The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview

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June 7, 2010

Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009

Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05

Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07

Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09

Events Density
- No events
- Low
- Medium
- Significant
- High

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data.
Where the Fighting Was: 2005

The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded geographically.

The Insurgency had momentum in much of the South and East.
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban

Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment

Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level

AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Where the Fighting Is: End 2009

Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

### IED Incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Sep-07</th>
<th>Sep-08</th>
<th>Sep-09</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>278</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>860</td>
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### IED's Turned in

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<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
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### Found/Cleared

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>384</td>
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### Ineffective IED Attacks

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### Effective Attacks

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### CF KIA

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### CFWIA

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<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>285</td>
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JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.
But the Fighting in Only Part of the Story: Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: End-2009

RED: Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace 95 Total

Orange: Insurgents have demonstrated capability 97 Total

Yellow: Insurgents have limited capability 162 Total

White: Not able to assess 45 Total

Sources: Afghanistan JIOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication

Source: SIGAR, January 2010, p. 119
The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

Source: NATO/ISAF: [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html), as of April 2010
The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces:

4,715 of 16,515 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011
Critical Impact of Civilian Casualties

Civilian Casualties, whether ISAF or Insurgent are responsible, increases violence.

- When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties kinetic activities increase by **25-65 % for 5 months**
- When Insurgents are responsible for attacks kinetic activities increase **10 and 25% for 3 months**
Six Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
COMISAF Intent

Purpose
- Assist GIRoA in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

Method
- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

Endstate
- Insurgency defeated to within GIRoA’s capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIRoA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

PROTECT the Population
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability
- Identify corruption; assist GIRQA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

SUPPORT Extension of Governance
- Increase GIRQA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley,
Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and
Kunduz.

Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT
raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT
raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase
mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIRQA
participation.

Malign actors are marginalized. Illegitimate
governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced,
foreign fighter networks disrupted, development
project extortion reduced and majority of
population views GIRQA as legitimate.

Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with
civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy
established; local governance mechanisms allow for
reintegration; RoL and legitimate, responsive, and
accountable governance extended to the population.

GIRQA revenue collection and resource distribution
mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road
networks bolster licit economy and increase
employment; incentive structures increase
stability in local communities.

MEANS
- GIRQA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is
defeated and no longer able
to threaten the survival of
GIRQA, Afghanistan is
stabilized, legitimate
governance extends to
local levels, socio-
conomic programs benefit
the majority of
Afghan people, and
GIRQA, with
ISAF in support, is
capable of
assuming the
lead for the
provision of
security.
Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.
- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.
- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.
- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.
- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.
- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
ISAF Future Operations

Central Helmand Hold Ops

Hamkari Baraye Kandahar

Kandahar Brief POA
Kandahar Shura
Deliberative Peace Jirga

Kabul Conf RC(S) Split
FP3 Arrival
Elections

Assessment
Lisbon

Election Campaigning

Central Helmand Hold Ops

FP1 ~16K
COIN RCT
Training BCT

FP2 ~10K
COIN BCT
Combat AVN BDE
Advise & Assist BCT

FP3 ~4K
Coalition Forces ~9K

Main Effort
Central Helmand (FP1)

Shaping Effort
Northern Kandahar (FP2)

Economy of Force
Ghazni / P2K (FP3)

195,000
ANSF
256,000

Key Terrain District
Area of Interest Dist

ANA
ANP

104.5 116.5
126.3 134 140.8

96.8 101.4 107.2 109 113

ISAF, May 2010
People have to believe that the future under GIRoA will be better.

- Detectable increase in confidence of GIRoA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIRoA viewed as empowering ANSF
Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

Population Supports Gov’t
Population Sympathetic w/ Gov’t
Population Neutral
Population Sympathetic w/ INS
Population Supports INS
Not Assessed

The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.

But, Reality Shapes Afghan Perceptions

The War will be lost without better civil-military coordination, and a far more honest, capable, and actively present GIRoA:

• Need immediate progress in governance, prompt justice, jobs, and economic opportunity in the field as part of each operation.

• Police, rule of law, and formal and informal justice efforts must be integrate and proactive at the local level.

• Military and PRT cooperation must be far better and more operationally relevant.

• UNAMA/UN, national, and NGO aid efforts need to focus on real world short and mid-term needs to get to long term. Need far more focus on validated requirements, Afghan perceptions, measures of effectiveness, and honest contracting.

• Corrupt and incapable Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers need to be excluded from outside funding and support, kept under constant pressure, and “outed.”

• Honest and capable Afghan officials, officers, and local leaders should be rewarded and encouraged at Ministerial, provincial, district, and local levels.

• The US, ISAF, UNAMA, and all aid workers must address their role in causing corruption and waste, and funding the Taliban. The civil side of the war needs ruthless national, UN, and ISAF accountability and transparency.
Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts

Key Terrain Districts (80)
Area of Interest Districts (41)
Unfinished Road
Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

Support for Afghan Government

Comparative Security

ANSF is Making Progress, But Development is Still in Crisis

• Building an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge and attainment of the growth objectives is not assured...recruiting will significantly challenge our programs, both in regards to quality and quantity. The development of effective leaders and the persistent high attrition in specific components of the ANSF also pose major challenges.

• In November 2009, NTM-A/CSTA-A was manned at little more than 25%, and trainer to trainee ratio for ANA was 1:79 and as bad as 1:466 in some locations. All trainees graduated regardless of quality although only 35% made basic marksmanship, and training facilities lack key commo gear, vehicles, and weapons. Most ANP seldom received any formal training. ANSF lacked pay parity.

• By May 2010, major US reinforcements raise NTM-A manning to 70% and ration to 1:29. Marksmanship up to 65% and vehicle training underway. But, NATO allies short of 750 of pledged trainers (10% of requirement).

• Attrition better, but still a critical problem and 70% for ANCOP force. Lack of adequate rotation, rest, and follow-up training still a key problem.

• Cutting ANA and ANP training period by 2 weeks to make quantity has had a serious impact on quality.

• Makes partnering absolutely critical to achieve minimal capability in field.

• Corrupt and incapable Afghan officers still a key problem, compounded by lack of other elements of rule law, ethnic imbalances in force, lack of governance, and impact of power brokers.

• CRITICAL RISK WILL USE UP THE BEST OF THE ANSF; NOT DEVELOP A TRANSITION CAPABILITY
### Continuing Crisis in NTM-A Personnel

![Graph showing authorized, assigned, short, and percent filled for different categories of personnel.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Short</th>
<th>Percent Filled</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO Staff</strong></td>
<td>314</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>*44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO Trainers</strong></td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>*23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Personnel</strong></td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>*95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>*5,209</td>
<td>*3,111</td>
<td>*2,098</td>
<td>*60%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Does not include POMLETs, another critical shortfall. Other personnel does include 419 US Army personnel temporarily assigned to perform trainer duties.

ISAF, As of May 8, 2010
Development and Build are Equal Challenges:

Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

Central Helmand Update

• Progress is slow, but steady

• Violence and intimidation

• Limited GIRoA capacity limiting governance and development

• Population tentative, but responding positively

GIRoA gaining credibility and earning legitimacy is a slow process.

ISAF, May 2010
Civil-Military Progress in All of Helmand Will Be Critical
Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge
Where It May Take 12-18 Months
More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”

Population Density

Tribal Map

ISAF, April 2010
Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge Where It May Take 12-18 Months More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”
Focus on Kandahar

Why Kandahar?

Why is it planned this way?
Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar
Key Challenges

- Economic disparity between elites and populace
- Extreme patronage network
- Monopolization of contracts
- Criminality and illicit economy dominates
- Frequent land disputes
- Distorted commodity value-chains
- Inadequate Infrastructure
Not a City, But a Critical Area Where Only a Phased Effort Can succeed
Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

- Commitment from the Afghan government
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels

- GIRoA capacity to deliver services
  Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries

- Contracting and corruption
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
Resilient and Complex Insurgency

**Kinetic Events**

2006: 957
2009: 2968

Taliban operational emphasis:
- Increase murder and intimidation campaign
- Increase targeting of GIROA officials
- Increase IEDs; reduce freedom of movement
- Reposition beyond ANSF/ISAF areas
Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation

Struggles for power and influence both leverage and exacerbate tribal rivalries

Major Tribes and Subtribes

- Durani
  - Popalzai
  - Barakzai
  - Mohammendzai
  - Alikozai
  - Achakzai

- Panipai
  - Noorzai
  - Alizai
  - Ishazai

- Chilzai
  - Baluch
  - Hotak (Chilzai)
  - Khantee

Community Rivalries & Disputes

ISAF, May 2010
Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Success Requires a Sustained Effort Long Beyond 2010 or 2011

- Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011
- Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.
- Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.
- Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.
Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010
(Green is highest level of trust)

Source: Afghan Perception & Attitudes Survey

Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level:
Struggle for the Rest of the Population
Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation’s history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.