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This report is largely the product of research and writing by Varun Vira, who carried out this project under the direction and guidance of the Burke Chair.

It draws on a wide range of sources. These are cited in detail, but US experts who cannot be cited by name or organization provided some information. Their work played a critical role in shaping the framework of analysis and several key judgments in this analysis.
As the events surrounding the death of Osama Bin Laden make all too clear, Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history. This instability goes far beyond Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, or the war in Afghanistan. A net assessment of the patterns of violence and instability indicate that Pakistan is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment, and intensifying domestic and external wars, resulting in unprecedented political, economic, and social turmoil.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a net assessment of these threats and areas of internal violence in depth; and does so within in the broader context of the religious, ideological, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal causes at work; along with Pakistan’s problems in ideology, politics, governance, economics and demographics.

The assessment shows that these broad patterns of violence in Pakistan have serious implications for Pakistan’s future, for regional stability, and for core US interests. Pakistan remains a central node in global terrorism. Osama Bin Laden was killed deep inside Pakistan, and there remain questions on the presence of other major terrorists and extremists like Mullah Omar and his “Quetta Shura Taliban.”

Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of cross-border sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, and prolong the fighting causing serious US, ISAF, and Afghan casualties. At the same time, Pakistan cooperates with the US in dealing with some aspect of these threats, and faces a growing threat from its own domestic terrorist and extremist forces.

Al Qa’ida and the Taliban are only part of the story. There are many other movements and tensions that feed violence and extremism in Pakistan; many of which grow out of a government that has consistently failed to meet the needs of Pakistan’s people over a period of decades. Tremendous shortfalls in the Pakistani government’s capacity and willingness to provide for its citizens interact in ways that encourage separatist movements and a rising tide of violence.

These failures in Pakistani governance and development interact with a growing wave of Sunni-Deobandi radicalization that manifests in anti-state violence and sectarian intolerance. A significant resulting uptick in terrorist violence has been accompanied by a gradual perversion of the Pakistani social fabric, intimidating secularism to the benefit of militant Islam.

Despite these dangers, Pakistan is not a hopeless case. The country is not yet in terminal decline, if only because of its vigorous civil society and its talented secular elite. Nevertheless, a wide gap exists between Pakistani rhetoric and reality, and its leaders, military, and politicians fall far short of meeting their peoples’ needs.

Entrenched organizational interests including those of political, and security elites, as well as religious radicals, resist effective reform. Successful reform efforts require a far better
planned and managed stabilization strategy that addresses all of the various causes of extremism and violence and actually executes such plans in ways that implement real, large-scale reforms.

As this analysis shows, the links between Pakistan’s conflicts and their causes mean that selective attempts to redress grievances cannot fundamentally alter or reverse Pakistan’s problems and cannot bring its people security and stability. Pakistan cannot succeed if its civilian leaders and security forces continue to rely on internal security, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency—important as improvement in these activities remain. Pakistan can only move forward if its leaders also focus on investing in its peoples’ welfare and addressing their core grievances.

Pakistan must give priority to its internal needs over dealing with perceived external threats. Pakistan continues to prioritize strategic competition with India, in ways that creates growing problems in Afghanistan and strengthen internal extremists. To this struggle, Pakistan devotes an inordinate amount of its attention and resources, and does so at the direct expense of the welfare and future of its people.

The Challenges of Internal Violence

Pakistan faces the convergence of various localized conflicts that were once insulated from each other. A massive growth in militancy in the Pakistani-Afghan border area interacts with growing threats in the heartland of the Punjabi, Sindhi, and Baloch interior. Pakistan’s growing instability does not have one cause or center of gravity: it has many.

The war in Afghanistan has moved al-Qaeda into Pakistan along with the Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hekmatyar’s forces. At the same time, Pakistan faces a combination of separatist pressures in Baluchistan and the Sindh as well as foreign and domestic neo-Salafi threats, that have growing ties to al-Qaeda. These threats include the continuing violence in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) and the neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).

Insurgent momentum shows few signs of having been decisively reversed despite increasingly robust Pakistani military (PAKML) operations. Improved counterinsurgency efforts have had some successes in certain tribal agencies, but gains are likely to be ephemeral, as many of the root causes of militancy remain unaddressed, including political, administrative, and economic stagnation.

A diverse array of militant actors including core command nodes of al-Qaeda, continue to operate inside the tribal areas. They maneuver in support of distinct organizational priorities, including the global jihad, regional jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as domestic anti-state and sectarian agendas. They collaborate on operational, ideological, and fundraising axes.

Their combined activities have uprooted many of the traditional modes of tribal governance, complicating efforts to restore stability. Pakistani military operations have compounded these problems. The selective counterinsurgency approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani interests, and those—like the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba—that may have future strategic
utility in reestablishing Pakistan’s sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies.

Senior US officials and officers have made all too clear—along with some Pakistani and Afghan experts—that some elements of the Pakistani government and security forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the United States and Afghanistan. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in US-Pakistani relations, and complicating the prospects for future US aid. It also is helping strengthen extremists who may ultimately become an active threat to Pakistan.

These conflicts have been augmented by violence and tensions inside the rest of Pakistan. In south Punjab, a historical hotbed of militancy, various groups once tethered to state policy have begun to splinter and migrate to the tribal areas. These groups have considerable combat experience and knowledge of the weapons and technologies needed for asymmetric warfare. They have joined tribal militant groups, and assisted them in bringing terrorist violence into the previously insulated urban centers of the Punjab and the Sindh.

In Karachi, the economic engine of Pakistan, ethno-sectarian violence has risen to new levels with the real danger of a slide back into the communal violence of the early 1990s. Such a reversal would be catastrophic for national stability, exacerbating already chronic economic woes, whilst providing fodder for the sectarian and ethnic drivers of conflict in Pakistan. This violence has been augmented by the ingress of Taliban militants in search of urban sanctuary and access to funding and logistical networks.

In Baluchistan, a fifth separatist insurgency has become more active since 2004, and is closely linked and influenced by regional geopolitics. The Baloch insurgency is distinct from other conflicts, primarily in that Sunni-Deobandi philosophies play little role, but it nonetheless benefits from many of the same drivers, including widespread impoverishment, chronic underdevelopment and alienation from mainstream Pakistan.

The Challenges of External Relations

Pakistan’s focus on the challenge from India affects virtually every aspect of its external relations. This plays out in Afghanistan in the form of a competition for influence over the Afghan government where Pakistan attempts to use its ties to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and other movements to limit Indian influence, ensure its influence over the future of Afghanistan, and to limit any threat of Pashtun independence movements.

The result is the many of Pakistan’s leaders, senior officials, and politicians have a fundamentally different perception of Pakistan’s national interest from the US focus on Afghan security and stability. These divergent interests are the reality behind the rhetoric of “ally” and “strategic partner” and have led to constant tension with the US, particularly as a result of continuing cross-border violence into Afghanistan.

The Indo-Pakistani border remains one of the most threatening areas on the planet, and is linked on both sides to the deployment of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. Cross-border violence can escalate into large-scale war, particularly in the aftermath of terrorism originating from Pakistan. Many Kashmiri militant groups have splintered, as in south Punjab, and the growing risk of militant proxies operating autonomously, perhaps to divert Pakistani military attention away from the tribal areas, cannot be discounted.
The result is that Pakistan’s concern with the threat from India diverts massive amounts of resources and security forces away from far more serious internal problems and threats. Pakistan’s current policies not only feed a major arms race with India, and tensions with Afghanistan and the US, they also waste critical resources in the name of security, to the extent that they have become a threat to the state and the future of the Pakistani people.

Instability as a Self-Inflicted Wound

Pakistan’s critical need to focus on its internal needs and security becomes clear from the detailed analysis of violence in Pakistan in the full text of this net assessment. This violence is driven by a mix of ideology, religion, politics, governance, economics, and demographics, with all the ingredients that have caused instability in Middle Eastern regimes. The drivers of conflict are shaped by a systemic malaise that includes weak and underdeveloped governance institutions that are hobbled by the omnipresent specter of a military coup, and incentivize the maximization of rents instead of efficient representation.

Economic mismanagement, and chronic underdevelopment in building up the nation’s base of human capital, have perpetuated deep inequalities and assisted in the alienation of large segments of the population. Demographics are an additional problem, and population pressures are compounded by a severe and growing “youth bulge.” Social services, including the provision of core goods such as education, employment and health are already inadequate, and integrating increasing population figures has worrying implications for future instability.

Other key underlying causes of violence and instability include a dysfunctional civilian government that is all too often mired in internecine squabbling, self-seeking service politics, and the willingness to exploit ethno-sectarian divides for political gain. Strong organizational resistance continues to impede reform. Corruption, nepotism and favoritism, power brokers, entrenched feudal interests, and a marked civil-military imbalance continue to lead Pakistani elites to give their own interests priority over those of the population, and help institutionalize entrenched patronage networks, widespread corruption, and significant structural distortions in tax collections.

Pakistan has made some efforts to rectify these shortfalls in governance. The 18th Amendment package of constitutional reforms passed by the new civilian government in August 2010 included dilution in the powers of the executive and an expansion in the autonomy and representation of provincial interests. A greater emphasis on human security has also led to increased allocations in critical sectors such as education and employment.

Yet, these efforts have faltered, Far too many reform programs end up remaining rhetorical exercises in political opportunism, with the government making only superficial attempts to rectify deep-rooted structural problems. Where it has spent money, Pakistan and its donors have placed too much emphasis on allocating resources with too little on ensuring a meaningful outcome.

Money alone is no guarantee of success, particularly when entrenched corruptions and inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system provide diminishing returns to investments. Developing a focused set of metrics to accurately capture progress will be essential, and should reorient focus away from quantity to quality. Simply building schools in the tribal
regions for example, has no bearing on the number of educated graduates if the schools lack capable teachers, better curriculums and more relevance to the labor market.

The Broader Cost of Pakistani Instability

Pakistan is a pivotal regional player, whose problems affect the security of other countries in the region, and that of the United States. It has the potential to be either a major disruptive force or a major source of stability, in assisting end to violence in Afghanistan, in assisting in the peaceful rise of India, and helping constrain Iran’s bid for Middle Eastern hegemony.

At present, Pakistan is on a downward course. Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence, or the needs of its people. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving, and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations. It is playing a form of the “great game” which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shi’ite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. At the same time, it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states, and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action.

These presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict, and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia—a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, US options are limited. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support, and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major objectives. Cross-border sanctuaries, which are tolerated by at least some elements of the Pakistani security establishment, remain significant havens for Taliban insurgents.

At the same time, the US, its allies in ISAF, and the Afghan government need every bit of military, and counterterrorism cooperation from Pakistan they can get. Even limited Pakistani intelligence support is crucial in providing them with an understanding of militant dynamics, and they remain dependent on a logistic tail that transits through Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistani military action along the Afghan border helps degrade insurgent forces and sanctuaries.

Pakistan’s leverage in dissuading American pressure is further increased by the fact that the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan, and collusion, or worse subservience to its interests, is resented by large segments of the population. This creates major problems for both the US and Pakistan in finding some practical way to create a truly effective strategic relationship. It makes the success of economic and military aid uncertain, and sharply restricts the future ability for the US to transform its role from one of constant pressure on Pakistan to that of a real strategic partner.

The fundamental realities of Pakistan’s external relations are all too similar to those of its internal problems. Only Pakistan can save Pakistan. This can never happen as long as its leadership elite pursue policies where their definitions of “victory” fail the nation and its people, and really mean defeat.
1 setting the stage

It is all too easy to focus on Pakistan’s political problems or internal violence, but these are as symptomatic of the nation’s problems as they are the cause. Pakistan’s growing patterns of terrorism, insurgency and violence must be considered in the context of its overall political landscape, key problems like poverty and employment, challenges like demographics and education, and limits to the quality of governance and the reform of the security sector.

Pakistan’s Political Landscape

Instability in Pakistan is shaped by a dysfunctional political structure, which has become a three-way battle between the generals, the mullahs, and civilian political parties. Three years after the end of military rule in 2008, a new civilian government is in power, but is increasingly unpopular. Like its predecessors, it has suffered from weak and often self-serving leadership, struggles between opposing political parties, and the inability to make serious improvements in the lives of ordinary Pakistanis. These failures, and its inability to bring political corruption to acceptable levels, have led to increasing unpopularity—a decline reinforced by the government’s failures during flood relief operations in 2010.

Despite civilian rule, the military continues to have primacy in national affairs, and controls key aspects of foreign and security policy. Its preeminence has major impact on the federal budget, forcing Pakistan to limit civil expenditures and development.

Today, Pakistan’s population is caught in the middle of tensions and violence between the military and religious radicals, as well as between growing regional, ethnic, and sectarian tensions. Religious extremism is on the rise. This is increasingly manifested in acts of violent terrorism, but also by a far more insidious radicalization of society, vividly illustrated by the assassinations of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti in early 2011, in reaction to their attempts to reform Pakistan’s highly controversial blasphemy laws. The level of support for these assassinations shocked and intimidated secular progressive elements in Pakistan, and highlighted the impact of the religious parties “on the ‘street” despite their previous failures to win broad support in elections.

Civilian Governance with Military “Preeminence”

Analysts often paraphrased Voltaire to declare that while many states have an army, Pakistan’s army has a state.¹ Such beliefs have merit. The Army has primacy in Pakistan; it has ruled Pakistan for over half its existence and has never yet allowed a civilian government to complete its term. It acts as the primary guarantor of Pakistan’s stability and remains the country’s most powerful institution, with its power largely untouched despite the rise of a new civilian government.

The Pakistani military is run from General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, and is the most organized and functional organization in Pakistan. It is far more than a large and well-equipped fighting force, and maintains extensive landholdings and a significant business portfolio from factories to bakeries, which all when all told may comprise as much as 3–10 percent of the entire economy.2

Many analysts continue to believe that the Army is the glue holding Pakistan together—without which Pakistan would disintegrate into anarchy.3 However, the Army’s preeminence is also widely regarded to have restricted the growth of democratic institutions, ensured that the narrow interests of military elites drive foreign and security policy, and consumed a large share of resources needed for civil development.

The Army has indicated that it does not desire formal power. The Musharraf era damaged the army’s public standing, and the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani has shown deference to the civilian government and consistently voiced his opposition to military intervention in domestic politics. Kayani is often lauded as a “quiet, professional soldier… [with] a policy of keeping the army out of politics.”4 This is a view believed to be shared by his US military counterparts, including General David Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen.5

At the same time, formal power is unnecessary as no civilian leader or party can afford to challenge the military. The armed forces have de facto control of key budgetary allocations, with defense expenditures in FY2010–2011 officially making up at least as much as 13.5 percent of all budget outlays for the period,6 and recently perhaps increased by an additional 11.4%.7 These significant burdens on the economy are exercised without any transparency. The year 2008 marked the first year where the armed forces broke down their annual requirements,8 instead of submitting a single, incontestable line entry for their annual demands.9

The Army’s leadership also has strong continuity. In July 2010, Kayani was offered a three-year extension in his tenure of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) beginning November 2010 by the civilian government. The event, while unprecedented, was hardly a reflection of improving civil-military relations. The military high command is likely to have deemed continuity in a time of war essential, rendering civilian opinions irrelevant, and the US is believed to have strongly backed the extension.10

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3 Suba Chandran, “Reading Pakistan: Is the Military the Only Glue?” Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, April 7, 2011. Available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/reading-pakistan-is-the-military-the-only-glue-analysis-07042011/
In addition to reinforcing the army’s preeminence, the extension is believed to have important effects in enhancing military control over civilian politics. The extension now means that Kayani’s term will include overseeing the National Assembly elections, which are likely to be held in early 2013, an effect that necessitates that both major political parties, the incumbent PPP and the opposition PML-N stay in the army’s good graces.\textsuperscript{11}

Shuja Nawaz, a leading analyst on the Pakistani military also comments on its effects on the military command structure. He points out that nearly a dozen three-star generals will now retire before the expiration of Kayani’s term, leading to an “age and service gap between Kayani and his corps commanders [that] in another two years will be quite large as he digs down the rank orders.” This is likely to exacerbate Pakistan’s already steep pyramidal command structure, as “few junior officers will be willing to challenge the views of such a senior chief.”\textsuperscript{12}

The Army is widely popular amongst Pakistanis, and its shortcomings are often forgotten. It has often recovered from public anger quicker than many anticipated, as after the disastrous 1971 War with India. Furthermore, the Army has intervened almost exclusively with the popular support of Pakistanis eager to seek relief from kleptocratic civilian elites, as during the 1999 Musharraf takeover. Similarly, by mid-2010 the Army appeared to have restored its prestige, with a full 94% of polled Pakistanis believing that the military was a positive influence on Pakistan’s direction.\textsuperscript{13} In the wake of the US raid inside Pakistan in May 2011 that violated Pakistani sovereignty to kill Osama Bin Laden, the Army has again entered a period of significant public criticism.

The prominent position of the Army helps explain why the US has placed high value on its military-to-military relationships in Pakistan, and believes them to be its surest bet for long-term continuity in Pakistan’s volatile political landscape. At the same time, the US government and military have shown a growing frustration with the Pakistani Army’s inability (or failure) to hold cleared territory against the militants they claim to defeat; and at the continuing collusion of the Pakistani Army and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (more commonly known as Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI) with Taliban, Haqqani and other militants that use Pakistan as a sanctuary in attacking Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{14}

This frustration is matched on the Pakistan side. Kayani has made it clear that he neither is, nor wants to be seen as, an American proxy. Under his tenure, the Pakistani Army has increasingly focused on operations in the tribal areas, although Kayani himself has reiterated his continued intention to ensure that the Pakistani Army remains “India-centric.”\textsuperscript{15} Kayani has also displayed increasing impatience with US criticism, condemning a drone attack in March 2011, which killed

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\textsuperscript{12} Nawaz, “Kayani and Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations.”
\end{flushleft}
41 alleged civilians, in unusually strong language as “intolerable and unjustified... [and] in complete violation of human rights.”

The Uncertain Role of the ISI

Military intelligence is a key component of the military’s strength and has a major political and foreign policy role. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is the ‘deep state’ in Pakistan tasked with the overarching remit to ensure that Pakistan remains a “security state.” The organization’s continuing central importance in advancing military strategy has been reflected in the unusual one-year extension in tenure granted to Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha in March 2011, in complement to the extension of COAS Kayani’s term.

Pasha and Kayani dominate Pakistani strategic thinking, including the military’s continued India-centric focus, its increased interest in combating the Pakistani Taliban while maintaining its relationships with the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups perceived as strategic proxies of continuing utility. The ISI also maintains an extensive network of informants, pervasive across society and ranging from upper echelons of governance to “lowly informants watching the lobbies of the country’s hotels.”

From its headquarters in Aapbara, in Islamabad, the ISI operates both internally to resist civilian control, and externally to project the military’s power across Pakistan’s borders. Its internal influence is generally considerably higher during periods of military rule, such as during the Musharraf and Zia era when it was the primary conduit to organize religious political coalitions to hedge against mainstream parties, and militant groups to conduct proxy war on its behalf. Allegations of ISI complicity in various insurgent and terrorist attacks continue today, most often in attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan and on Indian interests.

The ISI is best known for its links to militant groups, although there is considerable uncertainty as to the magnitude of these relationships. The ISI itself, and its supporters inside Pakistan, allege that is an intelligence agency just like any other that works only to ensure the defense of Pakistan. US intelligence officials in contrast have alleged close ties between the ISI and Taliban elements, but there is likely some truth to a senior Pakistani official’s frustrated retort that “honestly, they see ISI behind every bush.” Some also allege that the ISI operates as a rogue organization, answerable to no one. Former US ambassador to Pakistan William Milam

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19 Lamont and Bokhari “South Asia: On the High Ground.”
20 Ibid.
disagrees, stating that, “I do not buy the thesis that the ISI is a rogue organization. It is a disciplined army unit that does what it is told, although it may push the envelope sometimes.”

Some element of collusion between the Army, ISI, and Afghan insurgents is almost certain, although estimates vary greatly, and recent developments have heightened concerns. The circumstances surrounding the successful US attack on Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011 have led many analysts to ask how Bin Laden was able to find sanctuary in the garrison city of Abbottabad. This city is the location of Pakistan’s most prestigious military academy, and home to at least three Army regiments and thousands of troops.

In fact, a week before Bin Laden was killed, as Kayani spoke of breaking the “back of terrorism,” he spoke within a mile of where Bin Laden was hiding. The scale of Bin Laden’s compound is also cause for worry, consisting of 12-foot-high walls and two security gates, increasing skepticism that it could have existed, particularly within the upscale Bilal Town colony of Abbottabad, without some element of the Pakistani military and ISI having knowledge of his location. Some analysts feel it either demonstrated either extreme incompetence on the part of the ISI, or is evidence that elements in the Army and government cooperate with a much wider range of Islamist extremists than just the Afghan Taliban. It is uncertain which prospect is more worrying.

Allegations of ISI collusion with militants are not uncommon. Some analysts, such as Matt Waldman, a researcher with the London School of Economics, have alleged extensive cooperation at both the operational and strategic level between the ISI and the Afghan Taliban, including ISI representation as observers during meetings of the Quetta Shura, the senior most leadership council. The veracity of these claims cannot be easily proven, but regardless, given the long relationships cultivated from the Soviet jihad, it is believed that at least some ISI officers, both retired and serving continue to maintain a sense of identification with their proxies.

Retired ISI chief Hamid Gul is an example. Now a prominent media personality, he has expounded on his various beliefs, including allegations that the Mossad perpetrated 9/11, that the US actively seeks to destabilize Pakistan “because it is a Muslim nuclear state,” as well as advocacy for an Islamist state— “a global village under divine order”— presumably led by the Taliban, who “represent Islam in its purest form.” Anatol Lieven, another Pakistani military researcher, recounts the multitude of stories in 2007-08 of individual ISI officers intervening to

rescue Taliban militants from arrest, “too many, and too circumstantial, for these all to have been invented.”

Military Rule Lite

Many feel Kayani is doing his best to limit military intervention in civil governance, to continue the professionalization and modernization of the military, and to limit the risk of a military coup. Kayani has sought to refocus the Army away from politics, and reversed many of Musharraf’s policies, including barring officers from meeting with politicians without express permission, and ordering all officers who held posts in civilian agencies to immediately resign their positions.

At the same time, some of his statements provide a warning that the army may still feel it is the ultimate option whenever civil governance falters or fails. Kayani has likened past military coups to “temporary bypasses that are created when a bridge collapses on democracy’s highway. After the bridge is repaired, then there’s no longer any need for the detour.”

These words are disturbing precisely because their rhetoric departs so much from the past reality. Each previous period of military rule further weakened civilian institutions, and conditioned political elites to maximize rents during their brief tenures instead of focusing on governance. Similarly, military rulers have often heavily militarized the bureaucracy, and staffed civilian institutions with military officers to ensure control, at the cost of efficiency. Former military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq is often seen as the symbol of a destructive military intervention, but Musharraf also introduced quotas for military representation in the civil service, appointed army officials to key civilian positions including agriculture, education and medicine, and created army monitoring teams to control and influence civilian institutions.

Despite some positive moves by Kayani to limit the army’s role in civilian governance and politics, it continues to have primacy in many sectors of decision-making, most notably in all levers of security and foreign policy. It continues to deeply resent any civilian attempts to intrude on this monopoly.

Upon his election, and in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Zardari government made improving relations with India a central strategy, an effort the army sharply undercut. Hours after PM Gilani issued a decree ordering the ISI to be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, his government was forced to rescind the order after the Army signaled its displeasure. The Army similarly rebuffed Zardari’s offer to send the ISI to India to collaborate with the Mumbai investigation, and refused to reduce the nuclear-alert status as a goodwill gesture to reduce tensions with India.

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30 Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men.”
An embassy cable released by Wikileaks—dated one day before the Mumbai attacks,—noted that Kayani was the sole obstacle preventing an Indo-Pakistan deal on Kashmir, claiming that “Zardari and Singh were ready, and there was text on paper.” The army also publicly campaigned against the Kerry-Lugar Bill, a US economic assistance package, because it felt the bill had conditions hostile to its interests that were tied to the flow of US aid. The Army also played a key role shaping talks with the US in Islamabad in March 2010, including setting the agenda, summoning heads of civilian institutions to Army headquarters to discuss details, and presiding over meetings with federal secretaries.

In recent times, the army has begun to more actively interfere in domestic affairs in reflection of its frustration with the civilian government. There have been persistent rumors of Kayani’s disdain for leading civilian politicians, and a Wikileaks cable dated from 2009 included an account of Kayani informing the US embassy of his desire to force the ouster of President Zardari, a move seemingly obstructed solely by the fact that “Kayani dislikes Nawaz far more than he mistrusts Zardari.” There have also been reports that senior politicians operate in fear of army retribution, including President Zardari himself who recounted to former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown his fears that Kayani might “take me out.”

Military frustration with the civilian government has many legitimate causes, and no one in the West should forget that people in the developing world have every reason to define “legitimacy” by how well leaders govern, rather than by the way in which they are selected. During the March 2009 political standoff between the incumbent Zardari-led PPP government and the opposition PML-N party for example, large-scale protests paralyzed Pakistan, and required Kayani’s personal involvement to push Zardari to accept key opposition demands, such as the reinstatement of the popular Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Such interventions appeared to be welcomed by the population, with Kayani’s approval ratings reaching 61% in mid-2010, compared to a mere 20% for Zardari.

The situation grew worse during and after massive floods later in 2010. During relief efforts, Kayani was the most visible public figure, and the Army was conspicuously involved in relief efforts in the field. In contrast, President Zardari initially continued a visit to his chalet in France, and the civil aid effort was often ineffectual or corrupt, and gave priority to the wealthy and the power brokers.

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Poor civil performance in the reconstruction phase that followed caused considerable additional popular anger with the government. It may have been part of the reason Kayani intervened in September 2010 to demand that President Zardari trim his cabinet, including several key loyalists. Zardari’s cabinet included several members facing corruption and criminal charges and was widely perceived as emblematic of government waste and corruption. Zardari maintained a politely defiant stance and the government initially responded by maintaining that the Army’s demands were unconstitutional, but within a few months, it had begun moves to trim the cabinet, and framed it as a cost-cutting exercise to foster better governance.

Stability Problems within the Army

There are reasons to question the long-term internal unity and cohesion of the Army, which is not immune to the wave of religious radicalization sweeping the Pakistani social structure. Former Pakistani dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq did much to trigger the forces that led to such movements, and they have been augmented in the post-9/11 era. There have been serious instances in recent times where the security forces have showed the impact of such radicalization, notably the assassination of Punjab governor Salman Taseer by a member of his own elite counterterrorist police force. Similarly, Faisal Shahzad, the would-be “Times Square bomber” was associated with a major in the Pakistani Army who allegedly served as a go-between for Shahzad and the Taliban.

In May 2011, an attack on a major naval base in Karachi destroyed two of Pakistan’s fleet of three P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft and was alleged to have been conducted with inside help. Al-Qaeda affiliated militants were able to enter the base and destroy the aircraft within 20 minutes, and appear to have had a good working knowledge of the base and its response protocols. Since then a former Navy commando has been arrested on suspicions of having helped conduct the attack, and an internal investigation is reported to have unearthed evidence of collusion between navy officers working at the base and the terrorists.

Others have alleged more extensive militant penetration of military institutions and units. Investigative Pakistani reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad for example reported on considerable militant, and particularly al-Qaeda, infiltration into the ranks of the armed forces, particularly the
Navy. Soon after the article, Shahzad was found tortured and killed in the Punjab, a crime that senior US military officials and many in Pakistan, have attributed to an ISI cover up.

Other radical Islamist groups that do not necessarily have strong links with terrorist or militant groups may also exert influence. The most notable is the Hizb ut-Tahir (HuT), which does not overtly advocate terrorism or violence, and strongly denies any connection with terrorism and militancy, but shares many radical ideological positions with transnational terrorist groups, and has a strong presence amongst the Pakistani diaspora, particularly in the UK. In December 2009, Seymour Hersch, a prominent US journalist quoted a senior Obama Administration official as saying that the group had “penetrated the Pakistani military and now have cells in the Army,” and in June 2011, the Army arrested a Brigadier General on reported association with HuT, the most senior such arrest to date. There have been other arrests of HuT affiliated members of the military, including Col. Shahid Bashir, a former commanding officer of the Shamsi airbase from where US drones reportedly flew. Bashir allegedly transferred sensitive information to terrorist groups and incited fellow soldiers to commit terrorist acts.

These recent manifestations can be traced back to the Zia-era Islamization of the state and the military. Subsequent leaders have reversed many of his policies, although some continue. For example, today one Islamic chaplain, or “long beard,” is attached to every battalion, a holdover since the 1980s. The Army is also believed to increasingly consist of more religious elements amongst its rank and file, although as retired moderate-Islamist Colonel Abdul Qayyum attempts to explain, “At heart the vast majority of the army are nationalists, and take whatever is useful from Islam to serve what they see as Pakistan’s interests. The Pakistani Army has been a nationalist army with an Islamic look.”

In aggregate, most observers agree that much of the Pakistani Army remains a professional and well-disciplined force that follows orders in spite of isolated incidents. Many in the Army perceive themselves as a “breed apart,” part of a “military family different from (and vastly superior to) civilian society… [with] contempt for the “feudal” political class.” This loyalty and camaraderie is a reflection of the unprecedented social mobility an army career offers to members of the lower and middle classes from where it recruits for its enlisted men. Anatol Lieven has examined the personal histories of the various COASs’ in Pakistani history, and summarizes their history by saying that, “some were rich, others poor, some secular others religious and some conspiratorial others loyal. Yet all have been first and foremost military men.”

The United States’ role in counterterrorism and in the Afghan War contributes to internal problems within the Army. A Wikileaks cable dated from 2008 detailed a strong anti-American bias in classes at the National Defense University for senior officers. An American officer who

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52 Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda had Warned of Pakistan Strike.”
54 Seymour M. Hersch, "Defending the Arsenal," New Yorker, November 16, 2009
58 Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men.”
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
attended classes at the academy estimated that less than a third of his class was secular and over a third were religiously devout with secular students pressured to appear more religious than they actually were. Various misperceptions about US policies and cultures were “infused” into lectures. The cable also noted that in contrast, perceptions about the Chinese were extremely positive.61

The Army’s limited cooperation with the American campaign in Afghanistan has resulted in significant problems. Initial operations in the FATA were widely interpreted in the ranks as subservience to the US, which caused deep consternation. An uncertain willingness to fight fellow Muslims led to several humiliating incidents, including the surrender of over 200 soldiers to a small group of militants in September 2007.62 Earlier operations in 2004 had led to desertions amongst the paramilitary Frontier Corps, and incidences where helicopter pilots refused to bomb targets.63

Some soldiers found they were “dishonored” in their local communities, which is not surprising given the fact that the army and the militants recruit from the same areas, particularly in the Punjab. Lieven points to this trend as one of the most dangerous, pointing out that when men from a high-status institution such as the army have trouble finding suitable brides for example, it points to a significant change in their perceived role in society.64 The military has made a concerted effort to address these issues, and has been helped by the growing alienation of many Pakistanis from militants after their brutalities in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in 2007-08. Unfortunately, the successes of 2009, gave way to a war of attrition in 2010, which led many of those in combat zones or displaced by the fighting to feel the Army had failed them and has caused at least some renewal of the tension between the Army and the people.

This gulf between US and Pakistani military perceptions is particularly important. No internal actor, including the Taliban, is strong enough to take on the military, and no regional actor, including India, is either capable of or willing to take on and destroy the army in an extended campaign. As Lieven notes, the tipping point is only likely to come “if Washington ever undertakes actions that persuades ordinary Pakistani soldiers that their only honorable course is to fight America, even against the orders of their generals and against dreadful odds, the armed forces would crumble.”65

Today, this worry is particularly acute. There is believed to be widespread anger in the ranks at the high command’s inability to prevent the US incursion into Abbottabad. General Kayani is believed to have faced tough questions and criticism by military officers during town halls held at garrisons across the country. Many are reported to have demanded to know why Pakistan did not “retaliate,” while others demanded that Pakistan “immediately suspend cooperation with the US.”66

64 Lieven, “All Kayani’s Men.”
65 Ibid.
As a result, even mutually beneficial actions come with problems. Pakistani military officials tolerate some aspect of the drone campaign in the FATA area, and find it useful in dealing with the militants and extremists that pose a threat to the Army and Pakistan’s ruling elite. At the same time conscious of public sentiment, they want far more direct control over every aspect of US operations in Pakistan, and to limit the role of US trainers and special forces. There is also likely unanimous consent opposing any expansion of US military activity in Pakistan, including into provinces such as Balochistan or the KPK. Any such unilateral action by the US is likely to constitute a red line for many in the army.

The Army also strongly opposes any cross-border incursions by US and ISAF ground forces and helicopters into Pakistan. An alleged incursion in September 2008 incurred great anger in Pakistan, and resulted in the issuing of orders for soldiers to open fire on any NATO forces attempting to cross the border according to a military spokesman. A similar helicopter-borne raid in September 2010 ended up killing three Pakistani border guards and injuring another three, which resulted in fierce condemnation of the attack and the closure of border crossings to NATO supply trucks. As yet, the Pakistani government has not undertaken similar actions after the US raid on the Bin Laden compound, but the operation has clearly rankled amongst both senior Army leaders and leaders in the Pakistani government.

Nuclear Safety

Pakistan has a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. Details are hard to come by, but in early 2011, US intelligence officials estimated that Pakistan had increased its deployed nuclear weapons to between than 110–200, compared to about 75–80 at the time President Obama took office. The Pakistani arsenal is the fastest growing in the world, and in April 2011 satellite imagery exposed a new nuclear facility in Khushab, which may come online around 2013. This rapid growth combined with the level of violence sweeping Pakistan, has raised major concerns over the safety of nuclear installations, and the potential for fissile materials to fall into the wrong hands.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a program of extreme sensitivity, and is seen by many, if not most, segments of society as the ultimate safeguard against Indian aggression. As a result, any intrusion into Pakistani nuclear affairs is deeply resented, to the extent that much of the US military presence in the region is seen by many Pakistanis as a ploy to defang the country’s nuclear capability. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the US raid that killed Bin Laden, COAS Kayani specifically spoke of the country’s nuclear assets; “Unlike an undefended civilian compound, our strategic assets are well protected, and an elaborate defensive mechanism is in place.”

In fairness, Pakistan has mobilized an extensive security apparatus, numbering between 12,000-15,000 personnel to protect these assets. The National Command Authority (NCA) formulates

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nuclear policy and is the key decision-making body for the employment and development of strategic systems. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is subordinate to the NCA, formulates nuclear policy, strategy, doctrine, and operational plans for deployment and employment.\textsuperscript{72}

Pakistani military officials have been adamant that these forces are well trained, carefully vetted, and subjected to intense safeguards. Pakistan is believed to have copied “best practice” from the US, is thought to have developed a Permissive Action Link system that electronically locks nuclear weapons, and is thought to have dispersed missiles and components.\textsuperscript{73} Yet, US assistance can only go so far given Pakistani sensitivity, and it is believed that there are several other undisclosed secret sites where standards may differ.

Pakistani officials have claimed that a direct assault on nuclear facilities is unlikely. Former President Musharraf himself once stated that, “If you want to get into a firefight with the forces guarding our strategic assets, it will be a sad day.”\textsuperscript{74} This is likely true, but the growth in militant operational expertise has consistently surprised even veteran Pakistan observers. The modalities of recent attacks, such as on the Pakistani Army’s GHQ and on the PNS Mehran naval base, add up to a “virtual blueprint for a successful attack on a nuclear weapons facility,” according to analyst Shaun Gregory.\textsuperscript{75} These include tactical expertise, access to relevant equipment and information and a proven ability to penetrate multiple layers of security.

Safety concerns have grown particularly acute in recent years, as militant violence has expanded into the interior. Most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are believed to be close to militant operating areas in the FATA and KPK, as they were designed with India in mind, and kept away from the border.\textsuperscript{76} Several facilities have already come under attack, although not yet in ways that seek to breach and acquire nuclear materials. In August 2008, a coordinated suicide attack killed 70 at the gates of the Wah Cantonment Ordnance Complex, which is believed to be a major storage and maintenance site for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{77} There have also been attacks targeting personnel and their families at the Sargodha and Kamra air bases in the Punjab, both of which are suspected of being affiliated with the nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{78}

Similarly, the May 2011 attack on PNS Mehran highlighted militants’ ability to infiltrate extremely secure locations. Mehran itself is located only about 15 kilometers away from the Mansoor Air Base, another presumed stockpile.\textsuperscript{79} In the wake of the Mehran attack and media speculation on nuclear safety, a Pakistani Taliban spokesman declared that they had no intentions of attacking Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, although such statements are difficult to take at face value.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{73} “Factbox: Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability,” Reuters, May 5, 2011. Available at http://reut.rs/md1fSp
\textsuperscript{74} Bast, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Surge.”
\textsuperscript{75} Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” \textit{CTC Sentinel}, June 1, 2011.
More worrisome however is the fear of infiltration through the security forces or other technical personnel, concerns shared by many Pakistanis. Pervez Hoodhboy, a prominent Pakistani nuclear scientist, has publicly expressed concerns in the wake of high-profile attacks saying, “What is the proof that nuclear installations or weapons stocks would be exempt from this [infiltration by militant sympathizers]? My worry is not limited to nuclear arsenals because places that deal with fissile materials can also be similarly infiltrated.”

The most worrying such incident was the uncovering of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network. Khan, the ‘father of Pakistan’s bomb’ is believed to have sought to proliferate nuclear technology to several ‘rogue’ countries including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. His popularity in Pakistan resulted in a pardon by President Musharraf in 2004 after a televised confession, but he was placed under house arrest. In 2009, all restrictions against Khan were lifted. Released Wikileaks cables confirmed that the US has continued to intensely monitor and scrutinize suspected Pakistani nuclear activity, including exerting pressure on Chinese suppliers, and efforts to divert suspicious shipments.

The Pakistani military has been adamant that the Khan network was a ‘one-man operation,’ but in mid-2011 reports have emerged suggesting that Khan facilitated payments between the North Koreans, and senior Pakistani military officials including retired military chief Jehangir Keramat and Lt. Gen Zulfiqar Khan—the first such formal accusations of nuclear-related corruption. Both men have denied the reported transfer of about US$3 million in cash and jewels, but senior Western officials reportedly support the claims.

There is also growing worry over the potential for a rogue commander to proliferate his charge, a matter that is particularly worrisome as Pakistan announces its intentions to deploy tactical nuclear systems onto the battlefield as deterrence against India.

Semi-dysfunctional Civilian Government

In over 60 years of independence, no democratically elected Pakistani civilian government has yet served out its full term, and been replaced by another. This history underlines the challenges facing President Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led incumbent government, and any US-supported democratization strategy. It also helps explain the deep damage that has been wreaked upon civilian institutions by repeated periods of military rule.

The military, however, cannot fully be wholly blamed, as it has generally responded to a failing and dysfunctional civil governments and politics, and often taken power with extensive popular support, driven by the population’s disenchantment with its civilian rulers.

No modern political leader of Pakistan has consistently put the nation’s interests before family, party, and power. Civilian political elites have been conditioned to focus on maximizing rents during their brief tenures, instead of focusing on issues of governance, and today corruption and

81 Rob Crilly, “Pakistan can’t protect Islamic arsenal from Islamic terrorists,” Telegraph, June 27, 2011. Available at http://tgr.ph/ki1XEj
entrenched feudal interests remain strong. Class, ethnicity, and religion continue to be instruments of marginalization, and access to political and economic power continues to rest in the hands of the urban middle-classes of the Punjab (and the Sindh) breeding provincial alienation, particularly in the periphery.

Despite all these problems, it should not be ignored that Pakistan’s civilian government is still in its infancy, yet has registered several important strides in recent years including constitutional reforms to empower civilian institutions and encourage provincial autonomy. In many instances, however, they are driven by an inability of elites to ignore public demands, than initiative on their own part.

A Continuing History of Failed Civil Politics and Governance?

The military would not—and could not—have seized power so repeatedly if it were not for the consistent failure of civilian governments to better the welfare of their citizens. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the predecessors to Musharraf’s coup, presided over the “lost decade” of the 1990s, their tenures marked by plummeting economic growth, rising poverty levels and widespread allegations of corruption, all of which helped mute criticism to the military coup.

This trend may be repeating. Three years into the PPP-led coalition civilian government, and many Pakistanis are already fed up. In mid-August 2010, a poll conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only 14 percent of Pakistanis were satisfied with national conditions.85 71 percent had an unfavorable impression of the civilian government, in contrast to the military, which had recovered its national standing as the most trusted institution, with an 84 percent favorability rating.86

On the surface, these polling results seem unfair. Halfway through its term, the civil government has made or tried to make several important reforms. The independence of the judiciary has improved, the media has grown freer and more vibrant, constitutional amendments have removed the concentrated powers Musharraf put in the hands of the executive, the provinces have gained greater autonomy, and some important electoral reform initiatives have been implemented.87

However little has changed for the average Pakistani, particularly Pakistani youth and those outside the relatively small middle class. Dysfunctional transitional democracy may be favorable to military rule for many of the more affluent urban secularists who make up Pakistan’s chattering class, but not all Pakistanis have that luxury of caring about the distinction when their everyday life grows worse by the day.

Attempts to calculate the wealth of political elites illustrate their distance from the poor. Income and asset declarations in 2010 were little more than a tragic joke, appearing to show that many powerful senators are no richer than ordinary Pakistanis. This provoked a Pakistani newspaper to sarcastically lament, “We never knew that those who travel in expensive vehicles and live in

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
royal palace like homes are actually so poor!”88 A study by PILDAT, a local transparency group, in 2002-03 instead estimated that the average net worth of a member of the National Assembly was PKR199.83 million (roughly US$2.7 million), and the richest senator at the time was worth a whopping PKR590 billion (roughly US$700 million)89—in a country where about a quarter of the population subsists below the $1.25 a day poverty line.

The failure to pay fair taxes is another critical issue. Pakistan has one of the world’s lowest tax-to-GDP ratios and it is estimated as few as 2% of Pakistan’s 170 million people pay tax.90 Political elites routinely escape paying taxes on their significant incomes, while poorer people have fewer avenues to escape the tax collector. Many Western politicians, including British Foreign Minister David Cameron, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have noted that such graft severely complicates external assistance. Clinton, in particular stated, “This is one of my pet peeves… Pakistan cannot have a tax rate of 9 percent of GDP when landowners and all the other elites do not pay or pay so little it’s laughable. And when there’s a problem, everybody expects the US to come in and help.”91

The promises of civil political parties also are often little more than exercises in hollow political opportunism. The PPP rose to power on the platform of “Food, clothing, shelter to every poor family in Pakistan,” but food shortages, energy crises, and price increases are all everyday realities that exacerbate the divides between the population and their unaccountable and kleptocratic civilian overlords who live in luxury.92 70 percent of people today believe that the current civilian government is more corrupt than its military-run predecessor,93 partly stemming from the low regard with which many Pakistanis hold President Zardari. Known as “Mr. Ten Percent,” for the widespread allegations of corruption during his wife’s tenure as Prime Minister, Zardari once jokingly commented that he only lives in two places in Pakistan—“the prime minister’s house or a prison cell.”94

As a result, few Pakistanis have faith in democratic governance. The country has the lowest voter turnout in South Asia, and in July 2010, only 3% of Pakistanis with a post-graduate education expressed an interest in politics as a career.95

The dysfunctional character of Pakistani civil politics reinforces these underlying causes of popular disaffection. Political competition is fierce in Pakistan and focuses on family, party, and service politics in ways which often complicates the ability to rule and which can make Pakistan appear to lurch from one crisis to another. The two major political parties, the incumbent PPP, and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PML-N) run by the Sharif brothers

89 “How Rich are Pakistan’s MNAs?” PILDAT, August 2007. Available at http://www.pildat.org/%5Cevents%5C07-11-15%5Cpdf%5CRich_Pakistani_MNAS.pdf
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
95 Pak Institute of Legislative Democracy and Transparency, “Mid-Term Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan.”
from Punjab, constantly vacillate between professions of undying unity, and aggressive, often violent competition.

Pakistani political parties remain divided along ethnic and linguistic lines. Only the PPP and PML-N can truly be regarded as national parties, and they too have the majority of their powers concentrated in the Sindh and the Punjab respectively. Others, such as the Awami National Party (ANP) are popular mostly amongst the Pashtuns, and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) amongst the Mohajirs of Karachi. These divisive politics have often necessitated weak political coalitions, with various actors accountable only to narrow constituent interests. This severely limits the ability to govern effectively, particularly on the many controversial issues that divide Pakistanis today. Vicious turf battles are common for political parties, as seen in the violence in Karachi today.

In March 2009, the army had to intervene to mediate between the Sharifs and President Zardari, after large-scale protests by the PML-N paralyzed Pakistan, and threatened to topple the government. Pressure from the Army forced Zardari to relent on key opposition demands including lifting the recent ruling on Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif’s ineligibility for electoral office nationally and in the Punjab, as well as reinstating the popular Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.96 The ban, which ostensibly was caused by the Sharifs’ previous criminal convictions, was regarded as a political move orchestrated by Zardari, while on the Chief Justice situation, Zardari had vacillated for fears that the Supreme Court under Chaudhry may choose to prosecute him on corruption charges.97

Coalition politics further complicate governance. In January 2011, the government almost collapsed again, when the MQM, a junior coalition partner, briefly withdrew from the government over opposition to the phasing out of fuel subsidies, a move demanded by the IMF.98 The MQM has since quit the coalition and joined the opposition PML-N, but the PPP retains the majority as of July 2011.

There remain significant obstacles to the government’s ability to complete its term in 2013. In early April 2011, the Zardari government continued to face blistering criticism by opposition leaders over the release of suspected American spy, Raymond Davis.99 The government has still been relatively ineffective in dealing with the aftermath of the flood, and with the impact of local fighting on civilians. It faces a major crisis from rising food and fuel prices, and faces a very uncertain global economy, and problems in ensuring the flow of foreign aid. Governance does not seem to be improving relative to the pressures caused by population growth and the nation’s youth bulge, and party politics remain as self-seeking and destructive as in the past.

A Background of Modern Feudalism

Some, if not many, of Pakistan’s political elites are also unpopular as they are regarded as extensions of predatory local power structures, and complicit in a form of near feudalism. President Zardari, Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, and various members of the National Assembly are members of this feudal class, maintaining undisputed political and economic control over vast swathes of Pakistan. The disparities between these wealthy landowners and the landless peasantry whose lives they dominate is often shocking, the magnitude best conveyed in the fact that 2% of Pakistanis control 45% of land in a country where the majority of people, particularly in rural areas are involved in agriculture.

So far, change is limited. A fairly typical feudal family, such as the Jatoi clan in rural Sindh can still own 30,000 acres of prime agricultural land, despite having lost 45,000 acres in the 1958 land-redistribution program, and still retain the allegiance of 400–500 lesser landlords and an estimated 1200 “armed loyalists.” In contrast, it is estimated only 37% of Pakistan’s rural residents own the land they farm, those too mostly in small family plots barely enough for subsistence farming. Most of the rest, including an estimated 1.8 million people estimated to be in debt bondage, work the fields for no pay, while others are engaged in classic sharecropping, where two thirds or more of their revenues go to landlords in debt and accrued interest repayments.

Feudal lords are often been accused of abuses, including systematic attempts to deprive the peasantry of education to keep them shackled in poverty or maintaining armed militias and operating private prisons. Relief teams operating deep in rural areas also found unexpectedly large incidences of malnutrition, an example of the extreme poverty many landless peasants continue to face even before the impact of the floods.

During the 2010 floods, this predatory behavior was on display, according to reports. For example, in Muzzaffargarh, in the Punjab some 400,000 acres were flooded, 51 people killed, many displaced and 337 schools destroyed when the Indus River overflowed because the local government refused to follow protocols and blow up a barrage designed to divert water to a designated flood basin. Local feudal elites—in this case the Hinjra and Khosa clans—were surreptitiously farming the basin and reportedly pressured the government to breach protocol to protect their crops.

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100 World Bank, “Pakistan: Priorities for Agriculture and Rural Development,” n.d., http://go.worldbank.org/KQ3CN5O0J0


105 Haider, “Pakistan feudalism boosts Taliban cause.”


Appeasement in the Face of Extremism

In the face of rising religious extremism, Pakistan’s political leadership has shown far too little courage, often choosing appeasement, over principle. The silence in the aftermath of the assassinations of two prominent liberal lawmakers—Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minorities Minister—has been deafening and has allowed the intimidation of all but the most courageous of progressive politicians and activists. Few government officials attended the funerals, and some such as Interior Minister Rehman Malik have publicly sided with the religious right, including Malik’s declaration that, “I will shoot a blasphemer myself.”

Even before their assassinations, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and another legislator Sherry Rehman, were some of the only supporters of reform. They were afforded virtually no support from their own parties, and today, Sherry Rehman, the last still alive, is bunkered down in her Karachi home and has since withdrawn her amendment proposal. The Ministry of Religious Minorities, which was headed by Bhatti now appears set to be demolished and religious minority issues have lost their national status, and are now to be decided on a provincial level according to a recent governmental ruling. The ruling marks a major setback for minority rights in that several articles of discrimination and prejudice such as the blasphemy laws are enshrined in national legislation.

In the aftermath of the US killing of Bin Laden, three members of the JUI-F in the parliament offered condolences and prayers for the “departed soul” of Bin Laden during a parliamentary briefing. The offenders were admittedly only three out of many, but they received only a mild rebuke. Other politicians have chosen to directly pander to Islamist extremists or the criminal underworld for political advantage.

The Sharif brothers in Punjab for example have links to various Sunni Islamist groups, which have influence in their voting districts. They have been linked to the rapidly anti-Shia SSP, and have extensive dealings with the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the humanitarian arm of the notorious terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of which are designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the US government, and the United Nations. In fact, in FY2010–2011, the provincial government under Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif is reported to have allocated more than 82

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million rupees to the JuD, including PKR79 million to its headquarters in Muridke and another 3 million to schools run by the organization in the Punjab.  

**Faltering Progress toward Reform**

As has been touched upon earlier, the civilian government has achieved some progress towards reform, particularly in the passage of the 18th amendment to Pakistan’s constitution in April 2010. The amendment constitutes an important list of reforms, including laws to dramatically reverse the centralization of power under the Musharraf era, expand provincial rights, and foster bureaucratic and judicial independence.

One of the greatest obstacles to national democratic governance in Pakistan is the fact that “Pakistan has failed to establish an effective federal covenant between its constituent units.” Much of this is driven by the unequal benefits of citizenship across various provinces leading to fragile associations with the state. The 7th National Finance Commission Award was a step forward in increasing the resource control of provinces, and more equitably distributing the federal divisible pool by increasing the shares of neglected provinces, such as Baluchistan and the KPK.

Similarly, various excessive powers of the presidency were trimmed and reforms to improve the social contract between the state and its citizenry. The 18th Amendment offered a greater role for the prime minister and the parliament, abolished the concurrent legislative list that allowed federal legislation to override provincial legislation, devolved various federal ministries, cut the size of the cabinet, and empowered the Council of Common Interests, a constitutional body to help resolve conflicts between the provinces and the government. Judicial appointments were also placed outside the direct control of both the president and the prime minister.

However, these reforms remain selective, and in many instances are far from having been implemented. Provincial autonomy for example is discussed primarily in the context of the four major provinces. It excludes the federally administered areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and the FATA, all of which suffer various discriminations. The FATA too remains governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (FCR), a legislative holdover from colonial times, under which, the legal protections afforded to most Pakistanis do not apply. Promises have been made to repeal the FCR, but progress has been halting.

**Weak Police and Rule of Law**

Politics and governance cannot be separated from the practical conduct of the rule of law and any review of the security problems in Pakistan, and its stability, must consider the impact of the

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120 “Impact of the 18th Constitutional Amendment on Federation-Provinces Relationship,” *PILDAT*, July 2010. Available at http://tiny.cc/hm2go
Police, the courts, and the rule of law. Similarly, security and counterinsurgency operations cannot be assessed simply in terms of their impact on extremists, insurgents, and terrorists. The overall impact of the legal system, and the respect the security services and military show for human rights is critical in shaping the level of support for the government or for its violent opposition.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan’s case, security operations and legal system are still a cause of security problems as well as a cure. An index created by the World Justice Project judged Pakistan to have the worst access to civil justice and to be the least orderly and secure of the 66 countries ranked in its Rule-of-Law index.\textsuperscript{122}

Primary internal security responsibility falls upon the police under the command of the Ministry of the Interior. In some areas of the Punjab and the Sindh, particularly in Karachi, paramilitary organizations such as the Rangers augment local police. In the periphery provinces of the Khyber Pakhtunkwa, the FATA and Balochistan, paramilitary organizations such as the Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary, sometimes backed by units from the regular Army have primary security responsibility. Declining security across the country has also led to an explosion in demand for private security, creating a de-facto auxiliary police force that ranges from individual “chowkidars” (guards) posted outside family homes—some armed, others not—to extensive security details for the rich and the powerful.

Police capacity issues are chronic, as detailed in a recent report by the United States Institute for Peace. On paper, combined federal and provincial law-enforcement forces (including paramilitary forces and intelligence organizations) amounted to about 575,000 personnel, a ratio of about one police official to every 304 people, better than the UN peacetime recommendation of one to every 400.\textsuperscript{123} When isolating only the police, the number may fall to about one to every 477 people.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, these figures do not account for force quality, which is rife with issues of corruption, low pay, equipment or training.

Security services are widely perceived as corrupt, over-reliant on repression, and ineffective in the face of rising violence and militancy across the country. Corruption surveys have consistently ranked the police as the most corrupt institution in the country,\textsuperscript{125} with a thana (police station) culture of abuse, violence and intimidation. Furthermore, many police stations are self-financed to a significant extent, and rely on political patronage to secure even basic equipment, compromising their independence and professionalism.\textsuperscript{126} Human rights reporting is often controversial, but the US State Department provided the following official summary of the

\textsuperscript{122} Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, and Alejandro Ponse, \textit{Rule of Law Index 2011}, World Justice Project. Available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/wjproli2011_0.pdf


20 | pakistan—vi olence versus stability: a national net assessment
problems in Pakistan’s security apparatus in its country report on human rights released in April 2011. Selected segments from the report are reproduced below.127

The major human rights problems included extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Although the government initiated an investigation into an Internet video showing men in military uniforms apparently committing extrajudicial killings, a failure to credibly investigate allegations, impose disciplinary or accountability measures, and consistently prosecute those responsible for abuses contributed to a culture of impunity. Poor prison conditions, instances of arbitrary detention, lengthy pretrial detentions, a weak criminal justice system, insufficient training for prosecutors and criminal investigators, a lack of judicial independence in the lower courts, and infringements on citizens' privacy remained problems. Harassment of journalists, some censorship, and self-censorship were problems. There were some restrictions on freedom of assembly. Corruption was widespread within the government and lower levels of the police forces, and the government made few attempts to combat the problem. Rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, honor crimes, abuse, and discrimination against women remained serious problems. Religious freedom violations, as well as violence and discrimination against religious minorities continued. Child abuse and exploitive child labor were problems. Widespread human trafficking, including exploitation of bonded laborers by landowners; forced child labor; and commercial sexual exploitation of children remained problems, as did lack of respect for worker rights.

[...] Police often failed to protect members of religious minorities, including Christians, Ahmadis, and Shia Muslims, from attacks (see section 2.c.). Some members of the police committed human rights abuses or were responsive to political interests. Frequent failure to punish abuses created a climate of impunity. Police and prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. The inspectors general, district police officers, district nazims (a chief elected official of a local government or mayor equivalent), provincial interior or chief ministers, federal interior minister, prime minister, or courts can order internal investigations into abuses and order administrative sanctions. Executive branch and police officials can recommend, and the courts can order, criminal prosecution. These mechanisms were sometimes used. The court system remained the only mechanism available to investigate abuses by security forces.

The report did however note some, albeit limited, signs of improvement.

There were improvements in police professionalism during the year. As in previous years, the Punjab provincial government conducted regular training and retraining in technical skills and protection of human rights for police at all levels. In March the Islamabad Capital Police established a human rights cell to encourage persons to report cases of human rights violations either in person, through a telephone hotline, or via e-mail. Islamabad police also decided to appoint human rights officers (HROs) and members of the community at all police stations. HROs could visit police stations at different times and had authority to interview arrested individuals. If a police officer was reported to be involved in torturing or detaining persons at police stations without justification, HROs could recommend disciplinary action against the officer involved. Provincial and federal law enforcement officers also attended a training course that included human rights, victims' rights, and women's rights. Since 2008 SHARP has provided training to more than 2,000 police officers in human rights.

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Policing cannot be separated from the rule of law and the criminal justice system. Unfortunately the sector also suffers very serious shortfalls. A witness protection program is virtually nonexistent, leaving witnesses completely open to retribution, and judges and legal workers are sometimes subjected to intimidation and targeted killings.\textsuperscript{128} Police investigative procedures are weak, and often lack basic evidence-gathering techniques to build strong cases. Furthermore, the courts are completely backlogged with over 1.7 million cases pending in the subordinate and superior courts across the country.\textsuperscript{129}

As a result, acquittals of suspects in serious crimes, including terrorism, are common, increasing the frustration of security forces and incentivizing repressive and illegal tactics. The overall conviction rate is believed to be as low as 5-10 percent,\textsuperscript{130} and according to provincial court records in the Punjab, nearly three out of four terrorism cases in 2009 and the first six months of 2010 ended with acquittals,\textsuperscript{131} including one where a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) leader arrested and charged with over 70 murders, was found not guilty by the courts. In reaction to incidents such as this, the intelligence agencies have often restored to extraordinary measures. In one case for example, the ISI resorted to kidnapping 11 suspected terrorists from a police jail for fear the courts were about to set them free.\textsuperscript{132} Jails are sometimes regarded as the “think-tanks” of the militant universe, with easy access to cell phones allowing militant leaders to continue planning operations, and comingling with other militants facilitating a convergence of ideology and tactics.\textsuperscript{133}

The same State Department report provided the following detailed assessment the legal and criminal justice system. Selected segments from the report are reproduced below and provide a snapshot of some of the problems facing the system.\textsuperscript{134}

\textbf{Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention}

Police routinely did not seek a magistrate’s approval for investigative detention and often held detainees without charge until a court challenged the detention. Some women in detention were sexually abused. When requested, magistrates approved investigative detention without determining its cause. In cases of insufficient evidence, police and magistrates sometimes colluded to issue new FIRs, thereby extending detention beyond the 14-day period.

[...] Courts appointed attorneys for indigents only in capital cases. Individuals frequently had to pay bribes to visit a prisoner. Foreign diplomats could meet with prisoners when they appeared in court and could usually meet with citizens of their countries in prison visits.

\textbf{Denial of Fair Public Trial}

[...] The law provides for an independent judiciary; in practice the judiciary was often subject to external influences, such as fear of reprisal in terrorism cases. In nonpolitical cases, the media and the public generally considered the high court and the Supreme Court credible.

There were extensive case backlogs in the lower and superior courts, as well as other problems that undermined the right to effective remedy and the right to a fair and public hearing. According

\textsuperscript{128} Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure.”

\textsuperscript{129} “Police Organizations in Pakistan,” Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{130} International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System.

\textsuperscript{131} Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistani criminal system proves no match for terrorism cases,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2010. Available at http://lat.ms/n7Xm05

\textsuperscript{132} “A Great Deal of Ruin in a Nation,” The Economist, April 2, 2011.

\textsuperscript{133} International Crisis Group, “Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System,” December 6, 2010.

\textsuperscript{134} US State Department, “Pakistan.”
to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, as of May more than 1.1 million cases were pending with the country’s lower courts, 150,000 cases awaited the four provincial high courts, and 17,500 cases awaited the Supreme Court. Delays in justice in civil and criminal cases arose due to antiquated procedural rules, weak case management systems, costly litigation to keep a case moving in the system, and weak legal education.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high courts does not extend to several areas that operated separate judicial systems. In FATA, under the FCR accused persons have no right to legal representation or bail. In specific areas noted in the Nizam-e-Adl regulation (often informally called the Sharia law) in PATA, Sharia law is imposed, and judges, known as qazis, are assisted by religious scholars. Azad Kashmir has its own elected president, prime minister, legislature, and high court. The Gilgit-Baltistan Self Governance Order of 2009 instituted a separate judiciary, legislature, and election commission for the region. Informal justice systems that lack the legal protections of institutionalized justice systems continued, especially in rural areas, and often resulted in human rights violations. Lower courts remained corrupt, inefficient, and subject to pressure from prominent wealthy, religious, and political figures.

The politicized nature of judicial promotions increased the government’s control over the court system. Unfilled judgeships and inefficient court procedures continued to result in severe backlogs at both the trial and appellate levels. Feudal landlords and other community leaders in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun and Baloch areas continued to hold local council meetings (known as panchayats or jirgas), at times in defiance of the established legal system. Such councils settled feuds and imposed tribal penalties on perceived wrongdoers, including fines, imprisonment, or even the death penalty.

As with other sectors, various reforms have been promised including increased pay, training, regulation and support, but implementation remains far from certain.

**Rise of Religious Extremists**

Sectarian, ethnic, and regional groups are another major source of Pakistan’s problems. Pakistan’s religious groups have played a role in politics since the inception of the state and have often benefited from periods of strong state support. While they pursue distinct agendas in terms of religious and civil goals, most share the same fundamental objective—to increase the role of Islam in all aspects of the state. Religion has always been central to Pakistan’s identity as a secular nation founded on the basis of Islam. 96% of Pakistanis are Muslim, most of whom are Sunnis, divided into four broad categories, the Barelvis, Deobandis, Ahle-Hadith, and the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) movement. A recent Gallup poll released in late May 2011 showed 67% of Pakistanis favored an increased Islamization of society, and 31% wanted such steps to happen “at once.”

Pakistan’s problems with religion are not being caused by anything approaching mainstream Islam, but rather by deviant Islamist extremists. While the average Pakistani continues to take his religion extremely seriously, and is believed to want to see it play a major role in social justice in the public domain, he or she also sets pragmatic goals and want to “look progressive in a

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Pakistan’s mainstream religious groups are distinguished from extremist groups and movements like the Pakistani Taliban by the fact that they pursue a largely peaceful attempt to Islamize the state, in contrast to the cultural revolution being waged by the Taliban, which decries any coexistence or collaboration with the state.

There are important religious differences that divide Pakistan’s many religious groups. The Deobandis and Ahle-Hadiths for example share a disdain for the shrine idolatry and the Sufi tenets of Pakistan’s majority Barelvis, who comprise between 80-85% of Pakistani Muslims. Over time, “these divergent Sunni religious organizations have evolved over time into pressure groups, political parties, and extremist organizations.” Deobandi groups are generally perceived to be the primary drivers of extremist violence in Pakistan today, but various groups including factions within Barelvi organizations, have had long associations with militants, from the times of the Soviet jihad.

The two largest religious parties in Pakistan include the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Deobandi Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), notably the Fazl ur-Rehman faction (JUI-F), which seek to impose Islamic law through elections and maintain large networks of madrassas across Pakistan. Other religious-political parties and groups include humanitarian service providers such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which is closely linked to the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group. Various other political parties and groups also maintain contacts with militant groups, for example - the JI to the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HM), the JUI-F to the Afghan Taliban, the JuD to the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Millat-e-Islami to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.

The influence of extremists appears to be growing. A study by the International Crisis Group notes that, “Pakistan’s puritanical clergy is attempting to turn the country into a confessional state where the religious creed of a person is the sole marker of identity.” Their growing political role in 2010 and early 2011, has heightened fears of a growing radicalization of Pakistani society, and was manifested in the assassinations of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, over their support for a Christian woman sentenced to death under Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy laws.

The Grim Legacies of Zia and Musharraf

The rise in the power of Pakistan’s ‘religious right’ is often traced back to the Zia-era during the 1980s, when General Zia, himself steeped in radical Islam, relied upon the JI and Deobandi interpretation of religion to help impose his will upon Pakistan. His tenure witnessed the “forceful entry of extremist organization into the political life of Pakistan,” and state sanction brought with it massive increases in funding and resources, including money from the state.

141 Ibid.
through zakat, and from external donors. Over thirty years this has allowed religious parties to become well-armed and better developed in their financing, organization and propaganda capabilities.\textsuperscript{144}

Zia was scarcely exclusive in supporting (and trying to use) extremist religious groups. Civilian elites, including Z. A. Bhutto in the 1970s, and Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s have made various compromises to the religious parties, but for today’s context it is the Musharraf-era that is the primary accelerant.

To legitimize his military dictatorship, Musharraf backed a religious coalition of five major religious parties under the banner of the Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). A pan-Islamic grouping, including Deobandis, Barelvis and Shias, the MMA swept into power in the 2002 elections, garnering an unprecedented 59 seats in the National Assembly, and controlled two of the four provinces—the NWFP (now the KPK) and Balochistan.\textsuperscript{145}

However, during their time in power, religious parties wholly failed to deliver on their promises for change, and were soon seen to be just as corrupt and inefficient as the previous government, and solely concerned with Islamizing state institutions.\textsuperscript{146} By the 2008 elections, they had registered a precipitous fall in support to a mere 7 seats in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{147} Some observers have used these results to downplay concern about the rise of the religious right, pointing out that secular forces have always controlled Pakistan, and that religious parties remain at the margins of mainstream politics, rarely sharing more than 10% of the vote.\textsuperscript{148}

However, this may underestimate their true influence. Pervez Hoodhboy, a prominent Pakistani commentator notes that the religious parties represent popular discourse noting that their low share of the popular vote is because “the mullah parties... are geared for street politics, not electoral politics.”\textsuperscript{149} Hoodhboy recounts an increasingly familiar personal anecdote to support his theory noting that in a debate between him and spokesmen from the JI and the Sunni Tehreek, the audience composed of presumably well-educated university students thunderously supported the clerics and loudly praised Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer.\textsuperscript{150}

Similarly, even with low official representation, religious radicals are able to heavily influence Pakistani public life including strong influence in dictating the contents of school curriculums, and enforcing acceptable dress and food codes.\textsuperscript{151} This has resulted in a “growth of intolerance...
has forged an extreme, murderous, antipathy to freedom of expression,”

including at universities across the country. At the prestigious University of Punjab, a radical Islamist student group, the Jamiat-e-Talaba has been accused of running a parallel administration, attacking students and teachers over issues they deem un-Islamic.

Student groups are often associated with religious parties, and such strong presence is not atypical today.

The most striking indicator of the growing radicalization of Pakistan was illuminated during the furor over proposed amendments to the blasphemy laws. During the crisis over the blasphemy laws, rallies by religious parties brought thousands onto the streets, including an estimated 40,000 even in secular MQM-controlled Karachi. In the aftermath of the assassination of Taseer, the amendment’s main backer, “hundreds of thousands” more rallied to demand the Qadri’s release and demand the withdrawal of the blasphemy law. The government complied.

This street presence by religious radicals is not new. In February 2011, a rally by the JuD, the political wing of the notorious Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group in Lahore drew a crowd of over 20,000 to hear speakers urge the government to establish a ministry for jihad.

The organized and large presence of radical Islamists is in growing contrast to Pakistan’s weakened progressive and human rights activists. Most progressive legislators are now bunkered down, fearing for their lives, while activists are increasingly confined from the streets to pockets of the Internet and social media platforms, and fearful of their security if they assemble publicly.

The Wrong Kind of Movement toward Political Unity

The end result is that ordinary Pakistanis find themselves “squeezed between a liberal and distant elite on one side, and the religious right on the other—and it is the right’s offering of an egalitarian populism on earth and just rewards in the afterlife that is winning converts.”

The growing unity of religious movements under the banner of radical Islam presents may make these problems worse. Pakistan’s majority Barelvi faith had generally been regarded as the antidote to Deobandi Islam, which is attributed to be at the heart of religious extremism. Barelvis have often warred violently with Deobandis, particularly in Karachi, and have lost influential clerics to Deobandi suicide bombings. However in the aftermath of the assassination, religious parties were vocal in their support for Qadri.

156 Rodriguez, “Pakistan Handles Extremism with Kid Gloves.”
A statement from Jamaate Ahle Sunnat Pakistan, one of the largest Barelvi organizations representing over 500 mullahs read, “No Muslim should attend the funeral or even pray for Salmaan Taseer. We pay rich tributes and salute the bravery, valor, and faith of Mumtaz Qadri.” They included clerics from the Sunni Tehreek, which lost their leader Maulana Sarfaraz Naemi to a Taliban suicide bombing in June 2009 after he spoke out against suicide bombings. Leaders of other religious groups, including the powerful Jamaat-e-Islami party declared that, “Salmaan Taseer was himself responsible for his killing. Any Muslim worth the name could not tolerate blasphemy of the Prophet, as had been proved by this incident.”

Veteran New York Times journalist Carlotta Gall partly attributes this radicalization to the “Zia generation” having come of age. The young lawyers movement for example, seen as the vanguards of the democratic movement to overthrow former President Musharraf have also enthusiastically embraced Qadri’s cause, demonstrating on the streets for his release and garlanding him with rose petals before his court appearance.

The fear of radicalization among the security forces was also revitalized in the assassination. Qadri was a member of the “Elite Force,” specially vetted and trained police commandoes, and while he alone pulled the trigger, there were indications that he had discussed the issue with his colleagues prior to the act, and furthermore was able to empty an entire magazine into the Governor without any apparent intervention.

Similarly during anti-Christian violence across Pakistan in March 2011, following the burning of a Quran by Florida “pastor” Fred Phelps, six gunmen attacked a church near Islamabad, located inside a high-security zone that includes a large ammunition dump and is heavily garrisoned by the military, suggesting that the attackers may have come from inside.

**But Extremists Remain a Threat to Extremists**

Despite the support religious groups have extended to militants, both tangibly and ideologically, they are not immune from the violence sweeping Pakistan, nor threats from hardline factions of the Taliban who condemn any perceived affiliation with the state. A recent event that was startling to even veteran Pakistani observers, was the dual assassination attempts on the life of Fazl ur-Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F, in two days. Rehman was generally considered quite pro-Taliban. He rarely condemned suicide bombings in the FATA or KPK, and had two

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161 Sulehria, “Pervez Hoodhboy: Miracles Are Needed to Rescue Pakistan.”
162 Shah, “Mainstream Pakistan religious organizations applaud killing.”
164 Ibid.
decades of history with militant groups, including supplying thousands of recruits from his madrassas for jihad.  

Rehman has, however, been considered to be first and foremost a pragmatist who has built diverse relationships with all stakeholders in Pakistan. Wikileaks cables dated September 2007 reported Musharraf urging the US to support the inclusion of the JUI into the governing coalition and described Rehman as “moderate and pliable,” and also revealed that despite his publicly anti-American posture Rehman had reached out to the US ambassador for help with a failed bid to become Prime Minister in 2007.

Similar attacks on religious party leaders are rare, but the trend is escalating. In April 2010, a suicide bomber in Peshawar killed a local JI leader, although there is some confusion as to whether he or a Shia police officer was the primary target. In mid-April 2011, another JI leader narrowly escaped when police discovered and safely detonated an IED outside his house. Various theories have been floated on the attackers, but the most convincing has been the argument that such targeting is a function of jihadist power politics, and a result of the disapproval by hardline factions of any attempts to engage the US and negotiate a political settlement to the war in Afghanistan.

Intra-jihadi splits are increasingly common in Pakistan’s complicated landscape. Earlier in the year, Colonel Imam, a retired ISI officer often regarded as the ‘godfather of the Taliban,’ for his role in the Soviet jihad, was executed by Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP emir despite personal pleas by both very senior militant leaders Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani for his release. In a video from his recorded “confession,” Imam describes being held by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and reading off what appears to be a prepared transcript states that his kidnappers “cannot be pressured by anyone.” Similarly today, the attack on Rehman appears to have occurred without unanimous consent inside the Taliban. Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior Taliban commander based out of North Waziristan has issued a statement condemning the attacks and vowed to punish the culprits.

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170 Masood and Gall, “Suicide Attack on Politician Fails Again.”
Religious Extremism and Anti-American Populism

Religious groups have grown in popularity because their ideologies are increasingly attractive to the ordinary Pakistani. They have adopted a highly popular anti-US stance, and are seen as more in touch with the needs of common people than the cocooned urban secularists whose lives are worlds apart from the poor. Religious groups are also often visible providers of aid and humanitarian relief, particularly in the aftermath of disasters, all of which has earned them significant reservoirs of goodwill.

The JuD is at the forefront of this trend, and with its powerful political and military wings, it increasingly resembles Lebanese Hezbollah. It is not alone. During the 2010 floods, activists and militants from the JI, the JuD, and SSP were some of the first responders in heavily affected districts. The head of the JuD social welfare wing claimed a deployment of “100,000 activists…across the country,” over 60 ambulances, and the establishment of medical camps and water purification plants to ease drinking water shortages.177 The JuD claimed “3,000 people deployed in Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan” operating 16 mobile medical camps with doctors, 13 relief camps, 40 ambulances, and activists clearing blocked roads, providing relief and directing traffic.178 The president of the SSP also declared that, “As you know we have been listed as an ‘especially’ banned organization… But we feel this is a disaster, which needs the efforts of all Pakistanis. Therefore, I have instructed our activists to carry out relief activities without identifying themselves.”179

The anti-US platform of religious groups is often seen as a unifying force, as seen in the large rallies held to demand the continued imprisonment and execution of presumed CIA spy Raymond Davis.181 Anti-Americanism is rife across Pakistan, and not just amongst the religious, which has complicated previous attempts at engagement have had little effect.

For example, in mid-2009, former special envoy Richard Holbrooke met with leaders of religious parties including Liaquat Baloch, leading member of JI, and Fazl ur-Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F. They met in inside the fortified US embassy compound in an attempt to dispel rumors of a large Marine presence inside the compound. Holbrooke later called the meeting the “most intellectually sustained debate I’ve ever had in this country,” but despite this optimism, Baloch and his allies took to the streets in an anti-US protest immediately after the meeting.182

Demographics, Economics, and Education

The structural forces shaping modern Pakistan compound these various political and religious tensions. Like most of the developing world, demographics are a key issue and as Figure 1.1 shows, Pakistan’s population has made massive increases since 1950, and is today more than four times larger. The rate of population growth has slowed, but the population is still estimated

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178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Reuters, “Factbox: Pakistan’s anti-American bloc.”
182 “US reaches out to Islamist parties in Pakistan,” RFE/RL, April 19, 2009. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Reaches_Out_To_Islamist_Parties_In_Pakistan/1802816.html
to nearly double between 2000 and 2030, and Pakistan’s population is projected to grow to 335 million by 2050, making it one of the world’s most populous countries.\textsuperscript{183}

Pakistan simultaneously suffers from a massive refugee population, now numbering 1.9 million people—the largest refugee population in the world according to the UNHCR—in addition to over 950,000 internally displaced peoples (IDPs). The economic impact is estimated at 710 refugees for every U.S. dollar of Pakistani per capita GDP.\textsuperscript{184}

Every aspect of Pakistani politics, governance, and stability is still shaped by Pakistan’s massive “youth bulge,” and will be for decades to come. The size of Pakistan youth as shown in \textbf{Figure 1.2} makes it clear just how much the need to create jobs and acceptable careers, governance, and social conditions for youth is critical Pakistan’s stability. The CIA estimates that Pakistan’s mean age is only around 21 years of age, and that some 2,238,000 males and 2,105,000 females will reach the age where they will enter the labor force in 2010.\textsuperscript{185} Other estimates indicate that half of its population of over 187 million is under 20 years of age, and 66 percent is under 30.\textsuperscript{186}

\textbf{Figure 1.1: Trends in Pakistan’s Population (1950–2050)}

![Graph showing population trends from 1950 to 2050 with a 81.5% increase between 2010 and 2050](source)


No nation could easily adapt to such pressures, and Pakistan has made far too little effort to try. There is sometimes good nominal growth for Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP), as estimated in PPP terms, but this kind of growth says nothing about its underlying stability. Pakistani political and business elites focus on their own wealth and privileges with little regard for the overall population, or the impact of favoritism, nepotism, and corruption. They appear insensitive to the impact of growing disparities in income distribution, the continued existence of massive semi-feudalism in the agricultural sector, and the steady growth of massive urban slums.

Pakistan does not meet the most basic needs of its youth, and—as the following analysis shows—it has failed to come to grips with a single major regional, ethnic, and sectarian problem. Reliable data on the scale of these problems is not available, and the impact of Pakistan’s massive floods in 2010 are still being felt, but the CIA estimates that even if one ignores Pakistan’s massive disparities in income distribution, its per capita income is only $2400—which ranks 179th in the world.

The CIA also estimates that the present Pakistani labor force is around 55.8% of the total population—a relatively low number for so large a population, in spite of extensive exportation of labor to regions like the Middle East. It has an unusually high percentage working in very low productivity agriculture and service jobs (agriculture: 43%, industry: 20.3%, services: 36.6% (2005 estimate).

Direct unemployment is at least 15%, and under and disguised unemployment almost certainly raise this figure closer to 30% in terms of meaningful productivity gain. At least 24% of the entire population (and probably now closer to 30%) is at or below the poverty line, and the wealthiest 10% of the population is responsible for some 27% of all domestic consumption versus less than 4% for the poorest 10%.\(^{187}\)

The Struggling Economy

The Pakistani economy was relatively robust with over 5 percent annual economic growth until the 2008 economic crisis. Since then, worsening global economic conditions, a sharp increase in food and fuel prices and a worsening security situation has negatively impacted the economy. Pakistan appears to have missed many of its main targets for fiscal year 2010, which ended on June 30, 2011. Economic growth was pegged at around 2.5 percent, well short of the 4.5 percent target, and foreign investment has fallen by over a quarter over rising security and economic worries. Any reduction in US economic and military assistance as a result of worsening relations between the two countries or delays in multilateral donor assistance will likely further compound the economic strain.

In attempting to deal with rising costs from security operations, disaster and refugee relief, economic stimulus, as well as the costs of financing the budget deficit, Pakistan has witnessed a dramatic monetary expansion, with the government borrowing a record PKR 701 billion in the first 11 months of FY2010. The IMF estimates a 4 percent budget deficit to be appropriate for Pakistan, but the FY2010–2011 budget deficit was pegged at 5.3 percent of GDP, higher than anticipated, but nonetheless lower than the previous year. A portion of this improvement is believed to be a function of record remittances from Pakistani expatriates and a 28 increase in exports.

These bright spots are not guaranteed to be sustainable. The important textile sector for example has witnessed an alarming deterioration and accounts for 60 percent of export revenues, thus may negatively impact the trade balance and the broader economy in the future. Already, despite increasing export revenues, the trade deficit is sizeable and estimated at about 15 billion rupees. Flood damage has seriously affected export industries such as cotton, while increases in imports are anticipated owing to post-flood reconstruction.

Financing the budget deficit is an important strain on the economy, as are maintaining sizeable populist subsidies, particularly for fuel. These pressures have helped contribute to rising inflation, a sharp deterioration in Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves and a depreciation of the rupee. Massive supply shocks such as the 2010 floods or a worsening security situation in the financial capital of Karachi have compounded these effects, and several sectors have witnessed drastic signs of contraction. In the cement sector for example, 80 percent of producers are estimated to have suffered losses in the last year. Inflation is a serious concern. Pakistan has made some progress towards meeting the IMF goals of improving fiscal discipline and reducing inflation below 10 percent, but it remains at 13 percent, and increasing prices, particularly of basic commodities such as food and fuel, have the potential to stir significant social and political unrest and reduce the legitimacy of the civilian government. The consumer price inflation (CPI) has increased by double-digit figures consecutively for 38 months (with one exception) and in 2011, figures provided by the Pakistani Ministry of Finance pegged food inflation at as high as 18.4 percent and non-food

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189 Ibid.
inflation at about 10 percent—a significant worry in a predominantly agrarian economy that
nonetheless relies heavily on food imports.

The poor are anticipated to bear an inordinate share of the burden of rising prices, and already
devote on average between 50 and 60 percent of their household budget on food.\footnote{Pakistan Ministry of Finance. “Inflation,” Available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/07-Inflation.pdf} It is
estimated that food-inflation of 20 percent will push an additional 7 million people below the
$1.25/day poverty line and a 30 percent rise would add 11 million people.\footnote{Pakistan Ministry of Finance. “Poverty,” Available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/13-Poverty.pdf} As a result
tightening monetary policy is difficult, particularly when factoring in the negative impacts of
rising interest rates on already high poverty and unemployment levels.

Tremendous shortfalls in electricity generation have been a major cause of economic losses and
decline in productivity. Against a peak demand of about 18,000 MW daily, Pakistani electrical
capacity is only able to provide about 13,250 MW, leaving a shortfall of almost 5000 MW
daily.\footnote{“Scale of Pakistan’s Power Outage Certain to Rouse Anger,” Punjab News Online, Available at http://goo.gl/w3MxS} As a result, electricity prices have risen sharply, and in some parts of the KPK, the
average electricity bill is believed to have risen by as much as 60 percent.\footnote{Nisar Mahmood, “Electricity becoming luxury as tariff hiked by almost 64pc,” The News, July 6, 2011. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=56227&Cat=7&dt=7/6/2011} The manufacturing
sector has been impacted severely. In Faisalabad, the backbone of the country’s important textile
sector, a 50 percent fall in production is estimated as a result of rising energy and inflation costs.
Many factories have already shut down and others operate for only a few days a week. The
Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce further estimates that as many as 100,000 people have lost
their jobs in the previous two years.\footnote{Umer Farooq, “Trouble in Pakistan’s Heartland,” AfPak Foreign Policy, June 29, 2011. Available at http://goo.gl/Jcp21}

The primary obstacle to alleviating the energy crisis has not been one of capacity, but rather an
inability for the government to effectively make payments to private producers, thanks to a
lumbering bureaucracy that impedes any reform effort. A Wikileaks cable from the US embassy
in Pakistan from 2008 detailed the complex maze of bureaucracy in Pakistan’s energy sector,
detailing how the overlapping agendas of as many as six ministries and forty two agencies make
setting, managing and reforming energy policy and the power sector virtually impossible.\footnote{Idrees Bahktiar, “Haphazard Mix of Pakistan’s Energy Bureaucracy,” Dawn, July, 6, 2011. Available at http://goo.gl/zwf6O} There are some projects in the pipeline, namely a natural gas pipeline from Iran, that could help
alleviate some of this shortfall, but chronic shortages are likely for the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, worsening relations between the Pakistani government and key external donors,
including the US and international institutions such as the IMF, raise worries on the viability of
economic recovery. Pakistan has already blamed a portion of its budget deficit on the failure of
the US to reimburse its operational military costs in a timely fashion, and further delays or even
cuts to US aid are likely over the near-term. The IMF too has expressed concern over Pakistan’s
political dysfunction and its unwillingness to undertake effective structural reform, particularly
in introducing the revised sales tax and in reversing fuel subsidies to tighten fiscal discipline. The
Fund has since delayed some tranches of its remaining $3 billion in disbursements.\footnote{Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Pakistan,” April 2011}

The weakness of the formal economy has important impacts on social and political stability. The
informal sector already provides the real means of sustenance for far too many in Pakistan, and
the inability of the civilian government to register economic improvements, namely amongst

\footnote{“Scale of Pakistan’s Power Outage Certain to Rouse Anger,” Punjab News Online, Available at http://goo.gl/w3MxS}
\footnote{Umer Farooq, “Trouble in Pakistan’s Heartland,” AfPak Foreign Policy, June 29, 2011. Available at http://goo.gl/Jcp21}
\footnote{Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Pakistan,” April 2011}
everyday commodities, has impact on alienating the population from the government, incentivizing the popularity of non-state actors such as religious radicals, and expanding the recruiting pool of young, disaffected youth without prospects for militant groups.

Educating a Nation for Failure

There is still some possibility that Pakistan’s “youth bulge” could be an opportunity to build a more prosperous and capable Pakistan, but this can only begin to occur if the growth is adequately harnessed to steady economic development, adequate education, and job creation. What is now far more likely is that a continued failure to prepare or integrate large numbers of youth into the labor market will prove catastrophic and a key source of conflict risk.

A massive and focused increase in investment in the Pakistani education system is one of the most crucial components of any successful stabilization strategy. Increased education is necessary for enhancing the political legitimacy of the civilian government, for expanding the human capital available for economic growth, and as an important tool in the counterinsurgency arsenal. At present, the education sector suffers from chronic shortfalls in access and quality, as seen in Figure 1.3 leaving a massive shortfall between education demand and government supply. Funding for education has lagged far behind need, languishing at between 2-3% of GDP, as seen in Figure 1.4, behind that of comparable regional countries.

Pakistan cannot begin to address its economic and social needs or well as move towards political stability until it first addresses the dire state of the existing educational sector. Pakistan is one of the only countries in the world where the number of illiterates is rising. Some 6.8 million of its children are out of school and only 16.8% of Pakistanis have a secondary education. Despite these chronic shortages in supply, the Pakistani demand for quality education does not seem to have abated judging from the massive increase in private-education.

Worse, Pakistan does not have an adequate base of merit-based education or employment. Corruption and nepotism in hiring are every-day phenomenon and large disparities within provinces and communities continue to exist on the basis of political, communal and ethnic biases as seen in Figure 1.5. For example, the UNDP calculated that over 50 percent of Baluchi speakers are likely to have less than four years of education, in contrast to 10 percent of Urdu speakers.

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202 Pakistan Ministry of Education, 2008
204 Ibid.
Figure 13: Key Educational Statistics


Figure 14: Education Funding (2005–2010)

Madressa Education versus Secular Failure

The importance of religious schools or madrassas, which are sometimes popularized as ‘terrorist incubators,’ must be kept in perspective. Recent studies have shown that the share of madrassas in the total Pakistani education sector is low, and while estimates vary greatly, most concur madrassas represent less than 10 percent of the education sector,205 of which only a small minority have links to violent extremists. Their importance, however, lies far more in their impact on Pakistani society and politics.

The Pakistani Ministry of Education counted 12,448 madrassas in 2008/2009, with 97% in the private sector, and a total enrollment of 1.603 million (approximately 4 percent).206 By March 2010, this number of registered madrassas had risen to 19,104.207 These are likely conservative figures as many madrassas remain unregistered and efforts to reform and regulate the sector, such as Musharraf’s 2001 Pakistani Madrassa Education Ordinance and the 2002 Dini Madrassa Ordinance, have so far achieved only marginal successes. A major stumbling block has been the government’s unwillingness to recognize the madrassa education boards. (See Figure 1.6.)

For madrassa leaders, this is a core demand to attempt to preserve some measure of their traditional

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Madrasa-government relations have improved with the civilian government, but progress remains slow. A study conducted by Brookings in the Ahmedpur district of the Punjab found that only 39 out of 363 madrassas were registered with the government and that in the same district, 13 percent of the 465 government schools were closed for lack or absence of teachers.\(^{208}\) One worrying part of this lack of regulation is regarding content of madrassa curriculums. The propagation of intolerance is the most obvious worry, but the emphasis on traditional Islamic learning risks leaving graduates without any of the skills required to engage with the modern labor market—including core skills such as reading, writing, critical thinking or exposure to the sciences.

There is also some evidence challenging the links between madrassas and direct militancy. Some analysts, including Peter Bergen, have concluded that madrassas do not contribute to anti-Western terrorism asserting that unsophisticated madrassa graduates have few of the technical or language skills that would be appropriate for the operational requirements of such attacks. Bergen’s study of the 75 terrorists implicated in the five largest attacks against Western targets in modern history, found that only 12 percent attended madrassas in contrast to 53% who had at least some university study.\(^{209}\)

Yet madrassas are undoubtedly part of the cause of the Pakistani conflict equation. It was the storming of the radical Lal Masjid mosque, and its attached madrassas in Islamabad, that ignited the insurgency. Furthermore in the tribal regions, the levels of technical sophistication required for most operations is not high, and even in Pakistani urban areas, militants can quite easily blend in, particularly amongst IDP and migrant communities. The same applies for the war in Afghanistan (or in Kashmir), and indeed large numbers of militants from the Haqqani network in North Waziristan are believed to double as madrassa students.\(^{210}\)

Small but radical fractions of the madrassa population continue to maintain close links with militant and terrorist groups, and have played a role in sectarian and anti-Western violence across Pakistan. These trends, however, do not detract from the fact that many madrassas, perhaps a large majority, have few direct associations with violence and work towards the noble purpose of attempting to provide education in areas the government has all but abandoned.

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Symptoms of a Failed State: Forcing Private as the Substitute for Public Education

Far more important than madrassas may be the government’s failure to provide an effective alternative. Government-provided public schooling continues to be of low quality, characterized by overcrowding, poor teaching quality, and low educational achievement. A metric highlighting this failure has been the astronomical growth in alternative private education. In 1983, the share of private schooling was about 3 percent; by 2008-09 it had risen to 33 percent, as seen in Figure 1.7.

This entrepreneurial reaction, mainly comprising small “mom and pop operations” and small village educational communes may have had a net positive result. It has improved access to education, with even the poorest segments of the population digging deep to participate. In Lahore for example, 37% of children in the lowest income-group attend private schools.

A study conducted by the World Bank also found that despite government teachers being paid almost five times as much, private-education significantly outperformed government counterparts whose students required as much as two and a half years to catch up. A Pakistani NGO, the LEAPS Project also had interesting observations on regulatory prospects. Much like the madrassa sector, large swathes of the private sector were wholly unregulated, yet parental ability to choose schools enhanced competition, forced minimum quality standards, and prevented the emergence of monopolistic pricing.

Pakistan has made large promises and unveiled ambitious schemes to correct this situation, but even if they work, they will come too late to help at least 20% of the present population. Neither is money a guarantor of success, but in the second half of 2009, Pakistan unveiled its National

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214 Ibid.
Education Policy, which seeks to increase educational investment from 2 to 7 percent of GDP, and the country has benefited from an influx in foreign educational aid.

A sustainable and successful policy will require a focus on outcomes, stringent monitoring and evaluation, alongside a concerted attempt to increase not just access, but also the quality and content of educational options. It will also require doing so in an equitable manner that does not inflame grievances. Balochistan for example, already home to a long-running low-intensity insurgency, suffers chronic neglect, with the worst education statistics from across the country and more than 90 percent of its rural women have no education at all, yet educational staff are often identified and resented as agents of the Punjabi-dominated state that discriminates against Balochs.

Government curriculums are also not without problems. A study by Brookings noted poor learning and citizenship skills development at government schools with only two-thirds of students able to subtract single digit numbers and a small proportion able to multiply or divide by the 3rd grade. Similarly, the study pointed to lack of relevance of schooling to the marketplace, with few graduates equipped to compete in the growing areas such as telecommunications, information technology, or financial services. The content of government textbooks also is often parochial or prejudiced, particularly pertaining to India.

More generally, mismanagement, political manipulation, and corruption are severe obstacles. ‘Ghost schools’ that exist only on paper are not uncommon and as for those schools that actually exist, many are in abysmal condition. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s 2007 report estimated that of 63,000 state schools in Punjab, 5,000 were declared dangerous, 26,000 had no electricity and 16,000 no toilets. Education reforms are also problematic given that Pakistan operates primarily on the federal structure, but district governments are primarily responsible for schooling. This creates added layers of complexity in terms of leakages to corruption as well as overcoming the opposition of landed feudal elites who remain wary of empowering the poor.

Throwing money at the problem without a focus on actual implementation, quality of effort, and matching efforts at national economic reform and job creations may end up doing little. In the 1990s, the World Bank and other international donors spent hundreds of millions of dollars in Pakistan’s educational sector with little to show for it. In fact, during the same period, enrollment for boys declined, teachers were still not hired on the basis of merit and little evidence appeared of any improved attainment standards. Without a focus on outcomes, instead of a reliance on inputs, this could repeat itself today.

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217 Winthrop and Graff, “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan.”
218 Ibid.
### Figure 17: Provincial Public-Private Breakdowns in Educational Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public/Private Split</th>
<th>Total Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FANA</td>
<td>4,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>115,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>7,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa</td>
<td>40,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>59,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>11,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>5,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>245,682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “FANA” refers to the Federally Administered Northern Areas; “ICT” refers to the Islamabad Capital Territory; “AJK” refers to Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

2. The current crisis: patterns of militancy and violence

The mix of problems that foment violence and threaten Pakistan’s stability are far more complex than can be summarized in a short introduction. It is clear from this overview, however, that the present patterns of violence in Pakistan have deep underlying causes, and that they equally clear affect the entire nation, and are not concentrated in the FATA or near the Balochi border with Afghanistan. A variety of militant groups operate across Pakistan with complex modes of interaction, with varying targeting scopes, and varying degrees of affiliation with the state.

Data on violence in Pakistan suffers from a variety of problems and may not fully capture the instability inside Pakistan. Official government figures may suffer from attempts at manipulation, while security worries and the remoteness of many areas, complicates the comprehensiveness of US and NGO reporting. Nonetheless, their data is useful in identifying important trends if not in providing definitive statistical data, and this section relies heavily on that provided by the US National Counter Terrorism Center and a non-affiliated independent Pakistani think tank, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies.

The State of Militancy

Violence in Pakistan is extensive, and has steadily escalated in recent years. 2010 has been an extremely bloody year for Pakistan as can be seen in Figure 2.1.

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 further highlight that violence in Pakistan is national. Despite the concentration of attention on the FATA and the KPK, the Baloch separatist insurgency is a significant independent source of violence. Militant attacks in the Pakistani heartland, in the Punjab, in the financial capital of Karachi, and in the rest of Sindh province, are also on the rise, with dangerous implications for Pakistani stability. There has been a significant drop off in reported attacks in the KPK in 2010, perhaps because of Pakistani military operations in the area, but it remains to be seen if these gains will be sustainable.

Figure 2.4 further examines this data to highlight the lethality of these attacks, and the distribution of casualties across the country. Attacks in the Punjab and in Karachi have been numerically lower but more lethal per attack, perhaps a function of the operational sophistication required to mount these attacks relative to attacks in the tribal Pashtun and Baloch areas.
Figure 2.1: Attacks in 2010 by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terrorist Attacks</th>
<th>Clashes between security services and militants</th>
<th>Operational attacks by security forces</th>
<th>Drone attacks</th>
<th>Border clashes</th>
<th>Ethno-Political Violence</th>
<th>Inter-tribal clashes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. of Incidents</strong></td>
<td>2113</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Killed</strong></td>
<td>2913</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2631</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Injured</strong></td>
<td>5824</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1495</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2: Militant Attack Levels by Province (2008-2010)


Figure 2.3: Density of Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan (2007–2010)


Figure 2.4: Militant Lethality by Province in 2010


Militants use a variety of weaponry to conduct their attacks, but IEDs are now believed to be the insurgent weapon of choice. Although the data provided in Figure 2.5 shows a marginal decline in the quantity of reported IED attacks between 2009 and 2010, figures provided by the ISI actually show a 145 percent increase in IED attacks in 2010 over 2007, rising from 413 incidents to 1,015.221 The rise in quantity and complexity of IEDs in Pakistan is generally seen as a result of spillover of technical expertise from Afghanistan, but ammonium nitrate, the primary explosive ingredient, is sourced domestically. In March 2010, men associated with militant groups were caught in Lahore with over 6,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate, and in 2011, the US Department of Defense stated that over 85 percent of the material used in Afghan IED attacks comes from Pakistani ammonium nitrate.222

Figure 2.5: Militant Attacks by Weapon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EXP</th>
<th>FA</th>
<th>FB/INCEN</th>
<th>GREN</th>
<th>IED</th>
<th>LM</th>
<th>MIS/ROC</th>
<th>MOR/ART</th>
<th>U/O</th>
<th>PRIM</th>
<th>TOX</th>
<th>VBIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (June)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Examining militant targets in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 makes it apparent that the brunt of violent activity in Pakistan is borne by civilians—both in terms of the human toll to innocents, as well as the intense degradation of already scarce civilian infrastructure. Poorly trained and equipped security institutions such as the police, paramilitary and private-security forces have found themselves heavily targeted, more so than the regular army. However, it is important to note that the NTC data may not fully capture the scale of violence.

221 Chris Albritton, “Improvised explosive attacks soar in Pakistan,” Reuters, July 5, 2011. Available at [http://reut.rs/kMxJII](http://reut.rs/kMxJII)
Figure 2.6: Militant Attacks by Target (Human)

Figure 2.7: Militant Attacks by Target (Facility)


Pakistan is critical for the US and NATO war-effort in Afghanistan and hosts essential transit routes to supply coalition forces. The primary routes travel through insecure regions of the FATA and Balochistan. Attacks have grown against NATO materiel traversing these routes as seen in Figure 2.8, with the majority concentrated in Balochistan.
Figure 2.8: NATO-related Attacks

The data provided makes it apparent that Pakistan is suffering from extremely high levels of violence. As the previous chapter has shown, this violence has had a wide range of causes: along religious, anti-state, sectarian, ethno-political, and criminal axes. Figure 2.9 delineates these sources of violence by groups. These groupings are not absolute and are best estimates given current trends.

Various conflicts are waged within or from Pakistan. The armed groups populating these conflicts often overlap. Some operate with single-minded focus on a certain objective, while others have hybridized their targeting scopes, often participating in several conflicts simultaneously.

The Pakistani state has varying degrees of tolerance for violent groups operating within its territory. Some groups serve Pakistani strategic interests and are afforded a high degree of tolerance; others have attacked the state, been identified as a threat, and are ruthlessly pursued. Some groups, particularly the former Kashmir-centric jihadis, may simultaneously participate in multiple conflicts that can impact Pakistani security and insecurity simultaneously. In this case, security forces are likely to attempt to delineate between factions within the organization, target those arrayed against it, and seek to split those amenable to its interests from the rest.

### Figure 2.9: Militant Groups in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confederations</th>
<th>Militant Groups</th>
<th>Targeting Scope</th>
<th>Pakistani Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) and affiliates</td>
<td>Collection of semi-autonomous regional networks across FATA under emir Hakimullah Mehsud. Constituent groups include Mehsud factions; TSNM; Lashkar-e-Islam; Wazir factions, and other local groups Affiliates include Punjabi Taliban (splinter elements of Kashmiri jihad and sectarian groups); Ghazi Force</td>
<td>Pakistani state Anti-Shia Western interests Criminal activity</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Jihadis</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda; Brigade 313; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); Lashkar-e-Taiba; Tahriki-Taliban</td>
<td>Pakistani state Western interests Indian interests Afghan interests (low capacity)</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Taliban</td>
<td>Quetta Shura Taliban (QST); Haqqani Network (HQN); Hizb-i-Islami;</td>
<td>Western interests Afghan Security Forces Criminal activity</td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian</td>
<td>Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP); Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ); al-Qaeda; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM); Sipah-e-Mohammad (SMP)</td>
<td>Anti-Shia Intra-Sunni Anti-Sufi (limited degree) Anti-Sunni (only SMP)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir Jihadis</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM); Harkat-al-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI); Harkat-al-Mujahideen (HUM)</td>
<td>Indian interests</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


### Figure 2.9: Militant Groups in Pakistan (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-political</th>
<th>Pakistani state</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baloch Separatists</td>
<td>Anti-Punjabi</td>
<td>Created by the authors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baloch Liberation Army (BLA); Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student Organization (BSO); Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican Army (BRA); Balochistan People’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberation Front (BPLF); Popular Front for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed Resistance (PFAR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muttahida (MQM); Awami National (ANP); Peoples</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PPP); Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI); Jamaat-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e-Islami (JI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three way Pashtun-Sindhi-Mohajir conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious versus Mainstream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Pashtuns are the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan and are concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province (formerly the North West Frontier Province) and the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In between them lie six ‘Frontier Regions,’ providing a buffer between the ‘settled’ KPK from the tribal FATA. There is also a significant Pashtun migrant population inside the Punjab and the Sindh, particularly in Karachi.

The KPK marks the beginning of Pakistan’s periphery, and exemplifies the various ills affecting Pakistan. The KPK has been under-developed, under-policed and mismanaged, which many Pashtuns perceive to be as a result of historical discrimination leveled against them by a Punjabi-Mohajir alliance that dominates the government, the bureaucracy, and civil-sector. Pashtun nationalism is feared by the Pakistani state for its separatist potential, and security planners have often used religious radicals to hedge against its rise. The Pashtuns of the KPK are however not nearly as alienated or excluded from the state as other minority groups such as the Baloch, and many enjoy high positions within the government.

Some aspects of the FATA are little changed from colonial times. It has never been integrated into the Pakistani mainstream and colonial forms of governance and law enforcement serve as administrative mechanisms. National identity is weak, with many FATA Pashtuns looking to their kin across the border in Afghanistan, instead of towards Islamabad.

Tribal identity is strong, and if were it not for the Durand Line and a smattering of border outposts, it would be impossible to tell where Pakistan ends and Afghanistan begins. Tribes are represented on both sides of the border, and show little regard for its formal niceties, resulting in largely unmonitored flows of people and goods. The FATA is strategically located as the launch pad for Pakistani influence into Afghanistan, and the Pakistani security establishment resents any domestic or external intrusion into its affairs in the area.

The region is awash in arms from nearly three decades of unremitting war. In the wake of the 2001 US-led invasion it has also hosted an exodus of Taliban militants fleeing US forces. Many have since recuperated, and used the FATA as a rear staging area, and as sanctuary for their key command nodes.

Moreover, the aftermath of Islamabad’s storming of the Lal Maşjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in 2007 catalyzed a domestic insurgency that is now manifested in a war against all symbols of the Pakistani state,. The insurgency has spread rapidly across the KPK, and now includes high-profile terrorist attacks in the urban centers of the interior. By 2008-09, militants had gained unprecedented territorial control across the FATA and the KPK, although since then Pakistani military offensives have blunted, and in some cases, reversed militant momentum. Various other groups, including transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, continue to find refuge in the ungoverned spaces of the FATA.
A Shattered Political and Economic Landscape

Political and economic factors have been critical drivers of resentment and conflict in the Pashtun belt, particularly inside the FATA. Under the conventions of the Frontier Crimes Legislation (FCR) of 1901 and Articles 246 and 247 of the state’s constitution, the Pashtuns of the FATA are essentially some of the last subjects of colonialism. FATA residents are disenfranchised from the bureaucratic, legal, and judicial conventions of the rest of Pakistan and ‘Political Agents (PA),’ senior civilian bureaucrats wield inordinate judicial and executive power. PAs are vested with large unaudited pools of money to secure tribal loyalties and no regulatory mechanism exists to check their power. The courts cannot challenge their orders, and they are under no requirement to obey the recommendations of tribal jirgas.

 Administrative Systems

Under the “nikat” system, hereditary tribal maliks (elders) have been selected and employed as intermediaries and funds and resources are channeled through them from the PAs. Theoretically designed to represent and advocate for their tribes, maliks are not always well perceived by their tribesmen, and many see them as servile and corrupt with all the trappings of feudal overlords.

The archaic nature of the ‘nikat’ system compounds these problems and resource shares have rarely changed, sometimes for almost a century. In South Waziristan for example, despite the proportions of Mehsud and Wazir tribesmen largely leveling out by the end of the century, the Mehsuds continue to receive some 75% of resources and development funds as per the demographic patterns of almost a century ago.

This top-down decision-making structure has failed to include democratic inputs from tribes, and fostered patronage networks and clientelism. The system has been further undermined by the growing independence of mullahs (religious leaders) since the 1970s. Traditionally mullahs were subservient to the maliks, depending on them for income and protection, but since the Soviet jihad and the influx of Wahabbist petrodollars from the Gulf, they have grown to become an increasingly independent source of power.

The FCR, which began as a tool of colonial subjugation, has various other provisions that deny FATA residents the basic rights of other Pakistanis. These include the lack of any semblance of an independent judiciary, leading a lawyer to proclaim that the system permits “no wakeel (lawyer), no daleel (argument) and no appeal.” The FCR permits the use of collective punishment as a law enforcement mechanism, in violation of both the Geneva Convention and

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226 Ibid.


228 Ibid.

229 Ibid.

230 Ibid.

231 Ibid.
the Pakistani constitution. Punishments meted out can range from blockades, demolitions of houses and villages as well as fines, all of which can be invoked with little, if any, oversight.

In May 2008 for example, army bulldozers and demolition teams systematically destroyed the town of Spinkai during Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan in retribution for the supposed harboring of militants, including its bazaars, hospital, shops, and petrol station. Brigadier Ali Abbas claimed this was lenient saying, “As per the frontier crimes regulations, I should have destroyed everyone’s house but I didn’t. Call it my weakness. Call it kindness.” Similarly, journalist Imtiaz Gul recounts an anecdote, where a Political Agent demanded US$178,000 in payment for a militant attack on the phone system. The fee was later negotiated down to US$12,000, but nonetheless constituted a hefty sum. Such severe punishments are particularly resented today, when communities often have little control over the actions of militants.

A political vacuum further undermines any representation of FATA residents. Political parties are legally banned; there is no representation at the provincial level and the limited representation in the federal National Assembly is little more than a façade since acts of Parliament are not recognized in the FATA without direct Presidential approval.

The Weakening of Traditional Structures

Trends in the neighboring KPK have helped empower militants at the expense of traditional governance structure. During 2002-2008, the KPK was governed by a religious coalition, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which is a collection of five major Islamist parties, most, if not all of which have links to militant groups. Rising on a platform that promised to eradicate nepotism, corruption, and incompetence, MMA rule was marked by a continuation of all three, and focused instead on restricting civil liberties and Islamizing the public sphere. The most notorious of its edicts were in the 2005 Hisba Bill, which amounted to a strict implementation of sharia across the KPK.

The Musharraf government tolerated the MMA and its various agendas in exchange for a captive voting bloc to legitimize his military government. The MMA showed little inclination to tackle growing radicalism in the KPK, and largely turned a blind eye to the Talibanization of the province, and the neighboring FATA. The end result was that Taliban militants increasingly found space within the KPK to operate, dramatically increasing their presence, both through terrorist attacks such as the June 2009 attack on the Pearl Intercontinental Hotel in Peshawar, and through indirect control of vast swathes of territory, such as the TTP control of large parts of the KPK’s Malakand Division in 2008.

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233 Ibid.


235 Haider, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Tribal Belt.


238 Ibid.

239 Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal.”

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The convergence of these trends has helped ‘tribal entrepreneurs’ in the Taliban to challenge the existing structure. In a concerted campaign, Taliban militants had killed at least 600 maliks by 2009, and forced many others into hiding, all but uprooting the traditional tribal structure. Many maliks remain reluctant to return in spite of Pakistani military operations inside the FATA, sometimes for good reason. One malik for the Mamond tribe was assassinated on his way to a meeting with the Prime Minister in July 2008, and a Time Magazine article details how, even after a robust offensive in South Waziristan and the assurances of the army, a group of maliks from the Mehsud tribe arrived at the office of COAS Kayani in a car with blacked out windows to prevent the Taliban from identifying them.

The Taliban assault has been successful in large part because its narrative has harnessed elements of class struggle. Pitting the “kashars” (the young, poor with minor lineages) against the “mashars” (the privileged), they have successfully depicted the agent-malik nexus as a predatory and privileged class unto themselves.

They have also benefited from the fact that the tribal system has been in decline since the 1970s with elders increasingly losing ground to new generations of young and brash militants. Such trends are not surprising given the pressures of near constant war, and the accompanying waves of drug money and advanced small arms into the region for several decades. Additionally, the entrance of the Army and its direct dealings with tribes and militants has further undermined the legitimacy and relevance of local maliks.

Chronic Underdevelopment

Class divides are exacerbated by the chronic underdevelopment of the FATA, making it an easy recruiting ground for militant and criminal groups. On virtually all human-development metrics, the FATA ranks well below neighboring KPK and the rest of Pakistan, as can be seen in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. Some 60% of the population is below the poverty line, while the education and health sectors can best be described as abysmal. Literacy rates lie well below the national average and female literacy in particular languishes at a mere 3 percent.

Significant discrepancies exist between agencies. For example, the Upper Dir, a hotbed of militancy in the FATA, has a population-hospital bed ratio of 6909 compared to 550 for Peshawar, the KPK capital. Much of this underdevelopment has been due to the historical

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244 Nawaz and Bochgrave, FATA: A Most Dangerous Place.
246 Farooq, Mirahmedi, and Ziad, “Developing FATA.”
under-allocation of development resources to the region, although there has been a significant increase in funding allocations in recent years. Figure 3.4 shows funds have risen from 1.18 billion rupees in FY2001–2002 to 15 billion rupees allocated for FY2010–2011. Both the US and Pakistan have identified the communications sector as a critical sector to help counter extremist voices inside the FATA, and it has seen a major expansion of funding allocations

Such increases are immensely positive trends but may still be inadequate. The 6.6 billion rupees in funding allocated for 2008 represented a per capita investment of 905 rupees per person compared to the Pakistani average of 2,044 rupees, thus the present investment may only lift the FATA to parity with the rest of the country. Inputs alone are no guarantor of success, and given decades of chronic underinvestment, any development strategy will require a sustained period of commitment.

Gainful employment opportunities are scarce, forcing a substantial portion of the population to migrate to Pakistan’s more settled areas or to the Gulf, or rely upon the criminal and parallel economies to survive. In 2007, the official unemployment rate was around 25%, although the real number is likely much higher. Subsistence agriculture that has held together other impoverished parts of South Asia is difficult at best in the FATA’s terrain. Only 18 percent of land available for cultivation, of which only 44% is irrigated. As a result 44 people farm every irrigated hectare, compared to the national average of 9.

The little industry that exists inside the FATA has come under significant strain in recent years. A recent government study estimated that of all business closures between 1987 and 2009, 67.03% occurred within the militancy prone years of 2007-2009. Problems facing industries have included a severe deterioration of law and order, unavailability of sustainable sources of raw materials or skilled labor, frequent power breakdowns, problems in acquiring credit, lack of legal protections and high transportation costs. A few examples emphasize these challenges: only 0.94% of businessmen in the FATA were able to acquire bank loans, over 42% of the workforce is estimated to be illiterate and over 92% of workers had no skills when they started working.

Today, the FATA remains a precarious state, with little forward progress on essential reforms, and despite various promises remains in an ambiguous political state. Various politicians including President Zardari have promised to reform the FCR, curtail the power of PAs, and allow political parties to function, although to date little, if any, progress has been made.

Pakistani military operations, no matter how robust, cannot tackle these underlying causes of militancy and can provide little more than a temporary stopgap. Similarly an influx of development activity through the present structure, while welcome, will be channeled through

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254 Ibid.
the maliks. This may do little more than benefit a small number of politically connected and influential elites who already dominate the official economy and can control who benefits from new inputs. Furthermore the overbearing focus on inputs is not ideal. In an illustration of its inadequacies, the FATA actually has a better student-to-teacher ratio of 31:1, when compared with the rest of Pakistan and its 47:1.256 Yet, the quality of education remains much lower.

Reform will require combating the entrenched interests of powerful powerbrokers, including the civilian bureaucrats and local elites who benefit from the status quo, and also the military which is averse to any civilian oversight over the strategically important area. Furthermore, the social dynamics of the FATA themselves cannot be discounted including the conservatism of tribes and their deeply held (and often accurate) suspicions of interventions from the center being little more than Punjabi attempts to further control over the Pashtuns.

A recent assessment by the New America Foundation polled FATA residents on issues that were “very important” to them, and found that FATA residents overwhelmingly identified human services; 81.4% identified lack of jobs, 67.3% cited lack of schools and education, 70.8% lack of roads and good transportation and 70% cited poor healthcare.

In contrast, only 60% cited the U.S. drone program as “very important.”257 Similarly when asked about future strategies, human development investments such as new jobs (90%), building new schools (80.3%), improving healthcare (82.3%), and improving the economy (82.9%) significantly outpolled security issues such as defeating Taliban fighters (52.3%) or expelling foreign fighters (58.9%).258 Even in controversial social arenas such as female education, 61.3% of those polled thought building new government schools for girls was “very important.”259

258 Ibid.
259 Ibid.
Figure 3.1: Literacy Rates

Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance; FATA Secretariat.

Figure 3.2: Educational Enrollment

Source: FATA Secretariat; Government of NWFP; Pakistan Ministry of Education.
Figure 3.3: Population per Hospital Bed

![Population per Hospital Bed](image)


Figure 3.4: Annual Development Program (ADP) Funding Allocation for FATA (in PKR billions)

![Annual Development Program (ADP) Funding Allocation for FATA](image)

The Militant Landscape

The militant landscape in the Pashtun belt is diverse and dynamic, and incorporates at least three major militant groups and alliances, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, and transnational outfits. The large number of actual sub-groupings within these conglomerations renders it virtually impossible to adequately illuminate every local dyadic conflict. Rather the aim is to highlight and expose the trends in how groups interact and the many variables that affect their relationships. Militancy in the FATA, as in Afghanistan, is a “complex adaptive system,” i.e. one with multiple interconnected elements that change and adapt, with opportunism and overlapping interests often informing collaboration.

Several separate but overlapping conflicts are taking place on various axes; and are playing out on international, regional and domestic planes; they include a global jihad by groups such as al-Qaeda, regionally focused jihads in Afghanistan and Kashmir and various domestic wars including religious struggles to replace local cultures and traditions with hardline Deobandi tenets, a sectarian war pitting Sunnis against Shias, and an entrenched militant-criminal nexus that is not a war in the strict sense, but is a key driver for all the above.

A diverse array of militant and terrorist groups have emerged and grown inside the FATA and the KPK. Some groups are focused solely on one war, others are engaged in multiple struggles, and nearly all use criminal activities to fund operations. Opportunism and overlapping interests often shape cooperation, while tribal identities, their leadership abilities, and historical relations with the Pakistani state or other militant groups, can all complicate or facilitate their interactions. Most groups have distinct agendas that they prioritize above others, and cooperation is often predicated on advancing these objectives, but priorities may change with time and experience.

The vast majority of groups adhere to hardline Deobandi and extremist puritanical tenets, which help inform and guide their actions. Groups operating inside the tribal belt include the “Pakistani Taliban” and “Afghan Taliban” conglomerations along with a host of other smaller militants who can operate independently, embed fully, or selectively cooperate with the larger conglomerations for specific purposes. They can be force multipliers for certain missions, ideological guides, operational facilitators or mediators, or a combination of the above. Other militant groups may be little more than criminals in militant garb, using a militant “brand” for power.

In broader context, the differences between groups may be declining in importance because of growing convergence and radicalization of groups as a result of their associations inside the FATA. Terrorism expert Steven Tankel offers some instructive analysis, noting that “the more entrenched Lashkar becomes in the NWFP/FATA, the more robust these connections and collaborations become.” His comments allude specifically to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), but have broader applicability, particularly for groups that have entered the FATA in more recent years.

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The Pakistani Taliban and Local Affiliates

The Pakistani Taliban, or the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is a key threat to Pakistan’s stability. Its reach has vastly expanded since 2007, and despite fairly robust recent military offensives, it remains a potent force that is able to displace and resurrect quite rapidly. The TTP is essentially a conglomerate of various local networks that simultaneously cooperate and compete with each other and its presence is manifested in different ways. Depending on local conditions, these can include anti-state violence, inter-tribal warfare, sectarian violence, support or participation in the Afghan jihad, and even simply criminal warlordism.

The charismatic militant leader Beitullah Mehsud created the TTP in 2007, organizing it around a 40 personal council with representatives from all seven agencies of the FATA, and several districts of the NWFP.262 The Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan has been a key leadership node, spawning both emirs—Beitullah, and his successor Hakimullah Mehsud—as well as senior commanders such as Waliur Rehman and Qari Hussain Mehsud.263

Initially Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a senior Taliban commander of the Uthumai Wazir tribe in North Waziristan, was nominated as second-in-command, but in an example of the shifts in militant relationships, he has increasingly moved his organization away from the Mehsuds to prioritize his war in Afghanistan.264 In conjunction with Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan Gul Bahadur has also formed a rival counterbalancing faction called the Muqami Tehrik-i-Taliban (Local Taliban).265

Known as a pragmatist, Gul Bahadur has diverged from Mehsud TTP strategy and forged complex relationships with a variety of actors. He has opposed battling Pakistani troops, yet occasionally mounted attacks such as that on a military convoy in 2009.266 Similarly, he has signed peace deals with the Pakistani military, yet allowed Mehsud fighters to displace into his territory while fleeing Pakistani military operations in other agencies.267 Other internal schisms within the TTP are often more violent and less nuanced. In June 2011, against reports of alleged TTP infighting, an unknown attacker killed Shakirullah Shakir, a key TTP figure and a spokesperson for the group’s suicide-bombing squad, the Fidayeen-e-Islam group.268

267 Ibid.
Overall, however, the TTP has displayed more continuity than change. Its primarily domestic agenda has made it a key powerbroker in the FATA, emerging in terrain where once only the government and the tribes existed. Today both are on the retreat, as the TTP moves to replace the local tribal, cultural and administrative codes with its own religious one, all but destroying the traditional jirga system with a systematic campaign of assassination against tribal maliks.

The TTP has often used dysfunctional local governance as a recruiting tool. It has offered a system based on sharia as an alternative model, and has benefited from parallel sharia courts and inter-tribal conflict resolution mechanisms that are seen as more effective than their government counterparts. The TSNM, a TTP constituent in the Malakand Division of the KPK, rose in large part due to these reasons. Similarly in Mohmand in 2008, the TTP resolved a dispute between different clans of the Safi tribe, which the government’s FATA Development Authority had been unable to achieve.269 In this case such resolution gave the TTP local prestige as well as partial control over a major quarry in the area.

In other agencies, particularly the Khyber where Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) is prominent, the overall militant presence is manifested in ways that resemble criminal warlordism. Bagh has portrayed his struggle in class terms and attacked industrialists and other affluent communities and preys on vulnerable minority communities. The LeI is known to levy jizya (tax) upon the minority Sikh and Christian community in Khyber, and punish non-payments with kidnappings and death. The group continues to maintain influence in settled areas of the Khyber despite multiple Pakistani military operations in the region, although its reach has

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This criminality is not surprising as parochial interests, arising from local conditions motivate many sub-networks within the TTP. These can include marginalized tribes seeking to expand their influence or simply men attempting to rectify social and economic inequalities. Bagh’s group itself is instructive in both instances; the LeI draws strength mainly from the Sipah sub-clan, the least influential of the Afridi tribe, while Bagh himself was a bus driver before he was a commander.

Not only do many Taliban militants come from poor socio-economic backgrounds, Faiysal Ali Khan, the founder of an NGO in the KPK also points to their average ages, and notes that, “there is no militant leader over 30 or 35-years-old, and their foot soldiers are even younger.” The madrassa sector, which militants have helped expand, is also particularly unregulated in the FATA, and is believed to be a key driver for recruitment.

Other smaller groups that are not native to the FATA have begun to gravitate towards the tribal areas, seeing ideological similarity with the TTP, as well as seeking enhanced support to conduct their own core objectives, such as sectarian war. The Punjabi Taliban are the best known, and are composed of members of several state-supported Kashmiri jihadi groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), as well as sectarian outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).

All these groups have participated in sectarian violence in Kurram and other agencies. With their enhanced operational expertise, these groups, the LeJ in particular, have been force multipliers for the TTP, helping expand its reach into major urban centers. The Punjabi Taliban has been implicated with several of the most high-profile TTP attacks including the siege of PAKMIL’s GHQ in Rawalpindi in 2009, and an attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore in 2010, to name but a few.

Others, such as the Ghazi Force, are less well known. The Ghazi Force is composed of relatives of individuals killed in the Pakistani storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid in 2007, and is motivated by its sectarian inclinations and its desire for revenge. Largely headquartered in Orakzai, it is believed to have a close working relationship with Hakimullah Mehsud’s faction in

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270 Naveed Hussain, “Khyber Agency: This is Bara, the town that militancy ruined,” Express Tribune, July 6, 2011. Available at http://bit.ly/qfQ3Xm
the TTP, and has mounted several attacks in 2009, including a suicide bombing in June on an office of the World Health Organization.\(^{278}\)

Nicholas Schmidle, an expert on Pakistan who has close knowledge of the Ghazi Force expounds on the radicalization effect that comes with militant associations, noting that its former leader killed in during the storming of the Lal Masjid “was not a suicidal dude” but had “built up the jihad… and surrounded himself with some bad-ass fighters from Pakistan's most elite jihadi organizations, that when it came down to the final showdown, he left no room for himself to back down.”\(^{279}\)

More recently the TTP has more vigorously participated in sectarian violence against Shias, which may have resulted in as many as 22,000 people being killed between 1999 and 2009, according to statistics collected by the WHO.\(^{280}\) Some aspects of this violence provide an example of personality driving conflicts; sectarian war grew with the rise of Hakimullah Mehsud as the new emir of the TTP, after his predecessor Beitullah was killed in a drone strike in 2009. Hakimullah’s distaste for Shias\(^{281}\) translated into escalated sectarian violence, particularly in Kurram and Orakzai agencies, which have large Shia populations and have become the focal point for sectarian struggle. Nine mini-wars have been waged since 2001 and in Kurram over 2,000-3,000 people have been killed and over 3,500 wounded in the last four years.\(^{282}\)

The conflict has been made worse by tribal dynamics. The Shias in Kurram belong to the Turi tribe that has historically warred with the Sunni Mangal and Bangash tribes in the region, who grew in power in recent years with the influx of militants displacing from other provinces.\(^{283}\) The Turis have also compounded their apostasy in Sunni Taliban eyes by their historical decisions, including refusing to participate in the Soviet jihad in the 1980s and then again refusing shelter to fleeing Taliban fighters after the U.S. invasion in 2001.\(^{284}\) The Turis also sit astride strategically vital territory, particularly the Bodki-Kharlachi border crossing into Afghanistan that is only 50 kilometers from Kabul.\(^{285}\)

The Haqqani network is believed to covet this route and was reported to have brokered a truce between Sunnis and Shias, presumably to help facilitate transit across Turi lands.\(^{286}\) The truce is a good example of how groups prioritize their conflicts and relationships. The Haqqanis have


\(^{279}\) Russ Wellen, “The Red Mosque was Pakistan’s Waco,” FPIF, July 2, 2010. Available at http://www.fpif.org/blog/the_red_mosque_was_pakistans_waco


\(^{283}\) See “Tribes in FATA,” Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School. Available at http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Pakistan_Index.html, last accessed 4/22/2011


never demonstrated any particular warmth towards Shias, but Turi territory is a strategically vital intersection between Loya Paktiya and North Waziristan, and a viable alternative for the Haqqanis who find themselves being pressured around their traditional routes.

Kurram, however, is just one of many local sectarian dyadic conflicts within the FATA and KPK. Sectarian war has raged in various other agencies too, notably Khyber and the Frontier Regions of Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu and Kohat. Neither has this violence been restricted to Shias. In the Khyber, Lashkar-e-Islam, which subscribes to Deobandi religious interpretations, has waged intra-Sunni struggle with the Ansar-ul-Islam, a competing Bareli group. The violence has killed many, and caused serious population displacement and economic damage.

Sufi shrines have also been attacked marking another unprecedented shift in the militant calculus. The first recorded attack occurred in March 2008 on the 400-year-old shrine of Hazrat Abu Saeed Baba in the outskirts of Peshawar, and was followed by several others in Hangu, Nowshera, and Buner in the KPK, as well as three major attacks in 2010, in Lahore, central Punjab, and Karachi. In April 2011, the TTP bombers attacked a Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan killing over 50, the largest such attack.

The TTP has various ties to the Afghan jihad. Various militant leaders within the conglomeration such as Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir prioritize Afghanistan, some fighters may double between the two wars, while other networks contribute largely through attacks on NATO supply convoys, although this may as profit-driven as ideological. They have also forged links with other Afghan-oriented foreign militants such as the IMU, although this particular alliance may have been driven more by the personal relationships between Beitullah Mehsud and then IMU leader Tohir Yuldashev, than any concerted strategic decision.

This alliance appears to have broken, with the death of Mehsud and Yuldashev, and the expulsion of the IMU from South Waziristan by the Wazirs, but close relationships with other global jihadists such al-Qaeda continue. It is reported that in 2008, TTP emir Beitullah Mehsud with al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, a move that may have incentivized the US drone strike that killed Mehsud. TTP rhetoric has grown increasingly transnational, and cooperation with al-Qaeda is believed to have facilitated the TTP’s first foray into the global jihad with the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate a homemade explosive device in New York’s Times Square in May 2010. Daniel Benjamin, the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counter-terrorism assessed that the “TTP draws ideological guidance from al-Qaida while al-Qaeda relies on the TTP for safe haven.”

288 Ibid
292 “Pakistani officials knew about Beitullah, Zawahiri meeting,” Express Tribune, July 18, 2011.
The TTP remains operationally prolific and proficient. Attacks mounted under its aegis continue to be almost daily occurrences and the organization has mounted several high profile and complex attacks purportedly in revenge for the killing of Bin Laden. In the wake of the raid, the TTP has accused the government of complicity in the attack and issued a statement elevating Pakistan to “number one enemy,” now ahead of even the US itself.295 A recent TTP attack on a paramilitary academy in the KPK killed about 80 people, most recruits, in one of the most lethal attacks against security forces to date.296

In mid-2011, there have increasing reports of cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in remote areas of the FATA, a new trend, and one that has been met with a strong Pakistani army response. In the period of a month between June and July, at least seven attacks were reported—many large, coordinated attacks. In mid-May more than 100 militants attacked a checkpoint in Khyber in mid-May.297 A few weeks later about 200 militants crossed over from Afghanistan to attack a security check post in Dir.298 and in early July, 300 militants were reported attacking a checkpoint in Bajaur. Pakistani military officials claim 56 members of the security forces were killed in these attacks, and 81 injured—although independent verification is impossible.299 Pakistani officials have claimed the involvement of both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban, but an Afghan Taliban spokesman denied any participation by its members.300

In response to these attacks, the Pakistani military has shelled cross-border positions in Afghanistan in Kunar, Nangahar and Ghosht. Afghan officials have claimed that over 800 artillery rounds have been fired, and over 40 Afghan civilians killed, a matter that has angered senior Afghan defense officials, resulted in several anti-Pakistani demonstrations, despite which President Karzai has declared that Afghanistan would not retaliate.301 Pakistan has also mounted a new offensive in the central areas of Kurram to close a major supply and escape route for militant fighters between North Waziristan and Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban

The Afghan nationalists of the “Afghan Taliban” are quite distinct from the Pakistani Taliban, primarily in that they have disavowed attacks against or inside Pakistan, are by and large focused solely on Afghanistan, and are believed to work in concert with Pakistani grand strategy. It is a matter of great contention the extent to which they receive tangible support from Pakistani intelligence services. Formally the Taliban are led by Mullah Omar, under the command of the Rahbari Shura, more commonly known as the Quetta Shura, in reference to the Baloch capital where many senior Taliban leaders are believed to be hiding. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) is believed to primarily operate in Balochistan, but maintains influence across the FATA.

295 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan has a price to pay,” Asia Times, May 4, 2011. Available at http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME04D003.html
298 “About 200 launch cross-border attack on Pakistan post,” Reuters, June 1, 2011. Available at http://reut.rs/kCFhkh
On the face of it, the QST is at the center of the militant universe. Their leader Mullah Omar is the Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) to many militants and nearly all groups, Afghan and Pakistani and transnational groups such as al-Qaeda swear at least superficial allegiance to his command.\textsuperscript{302} His continuing relevance may be illustrated in the fact that in his eulogy to Bin Laden, the new al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri pledged bayaaah (an oath of allegiance) to Mullah Omar.\textsuperscript{303} Some analysts also believe that the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are closely operationally aligned, “Siamese twins… two heads of the same body,”\textsuperscript{368} which may be accurate to the extent that both groups operate autonomously, yet collaborate when their needs dictate. More precisely, however, Mullah Omar himself is likely more an arbitrator between the disparate networks that subscribe to his authority, than a hierarchical leader.

The QST has also been attempting to brand itself as a legitimate alternative to the government of Hamid Karzai, and has repeatedly stated, most recently in January 2011, that it is a “responsible force” that wants to “assure all regional countries that we will maintain good relations with them… following our independence.”\textsuperscript{305} Such rhetoric has put it at odds with other militant groups who are less careful in their targeting.

The QST is believed to continue to derive support from at least some elements of the Pakistani intelligence services. Analysts are divided on the extent --- some such as Matt Waldman indicate collaboration of “astonishing magnitude,” including direct representation on the highest Taliban command echelons and the extensive provision of funding, munitions, supplies and sanctuary.\textsuperscript{306} Regardless of the veracity of this information, it is clear that “Afghan Taliban” groups and Pakistan’s invisible establishment share a symbiotic relationship that is founded on mutual benefit. Reciprocity for sanctuary and supplies is believed to center on assistance in containing Indian influence in Afghanistan and ensuring Pakistani dominance.

By and large Afghan Taliban groups are not native to the FATA; the QST is also known as the Kandahari Taliban since its center of gravity is in Kandahar,\textsuperscript{307} while its affiliate, the Haqqani network hails from the Afghan Zadran tribe in Loya Paktiya.\textsuperscript{308} Both use their Pakistani strongholds most importantly as sanctuary for key command nodes and as rear staging areas. Pakistan’s sprawling Afghan refugee camps (particularly in Balochistan) also provide fertile recruiting ground.

Over the past three decades, Afghan militants have increasingly become permanent fixtures in the FATA, operating under the codes of Pashtunwali that dictate sanctuary to all who ask, as well as because of the prestige they accumulated in the jihadi universe from operations against both


\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.
The Soviets and Western forces today. They have grown intertwined into local structures through decades of interactions inside the FATA, but nonetheless remain a largely alien force.

Despite most Pakistani militants also pledging allegiance to the Afghan jihad, the QST’s influence over Pakistani militants such as the Pakistani Taliban may be limited. By all accounts, the TTP’s war against the Pakistani state is seen as an unnecessary distraction by those focused solely on the war in Afghanistan, and growing TTP autonomy may have helped strain relations. Recently for example, Mullah Omar issued a personal call to release Colonel Imam, a former member of the ISI who helped organize mujahideen forces and train Omar himself in the 1980s, being held by Hakimullah Mehsud, the new the emir of the Pakistani Taliban. Despite this appeal, a few months later Mehsud appeared on a video to personally order and oversee the execution of Imam.

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, is a constituent member of the “Afghan Taliban,” and is at the heart of the Afghan jihad, particularly in southeastern Afghanistan in the provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost and its Pakistani base in North Waziristan. The group has some of the closest links with transnational jihadists, including al-Qaeda, and occupies strategically favorable territory, including the shortest route to Kabul from Pakistan, and several major supply routes between the two countries, American officials regard the network as one of the most proficient and dangerous in the region, and the Haqqanis are believed to draw from a manpower pool of about 10,000-15,000 fighters on both sides of the border. As a result of the Haqqani’s centrality to regional conflict, it has been subjected to an intense series of strike by American Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), or “drones.”

Haqqani leaders, notably patriarch Jalaluddin, and his son and current operational commander Sirajuddin, are widely respected in the militant universe and have close links to the Pakistani state. Jalaluddin was regarded as one the ISI’s most favored field commanders and received privileged access to material and operational support. Captured battlefield communications between the ISI and Haqqani commanders detail extensive support, including assistance, money, intelligence and equipment during the Soviet period, at least some of which is believed to continue. Senior US officials often allege Pakistan’s duplicity, or at the very least indifference, to containing and combating Haqqani forces in North Waziristan, and most recently, twice in June, four Haqqani bomb-making labs were evacuated shortly after the US notified Pakistani security forces of their existence.

313 Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “Inside Pakistan’s Tribal Frontier.”
The Haqqanis pursue a “strategy of extreme pragmatism” demonstrating an enduring “ability and willingness to work with a wide variety of leaders, parties and foreign supporters,” according to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Drawing from diverse data sources, including captured Haqqani battlefield communications, the report elaborated on the Haqqani’s “nexus position” and their provision of “services or other items of value that suit the interests of its local, regional and global partners.” For different militant groups this can include battlefield access, sanctuary, mediation of inter-militant disputes or operational support, whereas for the Pakistani state it offers a valuable strike force to contain Indian influence in Afghanistan.

The Haqqanis also employed one of the most diverse assortments of cadres during the Soviet jihad and today continue to maintain links to many international and regional jihadists, including al-Qaeda, the IMU, the TTP, the LeT, the SSP, and the LeJ. They have, also, maintained their relations with the Pakistani state and have conscientiously avoided any direct association with international terrorism or attacks inside Pakistan. Such diverse relationships have made the Haqqanis effective interlocutors between militant groups, and between militants and the state. They also enjoy legitimacy in militant circles through an impressive historical record of battlefield success, particularly the captures of Khost and Gardez in 1991, victories that facilitated the fall of the Najibullah regime and the Taliban capture of Kabul, as well as some of the fiercest resistance against the US and ISAF presence.

The Haqqanis are formally a part of the Afghan Taliban under the command of Mullah Omar. Haqqani leaders have resolutely stated that they fully submit to Omar’s diktats, but in reality the group operates with considerable autonomy within the network. The Haqqanis have primary influence across large areas of southeastern Afghanistan, operate a separate command network called the Miram Shah Shura, and help ‘nationalize’ the QST brand by making them more than just a Kandahari movement. Furthermore, in areas where the influence of the QST and the Haqqanis overlap such as Logar province, they compete for influence.

On certain occasions, the Haqqanis have mounted attacks that contravene official Afghan Taliban (i.e. QST) rules of engagement and strategy, including an attack on a UN guesthouse in 2009. After the American invasion, even as Mullah Omar’s Taliban have sought to distance themselves from transnational terrorist groups to gain international and regional legitimacy, the Haqqanis are believed to have continued, and in some instances even expanded, their relationships.

By virtue of the clan’s prominent position in regional conflict over many decades, the Haqqanis have played a vital role in shaping the dynamics of militancy in Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas. Various leaders of Islamist militant movements across the world got their first taste of combat alongside Haqqani forces, and the CTC report precisely identified the vital role of the Haqqanis in shaping an “operational ‘glolocalization’ of conflict […] creating the space and context for al-Qa’ida and other fighters to inter-mingle and be influenced by one another,” and thereby facilitating an ideological convergence between transnational and regional jihadis.

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318 Gopal, Mahsud, and Fishman, “Inside Pakistan’s Tribal Frontier.”
These relationships also help explain why most foreign jihadis fled to Haqqani sanctuaries in North Waziristan after the US invasion, and not the Taliban’s in Balochistan.\(^\text{321}\)

Al-Qaeda in particular has had a long relationship with the Haqqanis dating back to the Soviet jihad. The first camps established by Bin Laden in Afghanistan were in Paktia along Haqqani supply lines and core operating areas, and many men who would later become senior al-Qaeda figures fought alongside the Haqqanis. In more recent times, before 9/11 as reported relations between Bin Laden and Mullah Omar grew more strained, Haqqani autonomy in Loya Paktiya came to be increasingly important for al-Qaeda’s freedom of action. After the American invasion, Haqqani support was important in facilitating the al-Qaeda exodus from Afghanistan, as seen in the 2001 death of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s wife, who was killed in a US airstrike on a Haqqani safe-house.\(^\text{322}\)

Today, the Haqqanis share a symbiotic relationship with Al-Qaeda, exchanging shelter for resources, including access to Gulf funding networks, links to other militant organizations, training, and personnel.\(^\text{323}\) This symbiosis may have increased in recent years due to the influence of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is regarded as more ideologically inclined towards global jihadists than his father.\(^\text{324}\) In July 2008, Muhammed Omar Haqqani, the 18-year old son of Jalaluddin and brother of Sirajuddin was killed alongside a senior al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan. As the CTC report points out this is another indicator of continuing relations as “Jalaluddin Haqqani would not let his son fight with just anybody; Abu-Hasan al-Sa’idi [the AQ leader] was a trusted confidant.”\(^\text{325}\) A study of al-Qaeda media releases also highlighted that over 50 percent of operational videos were filmed in Haqqani-controlled regions, particularly Khost and Paktika.\(^\text{326}\)

Punjabi Taliban militants, and those from the SSP, LeJ, LeT and others have found sanctuary in Haqqani territory. Various prominent figures from the Kashmiri jihad once fought alongside Haqqani fighters, including founding members of the HuM and the LeT, and Haqqani militant infrastructure had crucial impact on the scale of violence in Indian-controlled Kashmir in the 1990s. Many of these links have persisted, and the SSP in particular is believed to supply a considerable number of the suicide bombers used by the Haqqanis for attacks in Afghanistan. The LeT, which like the Haqqanis is very close to Pakistani intelligence agencies, has collaborated on high-profile attacks against Indian targets in Afghanistan, including the dual attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009.\(^\text{328}\) There is also some evidence of tactical convergence between the two groups, as seen in the February 2011 Jalalabad bank attack, which mimicked the LeT’s fidayeen style.\(^\text{329}\)

\(^\text{321}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{322}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{324}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{325}\) Rassler and Brown, The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida.

\(^\text{326}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{327}\) Dressler, “The Haqqani Network.”


The Haqqanis have publicly disavowed any attacks on Pakistani forces, or within Pakistani territory, and as such do not officially support the operations of the Pakistani Taliban. Nonetheless, senior TTP figures have close links to the Haqqanis and Beitullah Mehsud, the TTP founder is believed to have fought alongside Haqqani forces during the Soviet era. The complex bi-directional relationship between the Haqqanis and the TTP is not easy to pin down, but the CTC report identified the Haqqani network as a “lethal incubator for the TTP’s most lethal elements,” and that its influence has helped shape the conditions under which the domestic Pakistani insurgency has arisen.\(^{330}\) TTP manpower and assets also help augment the Afghan struggle and geographical realities have dictated a close relationship with prominent Wazir commanders, notably Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s group that controls the territory between Haqqani strongholds in North Waziristan and the Afghan border.\(^{331}\)

In recent times, with US pressure mounting on Pakistan to conduct military operations in North Waziristan, the group has been more prominent in other FATA agencies where the TTP has stronger influence, such as Kurram. Issues in Kurram are very important for the Haqqanis, since the agency has been a historical staging base for Afghan mujahideen and offers Haqqani militants alternative cross-border routes in the event of military operations in North Waziristan.\(^{332}\) As a result, the Haqqanis have participated in various mediation efforts to extend their influence locally, most recently helping negotiate a ceasefire to end the sectarian war in Kurram. The TTP failure to comply with the terms of the Haqqani-negotiated mediation may have led to some strain in the relationship since the spring of 2011. Against the backdrop of Hakimullah’s defiance and execution of Colonel Imam, Mehsud-appointed commanders have begun violating the terms of the Kurram ceasefire. As a result, a Haqqani affiliate is said to have reported that “Haqqani has said some very strong words to Hakimullah; Stop it or my men will make you stop it.”\(^{333}\)

American officials have strongly urged PAKMIL action against the group in North Waziristan, and the Pakistani military’s continuing refusal to comply is a prominent component of the growing discord in US-Pakistani relations. Such a trend is likely to continue, and perhaps intensify, as the US shifts Afghan surge operations east into Haqqani strongholds and seeks some measure of strategic progress. In contrast, with the nearing Afghan endgame, Pakistan is likely to continue to see utility in the group to advance its grand strategic objectives, and potentially to facilitate some form of negotiation and accommodation with militants in any post-American period.

**Transnational Groups and Al-Qaeda**

Various other axes of conflict, including the “global jihad,” have attracted other groups and elements in ways that affect the situation in North Waziristan. Many of these groups often have defined and known agendas, but their maneuvering and actions on the scene—particularly in the tribal areas—are less transparent. Both Osama Bin Laden, and Indonesian terrorist Umar Patek were both uncovered not inside the tribal areas, or in militancy prone districts of the KPK, but in

\(^{330}\) Rassler and Brown, *The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida.*

\(^{331}\) Dressler, “The Haqqani Network.”


the garrison city of Abbottabad, in the Hazara region of the KPK, where militant violence has been low. 334

Despite the exact location of its remaining command nodes, Al-Qaeda core is an important presence in the tribal areas and plays a significant role in helping shape militant dynamics. It has been significantly weakened operationally by relentless American pressure, 335 but has nonetheless reconstituted itself as an inspirational resource to provide direction for aspiring global jihadists. 336 As Christine Fair put it, “Bin Laden’s become the next Che Guevara… an icon for the rage of all kinds of people with all sorts of causes.” 337 It is uncertain to what extent this will continue after Bin Laden’s death, but most analysts agree that it will have important, yet limited impact on the group’s operational capabilities, and is unlikely to decapitate the organization, particularly today when it has grown to become an inspirational resource. 338

Al-Qaeda has helped shape and ‘internationalize’ a variety of jihadi groups inside the tribal areas, including the TTP, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). It has contributed by providing religious justification, acting as a force multiplier in specific violent acts and serving as a mediator and coalition builder. 339 Captured documents from the Bin Laden raid support this trend, showing that the AQ leader was hoping to establish a coalition of militant groups to reinsert himself into a central role. 340

The al-Qaeda core has been careful in not repeating the same mistakes its Iraqi affiliate made and is cognizant of the fact that despite inter-marriages and considerable integration, it remains a foreign force. As such it has carefully calibrated its strategy to support or work within local structures, rather than setting up its own governance systems, and recently set up the ‘Shura Al-Mujahideen’ to help resolve TTP disputes over tactics and ideology. 341 As a result it has sidestepped the problems faced by other foreign groups such as the IMU, whose presence in South Waziristan angered elements of the Wazir tribe, by being an economic drain on scarce resources, by attracting retaliatory strikes by PAKMIL forces, and by independently engaging in local struggles without local guidance. 342

In recent years, the IMU has relocated to North Waziristan, where its growing association with al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network has developed its internationalist inclinations. Today it has a tripartite agreement with the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, and itself to assist in the Taliban’s penetration of Uzbek areas in northern Afghanistan and has also hosted anti-Western militants in

342 Witter. “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions.”
its camps, including a group of Germans who plotted attacks in Hamburg, before being killed by drones. The IMU’s Uzbek character is particularly important for Afghan-centric organizations such as the Haqqanis and the QST, allowing them to burnish their credentials as nationalist forces representing the entire Sunni conservative movement, rather than merely a Pashtun insurgency.

Ilyas Kashmiri—who commands Brigade 313, an operational al-Qaeda cell—was a key facilitator who helped build coalitions between al-Qaeda, Kashmir-oriented groups and the Pakistani tribal insurgents, is As his name suggests, Kashmiri cut his teeth in the Kashmir jihad, and as an alleged former Army commando was an experienced tactician and operator, linked to some of the most high-profile and sophisticated attacks across Pakistan. Brigade 313 is also believed to have at least some element of overlap in the tribal provinces with the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ who are similarly composed of former Kashmir-oriented militants. Kashmiri and his organization are prime examples of force multipliers, assisting groups on various attacks across conflict axes.

In November 2010, Brigade 313 was reported to have jointly carried out an attack with the TTP against a police headquarter in Karachi, and he has also been linked to the TTP attack on the Army’s GHQ in October 2009. Kashmiri is also believed to have orchestrated the May 2011 attack on Pakistani naval base PNS Mehran, a highly sophisticated attack that destroyed two P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare planes, potentially took Chinese technicians hostage, held off Pakistani Special Forces for over 15 hours, and then may have ended with some militants being able to escape.

Kashmiri has been linked to various international plots, most notably a plot to attack the offices of the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, and may have provided tactical guidance to attacks in the north Caucasus. The CIA has commented that “the footprints of Brigade 313 are now in Europe,” although Kashmiri has continued his anti-Indian jihad. Brigade 313 has claimed to have conducted an attack against a German bakery in the Indian city of Pune in February 2010, has been linked to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and has issued threats against Indian targets, including during the Commonwealth Games in 2010. The group may have also lent its tactical

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expertise for high profile attacks in Afghanistan, including the suicide bombing on FOB Chapman in Khost that killed seven senior CIA officials.  

In early June 2011, it was reported that there were strong indications that Kashmiri was killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan.  

The Growing International Role of Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is another group that has increased its presence in the tribal regions, and has grown ‘internationalized,’ in part due to its growing association with al-Qaeda and other groups in the tribal areas. It is distinct from other groups in that its Ahle-Hadith faith and close relationship with the Pakistani state has resulted in a rocky relationship with other Deobandi groups, who don’t entirely trust its motives.  

In May 2011, after the death of Osama Bin Laden, LeT leader Hafeez Saeed held prayers along with 1,000 of his followers to mourn Osama’s “martyrdom.”

In recent years the LeT has found itself torn between its traditional Kashmiri jihad and its growing internationalist inclinations. As its freedom of movement in Kashmir has grown constricted, the LeT has grown increasingly involved in Afghanistan, particularly in Kunar province, where it has a close ally in the Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna in Korengal Valley, and in high-profile attacks against Indian interests in Afghanistan.

The group has also expanded its targeting scope to include Western targets, as seen in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, although the LeT continues to prioritize its anti-Indian struggle above other conflict axes. Some elements of the LeT have also been included in the ‘Punjabi Taliban,’ although it is unclear whether this constitutes renegade elements freelancing for other groups, or a deliberate tweaking of strategy.

As one of the most proficient militant groups in Pakistan, no doubt the LeT’s technical expertise is valued, although as noted earlier, its integration into Deobandi militancy has not been seamless. 15 activists from its humanitarian arm, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa were executed by TTP militants in Swat in 2008, and in the same year Mohmand TTP leader Omar Khalid attacked a camp run by its front organization, capturing and executing at least 10 leaders.

Criminal Groups

The role of criminal elements in such violence is often obscure, but is vital in providing funding for virtually every militant group in the FATA. A Pakistani newspaper recently estimated that as much as half of the tribal economy may be undocumented, indicating the extent of potential for

355 Ibid.
militant involvement in organized crime, both in protecting criminal operations and by participating in them to accumulate power.\textsuperscript{358}

Gretchen Peters, an analyst who has closely examined this issue noted that organized crime and militancy are symbiotic where “criminal profits fund the insurgency and terrorist violence helps militants to coerce and exert a level of control over local communities.”\textsuperscript{359} A large-scale drug economy in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a key part of the problem, and there are real fears that counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan may push cultivation into the FATA.\textsuperscript{360}

Pakistan is less a point of origination than a key transit route and a processing center. Smuggling of consumer goods, luxury vehicles, timber, minerals, drugs, and weapons is another key revenue source for Taliban on both sides of the border. According to a trader, militants charge between 2,000-5,000 rupees per truck, with payments made even by NATO transporters. The same individual also claimed that the Afghan Taliban charge more than their Pakistani comrades.\textsuperscript{361} Kidnappings for ransom are another key revenue source.

Various groups specialize in various criminal activities, often with significant overlaps. The TTP for example through the territory it controls is able to charge ‘toll taxes’ and charge protection money for various businesses inside the FATA, including mineral extraction. Militants in different agencies sometimes specialize in different aspects of the smuggling trade.

**Pakistan Military Operations and Counterinsurgency**

The events of “9/11” have helped trigger fundamental shifts in the role the Pakistani military plays in dealing with militant groups and the violence that they cause. Much of this shift has come as a result of US pressure, but much has also come from an internal appreciation of the threat posed by purely Pakistani groups.

In July 2002, the Pakistani military (PAKMIL) entered the Tirah Valley in its tribal regions for the first time in Pakistan’s history, and since around 2009, PAKMIL has demonstrated considerable resolve in tackling tribal militancy. The military has significantly increased its force presence as seen in Figure 3.6, and has conducted a variety of operations in the past few years that are shown in Figure 3.7.

In August 2010, Pakistan’s shadowy intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) publicly declared that the Pakistani Taliban constituted a greater threat to Pakistan than the Indian Army.\textsuperscript{362} In reflection, the military has made redeployments away from the Indo-Pakistani border, and has borne significant casualties. Some 2,348 soldiers have been killed and another

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6,710 injured according to government statistics as of January 2011.363 These casualty trends are further explored in Figure 3.8 and 3.9.

The lessons the Pakistani military have learned from these expanded operations have allowed it to refine, hone, and showcase an improved ability to act tactically on the battlefield, which in some areas such as the NWFP’s Malakand Division have resulted in a significant decrease in militancy. However, long-term strategic success is far from certain and violence in the FATA continues to rise, increasing 28 percent in 2010.364

**Tactical Success; Questionable Strategic Impact**

The longer-term strategic picture is less clear. The Pakistani military has traditionally viewed militants in the FATA as strategic proxies to advance its ambitions in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir, and there is evidence that it continues to see their utility in the future. This has informed a selective approach to targeting, where the best result for the Pakistani military is not an eradication of all militant and terrorist groups, but rather an attempt to selectively target groups that have targeted the Pakistani state, and maintain influence over other more pliable groups that may serve Pakistani grand strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir in the future.

There remain many reservations on the long-term sustainability of Pakistani military operations in the FATA. The US has already expressed concerns; a recently published White House report in March 2011 grimly declared that “there is no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan,” and noted how the current Mohmand offensive is the third major operation in the agency in two years, a demonstration of the inability for the Pakistani military to hold cleared territory.365 Even in Swat, a district far more closely interlinked with Pakistani state than the FATA agencies, two years after initial military operations, the military presence remains heavy, peace and stability remain tenuous, and the army remains in administrative control.

In the FATA, the situation is far worse and the Pakistani military has struggled to effectively complete even “clear” operations, let alone transition to “hold” or “build.” Operation codenames in the Khyber since June 2008 may inadvertently reflect the sense of growing alarm and frustration at militant resilience; the Army has mounted Operations Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (Right Path), Daraghlam (Here I come), Biya Daraghlam (Here I come again) and Khawakh Ba De Sham (I’ll teach you a lesson). The same has been repeated across other agencies. In Kurram, a strategically important militant gateway to Afghanistan, through June and July 2011 there have been reports of new and expanded military operations in the agency.366 Previous clearing operations in the agency had ended in June 2010, and as late as January 2011, army commanders were claiming the agency had been 80 percent cleared of militants.367

Pakistani grand strategy places key constraints impeding a doctrinal shift towards counterinsurgency (COIN). For the entirety of its history, the Pakistani military’s organizational

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essence has been towards a single purpose, being prepared for conventional war with India. Weakening the force balance along the eastern border is no small matter, and the extent of redeployments—including the deployment of the entire XI Corps seen in Figure 3.9—provide a further indication of the severity of the tribal insurgency.

Indian Military Intelligence estimated that as much as 35 percent of the Pakistani force deployment along the eastern border may have shifted to the FATA, particularly in the strategically important Shakargarh sector. Despite this stiffening of resolve, the military remains cognizant that extended COIN operations have substantial tradeoffs in conventional preparedness and compound already considerable resource limitations and capacity shortfalls, making it an unattractive option. As a result, Pakistan has stubbornly refused to budge from the vernacular of “low intensity conflict,” (LIC) implying its preference for enemy-centric targeted operations.

Inadequate Initial Performance

Unfortunately, the firepower-intensive campaigns that characterized Pakistani military operations prior to 2008/2009, achieved comparatively little. They were comprised of transient multi-unit clearing operations that rarely caught militants by surprise, and were followed by peace agreements regardless of any tangible change in the security environment.

The 2004 offensive into South Waziristan, for example, utilized 8,000 soldiers backed by air and armor assets. Despite causing considerable collateral damage, they failed to dislodge militants, resulting in heavy fighting particularly around Wana. The operation ended with over two hundred dead soldiers, numerous desertions by the Frontier Corps, and a peace agreement that bolstered the Taliban. Army commanders travelled to a Deobandi mosque near Wana to sign the peace agreement with Nek Mohammad, a move interpreted by militants as a tacit surrender. The deal soon broke down, and violence resumed. Such haphazard operational efforts, ending with little to show for their cost in casualties and damage to army morale helped strengthen a growing perception that Pakistani soldiers involved were acting as American guns for hire, a dangerous perception.

As a result of these failures, the Pakistani military made a concerted effort to rethink their tactics for prosecuting the war and paid more attention to incorporating population-centric COIN principles. In the process, it created a hybrid doctrine that is distinctive from the Western-style “hearts and minds” strategy, yet follows many of its tenets, including sensitivity to public

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opinion, care in the application of force and an orientation towards a more presence-oriented approach.  

While positive, these steps have still been shaped by a tactically focused mindset. As Ashley Tellis succinctly notes, “what we are really talking about is the selective refinement of a preexisting model to address some negative externalities,” namely groups like the Pakistani Taliban that have openly defied the writ of the state. Pakistan’s use of militancy as a tool of statecraft has served Pakistan well in the past, and it continues to do so, both in tying down Indian forces on the eastern border and in preserving influence in Afghanistan. As a result, care has been taken to distinguish between militant groups, between those that openly defy state authority and those that can be used to help meet Pakistani strategic objectives.

The use of the Haqqanis in North Waziristan has been a particular source of contention with the US. Pakistan continues to see the Haqqanis as a reconcilable network, facilitated in no small part by their assistance in anti-Indian operations in Afghanistan, their considerable influence in Afghanistan’s Loya Paktiya, and their steadfast refusal to engage in violence against Pakistani forces and institutions. Such informal strategic symbiosis has guided Pakistani reluctance to conduct any large-scale operations into North Waziristan.

Hopes were raised in October 2010, when Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi indicated that 35,000 troops were ready to launch an operation, but military officials have since walked back such hopes indicating that they are not yet ready to consider launching such an operation given existing commitments. In May 2011, there were again indications that Pakistan was considering such an operation. Pakistani newspapers have reported that aid agencies had been ordered to prepare for large-scale IDP flows from the agency. However, senior army commanders—including Lt. General Yasin Malik, the officer in charge of tribal operations—later denied these claims. Malik claimed he had 30,000 troops in North Waziristan but declared that his forces were tied up with operations in other agencies, particularly an upcoming operation in Kurram.

There have been some indications of growing tensions between militants and security forces in North Waziristan. In early July 2011, a rare clash between security forces and militants broke out in Miranshah, the agency capital, when troops intending to destroy a Taliban-used hospital were ambushed, requiring the intervention of helicopter gunships.
### Figure 3.6: Growth in Force Numbers in FATA (2002–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2008</th>
<th>2009 - June 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Services Group</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK Police</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Branch</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkars</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>169,000</td>
<td>321,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.7: Major PAKMIL Offensives (2008–2011)

Note: These do not constitute the sum total of PAKMIL offensives in the FATA. Various smaller-scale operations have been mounted in response to local conditions.

Source: Created by authors.
### Figure 3.8: Force Deployments in FATA

#### A. REGULAR ARMY FORMATIONS IN FATA/KPK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps Formation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Subordinate Units employed in LIC/COIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| I Corps         | Mangla         | Elements of 8th Independent Armored Brigade  
37th Mechanized Division  
17th Infantry Division |
| II Corps        | Multan         | 14th Infantry Division (Okara)                                                                      |
| X Corps         |                | 19th Infantry Division (Jhelum)                                                                      |
| XI Corps        | Peshawar       | 7th Infantry Division (Mardan)  
9th Infantry Division (Kohat) |
| XXXI Corps      | Bahawalpur     | Elements of 35th Infantry Division (Bahawalpur)  
Elements of 26th Mechanized Division (Pano Aqil) |
| SSG (Special Forces) |            | Zarrar Battalion                                                                                  |

#### B. PARAMILITARY AND LOCAL SECURITY FORCES IN FATA/KPK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Khassadars       | Approximately   | First line of law enforcement  
17,000  
Poorly trained, equipped, enlisted from tribes  
Loyal to maliks who employ them, tribes who get them employed  
Easily targeted, intimidated by Taliban |
| Levies           | Approximately   | Second line of law enforcement  
4,000 – 6,800  
Recruited on merit, better trained/equipped  
Used as deterrent force against tribal disputes |
| Frontier Corps   | 34,000 – 50,000 | Primary historical force in FATA  
Substantial improvements in training and equipment |
| Frontier Constabulary | 22,817    | Paramilitary police force  
Tasked with border security for settled areas  
and preventing ingress of criminal tribal elements |
| KPK Police       | 55,000 – 78,000 | Suffers from same problems as wider police sector  
Unable to function alone against insurgency  
Recent U.S. support, included equipment and vehicles worth $13.5 million |
| Lashkars (Militias) | Approximately 30,000 | “Anti-Taliban” tribal forces  
Provided weaponry and support by PAKMIL  
Outsources security to non-state providers and enhances fragmented tribal structure |


**Figure 3.9: Pakistani Security Force Casualties in 2010**

![Graph showing Pakistani Security Force Casualties in 2010](image)


**Figure 3.10: Security Forces to Militant Casualty Ratio in 2010**

![Graph showing Security Forces to Militant Casualty Ratio in 2010](image)

*Source: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2010* (Islamabad: PIPS, January 2011).*
Growing Tactical Capabilities

Despite these strategic disconnects, the Pakistani military has grown increasingly proficient at tactically prosecuting the war. Initially, Western sources believed that the Pakistani military had lost over 70 percent of its engagements prior to early 2009, and indeed early military activity demonstrated considerable deficiencies in Pakistani equipment, training and operational art.

By 9/11, the Frontier Corps (FC), the primary force tasked with guarding the FATA had devolved into a backwater force commanded by the dregs of the Army’s officer corps, with many units operating with bolt-action rifles of WW1 vintage. These forces were outmatched by well-armed insurgents, causing considerable embarrassment to the military, particularly in August 2007, when about 200 soldiers surrendered to militants after failing to take the high ground and getting themselves trapped in a valley against a vastly inferior force.

Even the considerably better-trained and equipped regular army ran into problems. The first augmentation of local forces in the FATA came from the XI Corps based out of Peshawar, notably the 7th and 9th Division, due to their proximity to the theater. Unfortunately they were trained for conventional war against India and had little knowledge or familiarity with the physical and human terrain of the tribal areas and suffered from a lack of translators, rendering them an alien Punjabi army operating in Pashtun territory.

Considerable effort has since been placed on creating adequate training regimens that prepare soldiers for operations in the tribal terrain. At least three major LIC training facilities have been built at Jharri Kas, Mangla, and Pabbi Hills, and new requirements mandate all incoming officers undergo LIC combat training. The FC has also benefited from U.S. and British SOF training, and monetary support, including a sizeable chunk of U.S. military assistance. The U.S. has assisted in addressing Pakistan’s helicopter deficit that impeded troop mobility and battlefield flexibility. Only 19 helicopters were initially forward deployed to the FATA, of which only 12 were operational. The US has provided Pakistan with 26 Bell-412, 10 Mi-17 and 20 Cobra attack helicopters, as well as armored vehicles and night-vision capabilities.

The Pakistani military has focused on increasing mobility and made more extensive use of blocking forces to prevent militants from conducting tactical withdrawals. The elite Special Services Group (SSG) has been employed extensively for both blocking operations and targeted raids against high-value targets (HVTs), while kinetic elements such as artillery and airpower have been used more carefully to minimize collateral damage. Ground forces advancing along
multiple thrust axes also follow these strikes and employ better route clearance techniques to combat IEDs.  

More favorable troop ratios have been employed, as with Operation Rah-e-Nijat, the 2009 incursion into South Waziristan, which employed between 30,000-66,000 troops, a dramatic increase from the 8,000 used in the agency in 2004. Clearing operations have been followed by retention of forces in theater instead of immediately transferring back to civilian authority, and forces dispersed into small bases amongst the population, in an attempt to stabilize peace through a longer-term presence.

The Pakistani military has increasingly acknowledged and adapted to the challenging human terrain it faces. It has attempted to offset the cultural and linguistic divides between the Punjabi-dominated army and the Pashtuns of the FATA/KPK by placing greater emphasis on expanding the Pashtun representation in the Army’s officer corps. This has risen to 14.5% by 2011, up from the existing 13.5%, and the share of Pashtuns from the NWFP amongst enlisted personnel has also substantially risen. Operation Sher Dil in 2008, the “Bajaur Experiment” under Major General Tariq Khan, also worked to refine procedures and protocols, becoming the first major operation to extensively raise and employ pro-government lashkars, work closely with local jirgas, and to encourage Pashtun-Punjabi cooperation and interaction within the army.

Far more diligent preparations have been conducted prior to operations, including embedding intelligence assets to intercept communications, establishing blockades to prevent re-supply or reinforcements from materializing and utilizing fire-power to soften targets before employing ground forces. Similarly the military has made more nuanced application of its divide and rule tactics, and has engaged in diplomatic negotiations with militant factions prior to launching operations. Before Operation Rah-e-Nijat, for example, powerful North Waziristani militant commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, was induced through aid and peace agreements, to not interfere with Pakistani military operations against the TTP, or offer retreating militants shelter within his territory. Gul Bahadur complied on the former, but less so on the latter.

The Pakistani military faces serious problems in spite of these successes. IEDs continue to exert a toll on Pakistani military forces. The M113 armored personnel carriers used by the regular Army are highly vulnerable to RPGs and IEDs, while the 46 UR-416 armored cars utilized by the Frontier Corps are more applicable for riot control than the threat environment they operate in. Pakistani military troops continue to use Chinese-manufactured wand detectors of dubious quality for dismounted patrols, and visual identification continues to be the best available

393 Nawaz, “Learning by Doing.”
Similarly despite improvements in troop mobility, the Pakistani military has continued to clamor for more helicopters, although high operational costs and a worsening economy have grounded even those already deployed in theater.

Pakistani forces have continued the forced resettlement of the civilian population prior to operations in an effort to minimize civilian collateral damage and make targeting easier. This strategy is however far from ideal and inherently short-term in that extended or repeated displacements merely expand the trust deficit between the military and the people. The Pakistani military has gotten better at providing for the displaced that make their way to its relief camps, but the magnitude of displacements has often overwhelmed its capabilities as seen in Figure 3.11. Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat for example, saw almost two million people displaced, the largest refugee exodus since Rwanda.

It has been estimated that scarcely 15 percent of the displaced have used official camps, with the rest moving to urban centers, including Karachi and Islamabad in search of employment. Their influx has often exacerbated existing tensions, by compounding ethnic security dilemmas and straining already weak social and economic services.

While the closed nature of the theater makes accurate verification extremely difficult, the military has become better at conducting itself in populated areas. Mingora, the site of fierce urban fighting between militants and the army in 2009 for example showed minimal damage after operations. Public polling done in the FATA also showed a significant increase in public support for operations, after the 2008 Bajaur operation, even among those who were forcibly displaced. This is illustrated by Figures 3.13 – 3.15.

Success at resettling displaced IDPs has not been uniform. The Swat/Malakand operation, which displaced over 2.8 million people saw rapid returns of the population leading Frontier Corps Head Major General Tariq Khan to trumpet that “in no other counterinsurgency operation in the world have residents gone back so soon.” Despite General Khan’s optimism, 2010 saw the displacement of another 400,000 IDPs, resulting in a total of at least 980,000 people still displaced as of December 2010.

As the International Crisis Group details in a report on the IDP crisis, resettling the displaced from the FATA has been much less successful than the Swat operation. Camps are less accessible to outside observers and NGOs due to tight military control, and there are allegations

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399 Nawaz, “Learning by Doing.”
that the military has strongly coerced and pressured people into returning, rather than allowing them a voluntary decision.407

Figure 3.11: Percentage of Population Displaced per Agency

An assessment by the ‘Save the Children’ NGO on IDP camp conditions in DI Khan notes that the average household of eight individuals was supporting itself on less than $2.30 a day!408 The vast majority of children (55% of boys and 71% of girls) were out of school and over 57% of people had no access to health services.409

Some IDPs have criticized government assistance money as vastly inadequate for the costs they have had to bear410 and COAS Kayani himself admitted to General Petraeus in early 2009, that he had no capacity to compensate those who had been injured or lost their property due to budgetary pressures.411 Many others have stayed away from returning to their homes for fear that


407 Ibid.
409 Ibid.
militants will soon return as admitted by an international aid worker who noted that, “We know the return to Mohmand agency was voluntary because so few IDPs actually participated.”

The Strategic Future

The increased lethality of the Pakistani military remains a very uncertain indicator of long-term strategic success. Data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal counts over 17,000 militants killed in PAKMIL operations since 2008, as seen in Figure 3.15, and targeted attacks have killed several high-ranking Taliban leaders, including TTP founder Beitullah Mehsud and senior commander Nek Mohammad. Despite these successes, the insurgency has shown more signs of continuity than of exhaustion or defeat. Furthermore while clearing operations may have degraded Taliban presence, eliminating them remains in the distant future.

In February 2011, a suicide bomber was able to enter the heavily guarded Mardan cantonment near Peshawar and kill over 30 cadets and injure 42 others. Similarly in December 2010, over 150 Taliban fighters mounted a coordinated assault against five FC checkpoints in Mohmand, where the Pakistani Army has now twice claimed success.

Furthermore there is still no clear evidence that more effective clearing operations have done anything to change the “balloon” nature of the insurgency, i.e. merely displacing militancy into neighboring provinces. In October 2010, a White House assessment criticized Pakistani efforts at stabilizing areas in South Waziristan saying, “the military largely stayed close to the roads and did not engage against those [TTP] militants who returned after fleeing into North Waziristan.” The military has declared operations in South Waziristan to be over and is now pressuring IDPs to return.

The sustainability of the Pakistani military’s hard-won gains is also undermined by the lack of a civilian counterpart to a strategy defined and dominated by the military to best serve its own organizational and strategic interests. Even though the Pakistani military has gravitated towards a more presence-oriented strategy, retaining forces in theater after operations for population security, it continues to focus heavily on the more brute elements of coercion. It has shown limited interest or capacity to engage in large-scale developmental activities to reform socioeconomic disparities, and has focused on the local version of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as tools to re-empower tribal maliks and build links with society.

The prolonged garrison atmosphere created by the extended military presence in the FATA has its own dangers. It is evoking resentment from fiercely independent tribes who may see this as a...

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417 International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis*
419 Nawaz, “Learning by Doing.”
Punjabi intrusion. Along these lines, a poll of 400 villages in the FATA conducted by a respected NGO working in the tribal areas highlighted growing public trust in the regular army but still expressed preferences for localized forces, notably the Frontier Corps, and the Levies and Khassadars, as seen in Figure 3.13. However, if the Pakistani military and government efforts are to achieve lasting effects, the military will need to demonstrate more diligence in partnering with civilian institutions and local law-enforcement agencies to transition security and governance responsibilities.

At present, police capacity in the Pashtun belt remains vastly inadequate for the task at hand. Law enforcement in the FATA is tiered ranging from local tribal police, to the paramilitary Frontier Corps, as seen earlier in Figure 3.8. The FC, having been the army’s primary partner in conducting operations has benefited considerably and has evolved into a more professional and capable fighting force. At its present size however it is unlikely to be able to cope with the current levels of militant violence, without regular army support. This may incentivize growing the force as a dedicated counterinsurgency force akin to the Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles raised to counter Pakistan-sponsored militancy in Kashmir.

More regular law-enforcement suffers from chronic shortfalls. In the KPK, it is estimated that police possessed only 17,000 automatic rifles, 7,500 bulletproof vests, and three armored personnel carriers for a presumed end-strength of about 50,000-55,000. Furthermore as is common of the police sector across Pakistan, the majority of the police are ill equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt with little chance of functioning as a paramilitary force capable of surviving an insurgency.

Hassan Abbas estimates that an average of 400 police officers were being killed annually in encounters with militants between 2005 and 2009, whereas 700 out 1737 police officers deserted or resigned their posts in Swat in 2006/07 upon receiving militant threats. The sector has also suffered low levels of external support; out of $731 million of military assistance allocated by the U.S., only $4.7 million has found its way to police forces. Recently, more attention has been focused upon the police. Recruitment has increased substantially, reaching an end-strength of 78,320 in 2010-11, up from 55,450 in 2009-10, but availability of funds continues to be an issue in effectively scaling up capacity.

In the meantime, efforts to rectify manpower shortfalls have led to the rapid proliferation of non-government tribal lashkars (militias), which are now believed to constitute an end-strength of about 30,000. Such a strategy has significant long-term risks, by transferring the responsibility of the state onto non-state actors of dubious loyalty and competence. Over time, they may grow disillusioned with the state and defect to the Taliban with their government-provided weaponry. The International Crisis Group has been critical of these groups, noting that in some localities

420 Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure.”
421 Jones and Fair, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan.”
422 Moeed Yusuf and Anit Mukherjee, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: Learning from India,” American Enterprise Institute, September 2007. Available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070928_YusufNSOg.pdf
425 Abbas, “Police and Law Enforcement in Pakistan.”
426 Abbas, “Role of Pakistan Police in Counterinsurgency.”
427 Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure.”
they have been derisively referred to as the “government Taliban,” for the impunity with which they operate, and the former Taliban fighters who fill their ranks.\textsuperscript{428}

Lashkars have had mixed successes. They have had successes in the more settled areas of the KPK and in Bajaur where the Taliban presence was initially weak, but in other areas have found themselves outgunned, outmanned and subject to vicious Taliban retaliation.\textsuperscript{429} Lashkars share ethnic and often tribal bonds with the Taliban, and are sometimes reluctant to mobilize against Taliban forces. Even when they do it is primarily in pursuit of specific localized goals. Over the long-term, their loyalties are uncertain. In an indication of the problems Pakistan continues to face, in March 2011, a 4,000-strong lashkar raised near Peshawar in 2007 ended government support. Tribal leaders cited inadequate governmental support, and their subjection to a spate of targeted attacks by the Taliban, including a suicide attack that killed 38 people in an attack on a funeral procession for the wife of a tribal leader.\textsuperscript{430}

Finally, no sustainable “hold” strategy can take root without adequate governance. Over the last decade, governance has steadily deteriorated in the FATA. Loosely controlled the best of times, today the feudal and colonial dynamics of the agent-malik governing structure is in ruins. It has been discredited as a governing mechanism and has served as a key driver for the insurgency. Religious radicals have used it to play on anti-government grievances, and promote a narrative that brands sharia as synonymous with a fair and equal justice system, whereas the TTP’s campaign of assassinations against maliks has greatly degraded the administrative structure.\textsuperscript{431}

Addressing these legitimate grievances will require implementing long-overdue reforms, including repealing the Frontier Crimes Regulation, and better integrating the FATA into the mainstream Pakistani political structure. Combining territorial gains with an integrated effort to deepen public trust in national security institutions, and more deeply involving the Pakistani civilian government in building human infrastructure and local institutions, is essential. For better or for worse, the Pakistani military is a key political player, and particularly for an integrated national-security strategy such as this, it retains enormous influence to pressure for a speedier implementation of reforms.


\textsuperscript{431} McGirk, “Pakistan’s Taliban War: Bringing Back the Music.”
Figure 3.12: Perceptions of Powerbrokers in FATA


Figure 3.13: Public Opinion on FATA Security Providers

Figure 3.14: FATA Public Support for Military Operations

![Bar graph showing public support for military operations in FATA]


Figure 3.15: Pakistan Security Force-to-Militant Casualty Ratio (2007-2010)

![Bar graph showing security force and militant KIA figures]

Note: Pakistani military casualty figures are contested. South Asia Terrorism Portal (utilized here), for example, notes 469 Security Forces killed in action in 2010, whereas Pak Institute for Peace Studies counts 641.

4. The situation in Balochistan

The province of Balochistan is another serious challenge to Pakistani security and stability, and is currently suffering a major separatist rebellion. With 44% of Pakistan’s landmass but only 5% of its population, any security effort in the region faces major challenges given the province’s vast expanse and low population density. The population is however projected to increase from 7.8 million in 2005 to 11 million by 2025.432

Balochistan has substantial endowments of natural resources, yet remains the poorest province in Pakistan, and has abysmal human welfare rankings that sustain the population’s alienation from state institutions. Balochistan is strategically located. Its porous borders neighbor some of Afghanistan’s most volatile provinces including Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul, in all of which coalition troops are heavily engaged. To the west it borders Iran while its coastline extends out to the Arabian Sea, making it a potentially vital trade intersection to connect the Middle East with South, Central, and East Asia. Its locational advantage also has had unintended consequences; the province is now one of the world’s largest opiate smuggling and processing routes.

The province is strategically crucial to the Afghan insurgency, particularly the Quetta Shura Taliban. Its long porous border renders it an ideal transit route for insurgent fighters, particularly into Kandahar and Helmand, where some of the toughest coalition battles are currently being waged. The province is close to key insurgent centers in the FATA, including North and South Waziristan and is a critical NATO logistical transit artery. About 40-80% of non-lethal NATO supplies are believed to transit through Pakistan,433 34% of which through Balochistan’s Chaman border crossing.434

The Threats

Baloch separatists, Taliban Islamists and Islamabad all compete for control of the province, and each poses distinct security challenges. The Pashtun population continues from the FATA and the KPK, to the north and east of Quetta, the provincial capital, while ethnic Balochs, who compose about 45% of the population, dominate the south and west.435

Many Balochs are now engaged in a bitter campaign for autonomy or independence from the Pakistani state, and have a weak sense of identification with the Pakistani state and its institutions, which many perceive as an extension of Punjabi power that has marginalized and suppresses them. A tribal chief summarized the prevailing sentiment, quoting a common Baloch

saying, “I have been a Baloch for several centuries. I have been a Muslim for 1400 years. I have been a Pakistani for just over fifty.”

Today, the Balochs are fighting their fifth separatist rebellion after an interlude of almost three decades. It has been marked by a significant escalation in brutality and its targeting scope. Many Baloch grievances are driven by the abject underdevelopment of the province and biased allocations of resources.

The most prominent Taliban group in Balochistan is the Quetta Shura Taliban, the command node of the Afghan Taliban. Named for the city of Quetta, it is believed that senior leaders, including Mullah Omar, Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) for all Taliban, are believed to be hiding in its urban sprawl.

**Efforts at Reform**

Balochistan is one Pakistan’s poorest province, when on paper it should be one of the richest. It has an abundance of mineral and petrochemical resources, including large natural gas deposits, extensive mineral deposits including coal, copper, lead and gold, a long unexploited coastline and a location on the trade intersection of South and Central Asia and the Middle East.

Despite this abundance of resources, Balochistan has the nation’s highest poverty rate and scores the lowest in ten key social indicators including education, literacy, access to health, and water and sanitation in 2006/07 according to a study conducted by the World Bank. 92% of its districts continue to be classified as ‘high deprivation areas,’ and 80% of its population is rural, with most engaged in subsistence agriculture. Balochistan also has one of the country’s worst records on gender equality.

A report by the World Bank recommended that, “Balochistan should pursue a development agenda around generating growth, delivering services and financing development.” With regards to economic growth, it recommended exploiting Balochistan’s locational advantage to develop a regional transit hub, to better exploit its natural resource base, to help encourage an economic transformation from agriculture to services and industry, and to increase the business environment and encourage private-sector development. The report further recommended that service delivery should center on improving basic human welfare and improve the access and quality of basic services such as education, while financing development should focus on upgrading the province’s fiscal management, by upgrading revenue collections and better prioritizing and allocating public expenditures.

Progress towards these goals has been sporadic. Once again, reform lags badly and Islamabad does far more in rhetoric than in reality. The November 2009 Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package of reforms has promised to address many of the core grievances of ethnic Balochis, but

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440 Ibid.
441 Ibid
442 Ibid.
to date, few of the promises have been implemented. Similarly the military has indicated its support for political and economic reforms, but continues to conduct a systematic campaign of intimidation through torture and extrajudicial killings. Force continues to be the dominant mode of competing against a movement that is essentially political in nature, and Islamabad remains far more concerned with suppressing the separatists than rooting out Taliban sanctuaries or bettering border security.

Chronic underdevelopment is the norm, and human welfare statistics are little short of abysmal, even relative to the rest of Pakistan as seen in Figure 4.1. The education sector is in particularly poor condition. The provincial literacy rate languishes at 34%, a full 23 percentage points, below the national average, whereas the female literacy rate of 15% is about half the national average.

These problems are even more serious in rural areas; Amnesty International found in rural Balochistan only 8% of females over the age of 10 have finished primary school, and educational infrastructure is in bad shape. According to Pakistani government statistics, 10.9% of schools have no building, 33.9% have no access to drinking water, 36.9% are without latrines, and 59.6% have no electricity. Amnesty International’s statistics deem these to be unduly optimistic. Their own figures classified 36% of primary schools as either “dangerous” or requiring “major repair” and noted that 81% of schools had no access to electricity.

Figure 4.1: Human Development Statistics for Balochistan


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445 “Their Future is at Stake,” Human Rights Watch.
Poverty and underemployment are major problems, and are significant contributors to instability and violence, particularly when considering that Balochistan has a greater youth bulge, than the rest of Pakistan. 49.5% of Balochs are under the age of 15, in contrast to the national average of 43.3%.446 In 2008, the World Bank estimated poverty in Balochistan at 47%, which might be conservative.447 The number of poor people in the province has increased considerably between 1998/99 and 2004/5, rising from 1.5 million to 2.1 million,448 in large part as a result of the five-year drought between 1997 and 2002 that caused famine, and decimated over 43% of the livestock population.449

A severe water crisis is a concern for many Balochs. Only 5% of Balochistan is connected to the Indus River basin, enhancing scarcity in a country expected to become water-scarce by sometime between 2020 and 2035.450 In and around Quetta, it is believed that the mining of groundwater has reached such levels, that the water table has dropped by 3.5 meters annually and it is believed the entire aquifer will be lost within 5-10 years.451 This scarcity deeply complicates the difficulties for the rural agriculture sector, which has few irrigation mechanisms to help provide consistent or adequate yields.

Most economic sectors in Balochistan have suffered from decades of underinvestment, and low productivity is a key obstacle impeding an economic transformation up the value chain. Basic agriculture is the mainstay for most Balochs, with 40% farming minor crops and 33% raising small herds of livestock. 452 Increasing agricultural efficiency, and encouraging moves towards more productive enterprises will both mean overcoming many serious problems, including a lack of rural access to electricity, limited access to financial capital and inadequate transportation infrastructure that has led to poorly connected and segmented communities.453 Educational gaps impede any move towards skill-intensive industries. At the moment, 1.4 million of 2.3 million provincial workers have no schooling at all.454

As a result of limitations such as these, various sectors have considerable untapped growth potential. Fisheries, which are touted as a growth industry for Balochistan’s undeveloped coastline, are a good example, possessing over 70% of Pakistan’s coast but less than 30% of its landed catch.455 Mineral exploitation also has considerable latent potential. The recently discovered Reko Diq copper mine in Chagai district was valued at $260 billion,456 but political problems have slowed development.457 The petroleum sector too is suffering infrastructure

451 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
degradation after decades of underinvestment in exploration and development, resulting in declining output from 355bcf in 1994/5 to 336bcf by 2005.458

The floods of 2010 have compounded these problems. About 2 million residents of Balochistan have been affected according to figures collected by UNHCR, including about 600,000 people displaced from the Sindh.459 Thirteen districts were affected, including Jafarabad, Naseerabad, Kohlu, Barkhan, Kachhi, and Harnai. Already limited infrastructure such as irrigation channels were washed away, while district administration largely ground to a complete halt.460

Some 700,000 acres of land were destroyed in the province’s agricultural belt, resulting in food shortages, which causes not only the obvious hunger, but also leaves farmers with no cash to prepare for the next season.461 A UNHCR employee noted that the region had been largely overlooked in relief efforts, and commented that, “I have worked in humanitarian situations globally and worked in refugee camps in Africa during emergencies, but to be honest I had never seen a situation as devastating as I saw in Balochistan.”462

The Resource Curse

Unequal allocations in the distribution of resource revenues, including natural gas have been a major source of contention. Natural gas was discovered in Balochistan in 1952 and was soon made available to the Punjab and the Sindh, but Quetta, the provincial capital, failed to receive any piped gas until the 1980s, and even today only 4 out of 21 districts have access to piped gas.463 In fact, Dera Bugti, home to the Sui gas fields has the richest endowment of resources in all of Balochistan, yet has the nation’s worst HDI ranking.464

The same is true in the minerals sector. The Saindak copper and gold mines are extracted by a Chinese company, and out of revenues worth $633.6 million, 48% went to Islamabad, 50% to Beijing and a paltry 2% to Balochistan itself.465 This trend is also true of the province as a whole. In 2007, Balochistan contributed PKR87 billion in gas revenues for state but received only PKR7 billion for the province.466 Such small allocations have been justified by the government which points to Balochistan’s small population, but recently as part of recent reforms, progress has been made on increasing Balochistan’s share of gas revenues from PKR4 billion to PKR7 billion, out of the total pool of PKR16 billion.467

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465 Baloch, “Exploitation of mineral wealth.”
466 Baloch, “The Balochistan Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace.”
Uncertain and Unstable Politics

The Pakistani state is often blamed for Balochistan’s situation. Certainly it deserves a large measure of blame, but Balochistan’s indigenous political system is also a major driver. Much of rural Balochistan is controlled by local sardars (leaders), and like the maliks of the FATA, they are hereditary leaders with considerable power over the people, including the implementation of taxes, control over local security apparatuses, and considerable say in the channeling and implementation of resources, including development aid.468

The Pakistani government often alleges that it is their fear of losing their positions to economic advancement that has ensured that Balochs stay impoverished. This assessment obscures the large role the Pakistani state itself plays, but the role of the sardars is important as acknowledged by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, which agreed that tribal sardars “have no interest in advancing a modern form of governance.”469

However, the Pakistani government, particularly manifested through its Punjabi-dominated omnipresent security forces, and its inefficient provincial government cannot be excused of culpability. A report released by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in May 2011 detailed the usual complaints including the oppressive militarization of the province, the culpability of security forces in disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings. The report also noted the “absence of the political government and the civil authorities from critical areas of decision-making,” the manner in which the “political government abdicated its responsibility towards the people and hid behind its own helplessness in the face of domination of the military and intelligence agencies,” as well as detailed the “complete disregard of the military authorities towards the political authorities and the civil authorities.”470

To its credit, Pakistan has made commitments in the past year to resolve Baloch grievances. The Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package of reforms is roughly translated as “beginning of rights in Balochistan” and true to its name included significant reforms, including promises to increase Baloch employment in the civil-sector, to offer Baloch a greater share of resource industry revenues, and to compensate communities displaced by violence.471

The package nearly doubled Balochistan’s share of the federal divisible pool from 5.11% to 9.09%,472 while in 2010, about PKR 12 billion was released to the Baloch government as the beginning of repayments for outstanding debts from natural gas revenues.473 Various mega-development projects are in the process of being built including the Gwadar port, which is touted as the key to bringing investment and prosperity to Balochistan. Other less high-profile initiatives include the US$1.2 billion 500-kilometer Kachhi canal being built to pass through Punjab and Balochistan.474

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471 “Their Future is at Stake: Attacks on Teachers and Schools in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province,” Human Rights Watch.
473 “Their Future is at Stake,” Human Rights Watch.
474 Kugelman and Hathaway, “Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis.”
Despite these initiatives, Balochs remain skeptical and for good reason. Baloch leaders have rightly pointed out that as important stakeholders they are excluded from the decision-making procedure, leading to an external model of development that is coercively imposed upon them. More tangibly by March 2011, despite sixteen months having passed since the passage of the bill, only 11 out of the 61 reforms had been implemented, the committee chairman had resigned in frustration at the slow pace of implementation. Critical components such as measures to review the role of security agencies, electricity generation projects, political outreach to Baloch stakeholders and increasing Baloch control of natural resources and broadcasting infrastructure, were still languishing in the “draft phase.”

Balochistan’s vast and rugged terrain presents additional problems. Security and violent incidents continue to hamper any development agenda, as do entrenched institutional biases—particularly among security agencies that have resisted any dilution of their presence and operational procedures. Endemic corruption and nepotism continue to persist and development strategies have failed to becoupled with any real attempts at political engagement.

Mega-projects designed to alleviate economic concerns can themselves be drivers of conflict. Various projects such as the Gwadar port are built largely with Chinese and Punjabi labor, largely excluding ethnic Balochs. As a result many projects are presumed to be inconsequential to the welfare of Balochs, and as a Punjabi plot to expand control and influence over Baloch resources. Given their historical interactions with the state, Balochs have little faith that the benefits of these projects will ever trickle down to assist in improving their condition. In reaction, separatist insurgents have mounted several attacks against workers and security personnel working at these installations, including on March 22, 2011 when gunmen killed 10 road construction workers near Gwadar, and a month earlier when between 3 and 10 FC soldiers were killed in a remotely detonated blast.

There is little evidence of outreach to nationalist groups, of any attempts to address the status of extrajudicial killings and unlawful detentions, or of attempts to reduce the security presence in Balochistan. This is particularly disconcerting because the most immediate and visible Baloch grievances relate to security issues, and economic redress by itself is unlikely to quell the depths of anger Balochs feel towards the Punjabi-dominated center.

The Separatist Rebellion

The scale of the violence affecting Balochistan must be kept in the perspective of its relatively small population of 7.8 million people, of which about half are ethnic Balochs. This means that the effects of violence are felt deeply across the population. The Pak Institute of Peace Studies counted 600 fatalities in 2010 across in 737 attacks mounted across a population about the size of Virginia, which in the Pakistani context equates to about 6,800 fatalities in the Punjab. Attacks

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in Balochistan have also significantly increased in quantity and lethality over the past few years as seen in Figure 4.2. It is however too early to tell if the 55% spike in deaths in 2010 over 2009 is a temporary phenomenon or the start of a significantly bloodier phase of the insurgency.

The present nationalist insurgency is the fifth in its kind. Previous insurgencies took place in 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, 1973-77, and were bloody affairs with the last two claiming about 3,000 and 2,000 lives respectively. The current rebellion began in earnest around 2004, and intensified in January 2005, after the rape of a female Baloch oilfield doctor by an army officer. Key drivers have included the usual package of grievances, including heavy militarization, the impunity and brutality with which security forces operate, alienation from political and economic modernization, perceived Punjabi encroachment on resource issues, and issues relating to the suppression of the Baloch culture. The insurgency has witnessed several new trends, notably the growing viciousness of insurgent tactics, and the increasing support for insurgents amongst the educated and middle-class Balochs.

The state response, as in each previous uprisings, has been heavy-handed, particularly so during the Musharraf era. Musharraf’s warning to insurgents in 2005 was indicative of his attitude towards the separatists; “Don’t push us. It isn’t the 1970s where you can hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won’t even know what hit you.” Despite this hardline rhetoric, a visit by Musharraf to highlight government successes in December 2005 was marred when separatists fired rockets near where he was speaking.

Follow on FC-led PAKMIL operations were severe. The closed nature of the area where international NGOs such as the International Red Cross are forbidden, makes exact casualty figures difficult, but it is believed that at least 3,000 people have been killed, and over 200,000 displaced as a result of military operations. Conditions in camps have been particularly bad. In 2007, when IDP numbers ranged around 85,000, UNICEF estimated that 28% of five-year olds in makeshift refugee camps were severely malnourished, and noted that 80% of recorded deaths were children under five—facts that incensed the Musharraf regime, and led to the expulsion of the UNICEF head in Pakistan. Today UNICEF estimates 116,210 IDPs in Balochistan and parts of Sindh, many from the Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts, the tribal heartland of the Marri and Bugti tribes, which are heavily represented amongst separatists.

This use of force, however, has done little more than consolidate Baloch anger, particularly the targeting of key Baloch leaders. The death of the highly respected 79-year old Bugti tribal leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who had been prominent in voicing his opposition, is widely regarded as having significantly escalated the insurgency. Security forces mortared Bugti’s house killing 60 of his people, but he survived and returned to the mountain ranges of Dera Bugti, his tribal lands,

482 Peter Tatchell, “The Baloch People have a Right to Self-Determination,” Open Democracy, April 27, 2010. Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/peter-tatchell/baloch-people-have-right-to-self-determination
with 5,000 of his tribesmen.\textsuperscript{486} PAKMIL offensives mounted a fierce punitive campaign in the area, and on August 26, 2006, helicopter gunships killed Bugti in his hideout.\textsuperscript{487}

The killing soon proved to be a grave miscalculation that catalyzed Baloch anger and led to widespread rioting, strikes and protests across Baloch areas, including in Karachi’s Lyari sector.\textsuperscript{488} Soon after the killing, Baloch nationalist forces held a jirga that was attended by more than 380 leaders, including 85 sardars, who petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to end the military occupation, a strong rebuff to Musharraf’s assertions that he controlled the loyalty of all but three sardars.\textsuperscript{489}

Criticism also came from non-Baloch sectors, including segments of the Army who feared a repeat of the 1971 East Pakistan experience, and from political opponents such as Punjab’s Nawaz Sharif who branded Musharraf a “killer.”\textsuperscript{490} Since then Pakistan, has killed other senior separatist leaders including Mir Balach Marri, purported leader of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in November 2007.\textsuperscript{491}

The end of the Musharraf era has not altered the situation and government forces continue to be consistently heavy-handed. Against the Baloch rebels, there is no evidence that the lessons learned in the FATA for more a sensitive tactical prosecution of kinetic operations are being applied in any earnest manner, or that PAKMIL and its local arms, notably local wings of the much-hated Frontier Corps (FC), believe anything but complete suppression is the solution.\textsuperscript{492}

The security services, particularly the FC and intelligence agencies, are often accused of extrajudicial killings, under a ‘kill and dump policy’ where individuals are abducted or ‘disappeared,’ with their bodies reappearing dumped on the streets with marks of torture on their bodies. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan counted at least 117 incidents of targeted killings in 2010,\textsuperscript{493} and a \textit{Guardian} investigation revealed that 1/3rd of all ‘kill and dump’ victims belonged to the Baloch Student’s Organization (BSO).\textsuperscript{494} By end-2010, Human Rights Watch estimated that there were 1,100 “missing” people,\textsuperscript{495} many taken into custody by uniformed personnel.\textsuperscript{496} Between October 2010 and February 2011, Amnesty International counted the disappearance or murder of at least 90 Baloch activists, teachers, journalists, and lawyers.\textsuperscript{497}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{487} “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Broken Mirror,” \textit{National}.
\item \textsuperscript{489} International Crisis Group, \textit{The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan}.
\item \textsuperscript{491} “Counterinsurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan’s Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications,” Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), July 15, 2008. Available at san-pips.com/download.php?f=pvt0004.pdf
\item \textsuperscript{494} Declan Walsh, “Pakistan’s Secret Dirty War.” \textit{BBC News}, March 29, 2011. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-pakistans-secret-dirty-war
\item \textsuperscript{495} “Their Future is at Stake,” Human Rights Watch.
\item \textsuperscript{496} “Balochistan Atrocities Continue to Rise,” Amnesty International.
\end{itemize}
Retaliations against civilians for separatist attacks are also often severe. A 2006 HRCP fact-finding mission in Balochistan found that in response to a bombing that killed three FC soldiers, the FC raided and burnt a nearby hamlet, executed 12 men and then demanded male members of the village come to collect bodies—the two who came were then also shot. Another HRCP mission conducted in May 2011 found that the situation had continued to deteriorate, and that enforced disappearances, and military impunity continued to remain rife.

Separatist insurgent dynamics too have changed, differentiating the conflict today from even the one in 2004. Most notable is the increasing diversity of nationalist fighters. A 2007 International Crisis Group reported that Marri and Bugti tribesmen who had dominated the early phases of the insurgency were now augmented by educated middle-class youth, and concluded that the insurgency “now crosses regional, ethnic, tribal and class lines.” This is particularly true of certain groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front, most of whose members are educated and ideological.

Such broad support is a marked change from previous conflicts, where tribal sardars provided insurgent leadership. The convergence of tribes and the educated middle class is a significant escalation in the depths of Baloch anger and their inability to conceive of a role for themselves in the Punjabi development model. Tribal support too is expanding. In the 1970s, the 180,000-strong Bugti tribe largely sat out a Marri-dominated insurgency; today they both, as the two largest tribes in Balochistan, have joined hands in the struggle along with other significant tribes such as the Mangals.

The mix of separatist groups operating in Balochistan has demonstrated signs of growing radicalization. The insurgency is now increasingly youth-led, in contrast to earlier sardari-led movements, and popular demands now focus on all-out independence, instead of the earlier more reasonable “autonomy minus defense, currency, communications, and foreign affairs.” Separatist groups include the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which draws many of its fighters from the Bugti and Marri tribes, the Balochistan Liberation Front, (BLF), the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan, and Jhawan Baloch Tigers.

Militant groups have grown increasingly hardline, targeting even fellow Balochs they suspect of collaboration or appeasement of the state. Persistent rumors have suggested that the assassination of prominent moderate Baloch leader, Habib Jalib Baloch in August 2010, may have been committed by separatist groups, in response to his emphasis on peaceful struggle. Similarly
the August 2010 assassination of Balochistan education minister Shafiq Khan Ahmed was despite his public lobbying for Baloch rights, and criticism of Pakistani military operations.509

Separatists have begun to expand their targeting scopes from government targets to all they perceive as collaborating with the state. Punjabi civilians, and educational facilities and personnel, have come under severe attack from militants who see them as tools to expand Punjabi hegemony and dilute Baloch culture. Human Rights Watch detailed the killings of 22 teachers and education personnel between January 2008 and October 2010, how separatist violence allowed schools to open for only 120 days in 2009, and how 200 teachers have fled the province with many others requesting transfers.510 The same is reflected in the local government. 1,600 government officials have also requested transfers out of Balochistan, burdening the already worst governance system in the country.511

Separatists continue to have considerable operational reach inside the province despite military suppression. On December 7, 2010, the Baloch Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani barely survived a bomb blast on his motorcade,512 and on March 22, 2010, the BLF killed 11 Punjabi road construction workers in the heavily guarded Gwadar district.513 The insurgency has also consistently targeted energy facilities, indicating that Pakistan’s outreach efforts, including the Aghaz-e-Haqooq package, have only had limited impact.

In the period of about a month between January 9 and February 13 in 2011, at least 25 gas pipelines were blown up in the eastern districts, and there were attacks on an additional 7 gas facilities, 9 electricity pylons, and a power plant.514 The BLA took responsibility for many of the attacks, which decimated the power sector, reducing available electricity from 1150 MW to 60–70 MW.515 HRCP also estimates that separatist attacks caused the Water and Power Development Authority at least PKR 1.5 billion in losses in 2007.516

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510 “Their Future is at Stake,” Human Rights Watch.
514 Madhia Sattar, “Pakistan’s Other War,” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/baluchistan_pakistans_other_war
515 Ibid.
Figure 4.2: Violence in Balochistan

### Figure 4.3: Force Composition in Balochistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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| **PAKMIL XXII Corps (Quetta)** |erate 33rd Infantry Division 16th Infantry Division Infantry Brigade Armored Brigade | Lt. General Javed Zia  
Primarily tasked with securing border with Iran and Afghanistan  
COAS Kayani (Feb 2011): Only one battalion in interior, restricted to Sui cantonment. All others deployed along border. |
| Frontier Corps         | 35,000-45,227| Primary paramilitary force for combating separatists  
Highly unpopular due to heavy-handed tactics, complicity in extrajudicial killings, non-indigenous composition, and complicity in criminal activities. |
| Coast Guards           | 1,200        | Alleged to have committed human rights abuses |
| Levies                 | 11,153 - 13,357| Localized forces that often owe primary loyalty to tribal sardars  
Patrol rural “B” areas but face significant capacity shortfalls |
| Balochistan Police     | 16,120 - 36,000| Note: Due to scarcity of available data, figures are best range estimates  
Reconciliation Attempts Fail to Address Core Grievances

On paper, Pakistan has made important strides towards reconciliation with measures such as the Aghaz-e-Haqooq reform package. But, as noted earlier, in reality reforms remain stalled with sections nowhere near implementation. The end result is that many Baloch nationalists now call for independence, a considerable advancement from earlier demands for autonomy, as they fail to conceive of the state redressing their core grievances. One of the most pointed has been the militarization of the province through the much-despised paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC).

Islamabad has long relied on the military to exercise its authority in Balochistan. The Quetta Cantonment houses the Command and Staff College, one of PAKMIL’s oldest and most prestigious military institutions, a reflection of the military’s historical presence. Today, the security presence remains severe. The 35,000-strong FC—which is a Pashtun majority force and is only 24% Baloch—mans 493 checkpoints, while the 1,200-strong Coast Guard mans another 87. The Musharraf-era construction of cantonments is another source of anger, particularly as many are situated in the interior, serving little defensive purpose, and oriented clearly towards subduing Baloch dissent and better controlling natural resources.

The Pakistani military made some progress in Balochistan under the stewardship of General Kayani. The Sui cantonment, the most contentious of all constructions, has now been reversed and converted into a military college to ease Baloch anger. In February 2011, Kayani declared that barring one battalion restricted to the Sui cantonment, all other regular army forces were deployed away from the interior. Kayani also voiced his support for a more equitable distribution of revenues from natural resource extraction.

The Pakistani military is engaged in a recruiting drive in Balochistan, with the intention of recruiting 10,000 Balochs by 2012. By March 2011, 1,673 Balochs had already been trained. Kayani has also emphasized the military’s positive role, pointing to its 47 army-run educational institutions that provide for over 23,000 students.

Despite these concessions, the preeminence of the security services remains untouched, and the issue of missing and detained Balochs is a key hurdle for the government. Even the Chief Minister of Balochistan has criticized the military’s zero-tolerance policies, accusing security services of running a “parallel government” that sabotages outreach efforts. This continues in spite of the judicial activism by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Chaudhry, who himself grew up in Quetta. In one incident, the courts threatened to arrest the director of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), if it did not produce people missing at the hands of intelligence.

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518 International Crisis Group, The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan.
521 “Baloch people has right on resources of province,” South Asian News Agency, February 21, 2011. Available at http://www.sananews.net/english/2011/02/21/baloch-people-has-right-on-resources-of-province-kayani/
523 Shahid, “Sui Cantonment Turned into Military College.”
agencies. As a result of their efforts two people were released.\textsuperscript{525} While these examples are encouraging, overall they have been insufficient to restrain the intelligence agencies. In 2009, Amnesty International identified 1,102 disappearances\textsuperscript{526} and the Pakistani Interior Ministry itself estimated that over 1,100 Balochs had “disappeared” during the Musharraf era.\textsuperscript{527}

Pakistan continues to deflect its responsibility for such problems by laying the blame on external powers such as India, which it accuses of assisting and arming separatist rebels, particularly Bramdagh Bugti of the BRA.\textsuperscript{528} Little tangible evidence exists of such collusion but certainly there is ample motive. It is likely some Indian desire to foment insurgency exists, but all evidence suggests to date its implementation is more aspirational than real.

Baloch leadership among both insurgents and political parties is fragmented, complicating outreach efforts. A variety of factors have driven this trend, including the growing disillusionment of Baloch youth with their elder’s abilities to deliver, continued and persistent tribal divides among nationalist forces, the deliberate targeting of senior Baloch leaders by paramilitary government forces, and the attempts by intelligence agencies to keep the Balochs divided and weakened. A May 2010 meeting between Prime Minister Gilani and senior Baloch nationalist leader Sardar Attaullah Mengal for example, was hailed as a major breakthrough, but quickly broke down as strong internal Baloch divides between the Mengals and the Marris surfaced.\textsuperscript{529} Personal attacks were leveled against rival leaders, significantly raising the potential for inter-tribal feuding.

Veteran Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai points to the “proliferation of splinter factions, far more radical, and led by younger and more emotional men,” and noted the influence that the diaspora exerts on setting the agenda.\textsuperscript{530} Jamil Bugti, the son of deceased Nawab Akbar Bugti, alluded to the same splintering effect when he noted that, “The next generation is all in the mountains. And they’re not willing to talk to anyone. People like me, and others, like the different nationalist parties that are in Parliament, they don’t have any role to play. They look good on TV. That’s it.”\textsuperscript{531} “Pakistan Murdabad” (Death to Pakistan) is now a common opposition chant, and many Baloch political parties have adapted to reflect the hardline demands of their constituents.

Dr. Abdul Hakeem Lehri, leader of the Balochistan Republican Party, purported to be the political face of the BRA, stated unequivocally, “We’re not interested in living with the corrupt Pakistani elite any more. We want freedom.”\textsuperscript{532} Moderate nationalist parties all boycotted the 2008 elections,\textsuperscript{533} and many continue to dismiss the Afghaz-e-Haqooq reforms, expressing their

\textsuperscript{525} International Crisis Group, \textit{The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan}.
\textsuperscript{527} “Their Future is at Stake,” Human Rights Watch.
\textsuperscript{530} Yusufzai, “The Baloch Insurgency is no Bluff.”
\textsuperscript{531} “Balochistan: Pakistan’s Broken Mirror,” \textit{National}.
mistrust of Islamabad’s ability to deliver, and their anger at the veto power central authorities continue to wield over local destinies. Growing radicalization has further threatened ordinary Balochs, who find themselves increasingly trapped between radical nationalists who punish any hint of collusion with the state, and security forces that have no tolerance for association with separatism.

Strong Military; Weak Police and Governance

The role of the military, and its paramilitary and intelligence arms, is heavily blamed for the growing radicalization of the Baloch national agenda. After almost a decade of intensified suppression, the argument goes security forces quite simply have tortured, murdered, and detained most moderate Baloch nationalists into radicalization.

Many leaders killed by the military had been from the earlier more moderate guard, including the Oxford-educated Nawab Akbar Bugti and Balach Marri, who had been open to dialogue with the state. Alongside intelligence agencies have worked hard to exploit tribal divisions, for example attempting to elevate the Kalpar and Masori factions of the Bugti tribes to dilute the traditional dominance of the Rahijas, who have accounted for the majority of tribal leaders, including Akbar Bugti.

These problems are compounded by weak local law-enforcement capacity that prevents localized police forces from taking primary internal security responsibility and allowing the paramilitary FC to return to its barracks. The province has traditionally been divided into ‘A’ and ‘B’ areas, with B areas compromising over 95% of territory, and A areas mainly population centers. Levy forces, which traditionally policed the ‘B’ areas were disbanded by President Musharraf, who saw them as private sardari armies, and forcibly integrated them into the formal police force. Such a policy did much to degrade local police capacity, particularly after sardari resentment.

Levy forces have since been resurrected and Balochistan’s police force is now focused largely on policing urban areas. Salaries too have risen 100% for levies and formal police forces. Despite this aggregate increase, there is no indication that the significant disparity in funding between levies and the police has been rectified. Levies receive 24% of overall funding, despite comprising 41% of the overall law enforcement force, and policing 59% of the population. Complementary prison capacity too remains weak, with Quetta District Jail suffering 131% overcapacity.

535 Zaman, “Inside Balochistan’s Ravaged Heartland.”
536 International Crisis Group, The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan.
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid.
The Taliban Sanctuary and Its Impact on NATO

Pashtuns make up the other half of Balochistan, and Balochistan has increasingly registered with coalition forces in recent years as a critical sanctuary for Afghan Taliban insurgents. Balochistan is an ideal rear staging area for Taliban insurgents, with long porous borders neighboring Afghanistan’s Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces, in all of which coalition forces are heavily engaged.

Eastern Balochistan is not easily separated from the FATA or the KPK, and is extremely close to critical militant centers such as South and North Waziristan. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) is the primary force in the region, with its leadership council believed based in the provincial capital of Quetta. In recent years, particularly since 2007, attacks against NATO convoys traversing Balochistan have increased in quantity and lethality, a significant escalation of overt Taliban presence.

The Musharraf era did much to facilitate the rise of Islamization in Balochistan, by state-sponsorship of the religious political coalition, the Muttahida-Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) to counter secular Pashtun and Baloch nationalism. As in the FATA, MMA rule did little to address core grievances, focusing instead on embedding religion into the social structure, and facilitating in the Talibanization of local culture. With the end of the Musharraf era, the MMA was swept out of power in the 2008 elections although it retains seats in the provincial parliament.

The majority of Taliban in Balochistan are believed to be Afghans, both from Afghanistan and from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, who use the province as a rear staging area and safe haven and are scattered in and around Quetta and its nearby refugee camps. Balochistan, by virtue of its geography, is ideally suited for Afghan infiltration. Quetta, the provincial capital is only a 10-hour drive from Kabul, and only 3 hours from the main Chaman border crossing, and the province’s long and porous borders allow for easy cross-border movement.

A 2006 UNODC investigation found no border posts along the long Chagai-Nimroz border, leaving open 300 kilometers. Frontier Corps sources also claimed that today there are still only two posts along in the Chagai and Nushki districts, two districts with the longest borders with Afghanistan. As a result, infiltration into Helmand, Kandahar, Nowshera, and Shorawak is relatively easy, and it is believed that Afghan fighters sometimes use hospitals in the cross-border town of Dalbandin in Chagai for wounded fighters.

The capital of Balochistan, Quetta is a warzone, populated by a lethal mix of extremist nationalists, political separatists, religious fanatics, narcotics and weapons smugglers, as well as international terrorists and foreign intelligence agencies. Sectarian violence and ethnic target killings are an almost daily occurrence as are attacks against government forces and institutions. Quetta is dominated by, but not fully controlled, by Pashtuns; various neighborhoods are Baloch

544 Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Opium, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2009, 134
546 Ibid.
547 Sood, “Balochistan: Behind an Iron Curtain.”
dominated, such as Sariab Road, Huddah, Brohi Road, and the Eastern and Western Bypasses and are no-go areas for other ethnicities, particularly Punjabis, but also Pashtuns and Hazaras.\footnote{Zaman, “Inside Balochistan’s Ravaged Heartland”; Ejaz Haider, “Immediate action needed in Balochistan,” Express Tribune, November 1, 2010. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/70492/immediate-action-needed-in-balochistan/}

Quetta has been a historical staging ground for war in Afghanistan, and is believed to be the command node for the QST command and control echelons, including Mullah Omar. Senior leaders such as now deceased Mullah Dadullah openly maintained residences and hosted parties in Quetta, including a September 2003 family wedding, at which JUI leaders, military officers and government officials were prominent guests.\footnote{Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation-Building in Pakistan (London: Penguin, 2008), 250.} It is often suggested that the ISI plays a critical role in facilitating Taliban sanctuary and logistics in the area.

Quetta has over a million Afghan refugees\footnote{“On the trail of the Taliban in Quetta,” BBC News, January 25, 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8472740.stm} and various Afghan neighborhoods in the city are outside the government’s writ including Pashtunabad, Kharotabad, and Kuchlak.\footnote{http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2009/10/14/afghan-refugee-camps-in-balochistan-are-taliban-breeding-ground/} Veteran Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid recounts how after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the JUI “virtually handed over Pashtunabad to the Afghan Taliban,” which soon treated it as its new capital.\footnote{Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 249.} Rashid also counted 50 JUI-run madrassas in 80-mile trip between Quetta and Chaman.\footnote{Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 249.} Indeed Maulana Noor Mohammad, who is also a senior leader in the JUI, runs the main madrassa in Pashtunabad, and openly admits to participation and support for the Afghan jihad.\footnote{Ibid.}

US officials have increasingly flagged Quetta as the command headquarters for the Afghan insurgency. In October 2009, a Financial Times report cited a leaked report prepared for General McChrystal that cited the Pashtunabad suburb of Quetta as the most likely hiding spot for the 12-15 members of the Quetta Shura, and described the area as the “Taliban’s post-office in Balochistan,” from where messages are relayed between the field and senior commanders.\footnote{US focuses on Taliban’s ‘post office’ at border,” Financial Times, October 13, 2009. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a63322c-b78e-11de-9812-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HnZpiVjt} The Institute for the Study of War concurs that senior leadership is based out of Quetta, and reports that its sanctuary allows for a “Quetta-based leadership to identify its priorities to Afghan-based leaders, who might need resolution at higher command echelons.”\footnote{Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Fosberg, “The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War, December 21, 2009. Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/25156509/Quetta-Shura-Taliban-ISW} This does not equate to direct field control, but rather directions and guidance including instructions at the start of fighting season, and strategic adjustments such as calling in reinforcements as the situation requires.

US military officials have increasingly voiced a desire for more aggressive action in Balochistan. The New York Times reported in mid-2009 of the Obama Administration’s desire to extend drone
operations into Balochistan, but it is clear that such activity constitutes a clear red line for Pakistani government and military officials.

In a break from the relatively low profile of the Taliban presence in Balochistan, Figure 4.4 shows that attacks on NATO convoys have become increasingly regular since 2007. Balochistan is a critical transit route for NATO non-military supplies, transiting from Karachi’s port, around Quetta to the Chaman border crossing. According to journalists, the Inspector General of the FC Balochistan claimed there were 159 attacks in 2010, which destroyed 194 trucks. These attacks are not crippling. Some 27,073 trucks passed through the Chaman border crossing in 2010 according to government officials. The lack of reliable data complicates assessments but violence appears to be increasing. Media reports suggest that in the space of one week in October 2010, over 150 NATO fuel tankers were destroyed in more than six attacks, and in 2011, as of July 2011, 40 of 60 NATO-related attacks across Pakistan had been recorded in Balochistan according to statistics collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal. Responsibility for these attacks was often claimed by the TTP, although they were less active in the province than the Afghan Taliban.

Growing sectarian violence has also been a source of concern. Sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) are believed to have traveled to the province. On Quds Day, in September 2010, over 50 people were killed and over 150 injured when suicide bombers dispatched by the LeJ attacked a Shia procession in Quetta. Both Deobandi fundamentalists and Baloch nationalists have targeted the Shi’ite Hazara community. Jundullah, a rabidly anti-Shia group also operates out of Balochistan, mainly into neighboring Iran. Despite the capture and execution of its leader Abdolmalek Rigi, its purported demise has proved premature. In July 2010, two of its suicide bombers struck the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing 27 and injuring 300 including two senior members of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC). Again on December 15, 2010, Jundullah suicide bombers attacked the Imam Hussein mosque in Chabahar, killing 38 and injuring over one hundred. Jundullah’s presence is a key source of irritation in Tehran, which greatly fears cross-border spillover inflaming its own restive Baluch population.

559 Ibid.

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Drugs and Interactions with Criminal Networks and Powerbrokers

Balochistan is a critical funding platform for Taliban insurgents and its intersections with criminal networks are extensive. Indeed it was the Quetta transport mafia that in the late 1980s persuaded the Taliban to advance on Kandahar to help secure some modicum of road security for their business interests, thereby creating the Islamic Emirate. Today key population centers such as Quetta host major fundraising networks for the Taliban, including narcotics smuggling, donations, and participation in other illicit enterprises.

Balochistan’s strategic location, and lack of functioning economy, has helped deeply entrench organized crime into the security landscape. Criminal enterprises fund the coffers of the Taliban, Baloch separatists, powerful political and criminal interests, as well as segments of the security services. The scale of activity is considerable. Virtually everything is smuggled across the border including drugs, guns, fuel, cosmetics, vehicles, cattle as well as migrants and trafficked humans.

The regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran comprise the Golden Crescent, one of the world’s largest opiate gateways. Balochistan sits at the intersection of all three. The province offers transit into Iran, as well as access to coastal routes, including the Makran coast, and the Gwadar and Karachi ports. The UNODC’s 2010 World Drug Report estimated that 40% of all Afghan heroin passes through Balochistan, and that 72% of total opium seizures between 2004 and

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2007 were in Balochistan. In 2010 too, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) seized PKR 782.63 million worth of narcotics in 103 raids.

Details are hard to come by, but it appears that significant overlaps exist between militancy and crime in Balochistan, including the sharing of cross-border routes, and the potential for militants (both Baloch and Taliban) to double between criminal and militant enterprises. A map of potential cross border smuggling routes identified by UNODC is shown in Figure 4.5.

UNODC identified the major Baloch routes as transiting from southern Afghanistan over the Chaman border crossing or other unregulated cross-border points towards Quetta or Dalbandin, and then moving either towards Iran for export to Turkey and Europe, or down to fishing villages and ports along the Makran coast for transit to various international destinations.

In addition to narcotics smuggling, other criminal enterprises including prostitution and forced labor are rife, exacerbated by the prevalence of refugee camps. Balochistan is also a key launch pad for migrants, particularly Afghans, seeking to enter Europe, and various simpler and more local illicit enterprises continue to flourish These include the smuggling of cattle, a matter that is depleting livestock levels in Pakistan.

The Taliban have extensive involvement in the criminal trade. Dennis Blair, the US director of national intelligence, estimated that the Afghan Taliban made $100 million in revenue from the drugs trade in 2008, while a former DEA official estimated the number to be closer to $300 million. After all, the original Kandahari Taliban began in the early 1990s, at the behest of, and with the backing of an “unholy alliance of drug smugglers, traders, and trucking groups.” It is unsurprising then that today analysts such as Gretchen Peters label the Taliban as more of a sophisticated drug cartel than a political movement.

Major traffickers pay directly to Taliban leaders. Insight into these arrangements came with the arrest of Haji Juma Khan, an ethnic Baloch who ran one of the region’s largest drug trafficking rings, with enough opium and laboratory capacity to supply the entire US market for two years. Khan had based his operations out of Quetta, and paid substantial sums to the Taliban for protection of his labs and supply routes. Traffickers are also billed for medical expenses incurred by Taliban fighters injured on the battlefield, with a USIP report detailing one major dealer who runs his own health clinic in Quetta, which is reportedly filled with wounded Taliban fighters.

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570 World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
576 Collins and Ali, “Financing the Taliban.”
fighters at any given time. Various Taliban affiliated tribes, particularly the Afridis and Shinwaris, are involved in the narcotics trade and straddle the border.

A 2010 CRS report on transnational crime examined various criminal syndicates and concluded that they already possess the capabilities to commit terrorist attacks and “can easily transfer this apparatus towards politically motivated ends.” This is likely particularly true in Balochistan, where the delineations between criminals and militants are often blurred. Various transnational syndicates have an institutionalized presence in Balochistan.

In recent years increased scrutiny along the Afghan-Iranian border has further increased the utility of the Baloch route, and today it is believed that ethnic Balochs are particularly prominent in the narcotics trade and “run the dominant smuggling networks heading southwest from Afghanistan.” Furthermore, although Pakistan was declared drug-free in 2001, various indicators suggest that limited cultivation has resurfaced in Balochistan, as well as the FATA/KPK and there are no indications that the flow of narcotics through Pakistan has diminished.

Even light enforcement can yield significant results. In 2006 for example, a relatively rare government raid netted two tons of morphine and eight mobile heroin factories, and in February 2011 only, official figures from Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), revealed the seizure of 2,590 kilograms of hashish and opium in Quetta alone.

Large segments of the opiate supply chain are based in Balochistan in addition to its primary role as a smuggling route. The Pakistani side of the border hosts many of the processing facilities that convert raw Afghan opium into heroin and the Chagai district near the smuggling hub of Baramcha in Helmand, “serves as a mega-heroin producing center, with capabilities of producing industrial quantities of morphine base and heroin.” Balochistan is also a relatively large end-user of opiates with the highest consumption rate in Pakistan at 1%, according to government statistics. The smuggling of precursor chemicals, used in heroin production, is another large smuggling racket that impedes Afghan counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency efforts.

Criminal enterprises often operate with the complicity of high-ranking government officials. A recent case linked a large cache of weapons, including AK-variants, RPG’s, 107mm antiaircraft guns, antipersonnel and antitank mines, to a member of the state cabinet. Similarly Imam Deen, the most wanted man by the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is believed to live without fear in

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577 Peters, “How Opium Profits the Taliban.”
578 World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
580 “Pakistan Country Profile,” UNODC.
581 World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
the city of Mand, and reputed to move around freely in Quetta with access to high-ranking politicians including the Chief Minister.  

The ANF appears hamstrung. A senior US law enforcement official complained of the ANF, saying, “They pick up the low lying fruit. We give them leads on targets. We give them phone numbers of traffickers they should be interested in. We are constantly doing that. We get smiles, a decent cup of tea, occasional reheated sandwiches, and assertions of progress, and we all leave with smiles on our faces.”

Figure 4.5: Major Pakistani Drug Trafficking Routes


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The Punjab is the “heart” of Pakistan. It is the most populous province, with 90 million of Pakistan’s 173 million people and is the country’s political, economic, and cultural center, as well as the heartland of its military and intelligence agencies. It is arguable that violence in the FATA or in Balochistan is only an irritant at Pakistan’s periphery, but violence inside Punjab is critical and the surest way to destabilize the state. Ethnic Punjabis mostly populate the province. They are the most privileged ethnic group in Pakistan with strong representation at the upper echelons of decision-making and the military high command.

The Punjab is divided into eight divisions. The three southern divisions of Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Multan, with their eleven districts, are most commonly considered to constitute south Punjab. Some districts from the Faisalabad and Sargodha divisions may also occasionally be incorporated as part of south Punjab. In aggregate the region suffers from considerable disparities relative to the rest of Pakistan, including endemic poverty, rampant corruption, ineffective governance or policing, and poor provision of basic services.

The Army primarily recruits from the province and it contains several strategically important cities, including the garrison city of Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan and Gujranwala. The Punjab has traditionally been relatively insulated from the violence in the periphery, but in recent years, particularly since the 2007 storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid, regular terrorist violence has plagued the province’s major urban centers.

The Punjab is also the nerve center for a number of militant groups including the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Many of these groups have been raised and nurtured since the Zia era in service of the state’s strategic interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Much militant influence and infrastructure is concentrated in the impoverished and underdeveloped areas of south Punjab that have seen little state investment or attention, and where human welfare metrics diverge sharply from the rest of the Punjab. State capacity and legitimacy are also weaker giving militants considerable freedom of action, including the open operation of various radical madrassas for recruitment and training.

In the past, the government tolerated, even encouraged, militants to serve in Kashmir. But in one of the most dangerous trends in Pakistan’s domestic insurgency, many former state-sponsored militant groups have broken ranks with Pakistan’s invisible establishment to actively target the state and collaborate with tribal militants in the FATA and KPK. The International Crisis Group has concluded, today these “violent Deobandi networks in Punjab lie at the root of Pakistan’s

militancy problem” and in June 2010, Interior Minister Rehman Malik claimed, “out of 1,764 persons associated with the two banned religious outfits Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Muhammad, 726 belonged to South Punjab.

The end results now threaten Pakistan as much as India. Many of these groups have forged operational links with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the group primarily responsible for the insurgency in the NWFP and the FATA, and they have come to be referred to as the ‘Punjabi Taliban.’ They have been implicated in a number of prominent attacks in recent years, both inside and outside Pakistan, including the formerly inconceivable storming of the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in October 2009.

**Failing the People While Playing Self-destructive Games**

The south Punjab scores lower, often significantly lower, in virtually all human-welfare metrics than the state average, which is seen in **Figure 5.1** adapted from data provided by the Punjab government for 2010. These problems have arisen as the result of government neglect, and southern districts have received far less state development funding than is their due, as seen in **Figure 5.2**. In the last few years, funding has trended upwards towards a more equitable distribution, but it remains to be seen if this will be sustained for the long-term. State institutions are similarly fewer and less resourced than their northern counterparts, as seen in **Figure 5.3**.

Although data provided by the state government shows institutional quantity that is relatively proportional to the population, it obscures the full picture. Quality remains suspect on all levels, including a substandard quality of teachers, a lack of resources and poor financial management. ‘Ghost’ schools and hospitals are not uncommon and those that exist are often in a state of considerable disrepair.

An investigative report by a Pakistani newspaper in 1998 uncovered over 4,000 ghost schools and 20,453 fake teachers, and there is no indication that these systemic problems have been tackled since. Little capital investment has also meant that the vast majority of Punjab’s industrial base is located in the north—seen in **Figure 5.4**—and of what little exists; the majority is concentrated in urban centers, excluding large segments of the populace. In Faisalbad for example, out of 1096 factories in 2008, 768 were located within Faisalbad City.

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Figure 5.1: Human Welfare in South Punjab Compared to State Average

![Figure 5.1](image-url)

Source: Created by authors from figures provided by the Government of the Punjab, Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab.

Figure 5.2: State Development Funding in South Punjab

![Figure 5.2](image-url)

Figure 5.3: Government Investment in South Punjab Relative to Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of population</th>
<th>% of police stations</th>
<th>% of hospital beds</th>
<th>% govt. run primary schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahawalpur</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG Khan</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>11.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>11.48</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sargodha</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>9.45</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>11.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalbad</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Punjab</td>
<td>31.49</td>
<td>30.71</td>
<td>21.47</td>
<td>34.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Punjab Plus</td>
<td>51.96</td>
<td>50.39</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>57.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Population figures are based on December 31, 2010 estimates provided by the GoP.

Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab.

Figure 5.4: Industrial Base of South Punjab (number of factories)

Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of Punjab.
Feudal landowners, in large part Shia, have been the traditional powerbrokers in south Punjab, allowing for both class and sectarian issues to fuse together. These problems and frustrations played a significant role in facilitating the rise of the rabidly anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in the southern district of Jhang in the 1980s,\(^\text{597}\) and today they continue to provide succor for the various hardline Sunni groups in the region.

The militant presence in southern Punjab has flourished over the past decades as they grew into a state-sponsored enterprise. President Zia ul-Haq used radical Sunni groups to suppress the minority Shias and to advance the anti-Soviet resistance in neighboring Afghanistan, while his successors used them to foment a proxy war in Indian Kashmir.

Consequently today, a variety of militant groups are firmly entrenched in south Punjab including the JeM, which maintains its headquarters in Bahawalpur, and the LeT, which has a strong presence across Pakistan, particularly through its humanitarian arm, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD).\(^\text{598}\) They continue to receive funding both from domestic and external sources, and “Wikileaks” has released a cable dated from 2008 that reported on funding from Saudi Arabia and the UAE estimated at about $100 million annually, with much flowing to radical Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith madrassas to help them make inroads into Barelvi-dominated areas.\(^\text{599}\)

The floods of 2010 may have strengthened this dynamic. As has become common in the wake of natural disasters in Pakistan, militant groups, notably the JuD, were some of the fastest and most effective humanitarian response units, winning both goodwill and legitimacy amongst the population. It was estimated that over 2,200 JUD relief workers were engaged in relief efforts in south Punjab and the tribal areas.\(^\text{600}\)

Militant groups have also firmly established their infrastructure in south Punjab, particularly madrassas for recruitment and financing. The madrassa sector has registered a considerable increase in recent years. Tamir Kamran, a Pakistani historian noted that the number of madrassas across the Punjab increased from 1,320 in 1998 to 3,153 by 2000.\(^\text{601}\)

A significant proportion of these madrassas have been in the south. A 1996 report counted 883 Deobandi mosques in Bahawalpur, outnumbering even Lahore, with another 361 in Dera Ghazi Khan, 325 in Multan, 149 in Sargodha. Ahle-Hadith and Barelvi mosques were excluded from the count.\(^\text{602}\) By 2008, the Intelligence Bureau counted 1,383 mosques in Bahawalpur division alone enrolling over 84,000 students.\(^\text{603}\) While the increase in madrassas is not synonymous with radicalism, it is unlikely that such an expansion in the madrassa sector came without some spike in those affiliated with violent militant groups.

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\(^\text{602}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{603}\) Ibid.
The Punjabi Taliban

The Punjabi Taliban, as they have come to be known, are generally believed to include the JeM, SSP, HuJI and the LeJ, or at the very least their splinter elements. The LeT, perhaps the most operationally prolific, is occasionally included in this grouping but it is markedly distinct from the others in that it has conscientiously avoided any violence within Pakistan. The ‘Punjabi’ term may also be an imprecise label in that these groups also contain Sindhis and Urdu-speakers.604

Traditionally all these groups worked in tandem with state strategy. The SSP was born in President Zia-ul-Haq’s Sunni fundamentalist era, where its rabidly anti-Shia inclinations were welcome, and it later splintered to also form the even more hardline LeJ. Similarly the LeT, JeM and HuJI were three of the most active groups inside Indian Kashmir, and have been implicated in various high-profile terrorist attacks inside India, including the joint JeM-LeT attack against the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the LeT attack on Mumbai in 2008.

With rising levels of domestic violence, and relatively more peaceful relations with India, Pakistani government support may have diminished. State-sponsored sectarianism is also no longer seen as a core objective, although it took until 2002 for the SSP and LeJ to be officially banned by President Musharraf.605 The Pakistani shift in focus from Kashmir towards Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the 2004 Composite Dialogue with India, caused disaffection in militant ranks and was a major incentive driving many militants to end ties with the state.606 Pakistani participation in the US ‘War on Terror’ and operations in Afghanistan also angered militants and after the 2007 storming of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid, many militant groups have turned their weapons against the state.

These groups (barring perhaps the LeT) have increasingly distanced themselves from the state, and moved towards the tribal militants of the KPK/FATA, in part to avoid intensifying pressure and scrutiny from the Pakistani government and Western nations, and in part to be closer to the pulse of the Afghan jihad. Prior to 9/11, many groups maintained some presence in Afghanistan, and many had long-standing relationships across the border from the time of the Soviet jihad. Others such as the SSP and LeJ formed them during crackdowns by Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1998-1999, when they fled over the border.607

The U.S. invasion in 2001 deprived these groups of their Afghan bases, while the subsequent scrutiny and pressure from the U.S., pushed them to relocate many of their training camps to the FATA but leave their mosque and madrassa networks in the Punjab and the Sindh intact.608 Punjabi militant groups have thus increasingly converged with the TTP. They have mounted joint attacks such as the 2009 attack on the GHQ, the 2010 attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore,

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606 Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network.”
608 Ibid.
and many others. Cooperation is now reportedly so extensive that leaders of the Punjabi Taliban network are represented on the TTP’s leadership shura.

The geographical position of south Punjab has helped assist this trend. The district of Dera Ghazi Khan for example borders both South Waziristan and Balochistan, and thus has easy geographical access to militant strongholds. Between March 2005 and March 2007 over 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab reportedly moved to South Waziristan to develop logistical networks. They were readily integrated and during the 2007 feud between TTP leader Maulvi Nazir and Uzbek militants, a sizeable contingent of Punjabis from banned militant groups fought alongside Nazir’s forces.

As Figure 5.5 shows, the Punjabi Taliban is growing to become one of Pakistan’s gravest security challenges and has mounted some of Pakistan’s most notorious terrorist attacks. It has excellent knowledge of security dynamics in the urban heartland, unrivaled operational sophistication and greater capacity to disrupt domestic, regional and even global stability. It has benefited from years of state patronage and ISI training, assisting in its operational development. Tariq Pervez, head of Pakistan’s National Counterterrorist Authority (NACTA) better explains their role in the militant supply chain; “Ideas, logistics, cash [comes] from the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians and Saudis, are on hand to provide the chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists plot the attacks, while the Pakistan Taliban provides the martyrs.”

Constituent groups within the Punjabi Taliban have also developed closer inspirational and operational ties to al-Qaeda. For example former HuJI commander Ilyas Kashmiri, so known for loyal service in Kashmir, was a senior military commander for al-Qaeda, leading Brigade 313 of the HuJI and perhaps also the shadowy Lashkar-al-Zil (Shadow Army) cell. Kashmiri was implicated in various terrorist plots against Pakistani and Western targets, and reportedly killed in a US drone strike in June 2011.

Similarly the LeJ is today regarded as the lynchpin of alignment between al-Qaeda, the TTP and domestic sectarian outfits, and has been implicated in numerous high-profile anti-Western and sectarian attacks including the 2008 Marriott bombing in Islamabad, possibly the 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the 2010 attack on Ahmadi mosques in Lahore.

The International Crisis Group has alleged that SSP and LeJ madrassas, mosques and training camps are extensively used as “conduits for foot soldiers, arms and funds from Punjab to other parts of the country, including NWFP and FATA”. The Punjabi Taliban have also reportedly participated in some of the most high-profile attacks in Pakistan, notably the 2009 attack against

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610 Khan, “Untangling the Punjabi Taliban Network.”
612 Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network.”
613 Ibid.
614 Ibid.
the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. The attack, as clear a declaration of war as any, demonstrated the group’s operational reach, and interestingly utilized many of the fidayeen tactics groups honed in operations against India.

Lack of Law Enforcement Capability and Political Will

The inability of Pakistani internal security agencies to cope with the Punjabi Taliban threat is as much a result of shortfalls in law enforcement capacity and related government services as a lack of political will. Security forces are under-strength and often outmatched and outgunned by militants. The entirety of Punjab has an end-strength of 160,000-180,000 police officers, which amounts to one officer for every 520-585 people, well above the UN peacetime recommendation of 1:400.

The problem is much more acute when one considers that only 40,000 of 180,000 officers are actually permanently stationed in police stations, whereas the rest are used for VIP protection and traffic policing, according to a study by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. More leakages result from political manipulation. By example, a staggering 6,000 officers are said to be guarding the four residences of Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif alone! In addition, political rivalries, between the federal and state governments and between civilian and military agencies, have led to blame casting disrupting effective intelligence coordination and sharing.

Endemic shortfalls in manpower availability, mirrored in equipment, training procedures, and professionalism, law enforcement personnel are often outmatched and easily intimidated by militants. For example, in 2009 an attempt to arrest a hospitalized JeM commander in Bahawalpur was called off after militants threatened to blow up police stations and schools if the arrest went ahead. The commander was then given safe haven by a local JeM madrassas. In Bahawalpur city the JeM openly maintains madrassas in the center of town, as well as a six acre property outside the city that many believe is a training facility. With such weakness even in urbanized areas, it is no wonder then that the volatile borders of south Punjab are left “almost unguarded from cross-border infiltration.”

Filing capacity shortfalls will be essential, but there is little obvious spare capacity. The Army recruits heavily in the Punjab, and consequently any army deployment is highly unlikely. So far no obvious large-scale efforts have been implemented, although Prime Minister Gilani has offered the deployment of paramilitary Rangers to assist law enforcement personnel.

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621 Petzschmann, “Pakistan’s Police between Centralization and Devolution.”
622 Ibid.
625 Ibid.
Analysts, such as Ayesha Siddiqua, have suggested that the roots of Pakistani reluctance to confront the Punjabi Taliban groups lies deeper, and includes an unwillingness to accept (or attract U.S. attention to) anti-state militancy inside “mainstream Pakistan.” This state of denial is often evident in government statements, and until recently most Pakistani government and security officials adamantly denied any significant pocket of militancy in south Punjab.

Moreover some in the Pakistani security and intelligence agencies may continue to believe that despite the ongoing structural changes in militant dynamics, they can continue to exert control and influence over their erstwhile strategic proxies, They seem to believe that should any group completely fall out of line, they will be dealt with in the manner of Al-Furqan, another former Punjabi-based militant group. Having fallen out of favor with the security establishment, the group was quickly discarded and its emir killed in Bahawalpur in 2009.

The constituent groups of the Punjabi Taliban are considerably larger, more organized, and more entrenched than Al Furqan, and it seems unlikely they would prove as easy a task. Furthermore, to date some of the groups within the Punjabi Taliban network—less so the SSP and LEJ, and more so the LeT—continue to enjoy a level of state toleration in the hopes of retaining the potential future utility against India. For example, leaders of the JeM and LeT, Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafeez Saeed respectively, have faced little more than a revolving door of arrests, despite both being listed on the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Yet, Hafiz Saeed has been seen at various public rallies around Pakistan, including leading 4,000 supporters to protest and mourn the killing of Bin Laden.

627 Siddiqua, “Terror’s Training Ground.”
629 Siddiqua, “Terror’s Training Ground.”
630 Office for Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”
### Figure 5.5: Attacks inside the Punjab

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Suspected Responsibility</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2011</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Two suicide bombers attack Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan, killing at least 41, and injuring over 85.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3, 2011</td>
<td>TTP/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Bomb blast at gas station in Faisalabad near ISI offices kills 32, injures over 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2, 2011</td>
<td>AQ/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti assassinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1, 2010</td>
<td>Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Three bombings in Lahore target Shia processions, killing 25, and injuring 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 2010</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Two suicide bombers in Lahore attack Sufi shrine, the Data Darbar Complex, killing at least 50, and injuring over 200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 2010</td>
<td>TTP/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Coordinated attacks on minority Ahmadi mosques kill 86 and injure 120 in Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8, 2010</td>
<td>TTP/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Suicide VBIED targets Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) building in Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 2010</td>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Suicide attack in RA Bazaar, within a military cantonment area of Lahore kills 62, including several soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 8, 2009</td>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Militants attack ISI office in Multan killing at least 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 4, 2009</td>
<td>TTP and “allied” groups</td>
<td>Taliban suicide bombers mount complex attack against mosque in Rawalpindi frequented by Army officers and their families. 40 are killed including two senior generals, and 83 wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 2009</td>
<td>TTP/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>Militants storm Army GHQ in Rawalpindi. Attackers killed several, including a Brigadier and took hostages. Military storms building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27, 2009</td>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Suicide VBIED targets offices of ISI and city police in Lahore, killing 27, injuring 326 and destroying building of Rescue 15 police service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 2009</td>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Attackers overran police training compound in outskirts of Lahore, killing over 50 cadets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3, 2009</td>
<td>AQ/TTP/Punjabi Taliban</td>
<td>A bus carrying members of the Sri Lankan cricket team is attacked in Lahore. At least six security personnel were killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 21, 2008</td>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Suicide bombing outside Wah cantonment kills at least 70. Wah is rumored to be a major nuclear weapons assembly site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This list is not exhaustive and is intended to be representative.

Karachi is Pakistan’s economic engine, generating over 60% of Pakistan’s total revenues and accounting for more than half its GDP. It is the site of Pakistan’s only major international port and serves as the prime transit route for NATO materiel to Afghanistan. Yet despite its importance to Pakistani stability, Karachi faces steadily escalating levels of violence, including a 228% spike in violence in 2010, as seen in Figure 6.1. According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, the upward trend in violence continued in 2011.

Casualty figures in Karachi have been the highest since 1995, the peak of the ethnic warfare in the early 1990s that devastated Karachi. Entrenched feuding for power, resources, and political space in Karachi has intensified considerably, and in the first half of 2011, 490 people were killed in “targeted killings”—essentially political, sectarian or ethnically motivated assassinations—according to figures provided by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

The city’s dense network of madrassas is a cradle that sustains at least some militancy in Pakistan, by providing ideological inspiration, and in some cases funding, training, and manpower. Many maintain links to various militant groups including Al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Simultaneously, as fighting and drones strikes have mounted in the FATA/KPK, a growing number of al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban and TTP members have migrated to the urban invisibility of Karachi’s sprawling Pashtun slums, and occasionally mounted deadly attacks against high-value targets in Karachi. The risk of these trends merging runs the very real risk of destabilizing Karachi, and in turn Pakistan.

Figure 6.1: Terrorist Violence in Karachi (2008-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Internal Sources of Violence

Karachi sits astride a vicious ethnic fault-line, pitting the growing Pashtun minority against the dominant Mohajir community and their loosely confederated Sindhi partners. Each ethnic base represents its interests through its political party—the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) for the Mohajirs, the Awami National Party (ANP) for the Pashtuns and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) for the Sindhis. On the streets of Karachi their well-armed politico-militant forces have waged bloody turf warfare for political space in the city. Expanded territorial control has meant votes, patronage from legal businesses and powerbrokers, as well as involvement in various lucrative criminal enterprises, facilitating a nexus between politics and crime. The relationship can be symbiotic. Criminal gangs help augment the street strength of political parties, and both profit from various criminal schemes, including land-grabbing, extortion, and even kidnapping, drugs and trafficking.

The MQM is particularly well organized, having been the predominant force in Karachi for numerous decades. In recent years, an exodus of Pashtun refugees fleeing fighting in the northwest has put increasing pressure on the MQM, which fears any shift in the demographics (and by extension, political power) of the city. Nonetheless, the MQM is a powerful political force in Pakistani politics, and was a part of the ruling PPP-led federal coalition government. In end 2010, in opposition to a fuel-subsidy reform bill, it demonstrated its power as a kingmaker in Pakistani politics by threatening to quit the coalition and collapse the government. Although temporarily mediated, by July 2011, the MQM officially quit the PPP-led coalition and joined the opposition PML-N party.

The decision to quit the government sparked a surge in violence in Karachi, and three nights in July resulted in almost 100 deaths from political and ethnic violence (by end July the toll has climbed to 185). Violence centered in the local neighborhoods of Qasba Colony, Orangi Town and Benaras Chowk, some of the many local fault-lines between lower class Pashtuns and Mohajirs, and areas where MQM is losing ground to the ANP because of Pashtun encroachment. Violence in not universal across the city, and certain wealthy and heavily guarded neighborhoods are oases of stability. The slums that grow nearby to meet their needs may not be as stable or fortunate.

Mohajir-Pashtun tensions, as a result of the growing Pashtun migrant population, are now at perhaps their highest point since the early 1990s. Pashtuns in Karachi already number 3.5 million including half a million Afghans, a number rivaling Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-majority KPK province. Increased incidence of terrorism and crime as a result of this large and unregulated population surge has not helped tensions.

Figure 6.2 shows two different estimates for violence in Karachi. These are the worst figures since 1995, a period of widespread ethnic strife that provoked “Operation Cleanup,” a 2-year Army intervention and resulted in large-scale low-intensity urban warfare. Even today the city remains awash in weaponry, including sophisticated urban warfare equipment such as RPGs,

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634 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghans in Karachi: Migration, Settlements and Social Networks, Center for Social Science Research, March 2005.
laser-sighted automatic rifles and phosphorus grenades, all of which have been reported used in street battles.

An upward trend in violence has continued and even escalated. 260 people were killed in the merely the first quarter of 2011, a figure that is almost the same as casualty figures for the entirety of 2008, according to the Human Rights Commission. Violence has been unrelenting, and prone to sporadic horrific outbursts of large-scale bloodshed. In March 2011, over 50 people were killed in less than a fortnight of violence, another 185 so far in July. Non-affiliated civilian institutions have also come under threat and hospitals and doctors are reported to be under pressure to not treat opposition sects in the aftermath of turf battles.

There has been a growing convergence in political and sectarian violence. The ruling MQM for example, now alleges that its workers are being targeted by not just political competitors, but also sectarian groups such as the LeJ and the SSP, in reaction to both Shia representation inside the MQM, as well as its strong public stance against religious extremism. In September 2010, the violence reached London where one of the founding members of the MQM was assassinated, compounding rioting and violence. The criminal element is believed to play a large role. Many hits are just another form of turf warfare to control protection rackets, land grabs and other illicit enterprises inside the city.

To date, police capacity has proven far too inadequate to combat the threat. The usual problems of training, equipment and morale come into play, but Karachi’s police are further constrained by the influence of politicians who often interfere in police work to protect their own party loyalists. Police raids also often arrest people based solely on their ethnicity, another trigger for discontent. In April 2011, Prime Minister Gilani promised an additional 5,000 police for Karachi, but in the interim the onus has fallen upon the better-trained paramilitary Rangers. The Rangers have been given expanded policing powers, and priority access to funding and equipment, yet have failed to constrain the violence. Some residents who disapprove of the
militarization of the city criticize their presence. In the wake of the July 2011 violence, 1,000 additional Rangers were ordered to Karachi with “shoot-on-sight orders.”

Figure 6.2: “Targeted Killings” in Karachi

![Bar chart showing the number of incidents reported by HRCP and CLPC from 1995 to June 2011.]

Source: Human Rights Commission Pakistan, Citizens Police Liaison Committee.

A Taliban Financing and Operational Hub

Mounting ethnic tensions make the rise of Taliban militants even more troubling, given their potential to fuse with legitimate Pashtun economic and social grievances. Karachi’s Pashtun slums, notably the sprawling slums of Sohrab Goth, provide ample urban sanctuary where drones, and security forces, cannot follow.

Karachi’s economic importance helps provide the resources to finance and equip the insurgencies including hawala networks, medical facilities, safe houses and access to organized transnational crime syndicates leading to Karachi becoming the Taliban’s “revenue engine,” according to Karachi mayor Syed Mustafa Kamal. CBS similarly reported that Agha Jan Mohtasim, the former Taliban Finance Minister’s presence in Karachi was an attempt to tap into wealthy donors in the city and “draw a significant amount of money into the organization” by reaching out to his “direct contacts” in Karachi. Hawala networks and banking systems in

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Karachi allow militants to launder money. A 2009 police investigation revealed $17 million of militant funds, suspected to have been transferred to the tribal provinces from one bank in Karachi alone.648

A spate of arrests in 2010 demonstrated Karachi’s importance to militants and extremists. In February, an early morning raid netted Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban’s second in command and top-ranking military commander.649 A few days later, Mohtasim and another ranking member of the Quetta Shura were arrested in Karachi.650 Some analysts have even suggested that the “Quetta Shura” was actually a smokescreen, and that Afghan Taliban leaders were in fact been sheltered in Karachi by the Pakistani security establishment under an ultra-secret “Karachi Project.”

Many low ranking members of the TTP are believed to be moving into Karachi to evade Pakistani military operations in the FATA. They have targeted pro-government leaders who fled to Karachi, including members of peace committees, former heads of lashkars and anti-Taliban maliks.652 This violence is not unidirectional and occasionally Taliban militants are themselves killed by Pashtun IDPs in retaliation for their plight.653

Transnational terrorists, and al-Qaeda are believed to have a strong presence inside Karachi. In fact recently released evidence from interrogations of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay reveal the importance of Karachi for al-Qaeda. The city served as a “workshop for its media and financial operations, strategic planning and it served as a reliable hideout.”

Various al-Qaeda leaders have been arrested in Karachi,655 and in December 2010 security forces arrested over 400 people in the city on suspicions of terrorism.656 Karachi has also been used an operational hub for global terrorism and linked to various plots and a long list of terrorists including the shoe-bomber Richard Reid, the 9/11 hijackers Muhammad Atta and Zacarias Moussaoui, all of whom passed through the city before executing their attacks.

Rising Levels of Taliban Violence

While groups such as the Afghan Taliban have relied on the city’s provision of “non-violent assets” such as sanctuary or fundraising, the Pakistani Taliban and its sectarian partners are considerably more violent. During the reign of Beitullah Mehsud, organized crime, including

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652 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi targeted killings of Pashtuns tied to militant groups,” Central Asia Online, April 1, 2011. Available at http://tiny.cc/n2kh3
656 “TTP network busted in Mangophir, 400 held,” Geo, December 7, 2010. Available at http://geo.tv/12-7-2010/75454.htm
bank robberies, kidnappings and extortion, were a key means to finance the insurgency and in 2009, 80% of bank robberies in Karachi were jihadi related. Kidnappings reached their highest levels in decades and ransom payments were reported to be Beitullah Mehsud’s single largest revenue stream. Other activities include skimming off Pashtun-dominated businesses such as the earth-excavating business off which the Mehsud tribe allegedly took 40% of earnings.

Militants have shown a greater willingness to attack strategic targets within Karachi, as the insurgency has grown more vicious. The city houses numerous high-value targets including the port, which is the entrance point for 75% of NATO supplies; the city’s oil terminal, which stores most of Pakistan’s imported oil; and the Super Highway, the main thoroughfare for NATO materiel, which transits right by the largest Pashtun slum of Sohrab Goth. As early as a year ago, Karachi was relatively insulated from the insurgency and to a degree it still is, but attacks are increasing.

In November 2010, an anti-terrorist police compound was hit by a VBIED and small arms fire killing 18 and injuring more than 100, in what may have been an attempt to break out some arrested LeJ militants. The TTP took credit for the attack, although security agencies have claimed the involvement of the LeJ. Other attacks have included an attack on a NATO convoy in Baldia on January 28, 2010, a failed attack on the oil terminal in September 2009, an attempted assassination on Benazir Bhutto when she returned from exile that killed 139 people. The LeJ also mounted an attack on Shia pilgrims in December 2009, fusing both sectarian and anti-state violence, a worrying combination.

These attacks have not abated. In one week in April 2011, suspected militants mounted three attacks against Navy personnel in the city, bombing buses carrying personnel to work. In May 2011, the highest profile attack to date took place on the PNS Mehran Naval base, which was assaulted by a fidayeen squad that destroyed two P3-C Orion ASW aircraft, and killed about 10 security personnel. This attack was highly embarrassing to Pakistani security officials and enhanced growing worries on their ability to protect sensitive installations.

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The Madrassa Factor

Karachi’s crowded madrassa landscape includes all sects, and many are completely unassociated with violence, but there are at least some elements that support fundamentalist Sunnis philosophies and have added to bloody, and ongoing, rounds of sectarian violence. Karachi-based madrasas represent nearly all South Asian Islamic sects including the Sunni Wahhabi-influenced Deobandis and Ahle-Hadiths, the more Sufi-influenced Ahle e Sunnat Barelvis, the Shias, and those run by the Islamist political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami. Some have ties to sectarian, regional and global jihadist groups.

The official 2004 Ministry of Education figure lists 979 madrasas in Karachi, a figure that is universally scoffed at. The Deobandis alone claim over 1,500 and new ones appear with alarming regularity. This high concentration includes a “jihadi cradle” that has sustained insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as considerable sectarian violence. Three major aggressor-target alignments have emerged over the years, each with significant overlap; the Sunni-Shia rivalry, the intra-Sunni Deobandi-Barelvi conflict and anti-Western terrorism.

Ultra-puritanical Deobandis run a large majority of Karachi’s madrasas, and have benefited from Saudi Wahhabi petrodollars and state patronage in reward for significant involvement in the Soviet jihad. The most prominent, and notorious Deobandi madrassa is the Jamia Uloom Islamia, informally known as Binori Town after its location. As the birthplace of the Afghan jihad, it carries the mantle of Deobandi leadership in Pakistan and has made little secret of its support for the Taliban. It established and has close links to some of the best-known Pakistani jihadi outfits, including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the rabidly anti-Shia Sipahe-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).

Former head cleric of Binori Town Maulana Nizamuddin Shamzai was believed to have been Osama Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor and the founder of the anti-Indian Jaish-e-Mohammed, Maulana Masood Azhar was both a student and a teacher at Binori Town. Figure 6.3 highlights other Deobandi madrasas cited for concern including the Jamia Darul Uloom Karachi, Darul Uloom Halafia and the Jamia Binoria, which operates a branch in New York.

The Jamia Binoria International madrassa, the largest in Karachi, while touted as more moderate, caters to “several hundred students from 29 countries,” including Somalia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Many, according to the Associated Press are admitted with no security clearance. Recently Mohammed Rehan an associate of the failed New York Times Square car bomber, Faisal Shahzad was arrested when he left the Bathha Mosque in Karachi run by the JeM.

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667 Ibid.
672 Kathy Gannon and Ashraf Khan, “Karachi mosque draws investigators into NY bombing,” Associated Press, May 6, 2010. Available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5mRGSMstmEYcykTPn1iLKC8fyyEAD9FHISKO0
The Ahle-Hadiths are a Salafi sect that receive the lion’s share of Saudi funds and offer some of the most radical and puritanical interpretations of all Pakistani Sunni sects. Despite having a relatively small number of madrassas in Karachi, 36 by the ICG’s count, they are prominent, particularly the Jamia Abu-Bakr al-Islamia madrassa that is closely linked to the LeT.

Ahle-Hadith madrassas are also considered more international in their outlook, rarely turning away foreigners unlike many of the Deobandi madrassas. As a result numerous foreign students are enrolled at their campuses including the brother of the leader of Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya, responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings. Other Karachi Ahle-Hadith madrassas include the Darsatul Islamia run by the Jamaat-ud-Dawaa (JuD), the charitable arm of the LeT, and is often frequented by LeT leader Hafeez Saeed.

The Jamaat-e-Islami is the oldest religious political party in Pakistan, and has approximately 97 mosques with over 8000 students in Karachi, including the Markaz Uloom-e-Deeniya’s Alfalah Academy in Sarjani Town, Jamiatul Ikhwani madrassa in New Karachi, and Jamia Darul Islam in Gizri Town. Madrassas belong to the Jamaat have supported jihad across the globe and their alumni have been found on global battlefields, including Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bosnia.

Madrassas belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami have been accused by some of having some of the most visible ties to international jihadi organizations. By example, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a senior Al-Qaeda figure, was arrested at the Karachi apartment of a Jamaat member. The Jamaat is also heavily connected to the political pulse of Karachi, and has often been drawn into violent political turf battles and street riots.

The Barelvi madrassas, while popularized as the most moderate, are not free of their share of radical militant elements. Most connected to Sufi traditions, the Barelvis are large and organized, but are not trained for war like their Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith counterparts. They fight largely to dilute Deobandis and Ahle-Hadith control of Sunni mosques and urban spaces to raise funds and followers. In recent years, they have found themselves in the cross hairs of Deobandi militant groups and have suffered severe blows as a result.

In 2006, 47 Barelvis, including the entire leadership structure of their militant wing, the Sunni Tehreek, was decapitated in a suicide bombing in Karachi’s Nishtar Park. The attack was blamed on militants from the LeJ and the SSP. On June 12, 2009, Sarfraz Naeemi, a prominent Barelvi cleric, was killed by a Taliban suicide bomber in retaliation for his outspokenness against Taliban extremism, and attacks on Sufi shrines in the rest of Pakistan are now not uncommon.

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675 Ibid.
Barelvis in Karachi have grown increasingly agitated in response to these attacks against their leaders, renewing worries of sectarian violence. In April 2010, Barelvis in Karachi burnt effigies of Mufti Naeem, the chief cleric at the Deobandi Jamia Binoria, and chanted slogans equating all Deobandis with the Taliban.682

More recently in the aftermath of the several incidences of Islamist rage such as the assassination of Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, the the release of CIA-contractor Raymond Davis or the killing of Osama Bin Laden, they have jointly protested with the Deobandis. It is uncertain if this solidarity on the street will hold.

Vulnerable Shi’ites

The minority Shia community is the most vulnerable in Karachi, and is numerically dwarfed by its Sunni counterparts. The ICG counted about 132 Shia mosques in Karachi with only 36 having attached madrassas.683 Some of these are believed to have close links with the Shia militant wing, the Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP). The SMP is a reactionary counterpart to the SSP and is considerably more active in the Punjab and tribal areas than in Karachi, although they are known to travel to the city in times of religious strife.684

Shiite religious processions are especially vulnerable. In December 2009, on the holy Shia day of Ashura, a suicide bomber attacked a Shi’ite religious procession killing at least 40 and injuring dozens more.685 In February 2010 on the next major Shi’ite festival, a double bombing struck a Shia procession killing 22.686

Shia communities by virtue of their size cannot easily afford open warfare. Some theories believe that the torching of thousands of shops in the aftermath of the Ashura bombing was carried out by enraged Shi’ites venting their fury against Pashtun traders whom they equated with the anti-Shia Taliban and SSP. Attacks on prominent Sunni clerics including Maulana Haideri, a senior leader of the SSP and Mufti Jalalpuri, head of a hardline anti-Shia Sunni organization have also been attributed to Shi’ite retribution.687

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684 Ibid.
**Figure 6.3: Radical Madrassas in Karachi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Militant Affiliations</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamiatul Rasheed Ehsanabad</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassa Khalid Bin Walid</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Harkat Jihad-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Ehsanul Uloom</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darul Uloom Rehmania</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Harkat Jihad-i-Islami</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Anwarul Quran</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Mujahidin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Abu Bukar</td>
<td>Ahle-Hadith</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Police uncovered “sleeper cell” of 19 JI cadres in 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darasitul Islamia</td>
<td>Ahle-Hadith</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td>Regular venue for speeches by LeT leader Hafeez Saeed,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassa-e-Arabia Faizanul Quran</td>
<td>Ahle-Hadith</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Heavy weapons and explosive materials recovered in 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Darasat al-Islamia</td>
<td>Ahle-Hadith</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrassa Hussein Bin Ali</td>
<td>Ahle-Hadith</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Taiba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamia Farooqia</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Various militants including TTP leader Qari Hussein Mehsud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darul Ifta-e-Wal Irshad</td>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>Al Qaeda, Harkat-al-Ansar</td>
<td>Operated by the Al Rashid Trust, which is accused by the State Department for links with Bin Laden and the JeM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This list is intended to be representative, rather than exhaustive.


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688 A significant proportion of this data is taken from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/pakistan/130_pakistan_karachi_s_madrasas_and_violent_extremism.ashx and Ali, “Karachi becoming a Taliban Safe Haven?”


Pakistan currently has a critical impact on U.S. strategic interests, in the struggle against global terrorism, in Afghan stabilization efforts, and in efforts to reduce the risk of violent conflict in the region. Increasingly however, the US has found that its influence in Pakistan is extremely limited, despite almost a decade of unprecedented aid and attention, including $4.34 billion in 2010. Relations with Pakistan have undergone unprecedented turbulence by the spring of 2011, particularly in the aftermath of the May 2nd US Special Forces raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in the garrison city of Abbottabad.

Pakistan’s critical role in the Afghan conflict was clearly recognized in the formulation of President Obama’s ambitious new strategy unveiled in December 2009.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.

America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

At the same time, US and ISAF forces were also aware of the difficulties involved in such a strategy, and an ISAF intelligence briefing summarized the challenges Pakistan posed as follows:

- Pakistan is as or more complex than Afghanistan
  - Tribal and religion overtones, yet strong national identity, multiple ethnicities, most desire some form of democracy, a worsening economy but a nuclear weapons state
- Foreign intervention resented in most of the country
  - Predominantly an Indian issue, but strong resentment against the US and UK; appears to be growing against Taliban
  - Tribal values and traditional core beliefs still dominate large parts of the country
  - “Outsiders” trying to impose new ideas and beliefs create tension; nature of tribal traditions can supersede Islam

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• Army is perceived to be more capable (and dependable) than the government
  – Regarded as a positive influence in the FATA and NWFP because they are locally recruited and able to work within local systems
  – Large numbers of internally displaced people from years of fighting, a poor economy and natural disasters
  – Potential breeding ground for the Taliban…but offers opportunities for counter-radicalization programs
  – Violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the Government of Pakistan
  – Demonstrates an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment.
• Staying the course in Pakistan as important as staying the course in Afghanistan.695

Unfortunately as a result of many of the challenges described in the ISAF briefing, and throughout this book, President Obama’s vision has not come to pass. The military retains primacy, civilian institutions remain weak and dysfunctional, and economic prospects have worsened. A year later, by the time of the Obama Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Review, the US had substantially scaled down its goals for US-Pakistani relations in favor of a narrower counterterrorist strategy focused on combating al-Qaeda:

> Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat al-Qa’ida and prevent its return to the region. We seek to secure these interests through continued, robust counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation and a long-term partnership anchored by our improved understanding of Pakistan’s strategic priorities, increased civilian and military assistance, and expanded public diplomacy.696

The President’s report of March 2011 made these issues even clearer:

> Pakistan is central to our efforts to defeat al-Qa’ida and prevent its return to the region. We seek to secure these interests through continued, robust counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation and a long-term partnership anchored by our improved understanding of Pakistan’s strategic priorities, increased civilian and military assistance, and expanded public diplomacy

> “With regard to al-Qa’ida’s Pakistan-based leadership and cadre, we must remain focused on making further progress towards our ultimate end-state, the eventual strategic defeat of al-Qa’ida in the region, which will require the sustained denial of the group’s safe haven in the tribal areas of western Pakistan.

>[…] Large elements of Pakistan’s military remain committed to maintaining a ratio of Pakistani to Indian forces along the eastern border. This deprives the Pakistani COIN fight of sufficient forces to achieve its “clear” objectives and support the “hold” efforts, while encouraging pre-engagement aerial bombardment that increases the number of displaced persons, and causing available Army forces to be bogged down with “hold” activities because there are insufficient trained civilian law enforcement personnel to assume that responsibility.

Pakistan security forces remain largely static during this reporting period (Oct. 1 – Dec. 31, 2010), generally focused on maintaining the security of previously cleared areas in the FATA and KP and continuing to support flood relief operations.

In January, Pakistani military and paramilitary forces began Operation BREKHNA, an effort to clear militants from Mohmand Agency using 6,000 Pakistani security forces along with ISR assets and ISAF ground troops and fire support on the Afghanistan side of the border. This effort expanded to include some operations in neighboring Bajaur Agency. It is important to note that this is the third time in the past 2 years that the Army has had to conduct major clearing operations in the same agency; a clear indicator of the inability of the Pakistani military and government to render cleared areas resistant to insurgent return.

[...] What remains vexing is the lack of any indication of “hold” and “build” planning or staging efforts to complement ongoing clearing operations. As such there remains no clear strategy towards defeating the insurgency in Pakistan.697

A Department of Defense report, issued in April 2011, was somewhat more polite, but made the same basic points:

Within its borders, Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates; to help bring about and ensure a durable political solution in Afghanistan; and to promote and sustain long-term regional stability so the United States does not again face a region that is home to terrorist sanctuaries.

Pursuing a long-term U.S.-Pakistani strategic partnership based on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust guides a whole-of-government, civilian-military effort. The long-term goal is for the U.S. strategy to lead to enduring linkages between the United States and Pakistan; stronger trade and investment ties; continued and deepened military and intelligence relations that support regional stability; and a secure Pakistan linked to its neighbors through a growing economy enabled by improved security.

There are significant hurdles to reaching that vision. The history of U.S.-Pakistani relations is fraught with negative perceptions on both sides, leading many in both countries to see the others’ pursuit of strategic objectives as being driven by transitory national security interests. To date, efforts on both sides have yielded some progress in improving this relationship. However, it will take a long-term relationship to overcome years of mistrust in order to achieve a long-term strategic partnership based on mutual interests.

The U.S. approach with Pakistan is to build an effective partnership that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests—while also demonstrating to Pakistan that the United States will remain a strong and long-term supporter of Pakistani security and prosperity. Central to this effort is aligning both U.S. and Pakistani interests in the near-term with respect to denying safe haven to all violent extremist organizations. Although great strides have been made in the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship over the past two years, heightened sensitivities regarding Pakistani sovereignty can set back this progress.

…Operational and tactical coordination between ISAF, ANSF, and Pakistan’s security forces has improved in quality and quantity over the past two years; however, significant challenges remain in building mutual trust and cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, given the complex historical relationship between the two countries.

Insurgent capacity continues to be supported by sanctuaries and logistical support originating in Pakistan, and insurgents will likely retain operational momentum in areas where these support structures exist. Consolidating security gains made during the reporting period requires more progress with Pakistan to eliminate these sanctuaries. Although putting pressure on insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan would not be sufficient to end the Afghanistan conflict in the near-term, it would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the conflict in favor of ISAF and the Afghan Government.

Pakistan’s military leadership has improved cross-border coordination with ISAF and the ANSF. Since October 2010, a series of high-level meetings between Afghan and Pakistan military leaders have gradually improved communication and cooperation, particularly in the border region. At the most recent high-level meeting, the 33rd Tripartite Commission in March 2011, ISAF and ANSF leaders met with Pakistani Army leaders in Pakistan for discussions on increasing cooperation and communication along the border.698

In June 2011, with the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the US unveiled a new national strategy for counter-terrorism. Relevant sections on Pakistan are reproduced below and highlight the declared US intention to continue counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, while also pursuing a vigorous aerial campaign against suspected al-Qaeda terrorists.

[...] To achieve this goal, we need to dismantle the core of al-Qa’ida—its leadership in the tribal regions of Pakistan—and prevent its ability to reestablish a safe haven in the Pakistan–Afghanistan region. In other words, we aim to render the heart of al-Qa’ida incapable of launching attacks against our homeland, our citizens, or our allies, as well as preventing the group from inspiring its affiliates and adherents to do so.

[...] In recent weeks we’ve been reminded that our relationship with Pakistan is not without tension or frustration. We are now working with our Pakistani partners to overcome differences and continue our efforts against our common enemies. It is essential that we do so. As frustrating as this relationship can sometimes be, Pakistan has been critical to many of our most significant successes against al-Qa’ida. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis—military and civilian—have given their lives in the fight against militancy. And despite recent tensions, I am confident that Pakistan will remain one of our most important counterterrorism partners.

[...] In some places, such as the tribal regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will deliver precise and overwhelming force against al-Qa’ida. Whenever possible, our efforts around the world will be in close coordination with our partners. And, when necessary, as the President has said repeatedly, if we have information about the whereabouts of al-Qa’ida, we will do what is required to protect the United States—as we did with bin Laden.

Despite the evolving US strategy towards Pakistan, the fact remains that Pakistan has a fundamentally different set of strategic priorities from the US, a fact that US experts have privately recognized since long before 9/11. Pakistan continues to focus on the Indian threat and does not trust the US, which it sees as a temporary actor that has once more wreaked significant harm in its neighborhood and similarly once more abandon the region in 2014, leaving Pakistan to deal with the consequences of a failed Afghanistan. In May 2011, US experts summarized both the fundamentally different focus in Pakistani strategy and the tensions it creates with the US in the material shown in Figure 7.1.

Current Pakistani Strategic Priorities

- India overwhelmingly dominates Pakistani strategic thought
  - Fear of being strategically surrounded (Indian influence in Afghanistan)
  - Fear of further attempts at bifurcation by India (Pakistani interpretation of 1971 India-Pak war)
  - Riparian rights issues (1950 water treaties) becoming increasingly critical
  - Kashmir still a central issue
- Hostile Afghanistan under GIRQa
  - Traditional Afghan claims to “Pashtunistan” and lands west of the Indus.
  - Afghan close ties to India: Threat of RAW / INDS support to Baluchi insurgents from Afghanistan
  - Pashtun (marginalization) by Tajik dominated Northern Alliance
- TTP and other Pakistan Taliban / AQ / extremists recognized as a threat to Pakistan's stability.
  - The “number one” threat according to recent statements by GEN Kayani
  - However, continued expenditures on conventional war equipment and actions regarding non-state actors such as Let run contrary the above assertion.
- Economic and Social issues with strategic impact
  - Stagnant economy and expanding unemployment
  - Crumbling infrastructure (particularly power)
  - Increased water stress, water shortages
  - Moribund education system
- Security of nuclear weapons

The Risk of Escalating Tension: Pakistan’s Dual Strategy

- Continue to support the Afghan Taliban, maintain viable proxy thru 2014
- Diplomatic full court press to engage the GIRQa in tri-lateral reconciliation talks with Pakistan providing the lead for the Taliban deliberate exclusion of the US

Uncertain US Goals and Progress

US relations with Pakistan are at their lowest ebb since 9/11 in the spring of 2011. Pakistan has grown increasingly disillusioned with Washington, and there have been a series of intensifying crises since mid-2010, including the closing of a vital border crossing to NATO supply convoys in September 2010, and the unprecedented hardline stance taken by the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies against the CIA presence inside Pakistan and the “covert” US-drone campaign in the FATA through early 2011. This was enhanced by the presumed ISI-backed detention of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, as well as the repeated public disclosure of the names of CIA station chiefs in Pakistan. The US raid that killed Bin Laden raised new questions about the scale of Pakistani support for al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and the extent to which Pakistan was covertly executing a strategy that directly threatened US strategic interests and progress in the Afghan conflict.

It has grown increasingly obvious that the US and Pakistan have very different national and strategic interests that are often in direct conflict with each other, particularly as Pakistan loses faith in the US’s ability to execute sustainable change in Afghanistan, and grows increasingly suspicious of a US tilt towards India. Yet, Pakistan remains important to US strategic interests, increasingly so as the Afghan endgame approaches. With Bin Laden dead, and the US combat deadline of 2014 approaching, some form of negotiated settlement appears increasingly likely. Most analysts agree that such a settlement, if it is to be durable, is difficult, if not impossible, without Pakistani help. Moreover, Pakistan has signaled its ability to play spoiler in any negotiations that do not adequately account for its interests.

In the aftermath of the Bin Laden raid, the US has shown a growing willingness to challenge Pakistan, including by suspending $800 million in military assistance, money that is important to the generals, despite their public nonchalance. However, even if the army were inclined to make compromises to the US, it faces an uphill task in justifying it to the Pakistani public.

Anti-Americanism is rife across Pakistan and association with US actions inside Pakistan deeply problematic Both perceived subservience to the US, and an inability to prevent unilateral US action threaten the legitimacy of the Pakistani military. The US raid to kill Bin Laden was particularly embarrassing to the military high command, given the ease with which US helicopters circumvented Pakistan’s vaunted air-defense network. The attack raised questions on the Army’s ability to defend Pakistani sovereignty, and on its ability to protect against a similar Indian attack.

There is some belief that the raid may have increased US leverage in demanding firmer action by the Pakistani security services, but shaming Pakistan is a troubling strategy. There is truth to a Pakistani general’s frustrated remark to a reporter; “You’ve pitted us against our own people. And if you make us choose, of course, how can we not choose our own people.” The US must take account of Pakistan’s central role in the Afghan conflict, as President Obama noted in his speech of December 2009, and acknowledge that regardless of will Pakistan may not have the capacity to confront terrorism and militancy on its own.

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Events in 2010 and 2011 have amplified this need and reiterated Pakistan’s placement as the central node of global terrorism, but without the will and ability to effectively combat this threat. Al-Qaeda core continues to find sanctuary inside Pakistan, while the most serious potential attack against US interests in recent years—the failed NYC Times Square plot of May 2010—was perpetrated by a Pakistani-American with links to the TTP, an organization that is a far greater threat to Pakistan than to the US.

The US has sometimes responded by openly confronting Pakistan while generally minimizing public discussion of the tensions between the US and Pakistan while quietly apply a mix of incentives and disincentives. Since the 9/11 “ultimatum” by then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the US apart from occasional fits of pique has rarely tested Pakistan, and despite various Pakistani initiatives contrary to its interests has never stopped the flow of extensive military and civilian assistance. The US has however taken limited steps to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, notably by initiating the Northern Distribution Network, an alternative transit route for NATO supplies.

Yet, frustration in Washington with suspicions of Pakistani duplicity is peaking in the aftermath of the Bin Laden operation and US officials have grown firmer in their demands that Pakistan take more robust action against militants and terrorists operating from its soil. In end May 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that relations between the US and Pakistan had reached a “turning point” and urged “decisive steps in the days ahead,” and in the strongest action to date, the US suspended $800 million of military aid, including money to reimburse Pakistan for military operations in the tribal areas.

A Turbulent History of Relations

Outpolling India in unpopularity is no small feat in Pakistan, but the US may have achieved it according to reports. As Figure 7.2 shows, the Pakistani populace is one of the most anti-American in the world and these feelings pre-date 9/11.

This unpopularity reflects a long history of political manipulation by Pakistani military and political leaders to deflect pressure on to the US, or to increase US aid and lever US action. It also, however, reflects Pakistan’s intense nationalism and US mistakes. The aftermath of the last US intervention is remembered for the tremendous destabilizing impact it had on Pakistan. Pakistanis feel that the US abandoned Pakistan once the Soviet Union left Afghanistan once their own interests were achieved. Some of this has merit, as the post-Soviet collapse of Afghanistan severely distressed vast swathes of tribal Pakistan and a huge exodus of refugees severely tested Pakistani capacity. A pipeline of weaponry and narcotics weaponized and magnified virtually every internal security threat, from anti-state separatists and insurgents to politico-militant groups and criminal syndicates.

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702 “We’ll bomb you to the Stone Age,” Times Online, September 22, 2006. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article647188.ece
The US and Pakistan’s long military-to-military relationship has gone through radical swings over the past few decades in ways that result in either a “feast or famine” approach as seen in Figure 7.3. Ties dropped off dramatically after the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani Wars, but picked back up during the days of the Soviet jihad, when the US worked closely with General Zia and channeled aid through him. By the 1990s, the relationship had chilled, due to diminished attention as a result of the end of the Cold War, but also because of sanctions triggered by the Pakistani nuclear program.

The Pressler Amendment of 1985 that came into force in 1990 was as a major driver of alienation between the two forces. The Amendment limited the US role if Pakistan were to be found actively building nuclear weapons, a matter Pakistani military officials saw as a betrayal after their loyal frontline service during the Soviet jihad, and the halting of weapons transfers, in particular several F-16s that were seen by US as having dual applicability as a nuclear delivery system, deeply chilled relations. However, as Christine Fair notes, the break in relationship was not one-sided as Pakistan made a deliberate “strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons at the expense of taking ownership of the fleet of F-16s.”

The result was a decade of relative isolation, leading to the rise of a generation of Pakistani officers denied any contact with their US counterparts, allowing widespread anti-American sentiment to permeate the ranks. In a speech to Pakistan officers in Islamabad, US Secretary of

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Defense Gates admitted that US policy during the period had been a “grave strategic mistake,” and admitted that, “one of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice... first after the Soviets left... [and then] through the 1990s because of the Pressler Amendment.”

The US reaction to 9/11, and attack on the Taliban, radically changed the situation. The US put massive pressure on Pakistan, and President Musharraf reacted by choosing to be “with” the United States, rather than “against” it, joining in President Bush’s war on terrorism. The resulting politics led the US to declare Pakistan a major non-NATO ally by 2004, and to give major arms sales and extensive military assistance in an effort to provide incentives that would to re-forge the military-to-military relationship.

The US military mission to Pakistan and the level of US military visits and representative at all levels have increased significantly. For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen became a key point-person for the Obama Administration, and has made over 20 trips to Pakistan to meet with COAS Gen Kayani. Mullen has commented that he is now on his ‘third cup of tea’ with Kayani, but this reputed friendship has not always benefited the US.

Despite these supposed warm relationships, the fact remains that Pakistanis at all levels strongly resent being treated as if Pakistan were a US strategic asset, and resent what they feel is a lack of American gratitude in acknowledgement of the large human and social costs they have borne in service to various US campaigns in the region, including having lost more soldiers in battle with Taliban militants than the entire coalition force across the border. The covert US military program inside Pakistan particularly rankles. It is a visible reminder of Pakistan’s sovereignty deficit, particularly as targeting is seen as unaccountable to any local authority and perceived as causing wanton civilian collateral damage.

Pakistani resentment towards the US flows from a highly emotional nationalism, but also from the perception that US actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan are conducted solely for narrow US interests without a thought for their consequence on the ordinary people. Pakistan has little faith in US stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, and few Pakistanis believe that the US is benevolent in offering aid. Instead many see financial support as a poor replacement for the violence and economic hardships they have endured. These are commonly attributed to US actions, resulting in a tendency to “see US financial support as an entitlement.”

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713 Christine Fair, “Spy for a Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown over Raymond Davis,” Afpak Channel, March 10, 2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/10/spy_for_a_spy_the_cia_isi_showdown_over_raymond_davis
“Victimhood”

While there are legitimate grievances on the Pakistani side, relations are also shaped by an institutionalized “narrative of national victimhood” that is pervasive across Pakistan. Conspiracy theories are often ludicrous and center around the nefarious plots of the US, India, or Israel, and prefer to deflect all of the country’s societal ills on external powers, instead of addressing its own complicity in perpetuating their rise. These have grown to become such a staple of Pakistani discourse, that prominent Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal coined the phrase “Paranoidistan” to describe the phenomenon.

Many conspiracy theories, even if grounded outside reality, provide a valuable window into Pakistani perceptions. Today, in the post-Bin Laden era, there continues to be strong skepticism inside Pakistan on the veracity of the raid. According to a recent poll, two-thirds of Pakistanis do not believe that Bin Laden was killed by US Navy SEALs, instead believing that Bin Laden died years ago and the raid was a carefully orchestrated US stunt, or even that he remains alive. Other favorites focus on the US’s alleged role in assisting India to seize Pakistani nuclear

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weapons, on an alleged secret US nuclear bunker beneath the embassy in Islamabad,\textsuperscript{717} or even on apparent collusion between the US and terrorist groups, including the TTP and al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{718}

The Pakistani media, whose development the US encourages, is an important disseminator of many of these theories. Prominent newspapers and magazines, including English language dailies, are not averse to including sometimes the most outlandish speculations as fact. As Ahmed Rashid, the doyen of studies on Pakistani radical Islam describes, the explosive growth in media outlets after the end of Musharraf’s repressive media restrictions has led to “large numbers of largely untrained, semi-educated and unworldly TV talk show hosts and journalists” alongside “pundits—often retired hardline diplomats, bureaucrats or retired ISI officers who sport Taliban-style beards and give viewers loud, angry crash courses in anti-Westernism and anti-Indianism, thereby reinforcing views already held by many.”\textsuperscript{719}

These include influential media personalities such as Hamid Mir, who was reportedly recorded assisting the Taliban on deciding whether a hostage held by them was a CIA spy or not.\textsuperscript{720} Others such Zaid Hamid coin phrases such as “Hindu-Zionists” to help explain who they allege ‘perpetrated’ the 2008 Mumbai attacks.\textsuperscript{721} The ISI too, through its powerful media arm, has strong influence over the media sphere, and maintains at least some control over the content of reporting.

However, in 2011 particularly after the Bin Laden operation, Pakistani media personalities have become less forgiving of the failings of the Pakistani military. Kamran Khan for example, who until recently was one of the most pro-military media personalities in Pakistan, launched a blistering criticism of state policies in May saying, “The nation should know that 3,900 Pakistanis have been killed in 225 suicide attacks—which have spared neither mosques nor schools—and not a single suicide bomber was Indian, nor American, nor even Israeli. All of them were Pakistanis, and Muslims. We need to accept the bitter pill: in almost all the terrorist attacks across the world, either Pakistanis have been used or the planning was done on Pakistani soil. Pakistan is seen as a heaven for militants… If the world perceives our dear country as the largest sanctuary of terrorists, their reasons are solid.”\textsuperscript{722}

**Overcoming Public Hostility**

All of these factors combine to show how public opinion (and a matching anger and hostility among many in Pakistan’s civil and military elite) imposes severe limitations on the ability of Pakistani political actors to deal with the US. They fear being seen as working in collusion with American interests, or worse yet subservient to them. This severe “trust deficit” is felt at all levels of society, and helps explain why Pakistan often grudgingly pursues American-backed policies, even when it recognizes that they are in its own interest.


\textsuperscript{718} Sultan Hali, “CIA’s multinational interests in Pak,” *Pakistan Observer*, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=79119


Militancy in the FATA for example has gravely impacted internal Pakistani security, yet collaboration with the US against militancy remains difficult. An ISI official touched upon a narrative of national pride and anti-Americanism, explaining, “By appearing as America’s mercenaries, our army’s acceptance level goes down.”723 Domestic public sentiment in the US too continues to be strongly anti-Pakistani with strong majorities across several polls expressing skepticism of Pakistan as a reliable ally and supporting cuts in military and civilian assistance.724

The US has often reacted in ways that make this worse, and has tended to rely on the Pakistani military rather than Pakistan’s civil political leaders. In the past, the US has seen the generals of Rawalpindi as more reliable than the civilians and Islamabad, and relied on strongmen such as Musharraf and now Kayani to secure their interests in the short-term, even if it means damaging the long-term goal of promoting more stable civil-military relations. Today US mistrust with Rawalpindi is peaking, and the US is increasingly working to independently secure its interests in Pakistan through covert and contractor personnel, chilling the relationship even further.

US military assistance continues to be heavily weighted towards the military. The GAO calculated that between 2002 and 2008, roughly 70.4% of US disbursements were deployed towards the support of the military, 26.7% towards economic, 2.6% for law enforcement and 0.3% for diplomacy.725 Appropriations between 2009 and 2010 reduced this disparity with security-related assistance falling to just under 60% and economic-related assistance rising to compose 40% of the total, according to figures provided by the Congressional Research Service.726

The priority the US is still giving to the Pakistani military is illustrated by various recent incidents, including during the Davis affair in 2011. When it became apparent that the civilian government could not secure Davis’ release, the US quickly sidestepped Islamabad in favor of Rawalpindi, and on February 22nd COAS Gen Kayani met with senior US military officials in Oman to discuss his release.727

The India Factor

Little the US does can be separated from Pakistan’s fear of India. Pakistanis are deeply worried that the US is improving its relationship with India at the expense of Pakistan and in South Asia’s zero-sum security environment, any such rapprochement is viewed with alarm. In recent years, this paranoia has gained in urgency as New Delhi extracts major concessions from the US, notably the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, and President Obama’s backing of India for a Security Council seat.728 A growing Indo-US military nexus has not gone unnoticed, with US companies bidding for various high-end Indian arms procurements, and an increase in joint military

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exercises between the two countries in recent years. Pakistan also resents Indian influence in Afghanistan, which it sees as directly facilitated and protected by Washington assisting in an encirclement of Pakistan by Indian forces.

Gen Kayani made Pakistan’s priorities clear in February 2010, when he stated that the Pakistani military would remain “India-centric” and continue to “plan on adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions.” Kayani has helped halt the progress made by Musharraf on reaching a settlement on a Kashmir settlement and as the Director General (DG) of the ISI between 2004 and 2007, is well aware of the utility of strategic proxies in combating India. As such Washington’s recent aggressive pursuit of two of the most important—the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba—is unlikely to have sat well. It is also likely that as the Indo-US relationship continues to warm, the stronger the Sino-Pakistani bond will get, as Islamabad looks to Beijing for support in maintaining some level of strategic parity with India.

**Competition over the Afghan Future**

Pakistan and the US have different conceptions of what a post-war Afghanistan should look like, a matter that has grown in urgency as the Afghan endgame approaches. With the death of Bin Laden, and growing public support for an Afghan withdrawal, the US combat deadline of 2014 is likely to be a significant date for transition, and will likely include a sizeable drawdown of US and international forces. The state of Afghanistan in 2014 remains uncertain, and US surge operations have already registered important tactical successes, but eventually it may prove impossible to replicate them on a national scale, or to end the conflict in a way that achieves a stable transition and has lasting strategic and grand strategic value.

Certainly Pakistan (and other regional actors), remain skeptical of the US and ISAF ability to execute sustainable change, in either decisively reversing the Taliban’s battlefield momentum, or in building up an adequate governance and security structure that will not fragment upon US departure. As can be seen in Figure 7.4, India is the lens through which Pakistani views its grand strategic objectives in Afghanistan, and especially today, the US presence is seen as temporary and unlikely to change the regional landscape, which is detailed by US experts in Figure 7.4. Furthermore, As a result, Pakistan increasingly prioritizes its ability to shape the post-war structure, and maneuvers to assure itself a central role in Afghanistan.

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730 “Pakistan Army will remain India-centric: Kayani,” Economic Times.
Figure 7.4: Pakistani Grand Strategy in Afghanistan

- **Dec 1971**: Pakistan loses 3rd Indo-Pak war. Bangladesh becomes independent. Pakistani national myth of "India manipulated" bifurcation of Pakistan born
  
  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT 1950'S TO 1970'S

- **1973-1977**: Baluchistan Insurrection - Baluch Insurgents given sanctuary in Afghanistan by GOA, some Indian involvement (amount?) Pakistani fear of 2nd bifurcation. Negotiated peace with insurgents but fear of India connection in Afghanistan persists

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT 1970'S TO SOVIET INVASION

- **1979-1991**: Soviet Period - India recognizes Soviet Installed Afghan Government. Pakistan - fearing India/Soviet backed Afghanistan, backs Mujahaddin. Pakistan fears encirclement by Indian friendly Russian supported Afghanistan more than actual invasion by Russia

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT 1983'S TO END OF SOVIET ERA

- **1989-PRESENT**: Kashmiri Insurrection - Originally largely spontaneous, used by Pakistan as a pretext for the use of armed proxies against India to gain control of Kashmir. Proxy war has continued off-on for 20 years – increasingly radicalized proxies almost cause war twice (2001, 2008)

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WAINING OR NIL FIRST 12 YEARS OF KASHMIR INSURGENCY

- **1991-1996**: Afghan Civil War Period - Indian influence limited due to factionalism in civil war maintains contacts mainly with non-Pashtun Northern Alliance

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT CIVIL WAR PERIOD

- **1996-2001**: Taliban Era - No Indian influence except with rump of Northern Alliance. Pakistan strategic flank secure.

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT TALIBAN PERIOD

- **2001-Present**: Enduring Freedom Era - Taliban driven from power. Massive increase in Indian influence. GIROA shelters Baluch separatists. Pakistan's fear of encirclement returns. Indians see a new avenue of leverage over Pakistan to force an end to proxy war over Kashmir

  - INDIAN INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGHOUT ENDURING FREEDOM PERIOD

Source: US experts.

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Figure 7.5: The Potential Strategic Train Wreck

- Pakistan's leadership confused over the intent of the US and coalition mission in Afghanistan 2001-2008:
  
  - Small number of forces deployed to Afghanistan signaled limited US commitment
  
  - The beginning of the Iraq campaign also indicated the US commitment to Afghanistan was not long term
  
  - The advent of NATO's role in 2005 further presaged US disengagement in Pakistani eyes

  - In spite of our rhetoric, the evidence of US commitment in the period of 2001-2008 was not persuasive in convincing the Pakistanis that the US was in Afghanistan for the "long haul"

  - Add to this our previous history of disengagement from Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Pakistanis drew the conclusion that they had better develop a "hedging" strategy

(continued)
The Karzai government does not suit Pakistan, which it sees as dominated by a Tajik-Uzbek coalition that is hostile to Pakistan. Pakistan particularly resents the Panjshiri factions, many of whom dominate the ANA today,732 and who in the 1990s as the Northern Alliance, drew support from India (and Iran and Russia) to resist the Pakistani-backed mujahideen forces. However, to hedge its interests, Pakistan has attempted to exploit the strain in relations between the Karzai government and the US. Pakistan has extracted important concessions as a result, including securing the removal of the strongly anti-Pakistani Afghan spy chief Amrullah Saleh and Interior Minister Hanif Atmar in June 2010.733 The Pakistani military has also made an offer to train ANA forces.734

In April 2011, it was reported that senior Pakistani officials, including Prime Minister Gilani, urged Karzai to disengage from the US relationship, and instead forge better ties with China.735 Reported Pakistani demands included urging Kabul to oppose long-term US bases in Afghanistan, to reduce the number of Indian consulates, to expel Baloch separatist leaders, to allow the Haqqanis a role in the Afghan government, to reduce the influence of the Northern Alliance in the government and assure Pakistan a role in the appointment of key security ministries, including defense and intelligence—in return for which Pakistan would pressure Taliban militants towards political reconciliation with the Karzai government.736 Whether these

details are correct or not, the above list is a good encapsulation of the desired Pakistani vision for a post-American Afghanistan.

To help achieve this mission, and hedge against any post-war Afghan settlement that does not adequately account for its interests, Pakistan continues to retain various strategic proxies, including the Afghan Taliban, and has so far ensured that all negotiations are channeled through itself. The arrest of Mullah Baradar, the most senior Afghan Taliban military commander in early 2010 was widely believed to be in retaliation for Baradar’s independent participation in Saudi-mediated talks that Pakistan was shut out of. There have also been reports that General Kayani has offered to bring Haqqani network commanders to the negotiating table, although the military has denied the reports.

US Military Involvement in Pakistan

These factors also combined to affect every aspect of US military involvement in Pakistan, and to place serious limits on the scale and nature of that cooperation. It affects US ability to operate against extremists and terrorists in Pakistan, cooperation in intelligence, and cooperation in training and aid.

Drone Strikes

The use of unmanned aerial aircraft (UAV, or colloquially drones) over Pakistan is a relatively new phenomenon that has escalated exponentially under the Obama administration. Figure 7.6 provided by the Long War Journal demonstrates how US drone strikes have increased substantially since 2008, rising to a high of 117 by 2010. The US has also shifted its targeting scope to more aggressively pursue fighters belonging to the Haqqanis, and to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, two groups that make up the bulk of fighting strength in North Waziristan.

The vast majority of US drone strikes have focused on North and South Waziristan. As LWJ details, over the past two years, there has been a significant shift in the location of strikes. In 2009, 42% of strikes targeted North Waziristan and 51% targeted South Waziristan, but in 2010, the balance shifted drastically with 89% of all strikes taking place in North Waziristan, and only 6% in South Waziristan.

This focus on North Waziristan is not unsurprising; it remains one of the only FATA agencies in which PAKMIL forces have not conducted operations, and the agency houses some of the most effective Afghan insurgent syndicates, including the Haqqani network and fighters loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, both of whom actively target coalition forces in Afghanistan. American officials have also indicated their desire to expand the drone campaign into Balochistan, to target the

Quetta Shura, but have been met with firm denials to date.\textsuperscript{740} FATA is a particularly unusual case, in that it has always been an ancillary component of the Pakistani state; Balochistan is not.

This use of drones has been a source of tension between the US and Pakistan. Any US military activity within Pakistan is unpopular with the Pakistani people, and the drone campaign has been no exception. Pakistan anger centers on allegations of inaccurate US targeting, excessive civilian casualties, and an inability to strike senior militant leaders.

Open-source information from virtually all non-Pakistani sources, including the Conflict Monitoring Centre, the Institute for Conflict Management, the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation refute some of these allegations.\textsuperscript{741} \textbf{Figure 7.7} is adapted from “high estimates” in data provided by the New America Foundation, which claims higher civilian casualties than other similar estimates. Even so, the figures clearly show a marked improvement in US targeting. Civilian collateral damage fell as low as 6\% in 2010, even though drone strikes more than doubled between 2009 and 2010. This ratio of casualties relative to the number of militants killed, is remarkably low for the number of strikes involved. They certainly seem far lower than would result from other ways of using force to strike at the same targets and achieve the same objectives.

Pakistani sources on the other hand claim much higher civilian casualties. \textit{The News}, a major Pakistani newspaper alleged 1,184 casualties, of which 703 were civilians, and claimed they were sourced from “local and international sources.”\textsuperscript{742} In contrast, Major General Ghayur Mehsud, the Pakistani military commander in North Waziristan, told reporters that, “a majority of those eliminated are terrorists”—although Mehsud’s comments then received blistering public criticism. An official paper issued by his 7\textsuperscript{th} Division HQ claimed that 164 drone strikes between 2007 and 2011 killed 964 terrorists, including 171 foreigners.\textsuperscript{743}

It should, however, that independent verification is often impossible and casualties may be higher than what US and Pakistani officials are willing to admit. Anecdotal evidence from the region is split, but Noor Behram, a local resident, who often visits and documents the aftermath of drone strikes, is adamant of a much higher civilian toll. The \textit{Guardian} newspaper quotes him as saying, “For every 10 to 15 people killed, maybe they get one militant,” he said. "I don't go to count how many Taliban are killed. I go to count how many children, women, innocent people, are killed.”\textsuperscript{744} Other local activists, including Lateef Afridi in the Khyber, have claimed high public support for drone strikes in militancy-affected areas such as North Waziristan.\textsuperscript{745}

Whatever the true toll, it is believed that many Pakistani officials often exaggerate the casualty impact of drone strikes for political purposes and in an effort to gain leverage over the US by exploiting popular anger. This has helped feed the general perception inside Pakistan that US

\begin{footnotes}
\item[742] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
raids heavily target civilians, and has a major impact on Pakistani media and politics. These claims resonate well in Pakistan. Many, officers and officials and common people oppose the US presence on principle, perceiving its activities as anti-Islamic and as destabilizing Pakistan through the war on terrorism and Afghan conflict.

A poll conducted of a sample of Pakistani journalists, found that while 76% of those polled voiced positive perceptions of the American people, 87% felt that US forces should not be allowed to operate on Pakistani soil, and 67% defined US drone strikes as terrorist attacks.746 Political opponents, recently including Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, have also seized on the drone issue to embarrass the ruling PPP-coalition.747 Pakistani anger against drones was not always as high, and abated in 2008 and 2009, with rising militancy emanating from the tribal areas. However, anger resurfaced in 2010, as tensions with the US intensified.

There is also some controversy over targeting, and some claim US strikes mainly kill low-ranking militants. Peter Bergen, an independent US analyst claims that only about a dozen of those killed in drone strikes in the past year were militant leaders—lending credence to the Pakistani argument that these strikes do little more than inflame public anger.748 Senior US and ISAF leaders disagree, and prominent militant leaders have been killed by drone strikes, including al-Qaeda’s third-ranking Abu al-Yazid, former TTP emir Beitullah Mehsud, senior TTP leaders such as Nek Mohammad, Qari Hussain, and most recently in June 2011, Ilyas Kashmiri, a veteran al-Qaeda and TTP military commander. Michael Hayden, the former CIA director has also stated that these strikes have a “very strong significant force in making the al Qaeda senior leadership spend most of their waking moments worrying about their survival.”749

As a result of their operational impact, some in Pakistan’s military high command covertly welcome drone attacks. The 2009 killing of Beitullah Mehsud, was widely praised by the Pakistani military,750 and a recently released Wikileaks document reported that General Kayani himself requested additional Predator coverage in South Waziristan in early 2008 from then CENTCOM Commander Admiral William Fallon.751 However, the aftermath of a May 2011 drone strike that killed over 40 people, including many civilians, in the worst case of civilian collateral since potentially 2006 led COAS Kayani to issue an unusually strong statement terming the attack “unjustified and intolerable.”752

Since the Bin Laden raid, Pakistani hostility to US drone strikes have further intensified. There have been demands for the US to vacate the Shamsi airbase in Balochistan, although the US has so far resisted. Even should the US be evicted, it is unlikely to affect the operational tempo as most drone strikes now appear to be flown out of bases in Afghanistan.

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Figure 7.6: US Drone Strikes by Targeted Militant Groups, 2004–July 12, 2011


Figure 7.7: Militant-to-Civilian Casualties in US Drone Strikes, 2008–July 6, 2011

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Intelligence Cooperation and Conflict

Intelligence cooperation should be a hallmark of the US-Pakistani relationship, but the ISI and CIA have always had a difficult relationship, and both have been highly suspicious of the other’s motives. Tensions between the two agencies have risen steadily in recent years, deteriorated rapidly since 2009, and relations are now in the spring of 2011, relations are at potentially their worst ebb ever. The US questions Pakistan’s willingness to actively pursue several jihadi groups that work against US interests, in Afghanistan and abroad, and suspects the ISI of continued collusion with militants that actively target US interests. As a result, the US has sought to independently manage intelligence activity inside Pakistan.

Such moves have naturally infuriated the ISI, which resents any dilution of its monopoly on intelligence operations inside Pakistan, resulting in a series of public crises. In December 2010, for example, the CIA station chief in Pakistan was publicly outed and forced to leave the country after being publicly identified in a legal complaint, a matter US authorities strongly believed was orchestrated by the ISI. In May 2011, soon after the Bin Laden raid, Pakistani newspapers once more named a senior CIA official working in Pakistan. It is uncertain whether the named individual was actually the new station chief.

The US raid to kill Bin Laden was deeply embarrassing for the ISI, and has been the most damaging event impacting intelligence cooperation to date. In the aftermath of the raid, Pakistan has attempted to crack down on the US covert presence inside the country, and has arrested about 35-40 suspected US informants, including an Army major in the medical corps. Pakistan has also demanded a drastic reduction in US personnel, including presumably covert personnel. There are worries that relations will further plummet under the tenure of the newly named head of the CIA, General Petraeus, who has favored robust covert kinetic action and been blunt about Pakistan’s role in the violence inside Afghanistan. COAS Kayani is reported to dislike General Petraeus and believes him to be a “political general.”

Even before the Bin Laden raid, the US, and Pakistan had scaled up operations in ways that infringed on each other’s “red lines.” Previous US operations affecting Pakistan generally followed the “Reagan Rules;” they centered on a light US military footprint, and relied heavily on the ISI and the Pakistani military to do the bulk of heavy lifting on their own terms. In the 1980s for example, “fewer than 100 officers ran the entire program in Washington, Islamabad and Riyadh—and never threatened Pakistani sovereignty or dignity.” Today, the US covert presence may be significant and increasingly proficient at conducting operations independently. The Bin Laden compound is believed to have been under surveillance for several weeks by CIA

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officers prior to the raid in an extensive intelligence-gathering effort, all of which appears to have gone unnoticed by Pakistani intelligence officials.\footnote{Greg Miller, “CIA spied on Bin Laden from Safe House,” Washington Post, May 6, 2011. Available at http://wapo.st/klYiAh}

The Raymond Davis affair in early 2011 further highlighted the tensions in CIA-ISI relations. Davis, a CIA contractor shot and killed two men allegedly trying to rob him in Lahore, and was denied diplomatic immunity, held for 47 days, allegedly questioned for 14 days by the ISI, and then released only after intense American pressure, and $2.3 million paid to the families of the deceased as “blood money.”\footnote{Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Pakistan tells US it must sharply cut CIA activities,” New York Times, April 11, 2011. Available at http://nyti.ms/m1MEnf} As Christine Fair points out, the public furor surrounding this event suggests direct attempts by the ISI to manufacture public outrage. Earlier in 2010 for example, when a US diplomat drunkenly got into his car and hit a young man, the ISI quickly downplayed the incident and the diplomat was ferreted out of the country, and little of the incident made the newspapers.\footnote{Fair, “Spy for a Spy: The CIA-ISI Showdown over Raymond Davis.”}

In mid-April 2011, ISI chief Shuja Pasha travelled to Washington to meet with his counterparts. There, Pakistani military officials allegedly demanded the withdrawal of 335 American personnel, a number they claim constitutes about 25-40% of the American CIA and SOF presence inside Pakistan.\footnote{Perlez and Khan, “Pakistan tells US it must sharply cut CIA activities.”} The US has labeled this number as “vastly inflated.”\footnote{Pam Benson, “Official: Frank Discussion between US, Pakistan Intelligence Chiefs,” CNN, April 12, 2011. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/11/us.pakistan.intelligence.talks/} The Pakistani government is also believed to have demanded the suspension of the CIA drone program, which Pakistan’s Foreign Minister labeled a “core irritant,” until “new rules” and “formalized terms” could be established.\footnote{“US missiles hit Pakistan despite request to limit,” AP, April 13, 2011. Available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110413/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan} It is a symbol of the anger on both sides that even as this incident was playing out—a drone struck in South Waziristan, the first strike in almost a month.\footnote{Bergen, “Pakistani wants to cut CIA drone strikes, personnel.”} A senior Pakistani intelligence official bitterly exclaimed, “If the message was that business will continue as usual, it was a crude way of sending it.”\footnote{Chris Allbritton, “US strike kills 6 in Pakistan, first since March,” Reuters, April 13, 2011. Available at http://reut.rs/hlZghs} Some Pakistani military anger may be a result of more aggressive US pursuit of groups that Pakistan sees as its strategic proxies. US officials have repeatedly urged an expansion of theater into North Waziristan to target the Haqqani network, and in recent months senior US military officials have more explicitly labeled the LeT as a threat to US interests.\footnote{“Lashkar-e-Taiba expanding, has global ambitions: US General,” Reuters, April 13, 2011. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-13/india/29413070_1_militant-group-holy-war-maldives} Pakistani resistance to actively combating these groups has led the CIA to independently step up its efforts through the use of agency and contracted personnel. Davis for example, was rumored to be working in conjunction with a covert CIA-led cell in Lahore that among other things, sought to track members of the LeT and their madrassa networks in the city.\footnote{Mark Mazzetti, Ashley Parker, Jane Perlez, and Eric Schmitt, “American held in Pakistan worked with CIA,” New York Times, February 21, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/asia/22pakistan.html}
Despite these very real strains on the relationship, it is important to note that US-Pakistani cooperation continues, and officials on both sides have stated a desire to rebuild trust. The most recent such as CBM has been the announcement that both countries will set up a joint intelligence team to pursue terrorists.\(^{69}\)

### Covert US Operations inside Pakistan

The covert US presence inside Pakistan includes American intelligence personnel, US military trainers, and contracted personnel, and has been a key source of resentment. Available information on such units is very limited, but US officials at one point acknowledged a 300-strong SOF contingent inside Pakistan to serve as trainers.\(^{70}\) A Wikileaks cable from October 2009 indicated their presence in both South and North Waziristan, with a “fusion cell” embedded with PAKMIL’s XI Corps in Peshawar to jointly conduct ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) operations.\(^{71}\) At least in the public domain, senior Pakistani military officials have expressed their worries that these forces might be tasked with spying and collecting information on the military, particularly its nuclear weapons.\(^{72}\) This appears rather far-fetched, since US personnel work closely with their Pakistani counterparts and are likely closely watched.

It is believed that contractor personnel, who are deeply unpopular in Pakistan, are extensively employed in support of US operations. Contractors offer plausible deniability, as well as increase the US freedom of action inside Pakistan, a move Pakistan might be mirroring. Both Raymond Davis and the two men he shot were contracted personnel for their respective agencies according to Christine Fair, meaning the violence was less “spook-on-spook” as “spook-contractor on spook-contractor.”\(^{73}\)

In end-2009, it was reported that US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was running a covert cell in Karachi to collect intelligence, as well as execute raids against high-value targets, all apparently manned by Blackwater (now Xe) personnel.\(^{74}\) Similarly while the CIA flies the drones, it has been reported that Xe and other contractor personnel provided local security, and loaded weapons.\(^{75}\) The US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs counter-narcotics program, a less covert program, similarly relies upon DynCorp personnel to fly its 17 helicopters inside Pakistan.\(^{76}\)


The CIA is also believed to operate a network of local Pashtun informants from eastern Afghanistan to infiltrate militant networks in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan. These forces have been accused of also executing cross-border ground raids into Pakistan, and one such organization, the Paktika Defense Force, is reported to have executed at least two cross-border raids, including one that destroyed a Taliban ammunition depot.

The Pakistani military’s control and influence over media organizations in Pakistan has been utilized to communicate the ISI’s displeasure and to mobilize public anger against the US. The military’s media arm, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) maintains a sophisticated apparatus that overshadows the civilian Information Ministry, and is able to use its influence to selectively shape media content, including downplaying violence in Balochistan or highlighting US abuses in the FAT A. Aamer Ahmed Khan, former editor of the Pakistani news magazine Herald concurs saying, “They [the media] are not ignoring it. They are very clearly being told to ignore it. And that speaks for the extent of influence that the current military media machine has over the Pakistani media.” Various “leaked” ISI documents and information have found their way to the media, including the names of the CIA station chief and in February 2011 an “internal assessment” of how the Davis case was fracturing relations with the CIA.

The CIA and US military have made compromises to enhance intelligence sharing and ease tension with Pakistan and the ISI. There are, however, limits to such compromises given worries about the ISI’s reliability, including reports that it revealed sensitive issues such as drone targets prior to strikes, and handed over information on covert US personnel. The CIA has further denied any plans to suspend the drone campaign with a senior US official saying, “[CIA director] Panetta has been clear with his Pakistani counterparts that his fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, and he will not halt operations that support that objective.”

It is important to note that despite the public backlash on both sides since the raid, intelligence cooperation has continued, although presumably the cost and complexity of obtaining Pakistani support has risen. The US was granted access to the wives of Bin Laden for interrogation, the CIA was allowed a detailed follow-up inspection of the residence, and the remains of a stealth helicopter that crashed during the raid was returned to the US, despite speculation it would be handed over to China as a means of retaliation. The US also appears to have agreed to Pakistani demands that the US reduce its military presence inside Pakistan to the “minimum essential,” and has ordered the departure of up to 20 percent of US Special Forces.

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780 Abubakar Siddique and Abdul Hai Kakar, “Pakistani Media Still Seen as on a Tight Leash,” RFE/RL, April 8, 2011. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan_media_controlled_by_military/3551125.html

781 Lamont and Bokhari, “Analysis: South Asia: On the High Ground.”


784 Ibid.

785 Karen DeYoung and Karin Bruilliard, “Pakistan ordered about a fifth of US Special Forces Trainers to leave the country as relations deteriorated,” Washington Post, May 20, 2011. Available at http://wapo.st/llWtsf
Despite visible anger in the relationship, the US has a vested interest in ensuring that intelligence cooperation does not collapse. This may explain why senior US officials significantly toned down their rhetoric vis-à-vis Pakistan and have downplayed any notion of Pakistani complicity with Bin Laden’s sanctuary in Abbottabad. Defense Secretary Robert Gates commented in late May 2011 that he had seen “no evidence at all that the senior leadership knew. In fact I’ve seen evidence to the contrary.” Gates went further to note that, “If I were in Pakistani shoes, I would say I have already paid a price. I’ve been humiliated. I’ve been shown that the Americans can come here and do this with impunity,” a tacit call to fellow policymakers to be more cognizant of Pakistani sentiment. Admiral Mullen, a fellow panelist similarly noted that the incident has been a “humbling experience” for Pakistan and urged space to allow for Pakistan’s “internal soul searching.”

The Backlash from Ground Force Raids

NATO has occasionally used helicopter gunships and heliborne troops to conduct cross-border strikes usually in ‘hot pursuit’ of fleeing militants. While the Pakistani military tolerates some aspects of the US drone campaign, it has vociferously denounced any ground incursions by US or NATO forces. As a result, it is notable that the US raid that killed Bin Laden in Abbottabad, the most visible and contentious of such incursions, was executed by a SEAL team augmented in size to hedge against the possibility of being engaged by Pakistani forces during the operation.

Ground-force raids have invariably resulted in vociferous Pakistani denouncements. In September 2008, after the first publicly acknowledged cross-border ground-force raid by US forces, which killed 20 Pakistanis, COAS Kayani issued a strongly worded statement declaring, “The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country will be defended at all cost and no external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan…There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the Coalition forces, whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.”

 Nonetheless, some raids are believed to have continued although those reported have been rare and limited in nature. US SEAL Team 6 is believed to have raided a suspected AQ compound at Damadola in 2006. On September 27th, 2010, ISAF commanders confirmed that NATO helicopters had crossed the border in ‘hot pursuit,’ and killed 49 militants, a move they claimed did not violate ISAF rules of engagement. Three days later on September 30, 2010, another ground raid was reported that killed three Frontier Corps soldiers, leading various politicians

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including Interior Minister Rehman Malik to express fury and demand that next time Pakistan go “beyond protest.”

Ground force raids are one of the most sensitive of Pakistani ‘red lines.’ Violations deeply strain US-Pakistani relations, and have led to strong countermeasures by the Pakistani military. During the 2008 raid, Pakistani forces opened fire on US helicopters providing support, and after the September 2010 raid, Pakistan moved immediately moved to close the Torkham border crossing in the Khyber Pass, which is said to account for over 66% of non-lethal NATO supplies transiting to Afghanistan through Pakistan. The closure of the crossing point for over a week led to a severe backlog of trucks, making them easy targets for insurgents who mounted several attacks during the period, amid accusations that the Pakistani military had ‘green-lighted’ such attacks.

Growing US dissatisfaction with the level of Pakistani support has led the US to continue planning for such attacks. In December 2010, there was increased open source reporting on the US military’s desire to conduct more such raids, although senior military officials including Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, the deputy chief of staff for communications for NATO claimed that there was “absolutely no truth” to such reports. ISAF and NATO also strongly denied any reports that their forces had crossed the border twice in November 2010.

This situation changed very publicly in May 2010. On May 1, 2011, a team of 20-25 US Navy Seals mounted a raid against a compound in the city of Abbottabad that killed Osama Bin Laden. Details remain murky, but it appears the raid was coordinated between the US Joint Special Operations Command and the CIA, and involved several US helicopters, including one that encountered mechanical difficulties was forced to land, and subsequently destroyed. Pakistan was not informed prior to the raid, and their involvement was minimal and restricted to the aftermath of the operation.

Given the nature of the target, official Pakistani anger was sharp considering the significant breach of its sovereignty that the US raid entailed, yet muted in understanding of the seriousness of the situation. The Pakistani government did issue a statement on May 3, 2011, however, that is an indication that tensions with the US were unlikely to diminish.

The Government of Pakistan categorically denies the media reports suggesting that its leadership, civil as well as military, had any prior knowledge of the US operation against Osama bin Laden carried out in the early hours of 2nd May 2011.

…Abbottabad and the surrounding areas have been under sharp focus of intelligence agencies since 2003 resulting in highly technical operation by ISI which led to the arrest of a high value Al Qaeda target in 2004. As far as the target compound is concerned, ISI had been sharing information with CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies since 2009.

…It is important to highlight that taking advantage of much superior technological assets, CIA exploited the intelligence leads given by us to identify and reach Osama bin Ladin, a fact also acknowledged by the US President and Secretary of State, in their statements. It is also important to mention that CIA and some other friendly intelligence agencies have benefitted a great deal from the intelligence provided by ISI. ISI’s own achievements against Al Qaeda and in War on Terror are more than any other intelligence agency in the world.

…Reports about US helicopters taking off from Ghazi Airbase are absolutely false and incorrect. Neither any base or facility inside Pakistan was used by the US Forces, nor Pakistan Army provided any operational or logistic assistance to these operations conducted by the US Forces. US helicopters entered Pakistani airspace making use of blind spots in the radar coverage due to hilly terrain. US helicopters’ undetected flight into Pakistan was also facilitated by the mountainous terrain, efficacious use of latest technology and ‘map of the earth’ flying techniques.

…This operation was designed to minimize the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there were no other individuals who were killed aside from those on the compound.

…There has been a lot of discussion about the nature of the targeted compound, particularly its high walls and its vicinity to the areas housing Pakistan Army elements. It needs to be appreciated that many houses occupied by the affectees of operations in FATA / KPK, have high boundary walls, in line with their culture of privacy and security. Houses with such layout and structural details are not a rarity.

…Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan. This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime constitute threat to international peace and security.

On May 5, 2011 at the 138th Corp Commanders Conference at GHQ Rawalpindi, the Pakistani military released a statement warning that any future attempts at "violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, will warrant a review on the level of military-intelligence cooperation with the United States" and that there was a decision to "reduce the strength of US military personnel in Pakistan to the minimum essential."  

Shuja Pasha, head of the ISI, is also reported to have delivered a blistering criticism of US actions in a closed-door session of Parliament soon after the raid. While the meeting ended with parliamentarians closing ranks behind the military, the very fact that senior military officials were able to be summoned spoke to the severe blow to the military’s prestige, and the anger among senior military commanders of the US’s unilateral actions.

Military Sales and Assistance

The US sees military assistance is seen as an important tool in inducing Pakistani cooperation, and Pakistan is one of the world’s largest recipients of US military assistance. US military assistance to Pakistan consists of four major programs—Foreign Military Financing (FMF) sales, Coalition Support Funds (CSF), Section 1206 Funds and the newer Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF)—as well as various other smaller ones, primarily devoted to counter-narcotics.

The scale of US military assistance to Pakistan has been extensive, rising to $2.7 billion in 2010, compared to an official Pakistani defense budget of $5.2 billion. $1.65 billion has been requested so far for 2011, not accounting for what Pakistan will require for operational reimbursements through CSF. Total military assistance reached over $14 billion between 2002 and 2010, as seen in Figure 7.8. In July 2011, the White House announced its intention to withhold $800 million in security assistance, about a third of annual security assistance to Pakistan.

As has been outlined earlier, military assistance has had limited results largely in that it is has failed to induce the desired levels of cooperation and been wasted or misused. As the chapter on Pakistani military chapter operations in the FATA details, equipment and training aid have assisted Pakistan in improving its troop mobility and in becoming more effective in tactical operations in the FATA. Yet, the military remains reluctant to expand operations for fear of overstretching its forces, or pursuing groups it tacitly recognizes as strategic proxies.

Other US critics feel Pakistan diverts counterinsurgency assistance towards the acquisition of conventional equipment best suited for conflict with India, and with little COIN applicability. This has been a serious concern in New Delhi and in July 2010, Indian military officials alleged that a mere 15% of funding was being directly utilized in the war on terrorism, and over 80% going towards the modernization of Pakistani armed forces, including major defense purchases from China, Germany and France. Moreover, many experts believe that much of this aid has been diverted to Pakistani military officers for their own benefit, and has allowed Pakistan to use funds to support ISI and other operations in Afghanistan.

US military assistance remains an essential component of Pakistani defense revenues but it is not open-ended. Even before the Bin Laden raid, there was skepticism on the level of corruption and fraud that marked Pakistani claims to reimbursement. The Wall Street Journal carried out an investigative report that detailed how the US is believed to have rejected as much as 40 percent of Pakistani claims, disputes that a senior Pakistani military official called “detrimental to bilateral trust.” In July 2011 in response to the Pakistani expulsion of US military and covert personnel from Pakistan, the US suspended $800 million in military assistance, including money allocated for reimbursements for Pakistani military operations.

In the face of public criticism after the Bin Laden raid, a statement issued by the military high command after the 139th Corps Commanders Conference in June “recommended to the government that US funds meant for military assistance to Army be diverted towards economic aid for Pakistan which can be used reducing the burden on the common man.” So far, there is no word on actual implementation.  

The statement also disputed US figures. General Kayani is reported as stating that only $8.6 billion of the expected $13 billion in military assistance had been received by Pakistan. The statement further stated that out of these monies, “the government had made available only US$1.4 billion to the Army over last ten years. A relatively smaller amount has gone to Navy and PAF as well. The rest i.e. approximately US$6 Billion, have been utilized by the Government of Pakistan for budgetary support which ultimately means the people of Pakistan.” This declaration cleverly omits that the government at the time was the military run government of President Musharraf,

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807 Ibid.
Coalition Support Funds

The Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program, which reimburses the operational costs of PAKMIL operations against Taliban insurgents, accounts for the bulk of assistance. CSF was established in 2001 to support 27 countries, but now Pakistan alone now accounts for 70% of total disbursements across the world.\(^808\) CSF funding for Pakistan has registered an astonishing increase as the Afghan war has progressed, rising 50,000% from $9.1 million in the three years preceding 9/11 to $4.7 billion in the three years after.\(^809\) Today it comprises the bulk of US military assistance to Pakistan, having reached a total of $8.8 billion since 2002, and comprising 55% of all military assistance in 2010.

CSF funding has been used to reimburse a broad range of PAKMIL operations, including for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; for combat air patrols, reconnaissance, close air support missions, airlift support and air traffic control; and for military operations in the FATA and increased management activity at Joint Staff Headquarters.\(^810\)

Various lawmakers have been skeptical of PAKMIL claims of reimbursement, and a GAO report published in February 2011 reiterated its previous recommendations on the “need to improve planning, monitoring, documentation and oversight of US assistance to Pakistan… [And] the need to increase oversight and accountability for Pakistan’s reimbursement claims for Coalition Support Funds.”\(^811\) Various incidents have supported this skepticism. A small sample include the billing of $1.5 million for the repair of Navy vehicles that had not been used, $45 million for the construction of bunkers and roads of which don’t exists, and the billing of $80 million per month in support of operations during ceasefire periods when troops were in their barracks.\(^812\)

Pakistani officials have complained of the slow pace of disbursements, but military payments have been significantly more efficient than comparable economic assistance. Disbursements have been partially used as a tool of coercion as during the 2011 Davis affair,\(^813\) but have been most strongly impacted in July 2011, when $500 million of CSF disbursements (out of a total of $800 million) were suspended, and perhaps withdrawn. The move was in reaction to Pakistan’s expulsion of the majority of US personnel in the wake of the Bin Laden raid.

Foreign Military Financing

In 2006, Pakistan signed arms transfer agreements with the US worth $3.5 billion,\(^814\) a figure that nearly matched the entire value of all Foreign Ministry Sales (FMS) program purchases by Pakistan from 1950-2001. FMF financing to Pakistan, essentially grants or loans to assist foreign purchase of US military equipment has increased exponentially in the past decades and drawn criticism for the heavy prevalence of conventional equipment that has little bearing on counterinsurgency operations. After the third “strategic dialogue” held between US and Pakistani

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\(^{810}\) “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan,” GAO.

\(^{811}\) Ibid.


officials in October 2010, US Secretary of State announced an additional five-year $2 billion package that was essentially interpreted as increasing current financing for the FMF program by about a third. The US also announced its intention to cut off aid and training to units accused of conducting extrajudicial killings.

Major post-2001 defense acquisitions through FMF and Pakistani national funding are detailed below, and include major conventional platforms with limited COIN applicability:

- 8 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft (at least 2 delivered)
- 36 F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft for $1.4 billion
- Variety of missiles and bombs for F-16 platform worth $640 million
- 1 ex-Oliver Hazard Perry class missile frigate
- Mid-Life Update Modification Kits to upgrade existing F-16A/B inventory for $890 million
- 115 M109A 155mm self-propelled howitzers for $52 million
- 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters
- Six C-130E transport aircraft
- 6,312 TOW anti-armor missiles (at least 2,007 delivered)
- 5,600 military radio sets
- 300 PVS-7 night-vision devices
- 600,000 cartridges of 20mm ammunition

Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) Funds and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF/PCCF)

Section 1206 Funds are used primarily to assist partner nations build up their counterterrorist capabilities. Pakistan is the second largest recipient of 1206 funding, receiving $203.4 million, or 15% of all 1206 disbursements million in 2009. 1206 funding has been used primarily to increase PAKMIL capabilities for operations inside the FATA, but has been phased out since FY 2010 with transfer of funding responsibility to PCF/PCCF. Key elements of support include:

- Building up Rotary Aviation Assets: 4 Mi-17s transferred, in addition to spare parts, night vision, aviation body armor, technical support and limited training.

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819 Ibid.
• Build up Special Forces Capabilities: Variety of equipment transferred to Pakistani SSG units, and the Pakistani Army’s 21st Aviation Squadron, including communications equipment, night-vision goggles, GPS systems and other field gear

• Build up ground based ISR capabilities and transfers of counter-IED kits

In 2009, Congress responded by creating two new funding vehicles in response to the Pentagon’s request for additional funding to build up Pakistani military capabilities; PCF run by the Department of Defense received $400 million in FY2009–2010 funding, while PCCF run by the Department of State received $700 million for FY2010–2011 funding. In April 2011, as a result of budget cuts at the Department of State, it was decided to return PCCF to DOD for the year; an additional $1 billion has been requested for next year’s budget, but it is unsure if the money will flow to DOD or the Department of State. These programs will continue to provide targeted assistance to PAKMIL in the transfer of weapons, equipment and training.

Economic Aid and Civilian Assistance

Pakistan has become the world’s second largest recipient of US economic and development assistance, ranking only after Afghanistan. A breakdown is shown in Figure 7.9. In October 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (EPPA), or the Kerry-Lugar bill, which authorized $1.5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan annually between 2010 and 2014. The proportion of civilian assistance relative to military is improving. Between 2002 and 2010, civilian assistance amounted to about a third of total allocations, but has risen to comprise 46 percent of funds in the FY 2012 budget request. Economic aid must be also be viewed in context; an entire year’s worth of assistance to Pakistan is equivalent to five and a half days of operations in Afghanistan, offering a particularly cost-effective way to tackle issues of terrorism and instability in South Asia.

The Act focused on three principal objectives including upgrading critical infrastructure needs, helping address basic needs and economic opportunity in militancy-prone areas, and strengthening the civilian government’s institutional capacity to pursue political and economic reforms. $3.5 billion of the $7.5 billion is designated towards “high-impact, high-visibility” infrastructure programs, especially in energy and agricultural sectors, with the remaining $4 billion split evenly between funding health, education and aid programs and the building up of government capacity.

Civilian assistance has often been conflated with the US military strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but that is a mistake. A true civilian assistance strategy that includes trade and investment policies as well as serious technical and diplomatic engagement, can have much more positive impact than simply short-term progress towards limited counter-terrorist goals; it can

help rebalance civil-military relations and facilitate economic growth in ways that truly tackle
the underlying causes of militancy and conflict in Pakistan. Recognition of these dual strategies
can maybe help improve US policy, by decoupling military and civilian assistance, and treating
them separately. Unfortunately, this would be unprecedented, as to date US military and civilian
assistance have risen and fallen in tandem.  

Furthermore, key provisions pertaining to US economic assistance have simply been ignored to
advance US military strategy. One of the most important components of EPPA for example was
to build the government’s institutional capacity and condition assistance on improved civil-
military relations, including civilian oversight over promotions. This has been met with fierce
resistance by the military, to which the US has succumbed. A Wikileaks cable noted then US
ambassador Anne Patterson reassuring senior Pakistani military officials, including COAS
Kayani and DG ISI Pasha, that the conditions on the EPPA package were largely superfluous,
that waivers were included and would be exercised, and that civilian assistance would not affect
the level of military funding.  

Much of US civilian aid also continues to be hampered by bureaucratic constraints, inefficiency
and waste. According to figures provided by the GAO, in FY2010, only $179.5 million of the
allocated $1.51 billion was actually disbursed. A July 2011 Congressional Research Service
report further detailed this gap, providing data that showed that not a single program has had its
monies disbursed on time. Many sources suggest that roughly half of US assistance pledged
for Pakistan is spent on administrative costs, including paying foreign experts. USAID has
similarly admitted that, “One year after the launch of the civilian assistance strategy in Pakistan,
USAID has not been able to demonstrate measurable progress.” Senator John Kerry’s
spokesman acknowledged the same saying, “the floods last year changed the Pakistani
landscape, literally and figuratively, and required us to take a step back and reexamine all of our
plans.”

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825 Wren Elhai, “Can US development strategy in Pakistan survive a spat over military aid?” Center for Global Development,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/228747
827 “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan,” GAO.
828 Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments.”
829 “Quarterly Progress and Oversight Report on the Civilian Assistance Program in Pakistan as of December 31, 2010,”
830 Josh Rogin, “Most US Aid to Pakistan still in US hands,” Foreign Policy, March 1, 2011. Available at
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/01/most_us_aid_to_pakistan_still_in_america_s_hands
In the FATA for example, where the US had allocated at least $728 million by the end of fiscal year 2009, the GAO found that in general long-term development programs did not achieve their targets.\(^{831}\) Of 115 schools USAID promised to build in Swat, none have been completed, and only 14-20 have even been started.\(^{832}\) Problems encountered included inadequate partnering between the US and the government of Pakistan (GoP), fears of corruption and leakages, as well as inadequate measures to report, monitor or evaluate the performance of development programs.\(^{833}\)

More emphasis has been placed on moving from reliance on foreign contractors towards partnerships with local agencies. This was advocated strongly by former special envoy to Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, but such a policy, while well intentioned suffers from various problems, including Pakistan’s inability to absorb such a large influx of funds, and a dearth of

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\(^{831}\) “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan,” GAO.


\(^{833}\) “Securing, Stabilizing and Developing Pakistan’s Border with Afghanistan,” GAO.
suitable human capital. Detractors—including a senior USAID official—have argued that, “Directing an immediate shift away from US contractors already on the ground to local implementers without an appropriate transition period will seriously compromise the more important requirements for quick counterinsurgency and economic impacts.” Even so, significant staffing shortfalls remain, including at USAID, which has a 20 percent shortfall in filled positions at the US embassy in Islamabad.

Various other problems have plagued US development assistance. Violence in many areas has restricted the ability of aid agencies to operate, while various requirements such as prominently displaying US government logos to increase visibility, has led international groups to pull out, for fear of being targeted. US personnel engaged in civilian development activities are often also equated with deeply unpopular security contractors and corruption has been an endemic problem. Fueled in part by the magnitude of US aid flows, there is worry that aid may actually end up being destabilizing by flowing to corrupt and violent powerbrokers.

A portion of aid is believed to flow to insurgents, paid in protection money by donor-funded contractors. An unnamed US official in Kabul estimated this portion could run as high as ten percent. Many Pakistanis also view US aid as insufficient given the costs they have borne. An analysis conducted by Pakistan’s Finance Ministry calculated that the conflict had cost Pakistan about $43 billion in economic losses between 2001 and 2010, including damaged infrastructure, diversion of budgetary resources, lost exports, capital and human flight, and other metrics.

Various suggestions to improve this situation have been put forward. Nicholas Shmidle for example argues that US civilian aid should prioritize the provinces of Punjab and the Sindh, instead of the FATA where returns on investment are low, and are unlikely to change public perceptions. This may be helpful advice; mirroring a changing strategy in Afghanistan that focuses on districts and areas that have pockets of support that can be consolidated.

More important, however should be an attempt to decouple economic strategy from military strategy and create a truly integrated civilian assistance strategy. An important component will be to transition from aid to trade, perhaps by measures such as improving trade access for Pakistani goods in the US. As Bruce Riedel points out, currently Pakistani textiles suffer from US tariffs, three times those of other nations. The same is reflected across the entire trade balance. 87 percent of Pakistan’s exports to the US faced import duties, in contrast to 30 percent of total US imports. A more level playing field for trade can help build up the Pakistani

835 Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments.”
837 Wright, “Setbacks plague US aid to Pakistan.”
economy in ways that are sustainable, and most effectively assist the Pakistani people, with less leakage to intermediaries and inefficiencies.

There are no guarantees that such assistance will change perceptions of the US or win ‘hearts and minds,’ especially in the short-term. US flood assistance in 2010 for example, was touted as an opportunity to showcase US efforts. The US was the largest donor and involved in most aspects of the relief efforts, including contributing $595 million in disaster aid by January 2011, according to figures provided by USAID. The US contributed 26 helicopters, tons of food and medical aid. Unfortunately, as in the aftermath of the earthquake, any improvement in the US’s public image has been temporary and continues to be overshadowed by anger over US military involvement in Pakistan.

It is very important to also remember that the lag time between the delivery aid and the results the US is seeking will often be considerably longer than what is needed in the Afghan stabilization context. However, walking away from Pakistan is a dangerous strategy, with important impacts on economic and political stability, and it appears clear that if the US is to provide aid at all, it will be essential to avoid the “feast or famine” approach, the US has traditionally employed. More emphasis should also be applied on employing an outcome-centric approach that includes robust metrics to measure and evaluate progress.

US Leverage

It is often assumed that “the United States is subject to Pakistani leverage as long as Washington maintains massive combat forces in Afghanistan.” This is true to a significant extent. While the US has sought alternative supply lines through Central Asia, Pakistan is a vital transit point for US and NATO materiel to warfighters in Afghanistan, and the fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are heavily intertwined by geography, history and calculated Pakistani action.

The US does have leverage. Pakistan derives many benefits from the US, none of which it is likely to want to lose. The US has been a critical supplier of advanced equipment since 9/11, including conventional platforms Pakistan can use to combat India, and has provided large amounts of fairly unregulated funds. It is also a critical restraining influence on India in crisis situations, as evidenced after the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

Ending this support would have a serious impact on Pakistani security. A strong relationship with Beijing might offset some of these losses, but Pakistan is a nation that has always traditionally ‘borrowed’ power to resist India, and is unlikely to be ecstatic about losing a key layer of its deterrence and funding. This can be a useful coercive mechanism; attaching greater conditionality on aid, particularly military aid, and tying disbursements to outcomes.

843 Wilder, “Testimony on US Aid to Pakistan and Accountability.”
845 Claire Truscott, “US flood aid ‘not enough’ to win over Pakistanis,” AFP, August 28, 2010. Available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hPhJwSwueNtARQSSDQTpcIpye551g
846 Ibid.
The US has attempted to utilize this coercive tool in mid-2011, withholding about $800 million dollars in security assistance, about a third of its annual security assistance. The move is reported to be an attempt to coerce and punish Pakistan for expelling US military trainers and imposing prohibitive visa restrictions on US personnel. The move may be successful in extracting concessions on details such as these or even in increasing US leverage in the short-term, but they are unlikely to be successful in altering Pakistan’s strategic vision.

US experts have warned of the risks of escalating competition, and outlined a sliding scale of response options as seen in Figure 7.10. Even so, the task ahead for the US is difficult, but not insurmountable. There are key overlaps in interest, particularly in the shared desire to eradicate militancy in the FATA, or to ward off economic collapse. Certainly magnitude differs, and the US desires much more including an expansion of theater into Afghan Taliban strongholds of North Waziristan and northern Balochistan, a matter Pakistan continues to resist. However, given the ongoing changes in the militant landscape since the 1990s, there is a growing danger that Afghanistan could end up being a haven for not just anti-Western and anti-Indian terrorist groups, but also anti-Pakistani elements who already straddle the border.

It may also help to have a more empathetic understanding of the political difficulties that collaboration with the US entails in the eyes of the public. An ISI operative acknowledged as much in the wake of the Davis affair; “There were just too many CIA movements and operations going on without our knowledge. It made us look as if we were not in charge.”

Figure 7.10: The Risks of Escalating Competition

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8. The Cost to Pakistan of Its Conflict with India

The dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani conflict are all too well known: two nuclear-armed powers with a long history of armed aggression face off along a heavily militarized and contested border. The heart of the conflict, as always, is Kashmir, which remains disputed and guides tensions between the two countries. Pakistan has played a key role in the Kashmiri insurgency, as have Indian failures in efficient and respectful governance. Today, violence in Kashmir is at its lowest ebb since the start of the insurgency, although there are fears that violence could resurface if Indo-Pakistani talks and a ceasefire break down.

Terrorism in major Indian urban centers, most notably the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, have increased in recent years although overt cross-border support for the insurgency in Kashmir has decreased. The net result is that tensions between India and Pakistan remain strong, with a high potential for military escalation, particularly in the aftermath of any high-profile terrorist or insurgent violence directed against India and originating from Pakistan.

India has so far exercised restraint in the aftermath of terrorist attacks due to the fear of the potential consequences of escalation, and likely due to strong US pressure which seeks to avoid a collapse of Pakistani support for anti-Taliban operations along the Afghan border. Indian restraint is not assured in the future.

Terrorist attacks have damaged progress in the Composite Dialogue, the latest round of peace negotiations between the two countries, and embarrassed the Indian government as it seeks to project itself as a stable rising global power, and a safe haven for foreign investment. Attacks generally include calls for retaliation, and various domestic factors including nationalist sentiment, political pressures from opposition parties, and a media clamor for a military response, can easily lead to an escalation in tensions, particularly given the trust deficit between New Delhi and Islamabad.

The Conventional and Nuclear Military Balance

The more than 2,000-mile long India-Pakistan border is one of the most heavily militarized in the world. The two countries have fought three major wars with each other in 1947, 1965 and 1971, as well as a limited war in India’s Kargil district in 1999. These are in addition to various asymmetric conflicts, ranging from a proxy insurgency in Kashmir to the covert sponsorship of terrorist attacks against the Indian heartland. Both countries have nuclear capabilities, and maintain sizeable arsenals directed at one another.

Given the historical context, India and Pakistan have seen an unprecedented calm in relations over the past decade. A bilateral Composite Dialogue formally resumed in 2004, and has “realized some modest, but meaningful successes, including a formal ceasefire... and some
unprecedented trade and people-to-people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LoC).850
Since 2008, however tensions have again significantly increased, particularly after the November
2008 terrorist ‘fidayeen’ attack in Mumbai, which killed 165 people, including 22 foreigners.

The conventional military balance is tilted in India’s favor as seen in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. India
maintains numerical superiority in manpower and all forms of high-power equipment, but
despite this imbalance, the Pakistani Armed Forces constitutes a major military force, and any
large-scale conventional engagement will be far from bloodless from India. A snapshot of the
Indo-Pakistani strategic picture, provided by US experts, is shown in Figure 8.3.

Pakistan retains significant deterrence capacity through its nuclear arsenal, but the 1999 Kargil
war demonstrated both countries’ willingness to fight a limited conventional war under the threat
of nuclear escalation. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine remains undeclared. It has refused to state a
‘no-first use’ policy, most likely to maximize deterrence against India851 and both countries lack
sophisticated early warning and command-and-control systems, heightening the risks of
unintended escalation.852 However, Pakistan is generally believed to be ahead on the evolution of
a nuclear command and control system and on operational planning for their tactical use.853 A
new rumored Indian military doctrine, Cold Start, has also raised tensions. The new strategy
reportedly seeks to break with India’s traditional posture of strategic restraint towards an
offensive strategy designed to rapidly mobilize several integrated battle groups for offensive
purposes.

Nuclear weapons are an integral component of the military balance. The 2010 SIPRI yearbook
estimated that the Indian arsenal at 60-80 warheads,854 and India is now believed to produce
about 20-40kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually, and probably has an accumulated stockpile
of 280-600kg of plutonium, enough for 40-120 weapons.855

Details on the Pakistani arsenal are less clear. In early 2011, US intelligence officials estimated
that Pakistan had increased its deployed nuclear weapons to more than 110, compared to about
75-80 at the time President Obama took office.856 Other estimates allege the real number is
closer to 200, given Pakistan’s surplus of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. The
International Panel on Fissile Materials noted in its 2010 report that Pakistan had stockpiled
about 2.6 tons of highly enriched uranium, and had sufficient fissile material to produce 40-100
additional nuclear devices.857 Heavy construction activity at the Khushab military nuclear site
has included the construction of three new reactors, which would substantially improve

850 K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul Kerr, Michael Martin, and Bruce Vaughn, “India-US Relations,” Congressional Research Service,
October 27, 2010.
851 “Pakistan Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/index.html,
accessed April 28, 2011.
852 Gaurav Kampani, “Seven Years after the Nuclear Test: Appraising South Asia’s Nuclear Relations,” NTI, June 2005.
Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_64a.html
853 Ibid.
Institute, 2010).
856 Sanger and Schmitt, “Pakistani nuclear arms pose challenge to US policy.”
857 “Pakistan Profile,” NTI.
Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity, and could allow Pakistan to nearly double its output of nuclear weapons within a few years to about 19-26 new warheads annually.\textsuperscript{858}

Pakistan has an extensive ballistic missile development program, and has focused on short and medium range missiles, to maintain the ability to execute a deep strike inside India. Pakistan’s domestic development program has accelerated rapidly through the 1980s and 1990s, but acquisition, more than development has been the defining feature. Most major Pakistani missile systems are of Chinese or North Korean lineage, including the Shaheen solid-fueled MRBM based off the Chinese M-11 and M-18 missiles, and the Ghauri liquid-fueled MRBM based of the North Korean Nodong missile.\textsuperscript{859}

The 2005 inaugural test-flight of the Babur (Hatf-7) cruise missile is reported to have come as a revelation, surprising observers with its secrecy and technical prowess, although analysts have noted design similarities with Chinese and American cruise missiles. Pakistan has since added air-launch capabilities to the missile family with the Raad (Hatf-8), and has test-fired the Nasr (Hatf-9) surface-to-surface ballistic missile, which would give it a tactical nuclear capability.\textsuperscript{860} In April 2011, there were reports that Pakistan intended to field the Hatf-9 close to the LoC, in reaction to Cold Start, a deployment that is believed to substantially increase the risk of a nuclear escalation and exchange.\textsuperscript{861}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure81.png}
\caption{Indo-Pakistani Military Manpower}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Army & Navy & Air Force & Paramilitary \\
\hline
India & 1,129,900 & 58,350 & 127,200 & 1,300,586 \\
Pakistan & 550,000 & 22,000 & 45,000 & 304,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{859} “Country Profile: Pakistan,” NTI. Available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/index.html

\textsuperscript{860} Ibid.

Figure 8.2: Indo-Pakistan Military Balance

![Graph showing military balance between India and Pakistan]


**Figure 8.3: India-Pakistan Strategic Picture**

![Map illustrating strategic picture]

Source: US experts.
The “Endless” Kashmir Issue

Kashmir is of negligible strategic importance to both Pakistan and India, and has been vastly costly to both countries in triggering futile local conflicts, forcing them to fund a costly conventional arms race, and triggering a nuclear arms race that now threatens the population centers of both states. It has been particularly damaging to Pakistan in diverting funds desperately needed for development and internal stability, ensuring the primary of the military, and being a key source of internal extremism and nationalism, all with the net result of wreaking immense damage to Pakistan’s national interests.

The disputed former princely kingdom of Kashmir remains one of the world’s most intractable territorial disputes, and has been at the heart of the dissent and mistrust between India and Pakistan since their inceptions. As President Musharraf declared in 2000, “We have been trying all kinds of bus diplomacy and cricket diplomacy and everything. Why has all of it failed? It has failed because the core issue was not being addressed...because there is only one dispute, the Kashmir dispute...others are just aberrations, minor differences of opinion which can be resolved.”

Large-scale wars have been fought over the region in 1948 and 1965, and since the 1990s, Pakistan has waged a proxy war in Indian-administered Kashmir, utilizing a diverse array of militant and terrorist proxies. In 1998, a mass-infiltration of militant jihadis and regular Pakistani Army soldiers in mufti led to the occupation of several strategic mountain peaks, and necessitated large-scale Indian military operations to repel them in what came to be known as the Kargil Conflict. In 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi greatly heightened tensions and led to a full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani forces along the LoC. Today tensions have diminished particularly since a drop-off in violence since 2001, but tensions remain high.

The Kashmiri Jihad

Pakistan is not the sole source of violence in Kashmir; the insurgency began and grew in large part due to a deep indigenous Kashmiri resentment to the Indian administration and militarization of their province. Today ethnic Kashmiris have mostly swapped violence for peaceful mass protests and demonstrations, although the scale of unrest in 2010 has belied Indian claims of successful reconciliation. Kashmiri militant groups have mostly laid down their arms and it is believed today, that Pakistan increasingly monopolizes organized violence.

According to figures provided by the Indian Home Ministry, the region has seen over 55,000 violent incidents between 1988 and 1994, and as of 2010, 13,800 civilians and 4,730 security personnel had lost their lives. The first period of violence, which roughly extends from 1988 until 2004 when the peace process began, resulted in everyday violence across Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as seen in Figure 8.4, and included the 1999 Kargil War and the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

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In June 2004, India and Pakistan engaged in their most wide-ranging and comprehensive peace negotiations, and since, violence has registered a dramatic decrease. In 2010, for example, only 36 civilians were killed in militant violence, compared to 1,067 in 2001. Matters in Kashmir however remain tense, and many Indian security officials fear a resurrection of the insurgency should American efforts in Afghanistan fail, Pakistan choose to subvert rapprochement efforts, or local Kashmiri youth grow once more frustrated enough to pick up weapons.

Pakistan now monopolizes the militant component of the Kashmiri struggle. The composition of foreign fighters increased considerably in the mid-1990s taking the insurgency in a much more brutal direction, ever since which India has been particularly aggressive in alleging rampant collusion between the ISI and militant groups. During his 2005 Independence Day address, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared his dissatisfaction with Pakistani efforts, “I am aware that the government of Pakistan has put some checks on the activities of terrorists from its soil. However, it is not possible to achieve success through half-hearted efforts. It is necessary that the entire infrastructure of terrorism is totally dismantled.”

There is considerable evidence that Pakistan has provided extensive training, weapons, funding and sanctuary to militant groups. Pakistan has officially denied any involvement but many observers including Human Rights Watch, an impartial NGO, believe that the “real decision-making authority and management of the “Kashmir struggle” has long rested with the Pakistani military and its ISI agency.”

This may have been borne out in part by the fact that the beginning of Indian and Pakistani talks were followed by a dramatic decrease in infiltrations across the LoC decreasing from 2,417 incidences in 2001 to 342 by 2008—although the number increased to 489 in 2010, as seen in Figure 8.5. Progress towards cross-border cooperation marked the period, including the resumption of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzzafarabad in April 2005 for the first time in nearly six decades. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have set up crisis ‘hot lines’ to manage conflict, regular flag meetings to discuss ceasefire violations, and in October 2005, the opening of five major border crossings for humanitarian relief after the 2005 earthquake. In January-March 2011, attacks registered a further 45% decline relative to the same period in the previous year, according to the J&K police chief.

Rapprochement alone has not secured increased peace. Other factors facilitating a decline in violence have included significant pressure on the Musharraf government by the United States, the 700-kilometers of fencing along the LoC, and a pronounced decrease in Kashmiri support for violent militancy.

Indian capabilities have increased at border-control and counterinsurgency and it is now estimated that only 15-20% of infiltrators are able to get across the border. However since

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2008, the ceasefire has come under pressure. Pakistani initiated attacks across the LoC with mortars and small arms fire sporadically resumed, largely in the Poonch and Rajouri districts, and on July 28, 2008, Pakistani troops crossed the LoC for the first time since 1999.\textsuperscript{870}

In August of the same year, Defense Minister AK Anthony reported 20 ceasefire violations by the Pakistani military,\textsuperscript{871} which are occasionally attempts to provide covering fire for infiltrating militants. Matters were further complicated by the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which killed 54, as well as an unprecedented surge in terrorist attacks on major Indian urban centers that raised cross-border tensions.

However, despite these incidents, violence has registered a definite decline, which was reflected in end 2009, when India announced a drawdown of two infantry divisions totaling 30,000 men to reflect an improved security situation in J&K.\textsuperscript{872} In January 2011, partly in response to the mass civilian unrest of the previous year, India announced its intention to further draw down forces by as much as 25 percent, although it offered no hard figures, or timeframe for implementation.\textsuperscript{873}

\textbf{Figure 8.4: Trends in Violence in Jammu and Kashmir}

Source: Adapted from data provided by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, www.mha.nic.in.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8_4.png}
\caption{Trends in Violence in Jammu and Kashmir}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{871} Ibid.


At the same time, high-profile terrorist attacks such as in 2008 in Mumbai, have left a powerful legacy, and resurrected Indian fears. A Wikileaks cable from 2010 describes a growing consensus in the Indian defense establishment that “cross-border terrorists are regrouping and preparing to launch a new wave of attacks.”

In support of this, Lt. General S. Hasnain, the commander of the IA’s XV Corps declared in March 2011, that 600-700 militants were waiting at various cross-border launch pads to infiltrate into J&K. The Indian Defense Ministry’s annual report to parliament in 2010-11 also stated that, “The continued infiltrations across the Line of Control and the existence of terrorist camps across the India-Pakistani border demonstrate the continuing ambivalence of Pakistan in its attitude and approach to terror organizations.”

Some high-profile attacks have compounded this fear, notably the January 2, 2010 fidayeen attack on a hotel in Srinagar’s Lal Chowk, the first attack in Srinagar since 2007. Lal Chowk, being the central square of Srinagar is an extremely sensitive target that belied Indian claims at having decisively reversed militant momentum.

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Kashmiri militant groups are divided into two broad groupings; the pro-Pakistan groups, which favor secession to Pakistan, and the pro-independence groups that favor secession from both India and Pakistan. Their character has changed considerably since the start of the insurgency.

At present, pro-independence groups have largely been marginalized within the armed struggle, and pro-Pakistani groups including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami(HuJI) have a near monopoly on organized militant violence. The ‘pro-Pakistan’ label itself comes with problems these days, as many groups that traditionally grew and operated with state support, have either splintered, or defected whole-scale to join the ranks of the Punjabi Taliban, and have moved fighters, resources and infrastructure into the FATA. Their consequent involvement in many high-profile terrorist attacks inside Pakistan has implications on their current relationship with Pakistani intelligence agencies, notably the ISI.

Pro-independence militant groups have increasingly fallen by the wayside, most notably because of ethnic Kashmiris’ rejection of violence as a means to achieve their objectives. In the early days of the jihad it is believed over 150 separate militant groups sprung up to combat Indian forces. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was one of the largest and most organized indigenous militant groups, and is credited with beginning the insurgency. By 1994 however, the JKLF had renounced violent armed struggle, announcing its intention to peacefully advocate for a separate Kashmiri state. Declining ethnic Kashmiri support for violence, increasingly competent Indian security forces, and the internal marginalization of pro-independence groups to pro-Pakistani groups facilitated this shift.

The JKLF is one of the most vocal critics of pro-Pakistani groups, particularly the LeT and its JuD political arm. In September 2010, it accused them of “subverting the indigenous movement” from a legitimate nationalist struggle into an Islamic movement, and today, despite retaining a presence inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir, pro-independence leaders and militants have found themselves under increasing pressure and subjected to a campaign of arrests and torture by the ISI.

Pro-Pakistani groups monopolize the armed struggle. Their presence began to be felt soon after the violence began in 1988-89, when the ISI after having been caught unawares moved to gain greater strategic control over Kashmiri militancy. It introduced several pro-Pakistani groups into the theater, first the Hizbul Mujahideen in mid-1989, and later various others including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI). The trend began in earnest in 1994, when Pakistan established the

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879 Ibid.
United Jihad Council to coordinate the activities of 13 militant groups including the HuM and the LeT.\textsuperscript{883}

Many of these groups drew their cadres from non-Kashmiri groups, including other Pakistani ethnicities, and were more amenable to the incorporation of foreign fighters. By 1993, the \textit{Economist} estimated about 300-400 foreign fighters inside Kashmir, whereas the Director General of the Indian Border Security Force estimated 2,300.\textsuperscript{884} A decade later in 2003 Indian government officials claimed that over 75\% of militants in Kashmir were foreign-fighters.\textsuperscript{885} It should be noted that Indian officials have incentive to overplay this trend, but it is quite evident that by the turn of the century, the Kashmiri jihad increasingly relied on foreign fighters staging from Pakistan.

The entrance of Pakistani and foreign fighters greatly changed the color of the insurgency, from a secular nationalist struggle driven by the legitimate grievances of Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir to a religious struggle increasingly informed by jihadist Deobandi tenets and privatized by Pakistan. By the mid-1990s, Kashmir had become a full-blown proxy war and was “the primary zone for foreign jihadi fighters in Eurasia.”\textsuperscript{886}

Ethnic Kashmiris paid the highest price in the conflict with the Mumbai-based International Center for Peace Initiatives estimating that nearly 85\% of those killed in the conflict were Kashmiri Muslims.\textsuperscript{887} The Sufi Kashmiri Muslims also found little ideological compatibility with the Deobandis, whose brutalities, fundamentalism, and lack of accountability to local communities soon alienated and alarmed them.\textsuperscript{888}

As a result, by 2002 a poll estimated that 69\% of J&K residents opposed the presence of foreign fighters,\textsuperscript{889} and a 2010 poll conducted by Chatham House found that only 20\% of Kashmiris supported violence as a tool to resolve the conflict.\textsuperscript{890} The violence that Pakistan unleashed may have permanently ended any Indian Kashmiri sense of affiliation with Pakistan; the 2010 poll found that while 43\% of J&K residents expressed a desire for independence, only 2\% supported secession to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{891}

Today, most militant groups are believed to maintain camps inside Pakistani administered Kashmir, including the regions of ‘Azad Kashmir’ (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan. In a leaked Wikileaks cable from June 2009, Indian Army chief Deepak Kapoor informed US National Security Advisor James Jones of 43 terrorist training camps inside Pakistan, including 22 in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.\textsuperscript{892}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{883} UNHCR, “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir.”
\item \textsuperscript{884} Shibli, \textit{Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency}.
\item \textsuperscript{885} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{887} UNHCR, “Everyone lives in fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir.”
\item \textsuperscript{888} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{889} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{891} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{892} “US embassy cables: Pakistan home to 43 terrorist camps – Indian army chief,” \textit{Guardian}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Indian counterinsurgency capabilities have improved. By 1999 only about 4-5 of the original 13 members of the United Jihad Council were still militarily effective, and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), once the most preeminent group in Kashmir, is believed to have substantially weakened by 1998. Today it has only about 500 active militants in its ranks, and has increasingly relied upon IED attacks instead of direct-fire engagements in a reflection of its weakened position.

Intra-militant competition has also resulted in a weakening of unity. Part of the HM’s current weakness is as a result of its attempt to insert itself into the political process and declare a unilateral ceasefire in 2000, a move regarded as a betrayal by hardliners, many of who make up other competing militant groups. Similarly another old-guard militant group, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) has lost ground to the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, a former General Secretary of the HuM. Azhar was released from an Indian prison after the HuM’s fifth attempt to secure his release, in this case by hijacking Indian Airlines flight IC814 from Kathmandu and forcing it down in Kandahar. A free Azhar soon founded his own group, the JeM, which is believed to have weaned away many HuM resources and foot soldiers.

Militant dynamics have also changed since 2004, and some analysts today such as Shuja Nawaz firmly believe that the ISI “has certainly lost control” of Kashmir militant groups. Historically speaking, virtually all Kashmiri groups grew out of the Soviet jihad, and some formed links to al-Qaeda. Today, several Kashmiri militant groups, in particular the HuJI and the JeM are believed to have either splintered or defected whole-scale to form the Punjabi Taliban, and assist tribal militants in their terrorist attacks across Pakistan.

Ilyas Kashmiri, the emir of the HuJI, and now also al-Qaeda’s operational commander in Pakistan is the best example. As his name suggests Kashmiri grew out of the Kashmir jihad, but has recently been best known for attacks against Pakistani and international targets. In April 2011, the US announced a $5 million reward for information leading to his arrest, and implicated him for a 2006 attack on its consulate in Karachi. As the trial of David Headley has proceeded, it has been reported that Kashmiri was an active plotter for the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Kashmiri has also been linked to various other attacks including an attempted assassination attempt on President Musharraf’s life in 2003, as well as implemented and planned attacks, in Chicago, India, Denmark, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Kashmiri was regarded as one of the most dangerous terrorists in the region, in part due to his sophisticated operational knowledge as a former army commando, but also due to his vast jihadi relationships. As a veteran US intelligence official put it, “This guy ties everybody together.”

894 Shibli, Kashmir: Islam, Identity, and Insurgency.
895 Ibid.
900 Ibid.
reported killed in June 2011 in a US drone attack in South Waziristan, although at the time of writing details remain murky.

Various other leaders have ties to al-Qaeda. The long-time leader of the HuM Fazlur Rehman Khalil was a signatory to al-Qaeda’s 1998 declaration of war against America and its allies, while Maulana Masood Azhar is believed to have traveled to meet Bin Laden several times and has received funding from the group.  

Captured intelligence from the Bin Laden raid found contact between the HuM and Bin Laden’s courier, and a Center for Public Integrity report on the execution of American journalist Daniel Pearl revealed seamless cooperation between al-Qaeda, sectarian groups and several Kashmiri groups including the HuM and the HuJI. The JeM is also believed to have close links with the Taliban and grown increasingly internationalist in its scope. The JeM’s reported links include Faisal Shahzad, the would-be NYC Times Square bomber, and its fighters are reported to be active alongside the TTP in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Despite these trends, at present, Pakistan is believed to continue to retain influence over the Kashmiri insurgency. In October 2010, Indian intelligence alleged that Syed Salahuddin, chief of the HM, visited three training camps in Azad Kashmir to help resurrect the insurgency, while accompanied by ISI officials.

Pakistan also exerts a strong influence on the extent to which Kashmiri separatist leaders can engage in reconciliation measures with New Delhi. As yet, talks between separatist leaders in Srinagar and New Delhi have broken down, in part due to a systematic campaign of assassinations leveled against reconciling or moderating leaders by Pakistani-backed terrorist groups. In particular leaders of the All-Parties Hurriyet Conference (AHPC), a coalition of Kashmiri separatist parties, have found themselves in the crosshairs of militant gunmen.

In 2002, Abdul Gani Lone, an AHPC leader was gunned down by a LeT hit squad, and in 2003 Abdul Majid Dar, a former commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM) who had advocated for an end to violence, was gunned down by his own former colleagues. More recently in December 2009, Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, another influential leader favoring peace with New Delhi, was shot at and critically wounded by a gunman believed to be from the HuM, an organization he once helped found. And most recently, in April 2011, Maulvi Shoukat Ahmad Shah, a leading moderate separatist leader, believed to be close to JKLF leaders, was killed in an

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explosion in Srinagar.\textsuperscript{909} Shah had been criticized by hardliners for meeting with Indian state officials and for criticizing the practice of stone throwing against Indian security forces.\textsuperscript{910}

**State-sponsored Terrorism? The Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Threat to Both India and Pakistan**

Pakistan has been accused of sponsoring terrorism against India. It is believed to have engaged several groups to conduct these efforts, but by far the most prolific and sophisticated has been the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Today, the LeT is in many ways symbolic of the wider militant landscape; an outfit that is torn between the radicalizing influence of the transnational terrorist groups it increasingly comes into contact with, and the influence of its traditional state patron. At present, the LeT has immense value to Pakistan as one of the few militant groups that has not turned its guns against the Pakistani state, and has consistently demonstrated its ability to reach deep inside the Indian heartland and perpetrate high-profile and complex terrorist attacks.

The LeT was formed in 1986 as the military wing of the Markaz Dawaat ul Irhad (MDI), and it is today headquartered in Muridke in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{911} An India-centric organization, its primary objective continues to be the liberation of Kashmir and the destruction of India, and it devotes much of its resources and manpower towards this goal. Unlike other militant groups, the LeT operates a vast social services network in Pakistan through its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), making it in some sense more akin to Lebanese Hezbollah, than al-Qaeda. The LeT was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US government in 2001, a move soon replicated on its political arm, the JuD in 2006.\textsuperscript{912}

The LeT has been an integral part of the Kashmiri insurgency, and has mounted several high-profile terrorist attacks against the Indian mainland. 2001 was a prime example of its preeminence in both conflicts. In the year, it mounted an attack on J&K’s provincial parliament, which it followed a few months later with an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, leading to the full-scale mobilization of Indian and Pakistani armed forces. Since 2006, the group has maintained an operational presence in Afghanistan, and has been implicated to several high-profile attacks, including dual attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.\textsuperscript{913}

In recent years, the LeT has grown increasingly globalist in its outlook, and has shown a willingness to target Westerners abroad, as well as incorporate them into its attacks inside India. Its primary targeting scope continues to be India, but it has also waged a peripheral jihad against Western targets, and has increasingly refocused towards the Afghan jihad since 2006. The 2008 attacks in Mumbai, which included attacks on Western and Jewish targets, marked the LeT’s formal arrival on the global jihadist stage, and its hybridization in terms of targets.\textsuperscript{914} In his


\textsuperscript{913} Bagoria, “The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations.”

annual assessment, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that the LeT is a “special case” that is “becoming more of a direct threat and is placing Western targets in Europe in its sights.”

Despite its leadership in the anti-Indian jihad, and growing participation in the Afghan war, the LeT is distinct in the militant universe. Subscribing to the minority Ahle-Hadith sect, it has an narrow constituent base, made even narrower by its rejection of mainstream Ahle-Hadith interpretations of jihad. The LeT also has antagonistic relations with the Deobandis. It has “criticized the Deobandi jihad against the Pakistani state and made clear its ideological disdain for these actors.” The group has been largely insulated from broader militant trends. It fought in the Soviet jihad but maintained separate infrastructure and pledged no loyalty to the Taliban in the post-war period. Neither did it send fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 to resist US forces.

The LeT’s hallmark modus operandi has been the ‘fidayeen’ attack, which was perfected on the Kashmiri battlefield and was on display during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. As Christine Fair explains, fidayeen attacks are not “suicide operations per se… (But) more akin to high-risk missions in which well-trained commandoes engage in fierce combat during which dying is preferable to being captured.”

LeT recruits are also believed to be better educated than comparable militant groups—the majority are believed to have completed at least secondary school, and many have college education—a trend believed to be a function of the organization’s founding by two engineering professors. This is not always true, as the sole surviving terrorist from the 2008 Mumbai attack, Mohammad Ajmal Kasab was an uneducated young man from the rural Punjabi village of Okara.

The LeT maintains a privileged working relationship with the ISI, although the level of symbiosis varies depending on the analyst. Some see very high levels of operational symbiosis. Jean-Louis Brugiere, a former French investigating magistrate in charge of counterterrorism operations claimed that even after 9/11 LeT camps were run by the army, including soldiers on detachment serving as instructors, and military helicopters dropping off supplies. Steven Tankel, one of the leading analysts on the LeT believes that the ISI and the LeT are closely linked, and speculates that the LeT’s willingness to toe the state’s line may be derived through coercion; the LeT lacks close allies inside Pakistan, has a narrow constituent base, and its vast infrastructure across Pakistan is highly vulnerable to government crackdowns.

There is uncertainty as to the level of operational interaction. For example in the Mumbai attacks it is uncertain if the ISI provided direct support or truly sanctioned the attack, “but there is no doubt that the Pakistani security apparatus has allowed LeT to operate unfettered. This passive

917 Ibid.
918 Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 LeT Attack.”
919 Ibid.
support was essential to enabling Lashkar to plan and train for the Mumbai attacks.”

David Headley—a Pakistani-American citizen who allegedly conspired with the LeT to launch the Mumbai attacks—is on trial in Chicago, and has claimed to have worked closely with the ISI, including receiving $25,000. Given the source, however, any such allegations need to be carefully parsed and not taken at face value.

Regardless of the exact details, the LeT has conscientiously disavowed any attacks inside Pakistan, or against Pakistani targets. This relationship is believed to have been instrumental in its ability to evade law-enforcement. The LeT was officially banned in 2002 by the Pakistani government, in response to which the LeT spun off its political wing, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) although the “actual separation between JuD and LeT was and always remained entirely cosmetic.”

The JuD openly operates in many cities across Pakistan, and was at the forefront of relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods. Similarly in response to international pressure LeT leader Hafeez Saeed has occasionally been arrested and detained in largely sham operations. In 2010, he has openly appeared at various rallies across Pakistan. Neither has the LeT’s funding been drastically affected, judging from the 82.77 million rupees it was granted in FY 2009-2010 by the provincial government of Punjab.

Despite state support, the LeT shares close ideological similarities with al-Qaeda, and is believed to be growing increasingly close to the organization. Steven Tankel described the group as focused on Kashmir with a low profile elsewhere, but under the surface it remains “very much part of al-Qaeda’s global jihad.” The LeT has had decades-long interaction with al-Qaeda, and the founder of its parent organization during the Soviet jihad was Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Bin Laden, and as a result several LeT militants are believed to have cross-trained in al-Qaeda camps. The LeT also served as “urban facilitators” during al-Qaeda’s retreat from Afghanistan. It helped “exfiltrate” fighters during the invasion and assisted with the provision of safe houses, fake passports, guards, and fixers.

Some senior al-Qaeda operatives have been picked up at LeT safe houses, most prominently Abu Zubaydah, who was captured at a LeT facility in Faisalbad. Collaboration with al-Qaeda may have increased post-2006 since the group entered the Afghan jihad, and moved fighters and bases to the FATA.

The LeT is a highly attractive partner for global jihadis. It has a large infrastructure base, extending from its headquarters in Muridke in South Punjab, to forward operating bases in Azad
Kashmir, including in and around Muzzafarabad, and presumably around the LoC. The group also has a presence in the Gulf, which it utilizes as a “logistical and recruiting hub, primarily for its jihad against India.”932 This presence allows the LeT to more directly tap its donor base, as well as provides good transit points for entrance into India.

The Gulf allows provides the LeT with direct access to recruit Indian Muslims working in the Gulf, and helps maintain its interface with Indian sympathizers and allies, including the Indian Mujahideen.933 The group is also believed to maintain an extensive transnational network, including cells in Britain, North America, mainland Europe and Australia, making it in the words of Tankel an “ideal global jihadist facilitator.”934

The LeT has been implicated in various global terror plots. Its European members have been suspected of providing financial support for shoe bomber Richard Reid, and the 2008 transatlantic airliner plot.935 David Headley was suspected of having conducted surveillance for the Mumbai attacks, there is evidence linking it to an intercepted plot against high-profile targets in Australia. LeT operatives have also been arrested in Iraq by British forces.936

The LeT also maintains links to transnational criminal groups inside Pakistan, which can have significant impact on making the LeT more autonomous and independent, and diluting its dependence on the Pakistani state. The most notable is its nexus with the Karachi-based D-Company run by Dawood Ibrahim, which is one of the world’s largest and most organized drug smuggling outfits. Ibrahim, who originated from Mumbai, before fleeing in 1993 after the Bombay Blasts instigated by his network, retains many links within the Indian criminal underworld, and further afar in the Gulf, Europe and Africa. These include networks, smuggling routes and money laundering channels, all of which can have significant utility for terrorist outfits. It is believed that Ibrahim himself, who considers himself a protector of Indian Muslims, diverts a portion of D-Company’s sizeable profits towards outfits such as the LeT.937 D-Company also controls many sea-routes into India, particularly from Karachi, from where the 26/11 attackers set out.

In theory, the LeT could be one of the single most dangerous elements in destabilizing South Asia, with unparalleled operational reach and proficiency. Should it free itself of the constraints imposed by the state and gravitate into the domestic insurgency, it could wreak havoc on Pakistani stability. Similarly, a high-profile attack against India runs the real risk of escalation into large-scale conventional war, and potentially to nuclear conflict.

**Pakistani-Indian Competition in Afghanistan**

As has been detailed earlier, Indo-Pakistani strategic competition in Afghanistan deeply complicates the US transition process, and future regional stability. Competition between India and Pakistan is nearly always zero-sum, and Afghanistan is no exception. Both countries have divergent strategic objectives, as graphically represented in **Figures 8.6 and 8.7.** To date, Indian

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933 Ibid.
influence in Afghanistan is limited and it is the US and Pakistan that are the primary external
powerbrokers in the country. Nonetheless perceived Indian attempts to threaten Pakistan’s
western flank and “strategically envelope” Pakistan are viewed with deep concern in Rawalpindi,
a paranoia that is a primary driver of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

India has been the largest regional contributor to Afghanistan, mostly geared towards
reconstruction and infrastructure-development projects, including alternative transport networks
to Pakistan, as well as industrial, irrigation and hydroelectric projects. India is deeply alarmed by
the prospect of premature American and NATO withdrawal and the return of a Taliban regime,
fearing spillover into Kashmir. Nonetheless, India has proceeded with creating a strategic
partnership with Kabul, and in a May 2011 visit to Afghanistan, Indian Prime Minister Singh
announced the investment of an addition $500 million in Afghanistan, bringing its total
contribution to $2 billion, the largest regional contribution. The Indian presence is primarily in
the northern Tajik and Uzbek areas, although it has some influence in southern provinces
bordering Pakistan.

Pakistan accuses India of using Afghanistan as a staging base to support its internal Baloch
separatist insurgency through its several consulates across Afghanistan. To date, no hard
evidence has yet materialized, and Pakistan’s paranoia is such that it has taken a long time to
even convince Pakistan that the number of Indian consulates in Afghanistan was five, and not
twenty four as they alleged. Even so, as Christine Fair puts it, “anecdotal evidence suggests that
although Pakistan’s most sweeping claims are ill-founded, Indian claims to complete innocence
are also unlikely to be true.”

The Taliban resurgence since 2006 has deeply degraded Indian influence in the country. India is
regarded to be close to Karzai and various Tajik powerbrokers in the government in Kabul, and
provided assistance to the Northern Alliance during the 1990s, including a field hospital, $8
million in high-altitude warfare equipment and defense advisors including one of brigadier
rank.

Indian interests have often been attacked, including dual attacks on its embassy in Kabul, one of
which killed its defense attaché. Various other attacks have targeted its citizens including a
February 2010 attack on a UN guesthouse rented out by the Indian embassy that killed nine
Indians, as well as two Indian Army personnel.

There are reportedly worries in Pakistan of a growing US-Indian-Afghan nexus that will dictate
the post-war future, but such concerns appear overblown. Indian interests in Afghanistan are
primarily composed of ‘soft power’ assets unlikely to survive without a coalition military shield
as detailed by Christine Fair who states, Indian influence continues to be protected largely under

938 Kronstadt et al., “India-US Relations.”
939 Alissa J. Rubin and Sangar Rahimi, “Indian and Afghan Leaders Forge Deeper Ties in Meeting,” New York Times, May 12,
34, no. 2 (Spring 2011). Available at http://www.twq.com/11spring/docs/11spring_Fair.pdf
941 Christine Fair, “India in Afghanistan: Strategic Interests, Regional Concerns,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2010. Available
at http://bit.ly/aFXK0K
942 Tom Coghlan, “Kabul bomb kills Indian military attaché,” Times Online, July 8, 2008. Available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4284698.ece
943 “Terrorist Attacks on Indians in Afghanistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal,
a ‘shrinking US security umbrella,’ and at present there is no indication that India has the capability to independently achieve any of its desired objectives in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{944}

A resurgence of Afghanistan as a militant sanctuary is deeply worrying for Indian strategic planners, given that virtually every terrorist group operating in India has trained in Afghanistan, and all have varying degrees of connection to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. As a result, India was reportedly alarmed by reports that the US intended to engage in negotiations with Taliban militants, but by May 2011 during a visit to Kabul, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that India would support the national reconciliation process between Taliban insurgents and the Kabul government. This is a qualitative shift in Indian policy in Afghanistan and is generally seen as tacit Indian acceptance of Pakistani influence. According to some analysts the quid pro quo for such recognition may be security guarantees for Indian interests in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{945}

\textbf{Figure 8.6: Pakistan’s Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan}

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\caption{Pakistan’s Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan}
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Source: US experts.
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\textsuperscript{944} Fair, “Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End-Game in Afghanistan?”

\textsuperscript{945} Luv Puri, “Bridging the India-Pakistan divide on Afghanistan,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, June 9, 2011.
Figure 8.7: India’s Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan

Source: US experts.
9. sino-pakistani relations

China and Pakistan have little in common in terms of ideology, culture, religion, and political system—but both continue to derive mutual benefits from an almost 40-year-old “strategic partnership.” Chinese officials, including President Hu Jintao, regularly describe this relationship in lofty terms, a bond that “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.” Such gestures of partnership are appreciated by the Pakistani populace, which in 2009 was the most pro-Chinese country in the world, with 84% of Pakistanis viewing China favorably.946

The reality however is less grounded in emotion than in a convergence of mutual strategic interests. China and Pakistan have similar desires for the regional architecture, namely weakened Indian power in the region. Hussain Haqqani, the current Pakistani ambassador to the US, lucidly summed up the relationship saying, “For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India. For Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India.”947

Pakistan has other value for China. It occupies a geographic position of strategic value, offering China access into the Indian Ocean at the very heart of the oil corridors of the Persian Gulf, as well as favored access to sizeable mineral deposits in Balochistan. A close partnership with Islamabad also ensures that regardless of US largesse, its influence in Pakistan remains limited. As a result, Beijing and Rawalpindi have forged a strong military bond, including joint production of some weapons systems, a pipeline of advanced conventional weaponry and crucial technical assistance with Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The relationship has serious limits. Jonathan Pollack of the Brookings Institution notes that “evidence of uncertainty and instability, the fragile nature of ruling authority in Pakistan… are things the Chinese worry about a great deal.”948 Beijing has no desire for regional conflict in its direct periphery, but it has a different conception of “stability” to that of the US. Beijing secures its interests primarily through the Pakistani military, and for example has no problems with either a military-run government in Pakistan or even an ISI-controlled Taliban-style government in Afghanistan, provided such a structure can be guaranteed not to inflame Islamist sentiment inside China or adversely affect Chinese interests in the region.949

Beijing has expansive public tolerance for Pakistani policies, but in private and material terms has little interest in supporting Pakistani endeavors that do not advance its own interests, leading to a “highly transactional, situation-specific approach to what Beijing is willing and able to do.”950 Furthermore, Sino-Pakistani relations continue to evolve and are affected by Beijing’s growing reluctance to pursue policies that threaten its image as a responsible global stakeholder.

947 Rajeev Sharma, “Chinese Military Assistance to Pakistan and its Implications for India,” South Asia Analysis Group, August 24, 2010. Available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3996.html
948 “Pakistan and China very close after 60 years,” Deutsche-Welle, May 25, 2011. Available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,6534374,00.html
950 Ibid.
Beijing, for example cannot replace the scale of Washington’s material support, nor does it appear to want to. Neither does China have interest in assisting Pakistan at times when it chooses to antagonize the US, as during the “handover” of the Gwadar power in June 2011. Nonetheless China and Pakistan share a close strategic partnership, and have sizeable economic ties. Bilateral trade reached $8.9 billion in 2010, with a mutual pledge to increase it to $12 billion by 2012, although this pales in comparison to Sino-Indian economic ties.

Hedging India

Pakistan “borrows” security, offsetting its own conventional weakness relative to India, by drawing on Chinese and American power to achieve some measure of parity. Today, the Chinese component is particularly valued. Pakistani relations with the US are beset with problems, and many Pakistanis continue to see the US as fickle and self-serving, whereas China is perceived as a consistent and reliable ally by most segments of the country.

China has similar motive to limit Indian power and influence in the region ever since the 1962 Sino-Indian War shaped Indian and Chinese relations into a continuing competition for power and prestige in Asia. China offers Pakistan significant support in its interactions with India, and plays an important role in restraining Indian action during periods of conflict. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, China sided firmly with Islamabad, offering it strong political support, issuing a strong condemnation of Indian actions and even mobilizing its forces to pressure an end to the fighting more on Pakistan’s terms. Similar maneuvering took place in the 1971, although by 1999, China adopted a more cautious attitude.

The conflict in 1999, when India and Pakistan engaged in a round of nuclear brinkmanship provided a good example of evolving Sino-Pakistani relations and Beijing’s reluctance to be dragged into positions that negatively impact its strategic interest. Although, Beijing sided firmly with Islamabad at the time, it nonetheless urged Pakistani to make concessions to India and exercise “self-control.”

The Sino-Pakistani strategy to contain India is most visibly manifested by a close military bond between the two countries that has intensified since the cutoff of US aid with the Pressler Amendment, which cemented the perception of Beijing as a reliable supplier and partner. Today China is a key defense supplier, offering advanced platforms often at subsidized rates and with few technological limitations, including the Type-85 MBT and the F-22 frigate. The two countries are co-producing several high-end conventional platforms including the Al-Khalid (MBT-2000) main battle tank of which Pakistan now has 240 in service and the Chinese reverse-engineered Babur (Hatf VII) cruise missile.

The Pakistani Air Force has a large fleet of Chinese-manufactured aircraft, including the F-7MG, and the F-7P Skybolt fighter aircraft, and a squadron of the newly inducted JF-17 Thunder (FC-1) aircraft fielded in early 2010. In the wake of the US raid to kill Bin Laden, a visit to Beijing by Prime Minister Gilani yielded the expedited delivery of another 50 JF-17s, out of an order of between 150 and 250. Pakistan also flies the Chinese built K-8 Karakorum (Hongdu JL-8) and

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951 Ibid.
952 Ibid.
has bought four ZDK-03 AWACS aircraft with Chinese sensors and communications.\(^{954}\) China also apparently agreed to sell the FA-20 (Chengdu J-10) aircraft according to Pakistani Defense Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar in May 2011.\(^ {955}\)

Beijing is also widely regarded as the “godfather” of Pakistan’s nuclear program, and has played a major role in providing materials, expertise and critical assistance for the construction of facilities according to a 2001 Department of Defense Report.\(^ {956}\) More details of Chinese support for Pakistan’s nuclear program can be seen in Figure 9.1.

Pakistani observers were amongst the only foreigners invited to Lop Nor in 1983 to witness Chinese testing,\(^ {957}\) and Chinese material assistance has been extensive, including providing enriched uranium, building the heavy water Khushab reactor in the 1990s and supporting the construction and expansion of the plutonium reprocessing Chashma nuclear complex. The expansion, three new reactors that could double Pakistan’s warhead-producing capability, came in reaction to the US-India nuclear deal in 2008.\(^ {958}\)

China is an important source of Pakistani ballistic missile capabilities. Beijing supplied missile technology, including the M-11 missile, as early as the 1980s and despite US pressure, this support has continued. Pakistan’s Fateh Jang missile factory for example produces the Shaheen-1 IRBM modeled on the Chinese M-9 missiles and the Shaheen-II, which closely resembles the Chinese M-18.\(^ {959}\) Pakistan’s Ghauri MRBM lines are believed to be modeled after North Korean missiles.

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\(^ {957}\) “Pakistan Nuclear Weapons,” *GlobalSecurity*. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke.htm

\(^ {958}\) Kardon, *China and Pakistan*.

\(^ {959}\) “China Missile Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” *NTI*, http://www.nti.org/db/china/mpakpos.htm
Figure 9.1: Chinese Assistance to Pakistani Nuclear and Missile Facilities

Source: East Asia Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Mercantilism: Ports, Oil and Resources

Pakistan’s geographic position can assist China’s thirst for resources by offering alternate energy transit routes as well as a transshipment hub to better integrate the Middle East, and South and Central Asia with the Chinese economy. However, Pakistani routes remain beset by problems of instability and cost, without easy solutions.

Chinese energy transit routes are vulnerable, given its heavy dependence on seaborne oil. 80 percent of this must travel through the Indian Ocean, in a 16–25 day journey through hostile waters around India and through the vulnerable Straits of Malacca chokepoint. Chinese grand strategy is driven by an attempt to reduce this vulnerability and Pakistan potentially offers a vastly shorter 48-hour inland route to the very mouth of the Straits of Hormuz once rail and road links are completed. This route also happens to pass through Pakistan’s resource-rich province of Balochistan, with vast mineral and energy deposits, and can offer another means to integrate China towards the Middle East.

Pakistan can offer China access to the strategically important port of Gwadar, which opens onto the Indian Ocean near the Straits of Hormuz. In May 2011, after the US raid that killed Bin Laden, senior Pakistani officials hinted at transferring the port to Chinese control. Defense Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar was most explicit, declaring that. “We have asked our Chinese brothers to please build a naval base at Gwadar.” China, which appeared to have been blindsided by the offer, balked at accepting a fairly transparent attempt to antagonize the US, and regional countries such as India. The Gwadar offer ran the risk of heightening growing regional insecurities and the perception of Chinese aggressiveness in ways that could be avoided, and for now, China has done nothing more than agree to take over the port once the lease with Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) expires in 2047.

However, China clearly understands Gwadar’s potential and has been its primary developer, contributing over 80 percent of the initial development money for the port and has also invested over $200 million in developing a coastal highway to better link it to transportation networks. There have also been unsubstantiated reports, namely by Selig Harrison in the New York Times, that “7,000-11,000 Chinese troops” are currently present in Gilgit-Baltistan portion of Pakistani Kashmir, most alleged working on transportation projects, including the Karakoram Highway that connect China and Pakistan across the Himalayas. Pakistan denies the Chinese presence.

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964 Ali, “China agrees to run Gwadar port.”
967 Harrison, “China’s Discreet Hold on Pakistan’s Northern Borderlands.”
Actually creating a forward-operating naval base at Gwadar, however, is a significant escalation from the current nature of Chinese involvement in Pakistan, and the future nature and scope of Chinese upgrades at the facility may prove to be a good metric through which to track China’s naval ambitions.969 At present, basing from Gwadar would involve very serious logistical challenges for China, and require extensive upgrades to the current facilities, and probably significant increases in China’s fleet and air capabilities. Gwadar’s defensibility has also been called into question.

Such a basing agreement could give China a western gateway of considerable value to Chinese grand strategy. It could allow China to project power into the Indian Ocean, as well as allow China to establish a sustained commercial presence in resource-rich Balochistan. Gwadar is also described as part of the ‘string of pearls’ strategy to encircle India, although at least at present, its commercial benefit is likely to greatly outweigh any perceived military advantage. It would have obvious commercial benefits for Pakistan should it become a pivot for regional trade and can offer the Pakistani Navy some strategic naval depth against India.

The Chinese presence at Gwadar, or even wider Balochistan, faces additional problems. The Baloch insurgency has complicated the growth of business, and the current operator, the Port of Singapore Authority has had major trouble attracting business. In fact, it has been alleged that Pakistan has deliberately diverted cargo from Karachi to Gwadar to artificially inflate its business volume.970 The Balochistan route also travels through extremely difficult terrain, estimated in certain stretches to cost a prohibitive $30 million per kilometer of transportation infrastructure, and be substantially less secure and cost-effective than routes from the Gulf of Oman through Iran and western Afghanistan, or directly from Central Asia to China.971

Despite security worries, China currently monopolizes some aspects of the province’s resource potential and has a major competitive advantage over other foreign investors. It has invested about $15 billion into Balochistan, including in refineries, copper and zinc mines, and with worsening Pakistani relations with the West, there are worries that Chinese companies might be granted the license to the Reko Diq mines, which are estimated to hold over $70 billion of copper and gold972 at the expense of the Canadian-Chilean consortium, Tethyan Copper Company.973 The Metallurgical Corp of China (MCC) also has a 50 percent interest in the $18 billion974 Saindak copper mines, although this may fall to 45 percent with the Afghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package.975

Any Pakistani influenced post-war Afghanistan is likely to offer China more reason to strengthen its relations with Pakistan. China already has the largest commercial investment in Afghanistan in the $3 billion in the Ayndak copper mine,976 and is likely to want additional investments. Such

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971 Ibid.
access gives China a reason to seek some form of negotiated settlement in Afghanistan that would favor Pakistan, although this presents the counter-risk of potentially strengthening Islamist extremist influence in the region and its threat to Western China.

The Strategic Future

Sino-Pakistani relations face their share of strategic challenges. As has been described earlier, the two countries have a convergence of some strategic interests, but both maneuver first and foremost to advance their own interests, which are not necessarily always aligned. China, along with other regional countries, fears the growing insecurity inside Pakistan, its potential threat to the country’s stability and integrity, the risk of spillover into China, and its adverse effect on Chinese investments inside Pakistan. China is also cognizant of its wider grand strategic concerns, including managing relations with the US and India, and is unlikely to offer unconditional support in the manner it once did.

Chinese wariness for their investments in Pakistan are despite the fact that it takes the safety of Chinese citizens and interests very seriously. The 2007 Lal Masjid operation, which marked the beginning of Pakistan’s domestic insurgency, did not materialize until radical students from the seminary took hostage some Chinese “masseuses.” Prior to this incident, security officials in the city had been content to allow the seminary to operate unimpeded, cognizant of its potential to destabilize already tenuous relations with the religious right. But, once Chinese citizens were involved, Pakistani commandoes quickly began operations.977

Yet, Beijing has ample reason to worry. Even if Pakistan has every wish to support and expand Chinese interests in Pakistan and beyond, if it does not have the capacity to protect its own vital strategic interests, then it cannot logically be expected to protect China’s. This is true, especially in Balochistan, where despite the extensive security apparatus mobilized to offer Chinese technicians and workers privileged protection,978 they continue to be targeted by Baloch separatists who perceive them to be agents perpetuating Punjabi dominance of the province.979 There were also reports that Chinese technicians working at the PNS Mehran base may have been targeted,980 although the veracity of these reports cannot be confirmed.

Most importantly, China fears a spillover of radicalism into its own neighboring restive Muslim-majority Xinjiang province. In May 2010, the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP), which seeks a fundamentalist state in China’s Xinjiang Province and has close links to al-Qaeda,981 was killed in Pakistan. Such incidents are, however, rare and Pakistan certainly has no tolerance for militant groups that target Chinese citizens or interests, or seek to expand their jihad into Western China.

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For Pakistan too, China is not always an ideal partner, and the nature of its wants are often detrimental to Pakistani stability and security. The Chinese presence in Pakistan is generally exploitative, both economically and the way in which it perpetuates the struggle with India. Chinese assistance is a vital lifeline that continues to feed the massive Pakistani military establishment that lies at the heart of many of Pakistan’s internal problems. China shares the US vision of a solvent Pakistan, but it has often rebuffed the civilian government, and shown no appetite to help rebalance civil-military relations.

However, even if it does not desire so, Pakistan continues to derive major benefits in US economic and military assistance, that China has neither the capacity nor the will to match. As such, any rational Pakistani strategy is likely to conclude that for as long as is possible, two external patrons are better than one, and that even if US aid comes with conditionality, instability and public anger; it still constitutes a major portion of the Pakistani defense budget and helps to prop holds a failing economy. These are benefits that Pakistan cannot easily ignore, and will continue to limit in practical terms the extent to which Pakistan is able to turn to China.
Pakistan is home to the world’s second-largest Shia population, and with violence increasing in Afghanistan from a resurgent Sunni Taliban insurgency and from Pakistan’s restive Balochs, Iran is likely to remain interested in stability in a manner that does not spill over into its territory. Energy ties between the countries are an important component of the relationship, and Pakistan is a net importer of energy from Iran.

Iran’s primary strategic interests are, however, towards the Persian Gulf, and Iran has obtained Chinese help in expanding its road and rail systems in a way that will pass from ports in the Gulf and Gulf of Oman through western Afghanistan to the north, establishing a line of communication that will largely bypass the “ring road” in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, the Central Asian states are steadily expanding their road and rail infrastructure from east to west and to the north. They already have a major “Silk Road” to Russia and China that bypasses both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Neither do their main trade and economic interests have anything to do with Afghanistan, Pakistan, or even Iran and access to the Gulf and Indian Ocean.

An Uncertain History of Relations

Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan in 1947, and relations were warm during the Shah era, as both countries pursued a pro-West policy, becoming alongside Turkey, the three main US allies in the region during the period.\(^{982}\) The 1979 Iranian Revolution changed the equation. Iran, ruled by Ayatollah Khomeini’s Shi’ite theocracy resented the sectarian persecution of the Shias during and after the Zia era, including the assassination of an Iranian diplomat in Lahore in 1991,\(^ {983}\) and sectarian violence in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s became in part a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. A continued Pakistani partnership with the US, particularly during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also rankled in Tehran, but Iranian-Pakistani relations have improved over the past decade.

The late 1970s marked a qualitative change in Pakistan’s sectarian dynamics, with General Zia’s ascent to power in 1977, and his consequent Sunni Islamization policies, as well as the Iranian Revolution in 1979. These changes helped galvanize the Shia community in Pakistan to more strongly exert their identity in the face of Sunni discrimination, and soon many Shias in Pakistan began to look to Tehran for support. In 1979, the Islamia Students Organization (ISO), a large Shia organization, publicly supported Ayatollah Khomeini as marja-e-taqlid (source of emulation), a significant shift from historical spiritual guidance from Iraq. Pakistani Shia students also increasingly traveled to Iran for education, helping erode the traditional control of the Shia clergy in Pakistan.\(^ {984}\)


\(^{983}\) Ibid.

This increasingly assertive Shia identity aroused anger amongst Sunni hardliners. Pakistan’s Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith madrassa infrastructure already drew support from Saudi money, but this support intensified both as a means to limit Shia influence in Pakistan, as well as in reaction to the outbreak of the Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. President Zia himself, sought ways to contain the Shias, and his intelligence agencies turned to militants, helping create powerful sectarian militant groups, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in south Punjab. In reaction to rising anti-Shia violence, Shias established their own militant groups financed in large part by Tehran. The Sipah-e-Mohammad, one such group, justified its position by saying, “We are tired of picking up corpses. Now, God willing, we will clear all accounts. We will erase the name of Sipah-e-Sahaba from the annals of history.”

985 Iranian support grew, particularly after December 1990, when SSP militants assassinated the Iranian Consul General in Lahore.

However, in net terms, Shias in Pakistan, particularly organized militant Shias, are quite simply outnumbered and outclassed by their Sunni counterparts, and as such have had a very limited impact on defending Shia communities, particularly when measured in national terms.

In Afghanistan, to combat Soviet forces, both Tehran and Islamabad cultivated anti-Soviet forces, but despite the US leaving the region soon after the Soviet withdrawal, serious differences persisted between their Afghan policies. Iran desired Afghanistan’s Shiite minority to be reflected in any post-war power-sharing arrangement, whereas Pakistan soon threw its full support behind the Sunni Taliban, who virulently persecuted Afghanistan’s Hazara Shias. The relationship reached its lowest ebb in 1998, after the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif, massacred the Hazara Shia populace and executed nine Iranian diplomats.

986 Relations between Tehran and Islamabad began to warm soon after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, when Iran perceived Pakistan as having ended support for the Taliban. At a joint press conference in December 2001, the Iranian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers announced a “new era of cooperation,” which was soon followed by a landmark three-day visit to Pakistan by Iranian President Khatami in December 2002. During the visit both countries pledged to step up support to improve border security, as well as economic cooperation, especially in the energy and natural gas sectors.

987 In Afghanistan, both Iran and Pakistan pledged support for the Bonn process, and the two countries stepped up their defense cooperation, including the joint production of the Al-Khalid MBT.

988 In recent years, relations have been strained by a spillover of violence—particularly by terrorist group Jundullah that has staged several high-profile attacks against Iranian military targets. The ‘Arab Spring’ and political unrest in the Gulf unrest are another irritant in tensions between the two countries, particularly over Bahrain. Pakistani play a key role in the Bahraini security apparatus, and the rumored deployment of further Pakistani support to Bahrain has agitated Iran, which opposes any crackdown on the country’s minority Shias.

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985 Ibid.
Today in mid-2011, stepped up Iranian-Pakistani diplomatic activity continues. President Zardari has made two trips to Tehran in the space of a month in June and July to attend discussions on terrorism, militancy and narcotics in the region, as well as economic and energy cooperation.990

Baloch Separatism

Iran and Pakistan share a 700-km common border that separates the Baloch people, who agitate for increased autonomy and freedom in both countries. Baloch grievances in Pakistan have already been detailed, and Iranian Balochs are similarly ethnically distinct from regime elites, and economically and politically disadvantaged. Historically, both Tehran and Islamabad have collaborated on suppressing Baloch nationalism, which both perceive to be a threat to regional stability and territorial integrity.991 This was particularly true during Iran’s Shah era when Iran sent Cobra attack helicopters to help Pakistan put down Baloch dissent during the 1970s.

The rise of virulently anti-Shia group Jundullah has complicated relations in the post-2001 period. Jundullah, a Sunni Baloch group believed to stage out of Pakistani Balochistan has mounted several high-profile terrorist attacks in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan, against sectarian and regime targets. In 2005, it was believed to be behind the attempted assassination of President Ahmadinejad during a visit to the province, as well as the kidnappings and executions of Iranian security personnel.992 Hostages were occasionally taken across the border into Pakistan.993 Jundullah’s attacks have grown in lethality in recent years, and have particularly centered in Sistan-Baluchistan’s provincial capital, Zahedan.

In 2007 a car bomb in the city killed 18 Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)994 and attacks in 2009 and 2010 targeted mosques in the city, including the Jamia mosque in July 2010, which is believed to have killed some IRGC officers.995 In 2009, Jundullah also assassinated several senior members of the IRGC, including the chief provincial commander, and the deputy commander of the Guard’s ground force, General Noor Ali Shooshtari.996 Jundullah is also believed to be heavily involved in the opium trade between Balochistan and Iran.

Pipelines and Ports

Balochistan can be an important energy and trade transit corridor, and has been subjected to the intrigues of various regional rivalries. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the warming Pakistani-Iranian relationship soon began to manifest in various pipeline projects, particularly the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline that came to be colloquially known as the “peace pipeline.” Pakistan is the lynchpin of the project, serving as both an end-market for Iranian energy, as well

992 Ibid.
as a transit route for Iranian attempts to reach Indian markets. In February 2002, Iran and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to conduct feasibility studies, but the project has since stalled, particularly due to American opposition. India has increasingly backed away from the project, and the project now appears to be primarily a bilateral attempt to resolve Pakistan’s domestic energy crisis. Recent statements by Iranian officials have indicated that the pipeline to Pakistan will be operational by 2013.

Iran and Pakistan are also seeking to expand economic and transport ties with Central Asia, and have used ports and road links to anchor their strategies—although Iran has focused on routes that would largely bypass Pakistan and most of Afghanistan. Pakistan has invested in the Chinese-built and financed Gwadar port on the Makran coast, which sits a mere 180 miles from the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz.

China favors Gwadar as a critical means to reduce its reliance on seaborne energy imports that must transit around India and through the Straits of Malacca, as well as project power into the Indian Ocean. The US has supported Gwadar, as a means to isolate Iran’s attempts to build up its Chabahar port. Chabahar, which is Iran’s attempt to alleviate congestion at its Bandar Abbas terminal, is strongly supported and co-developed by India. India hopes to build it up to provide it with access to Afghanistan, and help reduce Kabul’s reliance on Pakistan for economic transit routes.

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998 Bhadrakumar, “Pakistan, Iran become ‘natural allies.’”
11 Conclusions

It is tempting to offer the usual round of policy options for regional cooperation, for political change, and for dealing with internal security issues. The basic problem Pakistan faces, however, is that it cannot deal with any of its current security problems unless it addresses their underlying causes by carrying out effective reforms that are actually implemented on a large scale.

Pakistan is not yet a failed state, and may be able to muddle through almost indefinitely. It does, however, have a failed, self-seeking elite, and a failed approach to effective governance in the face of the combined impact of massive population growth and an extraordinarily young population. Pakistan has consistently prioritized reactive and inherently short-term policies in favor of a cohesive long-term and sustainable integrated national security and economic blueprint that accounts for both internal and external threats.

Pakistan has the dismal history of supporting military confrontation at the expense of national development and its real grand strategic interests. Its military may be the most powerful political force in the state, but it has also been consistently one of the most destructive. The fundamental irony of Pakistan’s long struggle with India is that it has built up its military at immense cost without creating internal stability, with the net result that its total national security efforts are more of a threat to its own grand strategic interests than India is.

The Afghan conflict has contributed to these problems—just as the actions of the Pakistani government have contributed to the Afghan conflict. The Afghan War, however, is only one part of Pakistan’s problems and its internal challenges are far more serious sources of violence and instability. Pakistan’s reliance on the military, and the significant weaknesses in its rule of law capacity have resulted in difficulties in confronting both violent militant forces, and organized religious groups. Their ranks are augmented by significant inequalities in access to basic economic and developmental goods and services, and to security, along provincial, class, ethnic and religious lines.

Pakistan faces very serious challenges but it cannot move towards true stability, towards development, or toward meeting the real interests of its people, as long as its elite does not come to grips with its own shortcomings, do not stop blaming other for its problems and deficiencies, relying on rhetoric and repression rather real reform. Until these changes occur, solving any given security problem will at best buy time in one narrow area, while the overall situation deteriorates. As long as Pakistan’s political and military elite are self-inflicted wounds, the country cannot move forward.
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