Report on U.S. Attitudes toward the Republic of Korea*
September 2010

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* This report is based on a series of survey questions on Korea posed as part of a larger Chicago Council national survey on American public opinion and U.S. foreign policy. For the full report, please visit www.thechicagocouncil.org. This report on attitudes toward Korea should be cited as Victor D. Cha and Katrin Katz, Report on U.S. Attitudes toward the Republic of Korea, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 16, 2010.

Introduction

On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Toronto in June 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama emerged from his bilateral meeting with Republic of Korea president Lee Myung-bak proclaiming that the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is “the linchpin of not only security for the Republic of Korea and the United States, but also for the Pacific as a whole.” This constituted new language to describe the strength and the importance of the relationship on the sixtieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War.

There is no denying that the U.S.–ROK alliance has evolved over the past half century to become one of America’s most successful postwar relationships. Once a war-torn country with an agrarian-based economy, the Republic of Korea is now one of the world’s most economically developed nations. It is also one of the most successful examples of a peaceful, democratic transition in modern history. The ROK has become an active partner with the United States in addressing global problems, including climate change, terrorism, humanitarian crises, and nuclear proliferation.

While the alliance is strong at the policy elite level, the question remains about how deeply rooted this relationship is among the general public. Americans certainly know of Korea, but for a long time this understanding did not extend much beyond memories of the Korean War and reruns of the M.A.S.H. television series.

As part of its Global Views 2010 survey of American public opinion on U.S. foreign policy issues, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs included questions to help determine the current state of American thinking on Korea. The findings of this survey are instructive for both policymakers and scholars. They undercut some long-standing conventional wisdom about views of Korea and its future. The findings also offer policymakers in Washington and Seoul some important lessons about how to formulate future policy within the alliance and toward the East Asian region.

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I. The U.S.–ROK Alliance

Americans assess the value of the U.S.–ROK alliance within the context of its ability to counter a rising China.

The survey results potentially undercut conventional wisdom that pervades leadership and policy circles regarding the longevity and utility of the U.S.–South Korea alliance. The prevailing view tends to be that unification of the two Koreas would likely undermine U.S. support for continuation of the alliance after the North Korean threat has subsided. The survey findings, however, suggest that Americans see the U.S.–Korea alliance as having value and purpose beyond its original intent of helping to deter outside aggression, particularly threats emanating from North Korea. In particular, the potential for the alliance to serve as a hedge against China’s rising power appears to figure into American thinking about the alliance. Eighty percent (80%) of survey respondents indicate that if North and South Korea were to reunify as a single nation, the United States should maintain its alliance with Korea. Of this 80 percent, approximately half (43%) support maintaining U.S. ground troops in Korea to serve as a counterbalance to China. Surprisingly, only 14 percent advocate ending the U.S.–Korea alliance following reunification.

Americans may view issues other than China—such as strong economic ties with the ROK—as contributing to the rationale for maintaining the U.S. alliance with Korea after reunification. However, results elsewhere in the survey suggest that China may be a factor. Fifty-four percent (54%) of respondents say China is “very important” to the United States, placing it first among many countries asked about and up from third place behind Great Britain and Canada in the 2008 survey.1 A majority of Americans (68%) say the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China, while only 28 percent (down 5 points from 2008) think the United States should actively work to limit the growth of China’s power. However, Americans are concerned about the potential for rivalry in the future. Sixty-five percent (65%) of respondents indicate they are either “very wor-

1. China is followed by Great Britain (49%), Canada (48%), and Japan (38%) as countries considered “very important” to the United States. South Korea is in thirteenth place out of eighteen countries asked about, at 20 percent “very important.” In 2008, 52 percent considered China “very important,” behind Great Britain (60%) and Canada (53%). See Question 160 on importance of countries to the United States.
ried” (17%) or “somewhat worried” (48%) that China could become a military threat to the United States in the future.2 Perhaps with this in mind, the majority of respondents (55%) say the United States and South Korea should work together to limit the rise of Chinese power in the years ahead.3 Cross-tabulation of the data shows those who prefer to work together with South Korea to limit the rise of Chinese power in the years ahead have the strongest enthusiasm for maintaining the alliance and retaining U.S. troops in Korea after unification (60%). Among those who do not seek work with South Korea to limit the rise of China, however, support for maintaining the alliance and keeping troops after reunification drops to 33 percent.

The U.S.–ROK Alliance: Policy Implications

American and South Korean policymakers interested in capitalizing on this expression of support for U.S.–ROK cooperation to hedge against China’s rise may decide to introduce new alliance initiatives in this area. Any proposals for overt U.S.–ROK military cooperation aimed at China would likely elicit entrapment fears on the part of South Korean policymakers and the general public even if there appears to be support among the American public for such cooperative endeavors. However, there is an array of initiatives short of this. Some of these initiatives could be directly related to countering a possible future threat from China such as increasing intelligence cooperation on China issues.

Others could be indirectly related such as strengthening trilateral cooperation between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. This would, in effect, forge a bloc of “traditional” alliances capable of fending off China. In fact, when asked to think about U.S. foreign policy in Asia, 57 percent of Americans say the United States should put a higher priority on “building up our strong relations with traditional allies like South Korea and Japan even if this might diminish our relations with China,” rather than “building a new partnership with China even if this might diminish our relations with our traditional allies.”

The 2010 naval and antisubmarine warfare exercises between the United States and the ROK in the West and East seas in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking by a North Korean torpedo is an example of alliance cooperation potentially indirectly aimed at China. This explains in part Beijing’s strongly negative reaction to the exercises.

In general, the survey findings demonstrate that the American public does not have an entirely one-dimensional, North Korea-centric view of the alliance. This runs contrary to other work in the field that has maintained that American views of Korea (at least as measured in newspaper media) are almost entirely fixated on North Korea at the expense of broader alliance issues. This survey’s findings will likely be viewed positively by policymakers in Washington and Seoul. They show that concern about China is still an emerging and subordinate concern for the public. Regarding the alliance, the findings demonstrate that decades of efforts by policymakers dating back to presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to broaden the scope of the alliance may finally be bearing fruit. These findings are also in line with the aim of current governments to work toward a multifaceted strategic alliance in tune with the regional and global aspirations of both countries.

II. U.S. Military Presence in South Korea

American support for a long-term U.S. military presence in South Korea is relatively strong.

One of the most striking findings of the survey relates to the long-term U.S. military presence in Korea. More American respondents think the U.S. “should have” long-term military bases in South Korea (62%) than any other country asked about on this question, including Germany, Japan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. Afghanistan

2. This is down slightly from 2008, when 25 percent said they were “very worried” and 46 percent said they were “somewhat worried” that China could become a military threat. See Question 359.
3. See Question 366.
4. See Question 376.
and Iraq, countries directly involved in “Overseas Contingency Operations” (previously known as the “Global War on Terror”) trail South Korea by at least 10 percentage points, with 52 percent and 50 percent, respectively, supporting long-term bases in those countries. When asked their view on current U.S. troop levels in South Korea (cited as “about 30,000 troops”), 50 percent of respondents indicate that this number seems “about right,” up from 34 percent who felt this way in 2004 when the question was first asked. On the flip side, the percentage of respondents who think that 30,000 U.S. troops is “too many” declined over this period, from 52 percent in 2004 to 34 percent in 2010. Responses to a similar question related to Japan have followed the same trend, with an increasing percentage of respondents saying they think the current U.S. troop level in Japan is “about right” (up from 39 percent in 2008 to 47 percent in 2010) and decreasing numbers saying it is “too many” (down from 55 percent in 2008 to 44 percent in 2010).

These results could suggest that the reductions in U.S. troop levels on the Peninsula to-date—one component of the broader realignment of U.S. forces in Korea under way since 2004—may have reached an optimal “goldilocks” point (not too many, not too few) generally accepted by the American public. Indeed, other responses in the survey seem to support this interpretation. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of Americans think that the number of long-term military bases the United States currently has overseas (in general, not just in Korea) is about right. Ten percent (10%) think the United States should have more bases, while 31 percent say fewer. In this regard, U.S. officials at the Department of Defense may take note of these results, particularly the extent to which they indicate sustained public support for a U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan, when considering long-term plans for the placement of U.S. troops elsewhere overseas. For instance, the Department of Defense’s “tour normalization” plan for U.S. service members in Korea—moving away from one-

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5. See Question 363.
6. See Question 361.
7. See Question 35.
year, unaccompanied tours toward three-year, family-accompanied tours—requires significant resource expenditures. High levels of U.S. public support for long-term military bases in Korea will likely be viewed as helpful in executing this plan.

III. North Korea Nuclear Issue

Americans support U.S. negotiations with North Korea as a means to end its nuclear program.

When presented with three U.S. policy options to deal with North Korea, a plurality of Americans (50%) support working “to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear capacity even if it means accepting the North Korean regime and continuing division of the Peninsula.” Around 20 percent of respondents support each of the two other policy options: working “to bring about regime change even if it may bring instability of the Korean Peninsula and further nuclear proliferation” (19%) and working “to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula even if it means accepting North Korea’s current regime and nuclear capability” (18%). Elsewhere in the survey, 62 percent of Americans say that U.S. government leaders should be ready to meet and talk with leaders of North Korea, down from 68 percent in 2008, but still a strong majority. Interestingly, 62 percent of respondents also favor meeting and talking with leaders of Iran, suggesting that support for the use of engagement as a tactic to deal with hostile or unfriendly nations is not limited to the DPRK.

North Korea Nuclear Issue: Policy Implications

These results suggest that Americans generally support the twenty-plus year record of U.S. diplomacy

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8. See Question 175/4.
9. See Question 175/2.
with North Korea, which has considered ending the DPRK’s nuclear program a priority over other policy objectives with North Korea. It also shows that the public considers negotiation a reasonable means to pursue this goal. It is worth noting the sizeable percentage that advocate regime change and that appear to support China’s view on the situation (i.e., the priority of stability), each at nearly 20 percent. The survey did not, however, ask the “pro-negotiation” respondents whether they believe that verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program is an achievable end goal of negotiations or not. This is a significant omission because it could skew upward the number in favor of stability at all costs.

Nevertheless, American and South Korean officials involved in the Six-Party Talks—who often face criticism that they are too soft on North Korea from those favoring regime change and too lenient on the issue of North Korean human rights—would likely be encouraged by the strong number supporting negotiations to end North Korea’s nuclear program. These policymakers may decide to cite this data in high-profile public statements and op-eds in an effort to bolster support for the Six-Party process.

IV. North–South Conflict

American support for U.S. military intervention to aid South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack is stronger in the context of a UN-sponsored multilateral effort.

A majority of survey respondents (56%) say they would oppose the use of U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea, with 40 percent indicating they would favor U.S. deployment. However, on the question of whether they would favor or oppose the United States contributing military forces together with other countries to a UN-sponsored effort to reverse the aggression if North Korea attacked South Korea, the responses are almost reversed. In this scenario, 61 percent favor the use of U.S. troops, while only 34 percent oppose it.

Results elsewhere in the survey suggest that Americans are more comfortable with U.S. deployments in the context of multilateral missions because of a general uneasiness with the idea of U.S. unilateralism. Seventy-nine percent (79%) say they agree with the statement, “The U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.” When asked which statement comes closest to their position regarding the United States’ role in solving international problems, 71 percent of respondents choose, “The United States should

10. See Question 30. Only China’s invasion of Taiwan received lower support as a justification for deploying U.S. military forces, with 70 percent opposed to the use of U.S. troops.
11. See Question 365.
do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries,” over the statement, “The United States should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems,” (8%) or the statement, “The United States should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems” (19%).

This sentiment may have also influenced American views on the appropriate role for the United States in response to the March 2010 Cheonan incident. Sixty-seven percent (67%) of respondents say, “The United States should strongly criticize North Korea for its attack, but should view it as one in a series of incidents in the North Korea–South Korea conflict over disputed waters.” Only 27 percent support the stronger response: “This was an act of unprovoked aggression and the United States should join South Korea in punishing North Korea.”

North–South Conflict: Policy Implications

Interestingly, these results run contrary to the terms of the mutual defense treaty. That is, if North Korea attacked again, Seoul would be well within its right to ask for U.S. bilateral support in fulfillment of treaty obligations. U.S. policymakers, both in the White House and those involved with war and contingency planning, may want to take note of the survey respondents’ strong expression of support for multilateral cooperation in the event of a North–South conflict. While it is likely that the United Nations would be involved in any case—the UN Command that U.S. troops fought under during the Korean War persists in South Korea to this day—it will be important to emphasize the UN’s role to the public if the need for a larger U.S. deployment of troops to the Peninsula arises.

American policymakers managing the fallout from the Cheonan incident may also take note of the majority view that this was yet another North–South skirmish in which the United States should not meddle too forcefully. The U.S. response thus far—which has included strongly condemning the attack, fully endorsing South Korea’s position, and conducting large-scale military exercises with South Korea as a show of force—has been significantly stronger than survey participants would seem to support. If the situation escalates further and the United States decides to implement even tougher measures toward North Korea, Washington may need to “multilateralize” these measures as well as deploy a more extensive public relations initiative to explain its rationale to the U.S. public.

V. Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement

American support for Senate approval of the Korea–U.S. free trade agreement is lukewarm. This appears to be the case with free trade agreements in general and is not particular to Korea.

Support for Senate approval of the Korea–U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) among respondents (44%) is roughly consistent with support for U.S. free trade agreements with other countries, even when the arguments for and against ratification are spelled out. Tepid support for free trade agreements in general is not surprising given the current state of the U.S. economy, struggling with 9.5 percent unemployment rate and a large trade deficit.

Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Policy Implications

Policymakers in favor of pushing for ratification of the KORUS FTA may view these numbers as highlighting the need for a public education initiative to emphasize the positive impact free trade agreements can have on the economy. Based on the data, however, it is unclear how much new support such a campaign would generate. As noted above, explanations of the trade benefits from the free trade agreement did not change the level of support. Rather, cross-tabulation of the survey data shows that support for free trade agreements correlates strongly with views of countries as practicing fair or unfair trade. Sixty-one percent (61%) of Americans who believe South Korea practices free trade are supportive of the free trade agreement’s ratification. This support drops to 27 percent among those who do not believe South Korea practices fair trade. A similar pattern emerges with other countries.
polled about trade practices and free trade agreements, including Japan, India, and China. In every case, among those who say a country practices fair trade, a majority also favors a free trade agreement with that country and vice versa (among those who say a country practices unfair trade there is very low support for a free trade agreement).

A public education initiative might therefore be focused on enhancing international perceptions of Korea as a free-trade nation rather than on the specifics of the free trade agreement. The lack of knowledge among Americans about the importance of U.S. trade with South Korea is likely contributing to low support for a free trade agreement (see next section).

Given the extremely high level of concern about jobs—and its relation to trade and globalization—among Americans evidenced in the survey, another angle might be to highlight the links between American exports and job creation in the United States along the lines of President Obama’s National Export Initiative. Economists project the KORUS FTA alone will generate billions of dollars in new trade and investment, while boosting job creation and economic growth in both countries.

Policymakers may also want to highlight the harmful economic effects of trade diversion, which is likely to occur as countries like South Korea, whose trade agreements are stalled in the U.S. Congress, pursue similar agreements with other countries. Finally, these surveys were taken before President Obama’s statements on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Toronto in which he called for passage of the KORUS FTA. This development may alter slightly the numbers in support of this agreement.

VI. General U.S. Awareness of South Korea

Despite the fact that the United States has maintained a strong alliance with the ROK for over six decades and went to war to prevent the dissolution of the country in 1950, Americans do not seem to be very well informed about South Korea.

Surprisingly, 40 percent of respondents do not think of South Korea as a democracy, despite the country’s status as one of the most successful examples of peaceful democratic transition in modern international relations. When asked which religion in South Korea has the most followers, 50 percent of survey respondents say “Buddhism,” while only 19 percent correctly answer “Christianity.” (According to 1995 census figures, 26.3 percent of South Koreans practice Christianity, while 23.2 per-

12. See Question 368.
13. See Question 379.
And, fully 71 percent of Americans do not realize that South Korea is one of the United States’ top ten trading partners—South Korea is the United States’ seventh-largest trading partner—with 46 percent thinking it is in the top twenty but not the top ten and 25 percent thinking it is not even in the top twenty.

**General U.S. Awareness of South Korea: Policy Implications**

While seemingly not a problem for policymakers on a daily basis, this general lack of awareness about South Korea among Americans may become problematic in two instances. The first is if either Seoul or Washington decides to undertake initiatives that require a high level of U.S. public support, which may be absent. The KORUS FTA, for instance, may have been easier to ratify during the George W. Bush administration if the American public had a greater understanding of the strength of our current economic ties with South Korea. The second instance is if unforeseen domestic events in Korea related to civil-military relations (such as the Highway 56 incident in June 2002 in which two fourteen-year-old Korean girls were struck and killed by a U.S. military vehicle) or other factors (such as the 2008 protests of South Koreans against a trade deal to import U.S. beef) lead to a potential backlash among the American public against South Korea.

In both instances, the lack of general knowledge about Korea among Americans is a potential vulnerability—a soft underbelly to the alliance—if external shocks create negative sentiments on either side of the Pacific. In the case of the United States, images of Koreans are fairly malleable absent a strong knowledge base. Protests against U.S. soldiers, for example, could lead to fairly rapid swings in the overall positive numbers supporting troops in South Korea exhibited in this poll.

The poor understanding of South Korea exhibited by the American public also potentially undercuts some of the more positive findings in the overall survey results. For example, how seriously can a policymaker accept that the majority of Americans prefer a negotiated approach to North Korea when they are unaware that South Korea is a liberal democracy? Or how can policymakers feel comfortable pushing for passage of the KORUS FTA when they know the American public has no knowledge of the heft of the bilateral trade relationship?

The basic lack of knowledge about Korea contrasts sharply with other studies on Korean views of the United States that find Koreans generally have a deeper knowledge base of and pay much more relative attention to the U.S.–Korea alliance. Policymakers would do well to work to deepen the underlying knowledge base of the alliance among the American public. Arguably, Korea stands as the Asian country closest in values to that of Americans today.

The identification by Americans of Korea sharing similar religious, social, and political values could also potentially solidify the “core” of the alliance. It could have a positive impact on views of policy issues as specific as the free trade agreement and on broader support for longer-term relations than those currently exhibited in the survey. Greater awareness of South Korea may also be helpful in the event that the United States ever needs to mobilize public support for a large additional deployment of U.S. troops to South Korea. Promoting new cultural, educational, and work exchange programs, introducing government-sponsored art and media exhibitions, and further easing travel between the two countries (as the United States did with Korea through the Visa Waiver Program in 2008 and the WEST program in 2009) are some methods that policymakers may employ to raise general knowledge about South Korea among Americans.

**Closing Thoughts**

The disparate American views on trade relations with the ROK on the one hand and surprisingly strong support for the alliance even after unification on the other hand is somewhat puzzling. Why is the American public strongly supportive of the alliance but less supportive of trade ties? Part of the

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15. See Question 373.
answer may have to do with a general lack of knowledge about the relationship as evidenced in the response on knowledge-based questions. But part of the answer may also reside in basic motivations and threat perceptions of the American public. The survey findings suggest that Americans may form their preferences about these issues based largely on threats. That is, there is strong support for the alliance because of perceived threats from North Korea’s nuclear program and over the longer term from China (and therefore support for the ROK alliance as a hedge).

At the same time, there is weak support for trade ties because of the (mis)perceived threat of job losses and outsourcing resulting from free, but not fair, trade agreements. This implies that American and Korean policymakers would do well to focus their audiences less on threats and more on opportunities that can be afforded by reduction of trade barriers or closer alliance ties. The formation of preferences based on opportunities rather than threats could ground the relationship in a much deeper basis of public support.

**Methodology**

This report is based on the results of a survey commissioned by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The survey results are from The Chicago Council’s 2010 Global Views survey, which is a wide-ranging biennial survey on American attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy. The Global Views survey was conducted between June 11 and June 22, 2010.

The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN), a polling, social science, and market research firm in Menlo Park, California. Some questions were given to the entire sample population, others were given to a random half, and in rare cases questions were given to one-third. The national survey was fielded to a total of 4,135 respondents, of which 2,717 completed the survey, yielding a completion rate of 66 percent. The survey had a total sample size of 2,717 American adults. Seventy-one cases were excluded from the national sample due to completing the survey in ten minutes or less, and an additional forty-nine cases were excluded for failing to reply to at least half of the questions in the questionnaire. The final number of respondents, after the application of demographic weights, is 2,596. The margin of sampling error for the national survey is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points. (The margin of error for questions that were asked of only one-half of the sample is plus or minus 2.72 percentage points. The margin of error for questions that were asked of only one-third of the sample is 3.33 percentage points.)

Additionally, some respondents showed a tendency to skip entire questions in which there were long batteries of items. If this behavior was exhibited by the same respondent for two or more batteries, the Council team opted for casewise deletion, thus deleting the responses only for the battery in question of those respondents who skipped a particular battery and at least one whole other battery.

The survey was fielded using a randomly selected sample of KN’s large-scale, nationwide research panel. The panel is recruited using stratified random digit dialing (RDD) telephone sampling. RDD provides a nonzero probability of selection for every U.S. household with a telephone. Households that agree to participate in the panel are provided with free Web access and an Internet appliance (if necessary), which uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and uses the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not limited to those in the population who already have Internet access.

The distribution of the sample in the Web-enabled panel closely tracks the distribution of United States Census counts for the U.S. population eighteen years of age or older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical region, employment status, income, education, etc. To reduce the effects of any nonresponse and noncoverage bias in panel estimates, a poststratification raking adjustment is applied using demographic distributions from the most recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The poststratification variables include age, race, gender, Hispanic ethnicity, and education. This weighting adjustment is applied prior to the selection of any client sample from KnowledgePanelSM. These weights constitute...
the starting weights for any client survey selected from the panel. Party identification benchmarks were provided by The Chicago Council. The benchmarks used for the national sample—based on the Gallup six-month party average for the most recent months preceding the survey were Republican, 28 percent; Democrat, 32 percent; Independent, 40 percent.

Comparable distributions are calculated using all completed cases from the field data. Since study sample sizes are typically too small to accommodate a complete cross-tabulation of all the survey variables with the benchmark variables, an iterative proportional fitting is used for the poststratification weighting adjustment. This procedure adjusts the sample data back to the selected benchmark proportions. Through an iterative convergence process, the weighted sample data are optimally fitted to the marginal distributions. After this final poststratification adjustment, the distribution of the calculated weights are examined to identify and, if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and lower tails of the weight distribution. The poststratified and trimmed weights are then scaled to the sum of the total sample size of all eligible respondents (entitled weight in the dataset).

For full methodological information on this survey, please visit The Chicago Council Web site at www.thechicagocouncil.org or the KN Web site at www.knowledgenetworks.com.

Acknowledgments

The 2010 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey is the latest edition in a long-running study conducted every four years from 1974 to 2002 and biennially since 2002. This report is based on a special segment of the 2010 survey focusing on American opinion of Korea and the U.S.–ROK alliance.

Thomas Wright, executive director of studies, was project director for the Korea Report project with responsibility for concept design, survey development, and implementation. Victor Cha, senior adviser and Korea chair at CSIS and professor at Georgetown University, and Katrin Katz, consultant on East Asia issues and a former director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, were the authors of this report and worked with the study team on producing the final copy as well as questionnaire development. Other contributors included Marshall M. Bouton, Rachel Bronson, Gregory Holyk, Catherine Hug, Steven Kull, Benjamin I. Page, and Silvia Veltcheva.

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The Chicago Council has also released a comprehensive report that more fully examines all survey results. It is available at www.thechicagocouncil.org.