The Afghan War: Metrics, Narratives, and Winning the War

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

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Make Metrics, Narratives, and Analysis Operational: Not Descriptive

Focus Must Be the Campaign: Now, Through 2011, and its Strategic Outlook -- Looking Towards 2015
Support COMISAF Intent

**Purpose**
- Assist GIRQ in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

**Method**
- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

**Endstate**
- Insurgency defeated to within GIRQ’s capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIRQ, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security
Help Implement Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

PROTECT the Population
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability
- Identify corruption; assist GIROA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

SUPPORT Extension of Governance
- Increase GIROA institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley, Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kunduz.

Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIROA participation.

Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced, foreign fighter networks disrupted, development project extortion reduced and majority of population views GIROA as legitimate.

Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy established; local governance mechanisms allow for reintegration; RoL and legitimate, responsive, and accountable governance extended to the population.

GIROA revenue collection and resource distribution mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road networks bolster licit economy and increase employment; incentive structures increase stability in local communities.

Ends

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIROA, Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GIROA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.

Means

- GIROA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

UNCLASSIFIED

ISAF, May 2010
Focus on ISAF Campaign Plan By Area and Do So in Detail Tailored to Given Operation
React to the Urgent Timeline of ISAF Future Operations -- While Looking Forward to 2012 and Beyond

ISAF, May 2010
Key Goals

• Develop a mix of metrics and narratives that support the key focal points of the campaign at every level of need.

• Show there is a credible campaign plan - both for next 12-18 months and through 2015

• Create a realistic picture of progress in challenges in key areas of transformation:
  • Underpromise, overperform
  • Define, measure, and achieve realistic expectations: Make “Afghan good enough” a practical end state

• Establish transparency, integrity, and trust: US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, allies, region, world

• Lay the ground work for “strategic patience” in both Afghanistan and Pakistan well beyond 2011.

• Drill down to force integration of deeply divided civil-military, allied, and GIRoA lines of planning, execution, and reporting.
Over-Riding Realities To Focus On

• We have bet the war on:
  • Credible “success” in Kandahar in 2010-2011
  • Salvaging Marja and showing progress in Helmand
  • Beginning to reversing insurgent momentum in most of country by mid-2011, not merely halting it.
  • Showing we can work around the limits of GIRoA, alliance warfare, UNAMA, and aid efforts.
  • Significant progress towards credible transfer to ANSF.
  • Having Pakistan as a credible partner.
  • Redefining and achieving expectations to create strategic patience through at least 2015
Key Non-Goals: How Metrics and Narratives Can Lose Rather than Win

• Total situational awareness directed towards the top; Information overload: Six color total confusion
• Report on the past and present; do not show the way ahead.
• “Spin:” Cover up key issues and fault lines.
• Encourage defeat: Focus on timelines only to mid-2011
• Reinforce stovepipes, “silos of excellence,” turf fights, and lack of fully integrated civil-military effort.
• More concepts without defined plans, resources, timelines, and measures of effectiveness: The endless “first year in Afghanistan.”
• Tie metrics and narratives to unrealistic expectations and buzz words: “Governance-led,” “State building.”
• Emphasize metrics over narratives and vice versa.
Metrics and Narratives Must Focus on the Immediate Campaign:

*Must Shape Credible Expectations and Measures of Progress*
Key Challenges for 2010-2011 Campaign Metrics/Narratives

• Spin and unrealistic expectations will lose credibility and support for the war.

• The emphasis on 2011 will lose faith in an enduring US commitment.

• Insurgency will succeed in battle of political attrition; not be cleared, infiltrate and remain and exploit GIRoA, ISAF, and US fault lines

• NATO/ISAF will be too divided and deep US civil-military splits and tensions will continue to limit planning and execution of campaign plan.

• The civil and civil-military plans for Helmand and Kandahar will fall short, bog down in GIRoA and power broker problems, and the failure to develop the unity of effort that exists in RC East

• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be rushed in size, used up in combat and by poor service conditions; police and justice system will remain corrupt and fail. The lack of adequate ANCOP capabilities and ability to deal with urban Kandahar will be critical.

• Afghan government will fail to develop the necessary capacity and legitimacy at key provincial, district, urban and local levels. Use up or lose key local officials.
Don’t Bog Down in Over-General Reporting: Key District Concept is Now Too Vague, Too Ambitious, Too Complex: Sets Meaningless “Priorities for Shaping Operations in Afghanistan”

• Combined IJC and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain.

• Key terrain is defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them, are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world.

• These districts roughly follow the line of Highways 1, 4, and 7 through the most densely populated portions of the country.

• Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 districts identified as areas of interest. In general these are districts that for a variety of reasons exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.

• Focus on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the focus of the IJC operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. Operational assessment necessarily focuses upon these areas.

• Population sympathizes with the Afghan government in 24% (29 of 121) districts.

• ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.

Create Functional Areas of Operation for Metrics and Narratives Within Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts --
Do Not Focus on Districts Per Se
Central Helmand: Create Clearly Defined Area and Set of Sub-Areas that Are the Focus and Where Security, Governance, and Economic Expectations Must Be Redefined and Progress Must be Credible

- Progress is slow, but steady
- Violence and intimidation
- Limited GIRoA capacity limiting governance and development
- Population tentative, but responding positively

GIRoA gaining credibility and earning legitimacy is a slow process.

ISAF, May 2010
Kandahar: War Will Be Lost if Metrics and Narratives Cannot Support Operations, and Show Broad Civil-Military Progress in Dealing With Each Major Challenge

- Economic disparity between elites and populace
- Extreme patronage network
- Monopolization of contracts
- Criminality and illicit economy dominates
- Frequent land disputes
- Distorted commodity value-chains
- Inadequate Infrastructure
Public Metrics and Narratives to Date are Too Limited in Timeframes and Recognition of Ability of Insurgents to Endure and Adapt

• No way to anticipate how well insurgent structure evolve, mutate, and adapt over time.

• Insurgents clearly recognize, however, that they are fighting a war of political attrition against a weak, corrupt, and incapable GIRoA and limited US and ISAF strategic patience.

• Maoist experience in China only one of many cases where insurgents rode out long series of defeats to win.

• “Clear, hold, and build” can become 5-plus year campaigns of shadow networks, reinfiltration, shifts in area, stay behinds. 12-18 month periods seem probable.

  -- GIRoA weaknesses, power broker divisions, corruption and poverty are key vulnerabilities.
  -- So are political impact of attacks on ANSF, US, ISAF, PRT, UN, and NGO targets.
  -- “Ride out” strategy offers insurgents many options.
  -- Combined pressures on Afghanistan and Pakistan may redefine threat, insurgent patterns of action.

• The more we “win,” the greater the risk we overextend.

• Metrics and narratives must anticipate these risks, constantly monitor insurgent policies and actions; treat GIRoA and power brokers, and weaknesses in civil side of civil-military operations, as enduring “threat”
This Means Metrics and Narratives Must Show Local Progress in *Clear* and *Hold* in Dealing with “Resilient and Complex” Insurgency

**Kinetic Events**

2006: 957  
2009: 2968

**Taliban operational emphasis:**
- Increase murder and intimidation campaign
- Increase targeting of GIRQA officials
- Increase IEDs; reduce freedom of movement
- Reposition beyond ANSF/ISAF areas
“Governance is a Main Effort” Seems to Lack a Real World Plan and Credible Integration of Civil-Military Operations: Metrics and Narratives Must Show There is Such a Plan, and then Show the *Successful Execution* of Operations

- **Commitment from the Afghan government**
  Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels

- **GIRoA capacity to deliver services**
  Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries

- **Contracting and corruption**
  Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries

- **Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers**
  Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences
This Requires Operational Metrics to Show Civil-Military Success in Dealing With “Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation”
Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Avoid “Cut and Run”
Metrics and Narratives -- Even if Only By Default:
Expand Coverage to 2011 and Show Need for Continuing Effort
in 2012-2015+

Change will not be visible day to day; will emerge over months

Illustrative

GIROA CAPACITY

Kandahar City
Arghandab
Zhari Panjwai’i
Daman

May 2010
Jul 2010
Sep 2010
Nov 2010

Governance and Development
Security force levels

District Delivery Program

ISAF, May 2010
Build on the One Area Where There Now Seems to Be a Functional and Integrated Civil-Military Effort: Graphics and Narratives for RC East

Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010 (Green is highest level of trust)

Need Metrics to Show Whether Have Halted and Reverse Insurgent Momentum:

Must Provide Focused Coverage of Population Centers and Areas of Insurgent Influence in Rest of Country

**Most Threatened Population Areas**

- Prevent GiRoA development and influence
- Limit population ability to choose

**Elements of Insurgent Influence**

- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

**Essential Security Influence**

- Create time and space
- Enable population opportunity to choose

**Elements of Security Influence**

- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable
Metrics/Narratives for “Reversing Momentum”

• Reductions in size and intensity of insurgent influence, high profile attacks, IEDs, etc. by population center and key area, not entire district or province.

• Expansion of GIRoA presence and activity:
  -- District and local governments resident and active.
  -- Presence of active ANP/ANA elements, courts, and justice systems.
  -- Expansion of local security forces with ties to GIRoA

• Expansion of ISAF and aid activity:
  -- Expanding areas of ISAF security coverage, and aid activity.
  -- Expansion of PRT, NGO, and other aid activity.
  -- Credible indications aid reaches and has broad impact on people.

• Focused and relevant polling data.
Create Integrated Graphics and Narratives for Afghan and Pakistani Military Operations: Measure Progress Beyond Afghanistan


Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation’s history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.
Metrics/Narratives Must Show This is an Afghan-Pakistan Conflict

- Yes, the two wars are still compartmented in many respects.

- But, every step forward in Pakistani action drives the Taliban. Al Qa’ida, and other and insurgents together, and creates a more common threat.

- Insurgents steadily more active across the border areas; Pakistani Taliban moving into Afghanistan, more foreign volunteers, etc.

- Support for war, strategic patience, and strategic narrative depend on showing combined risks, strategic needs.

- So, by the way, does any meaningful form of victory.
Metrics and Narratives Must Also Focus on the Broader Campaign and Key Longer Term Challenges

Provide the “Strategic Narrative”
Key Challenges for Broader Campaign
Metrics/Narratives

• The emphasis on 2011 will lose faith in an enduring US commitment.

• Insurgency will succeed in battle for strategic communications; show it can endure and score successes outside key areas of campaign, as well as carry out major attacks within them

• NATO/ISAF will only last through 2011, and US civil-military splits and tensions will to limit overall effectiveness of US effort.

• Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be rushed in size, and be used up in combat and by poor service conditions; police and justice system will remain corrupt and fail: Transformation will not be credible

• Afghan government will fail to develop the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Military will focus on combat and security while allied, UN, NGO and international community aid efforts are not coordinated and focused on war; no an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort.

• Pakistan will not act decisively enough; Iran and other states will present growing problems.
This Means Metrics and Narratives to Validate the Broader Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.
- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.
- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.
- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.
- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.
- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
The War Has Six Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. With the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
These Centers of Gravity Require Metrics and Narratives that Address 10 Key Issues

1. **The Ability of the Insurgent Threat to Adapt and Respond.** The insurgent threat may still be relatively small and unpopular, but it has expanded into a near power vacuum in many areas of the country, and key ISAF leaders agree that its momentum has been arrested but not yet reversed. Its divisions cost it some capability, but make it harder to attack its hierarchy in spite of growing successes by US UCAVs and elite forces. It has now had eight years of experience in irregular warfare, and created far better trained cadres. For all of its weaknesses, it is often less abusive, and virtually always far less corrupt, than the various elements of the Afghan government. It has learned to avoid direct combat when this only brings defeat, to infiltrate and create shadow governments, and exploit its ties with Pakistani extremist movements, Al Qa’ida, and a variety of foreign movements. If it can adapt and outlast ISAF and GIRoA in a war of political attrition it will win.

2. **Far too much of GIRoA is still part of the “threat.”** The Afghan government has honest and capable elements at every level, but their impact is outweighed by a virtual kleptocracy at every level from the President’s office and family through Provincial and District Governors down to the lowest levels in the field. Eight years of capacity building have had limited effect. Training and advisory efforts are often more than offset by the constant flow of military and civilian contract and aid money to power brokers and corrupt officials. Afghan politics have become more divisive and power oriented since the election campaign in 2009, civil servants and judges remain grossly underpaid, and the efforts of the many honest Afghan officials and civil servants are either hamstrung or countered by the wealth and power of power brokers, cronies, and the corrupt. The lack of Afghan government integrity and capability remains a more serious threat to winning the war than the Taliban, and it is still unclear that the US, ISAF, and allied governments can work with honest and capable Afghans to counter this threat during the course of the coming campaign.
3. **There is still a critical lack of unity of effort and effectiveness within ISAF.** The international command structure of NATO/ISAF has shown considerable strength, competence, and unity. The nations who contribute, however, still apply caveats and restrictions to key national forces that gravely limit their effectives. Pledges to provide trainers and mentors for the ANSF are not kept. Parts of the Afghan population are not properly protected. Military contracts of all kinds, including virtually every road shipment, often lack sufficient control to avoid empowering corrupt officials and power brokers, police and other elements of the ANSF, and sometimes the Taliban.

4. **The situation is worse in terms of foreign aid.** Far too many national efforts are little more than boutique programs that meet the needs of capitals, but not Afghan needs in the field. Far too much money goes to politically incorrect, but unachievable goals. Far too little money goes to meeting Afghan needs and expectations that are critical to winning an ongoing war and supporting a population-centric strategy. Efforts to proper manage and coordinate aid are weak and ineffective, and UNAMA has yet to show that it can effectively report on aid efforts, much less manage and coordinate them. The sacrifices and risks taken by aid workers in the field are offset by mistake made in Kabul and national governments. Moreover, all of these problems are compounded by short tours in country, “national branding” that funnels aid to meet goals set by capitals and not Afghan needs, excessive leave and force protection policies, lack of transparency and accountability, and a kind of “ticket punching” where military and aid officials strive for artificial accomplishments during short tours of duty.

5. **This is war, not post conflict reconstruction. Integrated civil-military operations must begin to be successful in the field in 2010-2011, or the war will be lost.** As far too many of the metrics in the briefing warn, these problems in the ISAF and aid efforts are only part of the story. The population-centric strategy is the last chance that the US and ISAF have to win; there is no tolerance for another new start or strategy. Success depends, however, on civil-integrated military progress.
It depends on showing that a combination of ISAF, Afghan forces, aid workers, and the Afghan government can really bring security, acceptable levels of governance, and some degree of economy progress to Helmand and Kandahar, and sustain the progress in the East. It depends on proving that enough progress is being made in other areas to end the near power vacuums that insurgents have exploited, and to significantly reserve – not simply arrest Taliban momentum. This can only be accomplished by building on the model of tight, fully integrated civil-military efforts that now exists only in RC East. It also requires fully developed, integrated civil-military plans and efforts be ready for the operation in Kandahar and be expanded in Helmand. This cannot be accomplished by relying on concepts that are not supported by joint, credible plans, or by accomplished by papering over a lack of civil-military coordination with polite rhetoric, leaving stovepiped aid operations (“silos of excellence”), or demanding the impossible of civil and aid staffs. Buzzwords like “state building” and “governance-led” need to be replaced with realistic civil-military goals and expectations, actual execution of key initial programs over the coming months, and measures of progress and effectiveness that reflect both Afghan perceptions and build outside confidence and trust.

6. **US, ISAF, UNAMA, national aid, and NGO efforts that support power brokers, and that corrupt Afghanistan, must be clearly brought under control.** Up to 40% of all foreign aid goes to corruption, security, and overhead. In many cases, aid money does more harm than good because it flows to a wealthy and corrupt group of power brokers and officials – doing more to discredit the Afghan government and international presence in country than win support. The same is true of a large part of in country military expenditures and contracting -- particularly the funding of private security forces and militias outside and concealed with the ANSF. Anti-corruption efforts will at best be symbolic, and normally only create scapegoats and shift the balance among power brokers. The lack of validated spending requirements, transparency, auditing and accountability, and meaningful measures of effectiveness on the part of outside forces is the primary source of gross corruption in Afghanistan and often directly funds the insurgency. Metrics and narratives must show the corrupt and in capable are bypassed, and capable Afghans at the central government, provincial, district, and local levels get funding and support.
Forcing the pace in developing Afghan National Security Forces can lose the war. The US and ISAF are just creating the kind of training and force development effort needed to win. The key equipment sets needed for training will be fully available for the first time in mid-2010. However, there will still be crippling shortfalls of trainers and advisors. Efforts to rush expansion of the Afghan Army mean the training cycle is far too short – particularly to create whole new units in a force where virtually all of its day-to-day leadership lacks adequate numbers of junior officers and NCOs and cadres with practical experience. This will be partly offset by far better efforts at partnering between ISAF and Afghan forces, but the progress that will result is still experimental and unproven. In spite of all of the improvements underway, there is a serious risk that Afghan forces will effectively be used up in combat and extended service and be far from ready to being transition in 2011. Quantity remains the enemy of quality, and even a year’s more time in reaching present goals could make a war-winning difference. This is especially true of the ANCOP forces – the key paramilitary element of the police. Current plans will almost certainly use this force up, rather than develop it on a sustained basis, and NTM-A needs to be given the time and resources to correct this and other key problem areas in ANSF development.

A new realism is needed in dealing with the rule of law, police, corruption, and narcotics/organized crime. There still are critical gaps in linking police development to the creation of an effective criminal justice system and practical rule of law. The police face immediate needs to mix counterinsurgency with prompt justice, but an emphasis on a formal, Western-style rule of law is tied to goals that can only be achieved over a decade or more if ever. Afghan society is dependent on the prompt resolution of key disputes and crimes. This requires a systematic effort to blend formal and informal justice in ways that can operate almost immediately in the populated areas that are cleared and to be held as part of the coming campaign. It requires far more attention to the overall patterns of corruption and power brokering that affect every aspect of police, prosecution, and judicial activity – as well as providing adequate pay and security for judges and prosecutors. It also requires a new degree of realism as to what can be achieved in strengthening Afghan governance. Anti-corruption drives produce little more than token scapegoats and broadening them seems unlikely to succeed and will lead to significant political battles. Ending the corrupting effect of military and aid contracts, empower honest and effective Afghan officials and officers, cutting off funds and visa to their opposites, offers at least some hope of reducing levels of corruption to those expected and tolerated by the Afghan people. This, however, means a new degree of realism in the US and all ISAF, aid donor, and other outside efforts.
9. **Success occurs at local levels defined in terms of specific population centers and groups, and local conditions, not in terms of nationwide narratives and metrics.** Like politics, all forms of counterinsurgency and armed national building “is local.” The war -- and effective civil-military action and economic development -- will be won or lost in a series of key local campaigns, and “shape, clear, hold, build, and transition” efforts tailored to local and regional conditions. Success means shifting away from a focus on nationwide trends and the central government, and dealing with these realities. It means facing the true complexity of the war, and the fact that national metrics and surveys often hide far more than they disclose. If ISAF, national governments, and aid workers cannot accept the complexity of Afghanistan, and the need to fight and develop by creating transparency in ways that focus on key campaigns and regional problems, they will lose the war.

10. **Timelines based on national politics, exaggerated expectations, and past failures can lose the war before it can be won.** Key countries like Canada and the Netherlands are withdrawing their forces in 2011. President Obama’s efforts to cap the size of the US military effort have been broadly misinterpreted as a sign the US plans to start major withdrawals after mid-2011. A lack of transparency and honest official reporting, failure to show credible progress, unrealistic goals and expectations have all combined to make the war unpopular in many ISAF and aid donor countries, and may still have that effect in the US. On the one hand, setting unrealistic timelines and expectations risks pressuring ISAF into trying to do too much, too quickly. On the other hand, it undermines faith in the US and ISAF commitment to stay in Afghanistan and continue to support Pakistan. It emboldens insurgents in their war of political attrition. It pressures Afghans and other in the region to hedge against US departure and compromise with insurgents. More broadly, it distorts the basic realities of an effective campaign plan.
Reshaping Metrics and Narratives to Cover Afghanistan as a Host Country

- Recalibrate reporting on reality: Can influence, but not transform.
- Show credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.
- Show host country forces face major challenges but partners and move towards conducting operations as quickly as possible.
- Establish level of clear and hold: Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.
- Show can deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values and credible form and rates of progress.
- Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level: Must show both progress and Afghan perceptions. Show have options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
Reshaping Metrics and Narratives to Cover Corruption, Accountability, and Fiscal Control

• Anticorruption efforts need accountability, but will at best have limited symbolic effect, and usually do little more than find scapegoats or shift the balance among power brokers.

• Key metrics and narratives will measure ability to shift military and civil contracting and aid to effective Afghans with suitable accountability, validated requirements, and measures of effectiveness.

• At present contract and aid do as much harm as good: Finance power brokers, gross distortions of economy and distribution of income, corruption, power, brokers, and insurgents.

• Need fundamental shifts that empower capable Afghans at central, provincial, district, and local levels; stop funding corrupt and suspect for short term expediency or out of negligence.

• US and ISAF military, UNAMA and national aid, and NGOs have been at least as “corrupt” in impact as Afghans.
Reshaping Metrics and Narratives to Cover The Civil Side of the Civil-Military Effort

• Stop conceptual reporting; demand real-world plans and meaningful measures of effectiveness.

• Stop issuing “input” reporting on spending levels, project progress, out of context of impact.

• Tie all reporting on civil and aid activity to show impact on key operations and challenges; whether integrated civil-military effort really exists.

• Explicitly require all aid reporting to show degree to which aid responds to Afghan needs, ends funding or corrupt and power brokers.

• Show degree of lasting impact: Short term gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Show can deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values and credible form and rates of progress.

• Show impact on Afghan perceptions of GIRoA and ISAF. Show have civil programs that can deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.

• Use SIGAR to honestly and transparently assess impact of UNAMA, US, allied, and NGO civil and aid efforts.
Changing the Metrics/Narratives for ANSF Development

• Metrics and narratives must shift to performance in the field.

• The extent to partnering can make up for training must be quantified and described.

• Metrics must focus on ANSF by element where they are needed and affect the campaign.

• ANSF force quality and retention are critical.

• Needs to stop use of truly stupid phrases like “quantity has a quality of its own:”

  • No evidence Stalin ever said it.

  • Stalin scarcely a suitable role model even if he did.

  • Used up incredible numbers of soldiers from 1942 onwards; More Russians died as a result of his dictatorship and mistakes than all other European theater casualties combined.
Must Credibly Define & Analyze Progress in “Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition”

• **Shape:** Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

• **Clear:** Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• **Hold:** Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• **Build:** Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

• **Transition:** Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.
Need Credible, Validated Survey Data to Show Progress in War of Perceptions: Tailored to Operational Areas, Show Sample and Methods Are Valid, Not Simply Meet Statistical Tests

People have to believe that the future under GIRoA will be better.

- Detectable increase in confidence of GIRoA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIRoA viewed as empowering ANSF
Validating Polling and Survey Results

- Current lack of public detail in USG and ISAF polling results has no valid security rationale and casts severe doubts on results.

- “Statistically relevant” and consistent results in no way mean have valid or relevant sample; questions respondents fully understand.

- Polling the ordinary Afghan may or may not be relevant in terms of background and attitudes.

- People with guns and power count most.

- Challenge of getting useful results rises sharply as need focused results in operational areas.

- Polling precision will never approach sigma in terms of error in real world.
Summing Up:

We Must Show Whether We Have Made Truly Convincing Progress and Can Actually Win During June 2010 to August 2011
Don’t Use Metrics and Analysis to:
-- Map the country and lose operational focus and credibility.
-- “Spin,” exaggerate, show short-term progress at the expense of credibility.
-- Support concepts for which there are no real operational plans, credible requirements, and measures of success.
-- Paper over US, Allied, Afghan and Pakistani “stovepipes” and silos of excellence.”
Do Use Metrics and Analysis to:
-- Redefine expectations: Underpromise and overperform.
-- Ensure full transparency and credibility.
-- Show both short-term success and longer-term commitment.
-- Ensure there are credible plans and progress in integrated civil military operations.
-- Show whether Afghan problems with corruption, powerbrokers, and capacity have been contained.
-- Help GIRoA and the ANSF develop its own metrics/narratives and transition to managing the war.
Back Up Slides

Crayola Analysis: “Coloring Within the Lines” Does Not Explain or Win Wars
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color Code</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Development</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Full Authority</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Secure Environment</td>
<td>Population supports Afghan Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Emerging</td>
<td>Dependent Growth</td>
<td>Occasional Threats</td>
<td>Population Sympathizes with Afghan Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal Growth</td>
<td>Frequent Threats</td>
<td>Population Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray</td>
<td>Dysfunctional</td>
<td>Stalled Growth</td>
<td>Dangerous Environment</td>
<td>Population Sympathizes with Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Nonexistent</td>
<td>Population at Risk</td>
<td>Insecure Environment</td>
<td>Population Supports Insurgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

District Assessment Model

Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & Security Forces

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

District Assessment
(Overall assessment based on Governance, Development, Security)

* An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas; or areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.
Defining Key Districts

• Key Terrain:
  – The combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents, to include:
    • Population centers
    • Commerce routes
    • Production areas
    – Border crossing points

• Area of Interest:
  – The 41 Area of Interest Districts represent a second tier of districts representing combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents.
  – Operationally, these are districts where deliberate comprehensive Governance, Development, and Security activities are not planned but where they are occurring or are planned to occur, such as districts which correspond to national and sub-national efforts to develop Government, Development and Security, including Focused District Development (FDD) process, District Delivery, District Support Teams (DSTs), and districts of concern for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These districts are generally adjacent to Key Terrain Districts or have a direct influence on activities in the key terrain.

• White Areas:
  – An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas
  – Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.
Support for Afghan Government

Comparative Security

Overall District Assessments

Population actively supporting Govt and Security Forces
Population sympathizing w/ Govt and Security Forces
Population neutral/on the fence
Population sympathizing with Insurgents
Population actively supporting Insurgency
Not Assessed*
Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat

The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives—a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.