“Closing the Gap”
The Euromissiles and President Carter’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy for Western Europe (1977-1979)

By William Leonard
Introduction

Shortly after entering the Oval Office for the first time in January 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his top foreign policy aides – including National Security Advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron – were immediately confronted with a serious threat to the security of the Western European members of the NATO Alliance. The threat came in the form of a Soviet force of long-range theater nuclear missiles – called “SS-20s” – that the Soviets deployed within striking distance of Western Europe. The Soviet Union’s growing superiority in long-range theater nuclear missiles (LRTNF) relative to the NATO Alliance worried Western European political and military leaders, particularly West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt claimed that the combination of SS-20 deployments within striking distance of Western Europe and the advent of “strategic parity” in the early 1970s revealed the existence of a serious “gap,” or vulnerability, in NATO’s “flexible response” deterrence strategy.\(^1\)\(^2\)

The presence of a gap in NATO’s flexible response deterrence strategy meant that NATO lacked the capability to credibly respond to a Soviet SS-20 nuclear attack of Western Europe. Since NATO lacked a long-range theater nuclear forces, Schmidt claimed that NATO would be unable to respond in kind to a Soviet SS-20 strike on NATO military sites with a corresponding NATO strike on Soviet military targets.\(^2\) In turn, Schmidt feared that if the Soviets were to perceive that NATO lacked the capability to respond to Soviet SS-20 strikes on Western Europe, then the Soviets would no longer be deterred and would initiate a SS-20 attack. Concerned about the security of West Germany, Schmidt demanded that Carter and his advisors devise a strategy that would close the perceived gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy.

In August 1978, President Carter, with the strong backing of Brzezinski and Aaron, approved a plan that he hoped would assuage the Western European concern that NATO’s deterrence strategy had grown deficient in light of SS-20 deployments and strategic parity. The plan called for NATO to deploy a contingent of 572 long-range

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\(^2\) Strategic parity meant that both superpowers held an “essentially equivalent” number of nuclear weapons that were capable of striking the territory of the other superpower.
single-warhead nuclear Euromissiles into the territories of America’s NATO allies by the end of 1983. On December 12, 1979, the NATO Alliance, with President Carter’s strong backing, approved the plan to deploy 108 Pershing II-XR ballistic and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy. In addition to approving a Euromissile deployment plan, NATO Ministers extended an offer to commence arms control talks with the Soviets focused specifically on reducing NATO and Soviet theater nuclear forces. The combined NATO Euromissile deployment plan and TNF arms control offer is known as NATO’s 1979 “double-track decision.”

This essay offers three explanations as to why the Carter Administration supported Euromissile deployment, the first track of NATO’s December 1979 double-track decision.

First, President Carter supported Euromissile deployment in order to reassure the worried Western Europeans that no gap existed in NATO’s deterrence strategy. By supporting the installation of a new long-range theater nuclear missile contingent in Western Europe, President Carter and his advisors hoped to assuage Schmidt’s concern that NATO did not have the capability to credibly respond to limited SS-20 strikes on Western Europe. During their meetings with the Western Europeans before December 12, 1979, Aaron and other American diplomats asserted that new missile deployments in Western Europe would close the gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy and equip NATO with the ability to conduct limited nuclear strikes against Soviet military targets in response to Soviet SS-20 strikes on Western Europe, should they occur. West German and British military strategists believed that equipping NATO with a limited nuclear response option outside of traditional NATO strategic forces would enhance the credibility of the American threat of nuclear retaliation and more effectively deter the Soviets from attacking Western Europe with SS-20s in the first place. Even though

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Carter and his advisors believed that the Soviets were already deterred from attacking Western Europe by previously existing NATO strategic forces, Carter supported Euromissile deployment because he wanted America’s NATO allies to feel assured that NATO had the capability to credibly respond to all types of Soviet aggression, including Soviet long-range theater nuclear missile strikes on Western Europe.

The second reason why President Carter supported Euromissile deployment was to prevent the Soviet Union from using threats of limited SS-20 strikes against Western Europe as a means to intimidate and coerce political concessions from America’s NATO allies. Brzezinski and Aaron did not want to give the Soviets free reign to intimidate the Western Europeans with their SS-20s, and thereby allow the Soviets to undermine Alliance cohesion. A particularly worrisome prospect for President Carter and his advisors was that unchecked Soviet threats of SS-20 strikes against Western Europe would cause the NATO Alliance to disintegrate and catalyze a process of “Finlandization” in Western Europe. Finlandization meant that the Western Europeans could be coerced, under threat of SS-20 nuclear strikes, into adopting a more neutral foreign policy, as opposed to a foreign policy strictly aligned with the United States. Euromissile deployment, in Carter’s mind, would reassure America’s NATO allies that NATO’s deterrence strategy was credible and thus prevent the Soviets from believing that they could intimidate and exact political concessions from the Western Europeans with impunity.

The third reason why President Carter supported the deployment of new long-range theater nuclear forces was to give the United States bargaining leverage if the Soviets accepted NATO’s offer to commence TNF arms control talks. President Carter and his advisors calculated that the only way to convince the Soviet Union to reduce the size of its SS-20 long-range theater nuclear missile contingent would be for the NATO Alliance to threaten the Soviet Union with a plan to introduce a long-range theater nuclear force of its own. President Carter reasoned that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to engage in TNF arms control negotiations if NATO had no corresponding theater nuclear force of its own that it could bargain away during arms control.

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7 David Aaron, interview by author, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA, June 29, 2010.
negotiations. President Carter and his advisors hoped that deploying nuclear missiles in Western Europe would induce the Soviet leadership to engage in arms control negotiations with the Alliance and consequently reduce its own SS-20 theater nuclear forces in exchange for reductions in NATO’s Euromissile force.

Before detailing why President Carter supported Euromissile deployment, it is necessary to answer the following question: Why did some prominent Western European political and military leaders – most importantly West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt – publicly question the credibility of America’s nuclear umbrella over Western Europe in the late 1970s?

The advent of strategic nuclear parity in the late 1970s combined with the Soviet Union’s decision to deploy SS-20s within striking distance of Western Europe prompted Schmidt to worry that a gap had been created in NATO’s flexible response deterrence strategy. Originally articulated by NATO in 1967, the flexible response deterrence strategy was meant to convey to the Soviets that NATO was determined to “resist Soviet aggression at any level” and “willing to escalate a conflict to whatever degree necessary to bring it to an end.”9 With the concept of an “escalation ladder” in mind, the NATO Alliance created a number of response options to complement NATO’s already-existing strategic nuclear forces stationed in Western Europe – including forward-based nuclear bombers and Poseidon nuclear armed submarines – so that NATO had the capability to respond to different types of Soviet aggression with its own response options.

In order to deter the Soviets from starting a European theater nuclear war in the first place, NATO’s flexible response strategy depended on a “Soviet perception that its use of nuclear weapons at any level would result in a certain [NATO] nuclear response that would frustrate achievement of the military objectives of the initial strikes.”10 By equipping itself with other response options outside of strategic systems, NATO strategists calculated that the Alliance would have the capability to respond to all types of

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9 Cartwright and Critchley, 6.
Soviet aggression without immediately being forced to escalate to the strategic nuclear level as its initial response option. NATO strategists believed that having a wide array of possible response options would “make the threatened use of nuclear weapons believable and provide possibilities other than the unthinkable and therefore incredible, option of all-out nuclear response.” However, “in the event of a major [Soviet] nuclear attack [on Western Europe], NATO would maintain a capability for a massive strategic nuclear response” against the Soviet Union itself. Under the flexible response strategy, employing strategic nuclear forces on a massive scale against the Soviet Union itself was the ultimate response option if Soviet aggression against Western Europe could not be countered with conventional or battlefield nuclear forces.

Chancellor Schmidt believed that the advent of strategic parity and SS-20 deployments revealed that NATO was losing its ability to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe. Schmidt argued that strategic parity “neutralized” the strategic nuclear capabilities of both superpowers. Since both superpowers possessed “secure-second strike capabilities” as a result of strategic parity, Schmidt believed that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would be willing to employ its strategic nuclear systems against the other superpower, because such a use of strategic systems by one side would invite the other side to massively retaliate with their own strategic forces. According to James Thomson, a National Security Council staffer serving under President Carter, “Western strategic analysts believed that in Soviet eyes, strategic parity would reduce U.S. willingness to use its strategic nuclear forces in contingencies short of nuclear attack on the United States itself, therefore sharply reducing the credibility of the American nuclear umbrella over Europe.”

11 Cartwright and Critchley, 6.
15 Thomson, 602.
The Western Europeans were also particularly frightened by the counterforce capabilities of the SS-20: a SS-20 strike could cripple NATO by destroying “military installations that supplied NATO’s conventional and nuclear forces in Central Europe.”

The SS-20 was mobile, highly accurate, and had the range to strike any target in Western Europe. Gregory Treverton, another former National Security Council staffer serving under President Carter, stated that the Western Europeans feared that “the new Soviet theater nuclear weapons (SS-20s) posed the possibility of limited Soviet nuclear attacks on Western Europe, or threats thereof. The only Western response might be from the central American strategic arsenal, an escalation that would risk the destruction of American cities.”

Western Europeans feared that if NATO did not have the means to respond to a Soviet SS-20 strike outside of Poseidon submarines, then the Soviets would perceive this gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy and would no longer be deterred from attacking Western Europe. According to RAND analyst J. Michael Legge, the Western Europeans demanded that NATO “maintain a complete spectrum of deterrent options so that the Warsaw Pact should not be able to escalate the conflict to a level where the Alliance would have no credible response.”

Schmidt feared that if NATO did not maintain a complete spectrum of deterrent options, and if the Alliance had no nuclear capability between U.S. strategic systems and medium-range systems only capable of striking the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, then “Soviet leaders might conclude that they could launch widespread nuclear attacks against Western Europe from a sanctuary inside the USSR.”

Schmidt believed that equipping NATO with a long-range theater nuclear missile contingent of its own would give NATO “the capability to strike back against Soviet territory from NATO territory in Europe and thereby gainsay any Soviet perception that its homeland might be preserved as a sanctuary.”

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16 RAND Corporation, NATO Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force Modernization: Rationale and Utility, 1.
17 CIA Report on Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces, NLC-8-16-3-1-2, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta.
19 “Bilateral with the FRG on TNF Issues.”
20 Legge, 36.
21 Legge, 36.
22 RAND Corporation, NATO Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force Modernization:
equipping itself with new long-range theater nuclear missiles, NATO would be able to respond to Soviet nuclear strikes without being forced immediately to escalate to the use of NATO’s strategic systems as its initial response option.\textsuperscript{23}

**President Carter’s Three Reasons for Euromissile Deployment**

**Reason 1: Reassuring America’s NATO Allies**

A number of unpopular political and diplomatic actions on Carter’s part – most famously his unilateral decision to defer production of the neutron bomb in March 1978 and his decision to impose restrictions on cruise missile deployments in SALT II – increased Western European concerns that Carter was closing off response options and opening more gaps in NATO’s deterrence strategy.\textsuperscript{24} In August 1978, President Carter agreed with his advisors that there was a need for limited increases in long-range theater nuclear systems capable of striking the Soviet Union from Western Europe.\textsuperscript{25} The documentary evidence – including transcripts of bilateral and multilateral meetings between American and Western European diplomats that occurred between August 1978 and December 1979 – offers one story as to why President Carter supported Euromissile deployment. However, interviews with former American principal policymakers – including Brzezinski and Aaron – who were involved in the crafting of the Euromissile deployment plan offer a different story as to why President Carter supported Euromissile deployment.

Analyzing the transcripts and notes of bilateral and multilateral meetings between the United States and its Western European allies might lead one to conclude that after August 1978, Carter and his aides were convinced by the Western Europeans that a gap did in fact exist in NATO’s deterrence strategy, which needed to be closed in order to deter a Soviet SS-20 attack. For example, during his meetings with the Western Europeans, Aaron articulated the same Western European “gaps in deterrence” argument to justify American support for Euromissile deployment. In a series of March 1979

\textsuperscript{23} “Bilateral with the FRG on TNF Issues.”
\textsuperscript{24} Trewerton, “Gray Area,” 1082.
bilateral meetings with the NATO allies, Aaron asserted that new missile deployments were necessary in order to close the gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy.

“The U.S. considers that improvements in Soviet theater nuclear forces constitute a deterrent problem for the Alliance in real terms, because it creates a gap in the deterrent spectrum, and Soviet modernization suggests the Soviets are considering taking advantage of this gap to enhance their nuclear warfighting capability.”

Similarly, in a June 1979 personal note to Chancellor Schmidt, Jimmy Carter himself said that one the main reasons why he supported the deployment of a new long-range missile contingent into Western Europe was because new missiles would “strengthen deterrence by providing credible escalation options” for the NATO Alliance. Deploying the new missiles would close the gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy and provide the Alliance with the capability to respond to limited SS-20 strikes on NATO military installations without immediately being forced to escalate to the use of NATO strategic forces as an initial response option. Likewise, during a November 1979 multilateral meeting with the NATO allies, Aaron stated, “the deployment of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise missile will close the gap in the ladder of deterrence. This step will ensure the necessary military capability to deter a [Soviet] attack.”

Analyzing the documentary evidence would lead one to conclude that after August 1978, President Carter and his advisors were in fact convinced that a gap existed in NATO’s deterrence strategy and that it was imperative from a military perspective to deploy new missiles in order to close the gap and provide NATO with credible response options.

In spite of the documentary evidence, however, Brzezinski and Aaron stated that neither they, nor other Carter advisors, actually ever believed that a gap existed in NATO’s deterrence strategy in the first place. Even though Aaron and other American diplomats told Western European diplomats in their August 1978-December
1979 meetings that they believed that there was a gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy that increased NATO Europe’s vulnerability to a Soviet attack, they did not really believe that the “gaps in deterrence” argument had merit.

The Americans had a markedly different perspective than the Western Europeans on the condition of NATO’s deterrence strategy and Soviet military objectives. First, Carter’s advisors did not believe that NATO’s flexible response strategy had grown deficient as a result of strategic parity and SS-20 deployments. There was thus no military imperative to deploy a new set of long-range theater nuclear missiles into Europe to repair any deficiencies in NATO’s deterrence strategy, because NATO’s strategic nuclear forces already deterred the Soviets from attacking Western Europe with SS-20s. Moreover, whereas Schmidt believed that strategic parity neutralized Carter’s ability to use NATO’s strategic forces against the Soviet Union in retaliation for a Soviet SS-20 attack on Western Europe, Aaron stated that he and other Carter Administration officials did not think that strategic parity had in fact neutralized President Carter’s ability to use NATO’s strategic forces as a response option. In fact, Aaron emphasized that Carter could and would likely employ NATO’s strategic forces against the Soviet Union in response to a limited Soviet SS-20 strike on Western Europe.33

Whereas the West Germans believed that the Soviet Union was going to exploit NATO’s lack of response options and attack Western Europe with its SS-20s, Brzezinski believed that the Soviets were not risk-takers and would not be willing to strike Western Europe with their SS-20s. The smallest possibility of an American retaliatory strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union already deterred the Soviets from attacking Western Europe with SS-20s in the first place. Therefore, based on the presumption that the Soviets were already deterred from attacking Western Europe by American strategic forces operating in Western Europe, some American policymakers – such as ACDA

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31 Aaron, interview by author.
33 Aaron, interview by author.
Director Paul Warncke – believed that it was strategically redundant to add more nuclear missiles to Europe as a means of strengthening NATO’s deterrence strategy.35

However, even though some American policymakers believed that European fears of a Soviet SS-20 attack on Western Europe were somewhat exaggerated, Brzezinski and Aaron believed that there was a political imperative to deploy a new contingent of long-range missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union from Western Europe.36 37

Reassuring the Western Europeans that no gap existed in NATO’s response options was one of President Carter’s primary motivations for supporting Euromissile deployment. If the Euromissiles were going to make the Western Europeans feel more secure, then Carter and his advisors decided that it would be best to give the Western Europeans what they wanted. President Carter and his advisors did not want the Western Europeans to believe (and publicly proclaim) that serious deficiencies and vulnerabilities existed in NATO’s deterrence strategy: doing so risked creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.38 39

The reason that Aaron said that a gap existed in NATO’s flexible response strategy during his August 1978-December 1979 meetings with the Western Europeans (even though he did not actually believe that a gap existed in the first place) was to reassure them that President Carter understood and was devising a solution that would resolve their security concerns. Carter and his advisors envisioned that new Euromissile deployments would demonstrate the solidarity of the NATO Alliance to the Soviets and would further deter the Soviets from launching their SS-20s against Western Europe. Furthermore, taking concrete steps to make the Western Europeans feel less vulnerable would encourage Alliance unity.39

Reason 2: Prevent Soviets from Intimidating Western Europeans with SS-20s

Whereas Chancellor Schmidt had always argued that the Soviets would exploit the gap in NATO’s deterrence strategy and attack Western Europe with SS-20s, the West Germans indicated to American diplomats during their August 1978-December 1979 meetings that the Soviets might not strike Western Europe with SS-20s and use them

35 Gardner, 227.
36 Aaron, interview by author.
37 Brzezinski, interview by author.
38 Treverton, “Gray Area,” 1080.
39 Ericson and Vest, "SCC Meeting on PRM-38, August 23."
instead as a means to intimidate the Western Europeans: “[T]he Soviets might regard political coercion as less risky and offering higher payoffs” than an actual SS-20 strike on Western Europe. Brzezinski said that he worried that the Soviets would use their SS-20s to “intimidate” and “exert political pressure” over the Western Europeans. The Soviets could use the SS-20s as one military instrument in a wider campaign of political coercion directed against Western Europe. Brzezinski and Aaron feared that during a crisis, the Soviets might use threats of SS-20 attacks on Western Europe to exact valuable political concessions from the Western Europeans. In a 1991 interview, Brzezinski said that the perception inside the Carter White House was that the Soviets “sought to win through intimidation rather than warfighting.” The Soviets would not risk launching SS-20s against Western Europe, but they would play upon European fears of vulnerability in order to obtain valuable political concessions from the Western Europeans. Given American concerns that the Soviets might try to exact political concessions from America’s NATO allies with their SS-20s, Brzezinski and Aaron believed that the Euromissiles would prevent the Soviets from believing that they could intimidate America’s allies with impunity.

In one February 1979 meeting with David Aaron, the West Germans also argued that threats of SS-20 strikes on Western Europe, if left unchecked by NATO, would catalyze a process of Finlandization in Western Europe: “[West German Minister] Juergen Ruhfus and other senior West Germans spoke frankly about what they called ‘Soviet efforts to Finlandize the Federal Republic.’ They expressed concern that the failure to respond to the SS-20 will be exploited by the USSR to that end.” David Aaron said that he and other Carter aides did not consider as exaggeration the possibility that the Soviets would try to intimidate and Finlandize West Germany and other Western

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41 Brzezinski, interview by author.
42 Brzezinski, interview by John G. Hines.
43 Brzezinski, interview by author.
44 Aaron, interview by author.
European allies with threats of SS-20 strikes on Western Europe.\textsuperscript{46} In short, Brzezinski and Aaron wanted to prevent America’s strong NATO allies, like West Germany, from becoming more like Finland, which in the late 1970s was a neutral state neither aligned with the United States nor with the Soviet Union. Brzezinski and Aaron feared that if NATO failed to counter SS-20 deployments with its own missile deployments, then the Western Europeans would be forced to shift away from their pro-U.S. political and military alignment to a non-aligned political orientation in order to protect themselves from a Soviet SS-20 attack. American policymakers envisioned Euromissiles as a means of “maintaining NATO solidarity” among the Western European members of the Alliance and preventing the Soviets from exacting political valuable political concessions from the Western Europeans with threats of SS-20 strikes.\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{Reason 3: Bargaining Leverage for TNF Arms Control Negotiations}

A number of Western European leaders – including Chancellor Schmidt and Dutch Prime Minister Dries Van Agt – said that it was imperative that the Alliance develop a theater nuclear weapons arms control negotiating posture in tandem with a plan for new missile deployments. Without a firm arms control posture in place, new missile deployments would not receive popular and parliamentary support throughout a number of Western European nations, and might be rejected altogether.\textsuperscript{48} \textsuperscript{49} Carter and his advisors supported the formulation of an arms control track together with a missile deployment plan because they believed that the arms control track could “help improve the political climate [in Western Europe] for NATO [missile] deployments” and

\textsuperscript{46} Aaron, interview by author.
\textsuperscript{47} David Aaron, "Report on Consultations with the Belgian, Dutch, and Italian Governments," March 20, 1979, Declassified Documents Reference System (accessed August 27, 2010).
\textsuperscript{49} Stephen Larrabee, Memorandum of Conversation between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Helmut Schmidt, July 25, 1979, NLC-23-64-14-6-5, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta.
“strengthen Alliance cohesion through Allied participation in managing the arms control component of Alliance security.”50

However, when some Alliance members – including Denmark – suggested that NATO initiate TNF arms control talks with the Soviets while deferring a decision on new missile deployments, American diplomats responded that a TNF arms control track had to be a “complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernization.”51 President Carter supported the first track of the double-track decision – new long-range missile deployments in Europe – in order to provide NATO with bargaining leverage in case the Soviets accepted NATO’s offer to commence arms control negotiations on long-range theater nuclear weapons. American diplomats told the Western Europeans during their August 1978-December 1979 meetings that developing a TNF arms control negotiating posture without a firm missile deployment plan approved by the NATO Alliance would not be a realistic strategy aimed at reducing the SS-20 threat to Western Europe. The Soviets would have no incentive to engage in any TNF arms control negotiation with NATO if the Soviet Union itself was not directly threatened by a NATO long-range theater nuclear weapons force. The best way to exert leverage over the Soviets into constraining and reducing the size of their SS-20 force would be for NATO to create a long-range theater nuclear force of its own, which directly threatened the Soviet Union. The idea was that only when the Soviets felt directly threatened by a NATO long-range theater nuclear force would they come to the negotiating table willing to put restrictions on their own SS-20 force in exchange for corresponding restrictions on NATO’s Euromissiles. David Aaron said in November 1979, “only if the Soviet Union is faced with concrete action in the deployment area will they agree to reduce and limit their own forces.”52 While the NATO Alliance said that “concrete arms control achievements which reduce the Soviet threat could reduce [NATO’s] own TNF requirements,” the NATO Alliance also affirmed that some missile deployments were going to be necessary irrespective of any outcome on TNF arms control agreements, in order to

51 SCC, “Theater Nuclear Forces Arms Control,” NLC-31-148-2-11-0.
52 Permreps 6 November Discussion of Integrated Decision Document.
restore Western European “confidence in the viability of NATO’s spectrum of deterrence.”\textsuperscript{53, 54}

\section*{Conclusion}

During my interview with David Aaron at RAND in June 2010, the former Deputy National Security Advisor repeatedly emphasized that in the case of the Euromissiles, reassurance of America’s NATO allies, not deterrence of the Soviet Union, was the primary objective of Euromissile deployment. President Carter’s support for Euromissile deployment should be viewed and regarded by historians as an American-backed measure designed to rebuild European confidence in the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy. From the American perspective, there was primarily a “political and psychological” need, as opposed to a military need, to deploy new long-range theater missiles into Western Europe.\textsuperscript{55} According to Brzezinski and Aaron, even though the Americans believed that the NATO already possessed a sufficient number of response options to deter a Soviet attack of Western Europe, the Western Europeans did not share this same sentiment. The Western Europeans believed that deployment of a new long-range theater nuclear missile contingent was required in order to equip NATO with more response options, enhance the credibility of the American threat of nuclear retaliation, and deter the Soviets from attacking Western Europe with their own SS-20 long-range theater nuclear missiles. Acquiescing to the Western European demand for new missile deployments would encourage Alliance unity and minimize Western European feelings of insecurity. Moreover, President Carter and his advisors supported Euromissile deployments in order to prevent the Soviets from playing on the Western European feelings of insecurity, and using threats of nuclear missile strikes as a means to compel valuable political and military concessions from the Western Europeans.


\textsuperscript{55} Gardner, 227.
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