Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
With the Assistance of Nicholas B. Greenough

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Where We Stand and How We Got There

IED Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep-07</th>
<th>Sep-08</th>
<th>Sep-09</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IED Incidents</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>860</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED's Turned in</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>355</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective Attacks</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF KIA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFWIA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IED Attacks with Coalition Force Casualties

IED's Turned In

IEDs Found and Cleared

Ineffective IED Attacks

JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009

Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05

Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07

Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09

Events Density
- No events
- Low
- Medium
- Significant
- High

Sources: Afghanistan JODIS NATO SIGACTS data.
The Insurgency Reaches a Crisis: 2005-2009

- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by GI RoA weakness
- International support for development has not met population’s expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Where the Fighting Is: 2009

Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOlIS NATO SIGACTS data.
71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.
Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: 2009

- RED: Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace
  - 95 Total
- Orange: Insurgents have demonstrated capability
  - 97 Total
- Yellow: Insurgents have limited capability
  - 162 Total
- White: Not able to assess
  - 45 Total

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.
Area under Poppy Cultivation (ha) and Potential Production of Opium (mt) 2001-2008

Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication

Source: SIGAR, January 2010, p. 119
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
In 2009, the number of civilian casualties was the highest since 2001, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA recorded 2,412 deaths in 2009, a 14% increase from the 2,118 deaths recorded in 2008. Of all civilian deaths reported by UNAMA in 2009, 67% were attributed to anti-government elements and 25% to pro-government forces. The remaining 8% could not be attributed to either category because some civilians were killed in cross-fire or when unexploded ordnance detonates.
“Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces

**Kinetic Events by Geography**

01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05

01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07

01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

**Kinetic Events by Week and Type**

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.

- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.

- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
“The insurgency is confident “…Winning a War of Political Attrition by Reducing International Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Likely</th>
<th>Most Dangerous</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach</td>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces</td>
<td>➢ More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
<td>➢ Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west</td>
<td>➢ Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides</td>
<td>➢ Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers</td>
<td>➢ Reduced security in population centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Reduced international support for Afghanistan</td>
<td>➢ Significant loss of international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA</td>
<td>➢ Open popular frustration with GIRoA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Reduced support for ANSF</td>
<td>➢ Popular enmity toward ANSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency</td>
<td>➢ Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.
Can the New Strategy Work?

“Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”
Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

• **Shape**: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

• **Clear**: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• **Hold**: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• **Build**: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

• **Transfer**: Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.
Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan as A Host Country

• Can influence, but not transform.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations as quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
Afghan Expectations Are More Positive

“...the latest poll by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV finds that sharply more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country’s strife, while many fewer blame the United States or its allies – significant progress in a central aim of the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Another, basic change is larger still: After steep declines in recent years there’s been a 30-point advance in views that the country is headed in the right direction; 70 percent now say so, the most since 2005. Afghans’ expectations that their own lives will be better a year from now have jumped by 20 points, to 71 percent, a new high. And there’s been a 14-point rise in expectations that the next generation will have a better life, to 61 percent.

Many challenges remain. Complaints about official corruption are higher than ever. Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.”

...There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views.

But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Another result on security points the same way. In 2005, 72 percent of Afghans rated their personal security from crime and violence positively. A year ago that fell to 55 percent. Today it’s still at 55 percent – stabilized, at least, but still well below its best, or where millions of Afghans clearly want it to be.

Afghans’ better hopes for the future, as noted, could also reflect hopes that the renewed Western commitment will ultimately resolve their country’s strife. Moreover, in addition to the U.S./NATO efforts, this poll find a 12-point rise in confidence in local commanders and their militia to provide security – a result that may reflect efforts by some local militia, called arbakai, to oppose the Taliban.
Afghan’s Still Support Their Government and the ANSF, and the US/ISAF Rating Has Improved

Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

There also are significant regional differences. Support for U.S. and NATO efforts are sharply lower in the South and East, where the fighting is heaviest. Local support for the Taliban rises to 27 percent on its home turf, in the country’s Southwest, vs. 10 percent in the rest of the country. And views of the country’s direction are markedly less bright in some high-conflict areas, such as Helmand, heart of the opium poppy trade.

Critical from the U.S. perspective is that, despite poor views of its performance, 68 percent of Afghans continue to support the presence of U.S. forces in their country – and nearly as many, 61 percent, favor the coming surge of Western troops initiated by President Obama. But support for the surge drops to 42 percent in the South and East; support for the presence of U.S. forces also drops in these regions, and support for attacks on U.S. and NATO forces, while sharply down overall, remains much higher in the restive South. honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

...Support for the planned increase in U.S. and NATO forces is accompanied by majority belief the United States will accomplish the goals set out by Obama – for example, training Afghan forces to take over security, strengthening the Kabul government, preventing the Taliban from retaking control, preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing a base of operation and reducing corruption. But fewer, ranging from 22 to 33 percent, are very confident these will happen.

The commitment expressed by the planned surge may be another factor bolstering public hopes. There are, in any case, other signs of improved views of the West: There’s been a 14-point gain from last year, to 83 percent, in the view among Afghans that it was right for the United States to invade and overthrow the Taliban just more than eight years ago. And the number of Afghans who say attacking Western forces can be justified has dropped sharply, from 25 percent a year ago to 8 percent, a new low. (It jumps to 22 percent in the South – but that’s half of what it was there a year ago.)
Shape

In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

• Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.

• Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
ISAF in a “Nationwide” War

ISAF Regional Commands
## ISAF Regional Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>RC-North</th>
<th>RC-West</th>
<th>RC-South</th>
<th>RC-East</th>
<th>RC-Capital</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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**Supporting:**

- Italy
- Poland
- France
- Turkey

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Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009

- Stand Aside: 28%
- Engaged: 15%
- Peripheral: 57%
Building on a Small Core of ANA Forces

In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations.

Source: NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html, as of October 22, 2009
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOlIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

ISAF will focus on 80 of 364 districts in 2010. Has not identified the districts, but are key population centers.
Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts

Key Terrain Districts (80)
Area of Interest Districts (41)
Unfinished Road
### Provincial Assessment Process

#### Methodology

- **Assessment of Provincial Governance/Development/Security Program Effectiveness** (Function & Linkage) & **Impact** on the Population in the Districts
- Bottom-up District Governance/Development/Security Assessments provide detailed understanding of effects on population and environment
Provincial Assessments focus on the capacity of the provincial government to serve the Afghan people by delivering leadership, planning, and resources to district level.
**District Assessment Model**

District Assessment

(Overall assessment based on Governance, Development, Security)

|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------|

* An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas; or areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.
Defining Key Districts

• Key Terrain:
  – The combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents, to include:
    • Population centers
    • Commerce routes
    • Production areas
  – Border crossing points

• Area of Interest:
  – The 41 Area of Interest Districts represent a second tier of districts representing combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or the insurgents.
  – Operationally, these are districts where deliberate comprehensive Governance, Development, and Security activities are not planned but where they are occurring or are planned to occur, such as districts which correspond to national and sub-national efforts to develop Government, Development and Security, including Focused District Development (FDD) process, District Delivery, District Support Teams (DSTs), and districts of concern for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These districts are generally adjacent to Key Terrain Districts or have a direct influence on activities in the key terrain.

• White Areas:
  – An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas
  – Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.

In All of Afghanistan

Activity trends in key terrain are consistent with overall activity levels.
Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan
Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar
The New Strategy is Having an Impact, But Afghan Support is Still Weak

just 38 percent rate the work of the United States in Afghanistan positively Š up 6 points in the past year, but far below its peak, 68 percent, in 2005. (NATO ratings are as low, and flat.) Fifty-one percent have a favorable view of the United States overall Š vastly below its high point, 83 percent, in 2005. And U.S. favorability drops to 35 percent in the East and 29 percent in the South (vs. 59 percent in the rest of the country) Š again, plummeting where the United States is most actively engaged in combat.

While its performance is rated poorly, most Afghans nonetheless see a need for the United StatesŠpresence in Afghanistan Š a view probably informed by very broad rejection of the likely alternative, the Taliban. As noted, more than two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in their country, slightly up from last year although still below its peak. (Most Afghans last year opposed a troop increase in the abstract; the shift from those views to support for ObamaŠsurge is mirrored in U.S. public opinion as well.)

Source: Gary Langer, "Views Improve Sharply in Afghanistan, Though Criticisms of the U.S. Stay High," ABC Polling Unit, reporting on ABC NEWS/BBC/ARD POLL: AFGHANISTAN – WHERE THINGS STAND, Jan. 11, 2010
UN Estimates that NATO/ISAF is Responsible for Far Smaller Percent of Civilian Deaths

Source: UN and NATO/ISAF as reported by ABC News, 11.1.2010.
But Perceptions Differ on Air Strikes and Where Offensives Have Not Brought Lasting Security

There clearly are many other remaining challenges for Afghanistan and its Western allies alike. In addition to their weak overall ratings and the issue of civilian casualties, 40 percent say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area – up 6 points from a year ago, but well below its peak. And just under half, 48 percent, are confident in the ability of these Western forces to provide security and stability – again up a bit, but far below its level in 2006, 67 percent.

Strikingly, just 42 percent in the South and East support the presence of U.S. forces in their area, compared with 78 percent in the rest of the country. Positive ratings of the U.S. performance dive to 16 percent in the South and 28 percent in the East, vs. 45 percent in the rest of the country. And just 26 percent in these two regions are confident in the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to provide security, compared with 56 percent elsewhere.

More generally, support for the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is 18 points higher among people who rate their local security positively, 26 points higher where reports of violence are lower and also 26 points higher where there’s no coalition bombing reported. Similarly, where the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is seen as strong, 67 percent report confidence in the ability of these forces to provide security, 73 percent rate their performance positively and fewer blame Kabul or the West for the country’s violence.

...more Afghans also say the United States and NATO are doing worse, not better, in avoiding civilian casualties, by 43-24 percent. This may reflect dismay over widely publicized individual incidents, such as the bombing of a pair of hijacked fuel tankers in September that killed scores of civilians in Kunduz province. It’s another measure the allies want to move their way if their basic support is to rise.

Hold

In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

*Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.*

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
ANSF Force Levels and Goals: 2009-2013

From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 238 ANA casualties, according to IJC: 173 soldiers wounded in action and 65 killed in action. The number of ANA casualties decreased by 46% from the preceding quarter. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.

From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 258 ANP casualties, according to IJC: 155 personnel wounded in action and 103 killed in action. Total ANP casualties decreased by 52% from the preceding quarter. Casualties were concentrated in the southern provinces. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.
From October 1 to December 31, 2009, the ANA fielded 1,791 radios, 980 vehicles, and 15,097 weapons, according to CSTC-A. The only weapons that the ANA procured this quarter were 12,305 M16A4 rifles. The largest difference in equipment fielded was the number of weapons, which was more than seven times as many as last quarter. The ANP fielded 309 radios, 520 vehicles, and 1,257 weapons, according to CSTC-A. The only ANP procurements this quarter were 1,515 AK-47 assault rifles and 395 light tactical vehicles.
Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned January 2007-November 2008

ANA Unit CM Ratings
Period-To-Period Comparison

Capability Milestone (CM)

CM1: capable of operating independently
CM1: 34
CM1: 44

CM2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
CM2: 44
CM2: 37

CM3: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
CM3: 46
CM3: 41

CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions
CM4: 13
CM4: 5

Notes: May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.
CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%.
SIGAR is conducting an ongoing audit to evaluate the reliability of ANSF assessments, including the CM rating system.

ANP Unit CM Ratings
Period-to-Period Comparison

Capability Milestone (CM)

CM1: capable of operating independently
- CM1: 12
- CM1: 11

CM2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
- CM2: 29
- CM2: 37

CM3: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
- CM3: 35
- CM3: 34

CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions
- CM4: 21
- CM4: 13

Notes: One unit completed the District Development Program in December and thus is no longer rated.
CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70-85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70-85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50-70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50-70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%.
SIGAR is conducting an ongoing audit to evaluate the reliability of ANSF assessments, including the CM rating system.
CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled $33.53 million. As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.

US ETT Personnel Required and Assigned
August 2007-2013

PMTs, US Personnel Required and Assigned
June 2007 – November 2008

ANSF Force Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

- ANSF Growth and Development
  - ANP: 134k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
  - ANA: 171.6k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
    - ANAAC: 5.7k end strength, operating at CM-2, integrated C2 system, balanced against operational requirements; CM-1 by 2016
  - ANSF medical system at CM-3, with growth to CM-1 by 2020
  - Systems: Enduring Afghan operated and sustained systems *(Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency and other applicable measures)*
    - Education & Training at CM-2; Logistics at CM-2; C4I at CM-2; Personnel at CM-2

- Recruiting and Training Commands
  - ANAREC at CM-2
  - ANPREC at CM-2
  - ANATC at CM-2
  - ANPTC at CM-2

- Infrastructure
  - ANA at CM2: 75% in Permanent Facilities
    - 25% in Temporary Facilities (for no more than one winter)
  - ANP at CM2: 60% in Permanent Facilities
    - 40% in Temporary Facilities
MoD & MoI Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

GIRoA
– ONSC coordinating cross-ministerial issues
– MoD at CM-1
– MoI at CM-1

Leader Development
– Annual attrition goals achieved: ANA 14%, ANP 16%
– NCO and Officer positions filled to at least 85%
– Recruiting systems are established to sustain ANSF force levels and enable future growth if required
– ANA/ANP have achieved 70% approval ratings

Information Engagement
– Ministries and ANSF IE at CM-2
– Ministries and ANSF IE plan present and effective with objectives met
In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.
Corruption is a Critical Issue

Internally, ...corruption is a very prominent threat to hopes for progress. Nearly all Afghans – 95 percent – now say official corruption is a problem in their area, up 23 points since 2007. Seventy-six percent say it’s a big problem; both are new highs.

Outside their immediate area, 90 percent see official corruption as a problem at the provincial level, and 83 percent call it a problem in the national government in Kabul – both vast numbers – with nearly two-thirds saying it’s a big problem at both these levels of government.

But, Governance is Less of a Problem in Afghan Eyes

Given the continued challenges, a fundamental question is what’s behind the improvements in Afghans’ attitudes about their country’s direction and leadership. The answer appears to be a variety of elements rather than one silver bullet.

As noted, relief in the election’s end is a strong factor; the promise of stability can be appealing, fears of civil unrest after the disputed election were not realized and Karzai’s endorsement by several of his leading opponents may have carried weight.

Karzai may also be experiencing a typical winner’s rally, often seen in U.S. elections; indeed, beyond presidential approval, Americans’ views of the United States’ direction improved after Obama’s election – in still-challenging times – just as they’ve now soared in Afghanistan. A question is to what extent support may fade (as has Obama’s), especially if Karzai’s campaign promises are unmet.

ELECTION – On the Afghan election itself, this poll finds majority suspicion of fraud in voting and vote counting alike – 56 and 60 percent, respectively, think these occurred. But far fewer (three in 10) see it as widespread fraud; 82 percent express confidence that “a system of freely voting for leaders” will work in Afghanistan; and 75 percent say they’re satisfied with the election.

Positive views of the country’s direction likewise are dramatically higher among people who are confident democracy can work in Afghanistan, as well as among those who rate Karzai’s performance positively. Those who suspect widespread fraud, on the other hand, are considerably less sanguine about the country’s direction overall.

Karzai, for his part, is not immune from the country’s geographical divisions. His performance rating drops to 40 percent in Helmand vs. 72 percent in the rest of the country. And underscoring the impact of development, his rating is 18 points higher in areas where people give a positive rating to the availability of jobs and economic opportunity.

Another result on elections may not be one that Western governments would prefer: Forty-three percent of Afghans say their preferred form of government is an Islamic state, rather than a democracy (32 percent) or strongman rule (23 percent). Support for an Islamic state spikes to 56 percent in the East, bordering Pakistan’s tribal areas. But elsewhere such views have changed; in Iraq, support for democracy ultimately soared after a series of successful elections.
Economic and development advances are additional factors. After long delay, there are positive reports of development in this impoverished country. Fifty-five percent of Afghans now say they have electricity, up 15 points since 2007. From its low in 2007, there’s been a 24-point gain in the number who rate their electrical supply positively – albeit just to 38 percent, indicating the continued need to develop power supply and delivery.

Fifty-six percent report new or rebuilt roads in their area in the past five years, up 21 points from 2007; the number who rate their local infrastructure positively has more than doubled since first measured in 2005. While access to medical care remains a problem, half report new or rebuilt health clinics, up 13 points from 2007. And, in a largely rural nation with heavy reliance on subsistence farming, positive ratings of support for agriculture – availability of seed, fertilizer and equipment – is up by 9 points in the past year, albeit just to 45 percent.

On the economy, while affordability of food and fuel remain significant problems, 45 percent of Afghans rate the national economy positively, up 12 points from a year ago. Fewer, 39 percent, rate their own financial situation positively, but that too is up, by 7 points. The availability of jobs and economic opportunities is still a challenge, rated positively by just four in 10, but that’s up by 11 points in the past year.

Part of the improvement in economic attitudes may reflect aspirations; the Karzai government has announced a plan to raise teachers’ salaries, encouraging some speculation that other public sector raises – army, police – may follow. Again, if they don’t, positive views could be at risk.

On the economy, while affordability of food and fuel remain significant problems, 45 percent of Afghans rate the national economy positively, up 12 points from a year ago. Fewer, 39 percent, rate their own financial situation positively, but that too is up, by 7 points. The availability of jobs and economic opportunities is still a challenge, rated positively by just four in 10, but that’s up by 11 points in the past year.

In one sign of consumer advances – small in the grand scheme, but potentially powerful in its personal impact – the number of Afghans who report having a cell phone in their household has essentially doubled since 2005, from 31 percent then to 60 percent now.

There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views. But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Conditions of Life

Poverty and Unemployment

Poverty Levels and Unemployment, September 2008

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>40 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below the poverty line</td>
<td>53 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communications

Wireless phone subscriber and landlines, September 2008

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wireless phone subscribers</td>
<td>6,536,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlines</td>
<td>45,668 (2001: 15,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Energy

Installed Electrical Generation Capacity, September 2008

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Installed Electrical Capacity</td>
<td>754MW (2001: 430MW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditions of Life (continued)

Transportation

Kilometers of road and percentage of the Ring Road complete, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roads Built (USAID only)</th>
<th>2,700km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Ring Road complete</td>
<td>73 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Health

Access to the Basic Package of Health Services, Trained Healthcare personnel, and Clinics constructed or rehabilitated, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of population with access to the BPHS</th>
<th>80 percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAID Trained health care workers</td>
<td>10,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinics constructed/rehabilitated by USAID</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education

Students enrolled in School, Percentage Female Students, and School Constructed or Rebuilt, September 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students enrolled in school</th>
<th>6,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of female students</td>
<td>33 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools constructed or rebuilt by USAID</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghanistan Gross Domestic Product (Licit) 2002-2008 (Source: World Bank)
# International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pledge (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission (EC)</td>
<td>1,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-U.S. Pledges</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,800</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including donors not listed)</td>
<td>(includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report, p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over $500 million total.
A “Coalition of National Branding and the Uncoordinated:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:
- Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
- 43 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 6,130)
- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (ESP)

Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 36,500)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD, AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA, ROU)

Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 4,400)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 5,700)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 18,300)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL, USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Funds Supporting Afghanistan Reconstruction Efforts ($Billions)

**FUNDING SOURCES (TOTAL: $51.01)**

- **ASFF**: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- **CERP**: Commander's Emergency Response Program
- **ESF**: Economic Support Fund
- **INCLE**: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- **Other**: Other Funding

**AGENCIES**

- **Department of Defense (DoD)**: $27.87
- **USAID**: $9.74
- **Department of State (DoS)**: $2.50
- **Distributed to Multiple Agencies**:

**AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)**

- **Security**
- **Governance**
- **Development**

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. a. DoJ, DoD, DoS, Treasury, USDA, USAID, and other agencies.

US Funding Trends

APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE ($ BILLIONS)

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009 ($ BILLIONS)
ESF Funds

Appropriations by Fiscal Year ($Billions)

Cumulative Comparison ($Billions)

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by USAID for FY 2002–2009.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.
CERP FUNDS

Appropriations by Fiscal Year ($Millions)

Cumulative Comparison ($Billions)

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by DoD for FY 2004–2009.


Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by DoD except as specified. Updated data from DoD resulted in a lower obligation figure than that reported as of 9/30/09.

Transfer

No clear definition as yet, but “transfer” is to begin by mid 2011.

- Afghan government will remain dependent on US and outside financial aid indefinitely into the future -- probably through 2021 and beyond.
- US military advisors talk about doubling (and largely funding) the ANA and ANP, but Presidential approval is uncertain and force expansion is to be assessed annually.
- US military advisors call for real partnership with Afghan forces, but it is unclear if this can be implemented before 2011, must less fully prepare for transfer before 2014.
- No clear plan for increasing Afghan governance capacity or economic support and development.

Success requires the US to address all six centers of gravity in the war.
The US must have truly integrated civil military efforts.
And, there is Pakistan...
Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

2) Training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.
Back Up Slides
Killed in Action: 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSF KIA</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF/US KIA</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Afghanistan CIDNE SIGACTS data through 31 November, as of 08 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

2007 – 2009
Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME)
(80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate)
Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308)

2003 – 2006
Predominantly Military Ordnance
Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473)
* No IED related casualty data available for 2003

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Steadily Increasing Size of Charges

- Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased
- Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology
- The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taliban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
High Profile Explosions: 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person Borne IED</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Vehicle Borne IED</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Borne IED</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yearly Totals: 163, 211, 158

Sources: Afghanistan CIDNE SIGACTS data through 31 November, as of 08 December 2009 reporting.
Indirect Fire Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Small Arms Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
# Funding of US Efforts in Afghanistan
(fiscal years, $US Millions, including supplementals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operation</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>4,872</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Security</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Governance</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>148</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dev/Hum</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>254</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alternative Livelihood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian/Other</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter-Drug</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eradication</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alternative Livelihood</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>10,268</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td>2,922</td>
</tr>
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</table>
## Allocation of DoD CN resources 2004-2008 ($US Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2004</th>
<th>FY2005</th>
<th>FY2006*</th>
<th>FY2007*</th>
<th>FY2008*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (OCONUS)</td>
<td>12,800</td>
<td>72,833</td>
<td>27,866</td>
<td>56,829</td>
<td>38,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (CONUS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,390</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>15,459</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Training</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>11,580</td>
<td>12,441</td>
<td>13,176</td>
<td>21,039</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Equipment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2,796</td>
<td>15,036</td>
<td>4,285</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,045</td>
<td>8,568</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>26,457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan Special Narcotics Force Enhancement</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>6,075</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (BCPs)</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>6,587</td>
<td>16,127</td>
<td>5,449</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (HQs)</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td>42,684</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Training</td>
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<td>9,911</td>
<td>7,350</td>
<td>41,460</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Equipment</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>14,188</td>
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<td>959</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Highway Police Facilities</td>
<td>8,400</td>
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<td>CN National Police Facilities</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>2,103</td>
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<td>CN Police - Equipment</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,850</td>
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<td>Public Information Campaign for MOI</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>3,432</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-MIP Efforts</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>7,382</td>
<td>12,564</td>
<td>70,976</td>
<td>43,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-Non MIP Efforts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>9,030</td>
<td>38,670</td>
<td>13,700</td>
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<td>Other Program Support</td>
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<td>9,228</td>
<td>9,202</td>
<td>11,794</td>
<td>9,887</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Dept Helicopter Lease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,700</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>224,535</strong></td>
<td><strong>108,054</strong></td>
<td><strong>290,985</strong></td>
<td><strong>189,619</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Includes total Supplemental funding appropriated in that year.