Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Art of the Possible

CONFERENCE REPORT: JUNE 14, 2011

Authors
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July 2011
A REPORT OF THE CSIS PROGRAM ON CRISIS, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION

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Cover photo: Afghan villagers play volleyball in their ancestral lands, Baghlan province, Afghanistan; photo by Robert D. Lamb.

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Acknowledgments

This conference would not have been possible without the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York; the authors are particularly grateful to Steve del Rosso at Carnegie for his long support for the work of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS, and now for the Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3), its successor. The research that motivated this conference was additionally supported by the Henry Luce Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.

The intellectual content of a conference is shaped in large part by its speakers, and we were fortunate to have a strong lineup: Colonel Joseph Buche, Catherine Dale, Major General Frederick B. Hodges, Clare Lockhart, Shuja Nawaz, Jacob N. Shapiro, Stephen Tankel, and Scott Worden; Anthony H. Cordesman and Andrew Wilder moderated the panel discussions. Representative Michael J. Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, gave the opening keynote address, and General John M. Keane (USA, ret.), former army vice chief of staff, gave the lunchtime keynote. We thank all of them for their generosity and their insights. We are also grateful to John Hamre, Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, and Mark Quarterman for their remarks.

Everyone who attended the conference participated in working groups as well, and those breakout sessions would not have been nearly as productive without the sharp guidance of the facilitators: David Berteau, Ashley Chandler, Catherine Dale, Stephen Flanagan, David Gordon, Sadika Hameed, Joshua Himes, Persis Khambatta, Andrew Kuchins, Amer Latif, Adam Mausner, Haider Mullick, Rick Nussio, Thomas Patterson, Mark Quarterman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Stephen Tankel, and Jennifer Taylor. Perhaps the most challenging job was to capture the insights of the working group participants, and for their skill and efficiency in taking notes and reporting the results, we would like to thank the rapporteurs: Emily Burke, Matthew Burnard, Catherine Cai, T.J. Cipoletti, Morgan Clemens, Nikki Collins, Michael Dziuban, Zack Fellman, Andrew Gagel, Lina Khan, Samuel Lindo, Reed Livergood, David Morrow, Julia Nagel, Hijab Shah, Nida Vidutis, Varun Vira, and Amasia Zargarian. Some of the rapporteurs offered logistical support as well, as did Emily Boggs, Brandon Fite, Rebecca Gilmore, and Lauren Speigel. Most of these individuals work at CSIS, and we are extremely fortunate to have so many colleagues who would volunteer their time for an entire workday; we are grateful to all of them.

Finally, we would be remiss if we did not mention that many people provided sound advice as we prepared for this conference, and the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell at the Pentagon was kind enough to host a brown-bag lunch where we could get feedback on the agenda from a group of more than a dozen experts. We appreciate all of their contributions and hope the results justify their time and assistance.

This entire conference, with the exception of the morning keynote address, was held on a not-for-attribution basis. While there was broad agreement on many of the issues discussed in this report, there was no universal consensus on any issue and quite a bit of disagreement on some. This report reflects nothing more than the authors’ analysis of the content of the panel and working group discussions, in the context of related research, and it should not be assumed to reflect the views of any individual participant on any particular issue.
Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed, Joy Aoun, and Zeina Boustani

Introduction

On June 14, 2011, more than 200 policymakers and experts participated in an invitation-only, full-day working meeting at CSIS to discuss a constructive, realistic way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main topics were Afghan governance, the Afghan security sector, and Pakistani cooperation. Informed in part by expert presentations on these topics, participants formed 17 simultaneous working groups asking: What accomplishments are essential? What are not essential? And what lasting gains can realistically be achieved? This format was motivated by the findings of prior CSIS research that had suggested a need to scale back expectations for what can be achieved by 2014, much less by 2012, because:

- the Afghan government is not likely to develop the capacity to fulfill all of its constitutional duties by then;
- traditional practices alone (e.g., patronage, shuras, militias) will not be able to guarantee stability or adequately compensate for the government’s other shortcomings;
- most Afghan security forces will not have the ability to operate independently; and
- Pakistani cooperation will not improve significantly—and nor will regional cooperation.

While the conference discussions generally supported these findings (with some dissent), they also generally suggested that such high expectations are not essential to the achievement of basic objectives on security, governance, and economics. There was a general sense that it is possible to create the conditions for achieving basic objectives (such as a decline in violence, the removal of at least some important barriers to Afghan self-help, or the progressive marginalization of anti-American elements within Afghanistan, to name three). But it will not be possible if the

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international effort remains as unfocused as it is today, with too many actors trying to accomplish too many different things at once.

What most participants felt was important is for the Obama administration to publicly identify what it believes to be the minimal essential requirements for Afghan stability and U.S. security and the minimal essential conditions on the ground that would enable those requirements to be met. (Many participants considered it essential that a broad range of Afghans be involved in defining those requirements and conditions, since they will be the ones who ultimately will judge progress.) By offering guidance on what accomplishments are essential, the administration would encourage activities on the ground to be prioritized more constructively.

As a modest contribution to that guidance, this report provides the key observations and suggestions that emerged from the conference discussions, focusing mainly on those issues on which there was broad (though never unanimous) agreement among the convened experts and policymakers.

Afghan Governance

The research motivating this conference had found that, to the degree insurgents provide any services or other benefits to Afghans, recipients accept them more out of desperation than ideology. Those findings suggested that insurgents could be marginalized from key populations through incremental but real improvements in governance and services by any non-insurgent source: the state, tribal or traditional institutions, hybrid (formal-informal) systems, civil society, or the private sector. Since most of those entities are too weak to make such improvements on their own, it will be essential that they share the burden of governing in the short term. (For the purposes of the conference, governance was assumed to include a set of public activities—making decisions and rules, providing services, building and managing institutions, and managing or manipulating networks of influence—that can be undertaken by a broad range of state and nonstate actors and institutions, from the local to the national level.)

Working group discussions were generally consistent with those findings. Most agreed it is not realistic to believe the Afghan state will have a monopoly on governance (e.g., justice, security, services) by 2014; nor is a monopoly essential for minimizing Taliban and al Qaeda influence or improving prospects for stability overall. What is essential in the short term is for those who hold de facto power in any territory or institution to behave in ways that are reasonably predictable, minimally acceptable to Afghans affected by their behavior, and suppressive toward armed insurgents and terrorists. It is also essential that the most predatory of Afghans—in and out of government—be progressively marginalized.

That does not imply it is pointless to support or reform government institutions. Rather, it suggests a need to be very selective about what reforms to advocate and what support to provide. It is necessary to have self-sustaining institutions and social practices that maintain some minimum level of security, offer some locally acceptable form of justice, and prevent disruptions to community self-help and private-sector activity.
It is essential to reduce the amount of money going into Afghanistan in the form of military contracts, development projects, and technical assistance—but it is equally essential that this reduction in income be both gradual, to avoid triggering a recession or depression, and strategic, to avoid undermining successful or essential efforts. Part of being strategic in spending involves knowing how, and by whom, money is being spent.

For that reason, it is essential to continue making targeted technical improvements in Afghanistan’s financial systems—banking, budgeting, taxation, customs, etc.—and building the capacity of civil servants to use them. Still, it is not realistic to fully prevent corruption, although efforts against the very worst abuses should continue.

It is essential, as well, to develop a workable economic strategy that fosters a robust private sector, protects small businesses, and attracts foreign investment.

It would helpful to devolve more de jure authority to provincial and district governments, but it is not essential, and reforming the constitutional system in the short term is not realistic (although the Sub-National Governance Policy can and should continue to be implemented). What is realistic—and essential—is to maintain the central government’s de jure authority while finding ways to share its de facto burdens of governing with capable subnational and nonstate entities. (Any hybrid governance arrangement, however, should be at least minimally acceptable to Afghans affected by it.)

In general, it is essential to protect local institutions and traditional practices that function at a basic level both from local rivals and from central-government interference. Given scarce resources, however, this probably is realistic only in strategically significant areas.

It is not essential to build physical structures such as government offices and schools, nor in many cases to provide computer equipment; what Afghanistan needs is trained civil servants and teachers, and more vocational training and secondary education, so that the government and the private sector have the human capital to function at a basic level.

It is neither essential nor realistic to extend the national justice system to local courts throughout Afghanistan in the short term; rather, the formal system could develop guidelines through which common traditional practices are recognized as a form of alternative dispute resolution. It also is not essential (or realistic) to create a system that depends on formally trained lawyers and judges; it is realistic for relatively educated or fair-minded Afghans to receive very basic paralegal or “justice of the peace” training to adjudicate disputes or act as intermediaries between the formal and informal systems or between the local and national systems.

The National Solidarity Program is an essential contributor to village stability; its full implementation is realistic, as would be the development of a formula through which its block grants could be made on a regular, more predictable basis. Community Development Councils are well positioned to act as de facto village councils, and they should be empowered and trained to do so.
It is essential that the new U.S. ambassador and military commanders have a constructive relationship with Afghan president Hamid Karzai until his term in office expires in 2014. It is not clear how essential Karzai is to Afghanistan after 2014. Some participants suggested that, if he insisted on maintaining a leadership role, he should be accommodated, whereas many others insisted that he was not essential and that Afghans could find realistic alternatives to his leadership by then. In any event, it was generally agreed that it is essential to begin planning now for a post-Karzai Afghanistan and to foster future Afghan leaders by protecting civil society and supporting its inclusion in political processes (including reconciliation talks).

It is essential that Afghan government personnel (civilian and military) continue to draw salaries at an economically competitive level to prevent an unemployment crisis or government brain drain. It is essential to avoid creating new dependencies by, for example, paying people to do things they already have reason to do.

Finally, it is essential to the sustainability of Afghanistan’s political and economic development that decisions affecting the Afghan public should be led as much as possible by Afghans and not by international donor agencies, foreign contractors, or military commanders. This implies that, all else equal, projects and institutions that can be sustained or maintained by Afghans should be given a higher priority for funding than those that cannot, and funding to improve local institutions or practices that already function at a basic level should be given higher priority than funding to create new institutions and processes from scratch.

Afghan Security

As U.S. and international forces draw down, responsibility for security will fall increasingly on Afghan forces that are not yet fully capable of independent action and on an Afghan government that is not yet fully capable of commanding them, paying them, or holding them accountable for results and abuses.

It is essential to continue training and partnering with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but it is equally essential to build civilian oversight capacity and to strengthen the link between the police and the justice sectors. (As noted above, it is not essential that the justice sector have the full spectrum of modern capabilities, but it does need to function at a basic level.)

More generally, it is essential to maintain military-to-military cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan to avoid creating a “lost generation” of officers (i.e., officers who, due to limited contact, have little understanding of American values and strategic interests, as happened in Pakistan during the 1990s).

It is essential to engage in peace talks with Taliban leaders. But it is not realistic to expect a comprehensive settlement to be implemented before 2012, nor to expect most insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to comply with it after 2012: there will be many spoilers. It is essential for Afghanistan’s peaceful opposition—not just the “usual suspects” on the High
Peace Council but other civil society, local, and younger leaders as well—to be included in those talks from the beginning: peaceful Afghans should not be asked to endorse a fait accompli at the end of the process.

- It is not realistic to eradicate all or most poppy cultivation or opium production.

**Pakistani Cooperation**

There was broad agreement that U.S.-Pakistan relations are tense but not hopeless, although it was not clear what, precisely, that implied beyond the following:

- The level and type of cooperation Pakistan offers is not likely to get any better than it is today or, at best, than it was before May 2.
- It is not clear that placing more conditions on U.S. aid to Pakistan can realistically improve Pakistani cooperation.
- A strategic partnership with Pakistan is not realistic. A stable transactional relationship is, however, essential in the short term and also all that is realistic to expect; that can be an honest basis on which to build relationships over time. An ongoing relationship, even if only transactional in nature, is essential. Delinking counterterrorism cooperation from other aspects of the relationship probably would be helpful to that end. (A small minority disagreed: some thought a strategic partnership essential, even if not realistic; others thought tighter conditions could somehow create leverage to improve cooperation.)
- It is not realistic to believe Pakistan-India relations will improve any time soon.
Appendix A: Conference Agenda

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Art of the Possible
June 14, 2011
CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, D.C.

U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are at a turning point. Budget pressures at home, Osama bin Laden’s death in Pakistan, the impending arrival of a new U.S. ambassador and new military chain of command in Afghanistan, the beginning of the drawdown of U.S. troops, and a new mood in Congress all are converging in a way that raises fundamental questions about the future of U.S. engagement in the region. Primary responsibility for stabilization must shift from internationals (mainly Americans) to Afghans over the next two to four years. What minimum accomplishments are needed in Afghanistan and Pakistan during that time? What lasting gains in governance and security can realistically be achieved?

NOTE: All discussions are not-for-attribution, except the opening keynote address.

8:30–9:00 a.m. Registration

Opening Session and Keynote

9:00–9:05 a.m. Welcome: Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS

9:05–9:45 a.m. Opening Keynote: Rep. Michael J. Rogers, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

9:45–10:00 a.m. Introduction: Dr. Robert D. Lamb, Deputy Director, C3, CSIS

Morning Session—Governance: Finding an Afghan Path to Stability

10:00–11:00 a.m. Presentations: moderated by Dr. Andrew Wilder, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Jake Shapiro, Princeton University
Dr. Catherine Dale, Congressional Research Service
Ms. Clare Lockhart, Institute for State Effectiveness
Mr. Scott Worden, U.S. Institute of Peace

11:00–12:00 pm Working Groups: all participants remain at tables
Group A (tables 1–6): What accomplishments are essential?
Group B (tables 7–12): What accomplishments are not essential?
Group C (tables 13–17): What accomplishments are realistic?

Lunch Session and Keynote

12:00 p.m. Lunch
12:15 p.m. Reconvening: Mr. Mark Quarterman, Director, C3, CSIS
12:15 p.m. Speaker Introduction: Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, CSIS
12:20–1:00 p.m. Lunchtime Keynote: General (Ret.) John M. Keane, SCP Partners and former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
1:00–1:15 p.m. Coffee Break

**Afternoon Session—Security: Working with Uncertain Partners**

1:15–2:15 p.m. Presentations: moderated by Dr. Anthony Cordesman, CSIS
   Major General Frederick B. Hodges, Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell
   Colonel Joe Buche, DARPA, formerly NTM-A/CSTC-A
   Mr. Shuja Nawaz, The Atlantic Council
   Mr. Stephen Tankel, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2:15–3:15 p.m. Working Groups: all participants remain at tables
   Group A (tables 1–6): What accomplishments are essential?
   Group B (tables 7–12): What accomplishments are not essential?
   Group C (tables 13–17): What accomplishments are realistic?

**Closing Session**

3:15–4:00 p.m. Plenary Discussion: Dr. Robert D. Lamb, CSIS
4:00–5:00 p.m. Conference Reception
5:00–6:00 p.m. The U.S. Army’s 236th Birthday Celebration
Appendix B: List of Participants

Harry Allen
Military Professional Resources, Inc.

Warner Anderson
U.S. Department of Defense

Mark Ashley

Tessa Baker
National Security Institute

Sierra Bardot
Ramsey Decision Theoretics & Civic Participation

Richard Barnes
International Space Consulting

Nancy Bearg
Project on National Security Reform

Fatma Benammar
Army Directed Studies Office

John Blackton
Strategic Advisory Services

Christopher Blanchard
Congressional Research Service

Karl-Wilhelm Bollow
Embassy of Germany

Jenifer Breaux
U.S. Army

Steve Brignoli
U.S. Army

Pete Brown
Fluor

Terry Brown
Army Directed Studies Office

Joseph Buche
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Melissa Burn
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

Richard Burt
Kissinger Associates

Vicki Butler
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Leigh Carahe
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Tara Chapman
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Aisha Chowdhry
American University

Rabia Chowdhry

Larry Closter
U.S. Army

Richard Colvin
Embassy of Canada

Anthony H. Cordesman
CSIS

Glenn Cowan
Democracy International

Catherine Dale
Congressional Research Service

Michael Delaney
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

François Delmas
CSIS

Megan DuLaney
U.S. Department of Defense
Barbora Esnerova  
Embassy of the Czech Republic

Joe Evans  
SAAB

Mehreen Farooq  
World Organization for Resource Development 
& Education

Benjamin Fernandes  
National Counterterrorism Center

Anna Fifield  
Financial Times

David Fishman  
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns 
Hopkins University

Anne Galer  

Sajit Gandhi  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Kaitlyn Garman  
BAE Systems, Inc.

John Glenn  
U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

Benjamin Goldberg  
U.S. Department of State

Raghubir Goyal  
India Globe & Asia Today

Thomas Greenwood  
U.S. Department of Defense

Robert Grenier  

Madeleine Gruen  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Daniel Hall  
International Center for Religion & Diplomacy

Thomas Hammes  
National Defense University

Aziz Haniffa  
India Abroad News Service

Kristian Harpviken  
Peace Research Institute Oslo

Janice Helwig  
U.S. Helsinki Commission

Robert Hershey  
Engineering & Management Consulting

Frederick “Ben” Hodges  
Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell, 
U.S. Department of Defense

Lisa Hopkins  
U.S. Army

Ahmed Humayun  
Georgetown University

Heather Hurlburt  
National Security Network

Minha Husaini  
Save the Children

Hans-Olaf Jessen  
Embassy of Germany

Anne Johnson  
U.S. Department of State

Michael Johnson  
Council on Foreign Relations

Robert Jutson  
Griffin Capital Partners

Becky Katz  

Maxwell Kelly  
Center for Complex Operations, 
National Defense University

Edward Kenney  
Center for International Policy

Ayub Khawreen  
Voice of America

Francine Kiefer  
Christian Science Monitor

Peter Kiss  
CSIS
Mitzi Wertheim  
Naval Postgraduate School

Guy Wetzel  
U.S. Army

Michael White  
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Andrew Wilder  
U.S. Institute of Peace

Michael Williams  
National Defense University

Richard Williams  
National Security Institute

Joseph Windrem  
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

John Wood  
Near East & South Asia Council for Strategic Studies

Scott Worden  
U.S. Institute of Peace

Ayesha Yousuf  
International Center for Religion & Diplomacy

Dov Zakheim  
CSIS

Steven Zyck  
International Development Innovations, NATO Civil-Military Fusion Center