Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences

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Under the current administration, the pendulum in U.S. policy toward China has swung from attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing back against Chinese assertiveness and challenges to international laws and norms. Getting tougher with Beijing was necessary, but it has also created unintended consequences that the next administration, either a second Obama team or a Republican lineup, will have to contend with.

The Obama administration’s initial policy in 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a G2 condominium that would make decisions over the heads of others. Those concerns were unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted the U.S. approach as weakness, which, along with China’s economic success and America’s struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that manifested itself in a series of intimidating actions in China’s neighborhood. Subsequent entreaties by regional states to counterbalance China increased U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Now, the U.S. Asia “pivot” has prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about intensified U.S.-China strategic competition.

In the run-up to the leadership transition that will take place at China’s 18th Party Congress this fall, Beijing is inwardly focused and unlikely to act on its fears. However, 2013 could see a shift in Chinese foreign policy based on the new leadership’s judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy that seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a great power.

Signs of a potential harsh reaction are already detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in China that will increase pressure on China’s incoming leadership to stand up to the United States. Nationalistic voices are calling for military countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s military posture in the region and the new U.S. defense strategic guidelines. For example, an article published in China’s Global Times, a jingoistic newspaper owned by the Communist Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, called for China to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities.

Deng Xiaoping’s guideline to keep a low profile in the international arena, designed more than two decades ago to cope with uncertainty produced by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, is increasingly seen by China’s elite and public as irrelevant and even harmful to the task of defending Chinese ever-expanding “core interests.” Some voices are calling for closer alignment with Moscow and promoting the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as a new “pole” in the international arena to strengthen the emerging powers against the West.

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Xi Jinping, who will assume the helm as China’s new leader later this year, will be under pressure from many domestic constituencies to more forcefully defend Chinese interests in the international arena. Seeking to quickly consolidate his power and enhance the legitimacy of the Communist Party, Xi and his newly installed Politburo Standing Committee colleagues may be more willing than their predecessors to test drive a policy that is more confrontational.

The U.S. response to a more muscular Chinese foreign and military policy, should it appear, will have to be carefully calibrated. Ignoring greater Chinese assertiveness would fuel the belief—already emerging in China and elsewhere—that the United States is in inexorable decline. History shows that when great powers falter, China does not hesitate to seize the opportunity to advance its interests, especially in the South China Sea. As American forces withdrew from Vietnam in the mid-1970s, the Chinese grabbed the Paracel Islands from Saigon. Similarly, when the Soviet Union withdrew from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and the United States terminated its base agreement with the Philippines, China quietly occupied Mischief Reef to the dismay of Manila.

Yet a hostile and overbearing U.S. response would confirm Chinese suspicions that the United States seeks to contain its rise, which could cement the emergence of a U.S.-China Cold War. In addition, it would further alarm regional states who seek at all costs to avoid having to choose between the United States and China.
U.S. policy will need to combine firmness with subtlety. A strategy will need to be shaped that protects regional stability and reassures China’s neighbors, but also avoids greater U.S.-China strategic competition and the classic security dilemma, wherein each side believes that growing capabilities reflect hostile intent and responds by producing that reality. Sustained attention and commitment of sufficient resources to the Asia-Pacific region will be key to assuaging the doubts of regional friends and allies about U.S. staying power. The United States also will need to maintain the military capabilities necessary to deter Chinese aggression.

At the same time, however, steps will be required to retain an overall cooperative relationship with China. To tamp down Chinese suspicions that the United States seeks to strategically encircle and contain it, anti-China rhetoric that has needlessly provoked Chinese ire and fears must be jettisoned. Assertions that the United States welcomes China’s rise will have to be matched with deeds to prevent Beijing from abandoning its peaceful development strategy and engaging in a zero-sum rivalry with the United States. Greater efforts will need to be made to strengthen China’s integration into the international system and draw China into cooperative security endeavors around the globe. As the Trans-Pacific Partnership becomes a reality, China should be encouraged to transform its economy so that it can qualify for membership.

Getting China right will be among the toughest challenges the next U.S. administration will face. Success will require a resurgent U.S. economy and adroitness in foreign policy that forestalls Chinese miscalculation.