Iraq: Patterns of Violence, Casualty Trends and Emerging Security Threats

Anthony H. Cordesman,
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

February 9, 2011
Executive Summary

Unless major changes take place in US and Iraq policy, US combat forces will withdraw from Iraq at the end of this year. The Iraq War will not come to an end with this withdrawal, any more than it did when the US withdraw from Iraqi cities and formally end combat operations early in the summer of 2010. Extremist attacks will probably continue for at least several years, and there are still serious risks of new outbreaks of sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The broad patterns in the US part of the Iraq War are, however, now documented in a wide range of tables and graphs that show the history of this violence over the period from 2003 to the end of 2010. In addition, enough data are emerging to show that major changes are occurring in the patterns of violence that affect the future ability of the Iraqi government to bring security, stability, and development to the Iraq people. This briefing uses a wide range of such indicators to the patterns of violence during 2003 to end 2010, and show some of the key changes occurring in these patterns.

The briefing is divided into eight main sections:

Section One is entitled “Overall Trends in Violence: 2003-2009.” It shows the historical trend data in major attacks by cause through the end of 2010. It compares the levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the declining patterns of violence by province over time, and patterns in casualties by cause and category. It documents both escalation into a major war, and a form of near victory by US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces.

It is important to note, however, that such data suffer from serious limitations. Decisions were taken early in the war to note break out patterns of violence by suspected attacker and group (including government security forces), and by ethnic and sectarian group and target.) Moreover, unclassified chronological analysis was patchy to non-existent. In many cases, it showed that a key ethnic or sectarian attack have a major impact on the course of the war. These decisions may have reduced the impact such data had on sectarian and ethnic tensions, but they also disguise the underlying causes and patterns in the conflict.
Moreover, then – as now – official data were not developed on the overall patterns in wounded and low-level violence (which also had a critical impact on the war), or on perceptions of the causes and levels of violence. Polling by ABC and other groups indicates that perceptions of violence were both a driving factor in the war, and differed sharply from the patterns in major incident counts. For example, polling showed that during large periods in the war most Iraqis saw the US and Coalition as posing an equal threat relative to insurgents and extremists.

Section Two is entitled “Emerging Patterns in Violence: 2010.” It shows that “victory” is relative as long as extremists and insurgents can keep up a consistent pattern of low level attacks. According to the GOI, more than 3,600 civilians and ISF personnel were killed in violent incidents during 2010.35 For the third consecutive month, however, December set a 2010 record for the fewest number of persons killed in attacks, down 151 from the previous month’s 2010 record low of 171. It also shows that more than 70% of the documented security incidents in the war from 2004 to end 2010 were bombs and IEDs. At the same time, it shows a shift in the pattern of violence to targeting Iraqi officials and security personnel.

It is again important to note, however, these data still focus on major incidents. A look on media reports of the chronology of violence show a clear pattern of high profile attacks on civilians designed to discredit the Iraqi government and provoke ethnic and sectarian tensions. It is also critical to understand that these data do not include crime, kidnapping, extortion, perceived bias and failures by the Iraqi security services, and perceptions of the overall effectiveness and fairness of the police and courts. These are all critical indicators now that major fighting has halted. They measure the broad level of stability and security in Iraq, and the risk Iraqi and international investors and businesses run in the post-US forces era.

Section Three is entitled “Mapping Key Patterns in Violence by Area. 2003-2010.” It corrects some of the problems citied earlier by showing the geographic patterns in violence, and focusing on several key areas. Violence in the areas north and west of Baghdad Province largely involved
and affected Sunnis, with some directed against Kurds and Christians. Patterns south of Baghdad largely affected Shi’ites. Baghdad Province was the main scene of violence throughout the US-led phase of the fighting, and was largely Sunni vs. Shi’ite. The patterns of AQIP Sunni and Sadrist Shi’ite violence are also clear. It is important to note Syria was the main source of support to Sunni insurgents, and Iran was a major source of support to Shi’ite extremists.

The more recent maps in this section show a steady concentration of violence in the north in Diyala and Ninewa provinces, ongoing violence in Baghdad, and mixed violence in the south – much of it consisting of bombings and suicide attacks designed to create sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi’ite.

The final maps in this section highlight the bombings and attacks on civilians mentioned above, new patterns in violence along the ethnic faultline in Kirkuk, violence against the Sunni Sons of Iraq, and violence in Basrah Province – a critical area in terms of petroleum development and investment. They highlight the new patterns of violence that are coming to dominate Iraq, and the need for new metrics that spotlight key problems and threats by target and local area.

Nationwide trends, and reports that aggregate all types of violence without regard to area, goal, and type of target have become increasingly meaningless or misleading, and maps and graphs need to be supported by detailed chronologies of the patterns in violence.

**Section Four is entitled “Spotlight on Baghdad.”** These data highlight the critical importance of Baghdad as a center of the fighting. Baghdad remains a key center of bombings, suicide attacks, and crime.

**Section Five is entitled “Iraqi Attitudes Towards Violence.”** These maps highlight the limited range of data provided in official reporting on Iraqi perceptions towards the end of the war. To be blunt, such data – and their equivalent in Afghanistan – are extremely suspect. The more detailed data publish in various US reports often
seemed to be designed to prove positive results, and the results rarely tracked with the far more comprehensive polling done by broadcast media and NGOs. They lack explanation as to method, and were often briefed as being “statistically valid” based on sampling methods that may have given this description had some mathematical justification – but only if divorced from the problems in real world sampling. In general, the unofficial polling conducted by ABC/BBC/and ARD seems far more credible and useful.

**Section Six is entitled “Different Estimates of Casualty Trends: 2003-2010.”** These data show a range of Iraqi, NGO, and US estimates of casualties, and do provide some insights into the cumulative level of ethnic and sectarian violence.

As noted earlier, these data only count killed – not injured and wounded – with the exception of the data on US forces. As a rough estimate, injured and wounded would have totaled 5-7 times the number killed. The data differ significantly according to source and definition – usually with no clear explanation of all the reasons for the differences. They also do not include those who died or injured in ways that never became part of the official record – including significant numbers of disappearances.

What all sources do have in common, however, is that casualties have dropped sharply and continued to drop during 2010 – in spite of the ongoing attacks of Sunni and Shi’ite factions. This trend has applied to total civilian casualties, ethnic and sectarian casualties, and Iraqi and US military casualties.

**Section Seven is entitled “More is Involved than Casualties: Displaced Persons.”** These data show another key impact of the war. They do, however, present the problem that such counts are very difficult to make, and internally displaced persons often do not count Iraqis making local moves into move secure sectarian and ethnic neighborhoods in the same town or city, and those who lost a business or access to jobs because of the inability to operate in a high risk or hostile sectarian and ethnic area.
Section Eight is entitled “IEDs and Weapons Caches: 2003-2010.” It measures the trends in the most critical source of violence in war as it affected US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces. The downward trend in such attacks has reached the point, however, where it has lost much of its impact on the overall pattern of the fighting. New reporting is needed on bombings and suicide attacks on civilians and should included both killed and wounded, and ethnic and sectarian breakouts.

Taken together, these data amount to a tactical victory during the US-led phase of the war, but do not yet define anything approaching a strategic victory on the war. Such a victory will have to be won by Iraqis, both in terms of security and stability, and by transition to a civil rule of law and ongoing economic development. This phase of the war has been delayed by both a major budget crisis in 2009 and most of 2010, and the long crisis over forming a new Iraqi government.

Success will also depend heavily on US ability and willingness to create a strong military, police, and civil aid program after US military withdrawal at the end of 2011. These programs have been proposed by the Obama Administration, but have not yet been accepted by the new Iraqi government or accepted and funded by the US Congress.

Section Nine is entitled “The Iranian-Iraq Power Vacuum:” It highlights the fact that the US-led invasion destroyed Iraq’s conventional forces and capability to defend Iraq against foreign threats. It shows this left a major vacuum in the balance of power in the Gulf, and one that cannot be corrected before 2020 under anything like current plans and spending levels.
Section One

Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to August 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

- Average daily attacks in Afghanistan
- Average daily attacks in Iraq

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Terrorist Attacks in Iraq</th>
<th>Iraq Attacks with at least one killed, injured, or kidnapped</th>
<th>People killed, injured, or kidnapped in Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>2,648</td>
<td>20,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6,631</td>
<td>5,910</td>
<td>38,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,210</td>
<td>5,507</td>
<td>44,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,256</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>19,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>16,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan</th>
<th>Afghan Attacks with at least one killed, injured, or kidnapped</th>
<th>People killed, injured, or kidnapped in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>1,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>3,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>4,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>5,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>7,584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009
Terrorism in Iraq vs. Afghanistan: 2005-2009

Source: National Counterterrorism Center: *Annex of Statistical Information, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, Offices of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State 2009

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province

Security Incidents, by Type

Cumulative Fatalities

Coalition Military (Non-U.S.) 223
Contractors 1,426
U.S. Military 3,859
Iraqi Security Forces 8,015
Major Security Incidents: Feb 2004 – Feb 2010

Overall Weekly Security Incident Trends
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.

DoD Quarterly Report, April 2010, p. 28
Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the Rise of the Insurgency to the Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010
Section Two

Emerging Patterns in Violence: 2010
Iraqi High Profile Attacks: 2006 - 2010

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)
May 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments, SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Does not include found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Iraqi Security Incidents by Type
Jan 2004 – Mar 2010

Security Incidents, by Type

- Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks: 12%
- Sniper, Ambush, and Other Small Arms Attacks: 15%
- Found and Cleared Bombs: 33%
- Detonated Bombs: 40%
- Attacks against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations: 40%
According to the GOI, more than 3,600 civilians and ISF personnel were killed in violent incidents during 2010. For the third consecutive month, however, December set a 2010 record for the fewest number of persons killed in attacks, down 151 from the previous month’s 2010 record low of 171.
SIGIR has relied on U.S. military authorities (in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), USF-I, and the predecessor Multi-National Force entities) for the security incident data presented in SIGIR’s Quarterly Reports. In February 2010, because SIGIR did not have a historically complete set of data at the time, CENTCOM provided SIGIR with a complete set covering security incidents from January 2004 through December 2008. This data set came from Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and it was consistent with previous data provided by MNC-I on security incidents through the first half of 2009.

In preparation for its April 2010 Quarterly Report, SIGIR received another set of data from USF-I that covered the period from April 1, 2009, through March 26, 2010. On the surface, this more recent data set seemed inconsistent with the older set because it showed markedly more incidents in the April–June 2009 period. SIGIR questioned the accuracy of the data and was told that it was all that could be provided. The “monthly incident” line in Figure 2.11 of the April 2010 SIGIR Quarterly Report reflects the discontinuity of the data and makes clear that the data came from two different sources. Supplemented with updates from USF-I, SIGIR displayed the same historical data in its July and October 2010 Quarterly Reports.

On November 30, 2010, USF-I contacted SIGIR and challenged the accuracy of the security incidents data displayed in SIGIR’s October 2010 Quarterly Report. After reviewing the underlying data, USF-I acknowledged that SIGIR’s graphs faithfully mirrored the data that USF-I had provided to SIGIR—but that the data was incorrect. USF-I informed SIGIR that it had “unknowingly provided an incorrect data file in September 2010 when responding to the quarterly data call.”

According to USF-I, the faulty data reflected “raw incidents (pre-analysis) across multiple categories, the majority of which did not meet the refined post-analysis criteria required of recordable security incidents.”

SIGIR received revised data from USF-I on January 4, 2011. Figure 4.7 compares the old “incorrect” data with the new “correct” data. USF-I has acknowledged that, “while the graph depicts the data submitted, it is not representative of the formally recorded monthly security data.” The new data set shows more security incidents than previously reported for the period from mid-2006 to mid-2007. According to USF-I, that difference is explained by inclusion of information provided by the host nation that has been reported in the Department of Defense (DoD) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) since August 2006. The new data also deviates significantly from the old data set starting in April 2009. From April 2009 through August 2010, the revised data shows a 50% reduction in total security incidents relative to the data previously provided by USF-I. If the new data is accurate, then all the security incident data that SIGIR received from USF-I in 2010—not just the data received in September—had inaccuracies.

All security incident figures in this January 2011 Quarterly Report use the new, corrected data that USF-I provided on January 4, 2011.
In 2010, as the number of U.S. troops fell by half from 2009 levels, the number of security incidents fell by more than 20%. As of December 31, 2010, the overall level of violence in Iraq was about 90% lower than the peak seen in 2007. Last year, the average number of daily security incidents nationwide was less than 25—making 2010 the least violent year since U.S. operations began in 2003.
Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the Peak of the Insurgency to the Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010
Iraq: Patterns of Violence From the End of Surge to Withdrawal of US Combat Forces

Redeployment of surge forces completed, 16 July 2008

Security Agreement deadline for US withdrawal from Iraqi cities, 30 June 2009

Iraqi national legislative election, 7 March

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010
Security Update

In his clearest statement yet of the future of American forces in Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that the Status of Forces Agreement and the withdrawal deadline of 2011 are "not subject to extension, not subject to alteration," though he did say that an extension of the deadline would require a completely new agreement, which is unlikely to take place.

Attacks in Iraq continue to occur on a daily basis.

According to US officials, the number of foreign fighters in Iraq is increasing. One unofficial estimate sets the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq in October at 250. The US claims the monthly number of foreign fighters entering Iraq is as low at 10. Iraqi officials warn of increased funding to Al Qaeda in Iraq as the US prepares to withdraw.

Casualties in Iraq are dropping. According to Iraq Body Count, in November, 245 civilian deaths so far have been recorded. They were 298 in October. According to iCasualties, 2 Coalition deaths occurred in October and November each, down from 9 and 11, respectively last year. The Iraqi government reports 171 deaths from violence in November, the lowest monthly toll since November 2009.

Approximately 100,000 civilians have died from violence since the 2003 invasion.

Christian Iraqis have suffered a recent spate of violence, and now many are heading north or abroad. The most violence recent attack was in October, when five suicide bombers seized a church. The terrorist attack and police counterattack left an estimated 53 dead and 75 wounded. Four of the attackers were Libyan or Syrian and had entered Iraq with fake ID cards identifying themselves as mutes so they would not have to reveal their accents to checkpoint guards. The number of Christians in Iraq has declined from an estimated 1.2 million in 2003 to an estimated 600,000 today.

The Sons of Iraq were promised new jobs, 20% in security and 80% in other ministries or the private sector. Hiring freezes in the Ministry of Interior and Defense have turned these into empty promises and now erratic pay have led to many deserting their posts.

Post-election targets of violence

Political leaders, foreign embassies, and consulates. Notably, Judge Mohammed Abdel Ghaffur

Sunni Awakening members

Apartments & local Shiite mosques

Shiite pilgrims targeted in attacks in key areas like Karbala

Attacks on high visibility targets: Central Bank of Iraq, Al-Arabyia News Station
Iraq: Average Weekly Violence Against Civilians: 2006- June 2010

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010
### SELECTED ACTS OF APPARENT TARGETED VIOLENCE AGAINST IRAQI OFFICIALS, 10/15/2010–1/17/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS/VICTIMS</th>
<th>LOCATION (PROVINCE)</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CIRCUMSTANCES</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>Salah Al-Din</td>
<td>10/19/2010</td>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel injured; at least 11 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior police officer</td>
<td>Salah Al-Din</td>
<td>10/19/2010</td>
<td>IED attack on residence</td>
<td>No reported casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Electricity director general</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10/25/2010</td>
<td>Attacked by gunmen using silencers</td>
<td>Director general killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10/23/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>MOI official killed; 3 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Planning undersecretary</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10/26/2010</td>
<td>IED attack</td>
<td>Undersecretary unharmed; 4 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police colon</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10/28/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Colonel killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF commander</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>10/28/2010</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Commander injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior police officer</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>11/1/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Officer killed; driver injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government official</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>11/4/2010</td>
<td>Multiple IEDs</td>
<td>Official and driver killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior national security official</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>11/16/2010</td>
<td>Residence bombed</td>
<td>No reported casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoI members from al-Iraqiya bloc</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>11/19/2010</td>
<td>IED attack on motorcade</td>
<td>Members unharmed; 1 bodyguard killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior passport office official</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>11/22/2010</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Official killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Municipalities IG officials</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11/22/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>2 IG officials killed; 2 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army brigadier</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11/24/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Brigadier killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior colon</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11/24/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Colonel injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police brigadier</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11/28/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Brigadier killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Endowment official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>11/28/2010</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Official injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/1/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Official injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Human Rights official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/1/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Official killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government official</td>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>12/1/2010</td>
<td>Residence attacked by gunman</td>
<td>Official unharmed; 2 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior police officer</td>
<td>Tameem</td>
<td>12/1/2010</td>
<td>IED attack on motorcade</td>
<td>Officer unharmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar provincial intelligence officer</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/3/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Officer injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Integrity official</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>12/14/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Official unharmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Ministry of Electricity official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/16/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Former official killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of Mosul University</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>12/20/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>President seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence officer</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/20/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Officer killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Endowment official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/21/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Official injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/22/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Official killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army brigadier</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/23/2010</td>
<td>Attacked by gunmen using silencers</td>
<td>Brigadier killed; 1 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police colon</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/23/2010</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunmen</td>
<td>Colonel injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/26/2010</td>
<td>Automobile attacked by gunmen</td>
<td>Official and driver injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs official</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/28/2010</td>
<td>IED attack on automobile</td>
<td>Official injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal court judge</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>12/29/2010</td>
<td>Sticky bomb attached to car</td>
<td>Judge injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul police commander</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>12/29/2010</td>
<td>Multiple suicide bombers attacked HQ</td>
<td>Police commander killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior lieutenant colon</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>1/1/2011</td>
<td>Automobile attacked by gunmen</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Endowment official</td>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td>1/2/2011</td>
<td>Multiple IEDs</td>
<td>Officially seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineawa provincial council chairman</td>
<td>Nineawa</td>
<td>1/2/2011</td>
<td>Multiple IEDs</td>
<td>IEDs dismantled prior to detonation; chairman unharmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior brigadier</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>1/3/2011</td>
<td>Ambushed by gunnem</td>
<td>Brigadier injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local security official</td>
<td>Tameem</td>
<td>1/5/2011</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Official injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Police</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>1/10/2011</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Chief and several associates killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial governor</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>1/17/2011</td>
<td>Suicide bomber</td>
<td>Governor unharmed; several injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table provides examples of assassinations, attempted assassinations, and other small-scale acts of violence that appear to have been aimed at specific persons or groups this quarter. It does not purport to be all-inclusive, nor assume to imply the attackers’ respective motives.

Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.
Section Three

Mapping Key Patterns in Violence by Area: 2003-2010
Annual Security Incidents in Iraq per 10,000 People by Province: 2004-2010

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. “U.S. Surge” denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq. ISF fatality data for deaths that occurred before 1/4/2005 is not available.


SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. .66
Arab-Kurdish Issues

Neo-"Baathists; SOI Issues

Foreign Fighter Flow

Neo-"Baathists; SOI Issues

Anti-AQI Tribal Success

Foreign Refugee/IDP Issues

Turkey and the PKK struggle

AQL/Insurgent & Shi'a Militias

AQL/Insurgent & Shi'a Militias

Intra-Shi'a Violence

Shi'a Infighting Over Power/Resources
Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges
Pre-Census “Guesstimates”

Sectarian Challenges
• 60-65% Shi’a
• 32-37% Sunni
• 3% Christian or other

Ethnic Challenges
• 75-82% Arab
• 13-20% Kurdish
• 3% Turkoman, Assyrian and other

Tribal Challenges
• Confederations
• Broad area
• Heavily urbanized.
Iraqi Ethnic Divisions

Iraqi National Unity

Anbar: Moved Forward
There was greater power-sharing among political parties on Anbar's Provincial Council, and the Sunni-dominated provincial government engaged constructively with the Shia-led central government.

Ninewa: Moved Backward
There was a series of high-profile attacks on minority groups. National unity remains unlikely without resolving the internally disputed boundaries and the status of Kurdish forces in Ninewa. Arab and Kurdish communities are divided along ethno-sectarian lines.

Tameem: Moved Backward
The future status of Tameem province remains a major challenge to national unity. The three main ethnoreligious groups refused to make concessions on issues such as elections out of fear that any compromise could harm their future territorial claims in the province. The presence of security forces controlled by political parties remains a major concern.
Al Qa'ida in Iraq
Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008

Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity
Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

Winter 2007-2008

Fall 2008

Key Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: February 2009
Location of Sunni and Shi’ite Insurgent Capability: August 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: Late 2009

**SIGNIFICANT SECURITY INCIDENTS BY REGION, 10/21/2009–1/13/2010**
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)

Source: SIGIR analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.
Attacks by Province

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
December 1, 2009 – February 28, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments, SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
To secure a working majority in the 325-person parliament, SoL, which won 89 seats, offered prominent cabinet posts to its former rivals. Under the November agreement, each bloc submitted three candidates for the ministries it sought, and Prime Minister al-Maliki selected from those nominees. The broad power-sharing agreement resulted in the following apportionment of power:

- **State of Law (Shi'ite)**. SoL controls 7 seats in the new cabinet, including the ministries of Defense and Interior, both of which are currently filled by the prime minister in an acting capacity. SoL holds about 17% of the cabinet seats and 27% of the CoR (89 seats).

- **Al-Iraqiya (Sunni/Mixed)**. Al-Iraqiya secured 10 cabinet-level positions, including the ministries of Finance, Electricity, Agriculture, and Industry and Minerals. Al-Iraqiya controls about 24% of the cabinet and 28% of the parliament (91 seats).

- **Iraqi National Alliance (INA). (Shi'ite)** This grouping of Shia parties, including the Sadrist Trend and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), has at least 12 spots in the cabinet, including the minis-tries of Oil, Justice, and Transportation. The INA holds about 29% of the cabinet posts and 22% of the total CoR (70 seats).31

**Kurdistani Alliance (KA).** The Kurds hold 7 cabinet posts, including the ministries of For-eign Affairs and Health. The KA controls about 17% of the cabinet and 13% of the CoR (43 seats).

The remaining positions are filled by representa-tives from minor parties. As of January 18, the government is still being formed, and all reported positions are subject to change.
Post Election Cycles of Violence: March-July 2010

Where The Risks Were: 1/1/2010-3/31/2010

**TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS, BY REGION, 1/1/2010-3/31/2010**

---

**Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People**
- 10-20 incidents
- 2-10 incidents
- 0-2 incidents

Sources: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 3/31/2010; SIGIR analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.
Where The Risks Were: 3/7/2010-7/18/2010

SIGIR Report, July 30, 2010, p. 56
MOI officials informed SIGIR that nearly 240 ISF and intelligence personnel and about 120 civilian government employees have been assassinated in recent months. More than three dozen mid- to senior-level GOI civilian and military officials were the apparent targets of assassination attempts this quarter, continuing a disturbing trend SIGIR first reported on in January 2010.

Unknown assailants attacked two Iraqi judges in January, killing one. Since 2003, more than 40 judges have been killed in Iraq. The HJC attempted to secure funding in the 2011 budget for an additional 4,000 judicial security personnel, but the CoM rejected the request, leaving the HJC far short of the number of trained personnel it needs to guard Iraq’s 1,260 judges.

In the bloodiest incident of anti-Christian violence since 2003, insurgent gunmen stormed a Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad on October 31, 2010, killing more than 50 people. The remnant Christian community in Iraq also fell prey to several other violent attacks, The UN estimates that several thousand Christians fled Ninewa and Baghdad provinces in the wake of the church massacre, seeking refuge in the Kurdistan Region and other areas of northern Iraq.
**Weak Governance at Every Level Affecting Stability and Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Basic Services</th>
<th>Government Effectiveness</th>
<th>Political Effectiveness</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Rule of Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerbala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadissiya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah Al-Din</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tameem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Very Unstable**
- **Unstable**
- **Moderately Stable**
- **Stable**
- **Very Stable**


SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2011, p. 59
SOI members have assumed considerable personal risk during the course of the program, and the danger continues even after the high-profile period of the surge.

As of November 2010, 387 SOI had been killed in 663 attacks. Attacks on the SOI appear to have been more targeted in 2010.

Although the number of total attacks in 2009 was 116% higher than in 2010, the number of SOI killed in 2010 was just 16% below the reported number of SOI killed in 2009.

Moreover, this comparison does not include those killed during the month of December 2010.
Security in Basrah: 2004-2010

MONTHLY SECURITY INCIDENTS IN BASRAH, 1/2004–12/2010


Basrah: Security Timeline, 2003-2010

- **March 2003**: UK forces enter Iraq from Kuwait.
- **May 2003**: About 26,000 UK troops in Iraq, mainly in the southeast.
- **July 2003**: Approximately 9,000 UK forces remain.
- **September 2003**: Pro-militia police detain two UK soldiers; subsequent UK rescue mission leads to large battle with Sadrist forces.
- **April 2004**: Multiple car bombs kill more than 70 in Basrah City.
- **June 2004**: Basrah residents riot over fuel and electricity shortages.
- **July 2004**: UK forces launch Operation Sinbad to regain control of Basrah City from Shia militia.
- **August 2004**: Basra provincial council suspends cooperation with UK forces.
- **September 2004**: Basrah provincial council resumes cooperation with UK forces.
- **October 2004**: PM al-Maliki declares one-month state of emergency in Basrah City after 100 killed in sectarian clashes.
- **December 2004**: UK transfers control of Basrah province to GOI.
- **January 2005**: UK hands over complete control of Basrah International Airport to the GOI.
- **March 2005**: UK ends mission and turns over command of Coalition military operations in southern Iraq to the United States.
- **June 2005**: Two killed in Basrah electricity protests.
- **April 2006**: Operation Charge of the Knights.
- **May 2006**: Basrah provincial council resumes cooperation with UK forces.
- **June 2006**: Car bombs in Basrah.
- **September 2006**: UK forces gradually withdraw from Basrah City to their main base at the airport.
- **October 2006**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **November 2006**: 10 killed and more than 40 wounded by car bomb in western Basrah.
- **December 2006**: ISF encounters fierce resistance from Iranian-supplied Shia militia forces; U.S. military rushes air assets and other support.
- **January 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops secure all of Basrah City.
- **April 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **May 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **June 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **July 2007**: Early April cease-fire between ISF and militias gradually implemented.
- **August 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **September 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **October 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **November 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **December 2007**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **January 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **February 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **March 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **April 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **May 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **June 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **July 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **August 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **September 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **October 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **November 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **December 2008**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **January 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **February 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **March 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **April 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **May 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **June 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **July 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **August 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **September 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **October 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **November 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **December 2009**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **January 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **February 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **March 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **April 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **May 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **June 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **July 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **August 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **September 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **October 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **November 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
- **December 2010**: ISF and Coalition troops clear remainder of Basrah City.
“The Kurdish Issue”

Sources of tension:
• Disputed territories
  • In Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Tameem
• Hydrocarbons law
  • Disagreements on contracts and management
• Constitution reform
  • KRG wants decentralization
  • GOI wants stronger center
• Security
  • Joint patrols of Iraqi and Kurdish forces
• Foreign policy
  • “KRG has been developing independent economic and political ties with foreign countries, signing separate oil deals, and meeting separately with foreign heads of state”

Legislative issues
• Article 23: covers property rights and prohibits owning property for demographic change
• Article 140: calls for census and referendum to end territory dispute, but none has taken place
• Article 141: recognizes Kurdish legislation, as long as it does not contradict the Iraqi Constitution. Dispute over draft constitution claiming Tameem province
“The Kurdish Issue”
## Spotlighting Ethnic Violence: Kirkuk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Roadside Bombs</th>
<th>Car Bombs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kirkuk Police and Mol as shown in *Washington Post*, 9.2.11, p. A8
Section Four

Spotlight on Baghdad
Ethno-Sectarian Violence: 2006-2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraqi Security Patterns: Oct 2009 to Jan 2010

**October 2009**
- Wednesday, October 14: 9 Iraqis killed and 56 wounded during armed attacks in Baghdad and bombings in Kerbala.
- Friday, October 16: 14 Iraqis killed and 80 wounded during an attack on a mosque in Telafer.
- Sunday, October 25: 132 Iraqis killed and at least 500 wounded in explosions outside the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad Provincial Council headquarters building.
- Saturday, October 31: 23 Iraqis wounded during attacks in Baghdad and Mosul.

**November 2009**
- Wednesday, November 4: More than 20 Iraqis injured during a series of explosions in Baghdad.
- Thursday, November 5: 2 Iraqis killed and 20 wounded during attacks in Mosul, Ramadi, and Hill.
- Monday, November 16: 24 Iraqis killed during attacks in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Abu Ghraib.
- Wednesday, November 25: Approximately 50 Iraqis wounded in bombings in Kerbala and Baghdad.

**December 2009**
- Monday, December 7: 7 Iraqis killed and 41 wounded during an explosion in Sadr City in Baghdad.
- Tuesday, December 8: At least 110 Iraqis killed and 200 wounded in a series of attacks in Baghdad that targeted GOI facilities.
- Friday, December 25: 25 Iraqis killed and more than 100 wounded in bombings in Hill.
- Wednesday, December 30: 23 Iraqis killed during an attack in Ramadi, in which the governor of Anbar was wounded.

**January 2010**
- Saturday, January 2: 2 Iraqis killed and 24 wounded in attacks in Mosul and Baghdad.
- Thursday, January 14: Approximately 27 Iraqis killed and 111 wounded in a series of bombings in Najaf.
- Wednesday, January 20: Approximately 36 Iraqis injured during an attack in Mosul.
Attacks Per Month By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Source: Senior Iraqi official
Iraqi Casualties By Type in Baghdad: 2009

Source: Senior Iraqi official
Section Five

Iraqi Attitudes Towards Violence
Iraqi Views of Security and Travel: July 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraqi Views of ISF and Stability: July 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Levels of Security and Travel: April 2010

Local Area is Calm

Move Freely

Govt Can Protect My Family

Iraq is Calm

Nationwide average > 70%

Nationwide average ~ 30%

Nationwide average ~ 70%

Nationwide average ~ 25%

0%

100%

Percent Who Agree

January 2010

Section Six:
Different Estimates of Casualty Trends: 2003-2010
### Who Has Been the Target: 2007-2009

#### Deaths Associated with Multiple-fatality Bombings in Iraq, by Group Targeted, 1/1/2007–12/31/2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>3,974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S./Coalition, ISF, GOI Personnel</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiscriminate/Unknown</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 person represents 100 deaths.

Note: Totals correspond with attacks that targeted a particular group or occurred in an area in which the group was in the majority. “Indiscriminate” bombings occurred in areas with mixed sectarian populations. “Unknown” corresponds with attacks where no sectarian information or location was reported.

Civilian casualties, March 2003 – September 2010

Source: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
# Deaths in Iraq: 2007 – July 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>INDF</th>
<th>UNKN</th>
<th>Iraqi Sec. Forces</th>
<th>US/Coalit. Forces</th>
<th>Iraqi Government</th>
<th>Monthly/Annual Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007 Total</strong></td>
<td>2575</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>5480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008 Total</strong></td>
<td>566</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009 Total</strong></td>
<td>833</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January (2010)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February (2010)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March (2010)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April (2010)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May (2010)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June (2010)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July (2010)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010 Total</strong></td>
<td>333</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civilian Deaths: January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Civilian Deaths
January 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.
Civilian Deaths, 2006 – July 2010

Source: http://www.icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx
Iraq: Average Weekly Violence Against Civilians: 2006- June 2010

Number of incidents

Total civilians killed

Source: ODNI, 31-8-2010
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
ISF and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq
January 2006 – February 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports), DoD News Releases, and CIDNE as of February 28, 2010. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
US Military Deaths in Iraq: March 2003 – September 2010

Source: http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx
Total US Military Deaths, KIAs, and WIAs in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-1.20.11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status</th>
<th>Fatalities As of: December 6, 2010, 10 a.m. EST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Deaths</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF U.S. Military Casualties</td>
<td>4,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM includes casualties that occurred between March 19, 2003, and August 2010, in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Emirates. Prior to March 19, 2003, casualties in these countries were considered OEF. Personnel injured in OIF who die after 1 September 2010 will be included in OIF statistics.

Source: http://icasualties.org/Iraq/ByMonth.aspx
Total Us Military Deaths, KIAs, and WIAs in Iraq (cont.): New Dawn (1.9.10 to 20..111)

OPERATION NEW DAWN (OND) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS**
FATALITIES AS OF: December 6, 2010, 2010, 10 a.m. EST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>Non-Hostile</th>
<th>WIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OND U.S. Military Casualties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OND U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPERATION NEW DAWN includes casualties that occurred on or after September 1, 2010 in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
Iraqi Civilian and ISF Casualties, Jan. '05 - Jan. '11

Source: iCasualties.org
Iraqi Civilian and ISF Casualties, Jan. '09 - Jan. '11

Source: iCasualties.org
Section Seven:

More is Involved than Casualties:

Displaced Persons
External Displaced Persons Challenge

October 2009

October 2010

IRAQI ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISCAL YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>13,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>18,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 through 9/22</td>
<td>19,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,942</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Excludes refugee statistics for Europe and Australia.


Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2009, p 80-81 and SIGIR, Quarterly Report, October 2010, p. 69
While tens of thousands have returned to their places of origin, the flow of the displaced to their homes—measured at 9,500 to 15,000 per month before Iraq’s March 2010 elections—has slowed to about 7,500 per month. The number of those displaced still far exceeds the number of people returned. The majority of returnees have been going back to Baghdad and Diyala provinces. According to Government of Iraq (GOI) data, more IDPs than refugees have returned home: From January to November 2010, about 22% of the 112,250 returnees were refugees; the rest were IDPs. Many who have returned lament their decision: A UNHCR survey of 2,353 Iraqis who had gone back to two Baghdad neighborhoods found that 61% of them regretted going home, and 60% cited security concerns as the reason.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 1.5 million Iraqis continue to be displaced inside Iraq, and as of November 2010, it had registered 197,996 Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries. The actual number of Iraqi refugees in the region remains unknown, but may be much larger: neighboring host countries estimate that as many as 1.8 million refugees may reside in those countries.

Loss of homes to squatters or violence and poor access to essential services were cited as reasons some internally displaced persons (IDPs) chose to remain displaced. However, while the majority of IDPs live in rented housing, some 500,000 of them currently live in makeshift squatter settlements or in public buildings. An estimated 200,000 of that total live in more than 120 such settlements throughout Baghdad. IDPs in settlements suffer from severe overcrowding and inadequate shelter, and they have limited access to water and other essential services.
IOM officials report that many Sunni refugees will choose not to return home until greater progress is made toward national reconciliation between Iraq’s religious and ethnic groups. In a 2008 survey, Sunnis accounted for 56% of the approximately 311,000 refugees residing in neighboring countries and registered with UNHCR. Within Iraq, the situation is reversed: Shia accounted for the majority of 1.3 million internally displaced in a February 2010 assessment done by the IOM.

Security for Christians is a growing issue. The GOI reported that, on October 31, 2010, an estimated 50 members of Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad were killed, and approximately 75 injured, after a front-group for AQI attacked the church and held worshippers hostage for several hours. The attackers detonated suicide vests and responded with gunfire as Iraqi Police (IP) stormed the building, resulting in numerous hostages and seven police officers being killed. Five of the attackers were reportedly killed, and eight were captured.

Ten days later, early morning bomb and mortar attacks on homes of Christians in Baghdad left at least 3 people dead and 26 wounded. Subsequently, Iraq’s Immigration and Displacement Directorate in Dahuk province announced that it had received more than 80 Christian families who fled Baghdad and Mosul.

Note: 221,983 IDP families were assessed.
The Internal Displaced Persons Problem

Factors Affecting IDP Decisions to Stay Put or Relocate

Reasons IDPs Said They Could Not Access Their Property

- Unusable, damaged, or destroyed
- Sold or exchanged under duress
- Fear of religious, ethnic, or political harassment
- Lack of security or restricted movement
- Located on land they do not own
- Occupied by insurgents or militia
- Occupied by members of the local community
- Occupied by the government
The Internal Displaced Persons Problem

Reasons IDPs Said They Chose To Return

- Improved security in area of origin
- Improved security in area of origin and very difficult conditions in displacement
- Very difficult conditions in displacement
- Benefits from returnee payments
- Other
- Improved security, difficulty in displacement, and returnee payments

Note: Survey respondents were allowed to select more than one reason; therefore, percentages do not add to 100%.

Section Eight

IEDs and Weapons Caches: 2003-2010
Iraq - IED Incident Trends – Coalition Force (U)

Incident counts based on preliminary data for June 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jun-07</th>
<th>Jun-08</th>
<th>Jun-09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED Incidents</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks (no CF casualties)</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Attacks</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF KIA</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF WIA</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iraq - IED Incident Trends: July-December 2010

- No significant change in number of IED events since July; % of effective attacks trending downward
- Coalition Force IED casualties continue to trend down, with only 2 CF IED WIA in December
- Host Nation IED casualties trends continue to vary month to month

NOTES:
1) Effective IED attacks are those that caused Coalition Force (CF) and/or Host Nation (HN) casualties. Ineffective IED attacks caused no casualties, and include detonations with no casualties, early detection, and pre-detonnations.
2) All data, including totals for preceding months, are subject to revision as new reporting becomes available.

Reasons for success:
- Effective COIN strategy
- Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces
- Effective host nation security force
- Political reconciliation
- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables
IED Incidents and Casualty Figures
Relative Frequency of IED Incident Types

- Found and Cleared
- Ineffective Incidents
- Effective Incidents
Lethality of IEDs: 2003 - 2010
Weapons Caches Found by Coalition and Iraqi Forces
February 7, 2004 – February 26, 2010

Source: USF-I J5 Assessments, SIGACTS III Database (U.S. and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2010. Chart includes caches and explosive remnants of war. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, USF-I now relies on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of U.S. and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented prior to June 2009.
Section Nine

The Iranian-Iraqi Power Vacuum
Comparative Military Manpower: 2010

Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2010
Iran vs. Iraq: 2003 vs. 2010

Main Battle Tanks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>1,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combat Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Details of Iraq’s Loss of Deterrent and Defense Capability: 2003-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Force Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Manpower</td>
<td>424,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>8:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Manpower</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>19:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>7:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAFVs</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>8:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCs</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>4:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Artillery</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>9:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP Artillery</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRLs</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopters</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>6:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major SAM Launchers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>11:10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Slow Pace of Change: US Arms Transfers

Real world Iraq plans delayed by budget crisis that began in 2009, election, and crisis in forming new government. Creating an effective national defense capability will take until at least 2020.

Only major modern weapons platforms now announced are limited buy of M-1 tanks and possible buy of F-16 fighters.

GOI is committed to 355 FMS agreements to acquire defense articles and services that the U.S. government proposes to sell. As of December 31, 2010, 72% of the $8.3 billion FMS program had been committed by the GOI.

Of the $1.97 billion in equipment and projects already delivered or in the process of being delivered, the GOI had funded 63.9%. Examples of recent activity in early 2011 included:

• As of December 31, 2010, 63 of the 140 M1A1 tanks were delivered to Iraq at an estimated cost of $3.6 million per tank. The last shipment is expected to arrive in Iraq in August.

• Eight M88A2 Recovery Vehicles were produced and delivered to Iraq, with an estimated value of $29.6 million.

• Operator and maintainer training for the M1A1s and M88A2s, under the New Equipment Training program, have been placed on contract and are scheduled to begin February 1, 2011. Included is training for two regiments (70 tank crews) through December 31, 2011. Tank maintainer training is currently scheduled through February 28, 2012. The total cost of this training package is estimated at $34.2 million.

• A one-year contract to provide support for contractor logistics ($35 million, estimated) is scheduled to begin on February 1, 2011.

• The Iraqi Army Aviation Directorate accepted delivery of two new Mi-171E helicopters. This delivery, coordinated with the USF-I’s Iraq Security Assistance Mission, increased the directorate’s total inventory of these Russian-made aircraft to eight. The helicopters will be used to conduct counter-terrorism, airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other missions.