Recent Trends in the Iraq War

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Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

February 3, 2010
The Changing Patterns of Violence: 2003-2009

Source: MNF-I SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 28, 2009. Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.
Incident counts based on preliminary data for June 2009
Civilian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province

Security Incidents, by Type

Cumulative Fatalities

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 42
Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- Winter 2006 vs. Fall 2008

Winter 2006-2007

Fall 2008

Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

Key Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: February 2009
Location of Sunni and Shi’ite Insurgent Capability: August 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Violence at End-2009-Early 2010
Iraqi Security Patterns: 10/21/09 to 1/13/10

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)

Northern Region

Western Region

Southern Region

Central Region

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. .43
**Insurgent, JAM, and Iranian Activity: Late 2009**

**Significant Security Incidents, 10/1/2009–1/20/2010**

**October 2009**
- **Wednesday, October 14:** 9 Iraqis killed and 56 wounded during armed attacks in Baghdad and bombings in Kerbala.
- **Friday, October 16:** 14 Iraqis killed and 80 wounded during an attack on a mosque in Telafer.
- **Sunday, October 25:** 132 Iraqis killed and at least 500 wounded in explosions outside the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad Provincial Council headquarters building.
- **Saturday, October 31:** 23 Iraqis wounded during attacks in Baghdad and Mosul.

**November 2009**
- **Wednesday, November 4:** More than 20 Iraqis injured during a series of explosions in Baghdad.
- **Thursday, November 5:** 2 Iraqis killed and 20 wounded during attacks in Mosul, Ramadi, and Hill.
- **Monday, November 16:** 24 Iraqis killed during attacks in Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Abu Ghraib.
- **Wednesday, November 25:** Approximately 50 Iraqis wounded in bombings in Kerbala and Baghdad.

**December 2009**
- **Monday, December 7:** 7 Iraqis killed and 41 wounded during an explosion in Sadr City in Baghdad.
- **Tuesday, December 8:** At least 110 Iraqis killed and 200 wounded in a series of attacks in Baghdad that targeted GOI facilities.
- **Friday, December 25:** 25 Iraqis killed and more than 100 wounded in bombings in Hill.
- **Wednesday, December 30:** 23 Iraqis killed during an attack in Ramadi, in which the governor of Anbar was wounded.

**January 2010**
- **Saturday, January 2:** 2 Iraqis killed and 24 wounded in attacks in Mosul and Baghdad.
- **Thursday, January 14:** Approximately 27 Iraqis killed and 111 wounded in a series of bombings in Najaf.
- **Wednesday, January 20:** Approximately 36 Iraqis injured during an attack in Mosul.

**Selected Insurgent Bombings of Key GOI Facilities, 8/2009–1/2010**

*Note:* The numbers represented in the calendar graphic are estimates of total Iraqi casualties throughout the entire country on that particular day. The text to the right briefly describes significant attacks on select days and does not purport to comprehensively detail all security incidents that occurred on the specified day.

*Sources:* SIGIR analysis of open source and official English and Arabic documents, studies, and analyses. All figures are based on the best available casualty information and represent the sum of killed and wounded for each incident.

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SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p.5
Attacks Per Month By Type in Baghdad: 2009


Iraqi Casualties By Type in Baghdad: 2009

- Wounded Civilian
- Dead Civilian
- Iraqi Security Force Wounded
- Iraqi Security Force Dead
- Body Found
Levels of National Unity and the Election
Major Threats to Iraq

- Foreign Fighter Flow
- Anti-AQI Tribal Success
- AQI/Sunni Insurgents
- AQI/Insurgent & Shi’a Militias
- Intra-Shi’a Violence
- Shi’a Infighting Over Power/Resources
- Lethal Aid, Training, Funding
Iraqi Ethnic Divisions

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments CiOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Ethno-Sectarian Violence: 2006 -2009

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 05-Sep-09; weekly beginning 01-May-06

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Who Has Been the Target: 2007-2009


1 person represents 100 deaths.

Note: Totals correspond with attacks that targeted a particular group or occurred in an area in which the group was in the majority. “Indiscriminate” bombings occurred in areas with mixed sectarian populations. “Unknown” corresponds with attacks where no sectarian information or location was reported.
Iraqi Views of Security and Travel: July 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraq: National Unity in Late-2009

Anbar: Moved Forward
There was greater power-sharing among political parties on Anbar’s Provincial Council, and the Sunni-dominated provincial government engaged constructively with the Shia-led central government.

Ninewa: Moved Backward
There was a series of high-profile attacks on minority groups. National unity remains unlikely without resolving the internally disputed boundaries and the status of Kurdish forces in Ninewa. Arab and Kurdish communities are divided along ethnosectarian lines.

Tameem: Moved Backward
The future status of Tameem province remains a major challenge to national unity. The three main ethnoreligious groups refused to make concessions on issues such as elections out of fear that any compromise could harm their future territorial claims in the province. The presence of security forces controlled by political parties remains a major concern.
Iraq-Kurd Disputed Territory

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraq: “The Kurdish Issue”

Five Issues Outstanding between the GOI and KRG:

- **Disputed Territories**: Both the GOI and KRG claim territory in several of Iraq's northern provinces, including Ninevah, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, and Tameem.
- **Federal Hydrocarbons Law**: The KRG and GOI have not reached an agreement on a package of federal hydrocarbons laws, and fundamental differences remain over contracting and management of the oil and gas sector.
- **Power-Sharing and Constitutional Reform**: At the heart of the constitutional reform debate is the GOI's desire to reinstate a strong central government and the KRG's push for decentralization. In 2008, a constitutional review committee recommended 50 changes to the Constitution, but efforts to implement the recommendations remain stalled.
- **Security**: In August 2009, GOI and KRG leadership laid preliminary groundwork for an interim security agreement, and joint patrols of Iraqi and Kurdish forces were established in Diyala. Efforts were underway to establish patrols in Salah Al-Din and Tameem. Attempts to establish similar joint patrols in Ninevah initially stalled, but went into effect in January 2010.
- **Foreign Policy**: The Iraqi Constitution gives the GOI power to formulate foreign, economic, and trade policies. However, the KRG has been developing independent economic and political ties with foreign countries, signing separate oil deals, and meeting separately with foreign heads of state.

立法问题：伊拉克宪法，于2005年制定，规定了GOI和KRG之间的关系，但争议依然持续，立法机构的权力影响两个实体，包括：

- 第23条，规定了产权和禁止“财产的使用权用于人口变化”的条款，特别是对有争议的领土和边界地区有效。
- 第140条，要求GOI实施临时过渡行政法律，该法律在2003年通过，法律中包含了解决领土争议的公式，包括全国人口普查和在塔米姆省举行全民公投。由于该公投，没有投票或全民公投被推迟。
- 第141条，该法律由伊拉克库尔德斯坦议会通过，该法律在2009年7月25日被全民公投否决。全民公投反对该草案，全民公投未列于草案。

努力解决悬而未决的问题：

- 在2008年9月，一个7人委员会被设立，以解决权力分享问题，投票率和财产问题，这些问题将影响塔米姆省参加省级选举。委员会错过了两个自我施加的截止日期，并将问题提交COI，于2009年5月31日。
- 在2008年11月，COI成立了五个“领导委员会”来解决这五个悬而未决的问题，这些委员会在科索沃和GOI之间进行了谈判，刚果科索沃省，努巴根政府在塔米姆省的高层政府办公室。所有委员会都暂停了工作。
- 从2000年6月起，GOI和KRG官员参与了高级别任务，该任务由联合国安全部门组织，代表伊拉克（UNAMI）与塔米姆省和其它相关方就解决争议领土和其它悬而未决问题进行谈判。
Iraq: The IDP Challenge

Key Rivals in the Election

**Iraqi National Alliance**
- Key Members: SIIC and Muqtada al-Sadr

**Iraqi National Movement**
- Key Members: Former PM Iyad Allawi and current VP Tariq al-Hashimi

**The State of Law Coalition**
- Key Member: PM Nouri al-Maliki

**Iraq’s Unity Alliance**
- Key Members: Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani and Sheik Abu Risha

**Kurdistani Alliance**
- Key Members: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party

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## Iraq: Forming a New Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Time Frame (in Days)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special needs voting and Election Day</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tally of results and preliminary results</td>
<td>4-7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complaints and adjudications: Provisional Results</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appeals and Certification of Results</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Session of Council of Republic; negotiations for selection of Speaker (maximum of 30 days after certification)</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speaker elected</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Council of the Republic elects President and other members of the Presidential Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister nominated (maximum of 15 days)</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime Minister picks Council of Ministers (maximum of 30 days)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister and Council of Ministers sworn in. (Presidential Council must designate new Prime Minister in)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US Withdrawal and Transition
US Withdrawal and Reorganization

2010

DoD

ITAM/ISAM: 337 Personnel
ISAM: 91 Personnel

DoS

INL
DoD will transfer 350-member police-training mission to DoS by 10/2011

Infrastructure

USACE/Transatlantic Division
U.S./Third-country Contractors: 160
U.S. Military Personnel: 75
Iraqi Contractors: 130

Any FMS projects not completed by June 2011 will transfer to OSC-I.

DoD

2 Districts
4/10/2010: 1 District

DoS

ITAO

Provincial Reconstruction

DoD

USF-I

OPA
OPA is concerned that reduced PRT and USF-I resources could lead to problems, including reallocation of PRT resources to maintain necessary oversight of CERP projects.

DoS

15 PRTs; 1 RRT
6 ePRTs

Note: Estimated operating costs shown above the PRT footprint were reported by DoS OIG in Audit MERO-A-09-10, released in 8/2009. The audit reported $484 million for FY 2009, $636 million for FY 2010, and $611 million for FY 2011. These transitions are still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.

## US Aid 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FY 2009</th>
<th>FY 2010</th>
<th>FY 2010</th>
<th>FY 2010</th>
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<td>APPROPRIATION</td>
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<td>HOUSE BILL</td>
<td>SENATE BILL</td>
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<td>300.0</td>
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<td>1,336.1</td>
<td>300.0</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign Operations</strong></td>
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<td>415.7</td>
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<td>500.0</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,817.1</td>
<td>800.0</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>659.3</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. The * symbol denotes no specific allocation. The 2010 appropriation provided no specific allocations for the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) fund or the International Military Education and Training (IMET) fund, but the difference between the budget authority provided under P.L. 111-117 and the allocations provided for the ESF and INCLE is equal to the requested amounts for the NADR and IMET, suggesting that among foreign operations accounts, only the ESF received a smaller appropriation than the administration requested.
As of 12/31/2009 OPA has completed the planning process for consolidating the remaining 6 ePRTs into the main PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar. This will leave 15 main PRT locations and 1 Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT), along with smaller satellite locations established in coordination with the local U.S. military commander, to focus on capacity-building activities and projects in the immediate vicinity of these locations.

PRT satellite locations remain in operation only if military support is available and only if programs, projects, or engagements deemed vital to U.S. interests remain in progress.

The current PRT Operation Plan anticipates maintaining the 15 fully functioning PRTs and 1 RRT into the summer of 2011. The U.S. civilian presence beyond that time is still under review.
US Withdrawal and ISF Development
As of December 2009, ISF force strength in the MOI, MOD, and Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force reportedly totaled 660,334 assigned personnel. The MOD has approved a force structure that calls for 14 Iraqi Army (IA) divisions; a Navy of 3,800 personnel, including two Marine battalions; and an Air Force of 6,000 personnel. The MOD has also begun to develop and plan for units across a range of disciplines: engineering, bomb disposal, medical evacuation, signal, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
US ISFF Funding

- Appropriated: $18.04
- Obligated: $16.75
- Expended: $15.09

Unexpended Obligations
Total: $1.66

- Equipment: $0.51 (31%)
- Infrastructure: $0.62 (37%)
- Related Activities: $0.13 (8%)
- Sustainment: $0.27 (17%)
- Training: $0.12 (7%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.
## US ISFF Funding By Ministry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Sub-Activity Group</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Expended</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>3,272.1</td>
<td>3,084.7</td>
<td>2,740.8</td>
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<td>Equipment</td>
<td>4,694.9</td>
<td>4,412.0</td>
<td>4,155.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>612.8</td>
<td>428.1</td>
<td>372.2</td>
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<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>1,940.2</td>
<td>1,858.5</td>
<td>1,649.8</td>
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<td>MOD Subtotal</td>
<td>10,520.0</td>
<td>9,783.4</td>
<td>8,918.4</td>
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<td>Interior</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
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<td>1,377.5</td>
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<td>1,699.8</td>
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<td>2,585.4</td>
<td>2,422.3</td>
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<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>610.5</td>
<td>594.5</td>
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<td>6,542.9</td>
<td>6,094.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>976.4</td>
<td>868.1</td>
<td>737.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18,039.3</td>
<td>16,745.5</td>
<td>15,088.0</td>
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</table>

**Note:** Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

**Sources:** OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 1/13/2010; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/2009.
Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

◆ Sectarian Challenges
  • Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other

◆ Ethnic Challenges
  • Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%

◆ Tribal Challenges
  • Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.
US Equipment Draw Down and Transfer

![Graph showing pieces of equipment, millions]

- Remaining for Transfer to the GOI
- Remaining for Redeployment or Transfer from Iraq
- Remaining for Redeployment at End of Mission (Transition Force Equipment Set)

US Changes in Police Training

Note: The nature of this transition is still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.
Iraqi Views of ISF and Stability: July 2009

Government Security Efforts are Effective

Iraq is Stable

Nationwide average = 48%

Nationwide average = 55%

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Iraqi Budgets and How Much Hinges on Oil
The Truth About Iraq’s Oil Wealth: Poverty on the Surface; Potential Underground

Ranks 162nd in the World in Per Capita Income: One of World’s Poorest Countries

Education and Health systems in collapse

2 million IDPs outside Iraq -- including much of elite

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>$110,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>$6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>$36,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CIA World Factbook, January 2010
Iraq’s Role in the Regional Youth Explosion

Population in Thousands:

- 2050
- 2025
- 2009
- 1975
- 1950

CIA World Factbook, January 2010
The Broader Demographic Pressure

- 38.8% are 0-14 years of age
- 313,000 males reach 18 each year.
- Unemployment 18-30%
- 154th in per capita income vs. 2nd for

Source: US Census Bureau, IDB, 28-7-09
### Iraqi Budgets: 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINISTRY/AGENCY</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>36.50</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>4.86</td>
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<td><strong>Total Revenue</strong></td>
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<td>70.10</td>
<td>42.70</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Expenditures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>25.69</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>10.55</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>3.91</td>
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<td>Interior</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.89</td>
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<td>Defense</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>4.92</td>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<td>KRG</td>
<td>3.19</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>8.81</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces (Non-KRG)</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>7.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>19.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.05</td>
<td>72.18</td>
<td>58.61</td>
<td>71.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surplus/Deficit</strong></td>
<td>-7.67</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>-15.91</td>
<td>-18.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Revenue and expenditure figures reflect amounts budgeted by the GOI; they do not necessarily align with actual revenue and expenditures.*
As of December 31, 2009, nearly $141.49 billion had been made available for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. These funds came from three main sources:

- Iraqi funds that were overseen by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi capital budgets—$71.19 billion
- International pledges of assistance from non-U.S. sources—$17.01 billion
- U.S. appropriations—$53.30 billion

CPA Era

Iraqi Funding Sources: 2003-End 2009
Iraq: The Cost-Benefit of Oil

Relationship between Price of Oil, Iraqi Oil Receipts, and GDP

OPEC Oil Export Revenues, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Net ($ Bil)</th>
<th>Per Capita ($)</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>5,421</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>5,368</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>17,061</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>25,221</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>10,863</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>572.6</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraqi Oil Receipts, Budget, and GDP, 2008–2009

Notes: Weekly Iraq Kirkuk netback price at U.S. Gulf used for all oil price descriptions, depictions, and analysis. All dollar values in current prices. Iraqi GDP is not available from the IMF for 2004; GDP figures from 2007–2009 are estimates. Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.
## Bidding for Oil - Who Got What: 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oil Field</th>
<th>Bidding Consortium</th>
<th>Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels)</th>
<th>Current Production (Barrels/Day)</th>
<th>Remuneration Fee ($/Barrel)</th>
<th>Plateau Production Commitment (Barrels/Day)</th>
<th>Production Plateau Period (Years)</th>
<th>Signature Bonus ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumaila</td>
<td>BP (51%), CNPC (49%)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Qurna 1</td>
<td>ExxonMobil (80%), Shell (20%)</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2,325,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubair</td>
<td>Eni (44%), Oxy (31%), Kogas (25%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majnoon</td>
<td>Shell (60%), Petronas (40%)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halfaya</td>
<td>CNPC (50%), Petronas (25%), Total (25%)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>535,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaiyarah</td>
<td>Sonangol (100%)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Qurna 2</td>
<td>Lukoil (75%), Statoil (25%)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badra</td>
<td>Gazprom (40%), Kogas (30%), Petronas (20%), TPAO (10%)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garraf</td>
<td>Petronas (60%), Japex (40%)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najma</td>
<td>Sonangol (100%)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>1,535,000</td>
<td>11,140,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers affected by rounding.

*a* Key to acronyms and national affiliation: BP = Royal British Petroleum (United Kingdom), CNPC = China National Petroleum Corporation (China), ExxonMobil = United States, Shell = Royal Dutch Shell (United Kingdom), Eni (Italy), Oxy = Occidental Petroleum (United States), Kogas = Korea Gas Corporation (Korea), Petronas = Malaysia, Total (France), Sonangol = Angola, Lukoil = Russia, Statoil = Norway, Gazprom = Russia, TPAO = Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Turkey), Japex = Japan Petroleum Exploration Company (Japan).

*b* A signature bonus is a non-recoverable sum of money that the winning bidder agrees to pay to the GOI upon award of the contract.
Projections of Possible Oil Revenues

Note: This graphic represents but three of countless possible scenarios. Oil export quantity and price are treated as independent variables. The low projection assumes a slow increase in oil export volume and stable oil prices. The median projection assumes a moderate increase in oil export volume and increased oil prices. The high projection assumes a rapid increase in oil export volume and increased oil prices.
Back Up Slides
Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
December 1, 2008 – February 28, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of February 28, 2009. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.
Average Daily Attacks by Province, June 1, 2009 - August 31, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments, SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
High Profile Attacks (Bombings), May 2006 - August 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 31, 2009. Does not include found and cleared. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
Weapons Caches Found by Iraqi & MNF-I forces), January 3, 2004 - August 28, 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of August 28, 2009. Chart includes caches and explosive remnants of war. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09
ISF and MNF-I Military Deaths, January 2006 - August 2009

Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports), DoD News Releases and CIDNE as of August 31, 2009. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths. As a result of the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from cities, U.S. forces must now rely on host nation reporting as the primary data source. Current charts now show a combination of Coalition and host nation reported data. The combination of these reports causes baseline numbers to increase, making it difficult to directly compare these charts with those presented in previous publications of this report.