</td>
<td>556.9</td>
<td>419.6</td>
<td>-31.7</td>
<td>525.1</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>War Funding</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>-6.4%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FY2013 050</strong></td>
<td><strong>645.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>494.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-37.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>608.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unobligated Balances carried forward</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Nat'l Defense resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>751.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>563.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-42.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>708.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-7.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Estimated Total Effect of the March 27, 2013 Sequester on National Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enacted Funding/Budgetary Resources</th>
<th>FY2013 Continuing Resolution</th>
<th>FY2013 Budgetary Resources Subject to a Sequester</th>
<th>Sequester Amount</th>
<th>Post-Seq. Funding</th>
<th>Cut to all accounts</th>
<th>Cut to Affected Accounts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Budget</td>
<td>556.9</td>
<td>419.6</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>521.1</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Funding</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FY2013 050</strong></td>
<td><strong>645.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>494.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>603.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unobligated Balances carried forward</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Nat'l Defense resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>751.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>563.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>703.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.9%</strong></td>
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#### Estimated Total Effect of the March 2013 Sequesters on National Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enacted/ Budgetary Resources</th>
<th>FY2013 Continuing Resolution</th>
<th>Budgetary Resources Subject to a Sequester</th>
<th>Sequester Amount</th>
<th>Post-Sequester Funding</th>
<th>Cut to all accounts</th>
<th>Cut to affected accounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Budget</td>
<td>556.9</td>
<td>419.6</td>
<td>-35.7</td>
<td>521.2</td>
<td>-6.4%</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Funding</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>-7.2%</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total FY2013 Budget Function, 050</strong></td>
<td><strong>645.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>494.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-42.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>603.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>-6.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-8.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unobligated Balances carried forward</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Nat'l Defense resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>751.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>563.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-47.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>703.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-6.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-8.5%</strong></td>
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FY2013 and FY2013CR Funding Levels for Active Duty O&M By Service
In Billions of Dollars

## Potential Impact of Sequestration on O&M

*In Billions of Dollars and Percent Reduction*

### Total Impact Assuming Allocated Evenly to All Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Base Budget</th>
<th>War Spending</th>
<th>Total enacted as of FY13 CR</th>
<th>Percent Sequester Cut</th>
<th>Sequester Cut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$198.9</td>
<td>$64.0</td>
<td>$263.3</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
<td>-$22.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### O&M Funds Likely to Be Available to Absorb a Sequester

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Base</th>
<th>O&amp;M Civilian Hiring Freeze as of February 1, 2013</th>
<th>Furloughing O&amp;M Civilians as of March 1, 2013 for 22 days</th>
<th>Civilian Savings in Working Capital Fund from hiring freeze and furloughs</th>
<th>Operating Forces Funding (Budget Activity 1)</th>
<th>Other O&amp;M: Mobilization, Training and Recruiting, Administrative and Service-wide including all Base Support</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-$2.3</td>
<td>-$3.7</td>
<td>-$1.6</td>
<td>-$5.5 to -$6.6</td>
<td>-$9.3 to -$8.2</td>
<td>-$22.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FY2013 and FY2013CR Funding Levels Major Weapons System Accounts By Service
In Billions of Dollars

Potential FY2013 Impact of Sequestration on Major Weapons Systems: Shipbuilding

- The Navy would not be able to complete the refueling complex overhaul (RCOH), a mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul on the carrier, CVN-71, ($135 million requested in FY2013) and would not be able to continue work on the CVN-72 RCOH ($1.6 billion requested in FY2013).

- A $96 million reprogramming of FY2012 funds to the RCOH program that Congress approved in late-September 2012 provided a short-term funding patch for the CVN-72 refueling but did not provide enough funding to fully meet the program’s FY2013 funding needs. If no additional funding for the refueling is provided, the Navy’s plan would be delayed, possibly making it more difficult to have carriers available for future rotations.

- The Navy would not be able to complete construction work on two ships procured in prior years—LPD-25 and LHA-6.

- The Navy would not be able to award a full-ship construction contract for the next carrier, CVN-79 in FY2013, as requested, because the Navy did not procure a CVN-78 class ship in FY2012. The Navy might be able to award a short-term contract for continued pre-construction activities on the ship, but that is not certain.

- The Navy would not be able to procure in FY2013 the second DDG-51 requested for FY2013, because the Navy procured only one DDG-51 in FY2012, slipping the schedule to the right.

- The Navy would also not be able to award an MYP contract for the DDG-51 program starting in FY2013, as requested, because new multiyear contracts are prohibited under the FY2013 CR.

- If a year-long CR does not include the equivalent of an FY2013 DOD appropriations act, and Congress wanted the Navy to proceed with the refueling of the CVN-72 or make an exception for the new DDG-51 multiyear contract requested or the other programs above, Congress could add language to the next Continuing Resolution permitting those actions.

- Even though funding shortfalls for the LPA and LHD ships, or other programs could probably be resolved with transfers from other programs, the Navy lacks the authority to do so because statutory language setting funding levels for these programs is not included in P.L. 112-74, the enacted FY2012 appropriations act.”
Potential FY2013 Impact of Sequestration on Major Weapons Systems: Aircraft Programs

- “The KC-46 tanker development program, which is slated to go from $877 million in FY12 to $1.8 billion in FY13, amounting to $1 billion, or 51% funding cut compared to DOD’s plan and potentially delaying by some months the Air Force’s declared highest priority hardware program.

- “A CR cut of 1 Air Force F-35 aircraft from the 19 requested.

- “At the same time, under the FY2013 CR, FY2012 funding provides for 7 Navy Joint Strike Fighter aircraft compared to 3 requested in FY2013. This excess funding, or funds from other AF programs, could be used to fund the Air Force request, assuming funding controls are set at the account level or by using transfer authority.

- “The multiyear contract proposed for the V-22 program for Air Force and Marine Corps that is projected to save $843 million over the life of the contract. This would not be permitted by the CR and might need to be re-negotiated next year.

- “The services could also choose to protect the most critical parts of individual programs from the 8.5% sequester cuts through allocations of funds within program lines. For example, of the $3.45 billion appropriated for the Air Force F-35 in FY2012, $2.3 billion went for the aircraft and their systems, while $786 million was appropriated for other non-recurring costs and $156 million for various support costs.

- “Because this support funding comes from procurement funds already designated for the Air Force F-35, it could conceivably be used to restore reductions in airframe spending without requiring a formal reprogramming action. As the aircraft paid for in FY2013 would not be built for several years, support funding reallocated to airframe procurement might be restored prior to the delivery of the aircraft.”
Potency FY2013 Impact of Sequestration on Major Weapons Systems: Army Programs

- "$206 million in planned procurement of 17 upgraded Paladin howitzers with improved accuracy and mobility would be delayed because none were bought in FY2012.

- "Plans to spend $107 million to buy 31 Improved Recoverability Vehicles (M88A2), which provide combat service support for a heavy-force contingency, would be delayed because none were bought in FY2012.

- "A shortfall of $13.5 million to purchase 31 Stryker modifications that upgrade the double-hull design to improve soldier survivability would be delayed.

  - "Unless the CR language prohibiting DOD from buying higher quantities in FY2013 than were purchased in FY2012 is deleted, the Paladin and M88A2 recovery vehicle planned buys would have to be put off until FY2014.

  - "DOD could request higher levels to offset the cut in FY2014 assuming that production capacity is available.

  - "For funding shortfalls, the Army could also request authority to transfer funds from other accounts assuming that Congress resolves the question of the amount of transfer authority available in the final CR."

Uncertain Dynamics of FY2013 Sequestration

“To soften the effect of a strict CR and the sequesters, Congress could choose to set the amount of reprogramming or transfer authority for FY2013 at a higher level than the $3.7 billion to $4 billion typical in recent years. This could raise concerns about giving DOD additional discretion on funding levels.

“Congress could also amend the Budget Control Act to adopt a more gradual path where year-to-year reductions grew over time, for example, from $25 billion in FY2013 to $60 billion for FY2015–FY2017, returning to $55 billion in later years through FY2021. The overall $490 billion in defense savings from the BCA caps for FY2012–FY2021 would still be achieved, which might also raise concerns.

Under a strict year-long CR, military personnel would receive the 1.7% pay raise authorized in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act using the funds available under the CR and after a sequester. There would be no sequester to military personnel accounts because the President exempted those accounts from a sequester last year.

“Sequester reductions would be levied on individual procurement, RDT&E, and military construction programs (Program Elements listed in DOD’s P-1, R-1, and C-1 budget exhibits).

“DOD would not be able to increase production rates of items, fund new starts, or sign new multiyear contracts for its procurement, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E), or military construction programs under a strict CR;

“DOD would have discretion to move funds within individual procurement accounts from less to more critical programs under a strict year-long CR as long as FY2012 funding at the individual account level was met, with the exception of programs with higher production rates, new programs, multiyear contract, or shipbuilding programs.

“The March 2013 sequesters would require a $22 billion reduction in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds, which would require an overall reduction of 17.5% to O&M funds available in the latter half of the fiscal year;

“DOD could limit reductions to the services’ readiness-related O&M funding that supports training for Operational Forces (Budget Activity 1) to 10% to 12% if the department implemented a civilian hiring freeze, furloughed civilians for 22 non-consecutive days, and reduced other O&M activities by 18% to 20%;

“Military construction funding is provided for individual projects, each of which are considered to be ‘new starts.’ For that reason, DOD would not be able to carry out any military construction under a year-long CR. If an exception were provided, then an 8.5% cut would be levied on each individual project.”
Possible Ways to Soften FY2013 Sequestration Impacts

- “For O&M funding where CR limits and sequester reductions are set at the account level, DOD could transfer funds from less critical to more critical programs, resolving many potential funding mismatches between FY2012 and FY2013, and potentially protecting readiness-related activities. For procurement accounts where a strict CR would set funding limits at the account level, DOD could also move monies within accounts to offset mismatches. Sequester reductions, however, would likely occur at the individual program level, which could cause some temporary delays.

- “If DOD wanted to protect critical programs, it might use reprogramming authority to transfer funds between appropriation accounts as long as the four congressional defense committees approved. DOD currently has about $5 billion available in prior-year reprogramming authority that can be used to move funds appropriated in previous years. This could provide DOD a way to protect some critical programs by offsetting sequester decreases to unobligated funds.

- “There does not appear to be consensus about how much, if any, reprogramming authority is available for FY2013. If the amount of reprogramming authority available is the level provided in the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act, then $3.75 billion would be available for the base budget. Clarity on whether that authority is available might need to be provided in a year-long CR. Congress could also choose to increase the amount of FY2013 transfer authority in a final CR to give DOD additional flexibility to move funds to more critical areas. Some would be concerned about the precedent of giving DOD more flexibility to move funds between accounts.

- “Since program elements may include several contracts, monies could be allocated among contracts in such a way as to protect the most critical elements. Some contracts, for technical data or support, could be let in future years without necessarily affecting deliveries of weapon systems.

- “Congress could also choose to include statutory language addressing specific anomalies (such as for those individual ships considered essential to buy in FY2013) in the final year-long CR.

- “Another way to soften the impact of the March sequesters would be to spread savings for this year and FY2014 more gradually over the next three years. Instead of requiring annual savings of $55 each year from the revised caps in the BCA, Congress could amend the Act to require annual savings that would grow from $25 billion in FY2013 to about $55 billion in FY2014, $60 billion for FY2015 through FY2017, and then resume the $55 billion reductions in the BCA through FY2021. The American Taxpayer Review Act included a partial and somewhat similar version of this option.

- “Under such a smoothed path, DOD would be better able to implement savings that build over time, such as reductions in force structure or to the civilian and contractor workforce, relying primarily on annual turnover rather than more costly early retirement incentives. After FY2017, DOD could return to the BCA path of annual savings of $55 billion, and still achieve the $490 billion in savings compared to BCA caps over the FY2012-FY2021 decade. Starting in FY2015, DOD funding levels would include 2% to 3% increases that could offset inflation and modest growth. Under this path, DOD funding in the FY2012-FY2021 decade would average between the FY2007 and FY2008 level in real terms, i.e., adjusting for inflation, a level that matches the Reagan era of the 1980s and the past decade, both historically high levels of defense spending.”
And On US Ability to Fund a Viable Strategy
Panetta on Sequestration Delay

“On behalf of the Department of Defense, I want to express our thanks to the Democratic and Republican Members of Congress who voted to temporarily avert sequestration. Hopefully, this will allow additional time to develop a balanced deficit reduction plan that would permanently prevent these arbitrary cuts.”

“Had Congress not acted, the Department of Defense -- along with other federal agencies -- would have been forced to begin taking dramatic steps that would have severely impacted our civilian personnel and disrupted our mission. For more than a year, I have made clear that sequestration would have a devastating impact on the Department. Over the past few weeks, as we were forced to begin preparing to implement this law, my concerns about its damaging effects have only grown. As an example, had Congress failed to act, I would have been required to send out a notice to our 800,000 civilian employees that they could be subject to furlough.”

“Congress has prevented the worst possible outcome by delaying sequestration for two months. Unfortunately, the cloud of sequestration remains. The responsibility now is to eliminate it as a threat by enacting balanced deficit reduction. Congress cannot continue to just kick the can down the road.”

“This Department is doing its part to help the country address its deficit problem by working to implement $487 billion in spending reductions in accordance with our new defense strategy. The specter of sequestration has cast a shadow over our efforts. We need to have stability in our future budgets. We need to have the resources to effectively execute our strategy, defend the nation, and meet our commitments to troops and their families after more than a decade of war.”

“Every day, the men and women of this Department put their lives on the line to protect us all here at home. Those of us in Washington have no greater responsibility than to give them what they need to succeed and to come home safely. My hope is that in the next two months, all of us in the leadership of the nation and the Congress can work together to provide that stability and to prevent sequestration once and for all. Our national security demands no less.”

Secretary Panetta’s Departing Remarks on Sequestration

• “Make no mistake, if these cuts happen, there will be a serious disruption in defense programs and a sharp decline in our military readiness. … We’ve implemented hiring freezes. We’ve curtailed facilities maintenance. We’re laying off temporary and term employees. We’re looking at putting 46,000 jobs at risk.”

• “[If there is sequestration] We will furlough as many as 800,000 DOD civilians around the country for up to 22 days. They could face a 20 percent cut in their salary.”

• “We’re going to cut back on Army training and maintenance, putting about two-thirds of our active brigade combat teams outside Afghanistan at a reduced readiness level. We’ve got to cut back on their training. We’re going to have to cut back on the ability to support the troops who are not in the war zone. So what happens is we put more stress on those who are in the war zone.”

• “We’re going to have to shrink our global naval operations with a reduction of as much as one-third in our western Pacific naval operations. This whole idea about trying to rebalance will be impacted.”

• “We’ll cut the Air Force flying hours and weapons system maintenance, putting flying units below acceptable readiness standards by the end of the fiscal year.”

• “And even if Congress acts again temporarily to prevent the effects of this crisis, and hopefully they will do that, but I have to tell you, if they only kick the can down the road, it continues the long shadow of doubt about whether the fundamental problems we face can really be resolved. That is a high price – a very high price that could be paid as a result of governing by crisis.”

Chairman Dempsey on the Risks of Sequestration

“That’s why I’m saying that we will be unprepared in a year, because we won’t be able to go to that level of collective training…Will we be able to go to the rifle range or go to the motor pool to turn a wrench? Sure. But we won’t be able to do the kind of live-fire training that pilots need. Flying hours [and] steaming hours will be cut back, and it’ll take about a year to feel the full effect.”

“We’ve got the people. We’ve got the equipment that we need… But we won’t have the ability to train.”

“What we’re experiencing is the potential for hollowness related to readiness.”

“We pushed responsibility, authority, resources to the edge -- to where captains and majors and lieutenant colonels had capabilities, responsibilities and authorities that I didn’t have as a major general.”

“We haven’t even begun to model the effect of a prolonged readiness problem… I can tell you that readiness problems always have an effect on retention.”

Hagel to SASC on Sequestration

“What do you believe would be the impact on the Department of Defense of a full sequester in FY 2013?

As Secretary Panetta has repeatedly stated, sequestration – both the size and the arbitrary manner of these cuts – would be devastating to the Department. It would harm military readiness and disrupt each and every investment program. Based on my assessment to date, I share his concerns. I urge the Congress to eliminate the sequester threat permanently and pass a balanced deficit-reduction plan. Impacts of sequestration could include the need to revise the defense strategy, fewer day-to-day global activities reducing our presence and partnerships, less training including cuts to flying and steering hours which would reduce readiness, near universal disruption of investment including 2,500 procurement programs, research projects, and military construction; reduced and delayed weapons system buys with resulting price increases, furloughs and hiring freezes for civilian workers resulting in reduced maintenance of weapons systems, oversight of contracts and financial systems; negative effects on morale and welfare of the force including recruiting and retention problems.

“What is your understanding of the impact that the combination of a full-year continuing resolution and a sequester would have on the readiness of the Armed Forces?

“It is my understanding that under this scenario, the Department would be forced to cut over $40B from our budget in a little over half a year, using a mechanistic formula to do it. It would result in 20% cuts in the Department’s operating budgets. As the Joint Chiefs have warned, such cuts, if allowed to occur, would damage our readiness, our people, and our military families. It would result in the grounding of aircraft and returning ships to port, reducing the Department’s global presence and ability to rapidly respond to contingencies. Vital training would be reduced by half of current plans and the Department would be unable to reset equipment from Afghanistan in a timely manner. The Department would reduce training and maintenance for non-deploying units and would be forced to reduce procurement of vital weapons systems and suffer the subsequent schedule delays and price increases. Civilian employees would be furloughed for up to 22 days. All of these effects also negatively impact long-term readiness. It would send a terrible signal to our military and civilian workforce, to those we hope to recruit, and to both our allies and adversaries around the world.”

Sequestration, Budget Uncertainty and its Impact on Military Planning – I

Each of the military branches have issued memos highlighting steps to be taken to cope with the threat of cuts to the defense budget:

**NAVY**

- Under continuing resolution:
  - Terminate private-sector maintenance on vessels and aircraft in FY 2013 3\(^{rd}\) and 4\(^{th}\) quarters
  - Cease civilian hiring, except for “mission-critical” personnel
  - Suspend non “mission essential” training and travel
  - Decrease “base operating support” and “facilities sustainment” by 10 and 50%, respectively
  - “…curtail training and education, including training events not related to either maintaining forward-deployed readiness or the readiness of next-to-deploy forces”
  - “…limit administrative expenses and supply purchases to essential consumption only”

- Under sequestration:
  - “Stop all deployments to the Caribbean and South America”
  - “Limit European deployments to only those supporting ballistic missile defense missions”
  - “Reduce the number of ships and aircraft deployed”
  - “Cease stateside training, flying, steaming and other operations for the majority of ships and aircraft preparing to deploy, unless funded by Fleet Commander’s proposed offsets”
  - “…consider the possibility of civilian furloughs of up to 22 days…”

http://www.pscouncil.org/c/e/EventList/Sequestration/Direction_Regarding_the_Continuing_Resolution_and_Sequestration.aspx
Sequestration, Budget Uncertainty and its Impact on Military Planning – II

ARMY

- For implementation in January 2013:
  - Cease civilian hiring with “exceptions for humanitarian and mission-critical purposes”
  - “Terminate temporary employees…term appointments shall not be extended unless a specific exception is approved…”
  - “…30% reduction of FY 13 Base Operations Support (BOS) spending levels compared to FY 12 levels…reduce utilities consumption to the maximum extent possible”
  - “Curtail temporary duties and professional training that are not mission-critical…”
  - “Curtail training…not related to maintaining readiness for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Korean forward-deployed units, Homeland Defense and the Division Ready Brigade”
  - “Limit administrative expenses and supply purchases to essential FY 13 consumption only…Ceremony expenses shall be similarly limited.”
  - “Cease facilities sustainment activities that are not directly connected to matters of life, health or safety…cease all Restoration & Modernization projects…”
  - “…plan to cancel 3rd and 4th quarter depot maintenance and reset orders and contracts that do not directly support units deployed to a theater or entering the Army Force Generation-available pool”
  - “…stop Army-wide Second Destination Transportation shipments…”
  - “…submit all Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and production contract awards or modifications that exceed $500 million to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) [USD(AT&L)] for approval prior to award”
  - “Accelerate Joint Reconciliation Program reviews…”
  - Suggest FY 2013 furloughs may be implemented

Sequestration, Budget Uncertainty and its Impact on Military Planning – III

AIR FORCE

• For implementation in January 2013 (January 14 memo):
  • Cease civilian hiring, “…immediate elimination of temporary employees and not renewing term hire employees with exceptions for mission-critical activities…”
  • “Review OCO requirements and identify potential reductions which will not impair wartime operations…”
  • “Cancel all temporary duties that are not mission-critical…”
  • “Curtail flying not directly related to readiness…”
  • “Curtail or cancel ongoing and scheduled studies that are not Congressionally-directed or mission critical”
  • “Limit supply purchases to essential FY13 consumption…”
  • “Defer non-emergency Facility Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM) projects…”
  • “Where practical, de-obligate/incrementally-fund contracts to encompass only FY13…”

• For implementation under sequestration (January 7 memo):
  • “Reducing Weapons System Sustainment (aircraft depot maintenance and engine overhauls) by as much as 17%, pushing aircraft availability and mission capable rates much further below standards”
  • “Reducing flying hours by as much as 18%…driving nearly all flying units to unacceptable readiness levels by the end of FY13”
  • “Implementing civilian furloughs to the maximum level possible without initiating reduction-in-force procedures across the total force”
  • “Prioritizing and curtailing operational training exercises…”

• F-35, KC-46, and “long-range bomber” programs could be jeopardized by sequestration (Defense News)

The Sequester Will Also Have an Impact on DoD Civilian Personnel and State GDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Department furloughs as a percentage of all jobs in each state*</th>
<th>Federal spending on procurement, salaries and wages as a percentage of state G.D.P.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hawaii 3.2%</td>
<td>19,728</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Va. 2.4%</td>
<td>89,810</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. D.C. 1.8%</td>
<td>13,268</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Md. 1.8%</td>
<td>46,459</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Alaska 1.6%</td>
<td>5,421</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Okla. 1.5%</td>
<td>23,888</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Ala. 1.4%</td>
<td>26,620</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Me. 1.2%</td>
<td>6,916</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Utah 1.2%</td>
<td>14,551</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Wash. 1.0%</td>
<td>29,000</td>
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<td>U.S. avg. 0.5%</td>
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</table>

*Civilian jobs

The New York Times

Sources: Defense Manpower Data Center; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Pew Center on the States

The Impact of Sequestration on the FY 2013 Defense Budget: Uncertainties Remain

There are still many uncertainties that make it difficult to forecast what the exact impact of sequestration will be on US defense and national security.

- As the preceding slides indicate, estimates differ between the OMB and the CSBA as to what the exact percentage of cuts will be to the defense budget. While CSBA indicates a 10.3% cut, OMB reports 9.4% for non-exempt defense discretionary and 10% for non-exempt defense mandatory spending.

- As the OMB points out, appropriations have yet to be set by Congress for FY 2013 as of the publishing of their report (OMB report, p. 4). This means that even their ability to forecast the exact impact of sequestration for the next fiscal year is limited.

- It remains unclear what action – if any – Congress will take to mitigate, postpone, or avoid sequestration.
Delaying Sequestration Until March 2013

- The fiscal debate focused on addressing the Bush-era tax cuts that will be expiring in 2013, and how to continue to close the deficit while preventing an expiration in tax cuts from hampering economic recovery.

- The Obama Administration has remained committed to preserving social welfare programs such as Medicare, while sustaining middle class tax cuts, and generating revenue through tax increases for the upper-class.

- Republican lawmakers have expressed interest in scaling back social welfare programs – namely Medicare – while avoiding tax increases.

- On January 1, 2013, the Congress postponed sequestration until March while allowing for the expiration of tax cuts for income over $450,000 for households, $425,000 for heads of households, and $400,000 for individuals – raising tax levels from 35 to 39.6%. The payroll tax break was also allowed to expire – raising tax rates by 2%; other expirations were facilitated for the estate tax as well as for exemptions and deductions.

- The stage was set for negotiations on the budget when House Republicans indicated that they would allow the debt ceiling to increase by three months – bypassing a contentious issue so a budget could be negotiated. Legislators would have their salaries suspended in the event that a budget was not passed by April 15. However, Republicans remained firm on placing a higher premium on savings rather than revenue – particularly in the wake of agreeing to tax increases in the January 1 legislation.

From Sequestration Prevention to Adaptation – March 1 and Beyond

FY 2013 Continuing Resolution:
- The failure of sequestration prevention through tax increases and other means by Senate Democrats has shifted focus to House Republicans, who have proposed a continuing resolution for FY2013 that would alleviate the impact of required cuts on defense, while allowing the sequester to continue through the fiscal year.
- The House resolution allows greater leeway in determining the allocation of funding within the Department of Defense, while not eliminating the overall cost of the sequester on the budget.
- The White House has indicated interest in the House Republican proposal.
- The CR has been passed by the House and is awaiting debate in the Senate, where it is expected that the Senate Appropriations Committee Chairwoman will press for budgetary leeway, similar to that granted to DOD, for other accounts.
- The plan, if passed, would prevent a budget crisis at the end of March by financing the government until September.
- The Congress must pass a budget by April 15 or face a suspension of pay.

Debt Ceiling:
- Reports suggest that Rep. Paul Ryan will propose a plan to end federal budget deficits within a decade – which would likely require cuts to entitlement programs.
- If Democrats in Congress and the Obama Administration are forced to accept the House’s continuing resolution to avoid an unfunded government, it raises doubt over the likelihood that the Senate and the administration will also concede to the spending cuts – particularly to entitlement programs – that Rep. Ryan’s proposal would require.
- Current deal extending debt ceiling ends May 19, though the Treasury Department may be able to prolong a debt ceiling crisis beyond the 19th.

Sources:
Implications on the FY 2014 Defense Budget

- Budget planning for FY2014 has already been set back by sequestration. Passback guidance was late in being provided to DOD, and the administration did not submit an FY2014 budget plan to Congress in early February – as is typically done.
- Planning for the FY2014 budget is complicated by the still undetermined status of how sequestration will impact the baseline.
- A sustained commitment to sequestration and deficit reduction by Congress could complicate defense planning – especially if cuts remain uniform across-the-board, giving planners and program managers no leeway in achieving austerity while still preserving key programs, systems, and training.

Research and Development Trends
Already on Decline During Recession

Sequestration Could Further Jeopardize R&D, Causing the US to Lag Behind China

27-Year Growth Trends in R&D Favor Key Asia-Pacific States Over the US

Sequestration: The Navy as a Case Study
Navy Case Study - I

Navy: Acting Now To Mitigate CR Impacts...
Sequestration requires deeper cuts

Without Congressional Relief on Transfer Authority Tier Bravo Cuts are Inevitable

Calculated as of: 1/25/2013 2:57 PM
UNCLAS-SUBJECT TO REVISION
## Navy Case Study - II

### Navy actions fleet-wide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Tier A – Continuing Resolution</strong> ($4.6B OMN + $1.7B “New Starts”)</th>
<th><strong>Tier B – Sequestration ($4.0B)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Cancel 10 ship avails in San Diego ($219M)</td>
<td>• Cancel several SSN deployments</td>
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<td>• Cancel 10 ship avails in Norfolk ($271M)</td>
<td>• Flying hours on deployed carriers in Middle East reduced 55%; steaming days reduced 22%</td>
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<td>• Cancel 1 ship avail in New London ($45M)</td>
<td>• Reduce WestPac deployed ops by 35%; Non-deployed Pac ships lose 40% of steaming days</td>
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<td>• Cancel 1 ship avail in Washington ($65M)</td>
<td>• Cancel naval operations in and around S. America; cancel all non-BMD deployments to Europe</td>
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<td>• Cancel 1 ship avail in Mayport ($4M)</td>
<td>• Shut down all flying for 4 of 9 CVWs in Mar13. 9-12 months to restore normal readiness at 2-3 times the cost</td>
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<td>• Cancel 3rd and 4th Qtr aircraft maintenance in San Diego, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Whidbey Island, Lemoore, &amp; Cherry Point ($433M)</td>
<td>• Stop non-deployed operations that do not support pre-deployment training</td>
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<td>• Cut 1,121 temporary workers mostly in shipyards and base operating support ($30M)</td>
<td>• Reduce non-deployed operations for pre-deployment training</td>
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<td>• Reduce FSRM by 50% ($1.142B)</td>
<td>• Cut all exercises (e.g., MALABAR, CARAT, FOAL Eagle)</td>
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<td>• Cut BOS by 10% ($363M)</td>
<td>• Reduce port visits</td>
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<td>• Cut non-essential travel/conferences ($26M)</td>
<td>• Furlough most Civilians for 22 work days ($448M)</td>
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<td>• Cut NECC by 20% ($182M)</td>
<td>• Defer emergent repairs (MIAMI - $294M in Maine, PORTER - $125M, MONTPELIER - $41M East Cost) ($505M Total)</td>
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<td>• Reduce ship ops, flying hours ($670M)</td>
<td>• Cancel Blue Angels shows in 3rd and 4th quarters ($20M)</td>
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<td>• Cancel 30 building demolition projects ($62M)</td>
<td>• Cancel Community Outreach Programs (e.g. Fleet Week)</td>
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<td>• Delay decommissioning and/or disposal prep ($33M)</td>
<td><strong>IMPACTS</strong></td>
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<td>• Implement civilian hiring freeze ($70M)</td>
<td>• TRUMAN and IKE CSG deployments extended indefinitely</td>
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<td><strong>“New Start” Prohibitions</strong></td>
<td>• NIM, GHWB CSGs will not be fully ready for scheduled FY13 deployments</td>
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<td>• Defer “new start” MILCON projects ($675M)</td>
<td>• By Oct 13, only 1 CSG / 1 ARG (Japan-based) crisis-ready</td>
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<td>• Defer “new start” construction of CVN 79 ($608M)</td>
<td>• By Oct 13, CONUS forces will require 9+ months to deploy due to maintenance and training curtailments</td>
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<td>• Defer “new start” aircraft procurements ($150M)</td>
<td>• Middle East deployed CSG reduced to 1 by mid-FY14.</td>
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<td>• Defer “new start” research and development ($263M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cancel construction of 1 DDG-51 ($1.4B) – quantity limit</td>
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http://www.pscouncil.org/e/e/EventList/Sequestration/Acting_Now_to_Mitigate_CR_Impacts_Sequestration.requires_deeper_cuts.aspx
Continued Cost Escalation Could Equal the Impact of Sequestration and Truly Cripple US Strategy
Cost Escalation Could Double the Impact of Sequestration

(Billions of 2013 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2013 to 2017, the years for which the Department of Defense's (DoD's) plans are fully specified; BCA = Budget Control Act of 2011.

a. For 2002 to 2013, supplemental and emergency funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO), such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for other purposes is shown separately from the base-budget data.

b. The CBO projection of the base budget incorporates costs that are consistent with DoD’s recent experience.

c. For the extension of the FYDP (2018 to 2030), CBO projects the costs of DoD’s plans using the department’s estimates of costs to the extent they are available and costs that are consistent with CBO’s projections of price and compensation trends in the overall economy where the department’s estimates are not available.

d. Base-budget data include supplemental and emergency funding before 2002.

e. This estimate assumes that DoD would receive 95.5 percent of the funding limit for national defense before reductions due to the BCA’s automatic enforcement procedures, on the basis of DoD’s average share of that funding in base budgets from 2002 to 2011.

f. This estimate assumes that DoD would receive 95.5 percent of the funding limit for national defense after reductions due to the BCA’s automatic enforcement procedures, on the basis of DoD’s average share of that funding in base budgets from 2002 to 2011.

Zooming In On The Future: FY2013-F2030

Looking at the DoD/BCA Reality Gap by Year: FY2013-F2022:

$14B in FY2013 without BCA; $66B with BCA

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Costs of DoD’s Plans as a Share of Economic Output

(Percentage of gross domestic product)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: For this figure, estimates describe outlays (as opposed to total obligational authority).

FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2013 to 2017, the years for which the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) plans are fully specified.

a. For 2002 to 2013, supplemental and emergency spending for overseas contingency operations (OCO), such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for other purposes is shown separately from the base-budget data.
b. The CBO projection of the base budget incorporates costs that are consistent with DoD’s recent experience.
c. Base-budget data include supplemental and emergency spending before 2002.
d. For the extension of the FYDP (2018 to 2030), CBO projects the costs of DoD’s plans using the department’s estimates of costs to the extent they are available and costs that are consistent with CBO’s projections of price and compensation trends in the overall economy where the department’s estimates are not available.

Strategy as a Set of Vague Concepts is as Bad as Sequestration and Cost Escalation

“New Strategic Priorities and Budgetary Goal” Are Described Largely in Terms of Good Intentions and “Fortune Cookie” Prose
Credible New Primary Strategic Priorities and Missions BUT, No Meaningful Explanation or Details

- Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
- Deter and Defeat Aggression
- Project Power Despite A2/AD Challenges
- Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space
- Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent
- Defend the Homeland and Provide support to Civil Authorities
- Provide a Stabilizing Presence
- Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations
- Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations
- Continue to Move toward a more Collaborative in Interoperable Joint Force
The Pentagon released an outline of its forward-looking defense planning in light of the roughly $490 billion in defense spending cuts over ten years currently underway as result of prior decisions in 2009-2011.

This guidance did not, however, consider the $580-$600 billion in additional reductions specified under the Budget Control Act, apparently assuming that Congress will intervene to prevent sequestration. Dealing with sequestration came later.

It featured a broad emphasis on technology, the air-land battle in Asia, maintaining a strong posture in the Middle East, relying more on partnerships with our allies, reduced but ready ground forces, and a slow-down in procurement.

Broad outlines, however, do not set real priorities until concrete numbers and plans for procurement, allocation, manpower, force structure, and detailed operational capabilities.

For all the talk of 10 years of planned spending levels and cuts, the President and Congress can only shape the actual budget and defense program one year at a time. There is a near zero real world probability that the coming plan and budget will shape the future in spite of changes in the economy, politics, entitlements, and threats to the US.

A national strategy cannot be based on military spending alone. It must consider the actions of potential allies and threats, global economic changes, domestic spending needs, foreign policy and aid, homeland defense.
“Strategy by Mystical Pyramid”

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
“Strategy by Concept”

STRATEGIC GOAL 1: PREVAIL IN TODAY’S WARS.
1.1-OCO: Degrade the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), while increasing the size and capability of the ANSF.
1.2-OCO: Execute a responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

STRATEGIC GOAL 2: PREVENT AND DETER CONFLICT.
2.1-1F1: Extend a global posture to prevail across all domains by increasing capacity in general purpose forces and by enhancing stability operations and foreign security force competency.
2.2-1F2A: Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the U.S. and on our allies and partners.
2.3-1F3: Strengthen cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field robust, pragmatic, and cost-effective missile defense capabilities.
2.4-1X2: Ensure sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection and analysis capacity for full spectrum operations and ensure resiliency of ISR operations.

STRATEGIC GOAL 3: PREPARE TO DEFEAT ADVERSARIES AND SUCCEED IN A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES.
3.1-1F2B: Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces.
3.2-1F2C: Enhance capacity to locate, secure, or neutralize weapons of mass destruction, key materials, and related facilities.
3.3-1F2C: Enhance U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions to operate with or in lieu of U.S. forces.
3.4-1X1: Expand capacity to succeed against adversary states armed with anti-access capabilities and/or nuclear weapons and improve capabilities to conduct effective operations in cyberspace and space.
3.5-2D: Maintain a strong technical foundation within the Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) program.

STRATEGIC GOAL 4: PRESERVE AND ENHANCE THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE.
4.1-2M: Provide top-quality physical and psychological care to wounded warriors, while reducing growth in overall healthcare costs.
4.2-2P: Ensure the Department has the right workforce size and mix, manage the deployment tempo with greater predictability, and ensure the long-term viability of the Reserve Component.
4.3-2R: Better prepare and support families during the stress of multiple deployments.
4.4-2T: Train the Total Defense Workforce with the right competencies.

STRATEGIC GOAL 5: REFORM THE BUSINESS AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS OF THE DEFENSE ENTERPRISE.
5.1-2A: Increase use of renewable energy and reduce energy demand at DoD installations.
5.2-2C: Protect critical DoD infrastructure and partner with other critical infrastructure owners in government and the private sector to increase mission assurance.
5.3-2E: Improve acquisition processes, from requirements definition to the execution phase, to acquire military-unique and commercial items.
5.4-2L: Provide more effective and efficient logistical support to forces abroad.
5.5-2UV: Improve financial management and increase efficiencies in headquarters and administrative functions, support activities, and other overhead accounts.

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
What Does This Actually Mean? Primary Missions and Priorities- I: “recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments”

According to the Department of Defense:

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa’ida and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

Deter and Defeat Aggression. U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor.

- As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere.

- Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains a land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.

- This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of -- or imposing unacceptable costs on -- an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

- U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur.

What Does This Actually Mean? Primary Missions and Priorities- II:

According to the Department of Defense:

**Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges.** In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.

- In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles,
- advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus.
- States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well.
- Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.
- This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

**Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space.** Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space.

- Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets.
- Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.

What Does This Actually Mean? Primary Missions and Priorities - III:

According to the Department of Defense:

**Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent.** As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal.

- We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.
- *It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force,* which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.

**Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities.** U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors.

- We will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event.
- Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong, steady-state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad.

**Provide a Stabilizing Presence.** U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises.

- These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.
- A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. *However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations.*

What Does This Actually Mean? Primary Missions and Priorities- IV:

According to the Department of Defense:

Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations.

- U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible.
- Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.

Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries.

- U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad.
- DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities.
- U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

Air Sea Battle: Access to What with What Land-Air Mix?

According to the Department of Defense:

- Recognizing that antiaccess/area-denial capabilities present a growing challenge to how joint forces operate, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force to develop the Air-Sea Battle Concept.

- The intent of Air-Sea Battle is to improve integration of air, land, naval, space, and cyberspace forces to provide combatant commanders the capabilities needed to deter and, if necessary, defeat an adversary employing sophisticated antiaccess/area-denial capabilities.

- It focuses on ensuring that joint forces will possess the ability to project force as required to preserve and defend U.S. interests well into the future.

- The Air-Sea Battle Concept is both an evolution of traditional U.S. power projection and a key supporting component of U.S. national security strategy for the 21st Century. However, it is important to note that Air-Sea Battle is a limited operational concept that focuses on the development of integrated air and naval forces in the context of antiaccess/area-denial threats. The concept identifies the actions needed to defeat those threats and the materiel and nonmateriel investments required to execute those actions.

- There are three key components of Air-Sea Battle designed to enhance cooperation within the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy.

- The first component is an institutional commitment to developing an enduring organizational model that ensures formal collaboration to address the antiaccess/area-denial challenge over time.

- The second component is conceptual alignment to ensure that capabilities are integrated properly between Services.

- The final component is doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities initiatives developed jointly to ensure they are complementary where appropriate, redundant when mandated by capacity requirements, fully interoperable, and fielded with integrated acquisition strategies that seek efficiencies where they can be achieved.

Air Sea Battle: Broad Concepts, No Plan, No Costs

- Complex mix of new threats without boundaries: Solution through “Cross Domain Synergy”

- But deliver a concept without a plan, and cost and feasibility not addressed as risk

DoD, JOINT OPERATIONAL ACCESS CONCEPT (JOAC), VERSION 1.0, 17 January 2012, p. 15, 46
Future Operational “Hybrid” Environment: How Do You Make Strategic Plans and Trade-offs?

Source: US Army
Scaling Potential Challenges, But Broad Concepts, No Plan, No Costs

Sources: Defense Department, ARCIC.
Too Vague to Be A Strategy

- No stable force plan for any service in terms of major combat units and major combat weapons.
- Meaningful plans to deal with manpower costs are deferred until FY2015 or beyond. No mid-term integrated manpower plan, showing active and reserve military, civilians, and contractors.
- Only a nominal RDT&E and procurement plan for the FYDP or longer term. No indication of what the new emphasis on technology as a means of reducing the need for force size actually means.
- No deployment and force plan for any region, or definition of the new goals in partnering.
- No breakout of current and planned forces by combatant command.
- No net assessment of US, allied, and threat capabilities now, or over time.
- Air-Sea Battle, Joint Operational Access, Hybrid Strategies all concepts, no plans.
- New emphasis on Asia and the Middle East is undefined in terms of forces, costs and costs.
- US force posture after reductions in Europe, and concepts of partnering with NATO allies not defined.
- No explanation of what “innovative” approaches to Africa and Latin American really mean.
- No clear plans for leaving Afghanistan, “transition,” or conversion to the new air-land-sea force posture, and no meaningful; OCO budget projections beyond FY2013.
- Future size and nature of the strategic nuclear triad is unclear, as is the nature of future strategic, theater, and tactical missile defense programs.
- Post reduction size and capability of Mobility Forces is not defined, nor is prepositioning.
- No plan for the defense industrial base.
- Sequestration addressed by denying that the option could take place.
- Do not address the proper mix of State Department, Department of Defense, various homeland defense, and Intelligence Community efforts. Compartmented and stovepiped efforts do not produce an integrated strategy or efficient use of resources.
Strategy as a Set of Vague Goals for Jointness

“Toward the Joint Force of 2020” = More Good Intentions and Fortune Cookie Prose
What Does This Actually Mean? Toward the Joint Force of 2020 - I

According to the Department of Defense:

To ensure success in these missions, several principles will guide our force and program development.

First, given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions described above.

☐ The Department will make clear distinctions both among the key sizing and shaping missions listed above and between these mission areas and all other areas of the defense program.

☐ Wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of U.S. military forces and our inability to predict the future.

☐ Likewise, DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.

Second, we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres.

☐ Accordingly, the concept of “reversibility,” including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis, is a key part of our decision calculus.

Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade.

☐ An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention. Unless we are prepared to send confident, well-trained, and properly equipped men and women into battle, the nation will risk its most important military advantage a the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force.

What Does This Actually Mean? Toward the Joint Force of 2020 - II

According to the Department of Defense:

Fourth, the Department must continue to reduce the ‘cost of doing business.’

- This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy.

- As DoD takes steps to reduce its manpower costs, to include reductions in the growth of compensation and health care costs, we will keep faith with those who serve.

- During the past decade, the men and women who comprise the All-Volunteer Force have shown versatility, adaptability, and commitment, enduring the constant stress and strain of fighting two overlapping conflicts.

- They have also endured prolonged and repeated deployments. Some a more than 46,000 men and women a have been wounded, and still others a more than 6,200 members of the Armed Forces a have lost their lives. As the Department reduces the size of the force, we will do so in a way that respects these sacrifices.

- This means, among other things, taking concrete steps to facilitate the transition of those who will leave the service. These include supporting programs to help veterans translate their military skills for the civilian workforce and aid their search for jobs.

Fifth, it will be necessary to examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements.

- This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare.

Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy.

- Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness.

According to the Department of Defense:

Seventh, as we transition out of Iraq and draw down in Afghanistan, we will take extra measures to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint forces have finally become truly interdependent.

- This imperative will shape a number of Departmental disciplines, ranging from establishing warfighting requirements to the way our forces train together.

Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology.

- We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas, most often operating in unchallenged sea and air environments.

- Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments.

- To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its “seed corn,” balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs.

The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the U.S. National Security Strategy at acceptable risk.

Strategy by Failed Procurement

Modernization, Termination, and Restructuring by Service
The Declining Industrial Base: Manufacturing in the U.S. Economy

To execute its base-budget plans for 2013 through 2017, DoD would need five years of appropriations totaling $53 billion (or 2.0 percent) more in real, or inflation-adjusted, terms than if funding for the base budget was held at the 2012 amount of $543 billion.

For the entire projection period of 2013 through 2030, DoD’s base-budget plans would require appropriations totaling $1.2 trillion (or 12 percent) more than if funding for the base budget was held at the 2012 amount in real terms.

To execute its base-budget plans for 2013, the department would require appropriations of $535 billion, 1.4 percent less than the $543 billion appropriated in 2012. That figure for 2013 is $9 billion higher than DoD’s request because CBO includes the cost of all active-duty personnel (whereas the department proposes to shift the cost of some of those personnel out of the base budget) and because CBO assumes that the Congress will continue its history of rejecting DoD’s proposals to shift some health care costs to the military beneficiaries receiving the care. To execute its base-budget plans after 2013, DoD’s appropriations would need to nearly return to their 2012 level in 2014 and grow at an average annual rate of 2.0 percent between then and 2017, all in real terms.

From 2017 to 2030, DoD’s appropriations would need to grow at an average annual rate of 0.9 percent in real terms. The cost of the department’s plans would rise to $574 billion in 2017 and to $645 billion in 2030 in real terms.

The primary cause of growth in DoD’s costs from 2013 to 2030 would be rising costs for operation and support (O&S), which accounts for 64 percent of the base budget in 2012. In particular, under DoD’s plans, there would be significant increases in the costs of military health care, compensation of the department’s military and civilian employees, and various operation and maintenance activities. O&S costs would grow from $356 billion in 2013 to $460 billion in 2030, for an average annual growth rate of 1.5 percent per year, all in real terms.

According to the Congressional Budget Office:

- The costs of replacing and modernizing weapon systems would grow sharply in the near term, from $168 billion in 2013 to $212 billion in 2018 in real terms—an increase of 26 percent. However, acquisition costs would remain fairly steady at that level until 2025 before declining.

- The growth in DoD’s costs would be less than CBO’s projection of the growth of the economy, so costs would decline as a share of gross domestic product product (GDP). Spending for DoD’s base budget was 3.5 percent of GDP in 2010 and would decline to 3.0 percent of GDP in 2017 and to 2.5 percent in 2030.

CBO FY2012 Warning of “Acquisition Squeeze” from Cost Escalation

(Billions of 2012 dollars)

Base Budget Plus OCO Funding

Base Budget

CBO Projection

FYDP

Extension of FYDP

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2012 to 2016, the years for which the Department of Defense's (DoD's) plans are fully specified.
CBO Projection of Real Cost of FY2013 Plan vs. DoD Projection - I

(Billions of 2013 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2013 to 2017, the years for which the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) plans are fully specified.

a. For 2002 to 2013, supplemental and emergency funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO), such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for other purposes is shown separately from the base-budget data.

b. The CBO projection of the base budget incorporates costs that are consistent with DoD’s recent experience.

c. For the extension of the FYDP (2018 to 2030), CBO projects the costs of DoD’s plans using the department’s estimates of costs to the extent they are available and costs that are consistent with CBO’s projections of price and compensation trends in the overall economy where the department’s estimates are not available.

d. Base-budget data include supplemental and emergency funding before 2002.

## Comparison of the CBO Projection of DoD’s Future Years Defense Program and DoD’s Own Projection

(Billions of 2013 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FYDP Period</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total, 2013-2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO Projection, Base Budget</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>2,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD's 2013 FYDP, Base Budget</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>2,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Between the CBO Projection and DoD's FYDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Building Down From $1 Trillion in Procurement Over the Last 10 Years

Defense Procurement Funding in Billions of Dollars

Source: Data from the Department of Defense. Greenbook for FY2012. Table 2.1. Graph from the Stimson Center.
Procurement Cost Drivers Actually Shaping US Strategy

Total sunk cost through 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Cost (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
<td>$25.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia-class Submarine</td>
<td>$14.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littoral Combat Ship</td>
<td>$11.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-8A Poseidon</td>
<td>$9.6 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH-53K Helicopter</td>
<td>$9.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVN 78 Class</td>
<td>$9.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Hawk Helicopter</td>
<td>$8.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-22 Osprey</td>
<td>$7.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG 51 Destroyer</td>
<td>$7.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTRS GMR</td>
<td>$7.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN-T Increment 3</td>
<td>$6.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMS UAS</td>
<td>$6.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2D AHE</td>
<td>$6.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC/MC-130 Recap</td>
<td>$5.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache Block IIIA</td>
<td>$5.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriot/MEADS CAP</td>
<td>$5.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaper</td>
<td>$4.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-120 Missile</td>
<td>$4.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF JTRS</td>
<td>$3.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEM DEMIL-ACWA</td>
<td>$1.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$0.6 billion</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Procurement Spending Declined Year-Over-Year in 2012 Compared to Other Major Powers

Living with a History of Critical Procurement Problems and Failures That Shape Real-World Forces

- Force multiplier = force reducer
- GAO documents constant history of cost escalation; violations of Nunn-McCurdy. DTOE reflects similar problems in test and development.
- Configuration creep (leap?); engineering cost vs. regression realism, State of the art = advanced development.
- Steady history of cost-performance drive force cuts.
- Army failure of FCS program and key follow-ons
- Navy failure to create affordable ship building and maintain air strength.
- USAF mortgaged to F-35, low-balling cost of new bomber, cost problems with tankers and enablers.
- Marine Corps tied to high cost air and amphibious lift; F-35.
- Bottom Up Accountability: Never fire the Chief and the Secretary first.
Procurement Problems Case Study: F-35 - I

Fewer put into service
In 2002, the Pentagon planned to buy 1,591 F-35 planes by 2017. That number has been reduced to 365.

1,600 F-35s
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200

Approximate total of F-35s procured each year

TOTAL ORDERED:
2002 PLAN 1,591
2005 PLAN 1,062
2008 PLAN 775
2011 PLAN 545
2012 PLAN 365

Procurement Problems Case Study: F-35 - II

More time to complete the design
Design and manufacturing problems are requiring so many engineering changes that incorporating them will take six years longer than was expected in 2007.

1,000 design changes

Procurement Problems Case Study: F-35 - III

Rising cost
The projected cost of buying 2,443 F-35s by 2037 has risen sharply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$233.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$244.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$287.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$382.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$395.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nunn-McCurdy Breaches in Cost Escalation

According to the Government Accountability Office Office:

- Since 1997, there have been 74 Nunn-McCurdy breaches involving 47 major defense acquisition programs...nearly 40 percent of Nunn-McCurdy breaches occurred after a production decision had been made…Of the 47 programs that breached, 18 programs breached more than one time…Thirty-nine were critical breaches and 35 breaches were significant breaches.

- Other GAO studies showed 1 in 3 major programs escalated in cost by 50% or more since 1977 – 47 of 134 programs at a cost of $135 billion with $70 billion over the last two years.

Figure 1: Critical and Significant Breaches by Calendar Year, 1997-2009

GAO as of 3/12: Cost Growth is Easing But Still Critical

“The total estimated cost of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2011 portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs stands at $1.58 trillion. In the past year, the total acquisition cost of these programs has grown by over $74.4 billion or 5 percent, of which about $31.1 billion can be attributed to factors such as inefficiencies in production, $29.6 billion to quantity changes, and $13.7 billion to research and development cost growth.”

Total Cost Growth Case Studies (3/12) *

*Does not reflect savings from cuts in total weapons numbers to be procured over time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Current total acquisition cost</th>
<th>First full total acquisition cost</th>
<th>Change in total acquisition cost from first full estimate (percent)</th>
<th>Change in total acquisition within the past year (percent)</th>
<th>Change in total acquisition within the past 5 years (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite</td>
<td>$14,083</td>
<td>$6,370</td>
<td>121.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>106.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH-64D Longbow Apache</td>
<td>14,773</td>
<td>6,132</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)</td>
<td>23,582</td>
<td>10,931</td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Hawk (UH-60M)</td>
<td>25,169</td>
<td>12,970</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block IV Tomahawk (Tactical Tomahawk)</td>
<td>6,943</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>228.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130J Hercules</td>
<td>15,397</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>1522.5</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA)</td>
<td>10,173</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>285.0</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>118.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG 51 Destroyer</td>
<td>101,819</td>
<td>15,186</td>
<td>570.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter)</td>
<td>326,535</td>
<td>213,708</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV)</td>
<td>20,048</td>
<td>10,447</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)</td>
<td>4,147</td>
<td>2,827</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B)</td>
<td>13,992</td>
<td>5,392</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)</td>
<td>5,827</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>229.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-57.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>+1 Upgrades (4BW/4BN)</td>
<td>12,557</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>246.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)</td>
<td>7,509</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>224.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>49.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Direct Attack Munition</td>
<td>6,578</td>
<td>3,419</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for Program Delays

- 32 Manufacturing/Development
- 35 Performance in OT
- 36 Programmatic
- 47 Performance in DT
- 8 Delays in conducting the test

FY 2011 Annual Report by DoD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:

- There were 158 instances of delays for the 67 programs in five categories (many of the programs had more than one reason for delays).
- Of the 67 programs, 56 programs (or 84 percent) had performance problems in testing (either DT, OT, or both) while only eight programs (or 12 percent) had issues conducting the tests that led to delays.
- The length of delays for the programs examined varied from none (for two of the Nunn-McCurdy programs) to 15 years.
- Thirty-seven programs were delayed greater than 3 years. The delays were measured against the most recent previously published schedule; so, in a sense the total delay experienced is likely to be even longer relative to the original planned schedule.
- Six of the programs were eventually cancelled, and one had its Milestone B approval rescinded.
The standard used to require that weapons systems were built with 30 percent reliability, meaning there was, at most, a 70 percent chance that replacements or updated elements would be needed after the systems had entered into operational use. Contractors’ adherence to reliability standards is now voluntary, in part because reliability is seen as so difficult to predict.

Only six of 11 Army programs that faced testing by the agency met their reliability thresholds. Among those that “did not do well” were unmanned systems and communications networks, even though the Army had stipulated in engineering and manufacturing development contracts that those programs should meet an early reliability test threshold.

The Navy, which established a high-level director of reliability and maintainability and several other working groups to address reliability issues, had 17 of 27 systems meet their thresholds. The most reliable systems were aircraft and submarines, but “ships and software-intensive systems” did not fare as well.

The Air Force had the worst record for reliability, with only three of 11 systems tested by DOT&E meeting the reliability threshold. The Air Force has produced a guidebook to identify risks and had courses on reliability built into levels of its acquisition and test personnel.
What the New Strategy and FY2013 Budget Say: Army Modernization, Terminations and Restructuring

• Warfighter Information Network – Tactical (WIN-T) funded: cornerstone tactical communications system funded. $6.1B FY13-FY17

• CH-47 Chinook Helicopter Upgrades funded: $5.7B FY13-FY17

• Stryker upgrades: $0.5B FY13-FY17

• High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Recapitalization Termination: Save $0.9B FY13-FY17

• Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) Reduced: Save $1.6 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.


Department of Defense, Overview - FY2013 Defense Budget
What the New Strategy and FY2013 Budget Say: Navy Modernization, Terminations and Restructuring

• Procurement of 10 new ships: 2 Virginia-class attack submarines, as well as funding for the design of the Block 5 Virginia Payload Module, which will increase future Virginia-class submarine strike payload capacity; 2 DDG-51 class Aegis Destroyers; 4 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 1 Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and 1 CVN-21-class aircraft carrier. Totals $83.7 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.

• $38 million for design efforts to construct a modified Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) variant known as the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), planned for procurement in FY 2014.


• Procurement of 12 EA-18G aircraft totals $1.1 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• Procurement of Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (STUAS) and modifications totals $0.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MRMUAS) Termination: provides the Navy and Special Operations Forces with sea-based, airborne IS&R totals $1.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) Restructuring reducing the procurement 18 ships to 10 ships saving $1.5 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• P-8A Poseidon Restructuring reduces procurement by 10 aircraft savings $5.2 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) Surveillance Restructuring reduces program by 9 aircraft and saves $0.5 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

• SSBN(X) Development Delay totals $4.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017

Department of Defense, Overview - FY2013 Defense Budget
Air Force Modernization, Terminations and Restructuring

- The U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) improvements raise total funding to $18.0 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- FY 2013 Space budget request pursues satellite block buys, reduces engineering costs for the procurement of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS). New acquisition strategy for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program; and restructure Joint Space Operations Center Mission System, next generation GPS satellites, and commercial imagery and Operationally Responsive Space program in order to provide more responsive. Overall, space funding totals $40.1 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- New Bomber with average procurement unit cost is anticipated to be about $550 million in FY 2010 dollars for a fleet of 80-100 aircraft totals $6.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System for three new airborne sensor platforms totals $0.9 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 (GH30) Termination of high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aircraft saves $2.5 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) Termination saving $2.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft Termination saves $0.4 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.
- Unmanned Air Systems Restructuring sustains 65 MQ-1/9 combat air patrols with a surge capability to 85; Retains Predator longer than planned, protects funding for Army’s Gray Eagle, and continues the development of new capabilities. Reduces procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper by 24 aircraft.

Department of Defense, Overview - FY2013 Defense Budget
Defense-Wide Modernization, Terminations and Restructuring

• Missile Defense supports the European PAA (EPAA), pursued phased adaptive approaches in the Asia Pacific and the Middle East met its objectives for EPAA Phase 1 with the deployment of Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) ships and land-based radar in Europe in 2011. The next phases include deploying an Aegis Ashore in Romania with Standard Missile-3 Block IB (SM-3 IB) interceptors, deploying an Aegis Ashore in Poland with SM-3 IIA interceptors, and the addition of SM-3 Block IIB interceptors and early intercept capability. Other key efforts supported include:
  • Procurement of 5 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) to support the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense flight test program, and procurement of GBI reliability enhancements.
  • Continued conversion of Aegis ships, with a planned operational availability of 32 ships by FY 2017, and the procurement of 29 SM-3 interceptors for Aegis BMD ships.
  • Procurement of 84 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles; the procurement of 38 Enhanced Launcher Electronic Systems capable of firing PAC-3 missiles;
  • Continued development of the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement designed to extend the PAC-3 range.
  • Completion of the Medium Extended Air Defense Systems (MEADS) Proof of Concept and demonstration.
• The FY 2013 budget request balances capabilities and risks to deter aggression, protect U.S.
  • and allied interests, and pursue cost-effective and operationally-effective capabilities as a hedge
  • against future threats. Funding in FY 2013 is $9.7 billion and totals $47.4 billion from FY 2013 –
  • FY 2017.
  • Science and Technology maintains a strong Science & Technology (S&T) posture, with the
  • Department wide request of $11.9 billion ($62 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017). The FY 2013
  • request is above the FY 2011 enacted budget of $11.7 billion, and down modestly from the
  • FY 2012 enacted budget of $12.2 billion
  • Chemical-Biological Defense Program funding totals $7.6 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017
  • Cooperative Threat Reduction totals $2.3 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017
  • Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Restructuring reduces the total number of interceptors from 333 to 180 from FY 2013 – FY 2017 saving $1.8 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017
Every Major Program Remains at Hazard:  
“Reasonable Reductions / Responsible Risks” in FY2013

In order to sustain the highest priority investments, we made substantial reductions to programs that:

- **Are experiencing schedule, cost, or performance issues:**
  - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – Buy only 179 over the next five years, committed to the JSF program of record that includes all three variants, but slowed procurement to complete more testing and make developmental changes to minimize concurrency issues before buying in significant quantities.
  - Army Ground Combat Vehicle - delayed by protest, thus freeing up available funding for other priorities.
  - Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) - curtailed due to concerns about program cost and operational mobility.

- **Are offering or augmenting capability that already exists, but at significantly higher cost:**
  - Joint Air-to-Ground Munition (JAGM) - significantly reduced, but limited funding sustained to enable lower cost alternatives such as Hellfire.
  - Global Hawk Block 30 replacement for U-2 - terminated for cost escalation reasons. Hope lessons will will help other Global Hawk programs like the USAF Global Hawk Block 40 and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

- **Are entering service before they are needed:**
  - Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) - terminated because premature to need.
  - Army aviation - delayed helicopter modernization by three to five years.

- **Or are deemed excess to requirements:**
  - Commercial satellite imagery - reduced purchases for capacity excess to requirements, but will still be substantially increasing coverage beyond today’s capability.
  - HMMWVs - terminated upgrades and focused modernization resources on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

Risks in Defense Industry and Industrial Base

- In support of the strategic guidance’s tenet of reversibility, this budget plan sustains, where possible, key skills in the design and manufacture of military systems in segments of the industrial base that cannot be duplicated elsewhere in the economy or regenerated quickly.

- However, the industrial base will require careful monitoring in the future.

- For example, adding the afloat forward staging base addresses urgent operational shortfalls and will help sustain the shipbuilding industry in the near-term and mitigate the impact of reducing ship procurement in the FYDP.

Reducing Costs Associated With the Strategic Shift Toward Asia

The US troop presence in the Pacific region is reported to have cost DOD $24.6 billion between 2006 and 2010. As Asia becomes a defense policy priority, the GAO makes a number of recommendations through which DOD can reduce costs associated with strategic planning and the shift toward Asia.

- Reevaluating the tour normalization policy for US forces stationed in Korea. Tour normalization is anticipated to cost DOD $5 billion until FY2020. GAO suggests that DOD explore single-year unaccompanied tours or other options to reduce the costs associated with longer deployments, the relocation and housing of military families, and the building of support facilities in-country.

- Realigning forces in Japan and Guam is expected to cost the US and Japan $29.1 billion, although DOD cost estimates and schedules, which will help ensure the efficiency of the realignment, have yet to be produced.


Unstable Strategy for Cutting Wartime (OCO) Spending
Emerging Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan

- Strategic overreach results in failure, and transforming other states is strategic overreach.
- US must fundamentally rethink its approach to “optional wars.” It is far from clear that it can win the Iraq War, rather than empower Iran.
- US will decisively lose the Afghan and Pakistan conflict if it does not quickly develop plans for a military and diplomatic presence, and help to aid Afghanistan in transitioning away from dependence on foreign military and economic spending during 2012-2020. US troop cuts are not a transition plan, and focusing on withdrawal is a recipe for defeat.
- US must deal with non-traditional threats with a far better and more affordable mix of global, regional, and national strategies that can deal with issues like the turmoil in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia, and terrorism and instability on a global basis.
- Steady decline in the size and military capability of our traditional allies poses a critical non-traditional threat. No amount of US exhortation will change this situation and the US must reshape its strategy accordingly.
- US must rely on aiding friendly states, deterrence, containment, and far more limited and less costly forms of intervention.
- Terrorism and insurgency are only one aspect of shifts in the threats to the US that force it to work far more closely and effectively with non-traditional allies, reshape elements of its military spending and operations to help build up their capabilities, and maintain strong embassy teams and aid efforts to help bring political and economic stability.
FY2008-FY2013: OCO War Funding and Troops Make Afghan Transition a Significant Risk

**Trends in OCO Funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding ($ in Billions)</th>
<th>Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>$187</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>$146</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2010</td>
<td>$162</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2011</td>
<td>$159</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2012</td>
<td>$115**</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2013</td>
<td>$89</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trends in OCO Troop Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troop Levels (Annual Average in Thousands)</th>
<th>Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>141</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2010</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2011</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2012</td>
<td>95***</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2013</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Afghan data is for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Iraq data is for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation NEW DAWN, and Iraq activities.

** FY 2012 number ($115B) includes $0.6B of rescissions that were applicable to FY 2010 OCO appropriations.

*** U.S. forces deployed in Iraq only for the first quarter of FY 2012.

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
Highly Uncertain End FY2017 Reductions from Peak FY2010 Wartime Spending (in $US Current Billions)

Source: Adapted from DoD Factsheet issued by OSD (PA) on 26.1.12
FY2012-FY2013: Shift in OCO Funding ($USB) Threatens ANSF and Reset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>FY2012</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Defeat</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Program (MIP) (Includes ISR)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for Coalition Forces</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Reset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary End Strength</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Classified</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-war/Other*</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>115.7</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rescissions</strong></td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total including Rescissions</strong></td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reflects base budget amounts transferred by the Congress to OCO, and congressional non-war adds (e.g., $1B for domestic National Guard and Reserve Equipment).
** Includes rescissions enacted in FY 2012 for FY 2010 OCO appropriations.

The FY 2013 budget also includes:

- TFBSO: $179 million for the Task Force for Business Stability Operations
- $508 million for the operation of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I)

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
FY2012-FY2014: The Incredible Shrinking ANSF Funding

Then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan National Army (ANA)</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>ANSF Fund*</th>
<th>ANSF Strength (in Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Afghan National Security Forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>312</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approved end-strength of 352,000.

Now:

- Funds shrink to $4.4 billion annual versus CY2011 plans for $7-9 billion at unstated time – FY2015?
- US goes from 54% funding to 25%: 50% allies, 25% Afghan?
- ANSF shrinks to closer to 200,000.
- Role of ANP, ALP, APPF uncertain; So is funding for justice system and governance.

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary and background briefs
Strategy vs. Cuts by Military Service:
Army Does Not Lose in Baseline Spending
Army Loses in FY2012-FY2013 Topline Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>201,386,549</td>
<td>184,640,025</td>
<td>-16,746,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>172,509,651</td>
<td>170,132,077</td>
<td>-2,377,574</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>161,666,101</td>
<td>154,337,023</td>
<td>-7,329,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>110,145,285</td>
<td>104,822,462</td>
<td>-5,322,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>645,707,586</strong></td>
<td><strong>613,931,587</strong></td>
<td><strong>-31,775,999</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>153,111,873</td>
<td>149,171,893</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>283,989,327</td>
<td>272,745,422</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>120,579,571</td>
<td>108,510,595</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>71,902,070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>11,366,701</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolving and Management Funds</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>645,707,586</strong></td>
<td><strong>613,931,587</strong></td>
<td><strong>-31,775,999</strong></td>
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</table>

Note: Reflects Discretionary Budget Authority

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
And, Army Loses in FY2012-FY2013 OCO Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCO Budget</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>67,445,544</td>
<td>50,052,150</td>
<td>-17,393,394</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>15,693,315</td>
<td>14,230,117</td>
<td>-1,463,198</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>16,796,526</td>
<td>14,272,783</td>
<td>-2,523,743</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>15,147,492</td>
<td>9,927,368</td>
<td>-5,220,124</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115,082,877</strong></td>
<td><strong>88,482,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>-26,600,459</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCO Budget</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
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<td>14,060,094</td>
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<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Procurement</td>
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<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
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<td>Military Construction</td>
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<td>Revolving and Management Funds</td>
<td>435,013</td>
<td>503,364</td>
<td>68,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115,082,877</strong></td>
<td><strong>88,482,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>-26,600,459</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
But, Army Wins in FY2012-FY2013 Baseline Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Thousands</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base Budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>133,941,005</td>
<td>134,587,875</td>
<td>646,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>156,816,336</td>
<td>155,901,960</td>
<td>-914,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>144,869,575</td>
<td>140,064,240</td>
<td>-4,805,335</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense-Wide</td>
<td>94,997,793</td>
<td>94,895,094</td>
<td>-102,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>530,624,709</td>
<td>525,449,169</td>
<td>-5,175,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$ in Thousands</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>Delta '12-'13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base Budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>141,818,404</td>
<td>135,111,799</td>
<td>-6,706,605</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>197,213,485</td>
<td>208,759,219</td>
<td>11,545,734</td>
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<td>Procurement</td>
<td>104,527,376</td>
<td>98,823,354</td>
<td>-5,704,022</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>71,375,712</td>
<td>69,407,767</td>
<td>-1,967,945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>11,366,701</td>
<td>9,571,929</td>
<td>-1,794,772</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
<td>1,682,946</td>
<td>1,650,781</td>
<td>-32,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolving and Management Funds</td>
<td>2,640,085</td>
<td>2,124,320</td>
<td>-515,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>530,624,709</td>
<td>525,449,169</td>
<td>-5,175,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reflects Discretionary Budget Authority

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
Strategy as Doing More with Fewer forces and Personnel

“Preserving the Force by Cutting Costs”
Force Strength Changes : FY-2013-FY2017

- The Army eliminates a minimum of 8 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and studies brigade structure.
- The Navy eliminates 7 cruisers and 2 Dock Landing Ships (LSDs).
- The Air Force eliminates 6 combat coded fighter squadrons (1 active and 5 reserve components) and 1 non-combat coded fighter squadron (active).
  - The active component includes 1 A-10 squadron and 1 F-15C squadron.
  - The reserve component includes 4 A-10 squadrons and 1 F-16 squadron.
- The Air Force reduces 303 aircraft:
  - 123 Combat Aircraft – 102 A-10, 21 F-16
  - 150 Mobility and Tanker Aircraft – 65 C-130, 27 C-5A, 20 KC-135, 38 C-27
  - 30 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Aircraft – 11 RC-26, 1 E-8C
  - 18 RQ-4
End Strength Changes: FY-2013-FY2017

The Department’s overall military end strength (Base and Overseas Contingency Operations) changes from 2,269,700 in FY 2012 to 2,238,400 in FY 2013, a 1.4 percent reduction equating to 31,300 in end strength.

By FY 2017, the overall military end strength will be 2,145,800, a 5.5 percent reduction equating to 123,900 in end strength from FY 2012. Details provided below:

- Army Active, Reserve, and Army National Guard end strength in FY 2013 is 1,115,300 –0.9 percent less than FY 2012. In FY 2017 the end strength will be 1,048,200, a 6.8 percent reduction from FY 2012.

- Navy Active and Reserve end strength in FY 2013 is 385,200 – 1.7 percent less than FY 2012. In FY 2017, the end strength will be 376,600, a 3.9 percent reduction from FY 2012.

- Marine Corps Active and Reserve end strength in FY 2013 is 236,900 – 2.0 percent less than FY 2012. In FY 2017 the end strength will be 221,700, an 8.3 percent reduction from FY 2012.

- Air Force Active, Reserve, and Air National Guard end strength in FY 2013 is 501,000 – 1.9 percent less than FY 2012. In FY 2017, the end strength will be 499,300, a 2.3 percent reduction from FY 2012.
Cost-Driven Military Personnel Cuts are Not a Strategy or a Plan

- Define active manpower cuts, but only Army and Marine cuts are related to changes in OCO mission.
- Navy and Air Force cuts driven more by procurement cost-escalation. Suffer more in baseline cuts than Army and Marine Corps.
- Unclear can control cost of military entitlements; force size vs. entitlements remains an issue.
- Reserves and civil service cuts defined largely in budgeting terms, with efforts to restructure reserves still to come.
- No clear effort to deal with contractor cost and role issues.
- Driven largely by Defense, government-wide annual cost of service contracts rose 44% over last 10 years from $181 billion to $324 billion. Contractor pay cap is $400,000. Does not include OCO efforts.
- Spending on federal employees increased by 34% from $170 billion to $324 billion.

Contractor cost data taken from Joe Davidson, “Congress considers putting a pay cap on contractors,” Washington Post, March 30, 2012
CBO Estimate of Personnel and O&M Cost Pressures

(Billions of 2013 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: Base-budget data include supplemental and emergency funding before 2002.

FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2013 to 2017, the years for which the Department of Defense's (DoD's) plans are fully specified.

CBO Breakdown of O&M Cost Per Active-Duty Service Member

(Thousands of 2012 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: FYDP = Future Years Defense Program; FYDP period = 2012 to 2016, the years for which the Department of Defense's (DoD's) plans are fully specified.

a. Base-budget data include supplemental and emergency funding before 2002.

b. For 2002 to 2012, supplemental and emergency funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO), such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for other purposes is shown separately from the base-budget data. The amount shown for 2012 has been requested but has not been appropriated.

c. The CBO projection of the base budget incorporates costs that are consistent with DoD’s recent experience.

d. For the extension of the FYDP (2017 to 2030), CBO projects the costs of DoD’s plans using the department’s estimates of costs to the extent they are available and costs that are consistent with the broader U.S. economy if such estimates are not available.
The Tricare Threat to US Strategy

(Billions of 2012 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual Period</th>
<th>FYDP Period</th>
<th>Beyond the FYDP Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRICARE for Life Accrual Payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Care and Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased Care and Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: Supplemental and emergency funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO), such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, is included for 2011 and earlier but not for later years.
Military compensation and healthcare expenses have expanded by nearly 80 percent since 2001, despite a comparatively small 5 percent increase in force size.
Ongoing Manpower Cuts: FY2012-FY2016

On January 6, 2011 Secretary Gates explained his decision to reduce the size of the Active Army and Marine Corps in FY 2015 and FY 2016, saving about $6 billion. The U.S. Army’s permanent active duty end strength would decline by 27,000 troops, while the Marine Corps would decline by somewhere between 15,000 to 20,000, depending on the outcome of their force structure review. These projected reductions are based on an assumption that America’s ground combat commitment in Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with the President’s strategy.

The Figure below shows these end strength reductions compared to FY 2012 levels, and the FY 2007 baseline levels at which the Army and Marine Corps had been operating. As shown, after these proposed reductions in FY 2015 and FY 2016, both Services will be well above FY 2007 levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End Strength-Base Budget (thousands)</th>
<th>FY 2007 Baseline</th>
<th>FY 2012 Request</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>FY 2015 – FY 2016 Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army*</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>+65</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps**</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>+27</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes end strength funded in FY 2012 OCO budget for 14,600 additional Active Army soldiers – a temporary wartime allowance – to help the Army meet its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

** Marine Corps will decline somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 in FY 2015 – FY 2016.

OSD Comptroller, FY2012 Budget Request-Overview, February 2011, p. 5-5
FY2012-FY2017: Active Personnel Cuts: Navy and Air Force Get Hit Hardest in Terms of Pre-War Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End Strength</th>
<th>FY 2001</th>
<th>FY 2012&lt;sup&gt;/1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>FY 2013&lt;sup&gt;/2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>FY 2017 Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>480,801</td>
<td>562,000</td>
<td>552,100</td>
<td>490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>377,810</td>
<td>325,700</td>
<td>322,700</td>
<td>319,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>172,934</td>
<td>202,100</td>
<td>197,300</td>
<td>182,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>353,571</td>
<td>332,800</td>
<td>328,900</td>
<td>328,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,385,116</td>
<td>1,422,600</td>
<td>1,401,000</td>
<td>1,320,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>/1</sup> Includes end strength funded in OCO appropriations. The OCO component of the FY 2012 budget includes funding for 14,600 additional Active Army soldiers – a temporary wartime allowance – to help the Army meet its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

<sup>/2</sup> The FY 2013 Army base budget funds enduring end strength of 490,000 plus 12,400 Temporary End Strength Army Medical (TEAM) associated with non-deployable Soldiers in the Integrated Disability System. Includes end strength funded in FY 2013 OCO – 49,700 Army and 15,200 Marine Corps.

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary

(End Strength in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Reserve</th>
<th>FY 2012 Authorized</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
<th>FY 2017 Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>205.0</td>
<td>205.0</td>
<td>205.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>358.2</td>
<td>358.2</td>
<td>353.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>101.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>847.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>837.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>825.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

(Dollars in Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program (Base Budget)</th>
<th>FY 2012 Enacted</th>
<th>FY 2013 Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Reserve</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal National Guard</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Military Personnel, Operation & Maintenance, Military Construction Appropriation levels, and estimated Procurement funding excluding National Guard and Reserve Equipment (NGRE)

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
No Clear Personnel Strategy After CY 2014

“Fortune Cookie” Focus on Military; No Integrated Effort Involving Civilians and Contractors
Why Integrated Military-Civilian-Contactor Manpower Policy Matters: Even if One Ignores Massive Increases in Contractor Role and Cost:
Half of DoD Career Personnel are Civilians

(End Strength/FTE in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Military Active Duty</th>
<th>DoD DH Civilian WorkForce</th>
<th>Total DoD Manpower</th>
<th>Other Federal Civil Service</th>
<th>Total Federal Civilian Employ ¹/²</th>
<th>Coast Guard ¹/²</th>
<th>Total Federal Employ</th>
<th>State &amp; Local Govts ²/³</th>
<th>Total US Public Employ</th>
<th>Private Sector Employ</th>
<th>Total Unemployment ³/⁴</th>
<th>Total Labor Force ³/⁴</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4,231</td>
<td>19,748</td>
<td>23,979</td>
<td>121,384</td>
<td>145,363</td>
<td>8,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4,255</td>
<td>19,723</td>
<td>23,978</td>
<td>115,899</td>
<td>139,877</td>
<td>14,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4,372</td>
<td>19,514</td>
<td>23,886</td>
<td>115,178</td>
<td>139,064</td>
<td>14,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Base</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>2,241</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 OCO</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Total</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>1,996</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4,299</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Base</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 OCO</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Total</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DoD direct hire (DH) civilian work force figures include both U.S. and foreign national direct hires. Foreign national indirect hire (FINH) employees that support DoD forces overseas are not included.
Beginning with FY 1996, all the Federal civilian work force is measured in Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) on this table.
All enacted war and supplemental data are rolled up into the Defense totals prior to 2012. Certain non-Defense employment data was not available past 2011.

¹/² From OMB Analytical Perspectives Table 11-3 (Total Federal Employment).
²/³ From the Economic Report of the President, Table B-46 (Employees on Nonagricultural Payrolls, by Major Industry).
³/⁴ From the Economic Report of the President, Table B-35 (Civilian Population and Labor Force).

DoD Green Book FY2013, p. 263.
CBO Projection is for Higher Gap if Real World Contingency Funding is Provided,

The Military Personnel Cost Pressures Described Earlier Remain Critical

“...the cost of military personnel has grown at an unsustainable rate over the last decade.

- Including wartime funding or OCO appropriations, military personnel costs have doubled since 2001, or about 40% above inflation, while the number of full-time military personnel, including activated reserves, increased by only 8% during the same time period.” (DoD Report)

- “Basic pay has risen 62 percent, housing allowances have increased by 58 percent, and subsistence allowance is up 43 percent, compared to a 46-percent rise in private-sector salaries.” (American Foreign Press Service)

- “Within the base budget alone (i.e., excluding wartime funding or OCO) during this same time period personnel costs increased by nearly 90%, or about 30% above inflation, while the number of military personnel has increased by only about 3%.” (DoD Report)

- Now spend about $181 billion a year on personnel, close to one-third of baseline budget: $107 billion for salaries, $50 billion for health care, and $24 billion for retirement.

“DoD addressed the growth of personnel-related costs while keeping in mind that:

- The core of the U.S. military is our All Volunteer Force
- Military life entails unique challenges and stresses
- War-related deployments of the past decade have put extraordinary demands on many troops and their families.” (DoD Report)

“Preserving the All-Volunteer Force While Cutting Costs”
No Plan or Strategy After 2014?

- Reductions in the rate of growth in spending on military compensation and other personnel-related costs and benefits in the budget are significantly less than their share of total defense spending.

- Military compensation and benefits currently account for roughly 1/3 of the defense budget; however, the changes in compensation and benefits account for about 1/9 of the total budget reductions.

- **Military Pay.** Instead of reducing military pay, created sufficient room to allow full pay raises in 2013 and 2014 to keep pace with increases in private sector pay.

  - Will achieve some cost savings by providing more limited pay raises beginning in 2015. This will give troops and their families fair notice and lead time before these proposed changes take effect. Use some savings in the later years to invest in force structure and modernization.

  - Despite this change, military personnel will see their pay check increase every year across the FYDP.

- **Health Care.** Military health care has seen rapid growth relative to the rest of the defense budget. Most of the changes made in this budget will not affect active duty personnel or their families. Also exempting medically retired and survivors of those who died on active duty from all health care changes.

“Preserving the All-Volunteer Force While Cutting Costs” Says Nothing About Scale and Spend of Services

Budget plan sustains or enhances key support programs while reforming and re-organizing others to be more effective and responsive to the needs of troops and their families:

- Wounded Warriors - extra funding added in the base and OCO budgets to enhance the Integrated Disability Evaluation System
- Transition Assistance - reform of the Transition Assistance Program and transition process for all service members through a collaborative DoD-VA initiative that improves career opportunities and readiness focusing on education, technical training, job placement, and entrepreneurship preparation
- Family Support - effective programs sustained, expanded, or improved, including non-clinical counselors, marriage support, new patient support, and stress-reducing recreation for returning troops
- Psychological Health - programs sustained and particularly effective programs, such as those addressing traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, were significantly expanded
- Reserve Component Support – DoD’s Yellow Ribbon program provides services and referrals to reservists, guardsmen, their families, and their employers through each stage of the mobilization cycle
- DOD Schools - facilities being restored and modernized
- Military Commissary System - current number and distribution of stores maintained

“Preserving the All-Volunteer Force While Cutting Costs”
Putting Retirement Up for Grabs

- Those most affected will be working-age retirees under the age of 65 still likely to be employed in the civilian sector. These proposed changes include:
  - Further increasing and adding new enrollment fees for retirees under age 65 in the TRICARE program, using a tiered approach based on retired pay that requires senior-grade retirees to pay more and junior-grade retirees less; the resulting fees remain below comparable civilian equivalents.
  - Establishing a new enrollment fee for the TRICARE--for--Life program for retirees 65 and older, again using a tiered approach; the resulting fees will be well below comparable civilian equivalents.
  - Implementing additional increases in pharmacy co-pays in a manner that increases incentives for use of generics and mail order.

- **Retirement.** Will ask Congress to establish a commission with BRAC--like authority to conduct a comprehensive review of military retirement in the context of total military compensation.

- Goal is to recommend changes in order to meet the personnel needs of in a cost effective manner.

- DoD strongly supports protecting the retirement benefits of those who currently serve by grandfathering their benefits. Any reforms should only affect future recruits.

“Restructuring and Maintaining Reserve Forces”

In What Way and How?

A smaller active force requires a capable and ready Reserve Component. Among other applications, a strong Reserve Component is a vital element of the concept of reversibility embedded in the strategic guidance.

Consequently, marginal reductions are being made in the Army reserve and Army National Guard and no reductions to the Marine Corps Reserve.

Furthermore, will leverage the operational experience and institute a progressive readiness model in the National Guard and Reserves in order to sustain increased readiness prior to mobilization.

In particular, will maintain key combat support capabilities such as sustainment as well as combat service support capabilities such as civil affairs maintained at a high readiness level in the Reserve Component.

Similarly, the Air Force is balancing the size of its reserve and active components, including aircraft and manpower reductions, and adjusting the alignment of missions and installations to sustain the operational Reserve Component for the long term.

The Air Force will augment the readiness of their reserves by increasing Active-Reserve Component associations.

Strategy by Listing – *But Not Defining the Plans for* – Key Mission Areas

No Picture of What Forces Exist and Where, or of Capabilities relative to Potential Threat, Role of Allies
Concepts: Five Major Strategic Tenets Without a Single Plan or Cost

The Department’s leadership and subject matter experts assessed the potential strategic, military and programmatic risks associated with each budget decision in accordance with five major tenets within the President’s strategic guidance:

I. Rebalance force structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions while sustaining key alliances and partnerships in other regions

II. Plan and size forces to be able to defeat a major adversary in one theater while denying aggression elsewhere or imposing unacceptable costs

III. Protect key investments in the technologically advanced capabilities most needed for the future, including countering anti-access threats

IV. No longer size active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise of a decade of war.

V. To the extent possible, structure major adjustments in a way that best allows for their reversal or for regeneration of capabilities in the future if circumstances change.

Key Force Capabilities to Meet New Strategic Priorities and Budgetary Goals With No Net Assessment of threat or Allies or US Forces

…the resulting joint force, while smaller and leaner, will remain agile, flexible, ready, innovative, and technologically advanced. It will be a force that is:

- Adaptable and capable of deterring aggression and providing a stabilizing presence,
- especially in the highest priority areas and missions in the Asia--Pacific region and the Middle East, while still ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe and other allies and partners
- Ready, rapidly deployable, and expeditionary such that it can project power on arrival
- Capable of defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities
- Possessing cutting-edge capabilities that exploit our technological, joint, and networked advantage
- Able to reconstitute quickly or grow capabilities as needed
- Above all, manned and led by the highest quality professionals

Service or Command Driven-Strategy: No Plan, Costs, or Net Assessment

Six commanders have specific mission objectives for their geographical areas of responsibility:

United States Northern Command
United States Pacific Command
United States European Command
United States Southern Command
United States Africa Command
United States Central Command

Three commanders have worldwide mission responsibilities, each focused on a particular function:

United States Strategic Command
United States Transportation Command
United States Special Operations Command

Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary
Vague Priorities for Asia-Pacific and Middle East Regions

- Maintained the current bomber fleet
- Maintained the aircraft carrier fleet at 11 ships and 10 air wings
- Maintained the big-deck amphibious fleet
- Sustained Army and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific, while maintaining persistent presence in the Middle East
- Budgeted to forward station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and patrol craft in Bahrain
- Funded development of a new afloat forward staging base that can be dedicated to support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as counter-mine operations
- …we increased or protected investment in capabilities that preserve the US military’s ability to project power in contested areas and strike quickly from over the horizon, including:
  - Funding for the new bomber
  - Design changes to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class submarines
  - Design of a conventional prompt strike option from submarines
  - Upgraded radars for tactical aircraft and ships
  - Improved air-to-air missiles
  - New electronic warfare and communications capabilities

Cuts and Slow Downs to Support Strategic Priorities in Asia Pacific and Middle East to be replaced by What?

- ...reduce the number of ships by slowing the pace of building new ships and by accelerating the retirement of some existing ships. These include:
  - Retiring 7 cruisers early -- 6 did not have ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, and the seventh with BMD capability is in need of costly hull repairs
  - Slipping a large deck amphibious ship (LHA) by 1 year
  - Slipping 1 new Virginia class submarine outside the FYDP
  - Slipping ocean surveillance vessel
  - Reducing Littoral Combat Ships by 2 ships in the FYDP
  - Reducing Joint High Speed Vessels by 8 in the FYDP
  - Retiring 2 smaller amphibious ships (LSD) early and moving their replacement outside the FYDP
- ...concluded that DoD could, at minimal risk, disestablish six Air Force tactical-air fighter squadrons (out of 60) and one training squadron. As e reduce air force structure are protecting aircraft with multi-role capabilities versus niche capabilities.
- ...adjust the posture of land forces in Europe in concert with overall Army transformation including eliminating two heavy brigades forward-stationed there

The Last Land War in Anywhere? North Korea? Iran?
“Not Needed for Long-term Stability Operations”

- In response to the demands of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, active Army end-strength increased by 95,000 and Marine Corps end-strength by 30,000.

- The U.S. military commitment in Iraq is complete and a security transition in Afghanistan is underway.

- In this budget, plan to reduce the size of the active Army from a post-9/11 peak of about 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 and the active Marine Corps from a peak of about 202,000 to 182,000.

- The Army plans to remove at least eight Brigade Combat Teams from its existing structure; however, the future organizing construct of the Army is under review.

- Even with these reductions, the Army and Marine Corps will be larger than they were in 2001.

- While the U.S. does not anticipate engaging in prolonged, large-scale stability operations - requiring a large rotation force - in the near-to mid-term, cannot rule out the possibility.

- If such a campaign were to occur, would respond by mobilizing the Reserve Component and, over time, regenerating Active Component end strength.

- Additionally, even as troop strength draws down, the Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command will preserve expertise in security force assistance and counterinsurgency training.

- These lessons apply to procurement as well; for example, the kind of troop transport vehicles needed to succeed and survive in an irregular warfare environment are included in the Army and Marine Corps modernization plans.

Power Projection: Protect but Don’t Define Force Goals

- ...protected important capabilities like:
  - the new bomber,
  - upgrades to the small diameter bomb,
  - aircraft carriers,
  - surface combatant modernization,
  - and cyber capabilities.

- ...also protected capabilities that allow US to project power in denied environments.

- In addition to funding for the new bomber and increasing the cruise missile capacity of future submarines, protected anti-submarine warfare and counter-mine capabilities.

Cuts in Air Mobility Forces to Match Reductions in Emphasis on Land Options and “Capacity to Support Two Large, Simultaneous and Rapidly Developing Ground Campaigns”

- Eliminate surplus without losing lift capability to move to another region
- 130 Aircraft will be retired or divested from the airlift fleet.
- “Retiring 27 aging C-5As, resulting in a fleet of modernized 52 C-5Ms and 222 C-17s”
- “Retiring 65 of the oldest C-130s, resulting in a fleet of 318 C-130s”
- “Divesting 38 C-27s.”

Undefined Goals, Forces, and Spending for Counterterrorism, Special Forces, and Cyberoperations

...protected key components of the force that are adept in executing Counterterrorism mission:
- Special Operations Forces - critical to U.S. and partner counter terrorism operations -and a variety of other contemporary contingencies
- Unmanned Air Systems -- fund enough trained personnel, infrastructure, and platforms to sustain 65 USAF MQ-1/9 combat air patrols (CAPs) with a surge capacity of 85;
  - Retained Predator aircraft retained longer than previously planned, allowing DoD to slow the buy of the Reaper aircraft and gain some savings;
- Funding for the Army’s air system, Gray Eagle
- Sea-based unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such as Fire Scout -- important ISR assets where ground basing is not available
- Advanced ISR --new unmanned systems with increased capabilities
- Cyber operations. The strategic guidance highlights the increasing importance of cyberoperations. As a result, cyber is one of the few areas in which actually increased investments, including in both defensive and offensive capabilities.

Changes in Strategic Triad With No Goals, Costs, Assessments

- Under the new strategic guidance, will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

- This budget protects all three legs of the Triad - bombers that provide both conventional and nuclear deterrence, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and ballistic missile submarines.

- To this end, are committed to the procurement of a new bomber.

- However, will delay the new Ohio submarine replacement by two years without undermining our partnership with the UK. While this delay will create challenges in maintaining current at-sea presence requirements in the 2030s, we believe this risk can be managed.

- An ongoing White House review of nuclear deterrence will address the potential for maintaining our deterrent with a different nuclear force.

Missile Defense Capabilities and Space Systems: Ditto

- *Missile defense programs:* provide the capability to defend our homeland, support our allies, and protect U.S. military forces when operating in regions across the globe.
  - Despite its importance, were not able to protect all of the funding in this area.
  - Protected investments in homeland defense and,
  - Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe aimed at protecting allies.
  - Reduced spending and accepted some risk in deployable regional missile defense and will increase reliance on allies and partners in the future.

- *Space systems:* Space systems are critical to our surveillance, communications, positioning and networking capabilities.
  - Protected funding for upgrades to the Global Positioning System (GPS), the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite programs.

Shaping the Global Mission and Resource Criteria for Defining a Viable National Security Strategy
Critical Questions

- If the funding picture requires the Pentagon to do less with less, how will the military now serve all of its newly revised primary missions? Where will scarce resources be spent and what specific capabilities need to be purchased in order to achieve our goals?

- What will happen if sequestration is not averted and the Pentagon needs to cope with an additional $600 billion in cuts over the next 10 years?

- Given the past systemic failure of all military services to efficiently manage their procurement and acquisition, will these dollars be allocated to maximize their strategic efficacy and in ways that preserve vital development capabilities within the US defense-industrial base?

- Given that this new guidance operates outside of the QDR/QDDR process, how will interagency coordination and funding over reconstruction/transition be accounted for in Afghanistan and Iraq?

- Exactly how does the US create smaller and cheaper forces that can be so flexible, ready, and deployable that they can fight and defeat any aggressor in any fight in every kind of war at once?

- Can the US really maintain an all-volunteer force - the willingness to stay in military careers for the years required to be fully effective - and cut spending? What are the details of the human factors necessary to make such a strategy workable?
Bringing Entitlements, Defense Discretionary Spending, Other Discretionary Spending – and revenues – into a stable, affordable balance

- Requires hard social choices about mandatory spending
  - Raise age limits, force efficiency and triage, or increase revenues.
  - Aging population, rising real medical costs pose major national threat.
  - So does any failure in economic growth.
- Discretionary spending can be cut, but does not solve budget problem.
- Real burden of defense on US economy is not a driving factor in historical terms. But,
  - Wars are unpopular and projections assume “victory” in 2014.
  - Perceptions of waste and mismanagement are critical.
  - Assumes a “one major regional contingency” force structure is enough.
Creating a Functional System for Tying Strategic Planning to a Working PPBS and Force Planning System Actually Executed on Time, at the Promised Level, and at the Promised Cost

- Must force system to actually execute plans at projected cost.
- High cost programs have to work. Must stop confusing force multipliers with force degraders.
- Top Down Accountability: “Fish rot from the head down.”
- Need real strategies and not concepts: Force plans, personnel plans, modernization plans, timescales, and costs.
- Need to make hard trade-offs, and by mission – not by service.
- Plan annually in rolling five year (ten? fifteen?) periods.
- Shift PPBS system away from services to major commands
Creating a Functional PPBS/QDR/QDDR

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Source: DoD FY2013 Budget Summary

- After ten years of war, still do not have meaningful integrated efforts, or clear definition of “hold, build, and transition.”

- Challenge of Withdrawal in Iraq and Transition to State is prelude to Afghanistan.

- Turmoil in Middle East shows risk of overdependence on security sector.

- Failure of QDDR illustrates the challenge. So does delay in civilian “surge” in Afghanistan. (1,100 military in 2009 vs. several hundred civilians now.)

- Need for integrated strategy and PPBS for OCOS and regional/national operations.

- Not simply a matter of State, USAID, and civilian partners abroad. Key trade offs involve some $77 billion in Homeland Security and GWOT.
Finding the Balance Between Irregular/Asymmetric, Conventional, and WMD Warfare in a Period of Constant Technological Change

- “Hybrid Warfare,” “Air-Sea Battle,” etc. only have real meaning if not tied to force posture and resource choices.
- Nuclear, cyber, biotechnology, weapons of mass effectiveness, increases in strike range, and unconventional delivery all change the map and nature of military power.
  - Counterproliferation can simply shift the activity to covert and/or alternative means.
  - Same with missile defense, preemptive/preventive strikes.
- Every key US and allied capability, resource dependence, and critical facility redefines the target mix.
- If you can’t ban the crossbow, you have to find an affordable way to live with it.
Coping with Ideological and Non-State Actors at the Political and Civil as Well as the Combat and Counterterrorism levels.

- Middle East crises are a warning that no population is passive or can be continuously repressed.

- Face at least two decades of demographic pressure, inadequate governance, religious and ideological challenges to come.

- Struggle for the future of Islam is internal, not a clash between civilizations, but shows the scale of the spillover effect.

- Impacts on key imports of resources, global economy (which steadily equals our economy.)

- Immigration, travel, speed and complexity of global transport, communications/Internet, financial training systems, and IT add to the problem.

- Steadily increases need to see through other’s eyes, define security to meet their interests and values.
Creating a Unified National Security Budget

- National strategy, defense QDR, State QDDR, and DNI strategies are not coordinated, tied to resources, and linked to coordinated regional and country plans.

- State Department resources are under even more intense budget pressure than DoD at time developments like “Arab Spring” show integrated State-DoD programs are critical.

- Department of Homeland Security alone cost $37 billion in FY2012 budget request. OMB estimates that total cost with DoD and 29 other departments and agencies is $71.6 billion.