SHAPING AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO IMPLEMENT PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW STRATEGY

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Executive Summary

President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan is critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghani National Security Forces (ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. Creating the necessary Afghan forces, however, poses major challenges that will endure long after 2011. Creating the forces needed to bring security and stability is a far more difficult challenge than many realize, and trying to expand Afghan forces too quickly, and creating forces with inadequate force quality, will lose the war. America’s politicians, policymakers, and military leaders must accept this reality or the mission cannot succeed.

Everyone now involved in developing the ANSF – Afghan, American, and ISAF – must resist the past tendency to claim false progress, exaggerate combat capability, downplay the seriousness of key problems, and rush towards impractical deadlines. It will be far better to under promise and over perform than to repeat the mistakes made during 2002-2008, or in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq. General Petraeus has warned that security force training is similar to “building the world’s largest aircraft while in flight and while being shot at.”i This is a warning that strategic patience is not a luxury, it is the only way to win.

The new US strategy must also build on an awkward legacy of insufficient resources and past failures. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made significant advances during the last few years, but their development had low to moderate priority for nearly half a decade. It was not until 2006-2007 that the ANSF began to have meaningful force goals, and to have adequate ISAF and US aid in developing its “force quantity.” Despite the additional resources that are now being devoted to ANSF development, increasing ANSF size and capabilities will take years even under optimal conditions. Moreover, increases in ANSF numbers will be meaningless without ANSF increasing its quality, and building quality takes time, mentoring, and experience. The statement that “numbers create a quality of their own” is true, but this is scarcely a recipe for success. Counter-insurgency history has shown again and again that low quality large forces are defeated by much smaller high quality forces, and that one of the best ways to lose a counterinsurgency campaign is to alienate the people with corrupt forces and/or forces that cannot protect them. The kind of “quality” that sheer numbers create is proven way of losing wars, with thousands of years of historical examples to warn that such an approach is a recipe for failure.

At the same time, major increases must take place in the ANSF if they are to become able to provide a total mix of ISAF and ANSF large enough to implement a population-oriented strategy, and “shape, clear, hold, build, and transfer.” Forces must become both large enough and capable enough to do the job or the strategy will fail. It is all too clear that the Allied forces in ISAF will not make significant further increases and some will leave in 2011. It is equally clear that any further effort to make major increases in US troops will be politically difficult – if not impossible. Larger and more effective Afghan forces are critical to providing security and stability in a country where civil Afghan capacity will lag behind the military and cannot operate without ANSF protection.

In short, the war will be won or lost by the ability to improve both ANSF quality and quantity. It will be determined by whether the US and its allies will provide the necessary resources and time, and whether progress is assessed with ruthless honestly and without false claims and exaggeration. The present ANSF force goals for 2011 are so high that they may not meet expectations. The heritage of eight years of inadequate resources, massive shortfalls in trainers
and mentors, failing to set the right force development goals, and false progress reports cannot be overcome by 2011. The following key shortcomings still cripple the ANSF, and must now be corrected:

- ISAF efforts that lacked unity of command, and the ability to flexibly apportion both ANSF and ISAF forces across the battle space;
- Failure to make the ANSF a full partner with the ISAF and to lay the ground work for transfer of lead security responsibility;
- Lack of effective coordination among the elements of the ANSF.
- A lack of capability and willingness on the part of the government of Afghanistan to honestly and efficiently develop and deploy the security forces.
- Unwillingness among various elements of ISAF and member countries to directly confront problems with corruption, powerbrokers, criminal elements, and insurgent influence within the Afghan government, and within the leadership of various elements of the ANSF.
- Setting inadequate force goals and force expansion plans that led to lack of sufficient capacity and capability of all types of ANSF, across the theater;
- Lack of clear near-term priorities and timelines for developing the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF required for the current fight extend beyond the ‘near-term’ of 12-24 months;
- Lack of longer term plans to expand and fund/sustain the ANSF for the length of the entire campaign, and help Afghanistan achieve lasting security and stability.
- Sustained mismatch between the force goals that were set and the resources necessary to implement them, including both funding and the provision of adequate trainers, mentors, and partners. Ongoing problems growing out of past failures to set the proper goals for ANSF expansion, provide adequate numbers of mentors and partners, and to fund the level of effort required
- Failure to understand, and properly audit and survey, the motivation of ANSF forces by force element to understand recruiting, performance, motivation, and retention problems; and to properly assess the levels of pay, privileges, leave, medical benefits, death and disability benefits, facilities and equipment. This is necessary to create effective forces on a sustained basis and compete with the Taliban and other insurgents and the pressure from power brokers, narco traffickers, and other sources of corruption.
- A series of major shifts in the training effort for the ANP involving repeated changes of mission and policing concepts coupled to a failure to prepare police for the reality of counterinsurgency and the Taliban threat, and to tie police development to the creation of a practical approach to the rule of law that could provide a functioning mix of formal, informal, and prompt justice.
- A focus on creating large numbers of battalion sized Kandaks in the ANA with emphasis on quantity over quality, and formal training without effective mentoring and partnering of newly created units; failure to understand that newly formed units require extended training at the whole unit level, and that extended mentoring and partnering of deployed units is critical, or formal training fails to achieve its goals.

**Resource Failures Through CY2009**

The US bears a large share of the responsibility for many of these failures. The US took more than half a decade to fund ANSF development seriously and then funded it erratically and failed to provide the proper numbers of trainers, mentors, and partners.

Critics of today’s ANSF should look carefully at the data in Figure One. The US failed to make funding effective Afghan forces a serious goal until FY2007, and much of this took 6-
12 months to have an impact in the field. This meant that such US funding only began to have a full impact in mid to late CY2008. The US then failed to provide the follow-up funding necessary to sustain a major force expansion. According to the Department of Defense, (FY) 2008 funding levels totaled $2.75 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA, $964 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. The total then dropped to $2 billion in FY2009, although the ANA force goal was being raised to 134,000.ii

The US must make massive expenditures it might well have avoided if it had taken ANSF development seriously in the first place. As has been noted by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR),iii

As of December 31, 2009, almost $17.55 billion had been disbursed. Of this amount, more than $11.47 billion (65.4%) was disbursed for the ANA and more than $6.00 billion (34.2%) for the ANP; the remaining $0.07 billion (0.42%) was directed toward other related activities.

. . . most of the funds for the ANA were disbursed for Equipment and Transportation (more than $4.95 billion), followed by Sustainment activities (more than $2.99 billion). Most of the funds for the ANP were disbursed for Sustainment activities (almost $1.68 billion), followed by Infrastructure initiatives (more than $1.59 billion) . . .

The good news is that ANSF funding levels have since risen to levels much more appropriate to the mission. DoD requested a FY2010 supplemental of 2.6 billion and an FY 2011 budget of 11.6 billion.iv The supplemental 2.6 billion brought the FY 2010 total up to 9.2 billion. This high funding level will have a better impact if it is maintained for several years, as opposed to the usual feast-or-famine funding seen in the past.

A comparison of Figure One and Figure Two also shows that the US and its allies failed to set adequate ANSF force goals through early CY2009 – although the following analysis shows that significant improvements took place after early CY2008. Furthermore, Figure Three shows that these mistakes were coupled to similar delays in deploying adequate trainers and mentors through early CY2009. As a Department of Defense report noted at the beginning of 2009:v

As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.

The U.S. is now actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. . . .

It is still unclear, however, that the ANSF will have the trainers and mentors it needs to meet its 2011 force goals—much less the full level of expansion it needs to implement the strategy
Figure One: No Real Funding Until FY2007

Congressional Research Service Estimate of Force Development Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08 Bridge</th>
<th>Cum FY01-FY09</th>
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*Note: Value of (1) equals one billion dollars


DoD FY 2011 Budget request

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<th>Afghan National Security Forces Fund</th>
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<th>FY 2011 Request</th>
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<td>$ in Billions</td>
<td>Enacted</td>
<td>Supp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army (ANA)</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police (ANP)</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
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<td>&lt;0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Afghan National Security Forces</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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</table>

Numbers may not add due to rounding

SIGAR Estimate of Force Development Costs

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, January 2010 p. 46.
Figure Two: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANSF Force Level, Goals, and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008

Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned, January 2007 – November 2008

Afghan National Police Assigned, January 2007 – November 2008
ANSF future growth estimates have been revised upwards since publication of this chart.
Table 4 - ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
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<th>CM1</th>
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<th>CM4</th>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>26</td>
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Table 6 - CM levels for ANP Units, December 2008

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>317</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Figure Three: Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement Through Early 2009:

Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors:

Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:

Leadership and Policy Failures

These failures to properly resource ANSF development, and to provide proper numbers of trainers and mentors for more than half a decade, were compounded by mistakes in shaping Afghan Forces and making them into real partners that also still haunt ANSF force development.

The Uncertain Race to 2011

This mix of past failures does not mean that the Afghans should be excused from taking full responsibility for ANSF development over time. They do mean that the US must now take responsibility for years in which it failed to act as if Afghanistan faced a serious and growing insurgency; and for its past under resourcing of every aspect of the war in ways that allowed the insurgents to take the initiative. The US cannot succeed by ignoring the fact that far too many of the failures in today’s ANSF are the product of a critical half-decade in which the White House, OMB, and OSD cut back on requests from US commanders and ambassadors, and essentially had no meaningful strategy for Afghanistan.

The US needs to work with other ISAF nations to correct these problems and resource shortfalls in the training, mentoring, and partnering effort. At a minimum, the US must be ready to fully support and resource the new plans NTM-A/ CSTC-A have developed to accelerate current ANSF force expansion plans. The combined ISAF and US advisory team that is shaping Afghan force development -- NTM-A and CSTC-A –reported the following key priorities in December 2009, following President Obama’s speech,vi

- Develop and grow leaders for tomorrow,
- Generate professional, competent, capable ANSF,
- Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by October 2010,
- Reform and growth the ANP to 96,800, and continue to 109,000 – pending JCMB approval,
- Partner and grow the ANA Air Corps,
- Develop Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) systems,
- Develop the institutional base (training and education for force generation, and,
- Resource the fielded force.

Force Goals for 2014-2016 and Beyond

At the same time, NTM-A/CSTC-A intended to establish the groundwork for further major expansions of the ANA and ANP by 2014-2016. Lt. Gen. Caldwell provided more details on these expansion plans in January 2010 and announced that the ANA would grow to 171,600 by October 2011, with the police growing to 134,000.\textsuperscript{vii} NTM-A also added that there were tentative plans for the ANA to grow to 240,000 by 2013. It also stated that the ANP was at an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, and there were tentative plans for it to grow to 160,000 by 2013. These plans would raise total ANSF strength from 191,969 in December 2010 to 305,600 by October 2011 and to 400,000 by 2013, although early success in the war could make full implementation of such plans unnecessary.\textsuperscript{viii} These near term force goals are shown in the Figure below.
These are necessary increases and ISAF must do all it can to meet these goals but the US and its allies must take the lead in ensuring that these force expansion efforts do not race beyond either Afghan or ISAF capabilities. Expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable ANSF units in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the ISAF can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and sustainability. Quality will often be more important than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important than generating large initial force strengths.

Reforming ANSF Development

The US and ISAF also cannot afford to ignore the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real world “friction” that affects force development. Slogans and rhetoric about ideological goals, leadership, and morale cannot be allowed to lead the force development effort to ignore Afghan material realities: problems in pay, corruption, problems in promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor medical care, overstretched or over committing force elements, problems in supporting families, vulnerability to insurgent infiltration and threats, and a lack of meaningful compensation for death and disability. These factors have a far greater affect on ANSF development than ideology and nationalism, which ISAF trainers mistakenly tend to focus on.

Focus on Mentoring and Partnering in the Field Rather than Formal Training

Creating effective combat units will pose serious challenges. Improvements in the training base are needed that emphasize training at the Kandak, integrated, and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of the ANSF can be trained and thrust into independent operations without adequate mentors and partners. The key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service.

This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months minimum. More realistic efforts are needed to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers. Such efforts take time and require careful attention to continuity at the embedded training/mentoring effort. Partnering and the creation of effective units in the field is an exercise
in sustained human relationships, and short tours and rapid changes in US and ISAF trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering making the ANSF an effective part of civil-military operations.

Providing Honest Readiness and Effectiveness Ratings

NATO-ISAF trainers and mentors must also be far more honest in their assessments of the ANSF. The present CM definition of “in the lead” is often little more than a joke. This is partially a result of trainers identifying with “their” Afghans and inflating ratings, but it is also the result of spin. There is immense pressure on the training system to perform quickly and capably, and the temptation is strong to inflate ANSF ratings in order to demonstrate progress and to please superiors.

These problems are compounded by rating units far more on the resources they have available, and on the extent to which personnel have gone through formal training, than on the basis of sustained performance in combat or in their actual mission. The ANSF cannot be allowed to repeat the mistakes of Iraq and Vietnam, wherein units with supposedly high effectiveness ratings were sent into combat only to fail.

Dealing with the Fact this is a “Resource to Experiment” and Not a “Troop to Task” Ratio

Other shifts will be needed in the structure of training and partnering of other aspects of ANSF forces as they move into populated areas and take on the full range of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations.

Much of this effort will be experimental, and ISAF and the ANSF will need time to adapt. As of April 2010, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and ISAF can fully define how best to implement clear, hold, and build in tangible ways that execute and manage the tasks involved and utilize valid measures of effectiveness. It is far more likely that as such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, developing the best approach will take until 2014-2015.

Finding the right approach will require integrated civil-military operations. President Obama and his advisors have said that the US is not involved in “nation building” in Afghanistan. This will only be true in the sense that the US has not made a commitment to the impossible goals set in ambitious concepts and plans like the Afghan National compact and Afghan Development Plans. The fact is that any victory in Afghanistan must involve armed nation building and the ANSF must play a critical role in the civil aspects of “hold” and “build” and in providing enduring security and stability once “transfer” takes place. This civil-military aspect of ANSF operations will require enduring US and outside aid that funds most ANSF development and operations as long as a major threat remains, as well as similar US aid in developing Afghan governance and enough economic activity and growth to bring suitable levels of employment and economic security. This is “nation building” and efforts to deny it are exercises in the semantics of obfuscation and dishonesty.

An effective ANSF requires effective Afghan governance. Furthermore, the ANSF cannot function as an effective institution unless there is an effective Afghan government, and the US and its allies help develop the capacity of the Afghan government at the central, provincial,
district and local levels. This is vital during the “hold” and “build” phases of operations, and to allowing the police development effort to support the creation of a functional mix of formal and informal justice systems. At the same time, the pace of ANSF development must be linked to Afghan capacity at the Ministerial level and efforts to reduce corruption. The US must help the Afghan government both develop the necessary capabilities to plan and manage security within the Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministries. It must help the leadership of every element of the ANSF deal with the problems of corruption, powerbrokers, narco traffickers, and Taliban infiltration – as well as with the problems of ethnic and sectarian pressures and tensions, and tribalism. No ANSF effort can succeed that does not address the problem of nation building within the Afghan security structure.

The US and its ISAF allies need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field. ix

The Afghan National Army (ANA)

None of these problems mean that the ANSF development effort cannot succeed. Afghan forces are improving and already play an important role in many operations. The training effort is now far better funded, manned, and structure than it was up to the fall of 2007, and partnering has improved – particularly with the Afghan National Army.

CSTC-A has already begun active efforts to expand ANA forces from an assigned strength of roughly 91,000 to 134,000, and from 117 fielded Kandaks to 179. It is procuring improved equipment and raising the number of Commando Kandaks from 6 to 8. A total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are already capable of leading operations. ISAF and the US have also begun to focus on preparing the ANA to carry out critical counterinsurgency tasks and to hold in threatened population areas. ISAF and the US have also begun to help better prepare ANP and ANCOP forces to provide hold capabilities where there is a less serious threat.

A successful US strategy to win the war in Afghanistan – and to create a true host country partner – does, however, require the full – and ruthlessly self-honest and objective – implementation of several decisions to shape the development of the ANA.

• The first decision is to accelerate training and improvements in partnering and force development to ensure the ANA can actually reach nominal effective strength of 134,000 men in 2010, while creating the base that can make future major expansions in the ANSF by 2011-2014. NTM-A/CSTYC-A has set a tentative goal of 159,000 by July 2011, and 240,000 by 2013. This will mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and in mentors or partner units. Resources to do this well should be identified and committed concurrently. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such an expansion is now needed. If ISAF is more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to be done both at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.

• The second decision is to end the shortfall in NATO and ETT mentors, and resources. There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but there is no doubt about the scale of shortfalls through 2009. CSTC-A reported that the ANA needed minimum of 67 OMLTs plus US trainers in July 2009. However, it had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. American ETTs were also under resourced in the past, though ETTs are being replaced by the “two BCT” concept of providing mentors. The
requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of CY2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25. Expert analysis is needed, but it may take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team (changing the two-BCT approach to a three-BCT one) to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new “enablers” like artillery, engineering, C2, medical services, as well as logistics and sustainability.

- The third decision is to focus on building up the capability of deployed units, rather than over-relying on formal training. Even the best formal training process is only the prelude to shaping the capabilities of new units in the field, testing leaders, providing practical experience, and supporting ANA and key ANP units with experienced cadres of mentors and partner units. Practical training in both operations and unit management and leadership is more critical with newly-formed units than formal training, and critical to limiting corruption and the scale of retention and AWOL problems. Even if the formal training process provided more extensive (or meaningful) training at the full Kandak or other unit level, inexperienced units would still be dependent on the “on the job” mentoring and support they receive in the field. Some experts suggest this can be accomplished by embedding a brigade combat team, brigade, or similar force into each echelon of each ANA Corps (which cover the same areas as the ANP regional commands) to provide the expertise and enablers to carry out joint planning, intelligence, command and control capabilities, fire support, logistic expertise, and other capabilities that the ANA now lacks and can acquire through partnership and joint operations with the US.

- The fourth decision is to create a full operational partnership, focused around the development of the ANA and key elements of the ANP, so that Afghans are a true partner in all NATO/ANSF and US operations and take the lead in joint operations as soon as possible. It is not enough for ISAF units to partner with the ANSF. The ANSF must be made a full partner at the command level as well. Afghans should see Afghans taking the lead in the field as soon as practical, and as playing a critical role in shaping all plans and operations as well as in implementing hold and build. This often cannot be done immediately; it must be done as soon as possible.

At a broader level, the US, ISAF, the Afghan government, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense need to make another critical set of choices. They must define how the Afghan government will use the ANA to work with civilian partners, and put these concepts into practice in the field. It is all very well to use a slogan like “clear, hold, and build.” It is quite another to systematically implement it as part of a population centric strategy. The ANA will also have to be capable of civil-military operations. No matter how much effort is made to improve the integrity, size, and capability of the various elements of the Afghan police, improve Afghan governance, and create an effective structure for prompt justice – there will be 3 to 5 years in which the ANA will have to play a critical role in various clear and hold efforts, and in helping local, aid, and government workers in various build roles.

**The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC)**

The Afghan National Army Air Corps is still in its formative stages, and will take time to form as a fully effective force, although elements of the ANAAC are already contributing to the COIN fight. ANAAC development plans must be tailored to Afghan needs and capabilities. There is a clear case for giving the ANSF at least the currently planned mix of air lift, battlefield, mobility, RW attack, IS&R, medevac, and multi-role capability. This would expand the ANAAC from a total of 36 aircraft and 2,500 airmen today to 139 aircraft by CY 2016.

The mistakes the US and ISAF have made in using airpower over the last eight years have shown, however, that there is a broader role that the ANAAC may be able to perform. It can develop the skills to support NATO in targeting and managing air operations, and take on responsibility for vetting air strikes and air operations. Such a partnership would do much to assure Afghans that Afghan forces were true partners in all air operations and played the proper role in reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Such a “red card” role presents
obvious difficulties, but it will be applied to all ISAF operations, including ground operations, in time. Working to make it effective now as well as a key partner and part Afghan and ISAF strategic communications could have major benefits.

**The Afghan National Police (ANP)**

Much of the Afghan police force still lags far behind the ANA in development. With the exception of the ANCOP part of the forces, it cannot operate effective in the face of serious insurgent threats. Improvements in pay do not solve its problems with power brokers, and corruption. Further, it lacks anything approaching effective civil partners and the other components of an effective prompt justice system and rule of law. Moreover, corruption within the Ministry of the Interior remains a serious problem – compounded by corruption in other elements of the Afghan government at the national, provincial, district, and local levels.

Improving the various elements of the ANP, while less time critical in terms of direct combat operations, will be equally urgent if the ANP is to play a central role in performing the *hold* and *build* functions in population centers, without which COIN will not succeed. Such improvement, however, presents different challenges than improving the ANA. The ANP currently suffers from critical problems in capability, leadership, corruption, supporting governance, and the district and local levels of courts, legal services, and detention facilities necessary to implement prompt justice and a rule of law.

Most of the ANP lack the ability to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. In July 2009, the Afghan Uniformed Police had an authorized strength of 47,000 and 51,000 assigned – although no one had reliable statistics on its actually level of day-to-day strength or levels of attrition. Some experts put the current percentage of ANP who have received no meaningful training as high as 78% of the force. Strength and capability are also only part of the problem. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

This presents serious problems in carrying out ANP operations and in improving its force quality. Yet, NTM-A must act on the reality that such an effort is critical and do its best to train the entire force and accelerate the FDD program. The initial phase of the *hold* function will require a transition to proving regular policing activity and supporting the prompt administration of justice. The ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the *build* phase cannot be properly implemented until the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

This means there are several areas where ISAF and the US need to work with the Afghan government at the central, provincial, and local level to shape the future of the ANP:

- **First**, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, *hold*, and *build*. ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.
The Focused District Development (FDD) program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- **Second, major efforts need to be made to simultaneously increase the size and quality of the ANP.** CSTC-A/ NTM-A reported that the ANP was at an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, and there were tentative plans for it to grow to 96,800 (or 109,000 with JCMB approval) by October 31, 2010, 123,000 by July 2011, and 160,000 by 2013. Current plans call for eliminating the backlog of untrained police (which as mentioned before some experts put as high as 78% of the existing force) within two years. Yet these plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is needed to improve the quality of its leadership and facilities. The ANP’s most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for is adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NTM-A, and not under civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP’s main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in training, mentoring, and partnering than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added PMTs as well. The Current 2 year timeline for training the police force is based upon estimates of police trainer contributions from European nations that may prove overly-optimistic. If European partner nations do not deliver the required numbers of trainers, NTM-A will have to reassess its police training timelines. However, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of the police was raised to 160,000.

- **Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP. These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions.** These could build on ANCOP and police commando cadres. The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the NDS and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.

- **Fourth, as with the ANA, ISAF must focus on building up the capability of deployed units, rather than over-relying on formal training.** Once again, even the best formal training process is only the prelude to shaping the capabilities of new units, testing leaders, providing practical experience, and supporting ANA and key ANP units with experienced cadres of mentors and partner units. Practical training in both operations and unit management and leadership are more critical with newly-formed units than is formal training, and are critical to limiting corruption and the scale of retention and AWOL problems.

- **Fifth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice.** The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice – unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected
unless the criminal justice system is seen as much less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

This latter point is critical. ANSF and ISAF success in the military dimension will have limited impact if the ANP cannot perform a combination of the Afghan formal and informal justice systems and cannot function at the civil level. They are in competition to replace the Taliban which now dominates the prompt justice system at the local level. So far, GIRoA, UNAMA the US and other nations have yet to demonstrate that they have effective plans to combine civil policing with an effective civil justice effort.

Past rules of law programs have often been failures described as successes. They have been programs that lacked the scale and coverage to meet immediate and urgent needs, which focused far too much on formal justice systems that were not in place and could not be put in place for years, and focused on foreign values rather than Afghan values. Like far too many civilian programs in Afghanistan, they did not seek an effective partnership with ISAF military and tie such effort to successfully implementing hold, build, and transfer—and winning the war.

**The Afghan Border Police (ABP)**

The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 authorized and 12,800 assigned. Afghanistan will require a competent and sufficient border police function in the future. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create and make effective under counterinsurgency conditions. Afghanistan’s geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement even more difficult than usual, and ISAF and the ANSF have more urgent priorities.

Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance, reduce corruption, and increase government revenues. These efforts should be complemented by specific technologies, including biometrics and ISR, to the extent feasible.

Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for ISAF action relative to building up the ANA or ANP, or for allocating additional forces, resources and other capabilities. A tightly focused effort may be able to help the Afghan government get more revenues from commercial vehicle traffic across the border than are now being lost through corruption.

There is no prospect, however, that the ABP can seal the borders or do more in the near-term than harass the insurgency while becoming a source of casualties and more corruption. Afghanistan’s borders have never been fully secured, and likely never will be. This is predominantly true as long as elements of the Pakistan government and ISI covertly support key elements of the Taliban. Moreover, it is not apparent just how much additional revenue will be provided, how well it will be collected and allocated, and whether it will make a real difference in reducing GIRoA dependence on outside aid.

**The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)**

Tribal and local security forces can play a useful role under carefully selected conditions. The AP3 is a tribal force designed to provide the equivalent of security guards for district-sized areas. (In Afghanistan, there are 364 districts, excluding major urban areas). This force is still in development, and Afghanistan’s tribal and regional differences mean that it may not work in every area and needs to be carefully tailored to local conditions. While the effort has been
somewhat successful so far, the level of resources put into it may not be sustainable, and the program may not be scalable to much of Afghanistan.

The best approach is to use the AP3 model only where it is clear that local Afghan commanders and officials, and local ISAF commanders, feel this can work. A system of checks and balances will ensure that the expansion of the AP3 is fully coordinated with Afghan provincial and district officials, local ANSF commanders, and ISAF regional and task force commanders to limit loyalty problems and tribal friction.

**Community Defense Initiative**

Like the AP3, the Community Defense Initiative can have benefits but poses significant risks. The use of local militia forces has the potential to help secure areas against Taliban influence. If these militias are self-motivated, and not created by US/Coalition forces, and if they are properly vetted and controlled, than they can help protect Afghan villages and provide key intelligence for ISAF.

However, if the militias involved in CDI are more focused on profiting from ISAF and/or dominating Afghan population for their own ends, and are not properly controlled, this program could backfire badly. While the Awakening movement in Iraq helped turn the tide and secure the country, Afghanistan is a very different country with a much weaker tribal system in many areas, and a much weaker central government. The risk of creating new power bases and even warlords runs high. Official reporting on this program is scarce, and its many potential problems have put its future in doubt.

**Making ISAF A Real Partner**

Every increase in ANSF force quantity and quality must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.

ISAF must also achieve far more unity of effort in treating the ANSF as real partners. It cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under-resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron, and many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

All the elements of ISAF must begin to work together with all of the elements of the ANSF to create equivalent forces that can conduct combined operations together. This will take time, resources, and patience. ISAF regional command Task force commanders must understand, however, that partnering with ANSF forces does not mean simply using them as they are, but making them effective, and treating operations as key real world aspects of training.

**The Need for an Integrated Civil-Military Partnership**

Various elements of the ANSF will have to be involved in forms of armed nation building over a period that may easily last for a decade or more after mid-2011. ISAF and the ANSF will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort.
in the field. It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. A mix of ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, but if this is all that is accomplished they will still lose the war to an opponent that can win a battle of political attrition. ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the hold and build missions. ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait for adequate civilian capacity to be present in the field and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government is still too corrupt and incapable to take these necessary actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, foreign civil aid efforts are far too narrow, far too security conscious and far too oriented towards talk and planning to serve Afghan needs in the field. The ideal is an integrated civil-military effort.

Building the capacity of the civil side of the Afghan government, and reducing corruption and the role of powerbrokers, will take time. If such an effort can be successful, it will probably only begin to have full impact in 2014-2016. In the interim, some combination of ISAF and the ANSF must provide at least enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and takes at least initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. They must also provide sufficient justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

Bypassing or counting Afghan corruption will be a key part of this effort. In many cases, however, this will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows that aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, actually do win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards true “build” phase.

Corrupt and incapable ISAF and US aid organizations and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted. Projects that cannot be scaled up to have a meaningful impact, ephemeral good works, fund raising without accountability or validated requirements, and efforts that support national “branding” rather than meeting Afghan needs, will need to be ended. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will win the people.

The Need for Honesty and Realistic Deadlines

The fact that President Obama has talked about beginning US force reductions in mid-2011, and accelerating transfer of responsibility to the ANSF and Afghan government, cannot be allowed to create a new set of unrealistic goals and timeframes. Nothing about the ANSF development effort to date indicates that it will be ready for large-scale transfer before 2014-2015.

Sacrificing quality for quantity, and rushing the ANSF and GIRoA into transfer before they are ready, cannot win the war – particularly when the civil side of GIRoA is likely to remain so weak and the role of Pakistan is so uncertain. US and other ISAF efforts to develop the ANSF must resist pressure from Washington, other capitals, and NATO headquarters to move more quickly than is practical and prudent. It also requires a command ethic that under promises and over performs, rather than the distorted and dysfunctional command ethic that existed between 2001 and which was pressured into doing just the opposite. It must be clear to all involved in the ANSF development effort that exaggerated progress reports became career killers and not career enhancers.
It will be equally necessary for ISAF, the US, and other allied nations to create the kind of truly integrated civil-military plan needed to implement the rest of President Obama’s new strategy. Stovepipes, turf fights, and internal bickering -- above all by elements within the State Department, -- have crippled the effort necessary to create a plan with the depth, detail, and content needed. The Obama Administration needs to force real unity of effort – not simply talk about a whole of government approach – and do so at every level. At present, the US is scarcely a model for ISAF or its allies. If anything, the NSC and State Department seem to be as weak in these areas -- relative to a rising need -- as they have been in the past.
Cordesman: Afghan Security Forces

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I. Creating the Afghan Forces Needed to Win

Afghan forces are a key to victory in Afghanistan, and there are good reasons why President Obama made the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) one of three critical parts of the new strategy he announced on December 1, 2009:x

... huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.

... as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

... this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America's war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.

The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

...taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over a prolonged amount of time. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going
forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation -- by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand -- America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

...Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And it is quite certain that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I've heard, and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to
generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort -- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who -- in discussing our national security -- said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

**Implementing the President’s Strategy**

Like all of the elements of the President’s strategy, creating an ANSF with the necessary capabilities presents major challenges and risks. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made significant advances during the last few years, but their development had low to moderate priority for nearly half a decade. It was not until 2006-2007 that the ANSF began to have meaningful force goals, and adequate ISAF and US aid in developing both its “force quantity” and its “force quality.”

Lt. General Caldwell, the current NTM-A commander, released the following draft commander’s intent statement in early 2010, envisioning the following end state for the ANSF:

NTM-A/CSTC-A is in support of an ANSF-led, enduring system that generates and sustains army, police, air, medical, and logistics capabilities. Afghan ministries are transparent, enduring, and fully capable of executive functions. NTM-A/CSTC-A has established enduring leader development systems that professionalize the force and promote transparency. NTM-A/CSTC-A has reinforced legitimate institutions and set conditions for the continued development of a professional ANSF. NTM-A/CSTC-A has committed its resources efficiently and responsibly

NTM-A also released the following more detailed draft of its end state force goals for 2011:

- ANSF Growth and Development
- ANP: 134k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
- ANA: 171.6k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
  - ANAAC: 5.7k end strength, operating at CM-2, integrated C2 system, balanced against operational requirements; CM-1 by 2016
- ANSF medical system at CM-3, with growth to CM-1 by 2020
- Systems: Enduring Afghan operated and sustained systems (Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency and other applicable measures)
  - Education & Training at CM-2; Logistics at CM-2; C4I at CM-2; Personnel at CM-2
- Recruiting and Training Commands
  - ANAREC at CM-2
  - ANPREC at CM-2
  - ANATC at CM-2
  - ANPTC at CM-2
- Infrastructure
  - ANA at CM2:
    - 75% in Permanent Facilities
- 25% in Temporary Facilities (for no more than one winter)
  - ANP at CM2:
    - 60% in Permanent Facilities
    - 40% in Temporary Facilities
- GIRoA
  - ONSC coordinating cross-ministerial issues
  - MoD at CM-1
  - MoI at CM-1
- Leader Development
  - Annual attrition goals achieved: ANA 14%, ANP 16%
  - NCO and Officer positions filled to at least 85%
  - Recruiting systems are established to sustain ANSF force levels and enable future growth if required
  - ANA/ANP have achieved 70% approval ratings
- Information Engagement
  - Ministries and ANSF IE at CM-2
  - Ministries and ANSF IE plan present and effective with objectives met

If the US, ISAF, and the Afghan government behave as they have in the past, the ANSF may not be able to achieve even its current force goals with the required quality by October 2010, let alone the more ambitious 2011 goals. Critical problems still exist in “force quality” because of a long-standing lack of mentors and partners, equipment, and a lack of the financial support the ANSF needs to grow and become effective. At the same time, Afghan forces need to be doubled to implement the new strategy ISAF adopted as a result of the President’s speech, and largely replace US and ISAF forces by 2014-2016.

Far more thought also needs to be given to the civil-military role of the ANSF. As of April 2010, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a “population-centric” strategy within the US military and ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved. Such efforts are already beginning to become operational on a large-scale basis, however, ANSF forces must be ready to support such efforts.

**Yes, It Is Armed Nation Building**

President Obama and his advisors said that the US will be not involved in “nation building” in Afghanistan. This is true only in the sense that the US has not made a commitment to the impossible goals set in ambitious concepts and plans like the Afghan National compact and Afghan Development Plans. The fact is that counterinsurgency must involve armed nation building and the ANSF must play a critical role in the civil and rule of law aspects of “hold” and “build” and in providing enduring security and stability once “transfer” takes place. This will require enduring US and outside aid that funds most ANSF development and operations as long as a major threat remains, as well as similar US aid in developing Afghan governance and enough economic activity and growth to bring suitable levels of employment and economic security. This is “nation building,” and “armed nation building” at that.

Furthermore, efforts to develop the ANSF must recognize that the Afghan forces cannot function as an effective institution unless the US and its allies help develop the capacity of the Afghan government at the central, provincial, district and local levels to use the ANSF effectively. Additionally, the US must tie the police development effort to the creation of a functioning mix of formal and informal justice systems. ISAF and the US must help the Afghan government develop the necessary capabilities to plan and manage security within the Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministries. They must assist the leadership of the ANSF deal with problems of corruption, powerbrokers, narco-traffickers, and Taliban infiltration – as well as with the
problems of ethnic and sectarian pressures and tensions, and tribalism. No ANSF development effort can succeed that does not address the problem of nation building as a critical part of the Afghan security structure.

The US and ISAF need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt such efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field.xii

No Chance of a Second Try: Key Short Comings That Must Be Overcome

Getting it right is particularly important because there is no time to waste and there will be no political support for a second try. Assessments by ISAF intelligence show that the insurgency has steadily gained ground for the last half decade, and the war has reached the point of crisis. The Afghan government, ISAF, and the US cannot win – even in the limited sense of giving Afghanistan reasonable stability and security and ensuring it is not a haven for international terrorist movements -- unless this situation changes radically and immediately. An effective ANSF may only be one of the elements of victory. Placing ANSF development on the right track requires immediate decisions and resources, and the following shortcomings must now be corrected:

- Failing to give ISAF efforts unity of command, and lack of ability to flexibly apportion both ANSF and ISAF forces across the battle space;
- Failure to make the ANSF a full partner with the ISAF and to lay the ground work for transfer of lead security responsibility; and
- Lack of effective coordination among the elements of the ANSF.
- Unwillingness among various elements of ISAF and member countries to directly confront problems with corruption, powerbrokers, criminal elements, and insurgent influence within the Afghan government, and within the leadership of various elements of the ANSF.
- Setting inadequate force goals and force expansion plans that led to lack of sufficient capacity and capability of all types of ANSF, across the theater;
- Lack of clear near-term priorities and timelines for developing the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF required for the current fight extend beyond the ‘near-term’ of 12-24 months;
- Lack of longer term plans to expand and fund/sustain the ANSF for the length of the entire campaign, and help Afghanistan achieve lasting security and stability.
- Sustained mismatch between the force goals that were set and the resources necessary to implement the, including both funding and the provision of adequate trainers, mentors, and partners. Ongoing problems growing out of past failures to set the proper goals for ANSF expansion provide adequate numbers of mentors and partners, and to fund the level of effort required
- Failure to understand, and properly audit and survey, the motivation of ANSF forces by force element to understand recruiting, performance, motivation, and retention problems; and to properly assess the levels of pay, privileges, leave, medical benefits, death and disability benefits, facilities and equipment necessary to
create effective forces on a sustained basis and compete with the Taliban and other insurgents and the pressure from power brokers, narco-traffickers, and other sources of corruption.

- Series of major shifts in the training effort for the ANP involving repeated changes of mission and policing concepts coupled to a failure to prepare police for the reality of counterinsurgency and the Taliban threat, and to tie police development to the creation of a practical approach to the rule of law that could provide a functioning mix of formal, informal, and prompt justice.

- A focus on creating large numbers of battalion sized Kandaks in the ANA with emphasis on quantity over quality, and formal training without effective mentoring and partnering of newly created units; failure to understand that newly formed units require extended training at the whole unit level, and that extended mentoring and partnering of deployed units is critical, or formal training fails to achieve its goals.

The Dangers of Past Failures to Properly Resource the Force Development Effort

The US bears a large share of the responsibility for many of the past failures in ANSF development. The US took more than half a decade to fund ANSF development seriously, then funded it erratically, and also failed to provide the proper numbers of trainers, mentors, and partners. US critics of today’s ANSF should look carefully at the data in Figure I.1. The US failed to make creating effective Afghan forces a serious goal until FY2007, and the lead times in using this funding meant it only began to have a full impact in mid to late CY2008.

As Figure I.1 shows, the US then failed to fund the level of post-2007 effort necessary to sustain a major force expansion. According to the Department of Defense, (FY) 2008 funding levels totaled $2.75 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA, $964 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. It The total dropped to $2 billion in FY2009, although the ANA force goal was being raised to 134,000.xiii

The results have been costly in dollars and in blood. The US has found itself making massive expenditures it might well have avoided if it had taken ANSF development seriously in the first place. As has been noted by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,xiv

The FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act—signed by the U.S. President on December 19, 2009—provides more than $6.56 billion for ASFF. This brings the cumulative total funding for ASFF to $25.23 billion—approximately 49.5% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. As of December 31, 2009, DoD reported that $18.67 billion has been made available, of which more than $17.76 billion had been obligated, and almost $17.55 billion disbursed . . .

From September 30 to December 31, 2009, DoD obligated approximately $460.06 million and disbursed almost $970.49 million to support ANSF initiatives.

. . . As of December 31, 2009, almost $17.55 billion had been disbursed. Of this amount, more than $11.47 billion (65.4%) was disbursed for the ANA and more than $6.00 billion (34.2%) for the ANP; the remaining $0.07 billion (0.42%) was directed toward other related activities.

. . . most of the funds for the ANA were disbursed for Equipment and Transportation (more than $4.95 billion), followed by Sustainment activities (more than $2.99 billion). Most of the funds for the ANP were disbursed for Sustainment activities (almost $1.68 billion), followed by Infrastructure initiatives (more than $1.59 billion) . . .

A comparison of Figure I.1 and Figure I.2 also shows that the US and its allies failed to set adequate force goals for the ANSF through early CY2009 – although significant improvements began to take place after early CY2008. Furthermore, Figure I.3 shows that these mistakes were
coupled to similar delays in deploying adequate trainers and mentors through early CY2009. As a Department of Defense report noted at the beginning of 2009:\(^v\)

As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP through Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.

The U.S. is actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. For example, Illinois Army National Guardsmen support a Polish battle group, a Latvian OMLT will deploy with 11 members from the Michigan Army National Guard, and Ohio Army National Guardsmen are deploying with a Hungarian OMLT.

... The eventual ANP training and mentoring objective is to send a PMT to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. Currently, the broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to meet this objective. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, 5 regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned (37 percent fill). The shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring.

Funding has improved sharply during the course of 2009-2010, but the legacy of past underfunding is still a problem that needs to be corrected more than eight years after the beginning of the conflict.

It is also important to understand the human cost of these developments, and how the lack of adequate pay and privileges, medical and disability benefits, death benefits, facilities and equipment, has impacted on Afghan forces. There are no public data on surveys of the attitudes of given elements of the ANSF, the impact of pay problems that left them less well-paid than the Taliban and were only recognized in later 2009, or the scale of retention problems that have crippled much of the force development and made some NASTO/ISAF readiness ratings little more than statistical nonsense.

These issues emerge all too clearly in media reporting, and in e-mails and other communications from forces serving in the field. They also are all too clear when one examines the patterns in casualties over time. Figure 1.4 shows the rise in attacks on the ANSF during 2007-2009. Figure 1.5 shows the patterns in casualties that resulted in part from the under resourcing, under training, under equipping and under partnering of Afghan forces. It is no coincidence that casualties were highest in the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the force that had the least resources and where the following chapters show the US and ISAF made critical mistakes in virtually every aspect of ANP force development.

In fairness, no one attempt to create an ANSF would be so vulnerable. Nevertheless, that was the end result. As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said in an interview of December 8, 2009, “Attrition is higher in the areas where combat is heavier. The reason is that there aren’t enough of them. And they essentially fight until they die, or go AWOL.” When he was asked if it wasn’t late in the game to learn these facts about the ANSF, Gates replied that, “There’s a lot of this that is late in the game, frankly.”\(^{xxi}\)
Figure I.1: No Real Funding Until FY2007 – Part One

Congressional Research Service Estimate of Force Development Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09 Bridge</th>
<th>Cum FY01-FY09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
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<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>12.95</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Value of (1) equals one billion dollars

Figure I.1: No Real Funding Until FY2007 – Part Two

SIGAR Estimates

Figure I.2 – Part One: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANA Force Level, Goals, and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008

Table 4 - ANA Unit CM levels, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure I.2 – Part Two: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANP Force Level, Goals, and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008

Figure I.3: Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement Through Early 2009:

Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors:

Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:

Figure 1.4: The Rise in Attacks on the ANSF Sharply Outpaced Force Development Effort

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the US Congress*, June 2009 pp. 55,
Figure I.5: Killing the Under Resourced and Underprepared: Comparative Patterns in ISAF and Afghan Casualties

Casualty Patterns 2007-2009:

Coalition, ANP, and ANA Killed in Action: October 2008-May 2009
Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2010, p. 64, 69
**Leadership and Policy Failures**

These failures to resource ANSF development, and provide the proper numbers of trainers and mentors, were compounded mistakes that still haunt ANSF force development, and for which the US must bear primary responsibility largely at the senior policy levels in Washington. Trainers, mentors, and partners were confronted with years of inadequate resources, constant changes in goals, pressures to rush out forces before they were fully ready, and political pressure to report levels of success that were not realistic:

- **Failure to try to seriously create Afghan forces that could be real partners to the US and ISAF, and eventually replace the US and ISAF in an extended insurgency that would require strong national security forces for a decade or more.** The US waited some six years to take the force development effort seriously, and then focused on rushing newly created small combat units – Kandaks of battalion size – into the field. It was not until the summer of 2009 that the US seriously addressed what partnering really meant, began to set goals for creating the kind of higher level joint headquarters and operations that could truly make Afghan military and police forces real partners, and lay the ground work for the eventual transfer of most military and paramilitary functions to Afghan forces.

- **False training standards:** Afghan and contractor rated training often granted virtually all those in training a passing grade regardless of actual competence and performance. “Quite literally, if you show up to most classes, and are there for the graduation ceremony, you pass.”

- **Promotion and positions were often sold, the result of political influence, or the result of sect and ethnic group without active and systematic resistance by the US and ISAF officers.** These problems were compounded by a failure to systematically resist corruption, the influence of power brokers, ties to narco-traffickers and criminals, and links to insurgents at political and higher command levels; and by an inadequate effort to improve the capacity and integrity of key Ministries like the Ministry of Interior, and Afghan officials at the provincial, district, and urban levels.

- **Lack of meaningful training for entire units:** These problems have been compounded by a failure to provide adequate training for the entire newly formed Kandak or unit. The trained parts are assembled without adequate training of the entire force element – a direct contrast to the key lessons of the importance of full unit training – even for mature forces – in places like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin.

- **Failure to see that mentoring and partnering of units, once they deployed, was the critical phase of force development.** It has only been in the course of 2009 that the US has focused on the fact that newly created, entire units, get their primary training and combat capability after they leave the formal training center and go into the field. The tacit assumption – or at least de facto experience – has been that the Afghans are already “fighters” and that newly formed units can be treated as something close to mature, functioning units, rather than units that require at least a year of embedded mentoring and close partnering to develop the proven leadership and core competence needed. This approach often proved to under resource mentoring and partnering, create major problems for new units, and encourage serious and rapid attrition.

- **Lack of honest readiness and combat capability assessments in the field – and of the impact of over deployment, erratic leave policies, and inadequate pay and support – on real world readiness.** Key problems developed in leadership, motivation, and retention that were understated or ignored through late 2009. It was only in the summer of 2009 that a systematic effort began to look beyond vague concepts like motivation and morale to examine Afghan perceptions of the problems shaping Afghan force readiness and critical retention problems. It took years to raise ANP salaries to levels that could make anything approaching an honesty police force possible, and more than half a decade to introduce pay systems that help ensure that those serving were actually paid and that reduced abuses like “ghost” soldiers that were not actually present. It was only in December 2009 that the US announced that it had found that the ANSF was sharply underpaid relative to the Taliban and other insurgents. An effort under Lt. General William B. Caldwell found that ANP soldiers were then being paid $180 per month versus $250-$300 a month.

- **Failure to understand the linkage between police development and the combined needs of a society dependent on an informal justice system capable of promptly resolving civil disputes and preventing local and tribal violence, and the need for police forces that had sufficient paramilitary capability to survive in an insurgency.** The police and rule of law efforts remained largely decoupled through early CY2009. While the consolidation of training under NTM-A in late 2009 has led to improvements in some areas, no clear plan to develop and reform the justice sector was in evidence as of early 2010.
• Failure to take the police training effort seriously for at least five critical years during the rise of the insurgency. It attempted to export responsibility. The training effort was turned over to an under resourced and terribly managed German effort that focused on training European-style police officers for a country that that had very different needs and resources. When the US finally did react, the program was effectively transferred to an under resourced, US-run, State Department system that was over-dependent on contract support and also sought to create conventional police that could not survive in the emerging insurgency. It was not until 2007 that that police began to get effective paramilitary training from the US military, and the training effort remained under resourced and secondary to the Afghan Army effort through early 2009.

• US continued to treat ANSF development as if the key goal was the tactical defeat of the insurgency rather than securing population centers, and denying the enemy control and influence over the Afghan population. Even today, American commanders and strategists talk about “clear, hold, build, and transfer” without a real definition of what this means, much less any public and credible plan for shaping ANSF development to perform the necessary civil-military functions in the “hold” and “build” phases.

• Unrealistic emphasis on border security efforts. As was the case in Iraq, far too much emphasis was placed on trying to create border and port of entry forces that could not credibly cover the areas required, did not have the firepower and mobility required, and were subject to constant Taliban and hostile threats and pressure, and vulnerable to bribes and corruption. These problems were further compounded by the fact that Pakistan was often treated as if it would be a reliable partner in such efforts when US experts clearly knew this was not, and would not, be the case.

• Failure to effectively exercise its de facto leadership role in the alliance to develop a coordinated ISAF/PRT effort. In practice, much of the ANSF development and deployment effort has put Afghan military and police forces in the field under conditions where each leading country uses Afghan forces somewhat differently, and where the lack of any standard for the operation of national ISAF forces – coupled to a lack of any standard for coordination of such forces with related PRTs – has left deployed ANSF forces without an effective ISAF partner.

• Failure to ensure proper continuity and management of the partnering effort. These problems were compounded in the field at every level by the rapid rotation of US and ISAF forces and aid workers, a lack of continuity of effort, a failure to prepare and rate commanders properly on partnering, and erratic handoff or transfer of this function during the rotation of field commanders and combat units.

• Having trainers rate their own success, and inadequate and inaccurate rating systems. The US should have learned from the battle of Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith, that trainers should not be allowed to rate those they train without independent verification. Unit readiness and performance need to be independently validated. More broadly, however, the US has developed a statistically-based rating system in both Iraq and Afghanistan that is useful in providing some key indicators, but not in measuring actual levels of combat performance, loyalty, quality of leadership, and the impact of key problems like attrition. This had led to the sharp over rating of army units as being truly “in the lead.”

• Unwillingness to deal with the reality of corruption and power brokering: The US was extremely slow to make serious efforts to deal with the complex impact of corruption and power brokering that affects ANSF development, operations, and force allocation at many levels – particularly the police. It often complained, but rarely acted decisively. It did not set a clear and predictable set of ground rules and behavior as to outing the incompetent and corrupt, dealing with powerbroker interference, and making anti-corruption efforts effective. It was only in the summer of 2009 that the US really began to address these issues, and how to allocate resources in ways that reward honest and effective performance and deny aid, contracts, and US support to the ineffective and corrupt. It is still unclear this will lead to effective and sustained US action that will support ANSF development.

• Delays in realistic assessment of manning, quality of facilities, adequacy of pay and privileges, and other key factors affecting attrition and combat performance. The US has been remarkably slow to act on past lessons and constantly evaluate the reasons for attrition, actual levels of Afghan morale and motivation, and the real world adequacy of key factors like pay, privileges, facilities, medical care, leave, retirement, and death and disability benefits. Efforts to establish effective systems are still a work in progress.

• Uncertain selection and career paths for US trainers and mentors: The US was slow to properly train the trainers, mentors, and partners; and it is still not clear whether playing this role will put the US officers involved on the kind of competitive career track they deserve.
**Facing the Impact of the “US Threat” to the ANSF**

These US mistakes do not mean that the Afghan’s did not have responsibility for many of their problems, or that Afghan leaders and commanders can be excused from taking full responsibility for ANSF development over time. They do mean that future US efforts must take responsibility for years in which the US failed to act as if Afghanistan faces a serious and growing insurgency; under-resourcing every aspect of the war in ways that allowed the insurgents to take the initiative. In the case of the US, many of the failures in today’s ANSF are the product of a critical half-decade in which the White House, OMB, and OSD cut back on requests from US commanders and ambassadors, and essentially had no meaningful strategy for Afghanistan.
II. Current ANSF Force Goals: Improving Both Quality and Quantity

ISAF, the US, and the Afghan government are still deciding on the shape of future Afghan forces, and it seems likely that it will be at least several years before the success of the new strategy is clear enough to set stable force goals. Even the best plans must be altered to reflect the realities in the field, and these are far from clear.

There have, however, already been major increases in the size and pace of plans for ANSF force development – increases that raise serious questions about whether it is possible to meet such goals with the required levels of force quality. Figure II.1 shows the size and structure of Afghan forces as of June 2009. Plans now exist to expand the authorized strength.

The ANA will reach its objective of 134,000 personnel by the end of 2011 if required resources are provided. The 134,000-man force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as a commensurate increase in institutional support. xviii

The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of at least 86,800 personnel. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. Development of existing ANP forces continues at a slow pace because of the shortage of Police Mentor Teams. xix

The MoI is instituting the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) as a pilot initiative in Wardak province. As of March 2009, the AP3 comprises 243 candidates and empowers and encourages local community leaders and communities to take responsibility for their own security. xx

The estimates in these goals are summarized in Figure II.2 NTM-A/CSTC-A anticipates groundwork for further major expansion of the ANA and ANP by 2014-2016. Lt. Gen. Caldwell added further detail to these expansion plans in January 2010. He announced that the ANA would grow to 171,600 by October 2011, with the police growing to 134,000. xxi NTM-A has since announced tentative plans for it to grow the ANA to 240,000 by 2013. It has also stated that the ANP was at an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, and there were tentative plans for it to grow to 160,000 by 2013. These plans would raise total ANSF strength from 191,969 in December 2010 to 305,600 by October 2011 and to 400,000 by 2013, although early success in the war could make full implementation of such plans unnecessary. xxi

Figure II.2. Shows a slightly different Department of Defense estimate issued in January 2010. While the end goal may keep changing for at least several years, it is virtually certain that Afghan force strength deployments will steadily increase to put more Afghan forces into the areas where they will face serious threats and fighting. This means resources need to be committed quickly both to solve key problems in quality and to lay the groundwork for a larger expansion of the ANSF after 2010 without sacrificing quality for quantity. If the US and other ISAF forces are to make even token withdrawals beginning in mid 2011, time is critical in making the ANSF ready for large-scale transfers of responsibility.
Figure II.1: Size and Current Force Goals for the ANSF

Force Levels and Goals in June 2009 (DoD)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Component</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Defense Forces</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD/GS</td>
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<td>Sep 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustaining Institutions</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>15,484</td>
<td>15,048</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
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<td>Detainee Operations</td>
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<td>520</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Infantry Kandak</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA Combat Forces</td>
<td>66,406</td>
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<td>ANA Air Corp</td>
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<td><strong>Total MoD</strong></td>
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<td>41,061</td>
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<td><strong>Ministry of Interior Forces</strong></td>
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<td>Mol Headquarters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Crime</td>
<td>5,103</td>
<td>4,013</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Order Police</td>
<td>5,365</td>
<td>2,462</td>
<td>Mar 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire/Medical/Training</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Mol</strong></td>
<td>81,956</td>
<td>81,020</td>
<td>Dec 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force Goals in September 2009 (SIGIR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Priorities for Security</th>
<th>ANSF Security Pillar</th>
<th>ANSF Target</th>
<th>Current Target</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>ANSF Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSF National Army</td>
<td>80,000 troops (plus 6,600 in training)</td>
<td>134,000 troops (by September 2010)</td>
<td>100,111 troops</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF National Police</td>
<td>82,180 professional policemen</td>
<td>109,000 professional policemen (by September 2010)</td>
<td>94,958 professional policemen</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
<td>All illegal armed groups disarmed in all provinces</td>
<td>88% of 132 DAW targeted districts declared compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>March 20, 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing Unexploded Ordinance</td>
<td>Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 70%</td>
<td>90% of all known mine- or explosive remnants of war (ERW)-contaminated areas cleared</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Narcotics</td>
<td>Areas under poppy cultivation reduced by half compared with 2007 levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding, n. For more data on the counter narcotics metric, see the "Counter Narcotics" section.

Figure II.2 Force Goals in January 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>93,809</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>97,011</td>
<td>*134,000</td>
<td>*171,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ANSF</td>
<td>190,820</td>
<td>243,000</td>
<td>305,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes about 15,000 Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS)


Figure II.3: Afghan Force Assessment
Building the Entire Force: Quality Must Match Quantity

There is no time to wait to shape an ideal force development effort. Given the lead times involved, the effort to double the ANSF must begin now -- even if much of 2010 must be spent on solving the problems in meeting existing force goals. This means the growth of key elements of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) must be accelerated and better resourced as soon as possible. It also means making new efforts to improve recruiting and retention. If attrition rates among ANA and ANP remain high, rapid force expansion will be extremely difficult, and will require huge numbers of recruits. Moreover, the total force authorized numbers for the ANSF disguise the fact that many of them are non-combat personnel, and among combat personnel attrition rates are so high that the number of combat forces actually in the field is surprisingly low.

No one can visit Afghanistan without learning that ISAF commanders at every level expressly agree on the need for such actions: there are too few ANSF forces in their areas to accomplish the mission; and they feel the proposed timelines for fielding additional ANSF to their areas are too slow. At the same time, there is equal agreement that both larger and higher quality Afghan forces will be needed if any “population-centric” strategy is to work – particularly if ISAF and US allied forces are to decline after mid-2011. As ISAF and ANSF forces clear key population centers, Afghan forces must assume the task of keeping these centers cleared (hold) and to performing the mix of COIN and regular policing activity necessary for hold and build. It is the ANSF, working with local Afghan officials, which will ultimately give the critical hold and build phases of ISAF strategy effectiveness and win popular support.

Quality needs to be improved from the top down – not just at the level of units in the field. The Ministries of Defense and Ministries of Interior are not yet able to manage the level of force development required. There are critical leadership and attrition problems. The capabilities of current ANSF forces, specifically the ANP and ABP, are inadequate. And, some of the ANSF, predominantly the ANP and ABP, are riddled with corruption which leads to popular alienation as well as ineffectiveness.

These needs are reflected in the broader range of goals that NTM-A and CSTC-A set for developing Afghan forces in December 2009, xxiii

- Develop and grow leaders for tomorrow,
- Generate professional, competent, capable ANSF,
- Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by October 2010,
- Reform and growth the ANP to 96,800, and continue to 109,000 – pending JCMB approval,
- Partner and grow the ANA Air Corps,
- Develop Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) systems,
- Develop the institutional base (training and education for force generation, and,
- Resource the fielded force.

“Zero-Basing” ANSF Funding Profiles

None of this can happen without massive US and allied funding to both create the larger ANSF forces, and then to sustain them as long as Afghanistan must fight a major insurgency. There is no near to mid-term prospect that Afghanistan can either create or support the ANSF it needs to
deal with the insurgent threat, and any effort to do so would cripple the expansion of government services and efforts to make the present economy function.

Some of the required resources have already been made available. As Chapter I has shown, the ANSF force development effort is already receiving better funding, although the force development’s budgeting and accounting capabilities remain understaffed and somewhat uncertain. Recent disbursement patterns have made significant improvements, as seen in Figure II.5. The ANSF received some $5.6 billion in FY2009 and will receive $9.4 billion in FY2010 (the FY 2010 figure includes a 2.6 billion supplemental that is not included in figure II.4). xxiv ANSF funding for FY2011 appears to be a generous 11.6 billion. xxv

While the short term funding environment seems adequate, DoD reporting in its June 2009 report Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan indicates that the long-term ANSF funding situation is not apparent, xxvi

CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The fiscal Year (FY) 2009 ASFF request for the existing force totaled $5.6 billion, including $4.0 billion for the ANA, $1.5 billion for the ANP, and $68.0 million for related activities including the training and operations of Detainee Operations and COIN activities. FY 2009 Bridge Funding was received in the sum of $2.0 billion, including $1.2 billion for the ANA, $842.0 million for the ANP and $4.0 million for the Related Activities. An additional $3.6 billion has been requested in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriation. ANSF development efforts are conditions-based; therefore it is not possible to provide a reliable estimate of a long-term ANSF budget.

Until the beginning of 2009, the NATO ANA Trust Fund was used only for ANSF development costs, which included fielding, equipping, and shipping of donated equipment. In March 2009 NATO approved the expansion of the ANA trust fund to cover ANA sustainment costs to allow non-NATO countries to contribute. The expectation is that the expansion of the trust fund will encourage increased international contributions for ANSF sustainment; however, as of April 2009, contributions have been limited.

…The ANA will reach its current objective of 134,000 forces by December 2011. The United States will take the lead in supporting the expansion by providing funds for the initial training and equipping of new ANA units. CSTC-A has requested $589 million in supplemental funds in order to build the first eight kandaks of the new force structure in FY 2009. Because of the limited amount of equipment immediately available for accelerated fielding, these kandaks will initially receive only 40 percent of the standard infantry kandak transport capabilities. The new kandaks will be used to provide security along the Ring Road. The long-term final end-strength for the ANA is conditions-based and may increase in the future.

**No Current Estimate of Force Quantity, Its Costs, or the Cost of Fixing Force Quality**

There is little public reporting or the future force goals for the ANSF that addresses the cost of giving them the right size and quality. Senior officials have said that these goals, and the exact costs of the changes necessary to implement the strategy the President announced on December 2nd, are still being examined. They have also said that the goals for each element of the ANSF are now to be regularly re-examined and adjusted on the basis of progress over time.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen did, follow up the President’s address with the following comments in an interview on December 2, 2009, xxvii

So we train the Afghan security forces to take the lead and take responsibility for their own security and achieving a stable country. That’s not going to happen overnight. We know that, and, it isn’t going to happen instantly all across the country. That’s the main focus. We move from a lead to a, if you will, side-by-side. And then, they will take the lead tactically, and then we go into an over watch kind of situation, not unlike we are in Iraq right now. And then we are able to have those combat forces depart.
...we had focus on developing Afghan forces for some time. But not unlike the combat forces, it just had not been resourced. These resources that effort...So we had a few months ago, the first full brigade -- the fourth and the 82nd -- gone into exclusively conduct training missions. We’ve got another brigade in this 30,000 that is focused exclusively on that. So we recognize we have to accelerate it. This is a high risk part of the strategy, we know that...And it’s a much higher risk with the police, as it was in Iraq, than it is with the army

...One of the questions I got today on the Hill is, ‘How do you know this is going to work? What lessons have we learned?’ ...we need good leaders in the Afghan security forces. That it really doesn’t turn until we have leadership at the non-commissioned officer level in the police as well as the army. And, that we need leaders at the mid-grade and senior officer level. That’s probably the long pole in the tent. They got to be equipped.

The armies -- they are good fighters. They want to get this right. The challenge -- probably the greatest challenge -- we have is in the police and in the corruption that has existed there. Now we’ve got a minister – a government and a minister very dedicated to rooting out this corruption. We also know that this is going to take some time.

...In addition, General McChrystal will focus on raising up...security in local villages. Now, there’s a very delicate balance here, because we’re not to go back to the warlord years. But that’s a very – historically that’s a very strong part of Afghan security...

“Guestimates” Do Show a Continuing Need for Major Outside Aid

The ANSF effort will depend on major outside aid for as long as serious fighting continues and two things are clear: first, the cost will not be cheap. Second, the appropriation of future funds, and actual disbursements, cannot be allowed to lag behind the demands imposed by a steadily intensifying conflict. If doubling the force does become an objective, this mean massive increases in cost, although the size of these increases will depend heavily on the exact rate of force expansion, standards for force quality, and a host of other factors that will be shaped by how successful the ANSF development effort proves to be in the future, as well as by the need to begin transferring more responsibility to the ANSF beginning in July 2011.

As a guesstimate, the range could be an increase from the present $5.6 billion to some $9 billion to $13 billion a year. But it is only a very rough guesstimate. Moreover it was only in December 2009 – after President Obama’s speech -- that a serious discussion of the issue even began. This is in line with the FY2011 ANSF funding ANSF at this level. President Karzai warned on December 8, 2009 that Afghanistan would not be able to pay for its own security until at least 2024 in a joint press conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Karzai noted that, “Afghanistan is looking forward to taking on our own responsibilities in terms of paying for its forces with its own resources, but...For another 15 to 20 years, Afghanistan will not be able to sustain a force of that nature and capability with its own resources.”

Secretary Gates responded to these comments by stating that the US had a tentative goal to increase the Afghan army to 134,000 soldiers at the end of 2010, with an ultimate size of 240,000, and that, “there is realism on our part that it will be some time” (before Afghan security forces can stand on their own.) He also described the development and resourcing of the ANSF in an interview. He stated that the US now was planning ANSF development on a step-by-step basis and had no clear way to predict is size or future cost.
army. One of the problems that we've had and that they've had is that, particularly those that are sent in to areas where there's a lot of combat, there aren't enough of them to rotate. And so they basically are sent there to fight until they either desert or are killed or wounded.

LAUER: But is that 400,000 number realistic? Can you accomplish that in two years?

GATES: Well, I think what the president has said—you know, maybe that's an aspirational goal, but what we need are annual goals. So the goal for the army is to go from about 96,000 right now to 134,000 at the end of 2010. So let's get to 134,000 instead of looking immediately to the 240,000 ultimate size of the army or that people have talked about and General McChrystal has talked about. Let's talk about getting to 134,000 first.

... In terms of lighting a fire under the Afghan government to get on with recruiting the size forces they need and getting them trained and getting them into the field, I don't know a better way to do that than what we have. By the same token, in terms of an assertion, of providing confidence of our commitment, I think that the conditions-based way of approaching the drawdown’s after July 2011 is also exactly the right way.

Lt. General David Petraeus provided a rough estimate of $10 billion a year or more for Afghan force development in testimony the next day to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and said that it would be years before the ANSF “can handle the bulk of the security tasks and allow the bulk of our troopers to redeploy,” and that they would, “require substantial international funding for years to come in a host of different areas, not the least of which is their security forces.”

What is clear is that the Afghan government has no near to mid-term capability to pay the costs of the ANSF it needs, that from the outside, they will need to be sustained for some five to ten years, and allied contributions will be limited at best. According to President Karzai, the Afghan government will not be capable of paying for its Army or Police force until 2024. As a result, the US will probably have to pay some $5 billion to $10 billion of the costs for the ANSF as long as there is a serious insurgent threat.

**Fixing AWOL and Retention Rates After Eight Years of Neglect**

The ANSF development effort must also put an end to persistently high attrition rates. The ANA lose 25% of their force annually according to the DoD, although independent experts believe this number may be much higher. Even so, the ANA fare better in comparison with the ANP. The ANA faces high drop-out rates during training, although reliable numbers are not available.

**Attrition Within the ANP**

The ANP lose 20% annually, although again this may be an underestimate. The heavily-used elite ANCOP force has lost as much as 75% of its force annually. A startling 67% of ANP recruits have also left before completing training or shortly thereafter. If these rates are not brought down, over the next two years the ANSF will need to recruit over 313,858 new troops in order to expand to and maintain a force of 300,000, as seen in Figure II.4.

Several factors have contributed to the systemic attrition problem within the ANP. They include the high casualties, high operational tempo, and damage caused when units are not properly trained from inception and mentored once in the field. Since his arrival in November, Lt Gen Caldwell has addressed the lack of collaboration and coordination within the ANP training program. As of March 2010, more standards and policies had been
implemented such as mandatory literacy training and mandatory formal basic training. Yet, the rapid pace of expansion and operations may still take their toll. Transforming the culture of corrupt and poor perceptions of the ANP will take time and steps taken by Lt Gen Caldwell have only begun to turn the tide.

**The Impact of Higher Pay**

Higher pay has already provided new incentive for both ANA and ANP. In late 2009, an enhancement and increase into the payment system provided an immediate impact to recruiting for the ANA. The overall ANA pay was increased $45 which brought the monthly total to $165. Additionally, an incentive program was introduced in which soldiers serving in hostile areas will receive a monthly hazardous duty allowance. The amount will vary depending on the threat. Soldiers in Helmand and Kandahar (high risk) will receive $75 per month versus that of soldiers in Konduz (medium risk) who will receive $65. December 2009 recruiting resulted in 8,000 new recruits, over double what is normally brought in each month. It is early to tell if the pay increase can curb retention since a majority of the AWOL and low recruiting months come at the height of fighting during the spring and summer.xxxiv

Likewise at the end of 2009, the ANP announced an enhancement and increased monthly payment to $240 a month. Prior to the increase, pay ranged from $120 - $180. Police recruiting immediately soared as about 2,700 applications were received within the first 7 days of the month this represents half of the overall monthly goal. Similar to the ANA, the ANP will also have a variable pay scale based hazardous locations.xxxv

**Providing Adequate Trainers and Mentors**

The lack of instructors for units in the field has been another serious factor contributing to AWOL/Retention rates in both the ANA and ANP. As of March 2010, NATO faced a shortage of 500-600 ANP trainers.xxxvi Shortages of trainers often equates with corrupt and incompetent police. Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, the top Marine commander in the south stated that "I'd rather have no police than bad police, because bad police destroy local faith and confidence in their government and push [the locals] to the Taliban."
Figure II.4: Afghan Force Goals and Recruits Needed to Reach Them*

Afghan National Army (ANA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ANA Strength</th>
<th>Troop Increase</th>
<th>Force AWOL rate (25%)</th>
<th>Recruiting Attrition N/A</th>
<th>Actual recruits req.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>24,250</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>24,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2011</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>42,750</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>79,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total ANA Recruits: 174,500

Afghan National Police (ANP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ANP Strength</th>
<th>Troop Increase</th>
<th>Force AWOL rate (20%)</th>
<th>67% Recruiting Attrition</th>
<th>Actual recruits req.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>94,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>12,596</td>
<td>31,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>24,656</td>
<td>46,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2011</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>26,800</td>
<td>34,706</td>
<td>61,506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total ANP Recruits: 139,358

Total ANSF Recruits Req. to Meet Oct 2011 Goals: 313,858

*These numbers are an estimate and do not account for ANA Recruiting Attrition rates (N/A) and include lower then estimated AWOL rates. Attrition and AWOL rates are variable and may not remain constant through October 2011.
Figure II.5: Recent Disbursements for the ANSF – Part One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current Funding</th>
<th>FY 2009</th>
<th>FY 2010</th>
<th>FY 2010 (With Suplimentals)</th>
<th>FY 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>$4.2B</td>
<td>$4.7B</td>
<td>$5.7B</td>
<td>$7.5B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>$1.5B</td>
<td>$2.7B</td>
<td>$3.5B</td>
<td>$4.1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
<td>$69.3M</td>
<td>$7.4M</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$5.6B</td>
<td>$7.4B</td>
<td>9.2B</td>
<td>$11.6B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure II.5: Recent Disbursements for the ANSF – Part Two

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the US Congress*, January 2010 p. 46
Shortfalls in ANA Trainers

This situation was still critical as of mid-2009. As of June 2009, CSTC-only had 2,928 men to meet a total combined ETT/PMT/OMLT requirement of 5,668 (51%) personnel.\textsuperscript{xxxvii} CSTC-A provided the following summary of shortages in the mentoring effort of Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams or OMLTs in June 2009:

According to NATO requirements, 67 OMLTs are currently required

- 56 OMLTs on the ground, 46 validated
- Confirmed offers –13
- Unofficial offers -5

Projected Status –End of CY 2009

- NATO requirement –75
- CSTC-A projection –62 OMLTs on the ground
- Deficit will be 13

Projected Status –End of CY 2010

- NATO requirement –91
- CSTC-A projection –66 OMLTs on the ground
- Deficit will be 25

While IJC now controls the mentoring (ETT/PMT/OMLT/POMLTs) mission, there have been no indications how this will affect these personnel shortfalls.

Shortfalls in ANP Trainers

There were even more serious problems in providing adequate trainers and mentors for the Afghan police. CSTC-A provided the following summary of shortages in the mentoring effort of Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams or POMLTs in June 2009:

CSTC-A is requesting that NATO provide 38 POMLTS by end of CY 2009

-14 POMLTs on the ground
- Confirmed offers -10
- Unofficial offers -8

Projected Requirements –End of CY 2010

- 98 additional POMLTs

Projected Requirements –End of CY 2011

- 46 additional POMLTs

CSTC-A is requesting that NATO provide 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY 2011

It is still unclear how this situation will improve in the future. NMT-A plans at the end of 2009 called for all ANP personnel to be trained by 2012. Current estimates for the percentage of untrained police run as high as 78%, and, the 2012 timeline is dependent upon estimates of European trainer contributions which seem likely to prove overly optimistic. If the European contribution of trainers falls short, the entire timeline will have to be reassessed.
The Impact of Such Shortfalls

Any continuation of major personnel shortages in trainers and mentors will be crippling to the CSTC-A mission and affects virtually every aspect of ANSF development. The DoD IG found numerous examples of personnel shortages affecting the training and mentoring mission.\textsuperscript{xxxviii}

ARSIC-S reported that its operations have been stressed by the lack of personnel resources. For example, the minimum force protection requirement for movement off of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) by an ETT to conduct an outreach operation is nine personnel. However, some teams are comprised of as few as four soldiers.

Because of this, some ANA units in outlying FOBs in ARSIC-S have not received the ETT mentoring support required. Those FOBs were visited whenever possible, but the ETTs could not provide the overwatch actually needed.

In ARSIC-E, ETTs are at less than 50 percent strength, staffed with four to six personnel, far short of the required 16. ARSIC-C reported that ETTs have an average of only four of 16 personnel required and are forced to “borrow” the necessary support and security personnel from nearby U.S. combat units.

Staff from the Regional Corps Advisory Command (RCAC) in ARSIC-E stated that replacement individual augmenters’ were rarely assigned by CSTC-A to the billet against which they were requisitioned, apparently due to a combination of combat and noncombat losses, as well as the changing situation on the ground. And, in many instances, personnel who were trained at Ft. Riley did not know whether they would be assigned as ETTs or PMTs until arrival in-country.

CSTC-A staff assigned to the CFC noted that ETTs accompanying Afghan infantry battalions (kandaks) were invariably under-strength.

Many of the ARSICs reported that MOS skills and specialties required of the ETTs/OMLTs and PMTs/POMLTs are not always analogous with the functions they are mentoring; personnel did not have the skill sets required for their positions.

Fixing such problems will require far more than providing warm bodies to serve in a mentoring and partner role. It cannot be solved by assigning personnel who lack the skills and desire to the job, or by contracting in ways that do not set valid requirements and get qualified personnel. The personnel involved must be motivated and competent – something lacking in many of those who have been arbitrarily assigned to such roles in the past. These positions must be treated as what they are: At least as important to victory as command roles in ISAF forces. Mentors must be trained in how to train a foreign Army or police force, something that is not easy to do.

Unfortunately, many of the mentors working with the ANA and ANP have received little or no relevant training in the past. According to one First Lieutenant assigned to the KMTC in 2008,

“...This is how my entire team was selected during the middle of my tour: a random group of people from all over Kabul—Air Force, Navy, Army, active-duty and National Guard—pulled from their previous assignments, thrown together and expected to do a job that none of us were trained in any meaningful way to do . . . . We are expected, by virtue of time-in-grade and membership in the U.S. military, to be able to train a foreign force in military operations, an extremely irresponsible policy that is ethnocentric at its core and which assumes some sort of natural superiority in which an untrained American soldier has everything to teach the Afghans, but nothing to learn . . . . You’re lucky enough if you had any mentorship training at all, something the Army provides in a limited capacity at pre-mobilization training at Fort Riley, but having none is the norm . . . . Soldiers who receive their pre-mobilization training at Fort Bragg learn absolutely nothing about mentoring foreign forces aside from being given a booklet on the subject, and yet soldiers who go through Bragg before being shipped to Afghanistan are just as likely to be assigned to mentoring teams as anyone else.”\textsuperscript{xxxix}
CSTC-A will also need more than military and police trainers. For example, DoD IG found that CSTC-A exerted “insufficient contract oversight” due to a lack of trained contracting officers and contracting officer representatives in country. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of every aspect of ANSF development. ISAF ‘mentors’ must be able to support and coach ANSF units through training and advice, including ‘observer/controller-like’ functions. Both functions will be critical, whether provided by the same or discrete coalition ISAF units. Minister Wardak and many ISAF commanders have stressed the impact top-flight partners have on raising the capabilities of ANSF units.

One partial solution might be to give ANSF mentoring a higher priority in US personnel selection. One ex-advisor recommends “We must pay the advisor bill with the best, brightest and bravest, even if it means diverting O-5 and O-6 command level talent to work with the ANA rather than their current service. This may meet fierce resistance from the services, but how much longer can we shortchange the advisor mission by filling only half the requirement? . . . While dozens of suitable officers inhabit the offices of ISAF and CJTF 82 planning solutions for the Afghan people, with little or no contact with ordinary Afghans, too few are deployed with the advisor teams.”

Another might be to force true unity of effort. ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stove piped, and under resourced national efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple the ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

“Spin” as the Enemy of Victory

No army has ever shown that its trainer can objectively evaluate their own work, or the quality of the forces they can train. Governments also continue to demonstrate at every level that a lack of transparency almost inevitably disguises key problems, and leads to mediocre or inadequate performance.

Adequate partnering cannot take place unless metrics and progress reporting are ruthlessly honest and objective, and career-ending penalties need to be imposed for exaggerating success. Unfortunately, past official reporting on the ANSF (much like official reporting on the Iraqi Security Forces) has been less than honest. Officials quote ‘trained and equipped’ manpower numbers as if these reflected the actual number of men in the field, which may be as low as 60% of these numbers. The recent revelation that 78% of the ANP had never received any training came shockingly at odds with past official numbers on police training. Higher ANA and ANP recruitment numbers are trumpeted, without noting that as much as 25% of the ANA disappears annually due to low re-enlistment, desertions, casualties, etc. This number may be higher in some police units, such as the ANCOP.

Honest use of CM level ratings may be a good snapshot metric for measuring the resources that go into a unit’s manpower and training, but they do not come close to being an adequate or honest measure of a unit’s effectiveness in the field. Unit histories and metrics of actual combat performance are much more useful in this regard. However, analysts and officials quote CM ratings as if they were accurate representations of a unit’s abilities, despite the many cases where
CM1-rated units operated poorly. Furthermore, there are strong indications that the CM rating standard had been lowered or ignored in order to report more CM1-level units.

Honesty in ANSF reporting has improved since Barack Obama took office and Gen. McCrystal was put in charge of operations in Afghanistan. The drop in the number of units rated CM1 is an example of such increased objectivity in the assessments. So are the statements admitting the limits of the CM system in the DoD Quarterly Report on Afghanistan issued dated September 2009. The fact remains, however, that this deceptive and dysfunctional system is still used in far too many briefings, and no adequate substitute that rates actual performance in the field has yet emerged for either the ANSF or ISF.

**Giving Partnership with the ANP Real Meaning**

The new strategy cannot succeed if major elements of the ANP remain little more than sacrifice pawns if they face a serious insurgent presence. Effective partnership requires forces that can fight and survive. This is particularly true of the effort to develop the ANP. The ANA has at least been trained for the right mission. The ANP has not and ISAF must take direct responsibility for many of the casualties that the ANP have suffered. The ANP do not take the bulk of the casualties in the fighting because they are leading the fight. They take them because ISAF has not trained and equipped them to survive in a counterinsurgency environment.

For far too long, the ANP has been treated as if their mission was to act as conventional police that could operate in a climate of security, while serving in a broader structure of a civil rule of law. These conditions simply do not exist, and cannot exist until the shape and clear phases are complete and hold and build have reached a level of stability and security where police can concentrate on crime, a criminal justice process and courts actually exist, and when there are normal jails. In the interim, the ANP and all other elements of the ANSF must be trained and equipped to be part of the fight.

In this context, the Canadian approach to PMTs seems to have been more effective than the American approach. In Kandahar province, Canadian PMTs were embedded in police stations 24 hours a day, and had strengthened their stations to western standards of force protection. American PMTs would sleep on American bases, driving out to ANP stations each morning. While the American approach may provide more flexibility, and more force protection for Americans, it was also unsuitable to the hostile climate of Afghanistan. According to a member of a Canadian OMLT in Kandahar in 2009, Afghan police stations were incredibly vulnerable. The Taliban was able to destroy these with “impunity,” and only stations protected by embedded mentors “could be counted on to still be there the next morning.”

**Reforming the ISAF and NTM-A Training and Mentoring Effort**

ISAF and the US already do have important reforms underway. The overall command structure of ISAF and US forces affecting the development of the ANSF is shown in **Figure II.6.** ISAF and US force training and generation efforts are now being combined under one commander and into a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The recently set up ISAF Joint Command (IJC), the 3 star operational HQ for the Regional Commands, will be in charge of commanding and controlling the ETT/PMT/OMLT/POMLTs. Essentially, NTM-A is now in charge of force training, generation and resourcing, while IJC is in charge of fielded force development.
This is creating the structure shown in Figure II.7, and is a critical step towards fully integrating the ISAF and US training efforts into an effort that can build real partners.

- SHAPE guidance signed on 25 June 09 provided implementation instructions for creating NTM-A
- The guidance directs:
  - Sixteen tasks for NTM-A to be implemented as and when resources are available.
  - Cdr, CSTC-A is being dual-hated as COM, NTM-A report directly to the COM ISAF.
- NTM-A was established in concept by the NAC Summit in April 09.
- NLT 15 Sept 09.
- Key tasks will remain within CSTC-A’s current responsibility: Generate the Force. And Resource the Fielded Force.. NTM-A will not execute MoD and MoI Ministerial Development.

Additional, more detailed, improvements have taken place within the command and control (C2) structure and training processes since late October, 2009, and some are shown in Figure II.8. These improvements are still in progress and may do much to correct the past problems in a poorly coordinated and inefficient effort.

It also seems likely that this reorganization will enable CSTC-A and NTM-A to focus more effectively on improvements in force development. The establishment of NTM-A, including the dual-hating arrangement with CSTC-A, and the placing of the ETT/PMT/OMLT/POMLTs under IJC, has the potential to help solve several major challenges that the ISAF has faced.

- First, the arrangement may help synchronize ISAF and U.S. approaches toward the ANSF mission. One caveat is that the transfer of TF Phoenix to (IJC) will require close integration among the dual-hated NTM-A/ CSTC-A and (IJC) on the ANSF mission, to ensure top to bottom integration from the ministerial to the ground level.
- Second, NTMA provides a readily available alternative for those TCNs that are ready to contribute but prefer not to provide combat forces.
Figure II.6: The Overall ISAF and US Command Structure Affecting Afghan Force Development

* Supports both ANA & ANP, report administrative to DCG ANA-
* Supports both ANA and ANP. Reports administratively to DOG ANA.
Figure II.8

Planned Changes to Integrate Command and Control of the Training and Partnering Efforts

Current Training Team Command and Control Structure

Future Command and Control Structure
Dealing With the Problems of Afghan Corruption and Power Brokering

All of these problems in the ANSF have been -- and are -- compounded by corruption and a lack of capacity in the Afghan forces and key ministries. Corruption and the need for competence within the GIRoA have created critical problems in developing and employing the ANSF, particularly the ANP and ABP.

The DoD Inspector General’s office described the scale of the problem in September 2009:

“Lack of accountability for funds, equipment, and personal actions remains problematic throughout the ANSF. Inspectors General and Internal Affairs personnel ranging from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, to ANA Corps and ANP Regional commands reported what they described as substantiated cases of corruption that resulted in little, if any, disciplinary action. Equipment has been consistently damaged, lost or diverted to other uses through noncombat actions without any systematic process to hold ANSF personnel accountable, when appropriate. Processes and procedures were generally not established to be able to determine individual accountability for equipment. Those accountability processes and procedures in place were generally ineffective or not followed.”

It will not be enough to create Afghan forces that are effective in combat. ISAF and the US will have to build capacity and integrity in the GIRoA, and especially in the Ministry of Defense, ministry of the Interior, and justice system. Afghan people must perceive the ANSF as legitimate and trustworthy if it is to be effective in the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ missions. Corruption and the perception of corruption in both the Afghan government and the ANSF -- particularly in the ANP – has shaken popular confidence and affected the Afghan people’s decisions about their ability to trust Afghan forces. Worse, the broader corruption and influence peddling in the Afghan government, partly the central government, has reached the point where it often interferes in the leadership, deployment, and use of Afghan forces in ways that sharply undermine their effectiveness and discredit them from the outside.

Fortunately, the Ministry of Defense has emerged as relatively honest and effective, the Ministry of Interior has improved with time, and there are many honest and competent Afghan officers and officials at every level. ISAF and the US must work with them directly to ensure that corruption and power brokers cease to present major problems in shaping the ANSF and in its operations. Failed and corrupt officials and officers need to be removed, bypassed, isolated, and deprived of all ISAF and US funds and support. In contrast, ISAF and the US need to work closely with honest officials and officers in ways that are transparent and that the Afghan people see provide lasting security, create a climate that helps provide prompt justice, and creates civil-military programs to meet their economic needs -- rather than simply uses the ANSF as a fighting force.

Using Afghan Forces with Care and Concern for Casualties

Finally, ISAF and the US must take more care in the ways Afghan forces are used. The expansion of Afghan forces has involved too many past experiments in training cycles, force expansion, and partnering as substitutes for military experience that are high risk efforts and will need to be constantly evaluated and recalibrated.

Such efforts have a moral and ethical dimension as well as a military one. The desire to demonstrate significant progress by summer 2011 in accordance with President Obama’s strategy may lead ANSF units into rushed deployments. It is one thing to push the development
of Afghan forces in the face of a military crisis. It is another to overstretch them, rush them into service, and use them up.

This will be as true in the future as in the past. Effective partnership means giving ANSF lives the same priority as those of ISAF forces. Afghan forces must not be rushed into the field in ways where ISAF and the US sacrifice Afghan soldiers and policemen in the interest of victory, or ask them to take unreasonable risks that ISAF and US forces will not take. Current operation tempo for the ANSF, -- including developing and fielding a force while simultaneously fighting an insurgency -- has left little room for forces, chiefly the ANA, to maintain a balanced cycle of combat, training and leave time. Afghan Forces need to be put on such a cycle even as some aspects of the training process are accelerated. If continued without respite, that operation tempo is likely to exhaust the force; to have a deleterious impact on retention; and to allow no room for the critical additional training required.
III. Creating a Strategic Partnership

Creating a true partnership will impose further requirements on the Afghan force development effort. It also means that the ISAF and US cannot succeed in developing the ANSF in the ways required unless they meet two tests.

- First, every aspect of force development must be tied to clear demands that the ANSF serve the nation and the Afghan people in ways that minimize corruption, power brokering, the interests of given national and regional leaders, and tie the aid and force development efforts to commanders and the use of the ANSF to valid military requirements. It must be clear to Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers at every level that they will be pushed out of their positions, bypassed, or blacklisted when they serve their own interests and not those of the nation.

It will be particularly critical to expand every element of ANSF forces at an Afghan pace that will produce adequate numbers of properly trained officers and NCOs, to ensure that those who prove competent are promoted and put in key command positions, and to remove those who are not competent, corrupt, or that respond to informal power brokers and political favoritism.

- Second, the standard for force development must be that ISAF and the US accelerate force development with adequate funds, mentors, and partners, in ways that limit casualties and the strain on Afghans to levels approaching those that allied forces face. Short term tactical expediency is not a substitute for real and lasting partnership, or using up Afghans as a substitute for coalition forces.

ISAF and the US must also look beyond the short-term needs of force expansion and the shape and clear phase of the fight. It must develop plans to make the ANSF a force that can independently defend the nation, and to deal with probable force cuts once the insurgency is defeated.

ISAF and US officials, commanders, and advisors now seem to understand these requirements. It is far less clear that capitols have the same understanding of these priorities or are presently prepared to act and set the proper standards for action. Everyone involved in the ANSF development effort must understand that more resources and more realistic force goals will not be enough unless the ANSF is made a true partner in every ISAF and US operation.

The Critical Importance of Trainers and Mentors

As has been stressed throughout this study, the past lack of trainers and mentors has been a key reason why the ANSF has been more an auxiliary than a true partner. One Canadian OMLT member observed that,

"as soon as one of your Coalition colleagues started talking about “putting an Afghan face on the operation,” you knew that meant rather than engage in the frustrating process of ANA skills development involved in mounting a joint operation . . . they were going to grab a couple ANP officers from somewhere at the last minute and throw them on the helicopter to meet the ISAF ConOp requirements. The gap in understanding between Afghans and Coalition was seen as simply too wide to rely on them in battle. And mentors, forced to fall back on personal diplomacy in the absence of any other leverage, were unable to bridge the gaps."\[^1\]

Trainee and mentor quality, and a failure to properly prepare and monitor partner units, have been equally issues. Newly formed forces do not have the ability of experienced units to absorb trained, but inexperienced, officers, NCOs, and other ranks. There are few – or no -- cadres that can pull units together into effective teams, deal with the fact that training is not practical experience, and help new personnel through the long process of acquiring practical expertise.

ANSF units need to be mentored in the field, partnered with ISAF units, and fight or work on actual operations. They also need full support from partner units. Too often, the attitude among
Correcting Shortfalls in the Past ISAF and US Training and Mentoring Effort

This is an area where ISAF and the US still seem to fall far short of what is needed – although some aspects of the situation do seem to be improving. As of February 24th, 2010, properly resourcing “mentors/trainers” into newly graduated ANSF units continued to lag as NATO announced a shortfall of 1,600 trainers. The recent deficiencies may signal a larger issue to come as ISAF are preparing to expand the ANSF by over 100,000 personnel to a total of 300,000. As the ANSF boost their ranks, thousands of additional trainers will be required. As attrition rates are high in both the ANP and ANA, many more than 100,000 personnel will need to be trained. If enough trainers cannot be found to serve the current ANSF force, it is hard to see how a force of 300,000 will be trained, let alone how it will be adequately mentored in the field and maintained in the face of high attrition rates. The lack of mentors/trainers both in number and in efficacy is one of the biggest hurdles facing the ANSF development effort.

It is also unrealistic to expect that newly graduated ANSF units have the capacity to put effective soldiers into combat, manage supplies and budget, and respond effectively in joint operations with ISAF forces. While about 14% of the soldiers are literate and pay deficiencies have just recently been addressed with a raise to $140 as of January, 2010, providing mentors in the field remains a vital component of ANSF development.

Moreover, an effective force development effort requires transparency and honesty on the part of both trainers and mentors. There has been a consistent tendency by US and ISAF personnel to exaggerate their success and the capabilities of their soldiers. Some of these problems were observed among US officers training the Iraqi Army, and are due to a number of factors, from loyalty to those being mentored, to a desire to demonstrate progress. For instance, reports indicate that some ANA units rated Capability Milestone 1 (CM1) had not received field training as a full unit. Units rated CM1 are supposed to be able to conduct independent operations with only liaison and air support or other support elements from ISAF forces. While this practice appears to have stopped, giving a unit the highest capability rating before it has ever been trained together as a full unit is clearly inaccurate.

Even when a unit is given a chance to operate in the field before receiving its CM rating, its capabilities may still be ‘spun’ to a higher rating than it deserves. One Canadian OMLT member observed a number of serious shortcomings in the ANA brigade he was mentoring, only to have it declared CM1, the highest rating possible. These observations make a sharp contrast with the official requirements for a CM1 rating in Figure III.1.
Fully Staffing the Training and Mentoring Base

Fully staffing the training and mentoring base with qualified and motivated personnel will be critical. ISAF and the US cannot afford to embark on more force expansions that are not properly supported by qualified trainers and mentors, as well as adequate facilities. While current reporting is lacking, and no plans to expand Afghan forces have yet been announced, report as of June 2009 showed that ISAF and US mentors and partners still feel far short of meeting even current existing requirements.
Figure III.2: ISAF/USFOR-A Organization Chart

Source: Department Of Defense
IV. Moving Towards Joint Command

If Afghan forces are to become full partners with ISAF and the US, and eventually replace them. The ANA, the ANP, and other elements of the ANSF need to become part of joint headquarters and joint operations at every level from regional commands on down. The provision of adequate numbers of mentors, partners, and enablers must be tied to joint planning, intelligence, and operations that move the ANSF steadily from a role where ISAF is effectively in the lead to the point where ANSF are in the lead and then replace ISAF forces. Both Afghans serving in the ANSF and the Afghan people must see that ISAF is building up a fully independent ANSF, will leave as soon as Afghan forces are ready, that ISAF respects Afghan sovereignty the moment Afghan governance is capable and honest, and that Afghans are steadily increasing their role in deciding where military force should be used and how best to protect Afghan civilians.

Some experts have suggested that this can be accomplished at the regional level by embedding elements or all of a brigade or brigade combat team with the regional command center and forces of the ANA and ANP. This is a decision for the ISAF command, but it is clear that any workable solution means expanding partnership at each major echelon of operations and not simply the top. It is equally clear that such efforts must be supported at every level by active ISAF enablers and partner units until the ANSF is ready to fully take over all aspects of the mission.

The need to coordinate a wide range of ANA, ANP, and NDS operations is also a reason for bringing the new Operational Coordination Centers (OCC) system – which is now beginning operations at the regional level -- to full operational capability. It is a reason for strengthening its coordination functions, for providing the OCCs with better communications and display systems, and for providing mentors and partners. Giving the OCCs and added command and control function and could make them a key tool in ensuring that Afghan forces can take the lead when they are ready, and shift from the remaining areas where ISAF is in the lead to operations centers where the ANSF is in the lead and ISAF is in support.

These steps will require a change in the ISAF military culture as well as efforts to create effective ANSF units. ISAF commanders and troops must uniformly treat the ANSF units they work with as real partners, and see their development as having equal or greater priority than day-to-day kinetic operations against the insurgents. There must be a common feedback loop to the NTM-A and CSTC-A. This process will constantly improve the training process, and work with the Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ISAF top command to keep altering the equipment mix and supply system for each type of ANSF force. In doing so, it can both fight effectively beside ISAF units and develop a force structure that is tailored to Afghan needs and the eventual creation of independent ANSF units that Afghanistan can afford and can sustain.

Partnering also means that Afghan force development must occur in “Afghan Time”. ISAF and the US must also learn there are times when they move at an Afghan pace and respect Afghan priorities and values. ANSF force development cannot be managed on the basis of ISAF priorities and standards of efficiency. Issues like leave and operation tempo need to take into account the need Afghans have to deal with their families and to avoid breaking units by overusing them. Efforts to create Afghan officers and NCOs that mirror Western military systems have to be tempered with the understanding that there are limits to how quickly Afghan
concepts of military training and operations can be changed – if at all. The task is to help the Afghans become more efficient in doing it their way; not to try to transform them.

At the same time, ISAF and the ANSF must work together to avoid “over-partnering,” cases where the ANSF has been constantly controlled and commanded by ISAF mentors and advisors and used only as a minor adjunct to NATO forces. According to one ex-Advisor, “When the ANA feel they own the problem, they excel. When we push them to the back or when we do too much for them, we stunts their growth or stifle initiative. When the ANA are living too close to the coalition, they are more apt to become stale and are all too ready to let the coalition do the heavy lifting . . . “partnering” will be most effective under the following conditions: 1) early in the ANA unit lifecycle, 2) of limited duration until the ANA unit reaches an ability to operate independently, and, most importantly, 3) with a focus on improving ANA effectiveness as the purpose of the partnership. In addition, a partnered unit should not be a substitute for embedded advisors.”

This “over-partnering” may also have affected some of the exaggerated assessments of the ANA’s capabilities. The high number of joint and “independent” operations the ANA has carried out is often used by ISAF officials to demonstrate their growing competence. Yet “In reality, the overwhelming majority of the ‘operations’ were carried out at the company level, which given the understaffing of most battalions meant fifty to sixty men. Occasionally a brigade-size operation was mounted – even successfully, like a much-praised offensive in Tagab valley (Kapisa) in 2008. In fact the overwhelming majority of these ‘operations’ were simple patrols. The larger ‘independent’ operations were supervised and assisted by the embedded mentoring teams and relied on the presence of supporting foreign troops and air support, a major morale booster.”

Finding the right balance of partnering will be equally important at the top. There has long been a need for more effective and comprehensive ministerial advisory support, a mission currently led by CSTC-A. While such efforts sometimes have less visible impact than building combat power, building key systems at the Ministry and service level – personnel management, logistics accounting – are essential to ensuring that the ANSF can eventually stand on their own. This mission also requires appropriate resourcing, including sufficiently senior-level advisors who have actually helped run ministries in their own countries.

Providing Proper Equipment and Funding

ANSF forces must acquire the necessary enablers and equipment, in as timely a manner as possible. The DoD Inspector General found that the ANSF has shortages of a number of essential unit equipment, including howitzers, mortars, communications, and engineer. Work by CSTC-A shows that it will be for the most part critical to provide the equipment needed for ANSF units to be interoperable with ISAF forces and weapons, and to ensure that such weapons are delivered as soon as ANSF forces are ready to absorb them. This does not mean that all equipment has to come from the West. There are systems like the Mi-17, D-30, SPG-9, and RPG-7 that are cheap and meet Afghan needs. A partner force, however, must be able to draw on ISAF support and sustainment and work directly with ISAF forces. It also cannot wait on time-consuming delays in the US FMS process or financial rules that block force development.

More flexibility is needed to rapidly provide existing funds to meet immediate needs. Equipment procurement and delivery needs to be made more rapid. ANA trust money should not be rigidly limited to the ANA when helping the ANP is critical. CSTC-A has identified the following immediate priorities:
• Timely receipt of funding
• Support for an FY 10 Supplemental if necessary to fund ANSF growth
• Realignment of function with Bureau of INL --Police development, mentor contracts
• International financial support to ANSF growth and sustainment
• Waivers for continued procurement of Mi-17s

Equally important, ANSF force development is far cheaper than providing equivalent ISAF forces. According to the DoD IG, “CSTC-A estimates the cost (in 2010 dollars) to generate ANA forces to be $1B/10,000 personnel, and the cost to generate ANP forces to be $35B/10,000 personnel. They also estimated that the annual sustainment costs for the ANA would be $210M/10,000 personnel; and the ANP would be $182M/10,000 personnel. By contrast, the Congressional Research Service in 2005 estimated that the annual cost to field and sustain U.S. forces in Afghanistan was $267,000 per soldier, which amounts to $2.67B/10,000 soldiers.”

Funding for the ANSF development effort cannot be allowed to swing from year-to-year on a feast and famine basis that makes effective management of the effort impossible. While much attention has been paid to the stability of funding to the ANSF development effort, delays in providing funds continue: the FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation was not made available to CSTC-A until the second quarter of FY 2009. ANSF funding for FY 2011 was set at $11.6 billion, which will be adequate if provided on time. However, if this $11.6 billion dollar feast is followed by a 2012 famine, ANSF development will suffer. ISAF members need to carefully review their own near- and longer-term commitment to the ANSF. This includes ensuring that ANSF development and operations are funded by alliance nations on a sustained basis until the war is won and Afghanistan has moved solidly towards security, stability, and development.

**Developing Sufficient Afghan Logistics Capability**

In the past, developing ANSF logistics capabilities has had low priority relative to the quick development of combat capabilities. The ISAF logistics system has often had to step in to provide the ANSF with needed materials. If the ANSF is to take the lead, and takeover security in Afghanistan, it will need an independent logistics capability.

The DoD Inspector General’s office found major problems with the present quality of ANSF logistics:

The Afghan National Security Forces’ logistics systems that support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), respectively, remained institutionally immature and insufficiently effective. Army and Police personnel have not become proficient in applying the established logistical model and did not demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the logistics system’s capacity to perform as designed. To ensure the supply system worked somewhat effectively, the ANA and ANP often depended upon U.S. mentors and trainers to “push” them needed equipment and supplies by mobilizing the support of U.S. counterparts in the ANSF supply chain.

This occurred because the ANA and ANP logistics functions were still in an early stage of development, with the ANP significantly lagging the ANA. Neither the ANA nor the ANP had enough trained and experienced logistics personnel to make their logistics processes and procedures function properly. Moreover, trained logistics personnel and units had been periodically diverted to “front line” security roles, which has been the ANSF and Coalition forces’ priority.

In addition, CSTC-A did not have an overarching strategic plan with corresponding operational implementation plans for developing logistics capability within the ANSF, and has not, until recently, sufficiently emphasized the importance of developing a sustainable ANSF logistics function appropriate to
its growing operational capability. In addition, CSTC-A did not have enough mentoring personnel to address effectively both security forces expansion and logistical development issues.

Finally, establishing modern military and police logistical systems will require overcoming the still strong legacy among ANSF leaders of the former Soviet-style, highly centralized, logistical mindset, as well as the cultural tendency to hoard, resulting from the countries prolonged experience with poverty. Corruption, which has been endemic in the ANSF supply system and continues to be problematic, undermines the potential effectiveness of the Army and Police logistical systems.

As a result, the ANSF systems were unable to reliably meet army and police logistical needs. Moreover, a widening gap has developed between the logistical and operational capabilities of the ANSF. This has limited the capacity of the ANSF to support its current force size, which could lead to a growing logistical gap, prolonged ANSF dependence on the U.S and ISAF/Coalition, and delayed building of a logistically sustainable Afghan security force.

CSTC-A also had a critical shortage in logistics mentors. Before 2007, logistics mentoring was provided only at the senior levels of the MoD and MoI, with some logisticians in the ETTs providing limited assistance at the Corps and Kandak level. Logistics mentoring below the MoI level was not provided before 2008 due to personnel shortages. “It was not until 2008 that CSTC-A began to organizationally coordinate and synchronize its logistics mentoring resources, with the objective of establishing a logistics mentoring organization capable of integrating and focusing logistics training for the ANA and ANP. The continuing shortage of logistics mentors – particularly for the ANP – has limited the impact of this effort.”

The high operational tempo of units in the south and east, combined with overly optimistic assumptions about ANA manpower (official manpower numbers are often highly inaccurate) have occasionally forced commanders to occasionally send logistics and administrative units to the front. This has severely harmed morale.

The MoI logistics system has also been less capable versus that of the MoD. According to one US officer, they were reduced to “convincing the Afghans to submit supply requests through their own system even though the requests rarely produce anything....In the end, U.S. troops often end up providing essential supplies, but only after the Afghans have submitted a request through their own lines.”

Stovepipes and over complex systems have also been a factor, Figure IV.1 shows the official logistics processes for the MoI and MoD are complex, even when they functions correctly. Yet these systems rarely function correctly. These systems are based upon Western models that do not seem appropriate for Afghanistan, and allow each step in the chain of command to become a problem. CSTC-A advisors reported that, “because there was little transparency in ANSF supply distribution, each step in the requisition and distribution process was vulnerable to significant inefficiency, as well as outright blockage of supplies due to corruption from bribes or from pilferage.

This has led to chronic supply delays or failure to receive ordered supplies. U.S. mentors to the ANA and ANP chains of command have sometimes been able to determine the cause of a supply problem and address the issue. But, because supplies were often not delivered to ANSF units in a timely fashion, if at all, CSTC-A and ANSF personnel reported widespread frustration with the supply requisition and issuance process and a lack of confidence in using it as designed. These problems are all compounded by a lack of Afghan personnel with logistics training.
Figure IV.1: The MoD and MoI Logistics System

**Taking Account of National Directorate of Security (NDS)**

The NDS does not fall under MoD or MOI command, but it cooperates closely with ANSF at every level. There are no indications that the present role and capabilities of the NDS needs to change. It is clear, however, that NDS activities do need to be fully integrated with those of the ANSF and ISAF, and there have been coordination problems in the past.

Both the Afghan government and the ANSF will need an integrated approach to both internal security and to HUMINT that mixes effective counterinsurgency with careful steps not to alienate key elements of the population. Afghan intelligence can play a critical role in supplementing ISAF and US collection and analysis capabilities, mainly at the local level where HUMINT is critical. It can be equally critical in ensuring that counterinsurgency operations have the kind of Afghan face, planning, and execution that avoids civilian casualties and collateral damage.

At the same time, any combination of intelligence and internal security efforts all too often lead to excesses in the treatment of suspects, detainees and popular alienation. Finding the right balance will be difficult at best, particularly as long as many elements of the population have little practical reason to trust the Afghan government, are unsure it will win a lasting victory, and/or do not have a local rule of law that offers both swift justice and relative freedom from corruption. It will take a systematic ISAF effort to help the ANSF and NDS find the best achievable and practical balance in any given area, as well as to ensure that the end result is to steadily build up the credibility and capacity of local governance. This will be above all important in executing amnesty programs, handling detainees, and attempting to bring moderate elements of the Taliban and insurgency back into the government and the mainstream of Afghan society.

**Integrated Civil-Military Partnership**

Finally, as is stressed throughout this analysis partnership must go far beyond fighting the insurgency. ISAF and the ANSF will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective NMATO/ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. A mix of ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, but if this is all that is accomplished they will still lose the war to an opponent that can win a battle of political attrition against an Afghan government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant and failing to provide basic services, while furthermore being viewed as corrupt and as supporting power brokers rather than the people.

This means ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the hold and build missions. A transition should take place from civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level. However, ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.

They must react to the reality that national elections and democracy do not bring any form of political legitimacy and loyalty by themselves; only actions count. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government is too incapable and corrupt to take such actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside civil aid efforts are far too narrow, far
too security conscious, and far too oriented towards talk and planning to serve Afghan needs in the field.

The ideal is a perfectly integrated civil-military effort. The reality must be a consistent operational demand for effective civilian and formal Afghan government action. This will take time, however, and in the interim some combination of ISAF and ANSF must act immediately to provide at least enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and takes at least initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. They must provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

The mix and phasing of such efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from civil military meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas. In far too many cases, however, this will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, do actually win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards the true “build” phase.

Participating must address corruption and incompetence on the part of both Afghan and ISAF and other allied aid efforts. In the process, a significant number of national caveats and restrictions on aid will have to be lifted. Corrupt aid officials and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted, while exercises in symbolism, ephemeral good work, fund raising and “branding” must end. Above all, the military must act immediately when civilians are incapable and these efforts will need ANSF support and leadership where the Afghan civil government cannot act. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will lose the peace.
V. The Afghan National Army (ANA)

The best elements of the ANA have already proven their value in combat, and the ANA will be the most essential element of the ANSF in the current fight. The ANA already partners with ISAF and OEF forces in shape and clear operations. While the ANP should arguably be the appropriate eventual lead in hold as well as build, the ANP currently lacks the capacity and capabilities needed to play that role effectively and the ANA will have to fill in for at least several years to come.

At the same time, the ANA is not yet strong and capable enough to carry out the tasks it now faces or to accept the transfer of responsibility from ISAF forces. Any study of future requirements for the ANA must depend on further clarification of the new strategy that President Obama announced on December 1, 2009, and then focus on the remaining problems and challenges in the ANA. At the same time, there is good news at many levels. In spite of a past lack of resources, the Afghan National Army is the most respected institution in the Afghan government.

Current Expansion Plans

The force goal for the ANA was still only 60,000 as late as in February 2006. It was then raised to 80,000 in February 2007, and then to 134,000 in September 2008. Meeting this goal of 134,000 was originally was set for 2013, but is now the aim for October 31, 2010. A further expansion goal of 171,600 for October 2011 was announced in early 2010.\textsuperscript{lvvi} It is not apparent that this goal can be met in 2011 if the ANA is to maintain and improve its force quality and expand in the face of persistently high attrition rates. The current annual ANA attrition rate is 25\%, and the rate from the ANP is at 20\%. It will take major improvements in the number and washout rates for new recruits, and in retention, to both expand the ANA and maintain current force levels. At the same time, it is clear that the ANA must be much larger to implement President Obama’s strategy and to deal with the insurgency as US and ISAF forces withdraw.

US officials have also mentioned a longer-term goal of 240,000 since President Obama’s speech on December 2, 2009, but have been careful to state that there are no firm plans as yet to achieve such a goal for either then ANA or ANP, and that future goals will depend on the rate of Afghan progress in both force quality and force quantity.\textsuperscript{lvii}

\textbf{US versus Afghan Views of ANA Expansion}

The US and Afghans view regarding this expansion do not always agree. Lt. General William B. Caldwell, who is now in charge of the overall US and ISAF force generation effort, stated in an interview on December 1, 2009 that the current force goal for the ANA was still 134,000 ANA October 31, 2010.\textsuperscript{lviii} Senior officials announced further expansion in January 2010, to 171,600 for the ANA and 134,000 for the ANP by October 2011.\textsuperscript{lix}

In contrast, Minister of Defense Wardak believes that the 134,000 force level cannot defend the country and that additional plans are needed to give the Afghan Army the kind of heavy weapons and equipment it needs to defend against foreign enemies, and not simply perform the counterinsurgency mission. General Sher Mohammad Karimi, the operational commander of the Afghan MoD has also stated that the Afghan Army falls far short of what is needed.\textsuperscript{lxx}

“The 134,000 army, which has been approved so far, it is not enough for our country. We have requested to increase that number to at least 240,000. Even during the 1970s, during the reign of King Mohammed Zahir, the army didn’t fall below 200,000 – and the target was 250,000 troops...Then, everywhere was peace. There
was no fighting with the Taliban militants and international terrorists...we need even more troops than during the king’s time.”

**The “Authorized” Versus the “Actual” ANA**

These official numbers also now mask a much smaller ANA than such totals indicate. The difficulties in accounting for personnel exacerbated by high desertion rates and casualties, as well as soldiers on leave makes it difficult to determine the actual number of ANA soldiers on duty at any given time. Additionally, some experts put the number of ANA personnel restricted to non-combat roles as high as 34%. If one adjusts the 76%, for desertions, low present for duty rates, and other factors; This may leave as few as 32,000 ANA soldiers available for combat duty.\(^{lxii}\)

NTM-A uses the general rule of thumb that for a 100k ANA, approximately 65,000 (65%) are in the fielded force. Of those, approximately 45,000 are present for duty. Of those not present for duty, 10,000 were AWOL and 10,000 were on leave, at school, or on some sort of medical leave. Of the AWOLs, approximately 80% return to duty within 60 days. The present for duty rate at the battalion level is even higher, averaging around 65%.

Some senior MoD officials also believe that ANA numbers are much smaller than the official tally, “probably around 60 per cent of its personnel charts. The typical battalion in the field, particularly in the south where desertions and losses are higher, was still around 200-300 men on average as opposed to a theoretical strength of 650.”\(^{lxxii}\) Thus even the ambitious goal of 171,600 ANA by October, 2011 could yield less than 85,000 actual combat personnel in the field according to CSTC-A’s rule of thumb.

**The Current Structure of the ANA**

The current structure of the Afghan Army is shown in Figure V.1. The history of efforts to expand the ANA are traced in Figure V.2. The end result is that ISAF reports that a total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are now rated as capable of leading operations (although this rating system sometimes grossly exaggerates the capability of given kandaks), Current plans call for growing from the current 117 fielded ANA kandaks to 179. Six of eight planned commando kandaks have already been fielded.

ANA Kandaks (Battalion equivalents) are also being expanded as part of the offensives planned for early 2010, each of the Kandaks in the 205 corps have been receiving an extra newly-trained company. This will increase the number of ANA personnel in the Corps that will see the most action, reduce the officer requirement that would be created if these companies were to be put into new units, and place green troops next to more experienced ones. It does however, still run the risk of putting newly-trained units into major operations, a tactic that often backfired badly in Iraq.

This again illustrates the risk in emphasizing quantity over quality. And such tradeoff may already be happening to some extent. According to a Canadian OMLT member, “Increasingly the rapid growth of the organization [the ANA] nation-wide was working against efforts to improve quality, diluting those officers and men with potential in a bigger and bigger pool, and elevating mediocrities for lack of any better alternative. ISAF’s focus on quantity over quality, which continues today, had already resulted in a significant reduction in the ANA's ability to contribute to the kinetic fight in our province by late 2008.”\(^{lxiii}\)
Plans to expand the ANA must also expand its training, replenishment, and sustainment infrastructure. The ANA currently has throughput capacity to generate and replenish about 90,000 personnel, in addition to a capacity to generate and replenish 96,000 ANP. Plans to grow the end-state force size must also increase this throughput capacity, in addition to the capacity of mentors and partners.
Figure V.1: The Size and Readiness of the Afghan National Army

Figure V.2: Growth of the ANA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Force Numbers</th>
<th>As of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>September 29, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>January 22, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>February 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,300 + 2,500 in-training</td>
<td>April 30, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,360</td>
<td>June 29, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,350 + 3,000 in-training</td>
<td>September 13, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,800 + 3,400 in-training</td>
<td>January 10, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,900</td>
<td>September 16, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>January 31, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46,177</td>
<td>January 10-22, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>October 18, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>December 28, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>August 8, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>November 2, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>March 10, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91,911</td>
<td>June 30, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trends, Training, and Readiness**

Measuring force quality is always difficult, particularly in terms of real-world combat performance versus “impact” like numbers of people, equipment and stocks and training levels. **Figure IV.3** shows an ISAF estimate of the key trends in the size and readiness of the Afghan Army. The most recent ratings do reflect some important improvements over the situation in January 2009. It must be stressed, however, that they do not reflect ratings based on actual performance in serious combat and that this unclassified reporting on the Afghan forces is dated. Accordingly, the best available unclassified description of the progress and problems in the ANA are still the Department of Defense account in its June 2009 report on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*:

- The ANA is subordinate to the MoD and is divided into five regional corps (aligned with the ISAF regional commands) and an air corps. Each corps is divided into brigades comprised of three infantry kandaks, one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. The commando kandaks are under the tactical control of the regional corps. ANA force generation remains on schedule in accordance with the accelerated program to increase the ANA end-strength to 134,000 soldiers by December 2011. Development of existing ANA forces continues to progress; as of May 2009, 29 kandaks had achieved Capability Milestone (CM) 1.

- Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT), or an ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT). ETTs and OMLTs provide ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and ISAF resources that enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively. ETTs, OMLTs, and U.S. Special Forces Units assess ANA units, helping the units identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.

- As of May 2009, the total requirement for U.S. ETT personnel for ANA training is 3,313 military personnel. ANA Units at the Corps level and below require 2,663 U.S. training personnel. The current U.S. contribution is 1,175 personnel, with 1,204 of those military personnel training ANA units at the Corps-level and below. The international community contribution of 55 OMLTs fills an additional 831 requirements. The low U.S. fill-rate is due to the concurrent mission to train the ANP. As stated above, a significant portion of the planned 2009 U.S. force increases will be dedicated to the ANSF training mission.

- NATO has committed to providing 103 OMLTs by the time the ANA reaches 134,000 personnel in 2011. As of April 2009, there were a total of 53 OMLTs out of the current requirement of 65 OMLTs.

- As of January 2009, the ANA has recruited 28,292 soldiers. We expect to recruit in excess of 34,000 by March 2009. The recruiting process remains unchanged from the previous report. The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 57 percent for soldiers and 63 percent for NCOs. This is an increase of seven percent for both soldiers and NCOs from the previous year. To encourage re-enlistment, the ANA approved an incentive pay package, a $20 per month pay increase, and the option for soldiers to sign one-year contracts.

- The current annual ANA absent AWOL rate is nine percent. With the exception of the 203rd Corps, AWOL rates are highest in units with high operational tempos. Other factors that contribute to high AWOL rates include poor leadership, difficulty returning from leave, and difficulty in supporting their families while deployed.

- The overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to corps-level is unchanged from the previous report; trends are positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism. In January 2009, the first 84 lieutenants graduated from the internationally-accredited National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) and received their commissions. The academy will provide an annual influx of professionally-trained young officers for the Army and Air Corps.

- ANA communications capability continues to improve. As of March 2009, the ANA is in the process of completing a planning annex to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). In March 2009 the
planning annex attained initial operating capability. This new capability is already greatly improving planning coordination between the ANA and coalition forces and enhancing development of ANA planning staff.

- The capability of the ANAAC continues to improve. Several milestones were reached in 2008. The first large fixed-wing movements of ANCOP occurred in July and August, moving 230 policemen from Herat to Kabul. A new ANAAC record for passengers transported in a single month was set in October 2008, with 9,337 personnel moved. The Air Corps moved an average of 54,000 kilograms (kg) of cargo and 9,100 passengers per month from between October and December of 2008, with an average of 810 sorties per month. Airlift numbers during January and February 2009 were lower due to poor weather conditions.

SIGAR has, however, reported some more current data on ANA readiness, and on the rising intensity of ANSF operations and the ANA casualties that result. These data are summarized in Figure V.3 to Figure V.5.

**Patterns in ANA Force Developments**

CSTC-A provided the following summary of ANA force developments at the end of June 2009:

- **Growing**
  - Already above 90,000.
  - Acceleration to 134,000 end-strength by Dec 2011; possible acceleration to achieve goal in 2010.
  - Expanding Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability; growing to 72 fixed wing aircraft and 67 helicopters by 2016
  - Building coordination with the ANP and NDS through five Operations Coordination Centers Regional and 29 Provincial
  - Increasing ANA infrastructure, completed 187 projects with 82 projects on-going and another 61 projects planned

- **Fielding**
  - 117 of 179 units fielded, 91,911 assigned of the 134,000 end-strength
  - NATO weapons and up- armored HMMWV fielding on-going; fielded 32,768 M16s and M4s, 1,760 M203s, 2,199 M249s, 1,138 M240Bs, 100 M2s, and 1,912 UAHs
  - 8 accelerated Infantry Kandaks for Hwy 1 security fielded between May – Dec 2009
  - 6 of 8 Commando Kandaks fielded, 7thkandak fielded Jan 2010

- **Fighting**
  - 76 of 117 units capable of leading operations
  - ANA has led 56% of the deliberate combat operations in the last 90 days
  - ANAAC currently executes over 90% of air movement requests for fixed wing aircraft
  - SOF mentoring 5 conventional Infantry Kandaks, and partnering with 14 other units

NTM-A and CSTC provided additional data on these goals in December 2009. They included:

- Develop and grow leaders for tomorrow,
- Generate professional, competent, capable ANSF,
- Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by October 2010,
- Provide an infantry centric, COPIN capable force, with minimal enablers initially,
- Provide for a more balance, self-sustaining force by end 2001 (adds military intelligence, military police, CS, route clearance, and other support units.)
• Prolong growth of highly specialized units (air wing, engineers, specialized branch of schools.)
• Partner and grow the ANA Air Corps,
• Develop Ministry of Defense (MoD) (MoI) systems,
• Develop the institutional base (training and education for force generation, and,
• Resource the fielded force.

NTM-A and CSTC confirmed the process will be conditions-based and to be revalidated in annual assessments, the first of which will be in the April-June 2010 time window. They noted that reaching the desired goals would require significant improvements in recruiting, retention, and attrition; as well as major improvements in the capacity to generate professional, competent, and capable officer and NCO leadership. They also said that efforts would be made to mitigate risks through partnering at all levels, and that there would be enhanced accountability of personnel, equipment, and pay.\textsuperscript{13xvi}
Figure V.3: DoD Data on Trends in the ANA


Figure V.4: SIGAR Reporting on ANA Developments in 2009

ANA Readiness Improvements: May-September 2009

Rise in ANSAF Operations:
Figure V.5: Trends in Casualties

ANA Casualties: July 1-September 20, 2009

TOTAL CASUALTIES BY MONTH, JULY–DECEMBER 2009

Note: Casualties recorded in December as of 12/27/2009.

ANA CASUALTIES BY PROVINCE

Note: Casualties reported from 8/21/2009 to 12/27/2009.

**Major Ongoing Problems**

There are other major problems that will require a sustained effort at every level from building the capacity of the Ministry of Defense to the individual Kandak.

**Corruption and Accountability**

In spite of the Army’s high reputation, and the relatively high integrity of the Ministry of Defense, corruption is still a serious challenge. This is evident at every level of the ANA, and in all regions of the country. The DoD Inspector General’s Office found a number of examples of persistent lack of accountability and corruption in visits to the regional commands:

**ARSIC-Central ETTs:**

Some corrupt ANA leaders appear to be getting around the Electronic Pay System (EPS) process in order to continue extorting soldiers’ pay. For example, there are reports of officers and NCOs devising methods to “get around the EPS system” to extort part of a soldier’s pay. This would occur, for example, when the soldier is required to give up his military ID card to the officer or NCO to obtain permission to go downtown to the bank. On his return, the soldier is required to pay to get the ID card back.

**ARSIC-South, J3 Staff:**

There is a problem in the 205th Corps with accountability and responsibility, not only for weapons and equipment, but also for personal behavior. There is no system in place for soldiers to be held accountable for their weapons, uniforms, assigned vehicles, or other equipment. There should be a functioning process and procedure for discipline at the Corps-level.

**ARSIC-East, RCAC Mentors:**

There is little accountability (e.g., clothing/inventory records), poor quality assurance and control, and virtually no consequences for loss or damage to equipment.

**ARSIC-East, HQ Personnel:**

For every 100 units of supply ordered by an ANA unit, on average, only about 80 or 90 will make it to the company. Additionally, 300 percent of the necessary cold weather gear had to be fielded to the 1st brigade, with no explanation for the duplication and no consequences to anyone for the loss and/or theft of the gear. And with no inventory records to document what has been issued to each soldier, the situation will not prove. ISAF/Coalition forces need to emphasize mentoring the concept of personal responsibility and accountability.

**ARSIC-South, OMLT Mentors (Canada):**

Very rarely is anyone punished for corruption or for losing equipment or uniforms, and if someone is reprimanded, it is usually quickly forgotten. A kandak commander from 205th Corps was caught stealing items from the unit’s mosque. When confronted, he blamed the interpreter, despite the fact that the items in question were found in the commander’s quarters. Although he was verbally reprimanded by the Corps Commander, supposedly court-martialed, and relieved of his command, the kandak commander went back to his unit and is still in command. Reportedly, a Corps Commander does not have the authority to relieve a kandak commander. That authority is held at the MoD. In another case, a kandak was issued 25 new vehicles, but while transporting them from the depot to the unit location, 21 of the vehicles were damaged or destroyed. No one was held accountable.

Corruption in the ANA cannot be separated from the more serious problems in the ANP—which affect all ANA operations with the ANP and the relative ability of each force to carry out any given part of the “clear, hold, build, and transfer” mission. Paying for police commander positions another manifestation of the wider corruption issue. Wealthy Afghans pay enormous sums ($200,000 – 400,000) to be installed as commanders. These sums seem outrageous, yet a police commander in the south can earn more than $600,000 a year extorting and collecting taxes on the drug trade. Unfortunately, most police commanders are appointed directly from Kabul, rather than from the provinces in which they operate, complicating efforts to combat this practice.
While efforts to combat this corruption are ongoing, they have been hampered by a lack of enforcement of rules and regulations in both the ANP and ANA. Inspector General programs in the MoI and MoD are under-staffed, under-resourced, and under-mentored. According to an OMLT member, “They had no functioning military law or administrative punishment systems so even if they wanted to sanction someone it would have been impossible.”

Accountability for personnel presents related problems. ANA and ANP recruits are still not properly vetted. Personnel use this lack of vetting to abuse the system in various ways. For instance, a common practice among ANA soldiers stationed in the south is to go AWOL or leave after their first 3 years are finished and then head north to join the ANA again under a different name.

A Lack of Officers and NCOs

The ANA also faces a serious shortage of qualified officers, NCOs, and specialists. Additionally the ANA struggles to recruit specialists, such as logistics and medical support personnel. These problems stem partly from a deficiency of qualified, literate recruits, and partly from a lack of training, incentives, and retention. As a result, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, “When we’re talking about basic training, we’re talking about really basic training.”

To put this problem in perspective, the Iraqi Army has also struggled to fill its NCO and officer ranks, despite having much higher literacy rates, as well as a recruitment pool of thousands of former Saddam-era officers with professional army training; there is no equivalent recruitment pool in Afghanistan. Ironically, despite decades of near constant war, Afghanistan lacks experienced and qualified officers and NCOs. Officer training is one of the few areas of the ANSF development effort where training facilities are more than adequate: ANA officer training schools regularly have only a 40-60% fill rate.

Another issue affecting officer quality is the over-centralization of the ANA. Promotions, demotions, sackings and appointments are all highly centralized in Kabul. This is based upon the highly centralized Soviet model, which permeates much of the structure and thinking of the modern ANA. The current system actually appears to be even more centralized than the Soviet one. In Soviet times, “. . . a corps commander had the right to sack subordinate officers up to the ranks of battalion commander if he wanted to, whereas now even sacking a non-commissioned officer is not possible at the corps level.”

The shortage of officers and leaders will continue to harm ANA performance in the future, and grow worse in the near term because of the increases in the goal for ANA end strength. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to solve this problem unless enough mentors are embedded in ANA units, and more attention is given to putting “partner” units or cadres where they can help train officers and NCOs in the field. Better pay and training facilities can help somewhat. But officers cannot be created overnight. It takes time for promising recruits to prove themselves in the field, and work their way through deployments and officer training.

Both ISAF and the leaders of the ANA do understand the seriousness of these problems and are placing serious emphasis on improving ANA leadership at the NCO and Officer ranks. Gen McCrystal stated: “It's more important than doctrine. It's more important even than ideology and more important than equipment.” Leading experts believe it takes 10 years to
develop a military however after 9 years inside Afghanistan, most of which spent neglecting force development, the ANA are at the 6th year in the cycle. lxxxi

The challenges involved are compounded however by problems in Afghanistan’s military culture and a disconnect between mentors and the leadership styles used by many Afghan commanders creating a rift between NCO’s and Officers. Commanders who led during the Soviet-era are less likely to value NCO’s or utilize their staff, contrary to western military teaching in Kabul. Other problems exist because Mujahedeen commanders placed in conventional ANA units are more likely to use creative unorthodox ways to secure and govern an area, again counter to western conventional army standards. Furthermore, as young officer’s graduating from the National Military Academy in Kabul, often feel frustrated by the fact that they are not utilized or valued by their Afghan Commanders in the ways they are trained to expect. lxxxii

Some officers serving in Afghanistan suggest that it would be possible to grow the ranks of junior officers by instituting a commissioning program for senior NCOs. These NCOs, and in particular Sergeant Majors, may be suitable to serve as Captains or Majors without additional training. lxxiii Many promising senior NCOs could be recruited into junior officer ranks but are currently wasting their talents as NCOs.

According to an ex-ANA advisor, “Senior NCOs indicated to this author they were departing the service because they are not valued within the ANA and there is no upward mobility for Sergeants Major beyond the Corps level. Many of these quality leaders are in their late 20s or early 30s and ready for increased responsibility. Unfortunately, the Soviet mentality among the ANA officer corps translates into little delegation of responsibility to senior NCOs. There is a fear that the NCOs will outshine the officers. Senior NCOs often exit the army fed up with mediocrity. It is not uncommon from them to take contractor jobs making three or four times their ANA salary.”lxxxiv

Training, Motivation, and Retention

Other challenges exist in training, motivation, and force retention. The extremely high attrition rate, in particular, will make any expansion of the force extremely difficult. The recent trends in training are summarized in Figure V.7. These trends do indicate that recruitment and training track roughly with the general distribution of the ethnic structure of the population, and significant numbers of skilled trainees are now entering the ANA. Ethnic and religious discrimination in promotion does remain an issue, and recruiting of Southern Pashtu’s is poor. Moreover, Tajiks make up some 41% of officers, but only 27% of the population. lxxxv

The most serious problems in formal training occur however, because of a failure to enforce training standards. There are serious problems in both ANA and all other aspects of ANSF training because virtually all Afghans pass training courses, regardless of performance. Unfortunately, it is not apparent that trainers can be trusted to rate the impact of their own training, and while the Afghan Army has considerably more integrity in its training effort than the Afghan police, it still has strong internal pressures to pass virtually all of those who enter training out as successes, regardless of actual performance. According to one first lieutenant working at the Kabul Military Training Command, “Afghan soldiers leave the KMTC grossly unqualified. American mentors do what they can to try and fix these problems, but their efforts are blocked by pressure from higher, both in Afghan and American chains of command, to pump out as many soldiers as fast as possible.”lxxxvi
Motivation and morale are different issues. They vary by unit, and many ANA units have fought fiercely, and taken casualties. But, reports of unmotivated ANA officers and enlisted men are common. One OMLT member observed, upon visiting an ANA brigade headquarters “His [brigade commander Gen. Bashir] cell phone is their primary communications link. The G2 is off somewhere playing chess with a source, the G3 is driving around the city by himself looking for troops to jack up and the G4 is taking a nap. Most of the rest of the headquarters are off playing cards or chess or watching Bollywood videos on a cell phone.”xxxvii This brigade was rated capability milestone 1(CM1), the highest possible rating for an ANA unit.

Motivation, leadership, and pay have all interacted to make retention of personnel is major problem in the ANSF. ANA units have been pushed beyond their limit by over-deployment for periods outside their home areas for over three years, often in areas without adequate facilities, equipment stocks and maintenance, and leave policies. The situation has been even worse for the Afghan Uniformed Police, (AUP), who lose substantial numbers each month.

The official ANA annual desertion rate is “only” 10%. Yet this figure masks the overall loss rate for the ANA. 12% annually do not re-enlist, which added to the 10% desertion rate, plus sickness, casualties, and other factors, means that 25% of the ANA quits, deserts, is killed/injured, or otherwise leaves the service every year.xxxviii Some analysts believe that these retention rates will make it impossible for the ANA to expand much beyond 100,000 personnel, as at that point the accession rate will be less than annual losses.xxxix

These problems have been compounded by problems in pay, although the situation is getting better as ANA and ANP become paid directly, rather than through their commanders. Pay to both ANA and ANP personnel has often been irregular, and was frequently stolen – at least in part -- by superior officers, despite the CSTC-A’s efforts to prevent this. Direct pay reduces these problems, although officers can still charge for positions and promotions, tax their troop’s part of their pay, and use less open forms of extortion.

The level of pay has also been a major problem in the past. ISAF and CSTA-A did not properly survey either the ANA or ANP to determine the reasons for growing recruiting and retention problems until late 2009. As a result, the ANP suffered for some years from being so underpaid that it virtually became corrupt out of sheer necessity – a problem compounded by far more erratic pay than in the ANA, worse training and leadership, worse facilities and equipment, and much higher casualty levels.

This problem was eventually reduced for the ANP by raising ANP salaries to the level of the ANA, but this did not address the fact that at least the starting salary of both forces was notably lower that the pay given to Taliban and insurgent fighters. The end result was desertion rate that official sources put at 25%, but many of those involved stated the actual range was from 35% to 50% over time. Furthermore, it was a situation which sharply affected loyalty and led soldiers and policemen to warn the Taliban and other fighters of coming operations for relatively small bribes, or to cooperate with insurgents in providing intelligence or allowing infiltration.xc

This led to a crisis in recruitment that the US and ISAF conspicuously failed to make public – or properly reflect in its combat readiness assessments – until late 2009. It was only in December 2009 that the NATO advisory team announced that it had found that this disparity
in pay was a major problem in recruiting, and that the Taliban was averaging $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120-$180 a month. ANA and ANP salaries were then raised to levels closer to $240 a month. This raised ANA recruiting from average lows far below the required level – and only 831 in September 2009 – to 2,659 in the first week of September 2009 – roughly half of the entire monthly quota level. It also led some 60 deserters out of 80 in one unit to return to service once they learned that the new pay system was in effect.

The increased pay in late 2009 greatly helped recruitment numbers. December 2009 was the best recruiting month in years, with more people signing up for training than the training centers could handle. If recruitment numbers stay at December 2009 levels, the ANA should be able to maintain its current size or even expand. These same announcements acknowledged that literacy training was being added as both an incentive for recruiting and retention, and to improve force quality. The briefings indicated that some 65% of ANA recruits were functionally illiterate – a major problem for training any kind of Afghan force above the ordinary infantry soldier level.

Figure V.6: ANA Recruitment from 2004-2009

In February of 2008, the MoD announced “Merit-Based Rank, Promotions and Salary Reform.” The modification ensures officers are paid according to rank, position and merit. The ripple effect of this restructuring is overdue as some situations existed in which mid-level NCOs were paid more than their junior officers in charge of Company size units.

Pay increases and reform, better equipment, enlargement of force strength and positive public perception have all contributed to the increase in recruiting. As shown in Figure V.6, in 2004 the ANA were only able to recruit a dismal 9,671 soldiers versus the more than 36,000 new recruits in 2009.

Another problem in ANSF recruitment rarely mentioned in DoD’s relentlessly positive reporting is the lack of troops in the 35 – 55 age range. This is a demographic problem, as
Afghanistan’s wars have simply killed off many of the available recruits in this age range. The CRS estimates that it will take a “generation” to fill this gap.\textsuperscript{xcv}

President Karzai has suggested one solution to these problems. He stated to the international community in Munich that he was considering a re-implementation of conscription. Prior to the fall of the Russian backed government in 1992, service in the military was compulsory. President Karzai believes conscription is a way to lessen the burden of international security forces, integrate Afghans and teach them skills they will bring back to villages throughout the country. This may be one possible solution to address the low recruiting numbers, ethnic tension, lack of Pashtu involvement in the ANA, and high unemployment rate. President Karzai said that he is consulting with his advisors and is being urged by community leaders, Karzai does not, however, seem to have the support of the Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak.\textsuperscript{xcvi}

**Leave Policies and Setting the Right Operational Tempo**

Troop use is also an issue. Paid leave is irregular in both the ANA and ANP. This is a major problem when soldiers and police frequently have to travel far through Afghanistan’s poor transport systems to reach their families and deliver the money they have earned. Many ANSF go on leave and are forces to stay on leave until their family gets enough cash together to buy the service member a ticket back to their unit.

These problems are compounded by inadequate unit rotation. There are essentially no regular unit rotations in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{xcvii} That means that ANA units stationed in the south or east, where fighting is constantly intense, never get a break. Meanwhile forces in the north rarely see real combat. Not surprisingly, this results in the units in constant combat having much higher attrition rates. Even during training, before units deploy to the south, desertions can be high. According to Lt. Col Daniel J. Walczyk “As soon as they find out we are sending them to the south, we start losing them.”\textsuperscript{xcviii}

This lack of unit rotation also harms the officer corps. A Kabul officer clique has formed, wherein officer rotate through Kabul units, including the ANA General staff, and do not rotate out to units elsewhere in the country. This has created a sense of cronyism among these Kabul officers, and lowers morale for less well-connected officers out in the field.\textsuperscript{xcix}

Additionally, the high operational tempo of ANA units in the south, as well as the high pressure on the ANA to take part in operations, has negatively affected the force. In some instances, over-ambitious operational plans have forced logistical and administrative units to the front when combat units were not available.\textsuperscript{c} This badly harms the moral of non-combat units.

It should be noted that many of these problems are directly related to the past under resourcing of the ANSF development program; rushing forces into combat without adequate or competent mentors and partners; and over-deployment of forces outside their home area and without proper leave policies. They have also been driven by past failures to properly survey Afghans as to why retention and desertion problems are so great, and to look at how Afghans perceive issues like pay and privileges, leave policies, promotion and assignments, medical services, death and disability, equipment, and facilities. US and ISAF reporting often criticizes Afghan leadership and morale without demonstrating that mentors and partners have been asked to systematically gather data on Afghan perceptions and to look beyond motivation and morale.
Figure V.7: Recent Trends in ANA Training

ANA Training Graduates by Specialty: July 1 to September 30, 2009

ANA Training Graduates by Program: October 1 to December 24, 2009

Total Graduates: 12,625

Kabul Military Training Center
10,591

Other Training Programs
369

Consolidated Fielding Center
1,665

Other Training Programs: 369

- Explosive Ordnance Disposal: 137
- Counter-insurgency Training Center-Afghanistan: 93
- Command and General Staff College: 92
- Logistics School: 52

a. At the Consolidated Fielding Center, units form, equip, and conduct initial collective training.


Literacy and Manpower Quality

As has been touched upon earlier, illiteracy remains a major challenge to the development of the ANSF. Only 28% of Afghans are literate – 13% of females and 43% of males. About 70% of recruits to the ANSF are functionally illiterate. Some sources place the illiteracy rate of new recruits at 90%. The ability to read is necessary in a number of positions in the ANSF, most prominently NCOs and mechanics/logistics technicians.

While these problems are solvable, ISAF literacy programs only recently had priority, and have thus far been marginally effective. ANP and ANA literacy programs have run into many of the same problems affecting the rest of force development – a shortage of qualified teachers, a lack of PMTs and ETTs, the difficulty of reaching personnel in remote locations, poor oversight, and the demands of the security situation. As with many other problems, illiteracy was worse among the ANP than the ANA. Unfortunately, ISAF “has not yet published a literacy development plan, with metrics to measure performance, nor issued clear guidance to its trainers and mentors on program oversight responsibilities.” While CSTC-A has recently begun to make literacy training a priority, it remains to be seen whether it will be effective at raising literacy rates in the ANSF.

The low literacy rates of ANA recruits also reflect a deeper problem. Some research indicates that most ANA recruits in the East of Afghanistan come from the poorest and most disadvantaged communities. Economic considerations, rather than any sense of nationalism, seem to be the main motivating factors for ANA recruits. This is indicated by the low recruitment rates before the base pay rate was raised in late 2009. Other factors, such as seasonal employment patterns and increased attention from MoD senior leaders may also have added to the higher recruitment rate, although money is clearly the primary factor.

Ethnicity and Loyalty Issues

While the ethnic makeup of the ANA now has a better balance, it has been a source of tension since 2001. Tajiks have always been over represented in the ANA, specifically in the officer corps. This was due initially to the huge number of Northern Alliance personnel transferring to the ANA upon the alliance’s victory over the Taliban in 2001. The Tajik over-representation has persisted and continues today, however, Pashtu’s, who make up the majority of the Taliban, are under-represented. The ethnic makeup of the ANA, as of 2008, is shown in Figure IV.8.

The ethnic makeup of the ANA masks a deeper problem. Promotions within the ANA also are often based upon patronage, ethnicity, money, or personal loyalty rather than upon ability. Entrenched and powerful patronage networks dominate the promotions system in the ANA, and have created large blocks of officers whose loyalty to the central government is dubious at best. By far the largest and most important of these networks revolves around Basmillah Khan: . . . the chief of staff of the army, who in 2008 (according to an unofficial survey carried out in cooperation with ANA generals) could count on the loyalty of an estimated six out of eleven brigade commanders and twelve battalion commanders out of forty-six. As chief of staff, moreover, Basmillah Khan was able to appoint loyal deputies to commanders he did not trust, or to win some degree of support among professional officers who had to lobby Basmillah in order to get a promotion. Aside from Basmillah’s network, other networks in the ANA are comparatively small. Minister of Defense Wardak could count in 2008 on the personal loyalty of only a single brigade commander (at least one
other brigade commander tended to sympathies with Wardak in the name of shared Pashtu ethnicity, despite being linked to a different political faction). Hazara groups like the various factions of Hizb-I Wahdat and Harakat-I Islami had the loyalty of a brigade commander and five battalion commanders, while four battalion commanders were linked to General Dostum and his group Junbesh- I Milli. A significant number of brigade and battalion commanders (over a third of the total) were not directly linked to any political faction and considered themselves as professionals; almost all of them had a background in the pro-Soviet army of the 1980s, but were often indebted to some of the factions mentioned above for having facilitated their careers.

In addition to the rivalry between these patronage groups, and the general ethnic tensions cutting across the ANA, and other rivalry simmers between former mujahedeen officers and those who served in the pro-Soviet army in the 1980s. While the seriousness of this rivalry is questionable, some advisors and mentors spend “substantial amounts of time” managing this rivalry.\textsuperscript{cv}
Figure V.8: Ethnic Mix of ANA Personnel Compared with the Ethnic Mix of Total Population


Ethnic Representation: ANA Graduates vs. General Population (Percent)

Equipment Issues

Figure V.9 shows that ANA equipment deliveries are increasing and the equipment is getting better, but problems remain and requirements must change if the ANA is to become a balanced force that can both be a true partner and accept an eventual transfer of responsibility. The Department of Defense stated in its June 2009 report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan that,

M16 assault rifle fielding continues in the 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps and Capital Division. NATO weapons fielding will be complete by spring 2010. Commando kandaks are currently equipped with U.S. and NATO weapons systems that include the M4 carbine and 81mm mortars. As of March 2009, the CSTC-A program to refurbish existing artillery (122mm, D30) is funded and awaiting award of contract. CSTC-A is attempting to acquire additional D30 artillery systems to expedite artillery fielding. In addition to artillery, CSTC-A is currently in the process of fielding more than 4,100 high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to the ANA, with expected completion by mid-2010.

Similarly, SIGAR reported in September 2009 that,

ANA personnel are equipped with M16 A2 rifles and M24 sniper rifles; M203A2 grenade launchers; and M2, M240, and M249 machine guns. For transportation, the ANA uses light and medium tactical vehicles (LTVs and MTVs), armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and ambulances. For communication, the ANA uses base-station, portable, vehicle-mounted, and handheld radios.

SIGAR added that in the last quarter of 2009 the ANA: “fielded 1,791 radios, 980 vehicles, and 15,097 weapons (see Figure 3.23), according to CSTC-A. The only weapons that the ANA procured this quarter were 12,305 M16A4 rifles. The largest difference in equipment fielded was the number of weapons, which was more than seven times as many as last quarter.”

The fact remains, however, that this equipment is very light by US and ISAF standards, and no current plans seem exist to give the ANA more than light armor or artillery. This means the ANA has no procurement plan that would equip it to accept a large-scale transfer of responsibility after mid-2011.

ANA Corps commanders report that their soldiers have old and unreliable equipment left over from the mujahedin DDR process, and their ammunition is of lower quality and reliability than that of the insurgent. CSTC notes that not every unit will be given new Western equipment, but that five corps now have M-16s or reconditioned AK-47s, uparmored HUMVEEs, new uniforms and body armor, and the other equipment they need. It reports that the other Corps will get such equipment by the end of 2009. Accelerating the growth of the ANA may require new units to be formed with full combat support, but not combat service support, and older – though functional and reconditioned types of equipment.

The past under equipping Afghan forces has been both morally reprehensible, and fiscally irresponsible. A trained Afghan soldier is far more expensive to replace than is his weapons and ammunition, should he become a casualty or fail to reenlist due to substandard equipment that puts him at undue risk. If partner troops who rely on NATO for support (ANA) are committed to combat, they should have modern equipment that is at least a match for insurgents, and reliable ammunition.

ISAF also needs to be sensitive to Afghan concerns that the ANA and its Air Corps eventually acquire the heavier weapons needed to defend the country without ISAF support. It is easy to
forget that Afghan forces once operated some 15 divisions with 1,300 tanks, over 1,000 armored fighting vehicles, large numbers of artillery and 120 jet combat aircraft plus armed helicopters. There is a clear need to concentrate on the insurgency, but ISAF must not forget that Afghanistan’s neighbors are scarcely pacifists and issues like Afghan honor and prestige remain significant.

**Figure V.9: Afghan Major Equipment Deliveries: October 1 – December 24**


### ANA Intelligence

ANA military intelligence still has major problems. Intelligence issues are inherently difficult to discern from unclassified reporting. However, it is clear that ANA intelligence capabilities are severely lacking. According to one Canadian intelligence office in a OMLT,

“The ANA intelligence section responsible for this area comprised five personnel. The two officers had received some training in their responsibilities; the NCOs had received only OJT. At the kandak level, the intelligence section was between 1 and 3 personnel. There is supposed to be one reconnaissance company per brigade, but throughout Afghanistan these are being used as regular infantry to hold fixed locations. That meant the combat intelligence teams had no information to evaluate other than the remarkably useless intreps they would receive from Corps. All the officers had their personal and confidential network of contacts, but that information would never be written down or passed on. With nothing coming in, at battalion, brigade, even corps levels, there was no collation system, no battle map to update, no analysis to conduct, no briefings to give.”

### Detainee Operations

Detainee operations pose a special problem for both the ANA and ANP. While ISAF forces have recently revised their detainee procedures to better separate hard-core insurgents from more reconcilable ones, ANA detainee operations remain troubling.

A Canadian OMLT member described typical Afghan treatment of detainees:

“The army handed over detainees as soon as possible to the NDS, who tended to immediately release them. At the time, all detainee cases had to be resolved within 72 hours. No questioning was conducted, and any statements of identity taken at face value: to do otherwise was considered rude. In most cases the detainee would soon be released upon payment of a surety: only the friendless went to Sarpoza [the Kandahar detention facility]. We’d run into some of them again, and it’s fair to say every high level insurgent in the province had been through the mill at least once. More problematic to me was the disposition of detainees while in custody, either left to sit around in the intelligence office, or
sometimes next to the brigade commander . . . for extended periods. It’s fair to say that any bona fide insurgent in ANA custody probably learned more from the experience than the other way around.”

Creating the ANA Needed to Win

The US and ISAF need to work with the Afghan MoD and ANA immediately to set clear goals for both correcting the qualitative problems in the ANA, and creating the base for a level of force expansion that may eventually have to double the present force goals for the ANA, although the actual goal should be regularly recalibrated – depending on the actual level of Afghan progress and the course of the fighting.

To succeed, ISAF and the US must carry out the following additional tasks to improve and expand the ANA:

- Focus on improving the quality of their effort to partner, mentor, and train ANA units in the field and to continuously monitor the success of its efforts to create truly effective forces. ISAF commanders at every level must make partnering and training key real-world parts of their operations and ensure that ANA units achieve true operational readiness.

- Identify and commit the resources needed to rapidly execute this expansion. These resources should include a third U.S. BCT on the model of the two new partner/mentor BCTs.

- Properly equipping and supplying ANA soldiers for combat must be a high priority.

- Alter the present CM rating system to rate actual combat performance; to gauge capability to conduct truly independent operations without enablers; and to track the success of partnering and mentoring. This task must be conducted jointly with the GIRoA.

- Ensure that ANA forces have proper ISAF support and enablers. This should not be a secondary role, when the ANA can be made a key part of operations. This reliance on ISAF should be reduced steadily with time, but it should not limit the development of the ANA, and the quality of partnership, in the interim.

- Constantly re-evaluate the deployment of the ANA and other ANSF forces to reflect the overall needs of the campaign and not the demands of Afghan politics and power brokers. Some ISAF and ANSF commanders in the field proposed to the Team that ANA forces be reapportioned across Afghanistan – typically, with a net increase in their own respective battles paces. In practice, there does not seem to be much room for implementing unit rotation policies to relieve units now engaged in combat, since no region currently has a surplus of ANA forces, and since far more ANA forces are already deployed in relatively ‘hot’ areas, including the south and east, than in the north and west. MoD’s fielding plans call for prioritizing the south, but ISAF needs to press the GIRoA to ensure that newly formed units are allocated where they are most needed, and not for political purposes.

Another core element of success is an ISAF decision that it must fund a substantial further expansion of the ANSF. This means sustained financing of the ANA by the international community, most by the United States Government, but also by other ISAF countries as has been noted previously.

**Key Decisions About the ISAF and US Role in ANA Force Development**

A successful US strategy to win the war in Afghanistan – and to create a true host country partner – does, however, require the full – and ruthlessly self-honest and objective – implementation of several decisions to shape the development of the ANA.
The first decision is to accelerate training and improvements in partnering and force development to ensure the ANA can actually reach nominal effective strength of 134,000 men in 2010, while creating the base that can make future major expansions in the ANSF by 2011-2014. NTM-A/CSTYC-A has set a tentative goal of 159,000 by July 2011, and 240,000 by 2013. This will mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and in mentors or partner units. Resources to do this well should be identified and committed concurrently. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such as expansion is now needed. If ISAF is more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to be done both at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.

The second decision is to end the shortfall in NATO and ETT mentors, and resources. There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but there is no doubt about the scale of shortfalls through 2009. CSTC-A reported that the ANA needed minimum of 67 OMLTs plus US trainers in July 2009. However, it had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. American ETTs were also under resourced in the past, though ETTs are being replaced by the “two BCT” concept of providing mentors. The requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of CY2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25. Expert analysis is needed, but it may take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team (changing the two-BCT approach to a three-BCT one) to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new “enablers” like artillery, engineering, C2, medical services, as well as logistics and sustainability.

The third decision is to focus on building up the capability of deployed units, rather than over-relying on formal training. Even the best formal training process is only the prelude to shaping the capabilities of new units in the field, testing leaders, providing practical experience, and supporting ANA and key ANP units with experienced cadres of mentors and partner units. Practical training in both operations and unit management and leadership is more critical with newly-formed units than formal training, and critical to limiting corruption and the scale of retention and AWOL problems. Even if the formal training process provided more extensive (or meaningful) training at the full Kandak or other unit level, inexperienced units would still be dependent on the “on the job” mentoring and support they receive in the field. Some experts suggest this can be accomplished by embedding a brigade combat team, brigade, or similar force into each echelon of each ANA Corps (which cover the same areas as the ANP regional commands) to provide the expertise and enablers to carry out joint planning, intelligence, command and control capabilities, fire support, logistic expertise, and other capabilities that the ANA now lacks and can acquire through partnership and joint operations with the US.

The fourth decision is to create a full operational partnership, focused around the development of the ANA and key elements of the ANP, so that Afghans are a true partner in all NATO/ANSF and US operations and take the lead in joint operations as soon as possible. It is not enough for ISAF units to partner with the ANSF. The ANSF must be made a full partner at the command level as well. Afghans should see Afghans taking the lead in the field as soon as practical, and as playing a critical role in shaping all plans and operations as well as in implementing hold and build. This often cannot be done immediately; it must be done as soon as possible.

At a broader level, the US, ISAF, the Afghan government, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense need to make another critical set of choices. They must define how the Afghan government will use the ANA to work with civilian partners, and put these concepts into practice in the field. It is all very well to use a slogan like “clear, hold, and build.” It is quite another to systematically implement it as part of a population centric strategy. The ANA will also have to be capable of civil-military operations. No matter how much effort is made to improve the integrity, size, and capability of the various elements of the Afghan police, improve Afghan governance, and create an effective structure for prompt justice – there will be 3 to 5 years in which the ANA will have to play a critical role in various clear and hold efforts, and in helping local, aid, and government workers in various build roles.
VI. The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC)

The Afghan Army National Air Corps is still very much a work in progress, as is shown in Figure VI.1. The Afghan National Army Air Corps got a late start and lags behind the development of other ANSF. The ANAAC is already contributing to the COIN fight, and further contributions –mainly, lift and medical evacuation – would be very welcome, and could relieve ISAF of some key requirements. Current ANAAC development plans are tailored to Afghan needs and capabilities. is, however, a clear case for giving the ANSF at least the currently planned mix of air lift, battlefield, mobility, RW attack, IS&R, and multi-role capability. This would expand the ANAAC from a total of 36 aircraft and 2,500 airmen today to 139 aircraft by CY 2016.

The mistakes the US and ISAF have made in using airpower over the last eight years have shown, however, that there is a broader and more urgent role that the ANAAC can perform. It can develop the skills to support NATO in targeting and managing air operations, and take on responsibility for vetting air strikes and air operations. Such a partnership would do much to assure Afghans that Afghan forces were true partners in all air operations and played the proper role in reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Such a “red card” role presents obvious difficulties, but it will be applied to all ISAF operations, including ground operations, in time. Working to make it effective now as well as a key partner and part Afghan and ISAF strategic communications could have major benefits.
Figure VI.1: The Afghan National Army Air Corps
VII. The Afghan National Police (ANP)

The vast majority of the ANP are lacking in both capacity and capability. These problems have long been mission-critical, and have greatly increased ANP casualties. Yet, the new strategy calls for the ANP to play the lead role in “holding” any area that has been cleared, and in providing security during “building”. These clear/hold/build/transfer activities are not to be thought of as sequential in any given battle space, let alone across the theater, which makes a competent ANP all the more essential.

Improving the ANA may be the most urgent immediate need in combat, but no one can ignore the fact the Afghan police force is still a “broken” force. With the exception of the ANCOP part of the forces, it cannot operate effectively in the face of serious insurgent threats. Improvements in pay do not solve its problems with power brokers and corruption, and it lacks anything approaching effective civil partners and the other components of an effective prompt justice system and rule of law. Moreover, corruption within the Ministry of the Interior remains a problem – compounded by corruption in other elements of the Afghan government at the national, provincial, district, and local levels.

NTM-A has recently put into place an effort to train the entire force within 2 years, and the FDD reform program is accelerating. Yet, police reform is extremely difficult in a COIN environment, particularly in a country as large, diverse, and inaccessible as Afghanistan. Furthermore, the reform effort is dependent on adequate contributions and trainers and mentors from ISAF countries, contributions that so far shows little prospect of meeting the required levels of quality and quantity.

The Structure of the ANP

The structure of the Afghan National Police units is shown in Figure VII.1. Like the ANA, the Afghan National Police have expanded significantly in recent years. This expansion has, however, been less effective than that of the ANA- reflecting both resource problems and just how late ISAF and member countries realize that conventional police could not survive in a growing insurgency. As of early 2010, much of the ANP remained largely untrained, and had massive problems with corruption, drug use, retention, and equipment. Police casualties have also remained very high. According to Gen., McChrystal, the Taliban “have put a severe amount of pressure on the police, particularly in areas where security is immature and so the police have borne the brunt of terrific amount of insurgent pressure, which increases police casualties, which makes it harder for the police to rebound.”

The ANP has also been slow to expand to anything like the force required. The force goal for the ANP was still only 60,000 in February 2006 -- for a country of some 33.6 million people – a far larger population than in Iraq with a larger territory, a far more dispersed population, and with far worse lines of communication and ease of movement at every level. It only rose to 82,000 in May 2007, and then to 86,800 in April 2009 and 96,800 in June.

According to CSTC-A, the ANP strength in Oct. 2009 was 94,000, with the goal of 109,000 by Oct. 2010 and 134,000 by Oct. 2011. In order to reach the 2010 projection, the ANP will need to increase officer strength by 15,000 in 2010. Yet they must but bring in 66,800 in order to overcome the 67% attrition rate among new recruits, as well as make up for the 20% annual attrition in the fielded force. In order to reach 2011 projections, the ANP will need to increase
troop strength by another 25,000 but bring in 102,800. Total recruits needed to accomplish Oct. 2011 goals will exceed 188,000. See Figure II.3

As is the case with the ANA, the mid to long-term goals for the expansion of the police are in flux. However, Lt. General William B. Caldwell, who is now in charge of the overall US and ISAF force development effort, stated in an interview on December 1, 2009 that the current force goal was still 96,800 ANP by October 31, 2010. He did state that the groundwork was being laid for expansion of the ANP beyond the goal of 96,000, but that no higher goal had been set. The force is being trained and equipped using an eventual goal of 160,000 police as a planning factor.

**Historical Background**

The history of the Afghan War is largely a history of failures at the policy level, and the national security leaders in the US government – as well as allied governments like Germany – failed dismally to come to grips with creating an effective ANP. Since 2001, a series of failures to develop an effective Afghan National Police gravely undercut the chances for victory. It took until FY 2004 for the United States and ISAF to even begin serious funding of the police effort. Given the lead times involved in creating effective units, this meant that any major output from the funding could only begin in FY 2005 and could only gather serious momentum in FY 2006. In practice, however, the actual training effort was so badly manned and organized that the actual pace of progress was far slower.

For most of this period, ISAF did not realize how difficult it would be for the ANP to function as a civil police force in country without a functioning criminal and civil justice system in most areas; without courts and jails; and where the formal justice system is far more corrupt, ineffective, and harder to access for some 95% of the population than the informal local justice system.

Worse, it took years to develop anything approaching a meaningful approach to police training and organization, and to reflect the reality that Afghanistan was still at war and faced a steadily growing insurgency. Germany was given the lead responsibility for police training in February 2002, and this resulted in an almost surrealistic mix of incompetence driven by, training the ANP for Western style police missions, under-resourcing it, and failing to react to the growth of the insurgent threat.

The problems with the German approach were detailed in a 2009 USIP report:

The Germans developed an initial plan for training the Afghan police based upon the European model of creating a police academy that would provide a university-level education for officers and a shorter academic program for noncommissioned officers. The Germans committed $70 million toward renovating the police academy in Kabul, provided eleven police instructors, refurbished Kabul police stations, and donated fifty police vehicles. The first team of German police advisers arrived in Kabul on March 16 and the German Coordination Office was opened on March 18, 2002. The Coordination Office supervised the reconstruction of the police academy, which formally reopened on August 22, 2002, with 1,500 officer cadets enrolled in a five-year program. The academy also offered a three-month recruit course for 500 noncommissioned officers.

The Germans seemed to have assumed that professionalism and integrity could be developed by a small cadre of police officers, but lacked anything approaching the capacity to train large numbers of rank-and-file policemen. Indeed the Kabul Police Academy was only intended to be effective in training small cadres of Afghan leaders. The GPPO stated that the plan was
“to start with the backbone, that’s why we started with the leaders,” but it soon became evident that this effort was far too small to reach the rank-and-file in contact with the civilian population, and that many leaders still remained ineffective or corrupt. The result was the German effort that was far too small to develop a police force for a country the size of Afghanistan. A German general stated, the effort was a “miserable failure” that would have taken “82 years” to complete.

These problems led the US State Department to supplement the German program during 2003-2005, with very limited success. The US used contractors in DynCorp, to greatly expand the training program, with 71,147 Afghan police receiving training. However, this new training program was rushed, haphazard, and generally ineffective. According to the USIP:

The quality of the training received by the majority of the graduates of the U.S. program is open to question. In Afghanistan, contract instructors faced a formidable challenge. Trainees had little or no previous classroom experience. They sat on hard benches for hours a day in prefabricated classrooms that baked in the summer and froze in the winter, listening to instructors who spoke in English and poorly trained Afghan translators unfamiliar with police terminology. Few of the American instructors were professional police trainers and there was little or no use of adult-learning techniques. Because more than 70 percent of the Afghan trainees were illiterate, most of those trained received only the fifteen-day program. The inability of recruits to read and write inhibited their ability to absorb information and learn basic police skills, such as taking statements from witnesses, writing incident reports, and maintaining records.

Trainees did not remain at the training centers long enough to absorb much detail or the ethos of democratic policing through contact with the instructors. The U.S. training program also failed to provide the type of follow-on field training that had been a constant feature of similar U.S. programs in Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans. Afghan trainees were returned to their place of origin with no follow-up to determine whether they were applying their training or to account for the uniforms, equipment, and weapons that were issued at the end of the training period. Many were assigned to static guard duty or reduced to serving under untrained and corrupt leaders who possessed little understanding of the role of police in a democratic society.

In addition to problems with training, the international police assistance program suffered from a lack of agreement on overall strategic objectives and coordination between the U.S. and German programs, as well as poor leadership from the Afghan Interior Ministry, which supervised the police, and inadequate funding. In May 2002, the UN Development Program established the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to enable donors to contribute funds for police salaries. By 2004, only $11.2 million of the $65 million requested had been contributed. Failure to provide funding meant that the Afghan government could not support the deployment of national police outside the capital. Even in Kabul, Afghan police went unpaid for months, a situation that resulted in petty corruption that undermined public confidence. Increasingly, the public regarded the Afghan National Police with a mixture of fear and disdain.

It was only in June 2005 – after the police had become heavily tied to warlord militia forces – which a serious police training effort began. Responsibility for the US police training mission was transferred to the DoD under the CSTC-A. This mirrored a similar transfer of police training responsibility from the State to the Defense Department in Iraq. However, “As in Iraq, transferring responsibility to the Defense Department infused manpower and financial resources but did little to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. police assistance program.”

This began a joint US DoD and German effort, which continued to fail until 2008, where a further reorganization effort took place. The police training effort then remained divided between CSTC-A and an EU-formed European Policy Mission (EUPOL), efforts that continued to repeat at least some of the German failures to prepare the ANP effectively for the counterinsurgency mission—coupled to questionable contractor support and performance standards.
EUPOL had major problems from the start of its operations. According to the USIP, “The first EUPOL commander resigned after three months, as the result of a dispute with the EU’s special envoy to Afghanistan. EUPOL had difficulty in establishing working relations with the NATO-led ISAF. The European public has been unenthusiastic about their forces serving in Afghanistan. There was also a problem with differing goals for the program among member states. European police were slow to deploy, with many EU member states balking at honoring commitments for personnel. Although EUPOL’s authorized strength was 400 members, it had only 218 police officers in attendance by May 2009.”

The ANP training mission was reorganized yet again in late 2009 when CSTC-A was put under NTM-A, its command was put under LTG William Caldwell, and the mentoring mission was put under IJC. In addition, a European Gendarmerie Force began training the ANP in late 2009, representing yet another group, with all of the bureaucratic and logistical demands that come with one. While the police training effort has now become far better resourced and led than in the past, there frequent reorganizations of the training program has hindered the development of an effective ANP. This problem was summed up by the New York Times in 2010: “The international nature of the NATO-led training program has resulted in a welter of 20 different programs run by half a dozen countries and agencies with widely varying methodologies and standards. Officials are now trying to write a nationwide instruction program that will be more standardized.”

As of late 2009, a huge percentage of the ANP remained completely untrained, with some experts putting this number as high as 78%. NTM-A, despite its stepped-up training efforts, estimated that the force would not be trained until 2012, and this timeline is highly dependent upon the contributions of Coalition partners. If Coalition partners deliver lower-than-expected numbers of police trainers, the entire timeline for police training will have to be reassessed.

One expert summarized the problems the police training program has faced as follows:

The central importance of police in contributing to stability in conflict and post conflict situations is probably obvious to this audience. But, unfortunately, it is not always so to policy makers and the military who usually drive policy making on the ground in Afghanistan. Far too often, the policing side of the equation (international and domestic) is an afterthought. And as a result it is often poorly thought out and poorly resourced.

Initially in Afghanistan, responsibilities for sectors were divided up between key international donors. The Germans were given responsibility for police, and Americans for the army, Italians for the justice system and the British for counter-narcotics. This almost inevitably resulted in a lack of coordination between these key elements of the security sector as well as a large differences in resources, with the vast majority of the money going to the Afghan National Army, the one institution to receive comprehensive, top to bottom reform.

There were big philosophical differences in approach by the Germans (and now the Europeans) and Americans. German training was primarily focused on a civilian law and order force with little acknowledgement of the security environment. The US squarely focused on producing an auxiliary security force to supplement their own troops.

These different philosophies also played out in the approach taken to training. Germans focused on producing a highly professional officer corps – three year training course for officers and one year for non-commissioned officers. This was laudable, but of course meant that only some 870 officers were trained in the first three years, and some 2,600 NCOs. Even more dangerously it meant that in the interim local commanders and militia leaders were able to embed themselves in the Ministry of Interior and in senior local police positions with their own men as the “beat police”. This greatly increasing resistance to meaningful reform in future years.
Frustrated by the slow pace in the police sector, the US entered the game in the lead up to the 2004 elections. Americans realized much greater efforts were needed to train the lower ranks, and ramped up rapid training course, churning out police in 8 weeks if literate, and just 5 weeks if illiterate – and only some 30 per cent or so of recruits were literate.

Meanwhile, while, far too little was happening in terms of real reform at the Ministry of Interior, long regarded as a deeply corrupt institution. The justice sector also continued to lag, with too little in the way of agreed strategic approaches to reform, including how the different institutions would work together. There is of course little point in having a police force if you don’t have functioning judges, courts or prisons and a working relationship between the different bodies. Building Afghan institutions is the ultimate exit strategy and the only way to ensure sustainability.

In 2006, in response to the growing insurgency even these minimal standards were dropped, with the creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police. This program was supposed to see 11,000 men hired in the most violent areas and given a gun and a uniform after ten days training. Crisis Group warned that this was a dangerous distraction from building a professional police force. As predicted after millions of dollars and two years of efforts this program was widely admitted to be a failure with a few thousand of these men switched to the regular police, but thousands more disappearing never to be seen again with their weapons and uniforms. Yet more were simply let go, again with their weapons and uniforms but now unpaid and presumably unhappy about it.

Imagine if this time and effort had been put into training quality professional NCOs, who are essential field leaders in a largely illiterate country. Instead their training too has been slashed from one year to some three months.

How quickly lessons are forgotten amidst the speedy rotations in Afghanistan. Almost identical rhetoric to that about the ANAP in 2006 is now being used by the Americans to promote the APPF, the Afghan Public Protection Force. Admittedly a far more closely monitored project – although it is only in the trial stages in Wardak province – it aims to provide local recruits with three weeks of training, and a gun. Given the current doubts about the effectiveness and accountability of the Afghan police force, we are skeptical that having a less trained “police” force, with local allegiances, will contribute to providing greater security and building public confidence.

There are some glimmers of hope. A new Interior Minister, with a far more strategic approach, took the helm at the end of 2008. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) has been streamlined and is co-operating, specifically at a working level, far more productively than previously. There was also great pride in Kabul at the quick reaction of the security forces to the February 2009 assault on three ministries in the capital, and that effective response provided an important psychological boost. These small achievements need to be built upon.

... There must be effective coordination between donors – at both planning and implementation stages. There must be a clear vision of the mission objectives, shared by all of the major donors in partnership with Afghan institutions. And there must be a chain of command with clear division of work.

This should be self evident, but apparently the lessons of the past have not been internalized. In Afghanistan there has been a failure to coordinate at all levels. The Germans and Americans and Italians did not coordinate over their vision of the security and rule of law sectors. The Americans and Germans did not coordinate their training of officers and police. Currently, the EU has the nominal lead for police training, even though the US contributes the vast bulk of the resources. And they both have a different philosophy of policing – be it counter-insurgency or community focused. The new minister of interior is far more effective in knocking heads together amongst the international community but efforts are still too often run outside Afghan institutions, and short term in focus.

Effective coordination also extends to donors’ internal organization to assist with police reform. In the United States there is no single agency responsible for police training abroad. The departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the Agency for International Development, all have police programs that operate independently and often without communicating effectively. The decision to give a leading role in police programs in Afghanistan to the Department of Defense has further blurred the distinction between the military and police.

The situation has improved since mid-2009, but -- as this chapter shows -- the ANP still lack the trainers, mentors, and partners they need. They have remained underpaid, subject to corruption
and political influence, and have not been given the facilities and equipment they need to survive and operate in the face of an insurgent threat.

**The Current Status of the ANP Development Plans**

The current status and readiness rating of the Afghan National Police are shown in Figures VII.2 and VI.3. The Afghan National Police (ANP) now includes several distinct forces: the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), responsible for general policing; the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force that provides quick reaction forces; the Afghan Border Police (ABP), which provides law enforcement at Afghanistan’s borders and entry points; and the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), which provides law enforcement support for reducing narcotics production and distribution.

Detailed tables and graphics describing the size and readiness of the ANP are included in Annex A to this report, but many do little more than provide authorized ration than real strength, and readiness rating that are suspect at best. The Department of Defense described the progress and problems in the ANP as follows in its June 2009 report on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*:

- The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of at least 86,800 personnel. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. Development of existing ANP forces continues at a slow pace because of the shortage of Police Mentor Teams.

- The MoI is instituting the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) as a pilot initiative in Wardak province. As of March 2009, the AP3 comprises 243 candidates and empowers and encourages local community leaders and communities to take responsibility for their own security.

- The goal for the ANP is 432 units, including district AUP units and specialized police units, rated at CM1. The number of CM1-rated ANP units increased from 17 in October 2008 to 24 in May 2009. The number of units at CM2 more than doubled, going from 13 units to 28.

- …challenges with personnel accountability may lead to inaccuracy in MoI-reported force levels. The MoI has deployed 34 provincial teams to establish personnel and equipment accountability throughout the country. As of March 2009 the MoI had completed work in 341 of 365 districts.

- The MoI failed to transition from a locally-based recruiting to a national recruiting system in 2009, and is on track to accomplish this by March 2010. The MoI is currently developing its own senior-level vetting system to ensure merit based promotions and to validate the quality of his current leaders. Rank reform was largely completed in 2008 with the total number of officers going from 15,001 to 6,820. At the highest ranks there are now 120 Generals down from 319; 235 Colonels from a high of 2,447, and 305 Lieutenant Colonels from 1,824. Officers took a written test as part of the reform process.

- Those that did not pass the test were provided a second opportunity to demonstrate their skills. The individuals who failed both tests were reduced to NCOs or patrolmen. Many candidate officers do not complete the vetting and training process. ANP ranks are further decreased by high casualty rates and the failure of ANP officers to report for duty.

- Police Mentor Teams (PMTs) are composed of both military and civilian personnel and train and mentor ANP units. More than 500 civilian police trainers and mentors are deployed with PMTs in the field and at training centers. The objective is to provide a PMT to every ANP unit. However, limited resources and the broad geographic scope of the ANP will necessitate additional training capacity and equipment if this objective is to be met.
• CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Assuming that one-third of AUP districts will have PMTs assigned at a given time, minimum PMT manning needs to be 2,375 personnel. As of January 2009, 922 personnel were assigned to PMTs and six districts had PMTs provided by the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF).

• U.S. maneuver forces that deploy to Afghanistan beginning in the spring of 2009 will have the additional mission of providing police mentors in districts where they are operating. The request for forces (RFF 920) that outlines this program projects that these U.S. maneuver forces will be able to provide 1,278 police mentors for the PMT mission.

• AUP districts will continue to undergo reform through the FDD program. Unit PMTs will participate in the district assessment, police training, and mentorship following the training to ensure that the teams are fully integrated into the FDD process.

• The remainder of the police mentor requirements beyond the RFF 920 sourcing was identified in RFF 937, which provides the full requirement for both ANA and ANP mentor teams over time. RFF 937 outlines the requirement for 1,097 police mentors and 3,349 Army mentors for FY 2009. The Joint Staff is currently planning to source RFF 937 with two brigade combat teams (BCTs). If this sourcing solution is approved, the BCTs will be terrain-oriented with one BCT responsible for the CSTC-A training team mission (ETTs and PMTs) in the west and south, and the other BCT responsible for the training mission in the north and east.

• To date, EUPOL ANP training and mentoring has only been executed at the regional and provincial levels. This restriction enhances the importance of NATO and other international ANP development programs that provide trainers and mentors down to the district police level.

SIGAR partially updated this information in its January 2010 report but had no valid basis for estimating actual strengths, or average levels actually present.cxxii

As of December 31, 2009, the ANP’s personnel strength was 94,958, an increase of 13,449 from May 2009, according to CSTC-A.116 The target personnel strength is 109,000 by September 2010.

President Obama did not state new goals for the ANP in his strategy speech in December 2009, but NTM-A/CSTC-A followed up in January 2010 by stating that it was establishing the groundwork for ANP to grow from an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, to 109,000 by October 31, 2010, 134,000 by October 2011. cxxiii
Figure VII.1: Capability of Select Afghan National Police Units
Figure VII.2: DoD Reporting on Trends in the ANP: 2008-2009

Figure VII.3: SIGAR Reporting on ANP Developments in 2009

APA Casualties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>ANP Casualties by Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1 – December 24</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-September 20, 2009</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%

CSTC-A Force Development Goals in June 2009

Like the ANA, the force development goals for the ANA have been in considerable flex. CSTC-A provided the following summary of the development goals for the ANP at the end of June 2009:

- **Growing**
  - Acceleration of 4.8K ANP for Kabul by Aug 2009
  - Expanding by 10K ANP in 14 key provinces by Aug 2009
  - Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) — 16 of 20 battalions fielded
  - Increasing ANP infrastructure, completed 102 projects with 331 projects on-going and another 351 projects planned

- **Reforming**
  - Reinforce good policing where it exists
  - Accountability Reforms
  - Rank Reform (100%), Electronic Pay (98%), Electronic Funds Transfer (70%), and Bio-metrics (21%)
  - Ministerial Reform Initiatives
  - Financial Disclosure and Merit Based Appointments

- **Developing**
  - Focused Border Development (FBD)
  - Cycle 1 - 3 complete; Cycle 4 and 5 on-going
  - Focused District Development (FDD)
  - 64 Districts and 12 Provincial reserve companies in FDD Cycles 1-8
  - Ministerial Development

CSTC-A reported the following goals for near term growth:

- **Phase I: 4.8K Growth for Kabul**
  - The 4.8K ANP growth approved by Washington D.C. and the JCMB
  - Recruited, Vetted, Trained, and Fielded by elections
  - Two Phase training program
  - CSTC-A will have the resources to fund this entire requirement

- **Phase II: 10K Growth – Key Provinces**
  - Approved in principle by JCMB in April 09; plan approved by IPCB in June 09, subject to the availability of funds
  - The 10K will be deployed in 14 high threat provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimroz, Paktika, Khost, Paktia, Ghazni, Nooristan, Badghis, Farah, Kunduz, and Baghlan
  - Two Phase training program
  - The total cost of the 10K growth estimated at $260M; coordinating with the International Community for funding.

NTM-A and CSTC provided additional data such as goals in December 2009. They included:
• Develop and grow leaders for tomorrow,
• Generate professional, competent, capable ANSF,
• Reform and growth the ANP to 96,800, and continue to 109,000 – pending JCMB approval
• Develop Ministry of Interior (MoI) systems,
• Develop the institutional base (training and education for force generation, and,
• Resource the fielded force.

NTM-A and CSTC intended, that the ANP development effort was to be conditions-based and to be revalidated in annual assessments, the first of which would be in the April- June 2010 time window. It noted that success would require significant improvements in recruiting, retention, and attrition; as well as major improvements in the capacity to generate professional competent, and capable officer and NCO leadership. It also said that efforts would be made to mitigate risks through partnering at all levels, and that there would be enhanced accountability of personnel, equipment, and pay. cxxv

**Afghan Priorities for Development of the ANP**

The Afghan Ministry of Interior has its own near-term priorities for the development of the ANP and these may be summarized as follows:

- **Accelerate FDD & Other Programs**
  1. International PMTs
  2. Survivability (MEDEVAC/IED/Force Protection)
  3. FDD/FBD/ANCOP

- **Eliminate Corruption**
  1. Ministerial Reform
     (Merit Based Appointment/Investigations)
  3. Inspection/International Audit Teams
  4. Logistical/Financial Accountability

- **Improve Police Intelligence**
  1. Anti-Crime Reorganization
  2. Neighborhood Watch/Community Engagement
  3. Technology (intercept/analyses/Kabul Camera)
  4. Expand Expertise (Mentors/LEP/Forensics)
  5. Enhance Counter Narcotics Operations

- **Increase Tashkil**
  1. Kabul Increase now to 4,800 (mostly completed by early 2010)
  2. 10K Increases by Election (mostly completed by early 2010)
  3. Increase to enable COIN “Hold”

- **Secure Key Cities & Highways**
  1. Eliminate illegal Tolls
  2. Expand APPF
3. Expand Partnering with SOF

**Secure Elections**

1. OCCR/P Activation
2. Security and Protection of Candidates
3. Election Security Planning as of 15 Jun 09

**MoI Reform**

The broad problems in the ANP do not mean that some elements of the ANP have now already achieved considerable capability, and these have been cases where ANP forces have taken serious casualties and sometimes fought with great courage. Afghan police forces have also been thrust into the forefront of the COIN fight regardless of their capability, and this is reflected in their casualty rate. The ANP has suffered casualties at three to four times the rate of the ANA.\textsuperscript{cxxvi}

The fact remains, however, that the ANP has problems from top to bottom. The Ministry of the Interior has not achieved the level of capability and integrity of the Ministry of Defense, and the international community has significantly under-resourced the building, training, equipping, and mentoring of the ANP. The MoI has major problems with a lack of proper command discipline and force allocation. According to Major General Cone, “Right now there are too many people who can pick up a phone and say to their man in the Ministry of Interior, “Call down and move 200 guys this way,” or “look the other way on this.”\textsuperscript{cxxvii}

A major program to reform the MoI, and to bring the command structure of the ANP into balance, was launched in 2006. Despite major delays, this program achieved some results, most notably reorganizing the officer corp (the system had far too many high ranking officers), and in pay reform: “By 2009, the program had reduced the ANP officer corps from 17,796 officers to 9,018, with a reduction in the number of generals from 319 to 159 and colonels from 2,712 to 310 and an increase in lieutenants from 4,000 to 6,000.

The police wage scale was also adjusted to align with the cost of living and salaries paid to the Afghan military. Wages for captains increased from $78 per month to $250; for colonels, from $92 to $550; and for major generals, from $103 to $650. Further reform of both police and military pay took place in 2009, in an effort to raise pay above the level received by many Taliban volunteers and to reduce the leverage powerbrokers, narco traffickers, and others had through payments and bribes.

A program of background checks on ANP officers was instituted, although the identity and actual number of ANP personnel remained unclear. LOTFA data indicated that there were 78,541 personnel on Interior Ministry and ANP payrolls, but by November 2008 UN validation teams had issued only 47,400 identification cards in a process that was hampered by a lack of ANP cooperation.\textsuperscript{cxxxvii}

Nevertheless, corruption and incompetence remained widespread. The same ISAF and national officials that sometimes publicly praise reform of the MoI also privately state that it is still corrupt and needs further reform. The purchasing of senior police positions appears to be a widespread practice. According to one senior ANP official “All posts are sold with a predetermined price.”\textsuperscript{cxxix}
As has been seen in Figures VI.1 to V1.3, ANP readiness remains low – even when judged by CM readiness standards that often seem to be far more a matter of measuring personnel, training and material than actual performance. The majority of ANP units are rated CM 2 or CM3. SIGAR did note an uncertain rise in readiness in 2009, but this progress is tentative at best: “As of December 31, 2009, there were 12 ANP units—approximately 12% of the units rated for this quarter—at CM1, according to CSTC-A. Last quarter, approximately the same percentage of ANP units were rated CM1 . . . Two additional units were rated this quarter.”

**Manning**

It is still not clear that any aspect of the manpower data on any element of the ANSF is fully trustworthy. When reporting numbers of ANP, a GAO report in 2007 stated that the Pentagon does not trust the figures that come from the MoI. “Ghost” reporting was rampant earlier when government accounting was non-existent. ANP commanders would pocket the pay of absent officers while reporting them present for duty. Additionally, the Department of Defense released a survey in 2007 stating that 20% of the ANP were unaccounted for yet on the payroll records.

While estimates are shown in the police census data in Figure VII.4, reporting still fails to report actual vs. authorized and absentee levels accurately, and these problems are considerably worse for the ANP than the ANA. Other reporting has also tended to sharply understate the level of real-world problems in the ANP.

For example, the Department of Defense reported in June 2009 that, between March 2008 and February 2009, nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs was 17,191 (2,737 ABP, 3,562 ANCOP, and 9,468 AUP and specialty police). It is important to note that the MoI has not had any problems achieving any of their recruiting goals. Positive polling data on popular support for the police and the propensity to serve as well as recent experiences with FDD suggest that this trend can continue. The MoI will transition from locally-based recruiting to a national recruiting system in 2009.

The MoI is currently developing its own senior-level vetting system to ensure merit based promotions and to validate the quality of his current leaders. Rank reform was largely completed in 2008 with the total number of officers going from 15,001 to 6,820. At the highest ranks there are now 120 Generals down from 319; 235 Colonels from a high of 2,447, and 305 Lieutenant Colonels from 1,824. Officers took a written test as part of the reform process. Those that did not pass the test were provided a second opportunity to demonstrate their skills.

The individuals who failed both tests were reduced to NCOs or patrolmen. All Afghan National Police recruits (AUP, ABP, ANCOP, etc.) undergo the same vetting process established four years ago by the MoI Recruiting Department and now fully implemented. The recruits are screened by the MoI Medical, Intelligence, and Criminal Investigative Departments. Recruits must have either a national identification card (Táchira) or two letters of recommendation from community elders.

Upon arrival at an RTC for FDD training, all AUP officers are vetted for a second time by a regional police recruiter. They also undergo health screening, biometrics data collection, enrollment in the electronic payroll system, issue of Identification Cards, enrollment in electronic funds transfer where available, and drug testing. Recruits who test positive for opium are released from the training program. Recruits who test positive for hashish or marijuana remain in the program and receive counseling concerning ANP drug policies and prevention. During the course of the eight-week FDD training, U.S. civilian police mentors monitor all trainees and identify those that need to be removed. Police officers that fail to graduate from the FDD course are removed from the force.

As of March 2009, the ANP is paid at parity with the ANA and all thirty-four provinces are using Electronic Funds Transfer to pay police. Electronic Funds Transfer is intended to eliminate the hand-to-
hand method of payment that provides many opportunities for corruption. However, such opportunities persist. It is still possible for ANP commanders to demand a portion of their officers’ salaries after disbursement from the electronic system. The MoI will extend Electronic Funds Transfer as the banking system extends throughout the country. The MoI is also testing a program to electronically pay police officers using cellular telephone technology.

These comments understated or buried the scale of serious problems many areas. For example, the statement that, “These numbers do not reflect actual increases in total ANP strength for this time period. Many candidate officers do not complete the vetting and training process. ANP ranks are further decreased by high casualty rates and the failure of ANP officers to report for duty” was made a footnote. Serious remaining problems in vetting were largely ignored, as were chronic problems in training performance—compounded by critical problems with illiteracy. One investigation in 2008 found only 1,200 officers in a region where Afghan commanders claimed 3,300 were serving. These ‘Ghost’ officers bloat official numbers to an unknown, but potentially significant degree.

**Figure VII.4: Various ANP Manning surveys conducted from 2005-2010**

![Graph showing various ANP Manning surveys from 2005-2010](image)


The DoD has also understated the police retention problem. Again, reliable numbers are hard to come by, but one source put police attrition rates as high as 20% in early 2009. One fourth of the officer corps quit annually. While retention rates seemed to be improving under the FDD program, FDD is progressing slowly and has only affected a small portion of the total ANP force. Overall attrition rates remain stubbornly high. As previously mentioned, any expansion of the ANP is extremely difficult to achieve when one fifth of the force disappears each year.

**Pay, Leave, and Recruitment**

As has been noted earlier, ANP pay has been a major problem. The ANP suffered for some years from being so underpaid that it virtually became corrupt out of sheer necessity – a problem compounded by far more erratic pay than in the ANA, worse training and leadership, worse facilities and equipment, and much higher casualty levels. This problem was eventually fixed by raising ANP salaries to the level of the ANA, but it did not address the fact that at least the starting salary of both forces was notably lower that the pay given to Taliban and insurgent fighters.
It was only in December 2009 that the NATO advisory team announced that it had found that this disparity in pay was a major problem in recruiting, and that the Taliban was averaging $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120-$180 a month. ANA and ANP salaries were then raised to levels closer to $240 a month. This still leaves the problem for the police, however, that the Taliban’s pay is only part of the problem. Buying positions and promotion remains a critical problem. So does extortion or “taxing” of pay and allowances by superior officers, and the ANP are far more vulnerable to bribes and corruption at every level of operation than the ANA because they come into far more direct contact with criminals and power brokers and have far more opportunity to extort money from the civil population.

Paid leave has been irregular in the ANP. This is a major problem when soldiers and police frequently have to travel far through Afghanistan’s poor transport systems to reach their families and deliver the money they have earned. Many ANP go on leave and are forces to stay on leave until their family gets enough cash together to buy the service member a ticket back to their unit. Others simply leave the service.

The recruitment process has been flawed, partially accounting for the low quality of recruits. The process is entirely under Afghan control, and until recently was locally based. The MoI set up a national recruiting program in 2009, which improved matters. However, there still appear to be few solid recruitment standards. Generally speaking, having a friend on the force or a powerful connection gets people on to the force more often than merit.

Vetting of candidates is also rarely carried out faithfully, if at all. Databases of Afghan’s recruits, crucial to background checks on recruits, are not detailed or extensive. Biometric cataloguing and vetting of ANSF personnel has yet to be widely adopted as a tactic that proved immensely useful in the Iraqi force development effort.

Training

Police training has been crippled by poor vetting and recruiting polices and enforcement, shifts in control and goals of the stratign structure and mission, and lack of trainers and mentors As Figure VII.5 shows, training is improving in volume, but training standards are mixed at best, and Afghans often come out of the training system who have not really met training standards or even shown they can handle the minimal literacy burdens involved. Essentially, if a police trainee shows up, and attends the graduation ceremony, he (or she) passes and is considered “trained.” Even by this rather loose standard, most police remain untrained. Furthermore, officer training schools only had a 40-60% fill rate as of early 2010.

Most of the ANP have little or no meaningful training. NTM-A put forth a 2 year time-line in early 2010 to train the force. However, NTM-A simply does not currently have enough personnel to carry out the police training effort, even with the added trainers coming into theater as the US troop level increases in 2010. The 2 year timeline is based upon presumed increases in training personnel from European Coalition partners. However, it is not understood if the European nations will meet these expectations. If the European contribution to the police training effort is low, the entire training timeline will have to be reassessed. It is not clear how badly this would slow down the police training effort, but it will likely be a significant delay unless more trainers are found elsewhere.

SIGAR reporting in January 2010 provides a relatively recent summary of the training effort, but one that understates the qualitative problems that still remain:
From October 1 to December 17, 2009, ANP training organizations graduated 4,286 personnel, a 48% decrease from the preceding quarter.

As of December 23, 2009, the ANP has 5,972 personnel in training. Some ANP graduates this quarter were given provincial assignments. Graduates were assigned to seven provincial locations, as shown in Figure 3.24. The largest number of graduates was assigned to Helmand.

ANP regional training centers address a high illiteracy rate among ANP personnel by using various methods of instruction, including instructor demonstrations, illustrative depictions of lessons, and hands-on training. Also at these regional training centers, ANP personnel receive literacy training from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are funded by DoD.

A key to the long-term sustainment of the ANP is developing the ability of the Afghans to carry out training without the assistance of the international community, according to the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International assistance is provided through “train the trainer” courses in which civilian police advisors work with Afghan trainers. Currently, Afghans lead all training at regional training centers; civilian advisors oversee them. According to NATO, the ANP needs more robust training and mentoring, as well as increased equipment supply.

To increase operational capabilities and survivability, NTM-A assists with ANP development, focusing on reform at ANP districts and at lower levels of the force. The European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) is also involved in training, focusing on conventional policing and higher-level police management and standards. NTM-A and EUPOL development activities are coordinated through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and the International Police Coordination Board.

In addition to training ANP personnel, DoS is also assisting the MoI with training. It has provided the MoI with executive and professional mentors to assist ministry officials in personnel management, administration, planning, and other areas.

NTM-A and CSTC-A are working closely with the MoI to establish a new ANP Training Command to take over the management, supervision, and execution of all ANP training. Currently, ANP training centers are managed by NTM-A, contractors, and coalition forces. The MoI will continue to provide ANP instructors for the training centers. NTM-A is emphasizing improvement in Afghan instructor selection and qualifications, including instructors for the “train the trainer” programs. In conjunction with the MoI, NTM-A will focus on leadership development for commissioned and non-commissioned officers and will review instruction programs and standardize training delivery across all training centers.

The MoI recently established a six-month officer school at the ANP Academy, where 900 officer candidates attend training. The ministry is also exploring the possibility of training ANP officers abroad.

Despite the number of personnel graduating from training in recent quarters, 70% of ANP personnel have not been through any formal police training, according to OSD. Training will be performed through Afghan Police Training Teams, which are currently in short supply. OSD is working with the international community to fill the shortfall of 119 training teams.

Lt Gen Caldwell, in coordination with Afghan Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, has outlined a plan to transport 3,000 top police officers to Turkey and Jordan for advanced training. Progressively utilizing ISAF forces abroad might help compensate for the shortage of 500 NATO trainers, graduating more educated officers and allowing the MoI to replace corrupt or ineffective chiefs.

The announcement of plans to send police officers abroad also came alongside MoI regulations called for all ANP will receive at least a six week basic training program before assigned to stations. Currently three quarters of the force have received no formal training. The fact remains, however, that it will still be at least several years before training becomes fully adequate.
Figure VII.5: Recent Trends in ANP Training

ANP Training Graduates by Course: July 1 to September 30, 2009

ANP Training Graduates by Provincial Assignment: September 30, 2009 to Dec. 31, 2009

Equipment and Infrastructure

**Figure VII.6** shows that equipment deliveries are improving. Even so, the ANP is significantly less equipped than the ANA, although some ANCOP units are better equipped for the COIN mission. SIGAR provided the following summary of ANP equipment in the fall of 2009:cxlii

... the ANP classifies equipment as critical weapons, vehicles, and tactical communication equipment required to support growth to the ANP’s targeted strength of 109,000 personnel by September 2010. From July 1 to September 30, 2009, CSTC-A reported that the ANP fielded 6,437 new individual and crew-assigned weapons.123 CSTC-A supplies the ANP with weapons and equipment through the same process as it uses for supplying the ANA. Donations and U.S.-funded purchases of Warsaw Pact weapons contribute to the ANP weapon supply. ANP personnel are equipped with 9mm pistols; AK-47, PKM, and machine guns; and RPG-7, GP-25, and GP-30 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons.

From July 1 to September 30, the ANP fielded 476 Ford Ranger trucks, referred to as LTVs, and four International Harvesters, referred to as MTVs, according to CSTC-A. The ANP also uses all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) but did not field any vehicles of this type during this period. As of September 30, the ANP is planning for 574 additional vehicles in the future. The ANP is expected to be supplied with armored HMMWVs in the late fall of 2009, according to CSTC-A. The Afghan Civil Order Police and Afghan Border Police units also want to acquire ambulances.

During this quarter, the ANP fielded 2,450 radios, according to CSTC-A. The ANP procured 4,162 radios during this period...As of September 30, the ANP is not planning for any additional radios.

... In another communications effort, CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol–based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the Afghan MoI, according to DoD. These networks will connect the five regional commands and units in all 34 provinces, and as many districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will link the MoI’s National Police Command Center and the Ministry of Defense’s National Military Command Center. CSTC-A plans to complete the radio networks by 2012.

Much of this equipment is too light, however to meet ANP needs as long as it must perform part of the “hold” mission and is vulnerable to attack by Taliban forces in the field. These problems are compounded by inadequate facilities that are often very vulnerable, and – as **Figure VII.7** shows, by the fact a number of infrastructure projects have not been completed because the threat was too great. CSTC-A reported in the spring of 2009 that it had, “cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled $33.53 million and these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.”cxliii That summer, SIGIR reported that “Seventeen contracts with a collective value of $14.50 million were terminated this quarter, one for security concerns and the others for contractor performance. No new contracts were awarded from October 1 to December 31, 2009.”cxliv

Nevertheless, the situation is, however, slowly improving:cxlv

Infrastructure contracts for the ANP—like those for the ANA—relate to barracks, headquarters, training buildings and ranges, administrative spaces, warehouses and storage buildings, and maintenance facilities. According to CSTC-A, ANP facilities are sustained through a national operations and maintenance contract. This contract includes training to enable the eventual handover of full operations and maintenance responsibility to the MoI.

As of December 31, 2009, CSTC-A reported 250 active infrastructure contracts, compared with 269 in the preceding quarter; the largest group of these contracts is for projects in the north. Seventy-seven contracts with a collective value of $174.35 million were scheduled to be completed during the quarter.
Figure VII.6: Recent Trends in ANP Equipment, Oct 1 – Dec 27.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2010, p. 69
Drug Use and Corruption

The drug trade has had a major corrupting influence on the ANP (and sometimes on the ANA). This is not surprising, with Afghanistan regularly achieving around 90% of global annual Opium production. In addition to huge sums of drug money corrupting the force, the availability of so much opium and hashish in Afghanistan has contributed to high rates of drug use among the ANP. While hard data on ANP (and ANA) drug use is hard to come by, it is clear that the problem is huge. One in five ANP recruits tests positive for drugs.\textsuperscript{cxlv} One British official estimated that 60% of the police in Helmand province were drug users,\textsuperscript{cxlvii} while other US sources put the drug use rate at 25%.

Afghans believe “almost universally that Interior Ministry officials, provincial police chiefs, and members of the ANP were involved with the drug trade. This belief was based on widespread reports of senior Interior Ministry officials accepting large bribes for protecting drug traffickers and for “selling” senior provincial and district police positions to persons engaged in drug trafficking. A combination of local loyalties, links to criminal networks, low or no pay, and a residual culture of impunity contributed to endemic corruption in the ANP.”\textsuperscript{cxlviii} Senior officials lack control of their personnel, and do not regularly monitor performance.\textsuperscript{cxlix} They are compounded by political interference, and by the lack of a robust justice sector. Well documented cases of ANP corruption are numerous, and often outrageous. Sadly, reports of ANP personnel taking part in rape, murder, torture, and other crimes are all too common.\textsuperscript{cl}
In March of 2010, GAO released a report titled, “Afghanistan Drug Control” which shed further light onto the neglected issue of drug use within ANP ranks. This is an issue government and military personnel are just beginning to address with such efforts as a new $11 million program that includes drug treatment facilities, develops protocol for the treatment of addicts and trains Afghan prevention providers.

Police and prosecutors are easy targets for bribery when their government paycheck is compared to that of drug lords. For the past 8 years, syndicates have easily infiltrated law enforcement through force or cohesion. Government officials who have attempted to remain legitimate or curb drug movement or growth in their districts have been either murdered or corrupted.

Although drug usage within the ranks has been a problem since the ANSF’s inception, not until recently has the government begun properly reporting and addressing the issue. According to the GAO report, 12-41% of ANP recruits tested positive for drugs at regional training centers however even that high number is disputed since opiates leave the system quickly. Furthermore, State officials stated that countless recruits who test negative show signs of withdrawal during the training.

The ANP lack a comprehensive drug rehabilitation clinic at either regional command training centers. Although the US drug demand reduction program does not extend to ANP, due to limited funds, the Ministries of the Interior and Public Health authorized ANP access to public health facilities nationwide.

The problems with drug abuse pale in comparison to the massive amounts of corruption within the ANP. The police are regularly seen as one of the most corrupt groups in the country, and they collect a substantial but unknown amount of money each year through shakedowns of local Afghans and businesses. ANP checkpoints are often little more than tolls.

ANP performance is crippled by other forms of serious corruption, manifested most powerfully to the Afghan population by frequent street-level ‘shake-downs’ by the police. There are no disciplinary units at the provincial level to control police forces. These problems are enabled by both corruptions at higher levels of command within the MoI and in other local governance structures.

The ANP does not just steal from Afghans. The US spends billions to arm and supply the ANP, many of whom then sell their weapons and ammunition to the Taliban, inevitably to be used against ISAF forces. With a steady supply line from the US, the Taliban rely on the ANP for newer weapons and a plethora of ammunition superior to older models available throughout Afghanistan or brought in externally from foreign allies. Furthermore, the Taliban can buy weapons and ammunition from the ANP at a cheaper price than off the street in Afghanistan. Insurgent commanders have reported that local police will go so far as to report a major firefight as justification for ammunition dispensed and sell the supplies to the Taliban.

Only recently have top officials acknowledged the ANP’s incompetency and corruption as Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's top representative in the region, has publicly called the Afghan police "an inadequate organization, riddled with corruption."
NATO/ ISAF programs cannot succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure that it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and desire to try to control and influence the ANP, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

The Focused District Development Program

One possible answer to part of these problems is the Focused District development (FDD) program, which is described in Figures VII.8 to VII.10. The FDD program is still being refined and evaluated, but it may prove to be a key to dealing with these issues. It is necessarily slow, however, because it is limited by the availability of formal trainers, coalition units to partner with the re-trained AUP units, and ANCOP units to backfill for the AUP during training.

The Department of Defense described the FDD program as follows in its June 2009 report on Afghanistan:

The Focused District Development (FDD) is a comprehensive program divided into six phases for assessing, training, and validating district AUP units. The program began in late 2007. Each phase includes units between seven and 11 AUP units. Fifty-two police districts out of a total of 365 districts in Afghanistan are currently enrolled in the Focused District Development (FDD) program.

To date, selection of FDD districts has focused on districts in the south and east, near the Ring Road. For the first seven cycles of FDD there were no formalized procedures for collaborating with international partners to select which districts would go through the FDD program. FDD cycle eight will incorporate a more collaborative approach to district selection. CSTC-A, through USFOR-A, approached ISAF to propose developing a more formal and integrated approach to district selection. CSTC-A, USFOR-A, ISAF, UNAMA, the ICMAG, and the MoI worked together to produce a prioritized list of FDD districts coordinated closely with the COIN strategy. This collaborative approach to district selection will be continued for future FDD cycles.

The first six cycles of FDD included only district-level AUP. However, cycle seven will consist of eight provincial police companies and four district units mentored by international PMTs (IPMTs) from Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The inclusion of provincial ANP in the FDD is the result of the lack of PMTs. The fact that provincial police have assigned mentors has eased the PMT constraint and facilitated their inclusion in FDD. It is also of significant value to the provincial police chiefs and governors to provide a trained police resource for quick response to crises and to provide flexibility within the province. At full manning levels, the FDD program would take three years to complete. As mentioned above, there are significant shortages in PMTs and overall ANP training personnel.

The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide a quick reaction capability, but this will need continuing – and objective -- reassessment to determine its actual success and what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

The Focused District Development program operates by taking the police off-line in entire districts, putting in replacement units, and putting the offline force through an eight-week training course. All the police from that district are then withdrawn simultaneously, sent to a regional training center together for 8 weeks to receive training appropriate to position and prior training and literacy levels, and re-equipped with all authorized equipment. During training, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) covers the police district, and are withdrawn when
the ANP return. Following their return, the police are monitored and provided with follow-on training, and police officers are trained further in specific topics to become trainers organic to the district.

Police in FDD who fail to graduate, or cannot be vetted, are supposed to be removed from the police force. Unfortunately -- as is the case with most of the ANSF training process -- personnel rarely ever fail training courses no matter how badly they perform. Some analysts estimate that the failure rate for FDD personnel is 5%.\textsuperscript{clix} Sadly, this low rate may be even higher than most ANSF training courses, wherein all that is required to pass is to show up.

As of February 2009, 52 districts had undergone FDD, as well as 25 city precincts. CSTC-A estimates that 2012 would be the earliest that FDD could be completed in all of Afghanistan’s 365 districts.\textsuperscript{clix} Accelerating the FDD program does not appear to be possible under current resource constraints, due to a lack of sufficient training capacity, a shortage of PMTs, and a shortage of ANCOP personnel to relieve the ANP while in FDD.

As with many aspects of ANSF development, the problems of the FDD program are exacerbated by a shortage of US and ISAF/Coalition training personnel. The shortage of PMTs is the most critical factor hindering the FDD program, according to CSTC-A. The total PMT requirement is for approximately 2,375 personnel. Only 39\% of that requirement had been met as of May 2009. Of the 635 required PMTs, CSTC-A fielded only 90, and these were under-strength. The decision to send an additional BCT to train the ANSF will significantly reduce this shortfall, but it will not eliminate it.\textsuperscript{clxi}

Additionally, while the ANCOP seems to have enough personnel to meet the current demands of backfilling police districts while they undergo FDD, the force is stretched thin. Efforts to conduct FDD without backfilling the force while it is away for training have proved unsuccessful. Any acceleration of the FDD program will require more ANCOP personnel to be trained, or an alternative force to backfill the districts in FDD must be found.

Finally, police forces that undergo FDD must have adequate mentors upon their return to their districts. Unfortunately, the previously mentioned massive shortages of mentors means that this rarely happens. NTM-A has not yet identified the necessary personnel to mentor the districts post-FDD. It is a waste of precious resources to conduct the manpower-intensive FDD process and then send them back to their districts without follow-on mentoring and supervision.

An effort has been made to focus the training cycles on regions with high levels of insurgent activity, primarily in the East and South of Afghanistan. However, due to problems in threat assessment, and a lack of intelligence advisors, the selection of districts may not be linked to the priorities that would emerge from an integrated concept of operations based on better intelligence and planning. There are some indications that districts have been picked on the basis of districts in need of help, but not the districts that need the most help.

Districts that have undergone FDD do seem to have experienced significantly lower civilian casualties after completion of the program.\textsuperscript{clxii} However, one of the consistent curses of the lack of credible transparency and reporting on virtually every aspect of U.S., allied, UN and Afghan government operations is that public and unclassified reports to the real-world results in plans and concepts have been “spun” into claims of success before they have had had a real or lasting impact on actual performance.

Senior U.S. officers, advisors, and intelligence personnel raise serious questions about the extent to which the problems with corruption and power brokers in the ANP reassert themselves over time, although most agree that the program does produce at least some lasting benefits and improves popular Afghan perceptions of the police.
What is more serious is that they also question whether the FDD program, or any police reform program, can work without changing the basic environment in which the ANP now operates. The police cannot exist in a vacuum. If governance is excessively corrupt and subject to power brokers at the national, provincial, and local levels, the police inevitably will follow. If the police operate in an environment where they have to deal with the insurgency and organized crime to survive, they will do so. If there is no functioning rule of law with formal or informal courts and adequate jails, or prosecutors and judges are corrupt or vulnerable to political pressure, the police will become a law unto themselves.
Figure VII.8: The ANP Focused District Development Program in March 2009

Figure VII.9: The Focused District Development Program in July 2009
Figure VII.10: Typical FDD time Phases

Developing the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)

Numbers are a problem as well as quality. The Afghan Uniformed Police falls far short of the numbers required in the field, and it seems likely that a zero-based review will conclude that major efforts need to be made to nearly double the size and quality of the AUP. Recent decisions to add 4,800 police to Kabul, and 10,000 more in 14 provinces (including folding in some existing but non-tashkil police officers), are steps in the right direction, but only a first step.

Too Light to Survive, Too Light to Win

The ANP now lacks the equipment to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. Many current AUP lack adequate equipment and facilities – and such gaps urgently need to be addressed. The Department of Defense states in its June 2009 report on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan* that progress is being made, but this progress will still leave the ANP too vulnerable for service in the hold and build phases of the conflict and to protect itself in high threat areas:

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2009 in recognition of the increased threat and capabilities of enemy forces operating in the border regions. ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchases. Specialty organizations, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism police receive equipment consistent with their mission.

The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as light tactical vehicles (LTVs) and International Harvester as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with armored HMMWVs in late fall 2009. Ambulances are scheduled to be provided in March 2009 to ANCOP and ABP elements. CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol-based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the MoI. The networks will connect the five regional commands, all 34 provinces, and as many of the districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will be linked to the MoI National Police Command Center (NPCC) and the MoD NMCC. Based on current fielding plans, the networks will be completed by 2012.

The lack of heavy forces has been a major cause of the high casualties the ANP has suffered. Yet this also stems from a tendency to employ the ANP as if it were a smaller branch of the ANA. The regular ANP simply cannot survive in high threat environments as one Afghan police officer pointed out, “Firing rockets is not the job of police officers.”

According to a 2009 USIP report, “ANP officers accompanied coalition and ANA patrols and were expected to operate as “little soldiers” helping to seize and hold territory and prevent the return of the Taliban. According to the Interior Ministry’s National Internal Security Strategy, coalition forces, ANA, and the ANP “continue to wage war against armed groups.” Police were used to man isolated checkpoints and to establish a government presence in rural villages. Operating in small groups with no means of communication and no backup, the police were no match for insurgent groups that targeted ANP convoys, checkpoints, and bases.”

Mentors and Trainers

The ANP’s most urgent need is for more trainers and mentors. The AUP faces even more severe shortfalls in partnering and training than the ANA, and any end-strength increases, though very welcome, will only exacerbate the gap. According to CSTC-A, the ANP needs a minimum of 38 POMLTs by the end of CY 2009. As of April 2010, 14 POMLTs are serving in Afghanistan. The deployment of a third U.S. BCT would help meet the most urgent of these needs, but the
goal of 38 POMLTs represents the impact of past under resourcing of the ANSF, and is roughly half the real requirement.

Even if no decision is taken to double the ANP, past plans indicate that the CSTC-A will need at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011, and there will be a need for added PMTs as well. These requirements will, however, be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of all elements of the police is raised to 160,000 by the end of CY 2014.

**Developing the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP)**

The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide a higher quality and more demanding set of police capabilities – specifically, to maintain civil order in urban areas, and to provide a police presence in less secure remote areas. The current ANCOP authorized strength is over 4,000 men. Its assigned strength is 3,345, in four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. Current plans call for growing the ANCOP to 20 battalions by the end of the year; if an increase in ANP target end-strength is approved, that growth would include corresponding increases in the ANCOP.

**The Afghan Border Police (ABP)**

The Afghan Border Police currently have limited effectiveness and significant problems with corruption where they are deployed in areas that involve significant commercial traffic across the border. The Focused Border Development Effort may help this situation, but its effectiveness is more uncertain that that of the FDD. This Program is summarized in Figure VII.11, and the Department of Defense described it as follows in June 2009:

Focused Border Development (FBD) is a program designed to enhance the effectiveness of Afghan Border Police (ABP) line companies in the RC-East area of operations. CSTC-A and CJTF-101 have partnered to accelerate the fielding of ABP companies in these areas. FBD will man, train, and equip 52 companies. Following the training and equipping stage, the ABP companies will establish partnering relationships with CJTF-101 units. The program is in the process of expanding to six companies in RC-South and eight companies in RC-North. Initial reports from partner units indicate positive progress, with ABP companies returning from training with increased capability to conduct operations. Eighteen companies have completed the training as of March 2009, which amounts to 1,677 border police trained. Additionally, 784 ABP are currently in training. ABP companies are provided with vehicles, weapons, and communication assets as they complete their training cycle.

The FBD program is different, and less effective, than the FDD program in a number of ways. ABP units do not come off-line to attend training as a unit. Instead, groups of 30-40 personnel at a time are selected by the Kandak commander to undergo training. This is done because there is no ANCOP equivalent to backfill for an entire ABP unit. Additionally, there are no assigned military training teams to carry out FBD. Instead, local Coalition battle commanders assign mentoring teams. Finally, two different contractors (DynCorp and Blackwater) have contracts to carry out FBD in different areas. Each contractor had a different training program, depriving the ABP of a homogenously trained force. CSTC-A has recently adopted a single standardized FBD program.

The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 and 12,800 assigned. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create, Afghanistan’s geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement all the more difficult, and ISAF and the ANSF have more urgent priorities. This raises important issues about the effort that should go into building the ANP.
Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance and reduce corruption. As is the case with the ANP, these efforts should be complemented by specific technologies including biometrics and ISR, to the extent feasible.

Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for ISAF action relative to building up the ANA or ANP, or for allocating additional forces, resources and other capabilities. A tightly focused effort may be able to help the Afghan government get 1 revenue from commercial vehicle traffic across the border than are now being lost through corruption. There is no prospect, however, that the ABP can seal the borders or do more in the near-term than harass the insurgency while becoming a source of casualties and more corruption. This is predominantly true as long as elements of the Pakistan government and ISI covertly support key elements of the Taliban. Moreover, it is not clear just how much additional revenue will be provided, how well it will be collected and allocated, and whether it will make a real difference in reducing GIRoA dependence on outside aid.
Figure VII.11: The Focused Border Development Program
**The Rule of Law/Prompt Justice Gap**

The ANP must also deal with civil issues the ANA does not face. David Kilcullen notes that “nobody is doing the job of actual policing—rule of law, keeping the population safe...civil and criminal law enforcement.” A number of polls and interviews suggest that regular crime and disputes are far more important to average Afghans than fighting the Taliban or counternarcotics. The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice -- unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or the use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. Unfortunately, a gap exists between the ANP and the justice system. The DoD IG found that “The professional connection and cooperation between the ANP and the criminal justice/Rule of Law (ROL) system at the district level in Afghanistan was tenuous at best.”

One major reason for this gap is the lack of an effective justice system at the district and local levels and adequate personnel. Some districts simply have too few judges and prosecutors, and many have none at all. The DoD IG found that “Regional Command-West PMTs reported in their monthly Capability Evaluation that in one district there was no prosecutor or judge available locally and, therefore, the police were unable (or unwilling) to arrest any suspect because a prosecutor’s guidance was required. Another report on a district in Regional Command-Central simply stated that its district AUP had no coordination with the prosecutors, and therefore conducted no investigations and no arrests. As a consequence, the AUP does not develop the effectiveness intended or the credibility with the population.”

This police-justice system gap is exacerbated by cultural and bureaucratic factors. According to representatives of the ROL Office at Embassy Kabul “prior to 2005, the police were not treated as part of the justice system in Afghanistan.” This problem was compounded because “the police have been primarily trained as a military force, not a police force.” The relationship between justice personnel and the ANP has never been close, with MoJ officials describing the police as “thugs and non-professionals.”

The FDD program does not seem to have been successful in erasing this gap. According to the DoD IG, “A review of the basic eight-week ANP Program of Instruction revealed that of the total 263 hours allotted, only 28 hours were collectively devoted to topics such as ethics, the Constitution, penal code, criminal procedures, and human rights. The preponderance of instruction was directed at safety/survival instruction, terrorist tactics, counterterrorism, defense, and weapons qualification. Training in criminal investigations during basic police training received little attention.”

The Regional Training Centers (RTCs), where the FDD training for the police is being accomplished, were also used to train Ministry of Justice personnel (prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) through the State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program. Despite using common facilities, however there has been no overlapping training between Justice Ministry students and ANP students. While at the RTC, in effect the two groups did not formally interact through receiving any joint training on how to professionally cooperate to assist one another in their respective functions to achieve common goals. This compartmentalized operational and training philosophy has repeatedly been identified as a potential problem by PMTs, PRTs, and Justice Training Teams.
Unfortunately, much of the Rule of Law development program in Afghanistan has been run by the US State Department in ways more suited to post-conflict reconstruction at the top than a nation with broad, urgent wartime needs. The State Department, due to a myriad of personnel, budgetary, cultural, and bureaucratic problems in coming to grips with a large armed-nation building effort: “There are currently more Foreign Service officers working in Rome, for example, than there are in southern and eastern Afghanistan. In Vietnam, there were hundreds of Foreign Service officers deployed in country at any given time after 1968. In southern Afghanistan today, there are less than 20 . . . In the eight years since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, only 13 Foreign Service officers have been trained to speak Pashto, and only two of them are apparently in Afghanistan today, a pathetic counterinsurgency effort by the State Department by any reasonable standard.”

Improving the Rule of Law effort in ways necessary to support the ANP and win the war will require strengthening of the informal justice system, while trying to create links that tie it in some ways to the formal justice system that is too weak, too limited in coverage, and too corrupt to meet the needs of some 90% of Afghanistan’s population. Military security is not security, and there is no time to wait the decade or so it will take to create an effective formal justice system – if, indeed, the Afghan people want or will ever trust the systems Western nations are now trying to implement. There must be some form of function civil and criminal justice, and one that is administered locally, promptly, and in ways ordinary Afghans can access.

The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system becomes less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is mission critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation. If this effort is not made a key part of the hold and build phase, the problems that have done so much to empower the Taliban in so many areas – and demonstrate that the Afghan government lacks practical legitimacy regardless of how it is chosen -- will continue. Like the other key failures in civil-military operations that have been warned about earlier, a failure in this area risks losing the war.

The Challenges to ISAF and the US

Dealing with this practical crisis in the implementation of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” requires ISAF, the US, and aid workers to work together to ensure that corrupt and incompetent ANP officials and officers are bypassed, excluded from ISAF support, publicly identified, and pushed out of office. It also means, however, using the same combination of incentives and disincentives to give the ANP protection from corrupt and incompetent Afghan officials and power brokers when this threatens the integrity of the force and its ability to perform its mission.

To date, ISAF, the US and other country efforts have often been part of the problem. They have tolerated too much or put too little pressure on at the top to support commanders and officials in the field. Empowering failure may be politic, but it is also a way to lose. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and to power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

Reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan in SCHB. ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can support the governance aspects of
the hold mission by showing that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

**Creating an Afghan National Police (ANP) that Can Clear, Hold, and Build**

As is the case with the ANA, key decisions are required about Afghan force development. Improving the various elements of the ANP, while less time critical in terms of direct combat operations, is critical if the ANP is to play its key role in performing the *hold* function in population centers and securing the *build* activities that are essential to the success of a population centric strategy.

Current ISAF plans raise serious questions as to whether the *hold* function can be performed with the ISAF and ANSF resources available, and without a major expansion of an improvement in the ANP. Time is critical because the initial phase of the *hold* function will require a transition to proving regular policing activity and supporting the prompt administration of justice, and ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the *build* phase cannot be properly implemented unless the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

Furthermore, retention of trained police officers remains a major hurdle. According to LTG Caldwell, there is a 67% attrition rate among police recruits. Caldwell stated that this rate was "far too high" and that revamping the way the police works to avoid burn-out was one of his main priorities. As the ANP attempts to expand to 300,000 personnel, this rate must come down or an enormous number of recruits must be found.

This means there are several areas where ISAF and the US need to work with the Afghan government at the central, provincial, and local level to shape the future of the ANP:

- **First**, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, hold, and build. ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

  The Focused District Development (FDD) program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

  No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- **Second**, major efforts need to be made to simultaneously increase the size and quality of the ANP. CSTC-A/NTM-A reported that the ANP was at an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, and there
were tentative plans for it to grow to 96,800 (or 109,000 with JCMB approval) by October 31, 2010, 123,000 by July 2011, and 160,000 by 2013. Current plans call for eliminating the backlog of untrained police (which as mentioned before some experts put as high as 78% of the existing force) within two years. Yet these plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is needed to improve the quality of its leadership and facilities. The ANP’s most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for is adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NMA-A, and not under civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP’s main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in training, mentoring, and partnering than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added MTs as well. The Current 2 year timeline for training the police force is based upon estimates of police trainer contributions from European nations that may prove overly-optimistic. If European partner nations do not deliver the required numbers of trainers, NTM-A will have to reassess its police training timelines. However, Furthermore, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of the police was raised to 160,000.

- Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP. These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions. These could build on ANCOP and police commando cadres. The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the NDS and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.

- Fourth, as with the ANA, ISAF must focus on building up the capability of deployed units, rather than overly relying on formal training. Once again, even the best formal training process is only the prelude to shaping the capabilities of new units, testing leaders, providing practical experience, and supporting ANA and key ANP units with experienced cadres of mentors and partner units. Practical training in both operations and unit management and leadership is more critical with newly-formed units than formal training, and critical to limiting corruption and the scale of retention and AWOL problems.

- Fifth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice. The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice -- unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as much less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

This, however, is only part of the story. ISAF must carry out additional tasks to support the ANP and meet the needs of the Afghan people:

- ISAF Regional and task force commanders need to work with mentors to integrate partnering, mentoring, and training ANP units in the field in ways that will help create effective forces. It also is not enough to use the current rating system; ISAF commanders at every level must make partnering and training key real-world parts of their operations and ensure that ANP units achieve true operational readiness and it must be clear where such activity is adequate and where it is not.
Partnering means ensuring that ANP forces have proper support when they come under attack from threat forces. This means strengthening ISAF and ANA quick reaction forces, but it may also mean strengthening the ANP’s ANCOP forces, and providing armored vehicles. Furthermore, it is a further reason for fully supporting the ANA Air Corps development plan to provide mobility and air support.

As long as ANP forces are so limited, ISAF needs to press the GiRoA to ensure that ANP forces that have been re-blued, and are judged competent, are allocated where they are actually needed, and not for political purposes.

ISAF provide the basic equipment necessary for ANP forces to survive engagement with limited numbers of insurgent forces and mobility necessary to perform their mission.

ISAF should adjust its readiness rating system for the ANP that explicitly assess the degree of corruption in individual units and areas. There should be public pressure for performance and reform, and to show ISAF is making real efforts to aid the Afghan people.

ISAF efforts to expand the role of regional training centers to relieve the burden on existing centers needs to be accelerated, and putting this training under CSTC could improve its quality and focus.

Finally, NATO nations need to commit the fiscal and human resources to making ANP development work. This may involve approaches with which some countries are uncomfortable, such as using non-governmental hiring practices to get sufficient numbers of qualified police mentors. This includes not only police trainers, but police managers who can help the ANP and the MOI improve the structure and performance of Afghan law enforcement systems.

One point is absolutely critical. ANSF and ISAF success in the military dimension will have limited impact if the ANP can a combination of the Afghan formal and informal justice systems cannot function at the civil level, and replace the Taliban where they now dominate the prompt justice system at the local level. So far, GIROA, UNAMA the US and other nations have yet to demonstrate that they have effective plans to combine civil policing with an effective civil justice effort.

The rules of law programs now in effect are failures that are being described as success. They are supporting programs that lack the scale and coverage to meet immediate and urgent needs, which focus far too much on formal justice systems that are not in place and cannot be in place for years, and on outside values rather than Afghan values. Like most civilian programs in Afghanistan, they do not form an effective partnership with the military, or provide any convincing hope that they can successfully implement hold, build, and transfer – or win the war.
VIII. The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and Other Local Security Forces

The use of local forces and militias like the AP-3 remains one of the most uncertain and controversial aspects of Afghan force development. The Department of Defense describes the (AP3) program as follows in its June 2009 report on Afghanistan:

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is a current MoI initiative. The AP3 is an Afghan-initiated and Afghan-led program that relies on increased community responsibility for security. The AP3’s mission is to enhance security and stability, strengthen community development, and extend the legitimate governance of the GIRoA to designated districts in key provinces through community-based security forces. The AP3 comprises security forces under MoI authority, closely coordinated with the ANA, ANP, and international forces. The AP3 leverages the same community elder groups that the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has worked with through the Afghan Social Outreach Program (see below). These community elder groups select members of the security forces. The AP3 pilot began in Wardak province in RC-East in March 2009. Wardak province was selected to facilitate partnering and monitoring by U.S. forces. Once the program has been validated it will be expanded to other areas.

In practice, the AP3 program is focused on securing areas roughly the size of a district (note that traditional structures, such as shuras, may not line up with district boundaries, so they may not exactly mirror districts). The goal of the program is to involve the people in keeping their neighborhoods clear of insurgents once they have been cleared and while they are being held. The program can best be described as a contract among three primary groups:

- Coalition Forces (both battle space owners and special forces, who train the guardians);
- The GIRoA, to include the Governor, MOI and the ANP;
- The people of a district

The coalition forces’ role is to ensure that the district is secure enough so that the APPF will not be overmatched by organized insurgent forces. The GIRoA’s job is to provide both proper administration and oversight of the effort through the MOI and ANP, respectively, and to develop consensus among the key local leaders so that they will not only support the program, but also provide reliable manpower for it. The people’s role is, through community and district councils as well as informal structures, to nominate military aged men (25-45) to serve in the guardian force and to provide popular support to it.

All three sets of players, as well as the NDS, help in vetting recruits. Special Forces train and mentor them to ensure they continue to improve and do not become militias. The ANP commander for a province oversees the program, and the MOI pays the soldiers through direct deposit.

**Shaping the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)**

The underlying premise of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is that neither ISAF nor the ANSF have sufficient strength to provide security for local communities, and that members of local communities – if properly selected, trained, and overseen – are capable of providing some first-layer security. The AP3 may also free up some Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from providing fixed site security, or manning local check-points, thus allowing them to focus on policing tasks. The concept of minimally-trained local security forces augmented more
traditional police and security forces is not a new one in COIN history, and has been successful in the past.

That premise – especially in the absence of sufficient ANSF during the 12-24 month near term – makes scaling up the AP3 worth exploring. At the same time, failed past experiments with community-based forces – most notably the Afghan Auxiliary Police – underscore that the GIRoA and ISAF must exercise caution in several distinct ways.

An interview with an Afghan Official involved in the AP3 program in April 2010 gave a broad outline of the current state of the program. Thus far the program is mainly centered in Wardak, although it may expand in the near future. The AP3 currently have 12,000 personnel on hand in Wardak province. The mission has limited responsibility to include guarding private construction sites, public buildings i.e. UN, EU facilities and radio stations. AP3 personnel also provide intelligence to NDS.

One major benefit of the recruitment process is that it is initiated by local elders who select reliable villagers. The recruits are then vetted by NDS, local and provincial government officials. Upon successful screening, the recruits attend a three week orientation which includes training, drug screening, biometrics upload, and the assignment of a uniform and weapon. AP3 personnel sign a one-year contract. The number of personnel required in each district is determined by the local security commander. While the ethnicity of AP3 members is not tracked, they roughly reflect the ethnicity of the districts in which they operate.

Since the recruit is originally selected by village elders, questions of loyalty between the GiROA versus the elders still exist. The same Afghan official stated that thus far, the program has succeeded where elders and GiROA have common unity for security and business growth. With that, AP3 can succeed and loyalty to the government will remain constant. Further, he stated that as long as the government continues to provide the supplies, payment and support for the program, then the program will continue to be successful. He estimated that roughly 60 - 70 percent of AP3 personnel were loyal to the GIRoA chain of command, with 30 – 40 percent loyal to local leaders.

He felt that some of the improvements in security in Wardak Province can be attributed to the AP3 program. Casualties have been relatively light for AP3 personnel. He also believed that the GiROA may be able to transform AP3 into a source of income for the government. For example, the Asian development project, established to build a railroad in northern Afghanistan, provides money directly to the MoI which transfers into the AP3 program, who are untimely responsible for securing the construction sites.

There are no current plans to incorporate the AP3 soldiers into the ANSF. However, some experts speculate that they could be used to provide a springboard for soldiers who demonstrate competence and can easily transfer their knowledge and experience into the ANSF. The AP3 program can ultimately draw down the enormously high AWOL rate within the ANSF since the program vets, trains and integrates Afghans into the security sector, at a circumscribed capacity.

**Scaling Up the AP3?**

By most reports the training of the initial AP3 class proceeded smoothly, and the group was well-received back in their home community, but subsequent classes may have encountered glitches. The pilot program also suggests some lessons about its broader use:
• First, community-based security forces need to be fully supported and vetted by local community leaders; they should be overseen in some form by the ANSF; for the foreseeable future ISAF needs to play a strong advisory and oversight role; and like many other security efforts, success may be catalyzed by linkage to locally-based development initiatives.

• Second, ISAF commanders and Afghan officials at all levels caution against a blanket application of a single AP3 model in all geographic areas. Community-based security forces will only work if they enjoy full legitimacy from their home communities, and their shape and nature may need to vary by area. Furthermore, in some areas, the basic premise of a community-based force linked to official GIRoA structures may founder as a result on the community’s current strong antipathy toward Kabul.

• Third, it is essential that Kabul-based GIRoA retain approval authority over the formation of community-based security forces, on the fundamental Weberian principle that the state exercises the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its territory. Though little known outside theater, there is already a small proliferation of ‘home-grown’ forces, including not only AP3, but also the KAU in Uruzgan, and the Helmandi Scouts…and possibly more.

Like all pilot projects, however, the key question about success is whether, when and how the AP3 can be scaled-up to be effective on a broad or national basis. Regional and task force commanders across the theater are actively – and sometimes skeptically – considering the application of AP3 to their battle spaces. This will require careful attention to four additional issues:

• First, ISAF HQ, ICW, ANSF and security ministries should take a hard look at options and opportunities to expand AP3 in both political and military terms. This hard look needs to include a clear definition of the requirement for a local force for any given geographic area, clearly assigned training and oversight roles to ANSF and coalition forces respectively, ensuring the result is loyal and does not lead to local tensions and conflicts.

• Second, such forces cannot continue to rely on elite trainers and monitors, and need to become forces that the ANSF can shape, train and control. In Wardak province, U.S. SOF are playing two key roles – training the ANP trainers, and providing embedded oversight of trained AP3 units, and links to US enablers and fire support. However, U.S. SOF is a precious and limited commodity, and likely cannot play that role for all AP3 should the program expand significantly. The next pilot, scheduled for Kunduz province, seems not yet to have met these prerequisites – and seems to have taken the RC Commander by surprise.

• Third, the creation and use of AP3 or other militia-like forces must also be based on a coordinated approach developed by regional and local ISAF, ANA, and ANP commanders – working closely with the provincial and district governor where this is possible. AP3 forces should not be imposed, and must be tailored to support all local conditions in ways that do not compete with other elements of the GIRoA, the ANSF, and ISAF forces.

• Fourth, ISAF should also work closely with the ANSF and security ministries, now, to plan the ‘way forward’ for the AP3, including transition into service in the ANSF, or vocational training and transition into civilian jobs.

**The Community Defense Initiative**

While the AP3 program has continued to grow, it is still limited to small areas of the country. The security situation has necessitated an even faster approach to building local security. In many areas, local militias have independently emerged and begun resisting the Taliban. In addition, a number of militias were recruited to provide security during the August 2009 elections, including the 12,500 men in 22 provinces recruited by Arif Noorzai, an Afghan politician from Helmand. The US has been generally encouraging of the emergence of these militias, and has created the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) to support and supervise them. These militias were operating in at least 14 different areas in the country as of late 2009.
The CDI organizes the militias mainly through Shuras and runs them through Jirgas. Small US SOF teams deploy to areas where these militias are operating and offer assistance. Thus far, this assistance has been small, consisting mainly of food and ammunition. Afghan intelligence officials also play a role in leading the CDI. US officials stress that they are not creating militias, but rather are “trying to reach out to these groups that have organized themselves.”

The US has not been arming the militias, although in some cases the local Afghan government or security forces have. The US also provides “critical backup when needed, including transportation, communications and medical treatment.” The US has thus far focused on training and defensive deployments of the local militias, although the militias have assisted ANSF and ISAF forces in clearing areas as well.

According to Gen. Petraeus, the CDI “essentially involves small special forces teams that have members who know the language, culture, and area, and essentially live in the village with the people and seek to empower them to involve them and empower them in the maintenance of their own security. This is not quite the same as the Sons of Iraq, this is more of a village by village and valley by valley, because of the nature of the situation in Afghanistan.”

The CDI program has proved to be more controversial than the AP3 largely because it risks becoming a tool for warlords. Many analysts feel that the program risks undoing the work of the 2001 UN effort to dissolve the anti-Taliban militias and incorporate them into the ANSF. According Nader Nadery of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, the CDI “is indeed a matter of concern for us who work to promote the rule of law and protect human rights . . . They would produce a new round of warlords who would fight for resources and positions of power for a long time.” Such forces also, however present an even greater risk of favoring one side in local or tribal rivalries and power struggles. Indeed, it is not clear how many Afghans support the formation of these militias: “The people were afraid of the commanders, but now they have a choice — they have to choose between the Taliban and the commanders.”

Locally organized militias have been a feature of a number of successful COIN campaigns, and are a part of COIN doctrine. Indeed, the CDI program was inspired by the success of the Awakening movement in Iraq. The key factor in determining whether these militias become independent sources of power is how they are supervised and employed, and how well they are integrated (and eventually merged) into the official government-run security forces. The CDI program is so new, however, that there was very little publicly available information on how well US efforts to supervise the militias were working, as of early 2010.

**Counternarcotics**

Like counterinsurgency, all counternarcotics efforts become local. So far, the end result has been to systematically push poppy growing and hashish production into Taliban controlled areas while creating a major new source of corruption. Narcotics have been major source of corruption and problems for the Afghan government – as well as a source of suffering for the Afghan people and nations throughout the world. The solution, if there is are, lies in providing substitute crops and the markets and food processing that will give Afghan farmers a living, and not in eradication per se, however, this is a long term solution that can only come with security and
honest and effective programs at the local level, as well as ANSF, substantial aid and development. Efforts to combine eradication with alternative crops must be combined and carefully phased so as to not alienate the Afghan people and thus empower insurgents in contested areas.

This does not mean, however, that other types of counternarcotics efforts are not an important part of security operations. Narco-traffickers both help fund the insurgency and are a key source of excessive corruption and the abuses by various power brokers. They undermine support for the Afghan government and undermine the effectiveness of the ANP and ANB. Accordingly, ISAF should focus on helping the Afghan security forces arrest the traffickers and related criminal networks and officials, and clarify which officials and informal power brokers are tied to drugs as a public way of pressuring them to change their behavior.

ISAF should work to eradicate drugs in areas where they clearly help finance the Taliban. Such action, however, must be carefully targeted, and should not interfere with shape, clear, hold, and build operations which require popular support. In these cases eradication should only take place where there are immediate and credible options to provide alternative crops.

The CNPA have faced many of the same problems the rest of the ANP have faced. Their training and retention has been no better than the ANP as a whole. However, an interview with a senior Afghan official familiar with the CNPA revealed an additional problem: miscommunication and redundancies in the British and American CNPA development program. According to the official, NATO/ISAF trainers have created 3 separate and partially redundant special units that regularly interfere with each other: The National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Technical Investigation Unit (TIU), and the Sensitive Investigations unit (SIU).

According to the State Department, the SIU “is a DEA/INL sponsored, vetted, and highly trained group of 45 investigators whose mission is to gather and exploit evidence, work undercover and confidential informants, and build cases against High Value Drug Trafficking. The officers were trained at Quantico.” The TIU is “a DEA/INL sponsored, vetted and highly trained group of investigators who will utilize legally authorized Afghan wire intercepts to gather evidence against High Value Drug Trafficking. This unit consists of 11 officers with 100 interpreters to log, monitor and conduct intercepted calls. The officers were trained at Quantico.” The NIU is “a DEA/INL sponsored and mentored, tactically trained Afghan law enforcement unit. It will soon be a 288-(authorized strength) officer National Interdiction Unit (NIU) of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) trained to execute search warrants, conduct raids, interdict and seize narcotics and precursor chemicals, secure evidence and make arrests. The NIU is a sub-unit of the CNP-A.” The SIU and TIU in particular are redundant and harm, unity of effort, according to the Afghan Official.
IX. The Battle of Marja- A Test of General McCrystal’s New Strategy?

Marja is a useful -- but uncertain-- preliminary case study in the effectiveness of the new strategy and the role the ANSF will play within it. The battle, or “Operation Moshtarak (Dari for “Together”), was the first major offensive for US coalition and Afghan forces employing the new reinforcements ordered by President Obama in December of 2009. The mission was to retake and then hold the town of Marja in Helmand province, a Taliban stronghold and center of the opium network.”

As a result, the operation had many aspects of the “Shape, Clear, Hold and Build” strategy advocated by General McCrystal and other US and ISAF leaders and planners—although the ANSF, GiROA and aid workers were scarcely fully ready to support such a strategy when the operation began.

Marja is located in the volatile region of Southern Afghanistan, twenty-five miles southwest of Helmand’s provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. The battle for Marja took place in a small (600-750 square kilometer) area divided by water barriers with a total population of some 80,000 Afghans. Like many densely populated areas throughout Afghanistan, Marja is less a city in the western sense of the word and more a union of several small impoverished villages linked together by roads either poorly maintained or non-existent. A majority of the homes lack either running water or electricity and instead depend on wells and irrigation canals for water. Marja’s irrigation canals, which today support rich opium fields, were built in the 1950s and 60s by U.S. engineers in order to promote legitimate agriculture in the area. Ironically, these same canals were later bombed by the ISAF forces following 9/11.

Its strategic importance lay largely in the fact it was a key center for Taliban control of the opium trade, and it was impossible to secure Helmand Province without eliminating major Taliban power centers. According to a Parliamentary representative from Marja, the Taliban administer the local drug business and have “registered 187 processing factories” that convert opium paste into heroin. Each factory reportedly pays a tax to the Taliban at a rate of approximately $1,200 per month which equates to over $200,000 per month in revenue for Marja alone.”

In addition, securing Marja was critical to giving British forces a major secure position in the province.

At the same time, Marja was a difficult objective. Both Marja and Helmand province are dominated by the southern part of the ethnic Pashtu majority in Afghanistan. The Taliban are largely a southern Pashtu movement and were founded in the city of Kandahar not far to the west of Marja. Many citizens of Marja developed a deep ideological connection with the Taliban. They also have had little reason to be loyal to a new Afghan government whose officials were often abusive and corrupt early in the war, and then virtually disappeared from the scene. As recently as two years prior to Operation Moshtarak, the ANP occupied the city under the command of Police Chief Abdul Rahman Jan, a man recently described in The Herald-Sun as:.

“The man with the most sway in Marjah . . . His officers in Helmand were so corrupt and ruthless -- their trademark was summary executions -- that many residents welcomed the Taliban as a more humane alternative. U.S. officials have made it clear in private meetings with Afghan officials that Jan will not be allowed to reconstitute his police militia. The Marines intend to set up a new police department, drawn in part from men selected by tribal leaders. Recruits will be screened for past
violations and will undergo weeks of training at the main Marine base in Helmand. U.S. officials think most Marja residents would rather not have Jan call the shots in the area. They are hoping Zahir will win over the population and mute Jan’s influence, but they are not certain that will occur.”

ABC polling in Afghanistan underscores these challenges, and the additional; problems ISAF faced in minimizing civilian casualties, given the antipathy associated with those casualties. In all Afghanistan, 16 percent of the population reports bombing or shelling in their area by U.S. or ISAF forces. That soars to 60 percent in Helmand (as in the South more generally). Similarly, 58 percent in Helmand report civilians killed or injured in the last year as a result of actions by U.S. or ISAF forces. In the rest of Afghanistan it’s far lower, at 19 percent.

(Civilian casualties blamed on the Taliban, and on the ANA, also spike in Helmand.)

Just 36 percent of those polled in Helmand personally support a presence of U.S. forces in their area. It’s similar, 42 percent, in the South and the East overall. In the rest of Afghanistan, outside these two regions, this soars to 78 percent. In another measure, just 18 percent of those polled in Helmand reported strong local support for the United States among the people in their area. However, twenty-five percent report strong local support for the Taliban.

Positive ratings of U.S. performance were only to 19 percent in Helmand vs. 39 percent in the rest of the country. Just 27 percent of those polled in Helmand are confident in the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to provide security, compared with 49 percent elsewhere. Ratings of the central government, the provincial government and the local police – including confidence in their ability to provide security – likewise are much lower in Helmand than in the country as a whole. The results of the ABC poll are detailed in Figure IX.2. This lack of effective GiROA governance, and of a meaningful ANSF and ISAF presence, gave the Taliban freedom of action in the south. A US official stated, “The Taliban has reaped a recruiting bonanza the past two years, capitalizing on NATO’s stagnant posture in southern Afghanistan by increasing fighter ranks by 35 percent.”

When Operation Moshtarak began on February 13th 2010, it was also uncertain test of several key aspects of “Shape, Clear, Hold and Build” ISAF and GiroA used some 8,000-12,000 ISAF and ANSF forces at various phases of the operations in a small area with only around 80,000 Afghans. The US military also estimated that only 400-1000 insurgents were in Marja prior to the operation. This made the operation one where ISAF could not duplicate the high troop to task ratio in most other areas. It also took place before many of the efforts to create the stronger Afghan and allied civilian capabilities necessary for the new strategy were not yet ready.

**The Role of Marja in a Population Centric Strategy**

Nevertheless, there were several reasons the Coalition chose Marja as a springboard to launch a new civil- military – or “population centric” strategy. First, the core of the Marja area is relatively dense with a population of 65,000-75,000 within 200 square kilometers. Second, the operation was part of a broader offensive that both rescued British Forces from an untenable position in Helmand, where they lacked the strength; and strategically placed ISAF forces to the west of Kandahar which is likely to be the next objective in the summer.

Third, poppy cultivation thrived in Helmand Province and the Taliban used this cash crop to fund operations throughout Afghanistan. Fourth, from a psychological operations perspective, it showed the Taliban that the ISAF will not hesitate to enter perceived or actual Taliban safe
havens. According to BG Nichols: “Central Helmand is extremely important to everybody and is a part of central Helmand and I think if you can bring those other ungoverned parts of Nad-e-Ali you will have then in central Helmand area where 750,000 people live which will be properly under the control of the government.”
Figure IX.1: Helmand Province

Source: Understanding War, “Operation Moshtarak”, March 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2010
Figure IX.2: Differences in Popular Opinion in Helmand vs. Afghanistan as a Whole

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<th>U.S./NATO shelling/bombing</th>
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<tr>
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Any local support

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Confident in security from:

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The Battle for Marja

Major military action in Marja began as early as May, 2009, when Afghan and British forces launched several offensive operations based on intelligence that Marja was the staging ground for the Taliban, from which they were to launch a major operation to take the capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah. Shaping the battlefield for Operation Moshtarak began in the summer of 2009 as part of the effort to recapture key terrain adjacent to the major population centers of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, however, lack of resources prevented the Marines and British from holding Marja. Without a major logistical support or a troop influx, the ISAF or Afghan forces were reluctant to maintain areas outside their operating bases for prolonged amounts of time.

In Operation Moshtarak, ISAF began staging larger forces on the outskirts of Marja. In order to accomplish this, Marines, British Forces and the ANSF needed to regain territory in and around the city. Thousands of U.S. Marines, British and Afghan forces successfully drove the majority of insurgent elements away from key terrain north and south of Helmand’s capital but they did not have enough resources to tackling the Taliban bastion of Marjah. Many insurgents fled west to Nad Ali and Marjar where they consolidated their positions, probing the perimeter of Afghan and coalition forces to the northeast and southeast, only occasionally striking within Coalition-owned battle space.

On February 6th, 2010, the British press reported that U.S. Navy SEALs and British Special Forces had begun infiltrating the town, airlifting in on “kinetic” missions during the night. The missions were described as kill or capture raids targeting top Taliban commanders in the town. Some aspects of “Hold and Build” also began. During these “Shape and Clear” operations, Brig. Gen. Nicholson and Afghan Brig. Gen. Mahayoodin Ghoori, set up a shura
or leadership council with Marjah’s most important district elders in which they encouraged them to convince residents to stay inside once the fighting begins. \textsuperscript{cxcv}

**Figure IX.3: Shaping Operation Timeline**

![Timeline Diagram](image)

\textsuperscript{cxcv}Source: Jeffrey Deal, “Operation Moshtarak: Preparing For The Battle Of Marjah,” Institute for the Study of War (February 11, 2010).

**Clearing Operations**

On February 9, 2010, the pace of the shaping operations increased. Approximately 400 troops from the U.S. Army’s 5\textsuperscript{th} Stryker Brigade along with 250 Afghan Army soldiers and their 30 Canadian trainers moved to take up positions northeast of Marjah. \textsuperscript{cxcvi} The main assault force was composed of U.S. Marines. One battalion of Marines, along with squads of Afghan soldiers, DEA agents, and private contractors were based seven miles north of Marja at Outpost Belleau Wood. \textsuperscript{cxcvii}

Afghan and ISAF troops surrounded Marja before launching the main assault. \textsuperscript{cxcviii} The only major road in or out of Marja was secured by U.S. and Afghan forces after clearing a multitude of mines and bombs. In an attempt to draw pockets of the blocking force into a premature engagement, Taliban mortar and small-arms teams repeatedly harassed elements of the force, such as Lima Company of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines who were positioned on the northern edge of the town. \textsuperscript{cxcix}

These operations had a major impact on the local population. By Friday, February 12th, the road between Marja and Lashkar Gah was clogged with cars and trucks fleeing the pending offensive. Over 2,700 people reportedly fled to the provincial capital just miles northeast of
Marja—some hastily escaping to avoid the impending invasion and others fearing recrimination from Taliban commanders. On February 12th, the Marine and ANSF set up broad cordons to the East and West with an assault force moving in from the South. Taliban fighters were seen fleeing the North and South East corners of Marja. On Saturday the 13th of February, British troops air-assaulted in to Nad Ali in three waves to secure several compounds and a bazaar, attempting to control both sides of the main canal running into Nad Ali. British and Afghan National Army (ANA) troops conducted patrols, set up checkpoints and conducted shuras with locals to inform them of their intent to “provide them with the security they need.” The initial phase of the assault is shown in Figure IX.5.

Figure IX.4 Operation Moshtarak: Assault in Helmand province

Source: BBC. “Operation Moshtarak: Assault in Helmand province.” February 18th, 2010
The air and ground assault was extremely successful according to Marine BG Nicholson. Ground units were staged in deception positions days prior while on February 13th, at 2am air insertion dropped troops into key locations inside Marja. The air-assault units were manned with portable bridges to cross the dozens of irrigation canals while ground units awaited the sunrise to begin movement into the city. The ground assault was slowed and predominantly dealt with IED’s and small arms fire.
The main tactical phase of Operation Moshtarak commenced just hours before dawn on Saturday morning (local time). More than sixty helicopters inserted thousands of U.S. and Afghan combat troops into the town and surrounding farmland.

By Monday the 15th of February, the initial assault phase was winding down. Marines from 1/6 and 3/6, and their Afghan counterparts began piecemeal clearing operations to secure the areas around key objectives. Most of Marja had been cleared, and the remaining insurgent held areas were isolated from each other, as seen in Figure IX.6.

**Figure IX.6: 15 February 2010**

Source: Department of Defense
The rest of the operation focused on clearing the remaining isolated pockets of resistance. By Wednesday, February 17th, Marines and Afghan troops reported “sustained but less frequent insurgent activity,” mostly limited to small-scale attacks. On Sunday the 21st of February, Marines and ANA focused on a two-square-mile area in the western quarter of the town where they believed more than forty insurgents to be entrenched. Progress was slow, but it appeared as though the approximately 100 fighters that were thought to have regrouped in the area may have fled.

During their advance, the force within Marja uncovered what was estimated to be four million dollars worth of raw opium and roughly 500 pounds of ammonium nitrate and other bomb-making materials. These were relatively small amounts, and either indicated that much of the Taliban had removed many stocks or that Marja was of more limited importance than some had indicated.

Saturday, February 27th, Marines and Afghan troops linked-up with a U.S. Army Stryker battalion north of Marjah. Lima Company of 3/6 Marines linked up with the Stryker battalion after days of meticulous advance and comprehensive clearing of northern compounds. As of March 5th, there had been several consecutive days without any major firefights, and the area was largely secure. The initial part of “Clear” phase of the operation was effectively over, although the prolonged effort necessary to deal with “stay beindgs,” sympathizers, and reinforcements had not yet begun.

Figure IX.7: Clearing Operation Timeline
The Taliban Reaction

The Taliban initially used the same strategy in Marja that they had used in reacting to past ISAF offensives action, which was to melt away into the population or to leave the area altogether and tactically chose the time and location to strike. By most accounts, the leadership had left the area and moved to either Pakistan or outlying villages. They did however leave behind local soldiers who provided stiff resistance, laced the area with massive numbers of IED’s and left other cadre who could continue to intimidate the local populace.

The Taliban’s tactical weapons of choice were small arms fire, snipers and roadside bombs in Marja. Since many villages and population clusters were inaccessible or difficult to reach by vehicles due to poor road conditions, roadside bombs served the insurgency in two ways. First, they caused casualties and delayed ISAF forces while they limited local villagers’ ability to move out of their homes. Taliban forces had weeks of advance warning of the upcoming operation and by placing an extraordinary number of IEDs and booby traps. ISAF military commanders were surprised by the “determined resistance” and the amount of militants who stayed to fight. Inevitably, the local population reacted by both placing much of the blame on and expected ISAF forces to clear the deadly IEDs.

Securing the population presented critical problems from the start. Once ISAF and the ANSF entered the area, it became clear that only a constant forward presence could stop Taliban re-infiltration, stay behind operations, intimidation and assassination, moreover ANSF performance that of the ANP, was often poor. Problems in protecting the population emerged at the onset of the operation. The initial timeline for the “Clear” phase of the operation was delayed due to both the resistance of the enemy and the rules of engagement built to protect
the civilian population. The terrain and ISAF rules of engagement clearly favored the enemy forces during this operation as the military committed to limit air-strikes, night time raids and mortar fire while only allowing the ANSF the role of foot soldier.

This illustrated the need for both effective and larger Afghan forces. Some 8,000-12,000 US, British, and Afghan security forces deployed into a geographically defined area of some 750 square kilometers, with some 80,000 civilians in the population. This cannot possibly be repeated on a national level, or even within the 80 out of 364 critical districts identified as high priority by ISAF. Far larger ANP, ANCOP, ANP forces – and ones that are effective and not corrupt – will be the only way of to get enough forces to secure the most critical areas in a country of some 652,000 square kilometers and a total population of well over 28 million.

At the same time, the operation sent other messages. Efforts to rush in a GiROA presence-“Government in a Box” and aid had limited impact, and sent as many negative messages as positive ones. GiROA also had problems in dealing with narcotics. Opium is woven into the economy of southern Afghanistan and has acted as a major source of funding for Taliban operations. International drug syndicates have utilized the Taliban at the local level as force protection.

Two-thirds of the poppy fields were in bloom as of mid March, and ISAF, the US, and GiROA were left with little time to make a decision on the poppy fields that would neither bind Taliban and locals’ interests nor counter the government’s laws. According to the UN, the Taliban took in $300 million dollars from the drug trade, but it is not clear how real such figures are or what Marja’s contribution was. US forces made a tactical decision, in coordination with the Provincial Governor of Helmand Mr. Mangal, to remain neutral in the harvest of poppy in 2010. The decision ran counter to the Afghan constitution which placed a ban on opium cultivation. However, United Nations drug officials believed that “Postponing eradication in this particular case is a sensible one.” Cmdr Jeffrey Eggers, a member of Gen. McCrystal’s strategic advisory group stated, “Marja is a special case right now.”

The operation also did not clear Marja of large numbers of weapons. Abdul Rahman Jan, former Provincial police chief stated “Hardly a single gun was captured by NATO forces.” This is a sign that many Taliban fighters remain in Marja and are working for the government but will consolidate and reorganize once the NATO forces move out to Kandahar in the summer. Local citizens stated that newly installed government officials and poorly paid ANSF will eventually take bribes, vis-à-vis the role of the Taliban, in order to move drugs out of Marja.

Other difficulties in the clear phase became a problem within days. Signs of a Taliban re-emergence began to appear on March 14th with one confirmed beheading and two cases under investigation. Intimidation has long been a common and effective Taliban tactic to offset Afghan citizens working with the government or military forces. It took roughly one month for Taliban forces to consolidate and reorganize their influence in Marja since the US/ANSF incursion. Locals have reported beatings, menacing, intimidation and threats made by the Taliban to anyone who works with the government or ISAF forces. Trust of the ANSF was a central issue among residents prior to the operation and with effective intimidation, the Taliban exacerbate the incompetency and inability of the government to secure Marja.
Holding Operations

The military side of “Clear and Hold” called for major resources over an extended period. First and second Battalion, sixth regiment along with their Afghan counterparts—had to construct combat outposts and patrol bases to the North, South and West in order to conduct patrols and hold terrain. Approximately 2,000 Marines and 1,000 ANA were to remain in Marja for several months, likely until the end of the coming summer to ensure lasting security. At the same time, efforts were made to enable the Afghan police to slowly takeover security duties, initially in bazaars and check posts and eventually throughout the entire town. These efforts proved to have uncertain credibility; given the fact ANP units began looting in some areas as they entered them.

The symbolic (or token) aspect of “Hold” were relatively easy to accomplish. Helmand Governor Gulab Mangal raised the Afghan flag over the center of town in Marja towards the end of the second week of Moshtarak. The ceremony was attended by nearly 700 residents and the newly appointed town administrator, Abdul Zahir Aryan and a team of advisors. To the north in Nad Ali, Afghan and coalition forces were also reporting progress by February 28th. District Governor Habibullah held a large shura of 450 people, which was supported by the district community council and Afghan security forces. A market had opened for the first time in eighteen months—supported by a new patrol base in a strategic junction nearby.

Rounding up a temporary popular presence did not, however, reflect broad popular support or stop the Taliban from “Owning the Night.” The regular ANP are supposed to serve as the long term local authority, but US and Afghan government are aware of the ANP’s past performance in Marja and did not permit any regular ANP to return to the city. Instead, the MoI sent 900 ANCOP to serve as a security stopgap while the ANP began the process of training. Marines trained locals, brought forth by Tribal leaders, to serve as permanent ANP. Over 900 Afghan Counter Narcotics Police and ANCOP began conducting security operations following the February 27th flag raising ceremony.

These police, along with 1,000 ANA soldiers under the command of Gen. Sher Mohammed Zazai -- who was commander of the Afghan National Army’s 205th Corps and top Afghan officer involved in the offensive --were expected to stay alongside 2,000 Marines in Marja. By bringing in ANCOP from outside the province, US officials believe they could curb corruption and disenchantment throughout the city of Marja towards the ANP. This is far too large a number to be a model for nationwide activity on anything approaching this scale. It also unclear that they can be replaced by local police. Since the ANP will be recruited from the local tribal leaders and trained by Marines in Helmand, there is a possibility of “Buy-In” from the religious leadership. However, home grown ANP units have typically resulted in large-scale inefficiency and corruption. Furthermore, a group of fresh recruits indicates that the government will need patience from the local population, reliable support by the ISAF and continual security from the ANA.

Civilian casualties and refugees presented other problems for clear and hold. ISAF forces scored tactical victories during the initial phases of the operations with minimal civilian casualties. Yet civilian casualties, refugees, and collateral damage still became a point of contention between the Afghan people and ISAF forces. Indiscriminant fire and killing of civilians by the ANA remained an issue even when ISAF forces operated alongside the ANSF. As in other operations, it was reported in Marja that the ANA continually pointed
their weapons at broad targets or mud huts, not aiming, and pulled the trigger with total disregard for the civilian population.

Military and civilian planners did prepare for the influx of refugees and are now preparing for an operating in Kandahar this summer -- which could displace far more serious numbers refugees. The UN reported “At least 900 families have fled Marja and Nad Ali districts of Helmand province for the nearby city of Lashkar Gah.” Additionally, “UN aid agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the area around Lashkar Gah have been mobilized to help the displaced families, distributing 750 kits containing food supplies and other items and organizing emergency shelter. Another 6,000 kits are already in place if needed, as well as water and sanitation equipment.”

**Performance of the ANSF**

The ANSF showed both that it was making progress and then it was still unready to assume responsibility for such an operation. Prior to Marja, the ANA had dealt largely with smaller clearing operations and the protection of villages. About 2,100 Afghan soldiers and 4,000 coalition service members participated in this offensive to clear the Taliban's largest remaining bastion in southern Afghanistan. Properly resourcing ANSF mission with ANSF for both phase and stabilization in “hold and build” operations in Marja was a top priority for ISAF and GiROA. The Afghan Force consisted of: Six ANA kandaks, two of the special commando kandaks and approximately 1,000 ANCOP.

This made Marja an important test of the ANSF, and the ANSF got strong high level support. In coordination with President Karzai, General Wardak (who runs the regional police that corresponds to RC South), and General Zazai, who commands the 205th Corps of the Afghan National Army, led a delegation to Kabul prior to operations. Cabinet and government viability approved and supported the operations while ISAF planners played a supportive role to this phase of the operation. ANSF officers also played a major role in approving, planning, and carrying out the Moshtarak operation, although it is clear that the bulk of the work was done by Coalition forces in all of these areas.

There were successes by both ANA and ANCOP forces. While on a video conference on March 4th, BG Nicholson stated that he was proud of the ANSF and while some senior commando units performed well, junior ANA units just out of the recruiting center were paired with the Marines and British forces during the assault. While the ratio of ISAF to ANSF stood at 3-1 during the shape, clear and hold phase, 1 ANA BN has operated completely independently. These units along with the ANCOP are solely responsible for searching homes. The responsibility of training the ANP will fall on the Marines however the General stated that 2 Marine Battalions (2,500 soldiers) and 1,500 ANA will remain in Marja until the summer. Long term security for the city may see 1/3 local hires, 2/3 outside Helmand Province. According to senior military officials, 400 ANCOP will remain in Marja.

Nevertheless, the ANSF performance was still mixed and ISAF reporting tended to exaggerate the role and capabilities of the ANSF once the operation began. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mullen initially stated, that the Afghans were in the “Lead”, implying that this was an Afghan led mission. However senior military officials later reported that the Afghans were not leading in combat, only in the planning phase. Even this claim later proved to be exaggerated. They certainly played a strong role as partners, but did not “Lead” the planning. By all accounts, the ISAF ran all ground operations, controlled close air support, logistics and heavy artillery. The ANSF remained in a supporting role.
Other US Marines’ varied in grading the performance of the ANSF during the operation. Sgt. Joseph G. Harms, a squad leader in the company’s Third Platoon, spent a week on the western limit of the company’s area, his unit alone with what he described as a competent Afghan contingent. “They are a lot better than the Iraqis,” said the sergeant, who has completed a combat tour in Iraq. “They understand all of our formations, they understand how to move. They know how to flank and they can recognize the bad guys a lot better than we can.”

Others were not as positive. Marine Companies C and K of the First Battalion faced heavy fighting during the operation. New ANA recruits were embedded with the Marines companies, who, after suffering 17 casualties, did not make positive assessments of the ANA performance. Reports of ANA corruption and misbehavior also started to emerge early in the operation. Following a foot patrol in Marja, Capt. Stephan P. Karabin II, of the US Marines reported to his counterparts that en route to their location, the ANA had looted the local bazaar, refused to stand post or fill sandbags and instead spent time walking around and smoking hashish. US Marines had to go back to the bazaar following combat operations and paid shop owners $300-$500 in an effort to apologize for the blatant disrespect and crooked behavior of ANA soldiers.

Other reports of looting by ANSF operating alongside US Marines during the initial assault of Marja were reported and continue to haunt the reputation of the ANSF. In shura’s prior to the operation, village elders clearly stated that trust in the ANSF has been a major problem. ANSF leadership remained a problem, and reflected the sense of entitlement, recruiting shortfalls, and lack of quality that has plagued the ANSF since its inception. An example of such leadership problem was demonstrated as Marines prepared to load up and walk food, water and supplies to an adjacent US/ANA company in Marja. The ANA refused to carry supplies to their counterparts, expecting their US soldiers to provide them with supplies. It took the threat of losing their own rations, and a stern warning from the Company Commander for the ANA leadership to reluctantly order soldiers to carry supplies. ANSF leaders also continually eat, drink or take the best supplies before giving the lower ranking soldiers.

Statements from GiROA in Kabul also exaggerated the role Afghan forces played in ground operations between February 13th and February 27th. Afghan officials stated that the ANSF military had planned the missions and lead both the fight and the effort to engage with Afghan civilians caught between the Taliban and the newly arrived troops. That assertion conflicts with what occurred in battle. In every engagement between the Taliban and one front-line American Marine unit, the operation has been led in almost every significant sense by American officers and troops.

At the same time, President Karzai kept a distance from the operation and showed limited interest in appointing effective and popular officials. US pressure did, however everything lead him to visit the area. On March 7th, President Karzai alongside General McCrystal visited Marja. During their short stop, President Karzai took direct questions and statements from roughly 300 village elders. Ultimately, ANSF conduct during the operations of both looting shops and home raids continued to be a major point of contention amongst elders who were united, in the short term, to support President Karzai but apprehensive about ANSF behavior.
In short, Marja continued to reflect the lack of an effective military culture in the ANSF, and created friction between ANSF units and their ISAF counterparts when paired together during operations. The ANSF culture of entitlement and inability to lead by example was a continued problem in paired missions.

**“Government in a Box”**

The civil side of the Afghan government also proved to be an uncertain partner. More local efforts had mixed success. These came to be called “Government in a Box” a term coined by Gen McChrystal to describe the district development plan to support combat operations and COIN strategy. The US State Department and other aid workers prepared a local government to be installed as the operation proceeded and ensure the installed government has the resources available to succeed. For months, Afghan government leaders including the future installed district governor Haji Zahir prepared to build a local government that could go into Marja and which could be capable of thwarting corruption, creating jobs and building infrastructure.

There was little popularity to build upon, and GiROA choices made things worse. Taliban rule, had been better organized and less corruption than GiROA rule. The new local government starts behind the power curve. The local citizens had lived in relative peace and calm for the past two years. The Taliban were able to provide a calm that the government failed to establish, as well as secure a cash crop from the sale of Opium.

The insertion of an outsider like Haji Zahir, a former western Afghan governor also presented problems. Zahir, a native of southern Afghanistan had spent the past 15 years in Germany, four under arrest for attempted manslaughter. His arrival elicited a lukewarm endorsement from the men who gathered to meet him. Their questions made clear that the Taliban still enjoyed deep support, while the Afghan government had little support. This illustrates the scale of the challenges ISAF forces and civilian stabilization specialists face as they try to establish basic civic administration.

The local Tribal leaders also stated in an early interview with District Governor that "They want three things: They want the road from Marja to the provincial capital to reopen; they want security; and they want their bazaar to reopen," Zahir said. With the massive amount of US aid, providing these services should have been relatively easy, but aid and services were slow once the initial showpiece deliveries were finished, and the Taliban showed it could still attacked aid workers and government officials, and intimidate local leaders. .

It is still unclear how effective a “Government in a Box” can be over time. As is the case in similar provinces and districts, a dichotomy exists between the wants and needs of the people and level of involvement of the central government. The newly installed government has a delicate balancing act to perform and well as the practical challenge of showing it is honest and ethical.

**Challenges in Securing Marja**

As for future operations, Marja does show that the twin pillars of success are local security and effective governance. It is clear from both Afghan civilian reactions, and the Taliban response that **clear, hold, build**, will have to be a continuing goal. At the same time, the Taliban is improving its approach to political governance. Last year, Taliban leader Mullah
Omar issued a "code of conduct" that directed Taliban fighters to limit civilian casualties.⁹⁹⁹ Although most Afghans are not enthusiastic about many aspects of the Taliban’s practices, they do prefer its stricter rule to government sanctioned ANSF corruption.

Several quotes illustrate the challenges involved:

> The Taliban provided us with a very peaceful environment," said Fakir Mohammed, 32, a tractor driver. "They did not bother us. We were very happy with them here."⁹⁹⁹

> “What comes after the shooting, by General McChrystal’s account, is what matters most: building an Afghan government, police force and army that can keep the Taliban out after the fighting is over.”⁹⁹⁹

> “As residents watched the flag raising, some expressed mixed feelings about the change of power. They said that the Taliban had provided order and security and that the Afghan Army now needed to prove that it could open schools, clear mines and explosives from the roads and fields, and keep the population safe.” ⁹⁹⁹

**Prospects and Lessons**

It is far too soon to know what lasting level of success the ANSF and ISAF can achieve, or what aspects – if any -- of Marja provide a scalable approach to implementing the race strategy on a rational level. A great deal of preparation went not only into the offensive action and civil military aftermath and an effort to win of a base of support from the local leaders and the population in a small area. Most villagers and leaders will pick their side or come down on the side of the Afghan government. The Taliban also has still to demonstrate what it can do as momentum shifts away from Marja. At the wind down of operations in Marja, the momentum has temporarily shifted away from this formerly Taliban controlled city.

The GiROA and the ANSF have yet to demonstrate they can provide lasting governance and prompt justice without corruption. Security continues to be the overwhelming concern among the population continues to be security. Villagers openly state to military and civilian officials that although they were not enthusiastic about the Taliban rule, there was calm. Villagers want to get back to this sense of normalcy, tend to their fields in this largely agricultural area, and not live in fear of night time raids and indiscriminant shooting.

It is equally unclear that any form of “Government in a Box” can do this or deal with local economic needs. No comprehensive plan has yet been rolled out on dealing with the opium trade by either the ISAF forces or the newly installed government. NATO’s mandate does not include counter-narcotics operations unless there is a clear link to the insurgency, a link that patently exists in Marja, however the fact remains that the newly installed government does not have the political clout to kill the cash crop without a viable alternative and ISAF forces are not in a rush to lose the support of the local farmers. Afghanistan has yet to formulate a comprehensive, successful counter-narcotics strategy. With tensions high from local farmers whom the government seeks to win over, no immediate action against the poppy fields will occur.

Short term measures can help. Civil military planners quickly started 33 projects to include, roads, wells and school repair meant to bolster the economy and build confidence amongst the civilian population. This will be nothing but hollow bribes however, unless “Build” is delivered on a sustained basis.
Some longer-term effects are also underway. US planners have stressed the need for President Karzai to provide needed civil servants to an area plagued with an uneducated workforce able to properly support the newly installed government. There also are efforts to shape a longer-term aid effort: “A group of U.S., British and Danish reconstruction specialists has devised a multimillion-dollar plan for Marja that includes reopening schools and health clinics, installing solar lighting in the bazaars, repairing culverts and streets, and offering cleanup jobs for the many unemployed, who are sometimes recruited by the Taliban. The three governments are contributing money. Later on, the plan calls for building police stations and small hydroelectric pumps and offering microloans to farmers and merchants.”

Making such plans real effective, however, is still an unproven process, and one that must begin to succeed if any degree of improvement in ANSF force development is to have lasting meaning.
X. Conclusions: Fully Addressing the Challenges of Force Development

It is not enough to announce a new strategy for the Afghan War. The US must now work with its ISAF allies and the Afghan government to take the detailed steps necessary to give the ANSF all the capacity and capabilities in needs to implement that strategy. Major new efforts are necessary to ensure that the ANSF becomes strong enough to work with ISAF to collectively, win the fight, and to accelerate the timeline for a responsible transfer of security activity to the ANSF and an eventual drawdown of ISAF forces.

This will involve increases in ANSF end strength as soon as these are practical. But, all involved must recognize that success is unlikely to come before 2014, and that any approach to ANSF force development requires efforts that are both innovative and necessarily experimental. Many aspects of ISAF’s shape, clear, hold, and build strategy involve major uncertainties, and that there is no precise way at this point to determine what kind of combined ISAF and ANSF troop to task ratio will succeed. It is far easier, however, to scale back an ANSF expansion program than to cope with one that does not meet the need. It also is clear that investments in the ANSF, CSTC-A, and added mentors will be far cheaper than any practical alternative.

Quality Before Quantity – On Afghan Terms

Moreover, force expansion efforts must not race beyond either Afghan or ISAF capabilities. Quality will often be far more important than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important than generating large initial force strengths. ISAF expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable units in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the ISAF can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and sustainability.

ISAF expediency cannot afford to ignore the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real world “friction” that affects force development. Slogans and rhetoric about ideological goals, leadership, and morale cannot be allowed to lead the force development effort to ignore Afghan material realities: problems in pay, corruption, problems in promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor medical care, overstretched or over committing force elements, problems in supporting families, vulnerability to insurgent infiltration and threats, and a lack of meaning compensation for death and disability. The US military and ISAF have systematically ignored such problems in the past, and understated or lied about their impact.

This means that the integrity and reputation of the ANSF will be an essential part of force development. No US efforts in strategic communications or aid can substitute for a host government’s ability to both communicate with its own people and win legitimacy in ideological, religious, and secular terms. Key aspects of operations – winning popular support, obtaining human intelligence, minimizing civil casualties and collateral damage, and transitioning from military operations to a civil rule of law – will all depend on both the quality and quantity of Afghan forces.

Creating Real Partnering for “Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”

Mid-2011 may not be a magic deadline, but the US and ISAF must do far more than build small units if a successful transfer is to take place. The emphasis must be on creating forces that are
fully mission effective, and which become the kind of partners that can really take the lead and then replace US and ISAF forces.

At a tactical level, improvements in the training base are needed to emphasize training at the Kandak and integrated and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the training effort longer—-not shorter—-they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of the ANSF can simply be trained and thrust into operations. Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.

Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers take time and require careful attention to continuity at the embedded training/mentoring effort. Partnering and the creation of effective units in the field is an exercise in sustained human relationships, and short tours and rapid changes in US and ISAF trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.

Much broader shifts are needed in the structure of training and partnering as ANSF forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “shape, clear, hold, and build” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations. It is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

The US and ISAF military need to address these issues with ruthless objectivity and self-criticism at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers, and in far too much media reporting, fully seriously. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field.

**Yes, It Is “Armed Nation Building”**

Whether or not the Obama Administration likes the term “nation building,” it is fundamentally dishonest to deny both its necessary and the fact this is precisely what the President’s strategy is based upon. ISAF and the Afghan government will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. The US, its ISAF allies, and the Afghan government must look beyond force development, and make armed nation building as a critical element of hybrid warfare. This will requires an integrated civil-military effort in which providing lasting security for the population, and economic and political stability, will often be far more important than success in tactical engagements with enemy forces. It also requires the US to understand that important as its traditional allies are, the key ally will be the host country and not simply its government but its population.
It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. Even once a mix of ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the *shape* and *clear* missions and part of the *hold* mission, they will still lose the war if they cannot *build*. Military action alone cannot defeat an opponent that fight a sustained battle of political attrition against an Afghan government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant, failing to provide basic services, and which is seen as corrupt as well as supporting power brokers rather than the people.

ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the *hold* and *build* missions. A transition should take place to leadership civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level, but ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.

In doing so, they must face the reality that national elections and democracy do not bring political legitimacy or loyalty without tangible actions that benefit the Afghan people. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government has been too corrupt and incapable in the past to take the necessary actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside ISAF and other aid efforts have been too narrow, too security conscious, and too oriented towards mid and long-term efforts to serve Afghan needs in the field.

Every effort must still be made to develop effective civilian and formal Afghan government action. This will take time, however, and some combination of ISAF and ANSF must act in the interim to provide enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and take initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. The end result must be to provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

The mix and phasing of such civil-military efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas. It also will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows what aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, actually do win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards true “build” phase.

**Obeying the “Iron Laws of Force Development**

It is easy to lose a war through the wrong kind of force development efforts – as Appendix A makes all too clear. To succeed, ISAF and the US must follow several “iron laws” for force development in carrying out all these efforts. First, they must pay as much attention to ANSF force quality as to increasing force quantity. They must not create units where there are inadequate mentors, partner units, facilities, equipment, and training capacity. Pay close attention to performance in the field versus formal training and quantified readiness measures. Second, they must properly equip and support ANSF forces or not put them into harm’s way.

Every increase in ANSF force quantity must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about
command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.

ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

Third, ISAF and the US must act to give to “partnership” real meaning. All the elements of ISAF must begin to work together with all of the elements of the ANSF to create equivalent forces that can conduct combined operations together. This will take time, resources, and patience. ISAF regional command Task force commanders must understand, however, that partnering with ANSF forces does not mean simply using them as they are, but making them effective, and treating operations as key real world aspects of training.

In the process, a significant number of national caveats and restrictions on aid will have to be lifted. Corrupt aid officials and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted. Exercises in symbolism, ephemeral good works, fund raising and “branding” will need to be put to an end. Above all, the military must act immediately when civilians are incapable and these efforts will need ANSF support and leadership where the Afghan civil government cannot act. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will lose the peace.

**The Need for Honesty and Realistic Deadlines**

It is time to make a fundamental reversal in US and allied behavior, and start to under promise and over perform. One key step in this process is for the US And ISAF countries to look beyond complaints about the Afghans and to look in the mirror. This is especially true in the case of the US. During 2002-early 2009, the US far failed dismally to set realistic goals for the ANSF in terms of time and resources, and to provide honest and objective assessments of its progress.

Since President Obama has talked about beginning US force reductions in mid-2011, and accelerating transfer of responsibility to the ANSF and Afghan government, ISAF cannot react and create a new set of unrealistic goals and timeframes. Nothing about the ANSF development effort to date indicates that it will be ready for large-scale transfer before 2014-2015. The NTM-A needs time and resources to develop the ANSF, not political pressure to declare victory and leave.

Sacrificing quality for quantity, and rushing the ANSF and GIRoA into transfer before they are ready, cannot win the war – particularly when the civil side of GIRoA is likely to remain so weak and the role of Pakistan is so uncertain. This means that the US and other ISAF efforts to develop the ANSF must resist pressure from Washington, other capitals, and NATO headquarters to move more quickly than is practical and prudent. It also requires a command ethic that under promises and over performs, rather than the distorted and dysfunctional command ethic that existed between 2001 and which was pressured into doing just the opposite. It must clear to all involved in the ANSF development effort that exaggerated progress reports became career killers and not career enhancers.
It is equally necessary for ISAF, the US, and other allied nations to create the kind of truly integrated civil-military plan needed to implement President Obama’s new strategy. Stovepipes and turf fights, and internal bickering – particularly by elements within the State Department, -- have crippled the effort necessary to create a plan with the depth, detail, and content needed. The Obama Administration needs to force real unity of effort – not simply talk about a whole of government approach – and do so at every level. At present, the US is scarcely a model for ISAF or its allies. If anything, the NSC and State Department seem to be as weak in these areas -- relative to a rising need -- as they have been in the past.
ANNEX A:

Doing It Wrong: Host Country Force Development Lessons from Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq
Developing host country forces requires a wide range of military expertise at every level, and no one should discount the progress the US military has made in these areas. At the same time, however, this progress should not lead US force development efforts to ignore the practical problems it has encountered from failing to look beyond the purely military aspects of force development in past wars, and that have damaged or crippled past efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Armed nation building is very different from aiding an ally with effective governance and an established force structure. An effective force development effort cannot tacitly assume that the ally is a host country capable of creating effective forces with a relatively strong central government or authority and with considerable unity of effort within its armed forces. It must address all key aspects of what happens when force development must take place under nation building conditions, in fractured or divided states, where alignments with the US are uncertain, and civil military operations are both difficult and critical.

These problems may not be critical to US advisory and training efforts in the many less demanding cases in the world, but they are the problems that have characterized all of the critical cases the US has had to deal with over the last half century, and where the US has had to relearn the same lessons again and again.

**Critical Shortfalls in US Force Development Efforts**

The US needs to look beyond the cases where the force development task is to respond to host country governments that have a high degree of unity and common objectives, and where the need to provide a politically sensitive advisory effort, linked to something approaching nation building, and caught up in complex irregular or asymmetric wars is minimal.

Virtually every major US military intervention since World War II has shown that US force development efforts must address a checklist of critical problems that repeatedly occur in fractured or weak host countries. Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan all serve as a warning that US force development efforts must make much better efforts to address several critical problems:

1. **Fractured states and divided states require a different approach**: Host country force development efforts often involved divided and competing security forces. There may be large elements within the host country leadership, political structure, and forces the US cannot trust. The force may have strong anti-US or anti-regime elements. The finance ministry, or its equivalent may not function, and individual combat elements may be under rival sectarian, ethnic, tribal, or factional control -- some involving serious loyalty problems. The advisory team may have to bridge over critical ethnic, sectarian, and tribal differences. The basic structure for force management, procurement, and budgeting may be weak, lacking, and/or corrupt.

    The US needs to find the best way to address these conditions in a functional way. It must find better ways to analyze a country’s capability or problems, and work around a failed or formative system. It must make conducting a network analysis to map out the “good” and “bad” guys a key aspect of force development and find better ways to deal with rival and competing groups.
2. **Host country force development must become an integrated part of civil-military operations, stability operations, and nation building.** The most challenging cases exist when the nation state is fractured, divided, or formative. This means the US must find much better ways to build Ministries, develop forces that can work in a counterinsurgency environment or deeply divided state, train forces to work with civil authorities, and determine how force development can create forces than can perform all of the relevant tasks in the “hold” and “build” phases of “shape, clear, hold, and build.” The problems in dealing with dealing with corruption, power brokers, political interference in promotion and retention, and the lack of civil capacity and the civil instruments of a rule of law need to be addressed far more explicitly.

3. **Zero-Based Force Building:** Creating new forces virtually from scratch is very different from improving or expanding an effective force structure in being and has post crucial problems that the US has had to relearn how to deal with every time they have arisen. They affect a key host country force development task: Deciding what force structure is needed within the elements of a nation’s security forces, and how to build forces from a very limited or zero base.

    Consider Iraq and Afghanistan: The US failed to determine the proper size of the forces needed, the speed of build up required, and the proper mix of elements within the armed forces, security forces, and police. It found that the formal training effort was only part of the force development task, and that mentoring, partnering, and enabling were critical once forces were supposedly trained and equipped. The size of the army required constant increases, often at a rate and in ways that created chronic leadership issues, promotion and retention problems, and issues with corruption in terms of pay and the creation of phantom forces.

    The US had to find ways to create battalions from scratch in ways the manual does not touch upon, phase in higher headquarters and formations, deal with issues in creating sustainability, and slowly find replacements for US enablers – where the need for such outside support was a critical part of the force development task where no clear system existed for deciding how to address the tasks. The various planning and coordinating groups lack experience and instruction and took years to function with moderate effectiveness – when they did.

4. **Every new effort to create a police and security force in a fractured country and under the conditions of armed nation building has failed, or repeated the same initial mistakes, over the last 50 years.** These previous problems have been even more severe in dealing with the security services, intelligence, branches, and various forms of police. Each case has led to efforts to create a civil police and formal rule of law that cannot function or survive in a counterinsurgency environment. It has repeated the same in initial mistakes in deciding how to structure such forces, the problems between DoD and State in creating forces that can survive in divided states and in a counterinsurgency environment; and the failures of allies like Germany in Afghanistan. It has understated or ignored the need for specialized or paramilitary police and other security elements, and the hard choices to be made as to what kind of training and vetting can really be provided for local police. It has also led to the many of the same initial problems in creating border police, specialized anti-terrorism units, and dealing with issues like narcotics.
The effort to create civil police that could not operate in a counterinsurgency environment has been a disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan. The failure to deal with the real world need for paramilitary police and for creating a force in a climate where the state is corrupt and/or the rule of law was tenuous to failed has been a problem and again. The manual does not highlight these real world problems and issues.

This, however, is only part of the story. The US has found itself dealing with countries that do not have a well-structured rule of law in the field. This effort to create police without the rest of the justice system has often coincided with an ongoing insurgency or civil conflict. The police have to be paramilitary to survive and are not supported by effective civil courts, jails, lawyers, etc. Moreover, force development efforts need to be structure from the start to prepare for the problems created corrupt officials, power brokers, and the use of the police as players in civil conflicts.

5. **Dealing with a corrupt, divided, and/or disloyal military.** Divided nations, a lack of capacity, poor pay and corruption, and sectarian/ethnic/tribal issues have other impacts. The misuse of promotion and military pay, phantom soldiers, equipment and weapons theft and sales, promotion by faction or personal loyalty, bypassing of training standards, false ratings of unit effectiveness and readiness, are endemic in the developing world. The risks of such problems and how to work around them are never realistically addressed, but any review of SIGIR, GAO, and DoD IG reports on past SFA efforts would make it clear that these are critical tasks.

6. **Dealing with a corrupt, divided, and disloyal mix of host country governance and politics:** The US must make clear and hard decisions regarding the ways in which its force development efforts fit into the broader US country team, outside alliance, and US command and intelligence problems in dealing with state building for either regular armed forces or police. How many times have we had to fix or bypass key officials and ministries in such countries? Deal with ministries lacking in capacity, caught up in political struggles, interference from outside power brokers, problems with Prime Ministries and finance ministries? What guidance does an SFA team need?

7. **Problems with contractors:** Afghanistan and Iraq made contracting a critical problem in US force development efforts and in operating where US military efforts have limited control in a resource limited environment. It is not apparent that the US military has yet developed anything like adequate tools to manage, audit, and control contract support. Both DoD and SIGIR have documented critical problems and failures in Iraq.

8. **Shortfalls in trainers and mentors:** Far too often, US training and partnering efforts have glossed over shortfalls in the quality of trainers and mentors; their lack of motivation and experience; and the tendency to use, rather than partner, host country forces. In Afghanistan, ISAF still faced the problem in late 2008 that it had only about one-third the police trainers and 50% of the required army trainers as the force development effort scaled up. The US was not prepared to deal with either its own shortfalls or the problems that occurred when allies did not deliver as planned.

9. **Addressing the “training” – “partnering” gap:** They also need to realize that improvements in the training base are need to emphasize training at the Kandak and integrated and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the
training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of a host country force can simply be trained and thrust into operations.

Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.

10. **Continuity of effort, and dealing with the need for sustained human relationships at the partnering and mentoring level:** Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers takes time and continuity of at least the embedded training/mentoring effort. It is an exercise in sustained human relationships and short tours and rapid changes in US trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.

11. **Understanding the emerging importance of civil military relationships and training:** Further shifts will be needed as forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “shape, clear, hold, and build” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations.

As of April 2010, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

**Other Issues That Need to Be Addressed**

There are a wide range of other areas that have been important in recent US force development experience. They too form a checklist that effective force development efforts must explicitly address:

1. **Case studies:** Where does the user go to find the lessons from recent US efforts? How do trainers and partners determine what experience may be most relevant?

2. **Continuity of Effort:** Shifts in command, particularly at the partnering and mentor level, often lead to a lack of proper continuity of effort, a breakdown or gaps in critical US-host country relationships, and a mutual lack of trust. Repeated rotations have help US officers reduce these problems, but they still need far more attention.

3. **Partnering:** The US military must now find the best way to actually implement create a partnering structure of the kind General McChrystal has put forward in his new strategy for Afghanistan. It must move from talk about empowering Host country commanders and making them more independent; and shaping the use of embedded mentors and partner units in a practical way. It must address the need to develop steadily higher levels of real world host country C2 capabilities, help host country elements move into the lead;
and truly partner – not use – host country forces needs more attention and case examples. So does the complex transition from being in the lead to the advisory role.

4. **Mentoring, Embeds, and Enablers:** Like partnering, finding the right mix of mentors, embeds, and enablers is critical; specifically in helping new units adjust to the realities of combat and allowing effective leaders to emerge. The complex tasking and organization required in such efforts has repeatedly been underestimated, and in the interface with partnering and enabling US and allied combat units supporting a host country force has not been realistically addressed.

5. **C4I/IS&R:** Modern force development requires far more sophisticated and technically advanced C4I/IS&R capabilities. These have been critical problems in shaping host country capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The practical problems encountered are not addressed, nor are the solutions worked out over time.

6. **Sustainability:** Few areas in force development have presented more recent problems in both operations and force generation. Progress has occurred in this area, but it still poses major challenges at every level.

7. **CM and Readiness Ratings:** Developing meaningful ratings of how ready a unit actually presented problems in Vietnam that help lose the war. It has presented major problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan – raising serious questions about whether the SFA team can develop objective independent ratings that can be trusted, and whether quantitative metrics are a substitute for narratives on how units are actually led and behave in combat. The issue of who rates the raters is not addressed, nor is the problem of rating units once they actually enter combat.

   New metrics are needed that show the impact of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions. A system needs to be put in place that provides practical help and experience to the actual force development effort in the field, and helps it find the right metrics for a given case and determine how to get reliable and useful data.

8. **Retention, unit manning, and unit leadership:** These have all been interrelated and critical problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Retention is often country, culture, and subgroup related and requires careful assessment of local practices, values, and methods. The problems in leave/family ties/local ties and other factors affecting in unit manning and the problems created by ghost manning needed much more attentions. So does the fact that formal training in new units can rarely provide a reliable picture of officer and NCO quality in combat, and there is a need to identify and remove weak and incapable leaders as soon as possible and help the inexperienced develop in other cases. The manual tended to assume that the SFA task is building elements in a relatively mature force when this often will not be the case.

9. **The NCO Problem:** It is far easier to try to introduce this aspect of US practice in different cultures and developing states than to make it actually work. This issue needs explicit attention in current and future US force development efforts.

10. **Donors from multiple states:** The US needs for focus far more on creating “alliances of the effective” and much less on getting as many different allied efforts and resources as
possible. ISAF have made progress, but proper coordination and the development of effective allied efforts remains a problem.

11. Developing pay, promotion, facility, medical, disability, death benefit, and family contact systems and ratings. The US had often stressed leadership and morale in fits force development efforts and ignored the realities of what actually drives human behavior and capability – particularly in forces that have a high element of politicization, corruption, and weak capacity. Any effective SFA effort and system must address all of these issues as key potential problem areas.

12. Counterterrorism and irregular warfare: US force development efforts have often focused far too much on formal combat training, and too little on counterterrorism and irregular warfare. Talking about hybrid warfare is not enough. The US must find better ways to make it part of the force development effort.

13. Military mission: The US has experienced constant problems where it sought to develop forces for its view of the mission when this differed from key elements in a divided host country military and political structure. A force development effort that pretends there is agreement on the mission within a host country, or between the US and all key elements of the host country, has repeatedly create a climate of illusions that has presented serious problems in creating effective host country forces and operations in the field.

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