Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia
CASES FROM INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND AFGHANISTAN

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CONTENTS

Preface iv

Introduction 1

India: Hindu Nationalist Groups 5

Pakistan: State-Sponsored Militancy and Pakistani Taliban 11

Afghanistan: Mujahideen and Successors 15

Religion and Militant Groups’ Strategies for Gaining Support 18
  Relations with the State 18
  Service Provision 19
  Kinship and Patronage Networks 22
  Diaspora Outreach 23

Conclusions 25
For the past six years, the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) and its predecessor, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, have studied the intersection of religion and both conflict and peace. This line of research began with a study of Islamic charities, including those operated by Hamas and Hezbollah and by European, Somali, and Saudi groups. Published in 2007 as Understanding Islamic Charities, this research found that the international community had great difficulty recognizing and supporting the constructive role that most Islamic charities play. That same year, for a report titled Mixed Blessings: U.S. Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings, our program surveyed executive-branch agencies of the U.S. government and found important gaps in policies and programming related to religion abroad. Those studies identified a need for better awareness within the U.S. policy community of issues surrounding religion and identity, especially in conflict-affected countries, and so we hosted a series of events on those topics throughout 2008 and 2009. The findings from our program’s work during this period, including recommendations to incorporate religious issues into training and education for U.S. civilian and military personnel, are detailed in “Navigating in the Fog: Improving U.S. Government Engagement with Religion,” published in Rethinking Religion and World Affairs (2012), edited by Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft.

Given the high level of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the important role religion seems to play in those societies, in 2010 we began a two-year study of religiously motivated nonstate armed movements in the region. Our focus was the role they played in governance at the subnational level to see how successful they were in using religion or service provision to build support in local communities. We found that religion has sometimes helped them gain access to some communities, but alienated others; intimidation and kinship ties have been the more common means of gaining access. Likewise, some groups have offered security, justice, humanitarian, and other services, but few have done it well—and even those who had initially been successful usually managed to lose support after becoming abusive or imposing their religious views in unwelcome ways. Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Literature Review, published in 2012, describes and analyzes what is known in the English language literature about how religious militant groups operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This line of research was part of a broader study of governance and politics in Afghanistan and Pakistan looking in detail at formal, informal, illicit, and hybrid structures in the region. Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan and Subnational Governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan, both published in 2012, considered the strategic implications of the complicated interactions among governance, politics, and militancy. (A forthcoming report, Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan, considers some regional issues affecting stability.) A series of background papers was published in late 2011 and early 2012 to elucidate the dynamics of governance in greater detail, especially in Pakistan: Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Chi-
In this final report, Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia: Cases from India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, we draw upon our entire research program on religion and conflict, especially over the past two years, to offer a broad overview of the different roles religion has played in governance, politics, and conflicts in South Asia. We argue that it is just as important today as it was when we began this research six years ago that policy officials pay specific attention to the role of religion in conflict settings. It is not safe to assume that religiously themed rhetoric represents the true motives of conflict actors or the true beliefs of local communities. But nor is it safe to assume that religion, and especially religious identity, does not contribute to conflict—or that it could not contribute to peace. Religion needs to be understood in context.

None of this research would have been possible without the generous support of the Henry Luce Foundation, and we are grateful in particular to Toby Volkman and Michael Gilligan for their willingness to fund policy research on these issues for so many years now. The governance and politics research of the past two years was supported as well by the Ploughshares Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Several anonymous reviewers provided extremely helpful feedback. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Delhi, India, convened a peer review of the India case, and we thank them for their criticisms and support.

Finally, I am enormously grateful to my coauthors, Joy Aoun, Liora Danan, Sadika Hameed, Kathryn Mixon, and Denise St. Peter, all of whom contributed in fundamental ways to the production of this report, and without whom it never could have been completed. I take full responsibility for any errors of fact or omission that might remain.

ROBERT D. LAMB
Washington, D.C.
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Introduction

The top headlines of the past year have made increasingly clear to U.S. government officials the central—but complicated—roles that religion plays in many of the most strategically important engagements of the United States.

Since early 2011, the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have brought about significant changes to long-standing political regimes. Concerns in the West over the types of regimes that will replace Muammar Qaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, and potentially others have been fueled in part by uncertainty over the role religion will play in national and regional politics. In some cases, these movements initially forged a degree of solidarity among protesters from different religious communities. But subsequently there has been an increase in sectarian, religious, and ethnic animosities among the challengers in some of those countries. For example, in the wake of Hosni Mubarak’s departure from Egypt, the country saw a surge in violent clashes between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Coptic Christian minority.

In October of last year, President Obama announced he was sending 100 military advisers to the Great Lakes region in central Africa to help find Joseph Kony, the leader of a terrorist organization called the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA had emerged in 1987 as an armed Christian movement demanding greater rights from the central government of Uganda. Over time the movement became increasingly violent, and today it is widely considered one of the worst violators of human rights in central Africa, with religion featuring prominently in the LRA’s rhetoric.

At the end of 2011, after the United States formally withdrew its troops from Iraq, tensions between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims grew rapidly, whether over religious beliefs, identity, prejudice, or politics. It remains unclear whether some of the early incidents were a bellwether for a broader...
sectarian conflict, or whether the U.S. withdrawal had simply caused some expected turbulence in the balance of power that will settle once a new political equilibrium is reached.

And in Afghanistan, the United States continues to fight the Taliban, a movement that originated in religious schools, evolved into a brutal theocratic regime, and, after losing power, became an insurgency purportedly seeking to reestablish its “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Importantly, the Taliban’s theology has always been at odds with the Sufi traditions of most Afghans, and many Taliban fighters have joined the movement for reasons besides religious conviction.4 Earlier this year, after it was discovered that American troops had mistakenly burnt copies of the Qur’an at a military base in Afghanistan, protests broke out in several places throughout the country, and some turned violent. Many observers believe the demonstrators were less concerned about the burning than they were frustrated with the American presence, and in many cases Afghan religious leaders and political opposition figures fueled the anger.5

More recently, as the United States contemplates engagement in Syria, what started as a relatively peaceful protest movement there has become a mainly Sunni armed insurgency that includes both local fighters and defectors from the Syrian military. The protestors armed themselves in response to the Syrian security forces’ violent attacks, but the conflict has sectarian tones as well. The Assad regime has engaged in sectarian rhetoric to mobilize the country’s Alawite, Druze, and Christian minorities against the mainly Sunni protestors, arguing that a regime with a Sunni majority would endanger the other minorities. Many Sunni volunteers joining the struggle against the regime from outside Syria have been motivated by a sense of religious obligation.6 In another layer of religion’s relevance, the Russian Orthodox Church has been a major force in ensuring Russia’s opposition to the removal of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, arguing that it would endanger Syria’s Christian minority.7

In many more places—including Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Northern Ireland, and even the United States—religion clearly interacts with politics, economics, and identity (including language, clan, skin tone, shared history, class, region, and state) in ways that are relevant to conflict (peaceful or violent). Which aspects are most salient often depends on the particular social context, but a well-established literature has acknowledged that identity is often an important factor in conflict situations.8 Identity competition, including religiously based competition, can play a central role


5. This observation is based on informal conversations one of the authors (Lamb) had with more than a dozen Afghans and Americans in Kabul, February 2012.


in the inception and escalation of intergroup conflict, even when economic and political factors also are at play.\textsuperscript{9}

Recent scholarship has increasingly explored a religion-specific role in both conflict “inception and escalation” and conflict resolution and peacebuilding; one expert task force has found that religion “lends a sacred aura and intensity to disputes and campaigns that also have significant secular dimensions.”\textsuperscript{10} In many cases, violence or conflict tends to consolidate religious belief or identity, as, for example, a coping mechanism in the face of deprivation, or as a protective measure, a flag to rally around in the face of attack. As one scholar proposes, “the decision to use violence may come first, at least on the part of the leadership, which then crafts a borrowed doctrine out of bits and pieces of established ideology or religion in order to support what is in essence a political goal.”\textsuperscript{11}

Other scholars have argued that the notion of sacrifice in many religious traditions acts as a particular type of motivator in both violence and peacemaking. When religion becomes an aspect of violence, conflict can therefore be more deadly and intractable than otherwise.\textsuperscript{12} The likelihood that religious cleavages will lead to political violence may depend on many factors, including the size of religious minorities, their geographic distribution, the history of conflict, external support, capacity for mobilization, and whether religious groups are internally divided. Religious divisions appear to have less salience where people of one religious group identify with different ethnic groups, geographic locations, or class divisions.\textsuperscript{13} Additional scholarship has found that state limits on religious practice are statistically linked to conflict and instability;\textsuperscript{14} at the same time, disagreement over the right to proselytize is sometimes a source of conflict, too. In looking at roles religion can play in promoting peace, scholars have pointed to the ways religious texts or claims can contribute to reconciliation. One expert, considering cases of transitional justice, has found “the presence of a political theology or culturally rooted concept of reconciliation, Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47, no. 51 (2009): 56; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 53; John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press 1996); David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear, The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 41–75.


with variations in its propositions and its warrants, in an impressively wide array of religions and cultures.”

This growing literature has sought to understand what distinctive qualities religion might introduce to these cases, but much research is still required in defining religion, investigating how it interacts with other conflict-relevant variables, and exploring whether it has particular characteristics to distinguish its capacity to either mitigate or exacerbate conflicts.

It is, however, clear in many conflict and post-conflict cases that religious institutions and leaders are critically important, and religious values often motivate either violence or peacebuilding. This paper contributes to the ongoing research effort to assess what is substantively distinctive about religion and the roles it can play in conflict, by exploring the ways that religion has been a factor in militant groups’ approaches to gaining support in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Religion is a relevant factor in key ways that these groups build support, including their relations with the state, service provision, kinship and patronage networks, and diaspora outreach. The roles religion plays in these categories are complicated and not always intuitive. Militant groups must find ways to limit central government’s pressures on their activities, including religious ones. These same groups can risk alienating local populations when they pair strong ideological or religious stances with service provision, or operate through patronage networks that are too rigid or not sufficiently inclusive. And global religious networks can inspire diaspora communities to pursue violent activity against their adopted governments. In all of these cases, religion might be an entry point for the militant group’s activities, or leaders might construct religious justifications after the fact.

In South Asia, these groups’ activities matter because they threaten the ability of states to maintain peace and stability internally and complicate relations between already tense neighbors; this instability has grave implications for U.S. national security. Many of the nonstate armed groups that incite or perpetrate violence—against the state, civilians, foreigners, or each other—draw on religious language and ideas to support their efforts to establish a theocratic state, defend their fellow believers against physical or doctrinal attack, punish heretics, or defend a prophet or a god against insult. There is a wide variety in the kinds of groups using those methods, and the role that religion plays in how those groups operate and gain support in certain communities varies widely as well. Hindu nationalists in India are different from Islamic militants in Pakistan. How some Afghans came to support the anti-Soviet mujahideen in the 1980s was different from how others initially came to support the Taliban in the 1990s, how some Indians came to support


Hindu nationalists, and how the Pakistani state came to support Islamic militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sometimes it will be necessary to engage the religious element directly—for example, by countering narratives of religious persecution or by working with religious leaders—and sometimes it will not, as when religion is not central to how malign actors gain support, despite their rhetoric.

The first section introduces three Hindu nationalist groups with different agendas and sources of support in India. The second section discusses the Pakistani state's changing relationship with religion through its history, focusing in particular on its role in fostering Islamic militancy to achieve foreign policy objectives over the past 30 years. The third section briefly considers the role of religion in the rise of the mujahideen and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The final section discusses some of the ways the groups introduced in this report have gained supporters, and the role religion has played in their garnering that support.

**India: Hindu Nationalist Groups**

On February 27, 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims from a holy site in northern India caught fire in the town of Godhra, India. Nearly 60 people were killed. The fire, believed to have been set by a Muslim mob, sparked a series of reprisal attacks and communal violence that killed more than a thousand people, most of them Muslims. Six years later, in the Indian state of Orissa, somewhere between 16 and 40 Christians were killed in a single day, hundreds of homes were destroyed, and thousands of people were displaced.

While the Indian government has long been concerned about Islamic extremism, the Orissa, Godhra, and post-Godhra attacks contributed to a recognition that some Hindu groups might pose a domestic threat as well. In February 2010, for example, Indian home minister Chidambaram highlighted the threat of the “recent uncovered phenomenon of saffron terrorism” and called for government officials to bolster their capacity to deal with these organizations. Later that year, a leaked cable between Congress Party leader Rahul Gandhi and U.S. Ambassador

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19. There is a great deal of variation regarding the number of reported deaths. Official reports state that 16 individuals were killed. However, estimates from other Indian and Western sources put the estimates closer to 30 or 40. Similarly, the numbers of displaced persons vary considerably, but are around 10,000 or higher. Hari Kumar and Heather Timmons, “Violence in India Is Fueled by Religious and Economic Divide,” *New York Times*, September 4, 2008; “BJP MLA convicted in Kandhamal riots case,” *The Hindu*, September 9, 2010.

Timothy Roemer quoted Gandhi as saying that radical Hindu groups posed a greater threat to India than Islamic radicals. The subsequent media coverage launched a national debate over the controversy.21

Hindu nationalism has its ideological origins in the British Colonial period. In 1923, writer and activist V.D. Savarkar coined the term “Hindutva” to describe the historical, political, and spiritual essence of being Hindu. Savarkar envisioned Hindutva as a political and cultural identity more than an explicitly religious one, and advocated for the creation of a Hindu rashtra (Hindu nation) based on Hindu traditions and values.22 Like many colonial-era nationalist leaders throughout the world, Savarkar made powerful use of pre-colonial historical narratives to reaffirm the glory of indigenous cultures and advocate for their right to self-rule. While Savarkar’s historical narratives served to unify Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs—all considered part of the Hindutva community23—they also designated Christians and Muslims as foreigners.24 After its independence from Britain in 1947, India faced the challenge of choosing national symbols, an official language, and a common historical narrative in the context of a multicultural society. Over the next few years, Hindu culture took root in India’s formal and informal institutions.25 During the same period, India also experienced a considerable amount of religious conflict, including violence in 1947 and 1948 related to the partition of Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan.26

Contemporary Hindu nationalism was shaped by several important events in the 1980s and 1990s. One was a long-standing dispute over the holy city of Ayodhya. Hindus believe Ayodhya is the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. In the 1500s, the Mughal Emperor Babur had a mosque built in the city. According to the Hindu narrative, Babur demolished a temple dedicated to Ram and had a mosque built on its foundation. The Muslim narrative, however, disputes that there had


23. These groups are also included in the category of “Hindu” in Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. Constitution of India, Part III, Articles 25–28.


ever been a Hindu temple on the site where the Babri Mosque was constructed. In 1992, several Hindu nationalist groups demolished the Babri Mosque with the intention of building a Hindu temple in its place; riots ensued.

Domestic political changes in the 1980s and 1990s also shaped Hindu nationalism. In 1979, Prime Minister Morarji Desai created the Mandal Commission to examine and document caste-based and religious inequalities in India. The report defined and identified India's "socially and economically backward" classes and provided recommendations for improving social and economic opportunities. Ten years later, Prime Minister V.P. Singh implemented the commission's recommendations, which included creating a quota system for members of the lower classes and religious minorities in educational entities and the civil service. This policy was opposed by right-wing parties, including Hindu nationalist organizations, some of which organized or encouraged riots and student protests.

The three largest and most influential Hindu nationalist groups in India today are the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP). While they differ in constituency, tactics, and ideological distance from mainstream views, they all embrace majoritarianism, employ Savarkar's rhetoric of Hindutva, and feature prominently on the national political scene. They support the integration of Hindu culture and traditions into state policies and institutions, and generally oppose the secular agenda of India's ruling Congress Party.

The RSS (National Volunteer Organization) was founded in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar, who was heavily influenced by the works of Savarkar and other Hindu activists of the 1920s. The RSS considers itself a Hindu cultural organization rather than a political one and bases its ideology and symbols, including its saffron-colored flag, on symbols associated with the god Ram. It has approximately 4.5 million members (in a country of more than a billion people). In spite of its cultural imagery, some of the RSS's objectives have also been explicitly political. Although it has not formally involved itself in politics, many of its members have, and some have held prominent

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31. In fact, one of the four founding members of the RSS was Baburao Savarkar, V.D. Savarkar's brother. Tapan Basu et al., Khaki shorts and saffron flags: a critique of the Hindu right (Hyderabad: Orient Longman Limited, 1993), 16.
32. Ibid., 13.
positions. For example, former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee India had joined the RSS in 1939.34 Lal Krishan Advani served as the secretary for the RSS in 1947 and later went on to become president of the BJP, minister of home affairs, and deputy prime minister.

Since the colonial era, the RSS has supported the establishment of a Hindu nation and has taken positions on educational policy and elections, among others.35 Created in British India, the RSS opposed both colonial rule and the partition of Pakistan from India. Its relationship with the Congress Party has often been adversarial. In February 1948, the Congress Party banned the RSS following the assassination of Mahatama Gandhi. Although RSS was not charged with directly participating in the attack, the home minister believed that its activities had indirectly contributed to the assassination. The ban was lifted in 1949 after M.S. Golwalkar, leader of the RSS, pledged its commitment to nonviolence and the Constitution of India.36 The organization was again banned from 1975 to 1977 by Indira Gandhi’s administration during the instatement of emergency rule.37 RSS was banned for a third time after it and other Hindu nationalist organizations were linked to the demolition of the Babri Mosque and subsequent retaliatory violence.38 That ban was removed in 1993.39

The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) is the predecessor of the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).40 The BJS was formed by members of the RSS in 1951. Following the imposition of a state of emergency by Indira Gandhi and the arrest of a number of political leaders from opposition groups, the BJS allied with a number of other organizations to contest the 1977 election, forming the Janata party. The Janata Party won the elections and formed the first non-Congress Party government. However, ideological differences between different groups within the Janata led to further splits in 1980. The BJP was created under these circumstances in 1980, and Atal Behari Vajpayee became the first president of the party.41

If the RSS is the cultural backbone of the Hindu nationalist organizations, the BJP (Indian People’s Party) is their “political arm.”42 The BJP is led by a cadre of prominent army officials and religious authorities and enjoys substantial support from both conservative and moderate Hindus. It served as the ruling party from 1998 to 2004 and is currently the second-largest party nation-

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35. From an RSS pamphlet from the 1920s, cited in ibid., 15.
37. Ibid.
40. While the closest translation to the terms “Bharat,” “Bharati,” and “Bharatiya” are “India,” “Indian,” and “Indian,” respectively, it should be noted that these terms strongly connote the Hindu nation rather than all of the people and cultures contained within the internationally defined state of India. Ketan Thakkar and Abimanyu Chandra, author interviews, November 28–30, 2011.
Ideologically, the BJP is strongly aligned with the concept of Hindutva. Its stance on the Ayodhya dispute was unequivocally pro-Hindu, and building a Hindu temple at the site of the demolished mosque was a cornerstone of the party’s manifesto for a number of years.

A number of national BJP officials have been accused of inciting or failing to prevent the post-Godhra violence in Gujarat against Muslims. Human Rights Watch claimed BJP leaders in Gujarat, including Chief Minister Narendra Modi, had directly organized the violence (BJP has disputed the charge). After the leak of a confidential report from the Supreme Court’s Special Investigation Team in early 2011, some Indian newspapers reported that Modi’s most serious infraction was diminishing the seriousness of the situation. Others, including The Hindu, reported that Modi failed to condemn attacks on Muslims and even justified them. A number of other BJP-linked officials were found to be either directly involved in the riots or guilty of appointing sympathetic (generally RSS or VHP-linked) prosecutors to sensitive cases.

The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP, for World Hindu Council) was founded in 1964 by Hindu spiritual leader Swami Chinmayananda and former RSS member Shivram Shankar Apte. Within the broader Hindu community, the VHP has advocated strongly for unity, pushing for the elimination of the caste system and the protection of all the religions encompassed by Hindutva (Buddhism, Jainism, Hinduism, and Sikhism). Its position on Islam and Christianity are more hardline, calling upon all Hindus to protect their traditions from what are considered foreign and aggressive forces. It has also advocated a number of majoritarian positions, calling for a national ban on cow slaughtering and promoting other Hindu values nationwide.

VHP has a youth wing, Bajrang Dal, that declares itself the “Warriors of the Hindutva Revolution.” Bajrang Dal, considered VHP’s militant wing, has held a number of training camps in Ayodhya, where students between the ages of 20 and 25 are trained to fight with firearms and

43. Ruparelia, “Rethinking Institutional Theories of Political Moderation.”
49. For example, one of the primary objectives of the female youth movement of the VHP is to "caution our sisters of the conspiracies of alien faiths like Islam and Christianity." Vishwa Hindu Parishad, "Durga Vahini," http://vhp.org/vhp-glance/youth/durga-vahini, accessed December 6, 2011.
knives in preparation for the construction of a Hindu temple at the Babri Mosque site.\footnote{Biswaheet Banerjee, “Bajrang Dal activist take up arms,” \textit{Times of India}, June 13, 2001; Bajrang Dal: The Official Website, accessed March 6, 2012.} VHP’s rhetoric and use of violence have prompted a backlash from more moderate nationalists, particularly from those in the BJP who think that Bajrang Dal’s violent tactics are counterproductive and give Hindu nationalists a bad name.\footnote{“Rein in Parivar outfits, PM tells RSS,” Tribune News Service, New Delhi, April 28, 2002.}

Regarding its relationship with religious minorities, VHP, like BJP and RSS, has been particularly concerned with what it considers forced conversions of Hindus by Christians and with Islamic terrorism directed against Hindus.\footnote{IPCS and CSIS, expert roundtable; Iris Vandevelde, “Reconversion to Hinduism: A Hindu Nationalist Reaction against Conversion to Christianity and Islam,” \textit{South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies} 34, no. 1 (2011): 31–50; VHP, “Religious Conversions,” http://vhp.org/faq/faq-rel/faq-rel, accessed November 15, 2011.} Recently, the VHP and Bajrang Dal have been directly implicated in instigating and orchestrating the communal violence after the Godhra fire.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, \textit{We Have No Orders to Save You}, 6–14; Sheela Bhatt, “Intelligence chief who had warned Gujarat government transferred,” rediff.com, April 8, 2002, http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/apr/08bhatt.htm.} At the insistence of the Supreme Court, thousands of VHP and Bajrang Dal members were later arrested for their alleged role in the anti-Muslim riots.\footnote{Samar Halarnkar and Mahesh Langa, “Godhra victims, VHP angry with Narendra Modi,” \textit{Hindustan Times}, February 21, 2011.}


Tensions between Hindu and Christian communities often center on the issue of conversions. While Part III of the Indian Constitution grants a basic set of religious freedoms, called “Fundamental Rights,” to all religious groups in India, many states have additional anti-conversion laws that prohibit conversion based on fraud or force. Many of these laws have been championed by the BJP and have a number of reporting requirements.\footnote{Constitution of India, Part III, Articles 25–28; American Center for Law & Justice (ACLJ), “Religious Freedom Acts: Anti-Conversion Laws in India,” June 26, 2009, 2, http://media.aclj.org/pdf/freedom_of_religionActs.pdf.} BJP, RSS, and VHP as well as some moderate Hindus have argued that Christian missionaries are violating these laws by converting Hindus,
particularly those from the lower castes. According to a former party official, “the right to practice does not give one the right to convert.”

Pakistan: State-Sponsored Militancy and Pakistani Taliban

In the years leading up to the independence of British India—which encompassed all of what is now Pakistan, India, Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—two competing visions of post-colonial governance emerged. The first view, espoused by the Congress Party, advocated a unified, democratic, and secular state that would map onto the areas under the British Raj. The second, promulgated by the Muslim League, questioned whether the Congress Party’s state would afford equal rights and participation to all of its religious communities, or whether Hindu majoritarian policies would marginalize British India’s sizable (but minority) Muslim population. It argued instead for a separate Muslim homeland, also a secular democratic state, but one in which Muslims would constitute the overwhelming majority.

It was from this debate that Islamic scholar Maulana Abul Ala Maududi articulated a third view of post-colonial governance. Like the Muslim League, he advocated for a Muslim majority state. Unlike the Muslim league, Maududi sought to create a theocratic state, one based on the social, economic, and political tenants of his interpretation of Islam and subject to the rulings of Islamic scholars. Maududi founded the organization Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), or Islamic Society, in 1941. In 1945, another party, called Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JI), or Assembly of Islamic Clergy, emerged advocating for an Islamic state as well. JI, which had broken from its Indian parent organization, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, was a specifically Deobandi group that sought a more rigid implementation of Islamic law than Maududi’s JI. Neither JI nor JI’s visions succeeded in gaining popular momentum in the final years of British rule, so when independence and partition came about in 1947, the new state of Pakistan was created largely according to the Muslim League’s vision.

Given that religious identity had been the primary consideration in the partition, it is unsurprising that the first conflict between the new states of India and Pakistan occurred along these same lines. A number of “princely states”—small polities—had existed, and for most the decision about whether to become part of Pakistan or part of India was straightforward. That was not the

61. Some Indians who do not support Hindu extremists also not believe the Christian missionaries in Orissa were “innocent” or “orthodox” in their tactics. Sushoba Barve, Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, author interview, Delhi, India, February 24, 2012; Hari Kumar and Heather Timmons, “Violence in India Is Fueled by Religious and Economic Divide,” New York Times, September 4, 2008; ACLJ, “Religious Freedom Acts.”

62. IPCS and CSIS, expert roundtable.


case for Kashmir, however. A Muslim rebellion broke out in the district of Poonch in September 1947, and Kashmir's status became a major issue of contention, as 12.5 million Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs moved across the newly created borders amid a wave of communal violence. Unable to quell the unrest, Kashmir's leader requested Indian assistance and India responded by making its support contingent upon Kashmir's accession to India. Intervention by Indian forces prompted Pakistan to deploy its military to the area, starting a war that would last until the cease-fire of January 1949.66

By the 1960s and 1970s, the India-Pakistani conflict, which had originally been based on religious identity and minority rights, had come to encompass more strictly political issues as well. The 1965 India-Pakistan War, while predicated on many of the unresolved issues of the Jammu-Kashmir settlement (some political, some religious), was also the result of escalation over the border dispute at the Rann of Kutch (in contemporary Gujarat), and by the interests of regional and international actors. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War resulted largely from India's involvement in East Pakistan's separatist movement (contemporary Bangladesh). West Pakistan did enlist JI, JuI, and local religious militias against Bengali and Indian forces, but unequal resource allocation, ethnicity, regional geopolitics, and Cold War proxy politics, not religion, were the fundamental driving forces behind that conflict.67

In the early 1950s, Maududi and the JI (which had been largely outside of the public spotlight since partition) and other Sunni theologians began campaigning for a decree declaring all people of the Ahmadi sect to be "non-Muslims." During this time, Ahmadi communities—who consider themselves Muslims—had been the targets of repeated communal violence, culminating in the 1953 Lahore Riots and 70 days of martial law. Maududi and another prominent member of JI were arrested and charged with treason and inciting sectarian violence. Two decades later, the Pakistani state officially declared Ahmadis "nonbelievers," and anti-Ahmadi sectarianism has continued to be an important issue in Pakistan's political scene since the riots in Lahore.68

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq's rise to power in 1977 marked a new era in Pakistan's history. While debates over which sect of Islam would have the most influence had been occurring to some degree since partition, these divisions were intensified when the Zia regime launched its "Islamization" program. His first step was to institute an obligatory zakat (tithe) for all Pakistanis, based on the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. After instituting the zakat, General Zia moved on to integrate his Hanafi Sunni interpretation of shari'a into Pakistan's broader economic, educational, judicial, and social systems. Under General Zia, JI's relationship with the Pakistani state became much stronger and Zia handpicked many of the party's leaders as his advisers.69 JuI also saw improved relations with the state during this time, although it did not receive the same level of preferential treatment.70

70. White, "Pakistan's Islamists Frontier," 53.
The success of the Iranian Revolution in 1978 and 1979 inspired some in Pakistan's Shi'a community to take more proactive action. In 1980, Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Jafariyya (TNFJ), or the Movement for the Implementation of the Ja'fari Law, was founded initially to protest the imposition of the Sunni zakat, but soon came to advocate for Shi'a participation in the Islamization process and for freedom to publicly practice and celebrate the Shi'a faith. Some Sunnis believed TNFJ was linked to the regime in Tehran and that it wanted all Pakistanis to be held to a Shi'a interpretation of shari'a. In 1985, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), or Army of the Prophet's Companions, was formed in Jhang District, Punjab, as a Sunni reaction to Iran's Shi'a revolution and the rise of organizations such as the TNFJ.\(^7^1\)

But SSP's concerns went beyond the national issues related to General Zia's Islamization policies. They were the product as well of local dynamics in Jhang district, where landed Shi'a elite had historically dominated local politics. Challenges to this Shi'a monopoly from local Sunni traders and intra- and inter-biradari (kinship group) rivalries combined to create a favorable environment for sectarian conflicts to emerge.\(^7^2\) During the late 1980s and early 1990s, sectarian sentiments bubbled over into full-scale sectarian violence, starting in Jhang and spreading into the rest of Pakistan. Both SSP and TNFJ spawned militant wings and more radical organizations. After the assassination of TNFJ leader Allama al-Husayni in 1987, a militant group called Sipah-e-Mohammad (SM), the Army of Mohammad, split from TNFP and began attacking Sunni elements, particularly SSP and its affiliates.\(^7^3\)

The 1980s and 1990s were also a time of fractionalization for the Sunnis. When SSP's co-founder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was killed by Shi'a militants at the turn of the decade, some elements within the group became dissatisfied with SSP's senior leadership and strategic vision. In 1996, former SSP activist Riaz Basra officially broke from SSP and formed the militant organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), or Army of Jhangvi, named after the city of Jhang and the surrounding region, where LeJ has enjoyed strong financial and political support. SSP and LeJ continue to be closely allied.\(^7^4\)

There have been conflicts between Sunni sects as well, especially Barelvis and Deobandis. Barelvi Islam has strong Sufi origins and deep roots within Pakistan. Deobandis believe that some Barelvi practices involving revering and celebrating the Prophet Muhammad and Muslim saints violate some fundamental tenets of Islam. For most of Pakistan's history, Deobandis and Barelvis

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coexisted peacefully. However, after the rise of SSP and other Deobandi militant groups, tensions between the two increased. Following a number of Deobandi-led attacks on Barelvi shrines in the 1980s, a Barelvi organization, Sunni Tehreek, was founded, which explicitly lobbied for the exclusion of Deobandis (and another Sunni sect, Ahl-e-Hadith) from religious and secular leadership positions. With support almost exclusively from the Karachi area, Sunni Tehreek has had altercations with the SSP. There have also been recent attacks on Barelvi shrines in Punjab and particularly Lahore, and Barelvis have retaliated. In one notable case involving the removal of a Barelvi banner celebrating the Prophet, Barelvis have attempted to use Pakistan's infamous Blasphemy Law against the Deobandis responsible.75

Two other important forces shaped the geography of Pakistani militant groups during the 1980s and 1990s. The first of these forces was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting conflict between the Soviet-backed government and the armed opposition, called the mujahideen (see next section). Many of Pakistan's sectarian groups, including JI, JUI, and SSP, were powerful forces in influencing the Pakistani government to back the resistance fighters, and many of their members became mujahideen soldiers.76 Other groups, such as Hizb-e-Islami, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), and HuJI's splinter group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Islami (HuM), were founded specifically to fight against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. Many of these groups continued to exist long after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. During the fight against the Soviets, Pakistan experienced a decrease in sectarian violence. This decrease can be attributed, in part, to the degree to which many of the sectarian groups had moved toward an ideology that, at least during that period, placed a high premium on Muslim unity (even Muslims excluded from the mujahideen, such as Shi'as, were considered less of an enemy than the “godless” communists).77

The second force shaping patterns of militancy in Pakistan was the rise of anti-Indian groups in Kashmir in the 1990s. After the Soviet withdrawal, many former mujahideen turned their attention eastward to Kashmir, forming or joining organizations such as Hafiz Muhammad Saeed's Lahore-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), or Army of the Pure.78 The structures of organizations such as HuJI and HuM remained largely intact, with only their intended targets changing significantly.79 Jaish-e-Muhammmad (JeM), or Army of the Prophet, emerged as a splinter group from HuJI and HuM in 2000. JeM's founder, Maulana Masood Azhar, a former HuA leader, was reportedly assisted by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the SSP in organizing and supporting

the group. Despite its more recent emergence in Pakistan’s militant landscape, JeM quickly became one of the most notable and dangerous nonstate armed movements in Kashmir.80

The events of September 11, 2001, dramatically altered militancy in Pakistan. While many Pakistani groups could have been considered Taliban sympathizers throughout the 1990s, it was not until after American troops entered Afghanistan that these groups came together to join fighters from the former Taliban regime, based mainly in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and making cross-border attacks.81 Some made deals with the Pakistani government in exchange for free movement in parts of the tribal areas, but others began to attack Pakistani state and military targets.82 In late 2007, organizations based in FATA and parts of the North–West Frontier Province (NWFP)—now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province—founded an umbrella group called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Student Movement of Pakistan, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.83

The objectives of the TTP, known popularly as the Pakistani Taliban, can be separated into three categories: enforcing shari’a, bringing an end to Pakistani military operations in FATA and KPK, and ousting NATO forces from Afghanistan.84 The first, enforcing shari’a, is clearly religious in nature, while the second is based largely on the pragmatic need to maintain free movement in FATA. The third is partly religious and partly political: their jihad—in Islam, the term means a striving for a worthy and ennobling cause—is the cause of defending Muslims from foreign invaders. Baitullah Mehsud frequently mentioned the Qur’an’s references to jihad as a justification for his organization’s actions both in Pakistan and across the border.85 In fact, some of the most important schisms within TTP have centered around the question of whether the Pakistani state was a legitimate target of jihad, or whether only foreign forces could be targeted—although there is some question whether the disagreement is religious (the legitimacy of attacking fellow Muslims) or pragmatic (the efficient use of limited resources).

**Afghanistan: Mujahideen and Successors**

Afghanistan has long been divided between reformers and traditionalists. Amanullah Khan, who ruled as king of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929, was a reformer who improved education for both boys and girls, modernized the country’s constitution with civil rights protections, and changed family law to better protect women and children. Traditionalists, particularly among some Pash-
tun tribes, objected to the modernization, and although an armed rebellion was put down in 1925, the rebellion slowed implementation, and by the end of the decade Amanullah was deposed and his reforms overturned. During the 40-year reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah (1933–1973), Afghanistan established foreign relations, universities, and a modern constitution. Because King Shah gave a degree of autonomy to tribal and ethnic leaders in most rural areas, implemented modernizing reforms slowly, and allowed that both the 1931 and 1964 constitutions be explicitly based on Sunni Hanafi law, his rule did not spark the violent backlash that other reformers suffered before him and later.

In the 1960s, two different kinds of student movements emerged: communist and Islamist. Some university professors had been educated at Al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, where they were exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, and they inspired the Islamist movements in Afghanistan. During the 1970s, however, the communists gained power. Daoud Khan had been prime minister of Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963, but he deposed King Shah in a bloodless coup in 1973 with the help of the communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA). In 1975 the Islamists split: Burhanuddin Rabbani remained with the relatively moderate Jamiyat-i-Islami that he had founded, whose membership was largely Tajik (with some Pashtuns and Uzbeks), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar founded the more radical Hizb-i-Islami, whose members were mainly Pashtuns. Hizb later divided into two factions, one led by Hekmatyar and another by Yunes Khalis. All of the Islamists, however, opposed the communists. In 1978, the PDPA removed Daoud from power and moved rapidly to institute modernist reforms, some directly targeting traditional tribal practices that some rural tribes interpreted as an attack against Islam. The Islamist groups likewise opposed the PDPA’s reforms. Amid the violent backlash that followed, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in support of the communist regime, and the Islamists went underground.86

The fight against the Soviet-backed communist regime was not solely about religion. Islam certainly served as a way to unify different tribal and ethnic groupings that otherwise had little in common. But secular calculations drove some of the groups as well. The PDPA attempted to seize and redistribute land based on the Soviet model, and some government reforms paralyzed the country’s agricultural production. The rebellion that followed these restructurings led the Soviet Union to intervene.87 Some conservatives believed the communists’ liberal reforms challenged their cultural honor. And the Soviet invasion certainly challenged their territorial holdings.

Pakistan’s leaders had long felt threatened by Pashtun nationalists in Afghanistan, who had sought to unify the Pashtun areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan with the Pashtun areas of FATA, KPK, and Balochistan in Pakistan, to form a nation they called Pashtunistan. For centuries, Pashtun identity had taken precedence over Muslim identity—and it was a powerful unifying force against outside invaders. During the Soviet era, however, Pakistan faced the challenge that its most important allies in the fight against Soviet encroachment were Pashtuns: it needed their support, but feared their nationalism. Islam provided the perfect alternative organizing construct: “a religious opposition would have broad appeal in an overwhelmingly Muslim country, without the implicit territorial threat of an ethnic-nationalist opposition.”88

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Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate worked with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to recruit Islamic fighters to combat Soviet expansionism from Central Asia. After the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, refugees began flowing over the border into Pakistan, where refugee camps were set up. The ISI installed schools that taught an extremely conservative version of Sunni Islam and military training camps that taught recruits how to fight. It channeled money and weapons mainly to the Hizb-i-Islami faction led by Hekmatyar, and to his old rivals in Jamiyat-i-Islami, led by Rabbani, and other religious groups, but forbade foreign fighters not affiliated with these mujahideen from using Pakistani territory (and actively sidelined some of the more nationalist mujahideen leaders).89

Once the Soviet Union withdrew, Islam did not remain a unifying factor among the mujahideen groups. Rather, their differing interests and power struggles led to the eruption of a civil war during the 1990s. When the Soviet Union collapsed, several military commanders for the communist regime cut deals with some mujahideen leaders. One of the most significant was the deal between Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek and a military commander in charge of Afghan troops in the north of the country, and Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik and mujahideen who had built a sizeable following despite not being a favored recipient of Pakistani assistance, and whose guerrilla warfare strategy had proved particularly effective against the Soviets. After the communist regime fell, Rabbani became president, and Massoud became minister of defense. Together with Dostum, they fought against Hekmatyar—Jamiyat’s rival since the 1970s—who with Pakistani support continued to fight against Kabul despite the fall of the communist regime. Dostum switched to Hekmatyar’s side in 1994, then helped to form what came to be known as the Northern Alliance when he returned to Rabbani and Massoud in 1996—and so it went.

Amid this chaos of the 1990s, Afghan civilians suffered greatly, partly due to war and partly due to the abuses committed by the warlords who controlled the areas in which they lived. A small band of conservative religious students—led by their teacher, Mullah Mohammad Omar, and supported in part by elements of the Pakistani state—entered southern Afghanistan from Pakistan and began a campaign against abusive warlords and extortionists. After initial success in clearing some towns and highways, they managed to take the city of Kandahar in late 1994. As they imposed a strict social order in the areas they came to control, many Afghans—tired of the abuses they had suffered at the hands of other warring factions—joined the movement and helped the Taliban consolidate their control of the country. With success came alliances with warlords in control of other areas—even with warlords who did not share their religious outlook—and by 1996 the Taliban had come to control most of the rest of the country, with the areas controlled by the Northern Alliance being the main exception.

The Taliban regime governed according to their extremely rigid interpretation of Islamic laws, banning art, music, most other physical forms of culture, many sports and pastimes, and, most notably, women from public life.90 Their rule was orthoprax rather than orthodox—that is, they enforced behavior, not belief. Men were required to grow long beards, for example, and women


required to wear head-to-toe burkas. While initially happy that the Taliban had brought order to their communities, most Afghans quickly came to despise the kind of order they imposed. But the Taliban fell from power only after their guests in the country, al Qaeda, attacked the American homeland in 2001, and the United States convinced Pakistan to turn against them. The United States and Pakistan then backed the Northern Alliance, and the Taliban, quickly removed from power, soon became an insurgency—based largely in Pakistan, where they planned and launched attacks against another internationally backed government in Afghanistan.

Religion and Militant Groups’ Strategies for Gaining Support

For all of these groups, religion has been a relevant factor in efforts to achieve objectives and win support in communities. This section considers some of the ways that religion interacted with four of the main methods these groups used to gain support: relations with the state, service provision, kinship and patronage networks, and diaspora outreach.

Relations with the State

Militant groups have enjoyed direct state support, sought political power by forming political parties, made deals of convenience with the state, and sought to become the state. The mujahideen, the Taliban, SSP, and JeM all depended on direct support from Pakistan at various times. For its part, Pakistan has used money and religion to keep the groups on its side. In only a few years, the Pakistani Taliban already have a long history of signing and breaking peace treaties with Islamabad when needed. Similarly, in Afghanistan Massoud brokered a ceasefire with the communist regime during the 1980s to give him time to consolidate his gains. During the civil war, Dostum allied with the state or with its enemies, depending on his calculation of expediency. And many such groups were political parties or had political wings, such as JI and JuI in Pakistan during the Zia era. The RSS, VHP, and particularly the BJP are well integrated into the formal government and security establishment at the local, state, and national levels.

The Taliban sought to establish an Islamic emirate and had a multifaceted approach to succeeding. They were most successful at winning the allegiance of the Pashtuns, but in general they downplayed tribal, regional, or political identities, and instead promoted pride in village-level identity. The Taliban used traditional Afghan institutions and values to their tactical advantage, giving special importance to the preservation of Pashtunwali—norms—the traditional social codes of the Pashtuns—and used their knowledge of the Pashtun social landscape to choose local leaders who would maintain and promote their image as “heralds of a better Islamic order.” Indeed, Jalaludin Haqqani—today head of one of the most important Taliban-affiliated insurgent networks—was viewed early on as the perfect co-optable leader, who could act as a Taliban proxy: he was well-versed in Islam but had no independent ambitions except to continue to rule his terri-
In addition, the Taliban manipulated Islamic symbols to enhance their legitimacy, as when Mullah Omar donned the Cloak of Mohammed, a venerated religious relic, and adopted the title Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful).97 Finally, their brutal suppression of dissent allowed them to consolidate control of almost 90 percent of the country by 2001, despite the damage their policies had done to Afghanistan’s economy and their own popularity.98

While these examples do not capture the full range of how these groups have interacted with state institutions, they are nonetheless indicative of a broader pattern of often-uncertain ties to the state. Where state structures are relatively strong, state officials often make an effort to co-opt, control, or contain these groups, while the groups themselves try to find ways to limit that influence. Where state structures are relatively weak, these groups often try to penetrate and regulate the state to suit their own ends. In both cases, the groups have had mixed results. The ability to gain support seems to depend in part on the degree to which their religious (and other) views align—or are made to align—with the views of important segments of society, such as state elites or powerful members of civil society who compete with state elites.

Service Provision

Another way militant groups have sought to gain support is by providing services to the populations with which they interact. Most such groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan are not terribly good service providers but can exploit frustrations related to poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and poor governance as a way to gain support. The TNSM in Pakistan’s Swat Valley and the Taliban throughout Afghanistan provided dispute resolution and other justice services, taking advantage of the state’s weakness in those areas. Islamabad’s 2009 truce with TNSM allowed the latter to provide shari’a courts, as the people of the region had demanded in the past. However, its brutal forms of punishment and reparations became increasingly unpopular (and in 2009 a military operation removed TNSM from power).

Recently, the proliferation of the Taliban and related insurgent groups has been witnessed in key cities such as Karachi and Lahore. It is clear that they are beginning to operate in Pakistan’s important political and economic areas, although the extent of their influence in these areas is not yet known.99 It was estimated in 2008 that there were roughly 2,000 madrassas with ties to insurgents around Karachi.100 The vast majority of madrassas in Pakistan are what they have historically been—charitable institutions that teach children the Qur’an and other religious texts and history. However, in part due to the legacy of the 1979 Soviet invasion and the use of madrassas to train...

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96. Ibid.
mujahideen, some of these madrassas have and continue to promote radical Islamist views. Some madrassas are run directly by radical or militant organizations. For example, SSP is known to control many Sunni madrassas. Other madrassas are not run directly by these organizations, but by individuals or groups with financial or social ties to militant organizations.

In madrassas that have been co-opted by nonstate armed groups, religion is used as a political tool to encourage recruitment and mobilize community support. Such radicalized Sunni madrassas do not only promote animosity toward the Shi’a, the state of Pakistan, and the West; they also contribute to tensions between Barelvis and Deobandis. Many of the most radical madrassas are Deobandi or Wahabi in philosophy and tend to reject Barelvi traditions and attempt to convert Barelvi students to their more rigid interpretations of Islam.

Militant groups have also provided some emergency relief and long-term development aid. JI, for example, has provided food, water, and shelter in Peshawar and Swat, where there are internally displaced persons due to natural disasters or conflict. Similarly, Falah-e-Insaniyat, which has ties to Jamat-ud-Dawa—a charity considered a front for the banned militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba—has also provided limited relief activities. Five years ago, Islamic charities with ties to radical insurgent groups led relief efforts after deadly earthquakes around Islamabad, granting a degree of short-term support to Islamist groups.

The Hindu nationalist groups have engaged in both short-term (in the case of crisis response) and long-term (in the case of large-scale development projects) assistance in their communities. In 1996, RSS volunteers were lauded for their efforts in the aftermath of the in-air crash between a Saudi and Kazakh plane over the village of Charkhi Dadri. More recently, the RSS garnered a great deal of international attention for its prominent role in the 2001 Gujarat earthquake relief efforts. Not only were RSS volunteers among the first responders in Gujarat and Charkhi Dadri, but they also performed duties such as removing the dead from collapsed buildings that some other NGOs would not. Similarly, VHP and RSS volunteers were at the forefront of crisis response and recovery following the 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Tamil Nadu.

104. Ibid.
The RSS and VHP have also initiated large-scale and long-term development projects. In 1979, the RSS established a community service organization called the Seva Bharati (Indian Service) with the primary objective of expanding access to health care and education, particularly among the urban poor in the slums of the major cities. Today, Seva Bharati has grown from a single front organization into a network of more than 45,000 RSS-linked charitable organizations in India. The VHP has a parallel service organization called the Vishwa Hindu Parishad Sewa (VHP Service). Both the RSS and VHP charities provide a range of educational, social welfare, health care, and rural development services nationwide.

The RSS also has its own educational front, Vidya Bharati (Indian Education), which, with more than 18,000 schools and 2.4 million students, is one of the largest providers of private education in India. The self-declared objective of these schools is to train children to be “the protector[s] of [the] country, Dharma (Religion), and culture.” Students enrolled in RSS schools are taught about Hindu history, Hindu religious texts, prominent Hindu leaders (including RSS leaders), sanskars (Hindu behaviors), and Sanskrit. The RSS’s schools, much like its shakhas, rely heavily on religious and cultural symbols and rituals. Also like the shakhas, these schools openly foster Hindu patriotism and support for Hindu nationalist groups. Indeed, students begin each day by reciting the Ekatmata Stotr (a list of the places, people, and ideas associated with Hinduism that includes no small mention of RSS leaders and founders). The students end their days with a pledge to protect Bharat Mata (Mother India), with the implicit connotation that what needs protection is the Hindu nation and not what is internationally recognized as the state of India.

Hindu nationalist groups also provide cultural and religious services in their communities. VHP Sewa, for example, has built around 300 temples and trained more than 50,000 religious leaders in what it considers “backward areas” of southern India. Some of these temples are managed by VHP, while others have been transferred to community leadership. Throughout the country, VHP organizes festivals, fairs, and pilgrimages for Hindu believers, organizing not only the

113. For example, see the Andhra Pradesh version of Seva Bharati at “About Sevabharathi,” http://www.sevabharathi.org, accessed November 29, 2011.
117. Sundar, “Teaching to Hate,” 1609.
118. Ibid., 1610.
cultural events themselves, but also the provision of food, shelter, and health services for millions of travelers.\textsuperscript{120}

The Taliban generally use intimidation and coercion to gain support and consolidate power.\textsuperscript{121} They have funneled almost $1 million into funding schools in its stronghold areas, but demand in return that schools adhere to a strict Islamic curriculum in tandem with Taliban ideology.\textsuperscript{122} The Taliban shadow government, a network of individuals appointed as shadow officials in the provinces, offers mediation and justice where the formal system is not operational or is corrupt.\textsuperscript{123} They administer their own punishments and intimidate residents to acknowledge or work with the central government. It is believed that they have a support network numbering in the thousands.\textsuperscript{124} However, they are generally perceived as providing few services that are truly useful.\textsuperscript{125} Their strategy to solidify community support relies more on intimidation or the exploitation of ethnic and social tensions.\textsuperscript{126}

The success of service provision depends on a number of factors. These efforts seem to have a better chance of winning support where the state and other licit institutions have a relatively limited presence, allowing malign nonstate groups to fill a void. Where the state and other institutions have more of a presence, malign groups might still provide services, but they face more competition for local support. Results are often mixed when nonstate groups allow themselves to pursue strong ideological or religious stances. In some cases they have won support from service provision, only to alienate local populations due to their religious demands or abuses, while in others their religious views have granted them initial legitimacy with a population that shares those views, but lost support after proving themselves poor service providers.

\subsection*{Kinship and Patronage Networks}

The RSS, VHP, and BJP have used their access to the power and resources of the state to position themselves as heads of patron/client relationships.\textsuperscript{127} This patronage can be either direct or indirect. Those with direct access to BJP officials can elicit favors from them when necessary or benefit directly from state corruption. For example, while observing the aftermath of the 2001 Gujarat

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{121} "The Danish force received intelligence that Taliban leaders were having to resort to violent methods to maintain discipline within their own ranks. To set an example, fighters who did not want to fight were tied up, stripped, and thrown into the Helmand River," Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “The Taliban in southern Afghanistan: a localized insurgency with a local objective,” \textit{Small Wars and Insurgencies} 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 256.
\bibitem{125} Asia Foundation, \textit{Survey of the Afghan People}, 2011.
\bibitem{127} Kalyanaraman, IDSA, author interview, February 22, 2012.
\end{thebibliography}
earthquake, “those with political contacts in the administration, political parties, or elsewhere sensibly exploited these connections.”128 With the BJP controlling both the state and the national government during this time, those with BJP connections had much to gain from them, and not just during the earthquake.129 Some researchers have suggested that the BJP funneled money into the RSS’s Vidya Bharati during its tenure as the ruling party, even though this would have been a clear violation of the Indian Constitution.130

Pakistani and Afghan militants have long used kinship and religious networks as means of influence, and often have turned to foreign sponsors or illicit trade for sources of income. Most importantly, they build off support networks already in place, reaping financial benefits (via patronage or direct financial backing), legitimacy, security, and popular support. They also often network and collaborate with each other.131 Many groups that have their origins in the mujahideen movement, such as the Haqqani network and the Pakistani Taliban, continue to collaborate on the Afghan/Pakistan border, particularly in the Miram Shah area.132

Regardless of how they are mobilized, kinship ties have proven to be useful tools for advancing the interests of nonstate groups. These ties, however, are not without risks. No matter how effective they might be, patronage networks also run the risk of alienating local populations and political leaders when “in groups” are too rigid and not sufficiently inclusive. Networks bring people together and allow them to maximize results, but by definition, networks also exclude. How these groups adjust to this reality can affect how successful they are locally and in the long term.

Diaspora Outreach

Hindu nationalist groups receive some of their financial, cultural, and political support from Indians living abroad.133 Both the RSS and the VHP promote a transnational Hindu identity and extend their protection of Hindus and celebration of Hindutva to those living outside of India.134 The VHP, for example, has established branches in more than 80 countries to strengthen links between the diaspora and the subcontinent, promote Hindu culture, and gain support for the

128. Simpson, “Was there discrimination in the distribution of resources after the earthquake in Gujarat?” 19.
129. This type of direct patronage, of course, may have little or nothing to do with religious identities per se. Allegations of corruption, clientelism, and individual-level political favoritism have been levied at the Congress Party and other political actors that do not espouse religious or identity group rhetoric.
131. An obvious example of this kind of networking is the mujahideen movement. In this case, groups with different objectives collaborated with each other and foreign militant groups to create a larger fighting force and training infrastructure for the fight against the Soviet government in Kabul.
organization.\textsuperscript{135} The VHP is particularly strong in diaspora communities in the United States and Canada, while the RSS has a stronger foothold in Europe and particularly the United Kingdom. In both Europe and North America, branches located abroad provide many of the same cultural, religious, and humanitarian services as those located in India.\textsuperscript{136}

It is not clear exactly the degree to which diaspora participation contributes to Hindu nationalism inside of India.\textsuperscript{137} One expert has argued that most of the Indian diaspora in the United States is not particularly interested in contributing to divisive nationalist movements inside of India. Rather, these groups are ideologically more interested in building U.S.-India relations than mobilizing on Indian domestic issues.\textsuperscript{138}

Because of the persistent conflict in Afghanistan for the past three decades, a significant diaspora community has developed, most notably in the United States, Germany, Pakistan, and Iran.\textsuperscript{139} Pakistan also has a significant diaspora community living primarily in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Pakistan ranks 10th in the world for remittances, sending home roughly $9.4 billion in 2011.\textsuperscript{140} Most of the militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan receive funding from wealthy “like-minded” donors, other religiously affiliated groups, and external governments, but not members of the diaspora as such. Al Qaeda brings in financial, political, social, and cultural capital from a range of Muslim diaspora groups, not just Pakistanis and Afghans. Some in these diaspora communities are recruited to fight, but generally groups recruit locally from mosques and madrassas.\textsuperscript{141} The Haqqani network also taps wealthy donors abroad, especially from Gulf States.\textsuperscript{142} Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), which operates in Pakistan, receives significant donations from the Saudi government, while the Shi’a Militants in Pakistan (SMP) is funded by the Iranian government.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} Manjari Katju, \textit{Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics} (Hyderabad: Orient Longman Private Limited, 2003), 155.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} The following roundtable discussion demonstrated that there was a wide range of opinions on the role played by the Diaspora in the actions of Hindu nationalists inside of India. IPCS and CSIS, expert roundtable.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Amer Latif, visiting fellow, Wadhwani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies, at CSIS, Washington, D.C., January 12, 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census 2006; Sonja Huag and Stephani Muessig, “Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland,” \textit{Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge und Migration} (2009), 76, chart 5; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Islamic Republic of Iran,” 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Mufti, \textit{Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan}.
\end{itemize}
Conclusions

Of the many ways in which religion factors into these groups’ efforts to gain support, perhaps the most obvious is as a recruitment tool. The prayer rituals of the RSS, the VHP’s pilgrimages, the campaign promises of the BJP, and the invocation of Q’uranic references to jihad are effective ways that militant leaders have articulated their messages and gained supporters. The Pakistani state has emphasized Pakistanis’ Muslim identity when it has been necessary to unify in favor of policies (such as the creation of the state) or against some enemy (such India or the Soviet Union), or to diminish the effectiveness of some movement (such as the Pashtunistan movement). In some cases, groups used religion to deliberately cultivate a cadre of supporters, as in the case of the establishment of the RSS schools or the madrassas in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Other times it is not religion per se that is important, but the religious networks that provide leaders with an opportunity to gain support. The VHP was successful in cultivating sympathetic diaspora communities in the United States and Canada largely because it was able to map onto existing structures of spiritual leaders and their followers. The same certainly can be said for the wide variety of sectarian groups in Pakistan, which generally recruit from within their own sects’ madrassa networks.

In addition to employing religion as a recruitment tool, groups have a wide range of religion-related motivations. While some leaders have used religion to consolidate their own personal or political power for reputational or financial reasons, others have genuinely sought to establish a religious state or at least to formally institutionalize religious values. That was the goal of the Taliban, and they succeeded for a time. TNSM managed to briefly establish an Islamic regime in the Swat Valley of Pakistan. The BJP has been known to compromise its position on some religious issues when politically expedient, while the RSS and VHP have remained somewhat more consistent in their ideology and rhetoric, even at the risk of alienating moderates. The BJP, for example, toned down its advocacy for the Ayodhya temple when faced with mounting political opposition. But the RSS, BJP, and VHP have all appealed to the rhetoric of Hindutva and advocated for the institutionalization of Hindu values.

Some groups’ efforts have been bolstered by the important social and psychological benefits provided by religion at the community level. In the face of overwhelming odds against the Soviet enemy, mujahideen fighters were able to turn to their religion for comfort and inspiration. Ordinary Hindus have suffered amid communal violence, but at least for the young men who participated in the daily RSS rituals, religion offered them a sense of purpose, community, and belonging. For those who perpetrated attacks against minorities, religion provided a framework to justify the violence that might otherwise lead to psychological guilt or social or legal censure. For the families of those who are killed during the outbreaks of communal violence, religious discourse provides a mechanism to rationalize what might otherwise be considered a senseless death or an unbearable cost.

144. Vidya Bharati runs training camps in addition to schools and encourages students to attend. See “Vidya Bharati: Akhil Bhartiya Shiksha Sansthan: About Us.” Further, not only students, but also parents are the intended recipients of pro-RSS ideology. Students are often instructed to bring home RSS materials from school.


146. Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Whether as an original motivation or a justification after the fact, religion has been a relevant factor in militant groups’ efforts to gain support. U.S. officials who hope to address the activities of these groups in this strategically important region will have to account for factors including the use of religious texts or claims in justifying violence; the roles of both proselytism and religious persecution in increasing radicalization; and the violence that can occur when certain sites or geographic locations are imbued with sacred significance. Policymakers have sometimes assumed religion is a more prominent feature than it is, but in other cases religion has been central but overlooked. By including religion as a distinct category of analysis, then, policymakers will be better equipped to approach violent conflicts or situations of social unrest, such as the events in the Arab world today.
Religious Movements, Militancy, and Conflict in South Asia
CASES FROM INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND AFGHANISTAN

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