Afghanistan: Campaign Trends

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The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded geographically. The Insurgency had momentum in much of the South and East.
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org
Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Sep-07</th>
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<td>CFWIA</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>285</td>
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</table>

JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Source: NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html, as of 21 June 2010
The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces: ISAF Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: June 21, 2010

At least 4,715 of 18,835 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011
Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.

- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.

- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.

- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.

- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.

- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
ISAF Campaign Plan – June 2010

**Strategic Main Effort:**
Grow the ANSF

Badghis-Ghormach

#4 – Islam Qal’eh
#7 – Torah Ghundey

#3 – Hairatan

Kandahar

Central Helmand

#5 – Zaranj

Kunduz-Baghlan

#1 – Tor Kham

Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman

Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni

Operational Main Effort

Shaping/Supporting Effort

Economy of Force

**Key Terrain Districts**
81

**Area of Interest Districts**
41

**Border Crossing Points**

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level: Struggle for the Rest of the Population
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

PROTECT the Population
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability
- Identify corruption; assist GIROA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

SUPPORT Extension of Governance
- Increase GIROA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley, Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabol, Uruzgan;
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kunduz.

Ends

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIROA, Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GIROA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.

Means

- GIROA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU
Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

• Commitment from the Afghan government
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels

• GIRoA capacity to deliver services
  Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries

• Contracting and corruption
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

• Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.

Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

Population Supports Gov’t
Population Sympathetic w’Gov’t
Population Neutral
Population Sympathetic w’ INS
Population Supports INS
Not Assessed

**Promising Growth, Challenges Remain**

- Growth on track for 2010;
  - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
  - Entering historical summer lull

- ANA quality improving, however;
  - Leader development lagging
  - Officer & NCO shortages persist

- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
  - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
  - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
  - Leader Development & Literacy

- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012

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**Afghan National Army**

- Growth accelerating
- Challenged by attrition and retention
Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011

Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.

Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.

Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.
Progress Toward Stability

Operational Progress → Civil Progress → Strategic Progress

Upturn in Violence

Increased operational tempo results in temporary increase in violence

Governance lags security

Confidence lags both

Violence

Security Campaign

Governance Campaign

Afghan Confidence

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Beyond the South: A National Campaign

Operation Bakhair
June 2009 22,555
June 2010 33,052

Operation Tajamu Va Tahjum II
RC (North)

Operation Cold Fusion III
RC (East)

Operation Chashme Naw
RC (North)

Operation Mountain Cover
RC (West)

Operation Mahasera Kohi
RC (Southwest)

Total Security Forces
June 2009 157,163
Jan 2011 331,572

Security Forces
June 2009 15,909
June 2010 24,324

Security Forces
June 2009 56,466
June 2010 102,375

Security Forces
June 2009 43,571
June 2010 91,576

Security Forces
June 2009 18,662
June 2010 28,139

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
SOF Effects: Degrading the Insurgency

**Effects on the Insurgency**
- In the Last 90 Days:
  - 121 Insurgent Leaders Removed
  - 505 Insurgents Detained
  - Instability among leadership is degrading insurgent operations
  - Reduced efficacy of Taliban “shadow governance”
  - IED networks being degraded

**Central Helmand**
- Nad’ Ali
- Marjah
- Lashkar Gah
- Operations: 72
- Persons of Interest: 21
- Enemy KIA: 10
- Detainees: 192

**Paktiya, Paktika, and Khowst**
- Kabul
- Tangi
- Khost
- Operations: 62
- Persons of Interest: 42
- Enemy KIA: 31
- Detainees: 163

**Kandahar**
- Kandahar City
- Operations: 94
- Persons of Interest: 44
- Enemy KIA: 59
- Detainees: 199

**Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan**
- Operations: 22
- Persons of Interest: 14
- Enemy KIA: 69
- Detainees: 51

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Operational Main Effort: RC-South

- Most significant Taliban influence over the population
- Protect the population in threatened or key areas
- Create time and space for governance to improve
- Create conditions for development, with freedom of movement and security along contiguous economic corridor

Demonstrable, near-term stabilization of the south is critical to success
Central Helmand Update

Jun 2009

- Central Helmand under insurgent control; Marjeh insurgent-narco hub
- Restricted freedom of movement; Illegal checkpoints and IEDs
- Negative perception of GIRoA

Jun 2010

- Initiative shifting to Coalition; presence in every major village
- Increased freedom of movement; IED threat remains
- Attitude of population trending positive

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Moshtarak Update (Marjah and Nad’ Ali)

1 February 2010

- Limited access by GIRoA officials
- Activities limited to provincial center
- Schools: Limited or no attendance; madrasses open
- Clinics: Limited access; open only in Provincial Center
- Few bazaars open in Marjah and Nad’ Ali
- Limited access to goods

1 June 2010

- District Governors in place
- Councils functioning; limited by tashkil growth
- Schools: 81 teachers available; students returning to school
- Clinics: Many opening; two new clinics under construction
- Four major bazaars open in Marjah; 100 new shops
- Expanding availability of goods

Security Forces

ANSF
2,734
+60% Increase
ISAF
2,107
4,794
3,157

Lashkar Gah
Marjah
Nad’ Ali

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Kandahar: Plan Overview

June 2009

- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Rising Tide of Security

- City – Expanded, partnered ANP

August 2010

- Gradual increase of GIRoA influence in surrounding districts

Political Reform

- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Economic Opportunity

- Address principal sources of corruption and grievance: contracting, private security companies, land disputes
- Significantly expand electrical supply to meet rising demand

Progress over months; process not an event
Kandahar: Complex and Unique Challenge

- Heart of Pashtun south
- Historic Taliban capitol
- Hub of trade and commerce routes

- Complex Damaged Tribal Structure
- Weak Government and Strong Powerbrokers
- Economic Inequity
- Resilient and Complex Insurgency

Each is difficult; collectively a unique challenge
Resilient and Complex Insurgency

Kinetic Events
2006: 957
2009: 2968

Taliban operational emphasis:
• Increase murder and intimidation campaign
• Increase targeting of GIROA officials
• Increase IEDs; reduce freedom of movement
• Reposition beyond ANSF/ISAF areas
Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation

Struggles for power and influence both leverage and exacerbate tribal rivalries

Major Tribes and Subtribes

Durani
- Popalzai
- Barakzai
- Mohammadzai
- Alikozai
- Achakzai

Panipai
- Noorzai
- Alizai
- Ishazai

Chiltzai
- Baluch
- Hotak (Ghilzai)
- Khantee

Community Rivalries & Disputes

ISAF, May 2010
Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation’s history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.