Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress

Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges

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Overview

The war in Afghanistan is now in its tenth year. In spite of that fact, the US, allied countries, ISAF, and the UN have failed to develop credible reporting in the progress of the war, provide meaningful transparency on the problems and challenges it faced, and a meaningful plan for the future. Moreover, since June 2010, the unclassified reporting that the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content – effectively “spinning” the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.

Drawing on Unclassified Official Reporting Lacking in Credibility and Transparency

The US is scarcely alone in failing to provide adequate reporting on the Afghan conflict. No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind. The UN, which has major responsibilities for aid, has failed to provide a meaningful overview of how aid requirements are generated, how aid efforts are managed and coordinated, of how funds are used, of the quality of fiscal controls and auditing, and of the effectiveness and impact of aid.

There are, however, some useful unclassified metrics in spite of the tendency to limit their content “spin” and “message control.” Moreover, some reflect real progress since the adoption of the new strategy for the war, and indicate that a more frank, meaningful, and open reporting system would do a far more better convincing job of winning support for the conflict – as well as be a way of obtaining the kind of feedback and informed criticism that could help meet the many problems and challenges that still shape the course of the fighting.

The Six Part Series Analysis of the War

The Burke Chair has prepared a six-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now reduce the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting.

Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understanding the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.
Even an overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. The US, its allies, and ISAF may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the “follies” presented in Vietnam, but there are enough areas where facts still become public to put much of the war into perspective.

The first two reports in this series have already been circulated and are now available on the CSIS web site. They are entitled:

- **Part One: The Failures that Shaped Today’s War:** [http://csis.org/files/publication/110215_AfghanMetrics.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110215_AfghanMetrics.pdf) This report highlights the US failure to resource the Afghan campaign, and the extent to which US failure to react to the growth of the Taliban, the al Qaeda sanctuary in Pakistan, and the failures of the Afghan government turned near victory into near defeat.

- **Part Two: Transitioning to the New Strategy:** [http://csis.org/files/publication/110215_Afghan_Metrics_part_two.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110215_Afghan_Metrics_part_two.pdf) This briefing highlights graphics and tables that summarize the new strategy and campaign plan, the initial impact of the result build-up of US forces and changes in tactics and strategy on the intensity of the war, and early estimates of how the changes in strategy will impact on the US budget and the affordability of the war.

**Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges**

The third report is now available. It is entitled **Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges.** Each section of this report highlights the unclassified graphics and tables that describe the key individual challenges that affect the course of the fighting and the ability to implement the new strategy.

**An Evolving Insurgency: Informal, Adaptive, Distributed Networks**

The US and ISAF are making progress in defeating the insurgency in the field, and attacking its leaders and networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most recent reporting, however, is by background briefing to the media, and is highly localized and anecdotal. While the summary metrics describing the Taliban and other insurgents have value, they ignore critical areas in the fighting.

Claims about tactical victories at the local level may or may not be significant, since the insurgency can recruit and promote new volunteers, disperse, shift targets, move to more secure areas, or go underground.
Similarly, vague claims that insurgents are tired of fighting have little historical credibility. Even successful attacks on leaders and senior cadres usually only have a temporary effect.

Failures to look at popular, ANSF, and insurgent opinion about who is winning or losing, and the need to accommodate the insurgents in some political settlement, do not evaluate the Taliban and GIRoA in net assessment terms.

A focus on the areas where ISAF and the US are most active ignores Taliban and other insurgent gains and losses in other areas. It also ignores areas in Afghanistan where the threat forces may be exploiting a lack of ISAF and ANSF/GIRoA effectiveness, and the nature and impact of sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

An emphasis on temporary gains – particularly at the tactical combat level – does not deal with the reality that the Taliban can win by outlasting ISAF and the US in a war of political attrition, and that it can maintain influence through shadow and sleeper structures, and low-level terrorism, assassination, extortion, kidnapping, night operations, and other forms of intimidation of officials, police, and the Afghan people.

Moreover, the way in which district and provincial numbers are aggregated does not spotlight the areas where Taliban and insurgent influence is increasing or static.

Focusing on Afghanistan to the exclusion of Pakistan denies one of the fundamental realities of the war.

Insurgent structures are networked with power brokers, a countrywide system of checkpoints and fees, elements in GIRoA and the ANSF, and Pakistani officials and officers. Analysis that only looks at the threat by group does not address their real world operational power structure.

Case after historical case has shown it is critical to maintain chronologies that show how given groups change their targets and tactics, and how well they adapt over time.

Mirror imaging Afghan popular perceptions to show they do not support the Taliban does not measure anger, resentment, and indifference to GIRoA, ISAF, and US values and actions. It also does not provide an adequate picture of why the Taliban and other groups attract volunteers and public support. Focusing on pay rather than ideology, status, faction, and religion creates similar problems.
**Casualties: A Perceptual Weapon**

The US and allied countries publish realistic death estimates for Afghanistan, within the severe limits imposed by the inability to measure civilians killed with any accuracy. Such estimates are inherently uncertain and controversial. They do not, however, cover wounded and injured for Afghan forces or civilians, and historically, these totals are around 5 to 7 times higher than the figures for those killed. Moreover, these data do not cover Pakistani forces and civilians, or the Taliban and other insurgents in Pakistan.

What is more important in an insurgency, however, is that current unclassified analyses and metrics do not cover critical aspects of Afghan and Pakistani patterns and perceptions of both casualties and other threats and violence, and do again do not report on the efforts of the Taliban to can maintain influence through shadow and sleeper structures; suicide attacks and other bombings; and low-level terrorism, assassination, extortion, kidnapping, forced relocations, night operations, and other forms of attack and intimidation of officials, police, and the Afghan people.

Like counting the intensity of the war in terms of major acts of violence, this kind of reporting treats an insurgency as if it were something approaching a conventional war. Estimate and metrics are needed to show the full range of insurgent activities that threaten and intimidate, and not simply the number killed.

Survey data is need on Afghan perceptions of the source and type of violence and intimidation for the full range of ISAF, ANSF, and insurgent actions. As these surveys showed in Iraq, they can provide a far better picture of how Afghans perceive the war, and the actions of the US and IASF to accomplish hold and build.

Such studies need to examine crime and corruption as part of the overall Afghan perception of GIRoA, ISAF, and ANSF ability to provide security. Before and after analysis is needed to measure the impact of clear, hold, and build. This is particularly important because peaks in the fighting are almost certain to create concern and anger while lasting security can quickly reverse such perceptions.

Reporting should regularly comparing ISAF, UN, ANSO and other estimates. As Iraq has shown, the data are often uncertain enough to require regular revisions, and perceptions are often based on estimates by other sources.
**Alliance: Unity of Effort versus National Caveats and “Branding”**

Covering up the differences and lack of unity in the alliance in military, civil-military, and aid operations may be politically correct, but it does little to improve unity of effort and effectiveness, and ensure that ISAF, the US, and allied countries do not pursue tactics and strategies they cannot implement.

Decoupling the UN and other national efforts to measure the size, integrity, and impact and effectiveness of aid efforts presents similar problems. So does the failure to analyze the integration of military and PRT efforts, and relevance of aid activity to the course of the fighting and efforts to determine whether “hold” and “build” are receiving the right priority and effectiveness.

Analysis and metrics are also needed of the integrity of the military and civil contract efforts and fiscal controls. The flood of money into poorly managed efforts has been a driving force in abusive Afghan corruption, the growth of power brokers and private forces, and the growing disparity of income in Afghanistan. It also interacts heavily with the impact of narcotics.

Finally, in other cases, surveys of the different perceptions of national military and aid efforts have proved to be important ways to identify both successful and failed approaches to tactics and aid.

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**Coping with the “Second Threat:” Afghan Governance and Corruption versus Popular Support in a War of Perceptions**

This section shows that some important efforts were made to measure Afghan perceptions of GI RoA that have since ceased to be reported in unclassified terms. It is all too clear that efforts to improve the integrity of GI RoA have lagged. It is also clear that the ability to work around this through rewarding effective ministries and central government officials, governors and provincial officials, their District-level equivalents, and local officials and Jirgas will be critical to achieving any successful forms of “end state” and transition.

NGO surveys reinforce these points. Corruption and power brokers are critical problems at every level, as is the lack of any effective presence of government officials and services, functioning courts and detention facilities, and regular police activity.
The metrics and analysis in past reports needed to be resumed and refined. The current failures and weaknesses in GIRoA – at every level – are as much a threat as the Taliban and other insurgents.

**Counternarcotics: Aid and Comfort to the Enemy? Or, Growing and Lasting Gains?**

Nearly a decade after the start of the war, far too much of the reporting on narcotics focuses on total volume of production. Moreover, past reporting has ignored the fact that much of the counternarcotics effort was corrupt, and drove production into Taliban controlled areas.

At the same time, it often took credit for drops or shifts in production that were the result of market forces, weather, and crop disease. As is the case with every form of civil aid activity, little accounting was made for expenditure, fiscal and management controls were minimal, and far too little effort was made to create credible measures of the total and marginal effectiveness of aid and other spending.

ISAF’s major gains in Helmand, market forces, weather, and crop disease have all combined to create an opportunity to limit production, but realistic analysis and metrics will be needed to determine effectiveness and trade-offs in creating other crops and forms of economic security.

Metrics and analysis need to focus far more on Afghan motivations and perceptions, and the impact of given programs, rather than simply estimate total crop area and output.

Moreover, integrated analysis is needed of the impact of the Taliban, corruption, and narcotrafficking. Narcotics need to be evaluated as a key force affecting hold and build and perceptions of GIRoA. It is particularly critical that this be done in evaluating the role of the police and justice system. There is little point in raising salaries, conducting anti-corruption drives, or simply cutting crop output if narcotics income is added to salaries, anti-corruption drives punish an easily replaceable few, and the destabilizing impact of narcotics on Afghan power structures continues by growing less and raising prices.

**IEDs: The “Stinger” of the Afghan Conflict**

Reporting on the trends in IEDs highlights a key threat, and measure of the intensity of serious conflict. It is also one of the few areas of consistently good unclassified reporting, although more needs to be done to highlight tends in key
combat areas, rather than simply on a national basis.

Important (and useful) as IED casualties are, however, they are only one measure of casualties and violence and spotlighting them to the exclusion of other causes of casualties and perceived violence can creating misleading priorities.

The Need for Credibility, Integrity, and Transparency and Future Reports in this Series

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed are easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that the other parts of this report show that major progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and metric are only part of that story. For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, major progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.

They will be analyzed in the future parts of this report:

*Part Four: Hold and Build, and The Challenge of Development*
*Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces*
*Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible*
Key Ongoing Challenges:

An Evolving Insurgency:
Informal, Adaptive, Distributed Networks
A Complex Mix of Weakness and Strengths

• **Weaknesses:**
  • Extreme ideology, hardline religious and social practices. no capability for development, largely Pashtun ethnicity.
  • Serious internal divisions rivalries.
  • Still have limited numbers.
  • Influence and control is usually tenuous and driven more by vacuum in GIRoA and ISAF presence and effectiveness.
  • Cadres have proved vulnerable. Many fighters driven more by need for income than true support.
  • Some argue fighters are tired, losing faith in leaders that stay in safe areas.

• **Strengths:**
  • Insurgency have eight years in which to learn; has same language and ethnicity as most of population it occupies; far less limited by “rules of engagement” that US, allies, and GIRoA.
  • Perceived as violent but honest. Can exploit corruption and lack of capability in Afghan government.
  • Major role in providing prompt justice. Able to exploit lack of aid and governance with minimal aid efforts and by paying fighters.
  • Adaptiveness, and lack of rigid hierarchy and central control, creates informal distributed networks that are very difficult to defeat and largely self-healing in replacing lost cadres and leaders.
  • Can largely self-finance.
  • Does not have to defeat US, ISAF, or GIRoA -- Just has to outlast them.
  • Ongoing links to ISI and Pakistani officials, partial sanctuary in Pakistan.
Main Areas of Insurgent Activity: April-July 2010

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 67

Does not include areas of lower levels of insurgent infiltration and influence
A Complex Mix of Informal, Distributed, and “Redundant Networks”

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Key Insurgent Groups: Quetta Shura Taliban

Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Omar’s group relocated to Quetta, Pakistan, in 2002, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and is now called the “Quetta Shura Taliban” (QST). The QST, however, refers to itself as the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan and considers itself Afghanistan’s legitimate government. According to the ISAF commander, the QST’s aim is to capture the city of Kandahar, their philosophical home.

Almost all Afghan insurgent groups have sworn allegiance to Omar. According to U.S. military and Afghan estimates, the number of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan is more than 20,000, as reported in June 2010 by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

On June 10, 2010, the ISAF commander reported that coalition forces killed or captured 121 Taliban leaders during the preceding 90 days. The CRS report noted that several key Taliban figures have been captured or killed this year, including the February arrests of Omar’s top deputy and two Taliban “shadow governors” and the March arrests of Omar’s son-in-law and another notable QST member.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 66-67
Key Insurgent Groups: Haqqani Network

- Jalaludin Haqqani, the Minister of Tribal Affairs in the pre-2001 Taliban government, founded the Haqqani terrorist network.

- Sirajuddin ("Siraj") Haqqani, Jalaludin’s son and a senior leader of the Haqqani Network, maintains close ties to al-Qaeda. According to DoS, Haqqani admitted to planning a 2008 attack against a Kabul hotel that killed six people, including an American, as well as an attempted assassination of President Karzai in April that year.

- More recently, the Haqqani Network may have been responsible for a January 2010 attack near the presidential palace in Kabul, according to the CRS. Believed to be residing in Pakistan, Haqqani has coordinated and participated in cross-border attacks against coalition forces, according to DoS.

- According to a DoD press report, the younger Haqqani represents a style of leadership that is more aggressive than past leadership and often uses brutality as a means to secure power. He has been responsible for training, influencing, commanding, and leading the Haqqani Network, using kidnappings, assassinations, beheadings of women, indiscriminate killings, and suicide bombings.

- In March 2010, DoS offered a reward of up to $5 million—through a program administered by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security—for information leading to the location and arrest of Siraj Haqqani. U.S. military and Afghan estimates set the number of Haqqani Network fighters in Afghanistan at approximately 1,000, according to the CRS. These fighters are mainly active in provinces around Khowst.

- In April-June, ISAF reported that joint ANP and coalition forces captured a Haqqani Network IED cell leader and several other insurgents in a compound in Khowst. The cell leader was responsible for emplacing IEDs, acquiring and distributing weapons, and coordinating suicide bombings against coalition convoys.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 66-67
Key Insurgent Groups: Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin

- Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the main mujahedeen leaders supported by the United States during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
- Active in Kapisa, Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan, the HIG is allied with al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents,
- According to the CRS. It reported that U.S. military and Afghan estimates set the number of HIG fighters in Afghanistan at approximately 1,000.
- On March 22, 2010, representatives of the GIRoA and the HIG confirmed that they were holding talks, including meetings with President Hamid Karzai.
- Since 2007, Hekmatyar has expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the GIRoA; some of President Karzai’s allies in the National Assembly are former members of Hekmatyar’s mujahedeen party.
- In January 2010, Hekmatyar outlined conditions for reconciliation with President Karzai that included elections under a neutral caretaker government following a U.S. withdrawal.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, pp. 66-67
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Casualties: A Perceptual Weapon
Critical Impact of Civilian Casualties

Civilian Casualties, whether ISAF or Insurgent are responsible, increases violence.

- When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties kinetic activities increase by **25-65% for 5 months**
- When Insurgents are responsible for attacks kinetic activities increase **10 and 25% for 3 months**

Good isn’t good enough

Tactical Directive
Driving Directive
Night Time Raid Directive
Critical - remains a focus
The trend line for 2010 in the figure below manifests a decreasing trend in ISAF caused civilian casualties during a sample 12-week period, compared to the same time period during 2009. ISAF and coalition forces have experienced a reduction in civilian casualties in spite of a spike in total violence during the summer fighting season. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS increased during the summer months, in line with the seasonal violence trends. Figure 15 illustrates the total number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties during this reporting period. The drop in CIVCAS compared to last year is attributable to both ISAF and insurgents. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS from direct fire doubled during the second half of the reporting period compared to 2009, which is likely due to insurgent shift in TTPs to a much greater use of direct fire.

## Afghan Civilian Casualties – 2007-30.9.2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th># of Casualties</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civilians</td>
<td>January 1, 2010-September 30, 2010</td>
<td>1,634 killed</td>
<td>In the third quarter of 2010, 90% of civilian deaths and injuries were caused by anti-Government elements, which includes the Taliban as well as other individuals or groups who engage in armed conflict with the Government of Afghanistan or members of the International Military Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,809 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009b</td>
<td>2,412 killed</td>
<td>67% of civilian deaths were attributed to actions of anti-Government elements (78% of these deaths were caused by improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,566 injured</td>
<td>25% of civilian deaths were attributed to pro-Government forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008c</td>
<td>2,118 killed</td>
<td>8% of civilian deaths were the result of cross-fire or improperly detonated ordnance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007c</td>
<td>1,523 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th># of Casualties</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>January 1 - November 30, 2010&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>314 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>737 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>292 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>859 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>259 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>875 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>January 1 – November 30, 2010&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>401 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>728 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>639 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,145 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>724 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,209 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>688 killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,036 wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rise in insurgent attacks has led to a 31 per cent increase in the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan in the first six months of 2010 compared with the same period in 2009.

The total number of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2010, according to (UNAMA), is 3,268 – including 1,271 deaths and 1,997 injuries.

Of the total number of casualties, 2,477 were attributed to anti-government elements (AGEs), representing 76 per cent of all casualties, up 53 per cent from 2009,

- 386 were attributed to pro-government forces (PGF) activities, representing 12 per cent of all casualties, down from 30 per cent in 2009.
- The number of children killed or injured has risen 55 per cent, along with 6 per cent more women, over the same period in 2009.

The report also noted a 30 per cent drop in the number of casualties attributed to PGF during the reporting period, which it said is driven by a 64 per cent decline in deaths and injuries caused by aerial attacks.

UNAMA identified two major developments that increased harm to civilians in the first six months of 2010 compared to 2009.

- First, anti-government elements used a greater number of larger and more sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) throughout the country.
- Secondly, the number of civilians assassinated and executed by AGEs rose by more than 95 per cent and included public executions of children.

The report stated that aerial attacks by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remained the most harmful tactic used by pro-government forces, causing 69 of the 223 civilian deaths attributed to PGF in the first six months of 2010 (31 per cent) and injuring 45 Afghan civilians.

- However, it added, civilian deaths caused by PGF aerial attacks decreased 64 per cent from the same period in 2009, reflecting growing implementation of ISAF’s July 2009 Tactical Directive regulating the use of air strikes and other measures to reduce civilian casualties.

Civilian casualties increased the most in southern Afghanistan in the first six months of 2010, with over half of assassinations and executions occurring there.

Source: UNAMA 10.8.10
Conflict related civilian fatalities grew by 18% this year (above left), to a total of 2,428 persons killed, with 17% caused by IMF and 83% caused by AOG. The leading cause of death was roadside IED strikes (below) with 820 people dying this way, 58% of them in the Southern provinces. This reflects the increased volume of ‘pressure plate’ (VOIED) devices utilized as AOG sought stand-off strike capability against overwhelming IMF numbers. The IMF have succeeded in reducing both the volume and percentage of fatalities caused by them, although IMF airstrikes killed a comparable number to AOG suicide attacks. Within the security forces*, the ANP still account for the majority of fatalities (above right) with a roughly 5:1 ratio against ANA/IMF deaths.

Coalition KIAs: 2001-January 2011

Coalition Military Fatalities By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>98</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>155</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2301</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Filter Deaths By Year

Coalition Deaths by Nationality

Coalition KIAs: By Province as of January 2011
Coalition Forces Wounded in Action
# Allied Casualties in Afghanistan – 20.12.2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Deaths</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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**Total Non-U.S. Coalition Fatalities**: 828


JEIIDO Estimate of US IED Casualties in Afghanistan:
2005-2010

Cumulative Through End 2010: Total US KIAs = 617. Total US WIAs = 5,764

ANSF Casualties by Province: 4-1 to 6-30 2010


Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 53
Key Ongoing Challenges:

The Alliance: Unity of Effort versus National Caveats and “Branding”
The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Source: NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html, as of 21 June 2010
At least 4,715 of 18,835 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Coping with the “Second Threat:”
Afghan Governance and
Corruption versus Popular
Support in a War of Perceptions
People have to believe that the future under GIRoA will be better.

- Detectable increase in confidence of GIRoA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIRoA viewed as empowering ANSF
Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

Population Supports Gov’t
Population Sympathetic w/ Gov’t
Population Neutral
Population Sympathetic w/ INS
Population Supports INS
Not Assessed

Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

- Commitment from the Afghan government
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIROA at all levels

- GIROA capacity to deliver services
  Channel International Community resources through GIROA ministries

- Contracting and corruption
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.
Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

Support for Afghan Government

Comparative Security

The Challenge of Corruption

GIROA’s High Office of Oversight (HOO) has attributed corruption in Afghanistan to several factors:

- Legacy of a quarter-century of conflict
- Erosion of state institutions
- Irregular financing of the conflict from various sources
- Worsening tensions among ethnic and tribal groups
- The growth of informal and illicit economic activities

The HOO also has noted that the growth of the drug trade and the influx of international aid have created more opportunities for corruption within the country.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) released the results of a corruption survey in June 2010 which found that Afghans consider corruption to be the third-largest problem in the country, following security and unemployment.

Approximately 75% of respondents believed that the problem of corruption became more significant over the course of 2009: 28% of adults paid a bribe to obtain a public service.

70% of Afghans perceived corruption as a common way of doing business with their government; however, 90% of respondents stated that they felt guilty for taking part in corrupt activities.

The average bribe that respondents paid in 2009 was Af 7,769 ($156), according to the survey; this amount represents 31% of the average annual income in Afghanistan ($502).

Afghans who earned less than Af 3,000 ($60) a year reported the highest exposure to bribery; they listed corruption as the largest problem in Afghanistan.

- The IWA survey showed that the highest levels of corruption occur in connection with the following government services: registration and issuance of ID cards and passports
- Police services
- Justice in the court system
- Respondents also reported increasingly high levels of corruption in the health and education sectors, where bribes tend to entail larger sums of money

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 67
Winning the War of Perceptions

The war will be lost without better civil-military coordination, and a far more honest, capable, and actively present GIRoA:

• Need immediate progress in governance, prompt justice, jobs, and economic opportunity in the field as part of each operation.
• Police, rule of law, and formal and informal justice efforts must be integrate and proactive at the local level.
• Military and PRT cooperation must be far better and more operationally relevant.
• UNAMA/UN, national, and NGO aid efforts need to focus on real world short and mid-term needs to get to long term. Need far more focus on validated requirements, Afghan perceptions, measures of effectiveness, and honest contracting.
• Corrupt and incapable Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers need to be excluded from outside funding and support, kept under constant pressure, and “outed.”
• Honest and capable Afghan officials, officers, and local leaders should be rewarded and encouraged at Ministerial, provincial, district, and local levels.
• The US, ISAF, UNAMA, and all aid workers must address their role in causing corruption and waste, and funding the Taliban. The civil side of the war needs ruthless national, UN, and ISAF accountability and transparency.
Key Ongoing Challenges:

Counternarcotics: Aid and Comfort to the Enemy? Or, Growing and Lasting Gains?
Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication

Source: SIGAR, January 2010, p. 119
Counternarcotics: 8% of All Aid

The DoD CN fund provides support to the counter-narcotics effort in the following ways: Supporting military operations against drug traffickers, expanding Afghan interdiction operations, building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement—including the Afghan Border Police with specialized training, equipment, and facilities. As of June 30, 2010, nearly $1.43 billion had been appropriated to DoD for counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan—almost 2.8% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance.

As of June 30, 2010, more than $2.68 billion had been allotted to INL for INCLE-funded efforts. More than 5.2% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. INL reported that of this amount, nearly $2.13 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $1.68 billion had been liquidated.

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report, July 2010, p. 48, 50
But, Recent Fighting has Drastically Reduced Output in Taliban Controlled Areas

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC, 2010, p. 4
In 2010, opium production in Afghanistan decreased by almost half (48%) compared to 2009 and was lower than in any year since 2003. This was due to a strong decline in opium yield in the main cultivation areas in the South and West of the country, while the overall area under opium poppy cultivation remained at level of 2009.

Potential opium production in Afghanistan had a 48% decline in 2010. In 2010, opium production in Afghanistan was produced. While the largest five opium producing provinces all showed strong decreases in opium production,

**Source:** Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC, 2010, p. 12
In 2010, the average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time (weighted by production) was US$ 169/kg, a 164% increase from 2009. The rapid increasing trend is a market response to the drastic reduction of the opium production which is due to the spreading of the opium disease in the major growing areas. After a steady decline between 2005-2009, opium price started a rapid increase in 2010 reaching nominal levels observed only at the end of 2004, a year when opium cultivation was also heavily affected by diseases. The long-time trend of opium price observed in the two provinces of Nangarhar and Kandahar shows that the price trend in 2010 followed a similar trend observed in 2004, but that the peak is still far from the very high levels reached in 2001 and 2003 when the market was affected by the lowest level of production. Price trends in the next months will show how the opium market will be affected by the production decrease in 2010, however, the current high price may play an encouraging factor for farmers to cultivate opium. In 2009 data on famers motivation to cultivate opium had started to show an increasing number of farmers stopping opium cultivation due to its low sale price. It is worrying that the current high sale price of opium in combination with a lower wheat price may encourage famers to go back to opium cultivation.

Security Versus Opium Cultivation in 2010

Security map (as at 30 March 2010) and opium cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2010

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, UNODC, 2010, p. 29
Key Ongoing Challenges:

IEDs: The “Stinger” of the Afghan Conflict
This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.
IED Incidents in Afghanistan
Jan 2004 - May 2010
IED Trends: July – December 2010

NOTES:
1) Effective IED Attacks are those that caused Coalition Force (CF) and/or Host Nation (HN) casualties. Ineffective IED attacks caused no casualties, and include detonations with no casualties, early detection, pre-detonations, and turn ins.
2) Data source (CIDNE Tampa SIGACTS) was pulled on 2 Jan 2011. All data, including totals for preceding months, are subject to revision as new reporting becomes available.

• IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO
• IED severity has decreased
• IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant
Effective IED Attacks
Ineffective IED Attacks