“Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer:” The Metrics of the Afghan War

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
With the Assistance of Nicholas B. Greenough

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Afghan Metrics: How to Lose a War and Possibly How to Win One

Anthony H. Cordesman

Nine months after President Obama announced a new strategy in Afghanistan, the US still seems undecided as to how to actually shape and implement that strategy and how to measure its success. President Obama may have made his decisions, but it is far from clear that his Administration has agreed on how to act upon them, or has the right mix of civil-military capabilities to do so.

There have been continuing reports of divisions – some minor and some serious -- between the Presidents civil and national security advisors, over the meaning of the 2011 deadline, over the future cost and budgets for the war, and over the timing and size of US military and civilian deployments. Equally seriously, there seems to be a serious risk that debates over resources, when and how to act, and various turf fights will undercut action in the field in the same way that crippled US and NATO/ISAF efforts during 2002 through early 2009.

No mix of metrics can adequately describe the way the US has fought the war to date, and particularly the problems it encountered in adapting to irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and the challenges of armed nation building in Afghanistan. The metrics that are available, however, reinforce the more detailed military history and lessons analysis now being developed by the US Army. They also add a major dimension – the extent to which the war was systematically underresourced, and the US failed to act decisively in dealing with its own internal problems, the problems in the NATO/ISAF alliance and Afghan government, and the need to focus on the Afghan population rather than tactical victories against the Taliban.
Bogged Down in Conceptual Debates Without Clear Plans, Action Schedules, and Metrics?

The President’s new strategy is supposed to focus on the population, and on transfer to Afghan forces and governance, but no plans or details have been announced for securing the population or such a campaign. The mantra of “shape, clear, hold, and build” seems to have shifted slightly to “clear, hold, build, and transfer,” but no one has clearly defined what “clear, hold, and build” mean, or announced any tangible plans to implement any given phase or element of the process. References are made to a civilian “surge” – which seems to be defined as a major increase in career and government contract civilians, but which will result in minor increases relative to the military and in terms of the ratio of US civilians (under 1,000) to a population of over 31 million.

Debates still take place over “counterinsurgency” vs. “counterterrorism” – albeit with almost no specifics as to what the difference really is in tangible terms, and at a time when increases in the role of Special Forces in Afghanistan serve both ends. There is still talk about showing decisive results in 12 to 18 months – presumably before mid 2011 – but no public indication of what this really means.

The US is now more than eight years into the war. However, the war, the Obama Administration still has to demonstrate that it is more effective than the Bush Administration in creating detailed plans of action, actually implementing them, and provide transparency as to their cost, risk, and effectiveness. The US is still conceptualizing a war it should be actively fighting as if the next year could somehow be the first year of the war. It is still debating how to plan and what metrics to use.

The Other Missing Dimensions of Strategy, Plans, Actions, and Metrics

Six additional -- and equally critical -- elements of a successful campaign have not yet been addressed – at least in a meaningful enough public form to provide any confidence that the President’s strategy is being effectively implemented:

• How to restructure and strengthen the national military and PRT elements of ISAF to produce far better unity of effort in a population-oriented campaign. This is only a matter of force and resource levels to a limited degree. It is far more a question of how to deal with short tours and constant rotations, differing national policies and patterns of action, differing national caveats and priorities, and a lack of allied civil-military coordination at the national level in many allied zones of responsibility.

• How to restructure the UN, national, and NGO aid effort to shape a meaningful mix of “hold, build, and transfer” efforts that can win the war coupled to realistic and achievable efforts at mid and long-term development – a effort with goals and objectives Afghans actually want rather than meet donor goals, that is reasonably well coordinated, that is transparent and resists corruption, and that has meaningful measures of effectiveness.

• How to create truly effective, integrated civil-military efforts – at least within the US country effort, and hopefully with key allies as well.

• How to build Afghan civil capacity to govern, provide prompt justice and an effective rule of law, and provide essential government services at every level with acceptable levels of waste and corruption as seen by the Afghan population.
• How to build up an effective mix of Afghan security forces that produce regular military, paramilitary, and police forces that provide reasonable levels of effectiveness in the field on a sustained basis and provide the capability to begin transfer of responsibility to the Afghan forces in mid-2011. This effort must be tied to success in building Afghan capacity to govern down to the district and local levels and link a civil and criminal justice system to the development of the Afghan police.

• How to link these efforts in Afghanistan to a very different – but directly related – campaign in Pakistan that is driven by the perceptions and actions of a deeply divided Pakistan that is an “ally” only to the extent that its elite perceives given sets of actions to be to its own advantage. This requires strategy, planning, and action to at least coordinate the NATO/ISAF effort in Afghanistan, and the US/allied effort in Pakistan, and progress in the war to be measured in net assessment terms.

For more than eight years, neither the Bush Administration nor the Obama Administration, never effectively addressed plans and progress in any of the six.

There are obvious costs to public debates and transparency in dealing with such issues. The polite rhetoric of “alliance” is inherently dishonest. The fact is that our ISAF allies, Afghans, and Pakistanis perceive the war and its goals differently from the US and from each other – as well as all of the other non-US actors in the conflict. Too much transparency, and too much insistence on US values and priorities, can lose key allies and potentially the war.

So, however, can too little. Each one of the six challenges listed above can do as much to lose the war as the actions of the Taliban and other insurgents. In fact, the lack of transparency, unity of effort, and effective in each of the six areas is now losing the war. No amount of spin, optimism, and wishful thinking can deal with any one of these challenges. Effective action does not require open confrontation, but it does require far more honest and objective US efforts than have taken place to date.
The Uncertain Metrics of Afghanistan

Given these problems, it is not surprising that there are many key gaps in the metrics available on the war, and other metrics are not properly defined, validated, or supported with the kind of narrative that is essential to giving any map, chart, or table real meaning. Numbers and maps are no more matters of revealed truth than any other form of judgment – they are simply quantified or symbolic adjectives.

There are, however, enough metrics to show why General McChrystal, Major General Flynn, and so many other senior officers have described the war as being in a crisis, and edged around the fact that the US, its allies, and the Afghan government are now losing the war. There are enough metrics to warn that the past failure to provide proper resources and unity of efforts did at least as much to lose the war as the actions of the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hekmatyar, and other insurgents.
A One Major Regional Contingency Approach to Two Wars:

Priority to Iraq and Underresourcing and Underreacting the Way to Defeat
Underresourcing and Underreacting the Way to Defeat

Even if one ignores the US failure to deal with Pakistan in realistic terms, rather than as a true ally, the US made three critical mistakes during the first eight years of the war:

• It failed to provide the military and aid resources necessary to take the initiative, ceding the initiative to the Taliban and insurgency in every year from 2002-2008;

• It focused on using aid for mid and long term development, rather than as an essential part of a counterinsurgency strategy;

• It did not address the critical problems of corruption and lack of capacity in the Afghan government and lack of unity of effort in NATO/ISAF.

These mistakes were heavily influenced by the war in Iraq, in spite of the fact that Afghanistan was a much larger country with a larger population, far less development and resources, and far more serious weather, terrain, and logistic problems. (p.7) This was largely a function of the assumption that the Taliban was too shattered and unpopular to recover and the far higher level of violence in Iraq (p. 8). It was not until the late spring of 2009 that the Afghan War overtook the level of violence in Iraq for the first time, and even today, the number of enemy initiated attacks is still about 35% of the peak levels in Iraq.

Inadequate and Poorly Managed Financial Resources

Annual total spending in Iraq is still far higher than Afghanistan, although this will finally change in the FY2010 budget (p. 9) The US spent well over three times as much on Iraq between FY2003 and FTY2009. (p. 9) The same was true of spending by the Department of Defense (pp. 10-11), and peak spending per month was five times higher in Iraq than in Afghanistan (p.1).

Foreign aid spending involved a smaller gap; spending in Iraq was roughly twice as high, but the US acted decisively early in the Iraq War while it waited until FY2008 to start seriously resourcing aid to Afghanistan (p 9). The US also never saw aid funding as a critical part of the counterinsurgency effort. State Department foreign aid spending was only 7.5% of Department of Defense spending during FY2001-FY2009. (pp. 12-13). Equally, critically, the US did not take the development of Afghan forces seriously until FY2007, and then failed to follow up. (p. 14). These failures were particularly critical because, unlike Iraq, the US had no real base to build upon and the lag between appropriations and creating any new facts on the ground tended to take anywhere from 12-24 months depending on the type of expenditure.
The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
~49,000

**AFGHANISTAN**
- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Landlocked, primarily agrarian economy: $35B GDP, $1,000 PC
- Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

**IRAQ**
- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI
- Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
~176,000
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to August 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

- Average daily attacks in Afghanistan
- Average daily attacks in Iraq


Iraq costs peaked at $14.3B/month in surge in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>GY08</th>
<th>FY09*</th>
<th>FY10*</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Afghan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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Annual Foreign Aid Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in $US billions): FY2001-FY-2010

Annual Spending on the Afghan Wars By Category (in $US billions): FY2001-FY2010

Annual US Aid Spending Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces (in $US billions): FY01-FY09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>FY04</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<td>FY05</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GY08</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY09 Bridge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cum FY01-FY09</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Coalition of the Impossible and Eight Years of Ceding the Initiative Without Unity of Effort
Delays and Gaps in Troop Levels
The gap in US troop levels was far more serious than the gap in spending. The US never came close to deploying anything like the troops necessary to cover Afghanistan through 2009. Its force levels were a token of those deployed to Iraq through early 2008 (p. 18), and serious deployments did not begin until the late spring of 2009 (p. 19) This made the outcome of the war highly dependent on deeply divided NATO/ISAF forces, and on Afghan security forces that only began to develop serious levels of capability in late 2008. (p. 20)

Political Correctness Over Alliance Effectiveness
From CY2002 to CY2009, the US dealt with its allies more in terms of political and diplomatic sensitivities than the realities of war fighting. It did not address the national caveats in NATO/ISAF forces, or the deep divisions and national “branding” in the PRT efforts of other countries. It failed to confront the real world impact of what were effectively “stand aside” countries that either ignored the war as if it was in a state of post conflict reconstruction or played a largely passive role as if the war was some kind of peacekeeping exercise. (p. 21). The slow, incremental increases in allied forces were more a political response to US exhortation than any meaningful change. (p. 22).

Wasting and Misallocating Aid
The US did more than underresource the war. Changes in goals, a lack of any integrated civil-military plans, and a failure to recognize or admit the serious of the conflict led to major swings in the allocation of US funding and a lack of coherent effort from year to year. (p. 23). It also led to a lack of the kind of humanitarian aid that had a major impact on Taliban recruitment and Afghanistan’s poor and displaced young men. (pp. 23-24). Moreover, allied funding was limited and actual payment on pledges was erratic. (p. 25). The resulting lack of funding, and erratic mix of aid programs, had a critical impact because Afghanistan was still too poor to finance more than 15% of its budget through FY2009-2010. (p. 26)

Stovepipes and a Failure to Develop an Integrated Approach Within the US
While it had less direct impact on the war, the lack of unity of effort in the US aid effort, and lack of a “whole of government” approach was another serious internal problem in the USG government approach. The US not only did not finance aid to Afghanistan as it did to Iraq (p. 27), the funding in given program areas varied sharply from year to year (p. 28), and other agencies made minor contributions totaling only 1.6% of US expenditures (p. 29). While the cost data are poorly categorized and not directly comparable, the US spent $768 million in US Aid farm security and Department of Agriculture aid during FY2002-FY2009, versus $3.9 billion in counternarcotics and $38.5 billion in to total civil and military aid. This in a country whose population was roughly 70% rural. (pp. 35)
Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan

US troop levels in Iraq were approximately 124,000 in November 2009, and 66,500 in Afghanistan

Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, U.S. Forces in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (14 December 2007); JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, U.S. Forces in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (14 July 2008).
US Troop Levels: Reacting and Losing
US Troop Levels: “Surge” During February and November 2009

A “Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area in October 2009

Source: NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html, as of October 22, 2009
ISAF Troop Levels: 2007-2009

Source: NATO/ISAF Placemats
Appropriations by Fiscal Year, Amount, and Percentage 2002-2009
In $ Billions

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2009, p.43
Cumulative Appropriations as of September 30, 2009
In $ Billons

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

ARTF Contributions for 2009, As of August 22, 2009 $ Millions

Total Contributions/Pledges: $607
Total Paid-in: $234

- United States: 222
- United Kingdom: 106
- Netherlands: 49
- Canada: 47
- Norway: 38
- Germany: 36
- Spain: 35
- Sweden: 18
- EC/EU: 17
- Australia: 15
- Others: 24

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.


Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2009, p. 53
GI RoA Budget and Revenue, 2009-2010

GI RoA Budget, 2009-2010 ($ BILLIONS)

- External Budget: $4.9
- Core Budget - Development: $1.0
- Core Budget - Operating: $1.6

Total: $7.5

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

GI RoA Domestic Revenue, 2009-2010 ($ MILLIONS)

- Tax Revenue: $760
- Fees: $220

Total: $980

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
Annual State Department Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in $US billions)

US Aid to Afghanistan: 2001-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2001-2009 Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund (ESF)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>223.8</td>
<td>900.2</td>
<td>1,312.8</td>
<td>489.7</td>
<td>1,210.7</td>
<td>1,399.5</td>
<td>2,048.0</td>
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<td>Development Assistance (DA)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>152.0</td>
<td>165.8</td>
<td>187.6</td>
<td>166.8</td>
<td>148.7</td>
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<td>874.6</td>
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<td>Child Survival/Health (CSH)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>390.2</td>
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<td>Migration &amp; Refugee Asst. (MRA)</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>441.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food Aid§</td>
<td>133.6</td>
<td>207.2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>108.6</td>
<td>109.6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>980.5</td>
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<td>Int’l Narcotics &amp; Law Enforcement (INCLE)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>220.0</td>
<td>706.3</td>
<td>232.7</td>
<td>251.7</td>
<td>307.6</td>
<td>484.0</td>
<td>2,268.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonprolif, Anti-Terror, De-mining (NADR)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>28.1</td>
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<td>Int’l Military Ed &amp; Training (IMET)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>191.0</td>
<td>413.7</td>
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<td>1,058.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other§</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>262.6</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>463.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total 150 Account</strong></td>
<td>192.2</td>
<td>903.9</td>
<td>779.0</td>
<td>1,978.5</td>
<td>2,838.5</td>
<td>1,133.7</td>
<td>1,843.8</td>
<td>2,146.3</td>
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<td>14,510.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD—Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>995.0</td>
<td>1,908.1</td>
<td>7,406.4</td>
<td>2,750.0</td>
<td>5,606.9</td>
<td>18,666.4</td>
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<td>DOD—CERP</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>215.0</td>
<td>206.0</td>
<td>486.0</td>
<td>726.5</td>
<td>1,809.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD—Other§</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>364.2</td>
<td>778.4</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>178.1</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>188.0</td>
<td>1,890.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total 050 Account</strong></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>403.9</td>
<td>1,909.4</td>
<td>2,231.2</td>
<td>7,790.5</td>
<td>3,320.7</td>
<td>6,521.4</td>
<td>22,366.0</td>
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<td>Other Functional Accounts§</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>147.0</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>352.1</td>
<td>89.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>942.1</td>
<td>981.8</td>
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<td>4,894.9</td>
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<td>9,717.9</td>
<td>5,819.1</td>
<td>9,305.5</td>
<td>37,789.4</td>
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Sources: SIGAR Report to Congress, April 30, 2009; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.

Notes: FY2009 figures are estimates. In some cases where funding level is not specified in appropriations language or explanatory statement, amount included is request level or final allocation when available. CERP level is reported allocation, except in FY2009 when it assumes half of appropriation (shared with Iraq) will be allocated to Afghanistan.

US Appropriated Funds for Afghanistan FY 2001- FY2009 in $Millions

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 35
US Aid to Afghanistan by Activity: $38.6 Billion in FY2002-FY2009

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

US Department of Defense
Funding for Afghanistan FY 2001- FY 2009
in $Millions

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 36
US Department of State
Funding for Afghanistan FY 2001- FY2009 in $Millions

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 40
USAID Funding for Afghanistan
FY 2001- FY2009 in $Millions

Figure 3-4– Information provided to SIGAR by USAID in March/April 2009

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 41
US Department of Agriculture Funding for Afghanistan FY 2001- FY2009 in $Millions

Total: $379

Food for Education
Food for Progress
416b Food Aid
P.L.-480 (Title I)

Figure 3-5 – Information provided to SIGAR by USDA in March/April 2009

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 42
Other US Agencies Funding for Afghanistan FY 2001- FY2009 in $Millions

Source: SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress, April 30 2009, Pg. 43
2002-2008
NATO/ISAF Fights an Uncoordinated Tactical War, Civilians Attempt Post Conflict Reconstruction, and Jihadist Insurgents Fight a War for Control of Territory and the Population
How the US “Lost” the War Between 2001 and 2008
While the metrics involved are uncertain and can only tell part of the story, the US also largely fought the wrong war against an enemy pursuing different and far more valid strategic objectives. The pattern of insurgent violence began to clearly emerge in CY2004, measured both in terms of total insurgent attacks (p. 38), and the monthly patterns in attacks on NATO/ISAF forces, Afghan civilians, and the ANSF (p. 39).

Winning the “Battles” and Losing the Nation
As the previous metrics have shown, however, the US was slow to react in terms of funding, troop levels, and dealing with its NATO/ISAF allies and Afghan force development. The US also pursued tactics that focused on attempting to defend the border areas near Pakistan, and on defeating the Taliban forces in the field. As UN maps show, however, the areas of Taliban influence increased in spite of this focus, and insurgent often took control of villages and areas well behind the borders. Insurgent influence grew faster than the patterns in violence, and was already significant in 2005 and more than doubled by 2007. (p. 40)

Limited NATO/ISAF gains during 2006-2007 were vastly offset by Taliban and insurgent gains in the battle for political influence and control of territory. (p. 41). Independent estimates by ICOS (Senlis) show a far faster and deeper expansion of Taliban influence, expansion of Taliban attacks, and impact on the fighting in Pakistan (pp. 42-43).

NATO/ISAF Tactical Metrics vs. Growing Taliban Influence and Control of the Population
At the end of 2008, NATO/ISAF estimates still focused on kinetic clashes – with claims that 70% of all attacks took place in only 10% of Afghanistan’s 364 districts. NATO/ISAF was still reporting as many favorable indicators as unfavorable indicators. (p. 45)

In contrast, the UN reported another massive increase in the area where the Taliban posed a medium to extreme risk, which now cover well over 70% of the country. (p. 45). The UN also showed that a US strategy based on forward positions and efforts to interdict the Taliban and other insurgents had failed in the East, which was then the principle area of US operations. (p. 46). ICOS estimated that that the areas with heavy Taliban and insurgent activity rose from 54% in 2007 to 72% in 2008. (pp. 47 & 48). While ICOS maps of attack incidents roughly correlated to those of NATO/ISAF, they showed a much broader distribution of incidents and Taliban-insurgent influence. These UN and ICOS estimates are roughly supported by SIGAR data showing the rise in the pattern of attacks on the Afghan national army (ANA) and Afghan national police (ANP). (p. 49)
Number of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, January 2003-July 2009

Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan
May 2003 to August 2009

Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S. contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on attacks against the International Security Assistance Force and coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force military personnel. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 1 and 2 do not include violent incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation.
The Insurgents Take Hold: UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:

2005 versus 2007

Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007

Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007
ICOS Estimate of Taliban Activity: November 2007

Source: ICOS, http://www.icosmaps.net/afghanistan_struggle/maps
NATO/ISAF Underestimates the War for Political Control? Security Summary: End 2008

2008

- 24% Afghans perceive improvement,
  19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)
- 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts
- 33% increase in Kinetic Events
  - IED events up 27%....single largest cause of casualties
  - 119% more attacks on GIROA
  - 5% less Suicide Attacks
  - 50% more Kidnappings/Assassinations

ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%
Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%

Building Host Nation Capacity:
- ANA: 13 more Kandak BNs formed
- 46 Kandaks capable of BN Ops
- ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD
- 13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

---

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008”

Data derived from NATO/JOIS database
Winning the Tactical Clashes & Losing 15-20% of the Country a Year: UN Accessibility Map 2008
2008: East Afghanistan - The US is No Longer “Winning” in the East
ICOS Map of Taliban Attacks: November 2008

Source: ICOS, http://www.icosmaps.net/afghanistan_struggle/maps
Growing Threat to ANA and ANP: 2006-Mid 2009

Ana

Total Attacks: 1,277

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006 (Oct 1-Dec 31)</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 (Jan 1-June 20)</td>
<td>192</td>
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ANP

Total Attacks: 2,839

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2006 (Oct 1-Dec 31)</td>
<td>194</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>966</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,148</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009 (Jan 1-June 20)</td>
<td>532</td>
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Spring 2009: The War Reaches the Crisis Stage
Spring 2009: The Crisis Stage

Regardless of NATO/ISAF and US “spin,” war had clearly reached the crisis stage by the time President Obama gave his first speech on Afghan strategy in the spring of 2009. The US and NATO/ISAF continued to “win” virtually every tactical clash, although rarely without civilian casualties and collateral damage, in ways that gave Afghan force a real role as partners, or in ways that provided any lasting security for the Afghan population. The Taliban and other insurgents were winning the war they fought to dominate the population and defeat the US and its allies through a war of political attrition. The US and its allies were winning largely meaningless tactical clashes while steadily losing the country and the people.

Telling Half Truths About A Critical Rise in the Intensity of the Fighting

NATO/ISAF continued to report as many positive indicators as negative indicators in its summary maps through April 2009. It reported that there was a 64% increase in insurgent attacks between January and May 2009, but that 80% of these occurred in only 13% (47) of Afghanistan’s 364 districts. It also reported that civilian deaths (evidently only counting direct major Taliban attacks) were down 44% and kidnappings down 17%, and that 35% of Afghans felt security was better than six months ago versus 28% when polled six months earlier. Other NATO/ISAF data showed significant Taliban/insurgent activity in only three provinces – Helmand, Kandahar, and Khost. (p. 53)

The NATO/ISAF data on attack trends were mixed through May 2009, although significant rises were reported in a number of areas. (p. 54). They also still reflected a focus on kinetics and tactical events, rather than control of the population and territory, with most attacks occurring in the south and the east, and little threat in the capital, north and west. (pp. 55 and 56)

In contrast, UN data showed serious risks in far more areas (roughly twice the territory), as well as a sharp correlation between Taliban influence and control and narcotics production. (Reflecting several years of UNAMA reports that showed the main impact of counternarcotics efforts was to push the crop areas south and into regions where drug production helped finance the Taliban.) (p. 57) ICOS estimates showed a further increase in areas with heavy Taliban influence from 54% of the country in 2007 to 72% in 2008 and 80% in 2009. (p. 58).
Using Counternarcotics to Aid the Taliban

This reflected the result of a counternarcotics campaign that pushed narcotics production steadily further south (p. 60), to the point where it eventually took place largely in provinces controlled or dominated by the Taliban (p. 61). This program sometimes cost considerably more than the aid being provided to the Afghan people in combat areas (pp. 62-63), but had no meaningful impact on street prices and availability/demand for drugs. (p. 64).

And Losing the Afghan People

The result was a pattern of fighting that inflicted serious civilian casualties and collateral damage, and steadily lost the support of the Afghan people because NATO/ISAF, Afghan forces, and the US steadily lost control over more and more of afghan territory and more and more of the Afghan people. NATO/ISAF data on civilian casualties issued in the spring showed a sharp difference between NATO/ISAF and much higher UN estimates (p. 66). These also showed that NATO/ISAF estimated that it was inflicting 20-25% of all casualties while providing steadily less security for the Afghans. (p. 67).

Polling data showed that Afghans saw a major rise in the Taliban presence (p. 68), and still saw it as by far the most serious threat (p. 69). At the same time, the way the US and NATO/ISAF fought exposed them to so much violence without lasting security, that felt they experienced as much violence from NATO/ISAF as from the Taliban (p. 70.). This reinforced a steady downward trend in the still great support for NATO (p. 72) and the US (p. 73), as well as an increase unfavorable attitudes towards the Afghan police and government. These trends were only offset by public support for the Afghan Army (p. 74).
Partial Denial: Security Summary (April 2009)

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)
- 28% increase in CF force strength
- 38% increase in ANA force strength
- 59% increase in CF offensive events

January to April 2009
Kinetic Activity Density Plot
By District

More Activity
Less Activity

Footnotes on Sources:
1 JOIIS, 4 May.
2 ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.
3 CJOC CivCas cell, 2 May.
4 CSTC-A, 4 May.
5 CJ1, 3 May.

- Civilian Deaths: down 44%
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 55%
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%
  (Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIRoA officials & district centers: up 90%
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%

Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)
- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

ANSF
- ANA: 50 of 79 Kandak battalions capable of independent ops
  - Average of 83 total deliberate ops per week in '09 (37 in '08)
- ANP: Focused District Development: 52 districts completed training
  - 14 of 20 Civil Order Police Battalions fielded
- APP: Focused Border Development: 2 cycles complete (20 companies)
  - 3rd and 4th Cycles underway (14 companies programmed)

Steadily Rising Problems in the South:

Average Daily Insurgent Initiated Attacks

By Province, January 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009

- The Number inside the bar indicates average daily insurgent initiated attacks (i.e. Helmand averaged 10.7 attacks per day from Jan 09 – May 09).

- The Number on top of the bar indicates the change relative to last month (i.e. average daily insurgent initiated attacks increased by 0.2 per day in Helmand relative to last month). If no number shown for a province, there was no change in the average daily incidence of insurgent attacks (i.e. Kunar averaged 3.9 daily attacks from Jan 09 to May 09 as well as from Jan 09 to Apr 09).
Attack Trends
Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

Suicide attacks were up 9%

Attacks on GiRoA officials were down 11%
Attacks on GiRoA infrastructure were up 156%
Attacks on ANA were down 18%
Attacks on ANP were up 15%

Complex attacks were up 152%.
Complex attacks include those involving more than one means of attack (i.e. small arms plus IED, small arms plus indirect fire, etc.) or more than 20 insurgents.
Complex attack numbers do not include attacks against District Centers

Kidnappings were down 27%
The number of Assassinations did not change
Insurgent Attacks by RC

- Comparing Jan-May '08 to the same period in '09, insurgent initiated attacks were down 21% in Kabul City but up 51% in the rest of the province (primarily Surobi District).

- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same period in '08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
  - Up 78% in RC South
  - Up 41% in RC East
  - Up 29% in RC Capital
  - Up 21% in RC North
  - Up 73% in RC West
UN: Security and Opium Poppy Cultivation 2009

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 107
ICOS Estimate of Taliban Activity: January-August 2009

Source: ICOS, http://www.icosmaps.net/afghanistan_struggle/maps
The Impact of Narcotics
Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
In $ Billions

### Allocation of U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) funds 2009

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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>FY 2009</th>
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<tr>
<td>NIU³⁸/CNPA - Air Mobility (OCONUS)</td>
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<td>NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (CONUS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU/CNPA - Equipment</td>
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<td>NIU/CNPA - Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (BCPs)</td>
<td>7,635</td>
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<tr>
<td>CN Border Police - Training</td>
<td>20,809</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-MIP Efforts</td>
<td>38,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Technology-Non MIP Efforts</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Program Support</td>
<td>15,070</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Dept Helicopter Lease</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$171,734</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Heroin retail prices in Europe (US$) 1990-2006

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 31
Losing the People:

NATO/ISAF Fails to Provide Security, GIRoA Fails to Provide Governance and Justice; Aid Never Reaches the People, and Casualties Create a Critical Backlash
NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008

- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*

*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations
Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun)
- Comparing Jan-May 09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF

Year 2009 Civilian Deaths (ISAF/OEF Responsible)

- Troops in Contact - Close Air Support
- Troops in Contact - Indirect Fire
- Troops in Contact - Direct Fire
- Road Traffic Accident
- Rules of Engagement / Escalation of Force

ISAF Responsible
Jan 07 - May 09 20%
Jan 07 - Dec 07 19%
Jan 08 - Dec 08 21%
Jul 08 - May 09 29%
Sep 08 - May 09 22%
Jan 09 - May 09 21%

Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC
Standardized process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Fearing a Taliban Resurgence: 2/2009

Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in ten, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public’s alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

Suicide Attacks | Snipers | Kidnappings | Coalition bombings | Coalition forces | ANA/ANP | Taliban
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
2009 | 26% | 19% | 31% | 16% | 21% | 13% | 24%
2007 | 27% | 20% | 25% | 17% | 24% | 16% | 27%

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Losing the Afghan People: 2006 vs. 2009-2

Among people who report bombing or shelling by U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of U.S. forces drops to 46 percent, vs. 70 percent among those who report no such activity. There’s a similar pattern in support for retribution against U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces. While 25 percent of all Afghans now say violence against such forces can be justified, that jumps to 44 percent among those who report air strikes or shelling in their area. It’s a similar 45 percent in the South and East, where the fighting has been most intense. By contrast, support for attacks on Western forces drops to 18 percent where no bombing or shelling has occurred, and to 15 percent in the provinces where conflict has been lowest, roughly the northern half of the country. All told, one in six Afghans report coalition bombardment in their area within the past year, but with huge variation; it soars to nearly half in the Southwest and nearly four in 10 in the East.

Afghan Perceptions of ANSF Behavior

ANA has a more positive image than the ANP. Perceptions of improper behaviors by the ANA have remained relatively low while those of the ANP have decreased.

“Have you seen or heard the police in your mantaqa doing anything improper?”

“Have you seen or heard the National Army doing anything improper lately?”

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.
End 2009: 

The Course of the fighting to Date
The War’s Metrics at End 2009: Obama, McChrystal, Eikenberry and the New Realism

The period since President Obama first speech and the end of 2009 has reflected a far more realistic approach to both the growth scale of the war, and the importance of influence and control over the population versus tactical battles and “kinetics.” NATO/ISAF and USCENTCOM have issued far more realistic estimates of the areas where fighting took place in 2007, 2008, and 2009. (p. 78).

While USCENTCOM is still reporting that 71% of all attacks took place in 10% of Afghanistan’s districts, its maps now show the fully range of Taliban activity and just how much of the country the Taliban and insurgents operate in. (p. 79). Moreover, briefings by senior NQTO/ISAF officers like Major General Flynn now fully recognize both the scale of the Taliban and insurgent expansion, and that the war was being lost because of the failure to deal with the problems in the Afghan government, aid effort and ANSF, and the NATO/ISAF and US failure to provide security for the population. (p. 80)

Senior officers, like Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, have stated that the Taliban and insurgents have a major influence or control over one third of the districts in the country – a conclusion supported by the USCENTCOM maps on pages 81 and 82. Senior US officers like Major General Flynn have acknowledged that Taliban now have what "a full-fledged insurgency" and shadow governors in 33 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, including those in the north, and that the Taliban now has a significant presence in northern provinces like Baghlan, Kunduz and Taqhar. This compares with 11 provinces in 2005, 20 in 2006, 28 in 2007, and 31 in 2008.

Data on the patterns in ANSF and US/ISAF casualties now show a sharp rise (p. 83), and USCENTCOM provides far better data are provided on a major rise in weekly security incidents (pp. 84-85) and IED attacks (pp. 86-89) during the course of 2009. Data on high profile explosions are provided in more detail (p. 90), along with better data on the sharp variations in indirect fire attacks (p 91), and a major rise in small arms attacks (p. 92).
Far more detail has been made available on the patterns in attack by regional command (pp. 94-98). These latter data now reflect timeframes that clearly show the steady rise in the intensity in the fighting in each area during 2009.

Along with the maps described earlier, they show why the current fighting is being assessed as one where the Taliban and insurgents have pushed the war to the crisis stage:

- The data on the patterns in security incidents in the Kabul regional command reflect relative low levels of activity, but also show the continuing ability of insurgents to conduct major attacks when this offers significant political advantages.

- Similar data on RC East show the rising intensity of the conflict between 2007 and 2009 – with a roughly 33% rise between 2008 and 2009, as well as a similar ability to suddenly raise the patterns of attack in the summer of 2009.

- The data on RC South also show the rising intensity of the conflict between 2007 and 2009 – with nearly 100% rise between 2008 and 2009 – driven in part by the ISAF offensive in Helmand and other parts of the south. Again, the insurgents show the ability to suddenly raise the patterns of attack in the summer of 2009.

- The data on RC West still show low levels of incidents relative to RC East and RC South, but again show a major rise in 2009 (around 70%), and the ability to suddenly raise the patterns of attack in the summer of 2009.

- The data on RC North are similar to those on RC West. They show low levels of incidents relative to RC East and RC South, but again show a major rise in 2009 (around 70%), and the ability to suddenly raise the patterns of attack in the summer of 2009.
Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009

Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05

Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09

Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
The Insurgency Reaches a Crisis: 2005-2009

- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive

- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIRoA weakness

- International support for development has not met population’s expectations

- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency

- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Where the Fighting Is: 2009

Afghanistan Security Incidents
January – October 2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.
71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.
Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: 2009

- **RED**: Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace. **95 Total**
- **Orange**: Insurgents have demonstrated capability. **97 Total**
- **Yellow**: Insurgents have limited capability. **162 Total**
- **White**: Not able to assess. **45 Total**

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.
Killed in Action: 2007-2009

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<td>ANSF KIA</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF/US KIA</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 20 Aug 09

Sources: Afghanistan CIDNE SIGACTS data through 31 November, as of 08 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.


2007 – 2009
Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME)
(80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate)
Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308)

2003 – 2006
Predominantly Military Ordnance
Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473)
* No IED related casualty data available for 2003

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
IED Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
# IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>Sep-09</th>
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<td>IED Incidents</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>860</td>
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<td>IED's Turned in</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>384</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td>355</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective Attacks</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF KIA</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFWIA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>285</td>
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</table>

Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased.

Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology.

The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taliban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen).

High Profile Explosions: 2007-2009

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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>Person Borne IED</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suicide Vehicle Borne IED</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle Borne IED</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yearly Totals</strong></td>
<td>163</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>158</td>
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</table>

Sources: Afghanistan CIDNE SIGACTS data through 31 November, as of 08 December 2009 reporting.
Indirect Fire Attacks: 2007-2009

Source: Afghanistan JOlIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Small Arms Attacks: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JODIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Caches Found and Cleared: 2007-2009

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.
Assessing the Taliban and Insurgent Threat
The Taliban and Insurgent Threat in 2010

This same realism applies to improved assessments of the insurgent threat. The Director of Intelligence for ISAF has issued an unclassified briefing that describes both the steady rise in the intensity of insurgent activity and the expansion of insurgent networks and influence.

This briefing show insurgents plan to further expand their influence and areas of operations in spite of the rise in NATO/ISAF forces, that the Taliban are adapting to try to win more popular support, and that expelling NATO/ISAF forces remains a major overarching objective. (pp. 101-102).

It notes that the Taliban has adopted new organizational structures to achieve its objectives (p. 103), and that the insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely unless defeated. (p. 104). It also notes that detainees and insurgent fighters perceive themselves as successful, and expect to again become the government with time – as well as see the current government as corrupt and ineffective, aid efforts as a failure, the ANP as corrupt, and the US as a nation that seek a permanent presence in Afghanistan. (p. 105).

It also makes it clear that the Taliban is sophisticated enough to think and act in strategic terms and not simply on the basis of ideological conviction or tactical opportunism. (p. 106). This does not mean that the insurgency does not have critical weaknesses as well as important strengths (page 107), but time is running out (p. 108) and the insurgents currently are confident and feel they winning a war of political attrition. (p. 109)
Overall insurgent strategy going into 2010 (despite increases in ISAF troop strength)

- Increase base of support (continue to expand into West and North)
- Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, esp., Coalition partners
- Undermine efforts of good governance
- Consolidate Command and Control, especially in the South
- Strengthen leadership and unity of effort throughout the country
- Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
- Increase influence around urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul

Mid year adjustment of Taliban strategy

- Leverage tribal influence to gain popular support
- Improve command and control and operational security
- Delegitimize participation in GIRoA
- Expand operations in the West and North

Taliban Overarching Goals:

- Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan
- Undermine GIRoA’s authority and perceptions of security
- Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Afghan Taliban Intentions and Directives

Taliban Code of Conduct published by Taliban leadership, Mid July 2009
(Mullah Omar’s COIN guidance – a population centric strategy)

• “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe. Do not let those people that love money take our local people’s property and cause them problems.”
• “Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide / separate you.”

Intentions
- We don’t have to beat ISAF militarily, just outlast international will to remain in Afghanistan
- Continue population outreach and protection programs
- Continue successful asymmetric operations
- Expand lethal IED and high-profile attacks to deny ISAF freedom of movement
- Emphasize increasing violence in RC North and RC West
- Demonstrate Taliban reach and perceived control of all Afghanistan
- Make the main enemy the United States

Directives
- Reiterated prohibitions on the following:
  - Mistreating population
  - Forcibly taking personal weapons
  - Taking children to conduct jihad
  - Punishment by maiming
  - Forcing people to pay donations
  - Searching homes
  - Kidnapping people for money

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Afghan Taliban Organization: 2001 vs. 2009

**TB Structure (pre-2001)**

- **Inner Shura**: Supreme Ruling body; makes decisions within Omar’s guidance
- **Greater Shura / Committees**: Rule on local issues that Shura leaders take to a national-level Shura
- **Local Shura**: Based on functional requirements, meeting needs of the Inner or Central Shura

**TB Structure 2009**

- **Inner Shura**: Supreme ruling body; decisions based on consensus and within Omar’s guidance
- **Regional Shura / Committees**: Direct and oversee policy; limited decision-making authority
- **Provincial Shura**: Enforces and implements directives; represents local concerns

* Decision delays as fighters require guidance from smaller core of TBSL decision-makers

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
The Afghan Insurgency Can Sustain Itself Indefinitely

• **Weapons and Ammunition:**
  - Small arms weapons and ammunition readily available throughout the region
  - Increased availability of IED and HME materials and technology

• **Funding:** External funding is top-down, while internal funding is bottom-up, providing Taliban a consistent stream of money to sufficiently fund operations:
  - **Internal:** Significant amount from opiate trade
    - Most reliable, accessible source of funds
    - Taxes; narcotics nexus; corruption
  - **External:** Originate in Islamic states
    - Delivered via couriers and hawalas

• **Recruits:**
  - Retain the religious high-ground
  - Able to recruit from frustrated population
  - Exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack of governance

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
How Detainees Perceive the War

OVERALL TRENDS:
• 2009 perceived as most successful year of the war for INS
• Expanded violence viewed as INS victory
• Elections viewed as INS success; low turnout; fraud

COMMAND AND CONTROL:
• INS attempting to solidify command structure
• Directed leadership replacement causing friction with local elements
• TBSL reestablishing strategic vision; wants TB seen as fair, uncorrupt
• View Al Qaeda as a handicap – view that is increasingly prevalent

POLITICS:
• Renewed focus on becoming a legitimate government
• Expand shadow governance

MOTIVATIONS:
• U.S. seen as desiring permanent presence in Afghanistan
• Promised infrastructure projects incomplete, ineffective
• Karzai government universally seen as corrupt and ineffective
• Crime and corruption pervasive amongst security forces

DIIRS By Category
- Atmospheric
- Training
- Corruption
- Facilitation
- INS Biographics
- Anti-Election
- Propaganda
- Threat to population
- INS Attack
- Threat to CF

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Taliban Strategic Relationships

The Taliban retains required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity

Domestic
Leverage Omar’s Islamic credentials to transcend tribal issues
Exploit corruption to generate funds, gain access, and secure protection

Regional / International – State
Known State relationships create tension
Current AFG TB vision if they return to power is to re-establish good relations with Islamic and Regional States
Careful not to antagonize Islamabad or Tehran in order to mitigate against crackdown on safe havens or support systems

Regional / International – Non-state
Manage relationship with AQ to avoid alienating Afghan population, but encourage support from global jihad network
Manage relationship with Pakistani militant groups to encourage reduced attacks in Pakistan, but encourage support for efforts in Afghanistan
Mutually supportive relationship with Chechen and Central Asian fighters

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Insurgent Strengths and Weaknesses

**Strengths**

- Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding
- Strength and ability of shadow governance increasing
- Much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations
- IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; as much a tactic and process as it is a weapon
- Speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign -- this is their main effort

**Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities**

- Comprised of multiple locally-based tribal networks
- Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership at local levels
- Dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of Pashtun population
- Over-reliance on external support

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
“Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

Kinetic Events by Geography

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09).

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
“The insurgency is confident “...Winning a War of Political Attrition by Reducing International Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Likely</th>
<th>Most Dangerous</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach</td>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces</td>
<td>➢ More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
<td>➢ Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west</td>
<td>➢ Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides</td>
<td>➢ Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers</td>
<td>➢ Reduced security in population centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Reduced international support for Afghanistan</td>
<td>➢ Significant loss of international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA</td>
<td>➢ Open popular frustration with GIRoA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Reduced support for ANSF</td>
<td>➢ Popular enmity toward ANSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency</td>
<td>➢ Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Can the New Strategy Work?

“Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”
Can the New Strategy Work? Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

There are no public metrics as yet that define how President Obama’s new strategy will be implemented, resourced, and assessed. Some limited goals have been set for the expansion of the ANSF, but it is unclear that there is a firm consensus within the Administration over these goals, their timing, and resourcing them.

**Buzzwords or Operational Realities?**

There also are differences within NATO/ISAF and the Administration as to the phases of the new strategy. The British have used the phrase: Shape, clear, hold, and build;” while senior US NSC officials have used the term “Clear, hold, build, and transfer.” None of these terms have yet been defined in detail, or in the form of clear operational plans and goals, and they would have to be implemented in different mixes and phases in virtually every major region and population center in Afghanistan. In broad terms, they seem to mean: (p. 115)

- **Shape:** Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.
- **Clear:** Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;
- **Hold:** Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,
- **Build:** Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
- **Transfer:** Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.

There are debates over the relative level of effort given to counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism – without any details as to the definition or implementation of given tactics under each heading. In practice, the distinction may represent a triumph of taxonomy over common sense: How does one defeat terrorism if insurgency continues, and how does one achieve victory if terrorism continues in spite of partial success in counterinsurgency?

References are sometimes made to a shift to a “population centric” strategy, but this too remains undefined, and it is clear that the withdrawal from some exposed forward positions does not mean abandoning forward operations against Taliban and insurgent networks outside populated areas or increasing the role of Special Forces in such missions. Administration officials have consistently denied that they are involved in “nation building,” and then almost uniformly described a campaign that is “nation building” – sometimes hopeless bogging down in meaningless semantic distinctions. The Afghan War is an exercise in armed nation building and anyone who denies this is simply a fool or a liar.
**The Enemy Plus Five Other “Centers of Gravity”**

Similarly, President Obama touched on the fact that a successful strategy in Afghanistan must deal with the weaknesses in the US, NATO/ISAF, Afghan, and aid efforts, as well as with the Pakistani side of the conflict. The means that the war effectively has six centers of gravity – not one in the form of the Taliban and other overt enemies. Again, however, it is not clear how any of these six centers of gravity are to be addressed in practical operational terms. (p. 116):

- Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but also by eliminating its control and influence over the population.
- Creating an effective and well resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.
- Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
- Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.
- Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.
- Dealing with Pakistan, Iran, and other states.
The Host Country is as Much of a Problem as the Threat

It is also clear that the quality and integrity of Afghan governance, and Afghanistan’s role as a host country, presents as many problems as the Taliban threat: (p. 117). This means that the US and its allies must deal with the following operational realities – each of which will be as critical as any aspect of tactical operations against hostile forces:

• Can influence Afghanistan, but not transform it.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations are quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
If the Obama strategy is to work, the US must develop plans and metrics that go far beyond tactical success against the threat. It shows it can deal with these host country problems, and with the problems in NATO/ISAF and the PRT and other aid efforts. (p, 118)

• Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.

Moreover, the US must get its own act in order (p. 119). As one US report stated, the US must have an integrated civil-military effort that is efficient in the field and whose effectiveness is constantly monitored and measured. This requires unity of effort in the following tasks:

“U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions: 1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qa‘ida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and 2) Training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.”
Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

• **Shape**: Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

• **Clear**: Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• **Hold**: Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• **Build**: Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.

• **Transfer**: Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.
Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan as A Host Country

• Can influence, but not transform.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations are quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

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Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.
In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

• Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.

• Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
Shape

While there are no unclassified plans or metrics defining how the NATO/ISAF and US would pursue some mix of “shape, clear, hold, build, and transfer;” the previous metrics serve as warnings regarding the scale of the task.

In the case of “shape,” the most serious immediate challenge is the lack of unity of effort within NATO/ISAF – although the lack of Afghan military capacity ranks a close second. If the new strategy is to succeed, all of the elements of NATO/ISAF must cooperate in shaping operations to defeat the Taliban, prevent the expansion of its operations and influence, and ensure that it cannot reinfiltrate in areas where it has been defeated. Earlier maps have already shown how complex these operations are, and that no part of Afghanistan can now be described as firmly secure.

NATO/ISAF web pages publicize the sheer complexity of the alliance as if it was a measure of merit. NATO/ISAF maps, however, describe what has been close to an “alliance of the impossible” mixing uncoordinated military and aid efforts driven by national priorities, and often by a denial of the fact Afghanistan is at war, and the only way to win is to fight. (p. 122). Similarly, NATO/ISAF data show just how small many national contingents are, that only a limited number of countries are really in the fight (p. 123), and that their size and diversity means that some they create problems in supply, interoperability, and support that re more costly than they are worth. (p. 124-125)

It is also clear that the years of delay in building up effective Afghan forces have left the Afghan Army with limited strength, and that it will be years before it is ready to take over the fight. (p. 1126). This raise critical questions about whether the combination of US, NATO/ISAF, and ANSF can provide enough forces to actually “shape” the operations necessary to clear all major Afghan population centers within a short enough time to meet President Obama’s timetable, the time limits imposed by the political patience of NATO/ISAF countries, and those imposed by the patience of the Afghan people.

It seems certain that a phased campaign will be necessary to deal with the scale of the problems shown in earlier maps and metrics, but it is not clear that the necessary resource to task ratios can be establish by 2011, 2014, or ever. No public plans or metrics have yet been provided even in broad conceptual form to show this is the case, particularly given the continued lack of full cooperation from Pakistan. Moreover, having the military resources to “shape” a campaign, or “clear” key population centers, will not be adequate unless the civil and military resources are available to then “hold” and “build;” that it is clear that some combination of the US and NATO/ISAF countries are willing to sustain aid and some level of force levels for a decade or more; and that a combination of the Afghan government and Afghan security forces are develop the size and capacity to be effective. No amount of conceptual rhetoric can disguise the fact that the US has so far done nothing public to show that it can meet these tests.
“Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces

A “Dog’s Breakfast:” NATO/ISAF Forces
October 22, 2009

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Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009
Engaged Troops by Nation: July 2009

Source: NATO ISAF
In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations.

In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.
Clear

At least for the next few years, “clear” must involve NATO/ISAF led military operations to both push the Taliban out of populated areas and key Taliban operational and support areas, as well as to attack Taliban and insurgent networks and cadres in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The previous maps have already shown the scale of effort required simply to protect the population in areas that are already under Taliban and other insurgent influence. These data are summarized in the maps and charts on page 129, and are reinforced by maps showing how well dispersed much of the Afghan population is (p. 130). While Afghanistan may still be primarily rural, it also has very large populated centers like Kandahar (pp. 131-132). Some 10 million Afghans live in cities, large towns, or population clusters. This means that any population centric strategy will require complex mixes of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in the form of urban warfare.

Moreover, “clear” must be an enduring activity that will involve fully clearing populated areas of Taliban and insurgents. It means ensuring that sleepers and stay behinds cannot be effective and destroying Taliban and insurgent shadow governments and networks. It also may well mean some 5-10 years of effort to deny reinfiltration – although this is as much a matter of “hold” as “clear.” Both types of activity will be heavily dependent on Afghan human intelligence and the ANSF knowledge of the population and how to deal with fellow Afghans. Kinetics can drive out easily identifiable fighters, but they cannot remove a covert presence.
“Time is Running Out....”

• The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

Kinetic Events by Geography

01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05
01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07
01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

Kinetic Events by Week and Type

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

• Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.

• Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.

• The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org
Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan
In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

_Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population._

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
Hold

Both “clear” and “hold” need to be given as much of an Afghan face as possible, and Afghanistan needs to take the lead as soon as Afghan forces can be made effective. This is essential to show Afghans that NATO/ISAF is not an occupying force and will leave, and to create forces that can provide lasting security on Afghan terms and in ways that are fully sensitive to Afghan culture and values. It is equally essential to deal with the reality that the US and its allies cannot obtain the domestic political support to sustain an indefinite campaign.

This, however, requires plans for improvements in the quality and size of every element of Afghan forces that still seem to be in development. These will need far larger and more consistent funding than the erratic US and allied aid programs in the past, as well as a far better coordinated training and mentoring effort and efforts to reform the police and reduce corruption and the influence of power brokers.

Past plans for the expansion of the ANSF are shown in page 135. Some leading US military officers believe that the US must now develop Afghan forces roughly twice these force goals and close to 400,000 men – as well as create fully balanced forces capable of being full partners and taking over the NATO/ISAF mission at some point beginning no later than mid-2011.

This requires improvements in force quality that will reduce Afghan losses and casualties, (p. 136). It requires far more money over a period of at least half a decade, and with far more consistency, than past funding profiles (pp 137-139). It will then require up to a decade more of aid to sustain the resulting forces until the Taliban and other insurgents are fully and permanently defeated. Creating an effective Afghan army will require much more honest ratings of readiness than in the past, and dealing with critical issues like retention and the need for large combat formations and support forces. (p. 140).

Creating effective Afghan police forces will be far more difficult, and will also require proper funding. (p. 141) It will mean a coordinated effort to deal with civil and police corruption, and create all of the elements of a prompt justice system – including courts, legal aid, and adequate detention facilities. It means developing paramilitary capabilities, properly funding the force, establishing far higher readiness levels (p. 142), and providing adequate and survivable mixes of facilities and equipment. (p. 143). The ability to actually transfer from a focus on security operations to one on a normal justice system will be critical to both “hold” and “build,” and ultimately to any meaningful definition of “victory” as the ability to transfer from US/NATO/ISAF to Afghan forces.
Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014

(Authorized Personnel)

ANA and ANP Casualties: 2006-2008

**ANA Casualties, 2007-2009**
- Total Wounded in Action: 1,980
- Total Killed in Action: 651

**ANP Casualties, 2007-2009**
- Total Wounded in Action: 2,885
- Total Killed in Action: 1,764

Note: Numbers are as of 6/22/2009.

US Aid to Afghan Security Forces

ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR
($ BILLIONS)

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON ($ BILLIONS)

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY, FY 2005-2009
($ BILLIONS)

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.
US Aid to Afghan Security Forces

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA
By Sub-Activity Group,
FY 2005–September 2009 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $10.75

- Equipment and Transportation: $4.43
- Sustainment: $2.81
- Infrastructure: $2.44
- Training and Operations: $1.07

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of September 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP
By Sub-Activity Group, FY 2005–September 2009 ($ BILLIONS)

Total: $5.76

- Equipment and Transportation: $1.34
- Infrastructure: $1.59
- Sustainment: $1.55
- Training and Operations: $1.27

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of September 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.
Progress in ANA Funding: As of 1 July 2009

ANA Readiness: As of 30 October 2009

Progress in ANP Funding: As of 1 July 2009

ANP Readiness: As of 30 October 2009

ANP UNIT CM RATINGS

Capability Milestone (CM)

CM1: capable of operating independently
CM2: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
CM3: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions

Total Units: 95

CM1: 11
CM2: 37
CM3: 34
CM4: 13

Notes: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%. CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70-85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70-85%. CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50-70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50-70%. CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%

ANP Projects Cancelled Due to Security Concerns: As of 1 July 2009

CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled $33.53 million. As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.

Build

In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.
The build phase of operations may not involve an effort to suddenly make Afghanistan a developed nation, but it is nation building and any effort to deny this borders on the ludicrous or outright lies. There cannot be any real victory in Afghanistan in terms of either security or stability that is not based on providing far more effective governance and a degree of basic economic security and employment that does not now exist.

As has been discussed earlier, however, this requires a major refocusing of the aid effort to win popular support, and deny the Taliban popularity and a recruiting base. This should affect all aid activity (p. 147) but it will be particularly critical at the level most visible to the Afghan people and that NATO/ISAF forces can protect in the field – the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or PRTs. (p. 148). It requires a far more integrated, and better planned and managed US effort. (pp. 149-150) with far more emphasis on programs with immediate effect, and that are both planned and executed by Afghans at the national, provincial, and especially the district and local levels.

Build activities again illustrate the importance of creating effective programs to create Afghan capacity, and reduce corruption and waste among Afghan officials, foreign and Afghan contractors, and within NATO/ISAF governments and NGOs. This is both a host country and a UNAMA-NATO/ISAF country problem. It is also one that again requires far more consistent, far better prioritized, and far better structured and managed efforts than the US has conducted in the past. (pp. 151-153)

They also raise even more problems in terms of resources and scale of effort in “build” activities for a nation of more than 31 million people than “clear” and “hold.” The key question is whether any combination of US and NATO/ISAF resources can actually provide the level of civil effort at the national, provincial, district, and local levels necessary to show the Afghan people that they will receive enough government services, and help in development and economic security, to halt the expansion of insurgent influence and win broad popular support for the government.

This requires levels of coordinated civil-military action that the US and other NATO/ISAF countries may well be unable to provide, as well as new levels of coordination and unity of effort at the civil and foreign aid level that neither UNAMA or any part of the Afghan government can currently provide. It requires a transition to a rule of law that covers both civil and criminal law, and can deal with corruption and power brokers.
It also requires a level of self-honesty that has been almost totally lacking on the part of UNAMA, the US and other donor governments, and NGOs. There are far too few trustworthy statistics on the way in which aid is allocated relative to validated requirements, the flow of aid money, how well it is managed and audited, and the success of aid programs in terms of sustained benefits for the Afghan people. Most of the metrics being provided a partial at best, and focus largely on the number and size of projects started, rather than their impact. There are virtually no data on sustained effect or how given aid efforts succeed in meeting overall requirements, even at the local level.

The foreign aid community needs to set far higher standards of professional and ethical conduct, and at least some NGOs seem little more than ineffective shells. Basic audits and financial transparency is lacking, and while UNAMA staff claim they have lists of corrupt Afghan government officials, and corrupt foreign and Afghan contractors, there is no evidence that such lists are adequate or that effective action is being taken.
# International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>($ in millions)</th>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>2,897</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-U.S. Pledges (including donors not listed)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,800 (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)</strong></td>
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*Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report. p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over $500 million total.*
A “Coalition of the Impossible:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:
- Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
- 43 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 6,130)
- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (ESP)

Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 36,500)
- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 4,400)
- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 5,700)
- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 18,300)
- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Aid Spending on Afghanistan: As of October 30 2009

## Cumulative US Civil Aid to Afghanistan: FY2002-FY2008

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<td>1478</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>6979</td>
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</table>

Source: CRS.
US Economic (ESF) Aid to Afghanistan

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
($ BILLIONS)

$2.5
$2.0
$1.5
$1.0
$0.5
$0

2002 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.


ESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON ($ BILLIONS)

$7.70
$7.63
$6.97
$6.09
$4.59
$4.17
$0

As of June 30, 2009
As of Sept 30, 2009

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

US Development Assistance Aid to Afghanistan

CERP Funds
In $ Billions

CERP FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR
($) MILLIONS)

$600
$500
$400
$300
$200
$100
$0

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2009.

CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON (BILLIONS)

$1.6
$1.5
$1.4
$1.3
$1.2
$1.1
$1.0
$0.9
$0.8
$0.7

As of June 30, 2009

Funded $1.62
Obligated $1.45
Disbursed $0.81

As of Sept 30, 2009

Obligated $1.61
Disbursed $0.96

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009 and 10/14/2009.

LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS, FY 2005–JUNE 2009 (PERCENT)
By Proportion and Allocation

Total Projects: 10,524
Total Obligations: $1.4 Billion

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Projects
Obligations

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Large-scale projects are defined as those costing $500,000 or more. Total obligations amount differs from amount reported by DoD because of rounding and timing differences.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 30, 2009, p.46, 47
Transfer

No clear definition as yet, but “transfer” is to begin by mid 2011.

• Afghan government will remain dependent on US and outside financial aid indefinitely into the future -- probably through 2021 and beyond.
• US military advisors talk about doubling (and largely finding) the ANA and ANP, but Presidential approval is uncertain and force expansion to be assessed annually.
• US military advisors call for real partnership with Afghan forces, but unclear this can be implemented before 2011, must less fully prepare for transfer before 2014.
• No clear plan for increasing Afghan governance capacity or economic support and development.

Success requires the US to address all six centers of gravity in the war. The US must have truly integrated civil military efforts. And, there is Pakistan...
Transfer

No one in the Obama Administration seems to agree on what the President’s vague words about beginning US force reduction in 2011 mean, willing to discuss the impact of the real world limits to allied willingness to provide more funds and troops, or willing to discuss key issues like planned Canadian and Netherlands withdrawals.

It is an ill-kept secret that the studies of ways to accelerate Afghan force development conducted in the summer of 2009 as part of the President’s strategic review found far less progress, and far more problems, than had previously been reported. This does not mean that Afghan forces cannot become full partners and take over the bulk of the military burden at some point, but it seems much more likely to be 2014-2016 than 2011. It also seems likely that the Afghan force will require nearly full outside funding for 5-10 years after that time, particularly if Pakistan remains a major problem.

Transfer of responsibility to the Afghan central government is even more problematic. It is also clear that the crisis over the Afghan Presidential elections, delays in forming a new government, the prospects for another electoral crisis over coming elections for parliament, and delays in implementing legislation to strengthen provincial and local governments make it unlikely there will be a stable Afghan government before the spring to mid-2010 at the earliest. It also seems nearly certain that no combination of US, allied, and Afghan government civil effort can be effective on the ground, at the scale required, before 2012, and that it too is more likely to take until 2014-2016 at the earliest.

These problems may well make effective plans and metrics for transfer impossible. It certainly requires a level of strategic patience and bipartisanship within the US that neither Democrats or Republicans currently seem willing to provide.
The Key Impact of Pakistan
Pakistan

The politics of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan are so different that they require fundamentally different approaches to each country. They both are the scene of a common struggle, although Pakistan faces a far more complex mix of internal and external threats than the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hekmatyar, and smaller insurgent groups.

There are few official metrics on the Pakistani side of the war, and most have emerged in recent UN reporting on the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. Some declassified intelligence estimates of the threat, and how its structure and intentions overlap the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan are shown in pages 158-159. US estimates of how these interact with differences between insurgent organizations and objectives are sown in pages 160-161.

A summary US estimate of the challenges Pakistan poses is shown in page 162. A UN estimate of tribal groups and their ties to insurgent threats is shown in pages 1643 and 164. UN metrics on the critical importance of the lack of border security in Afghanistan and Pakistan are shown in pages 165-168. UN data are shown on the uncertain governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in pages 169-170; and similar data on Baluchistan are shown in pages 171-172.

For all of its problems, Afghanistan is a willing host country and its government is largely committed to winning the war. Pakistan is at best a pressured “ally” that reacts to US carrots and stick, and to its own internal Islamist extremist threats, but focuses primarily on domestic security and the threat posed by India. It will not tolerate an over foreign military presence, and is reluctant to accept an effective advisory effort. Its government, forces, and intelligence are deeply divided about the war, the continued value of trying to manipulate the Afghan Taliban to serve Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, and whether the US can be trusted or is the source of a new threat on Pakistan’s western borders. Pakistan is a tenuous ally at best, faces massive internal stability problems, and is only likely to fully engage as an ally if the various Afghan insurgent groups and Al Qa’ida become a direct threat to the Pakistani government.
The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation, training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

**TBSL in the south:** Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.

**Insurgent leadership in the east:** The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.
Insurgency Objectives in 2008-2009

**RC-North:** Destabilize and Expand - Increased asymmetric attacks aimed at destabilizing and controlling the region

**RC-West:** Expand - Aggressive insurgent expansion designed to further develop shadow government and support areas

**RC-South:** Control - Enemy attempts to deal with ISAF offensive in Helmand and control Kandahar

**RC-East:** Sustain or Intensify - Enemy sustains or intensifies current level of operations in the east through increased use of asymmetric tactics
The Challenge of Pakistan

• Pakistan is as or more complex than Afghanistan
  – Tribal and religion overtones, yet strong national identity, multiple ethnicities, most desire some form of democracy, a worsening economy but a nuclear weapons state

• Foreign intervention resented in most of the country
  – Predominantly an Indian issue, but strong resentment against the US and UK; appears to be growing against Taliban

• Tribal values and traditional core beliefs still dominate large parts of the country
  – “Outsiders” trying to impose new ideas and beliefs create tension; nature of tribal traditions can supersede Islam

• Army is perceived to be more capable (and dependable) than the government
  – Regarded as a positive influence in the FATA and NWFP because they are locally recruited and able to work within local systems

• Large numbers of internally displaced people from years of fighting, a poor economy and natural disasters
  – Potential breeding ground for the Taliban…but offers opportunities for counter-radicalization programs

• Violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the Government of Pakistan
  – Demonstrates an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment

Staying the course in Pakistan as important as staying the course in Afghanistan

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Tribal Connections at Afghanistan/FATA (Pakistan) Border

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 130
# Tribes and insurgent groups in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border agency/province</th>
<th>Main tribes</th>
<th>Main AGE groups (non-exhaustive)</th>
<th>Cross-border representation and linkages in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>Shinwari, Afridi</td>
<td>Lashkar 1-Islam, Ansar ul Islam, HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Shinwari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>Turi, Mangal, Bangash, Jaji, Moqbil</td>
<td>HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Jaji, Mangal, Moqbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td>Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda, IMU and Uzbek splinter groups (e.g. Islamic Jihad Union), Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td>Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda, IMU, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Ahmadzai Wazirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>Mohmand, Safis</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Mohmand, Safis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orakzai</td>
<td>Orakzai, Afridi</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan province</td>
<td>Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch</td>
<td>Afghan Taliban, Balochi separatist groups, Jundullah</td>
<td>Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Official border crossing points between Afghanistan and its neighbors

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 62
Average daily vehicle crossing in FATA 2007-2008

Source: Information provided by Pakistani embassy officials in Kabul.

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 122
Trafficking routes and unofficial border crossing points in Afghanistan 2008

Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC.

22 Estimating and/or targeting processing laboratories is not an easy task, as they can function virtually anywhere, using a few metal drums and a press.
Drug Trafficking routes in Pakistan

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 63
FATA’s seven agencies and Baluchistan

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 124
# Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (1998 census)</th>
<th>Density (people/km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td></td>
<td>595,227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td></td>
<td>546,730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td></td>
<td>448,310</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td></td>
<td>334,453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
<td>361,246</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orakzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>225,441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
<td>429,841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Frontier Regions combined</td>
<td></td>
<td>235,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>27,220</td>
<td>3,176,331</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 122
Afghanistan/Pakistan Border: Baluchistan Province

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 132
Refugee camps and heroin seizure locations in Baluchistan, 2002-2008

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 137
Can We Still Win?
2010 and Beyond
2010 and Beyond: Can We Still “Win?”

The war is still winnable, but as Major General Flynn of ISAF warns, any form of victory remains uncertain (p. 177) So far, the resourcing and implementation of “new strategy” is more conceptual than real and it is important to understand that current unclassified metrics describe only part of the challenges involved.

• There are no detailed descriptions of the level of corruption and lack of capacity in the Afghan government and security forces. There are no lists of corrupt or incapable power brokers, officials, and officers. There are no lists of corrupt or incapable aid efforts and outside contractors. There are no unclassified net assessments of Taliban/insurgent areas of influence and control versus Afghan government and ANSF areas of influence and control. There are no public metrics showing relative Taliban vs. Afghan government control of the actual process of local government and the justice system.

• The effort to develop effective Afghan forces is being reorganized as part of a zero-based review and only began to take hold in December 2009. The metrics that reflect past failures and lack of resources in the ANSF development effort are too complex to summarize in full in this report. They are described in a separate report – entitled “Shaping Afghan National Security Forces” and available on the CSIS web sites at [http://csis.org/publication/shaping-afghan-national-security-forces](http://csis.org/publication/shaping-afghan-national-security-forces) -- a report which described both a high level of unnecessary part failure and very real future opportunities.

• There is no meaningful transparency as to the mix of national caveats, national objectives and “branding” of aid efforts, and rules of engagement that divide allied ISAF and PRT contributions and limit effective actual unity of effort within NATO/ISAF.

• The full level of US mistakes and failures in the US aid effort are still being explored by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the metrics in this report only hint at the gross incompetence of the State/USAID-led effort to date. The level of problems involved does become clearer, however, from the studies that SIGAR has already done – which are available at [http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Default.aspx](http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Default.aspx), and from a wide range of GAO studies available at [http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/afghanistan.html](http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/afghanistan.html).

• The failures in the international aid effort are largely opaque, although Oxfam and many other studies warn that the UN and allied efforts have been a nightmare of waste and corruption, uncoordinated programs, and funding of programs and efforts spent outside Afghanistan or in ways where much or most of the money ended in flowing outside the country. Eight years into the war, neither UNAMA or any allied country has provide a credible and transparent analysis of the impact of its aid efforts.
There are only limited unclassified, official estimates or metrics of the course of the war in Pakistan. It is clear, however, that there are now two campaigns—Afghan and Pakistani—that make up what is effectively one war that flows across their common border.

**Winning By Learning from the Past**

At the same time, the metrics in this report do show just how much past insurgent gains have been dependent on past US failures. They have been driven by the lack of resources, focus and coordination in US civil-military efforts, and US unwillingness to confront reality in dealing with the Afghan and Pakistani governments and allies. They have been driven by a focus on tactical victories against an enemy that was winning a far more critical series of struggles for political influence among the Afghan and Pashtun populations and a battle of political attrition against the US and NATO/ISAF.

Moreover, polls show that the US and its allies also face a very different strategic environment from the one that the Soviets faced in the 1980s. Much of the unclassified polling of the Afghan people is now dated and has uncertain credibility in terms of the samples and methods used, but the results do not indicate the Taliban has won popularity where it is in control. This is clearly reflected in a series of ABC/BBC/ARD polls, and the most recent results summarized in pages 178-184.

These polling data provide strong support for the key elements of the new US and NATO/ISAF strategy—*if it is properly implemented*. They reflect the first positive results in three years, and indicate that US and NATO/ISAF forces are not unpopular because they are foreign, but rather when they do not provide lasting security, and when they fight in an area and leave a power vacuum where the Taliban can return and take revenge. Similarly, the Afghan government consistently polls favorably, as does the ANSF and many of the negatives in such polls come from the absence of basic services, security and gross corruption—not from any popular support of Taliban ideology and religion, or separate sense of Pashtun identity.

Taliban and insurgent extremism and excesses also offer critical fault lines that the US, NATO/ISAF, and the Afghan government can do far more to exploit if they can make the “hold, build, and transfer” aspects of the new strategy an operational reality. The unclassified metrics now available only begin to provide a picture of Taliban and insurgent abuses and the casualties they cause.

There are no maps or detailed figures that show the level of extortion, kidnappings, seizures of property, night letters and threats, killings and attacks on local leaders, destruction or disbanding of schools, or the host of other problems in the areas where the Taliban and insurgent groups have major influence and control. It seems likely that casualty estimates would be significantly different if they could count this kind of violence half as well as they can make estimates of the impact of NATO/ISAF air strikes.
The Obama Administration Has Made an Important Beginning

The fact that the Obama Administration has so far failed to articulate a detailed strategy does not mean it has not made a beginning. The US has begun to reverse some of the most critical mistakes it made earlier in the war. It is now beginning to provide adequate resources. The US is now being far more honest in addressing the lack of capacity and corruption in the Afghan government, the failures to structure anything approaching an effective effort to make the Afghan security forces a credible partner, the weaknesses in NATO/ISAF and allied PRT efforts, the irrelevance and corruption in the international aid effort, and the fact that Pakistan is not an ally as much as a nation perceiving significantly different national interests but subject to US influence.

It also seems clear that best way to stop losing is to stop making critical mistakes. A more effective effort to actually implement a population oriented strategy can still reverse the situation and “win” to the extent that Afghanistan can gradually assume responsibility for its own security and stability – albeit with substantial aid over a period that may consume well over a decade over 2011. Such a victory would deny Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, and succeeding violent, Islamist extremist movements a sanctuary and a critical strategic victory, as well as promote regional stability, stability in the greater Middle East and Islamic worlds, and give the Afghan people hope and the opportunity to develop a truly viable state and economy.

Even Odds the Mission Can Be Accomplished?

These options are no guarantee of victory. The trend data in this report are a warning that the situation has probable deteriorate to the point where the odds of victory are probably now little better than even, even if the US does take effective action. The steady erosion of the politico-military situation in Afghanistan since the President’s first speech in March has also shown that the situation will continue to slowly deteriorate as long as the US fails to actually implement a new strategy. Moreover, Pakistan is more critical in strategic terms and presents higher risks. No success in Afghanistan can guarantee victory in Pakistan, and it is unclear that any victory in Afghanistan can be sustained without an equal reversal in the course of the war in Pakistan.

But, war involves risk and there is no “exit strategy” that offers a better alternative or fewer mid and long term risks. The fact also remains that US mistakes and failures have been critical in Taliban and insurgent gains to date. The US, Afghan government, and NATO/ISAF do not confront a strong or popular enemy. They have failed to react and take the initiative, failed to use their resources effectively, and created a power vacuum that the enemy could exploit for well over half a decade. The enemy has not won the war as much as the US has lost it, and the only way to realistically assess the odds of winning is to stop making the mistakes that have been so costly in the past. The US can easily “conceptualize” its way to defeat; it may well be able to act in ways that win.
But the War is Still Winnable

The situation is serious -- significant change is required.

• We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed

• Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability and support to pose a threat to GIRoA’s viability (they are most coherent in the south)

• Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse

• New strategy will incur risks -- not properly executing the strategy has greater risk
  – Longer war
  – Greater casualties
  – Higher overall costs
  – Loss of political support

• Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions

• Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure

• Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
“...the latest poll by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV finds that sharply more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country’s strife, while many fewer blame the United States or its allies – significant progress in a central aim of the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Another, basic change is larger still: After steep declines in recent years there’s been a 30-point advance in views that the country is headed in the right direction; 70 percent now say so, the most since 2005. Afghans’ expectations that their own lives will be better a year from now have jumped by 20 points, to 71 percent, a new high. And there’s been a 14-point rise in expectations that the next generation will have a better life, to 61 percent.

Many challenges remain. Complaints about official corruption are higher than ever. Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.”

...There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views.

But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Another result on security points the same way. In 2005, 72 percent of Afghans rated their personal security from crime and violence positively. A year ago that fell to 55 percent. Today it’s still at 55 percent – stabilized, at least, but still well below its best, or where millions of Afghans clearly want it to be.

Afghans’ better hopes for the future, as noted, could also reflect hopes that the renewed Western commitment will ultimately resolve their country’s strife. Moreover, in addition to the U.S./NATO efforts, this poll find a 12-point rise in confidence in local commanders and their militia to provide security – a result that may reflect efforts by some local militia, called arbakai, to oppose the Taliban.
Afghan’s Still Support Their Government and the ANSF, and the US/ISAF Rating Has Improved

Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

There also are significant regional differences. Support for U.S. and NATO efforts are sharply lower in the South and East, where the fighting is heaviest. Local support for the Taliban rises to 27 percent on its home turf, in the country’s Southwest, vs. 10 percent in the rest of the country. And views of the country’s direction are markedly less bright in some high-conflict areas, such as Helmand, heart of the opium poppy trade.

Critical from the U.S. perspective is that, despite poor views of its performance, 68 percent of Afghans continue to support the presence of U.S. forces in their country – and nearly as many, 61 percent, favor the coming surge of Western troops initiated by President Obama. But support for the surge drops to 42 percent in the South and East; support for the presence of U.S. forces also drops in these regions, and support for attacks on U.S. and NATO forces, while sharply down overall, remains much higher in the restive South. honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

...Support for the planned increase in U.S. and NATO forces is accompanied by majority belief the United States will accomplish the goals set out by Obama – for example, training Afghan forces to take over security, strengthening the Kabul government, preventing the Taliban from retaking control, preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing a base of operation and reducing corruption. But fewer, ranging from 22 to 33 percent, are very confident these will happen.

The commitment expressed by the planned surge may be another factor bolstering public hopes. There are, in any case, other signs of improved views of the West: There’s been a 14-point gain from last year, to 83 percent, in the view among Afghans that it was right for the United States to invade and overthrow the Taliban just more than eight years ago. And the number of Afghans who say attacking Western forces can be justified has dropped sharply, from 25 percent a year ago to 8 percent, a new low. (It jumps to 22 percent in the South – but that’s half of what it was there a year ago.)

The New US Strategy is Having an Impact, But Afghan Support is Still Weak

just 38 percent rate the work of the United States in Afghanistan positively Š up 6 points in the past year, but far below its peak, 68 percent, in 2005. (NATO ratings are as low, and flat.) Fifty-one percent have a favorable view of the United States overall Š vastly below its high point, 83 percent, in 2005. And U.S. favorability drops to 35 percent in the East and 29 percent in the South (vs. 59 percent in the rest of the country) Š again, plummeting where the United States is most actively engaged in combat.

While its performance is rated poorly, most Afghans nonetheless see a need for the United StatesŠs presence in Afghanistan Š a view probably informed by very broad rejection of the likely alternative, the Taliban. As noted, more than two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in their country, slightly up from last year although still below its peak. (Most Afghans last year opposed a troop increase in the abstract; the shift from those views to support for ObamaŠs surge is mirrored in U.S. public opinion as well.)

There clearly are many other remaining challenges for Afghanistan and its Western allies alike. In addition to their weak overall ratings and the issue of civilian casualties, 40 percent say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area – up 6 points from a year ago, but well below its peak. And just under half, 48 percent, are confident in the ability of these Western forces to provide security and stability – again up a bit, but far below its level in 2006, 67 percent.

Strikingly, just 42 percent in the South and East support the presence of U.S. forces in their area, compared with 78 percent in the rest of the country. Positive ratings of the U.S. performance dive to 16 percent in the South and 28 percent in the East, vs. 45 percent in the rest of the country. And just 26 percent in these two regions are confident in the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to provide security, compared with 56 percent elsewhere.

More generally, support for the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is 18 points higher among people who rate their local security positively, 26 points higher where reports of violence are lower and also 26 points higher where there’s no coalition bombing reported. Similarly, where the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is seen as strong, 67 percent report confidence in the ability of these forces to provide security, 73 percent rate their performance positively and fewer blame Kabul or the West for the country’s violence.

...more Afghans also say the United States and NATO are doing worse, not better, in avoiding civilian casualties, by 43-24 percent. This may reflect dismay over widely publicized individual incidents, such as the bombing of a pair of hijacked fuel tankers in September that killed scores of civilians in Kunduz province. It’s another measure the allies want to move their way if their basic support is to rise.

UN Estimates that NATO/ISAF is Responsible for Far Smaller Percent of Civilian Deaths

Source: UN and NATO/ISAF as reported by ABC News, 11.1.2010.
Corruption is a Critical Issue

Internally, ...corruption is a very prominent threat to hopes for progress. Nearly all Afghans – 95 percent – now say official corruption is a problem in their area, up 23 points since 2007. Seventy-six percent say it’s a big problem; both are new highs.

Outside their immediate area, 90 percent see official corruption as a problem at the provincial level, and 83 percent call it a problem in the national government in Kabul – both vast numbers – with nearly two-thirds saying it’s a big problem at both these levels of government.

Given the continued challenges, a fundamental question is what’s behind the improvements in Afghans’ attitudes about their country’s direction and leadership. The answer appears to be a variety of elements rather than one silver bullet.

As noted, relief in the election’s end is a strong factor; the promise of stability can be appealing, fears of civil unrest after the disputed election were not realized and Karzai’s endorsement by several of his leading opponents may have carried weight.

Karzai may also be experiencing a typical winner’s rally, often seen in U.S. elections; indeed, beyond presidential approval, Americans’ views of the United States’ direction improved after Obama’s election – in still-challenging times – just as they’ve now soared in Afghanistan. A question is to what extent support may fade (as has Obama’s), especially if Karzai’s campaign promises are unmet.

ELECTION – On the Afghan election itself, this poll finds majority suspicion of fraud in voting and vote counting alike – 56 and 60 percent, respectively, think these occurred. But far fewer (three in 10) see it as widespread fraud; 82 percent express confidence that “a system of freely voting for leaders” will work in Afghanistan; and 75 percent say they’re satisfied with the election.

Positive views of the country’s direction likewise are dramatically higher among people who are confident democracy can work in Afghanistan, as well as among those who rate Karzai’s performance positively. Those who suspect widespread fraud, on the other hand, are considerably less sanguine about the country’s direction overall.

Karzai, for his part, is not immune from the country’s geographical divisions. His performance rating drops to 40 percent in Helmand vs. 72 percent in the rest of the country. And underscoring the impact of development, his rating is 18 points higher in areas where people give a positive rating to the availability of jobs and economic opportunity.

Another result on elections may not be one that Western governments would prefer: Forty-three percent of Afghans say their preferred form of government is an Islamic state, rather than a democracy (32 percent) or strongman rule (23 percent). Support for an Islamic state spikes to 56 percent in the East, bordering Pakistan’s tribal areas. But elsewhere such views have changed; in Iraq, support for democracy ultimately soared after a series of successful elections.
Economic and development advances are additional factors. After long delay, there are positive reports of development in this impoverished country. Fifty-five percent of Afghans now say they have electricity, up 15 points since 2007. From its low in 2007, there’s been a 24-point gain in the number who rate their electrical supply positively – albeit just to 38 percent, indicating the continued need to develop power supply and delivery.

Fifty-six percent report new or rebuilt roads in their area in the past five years, up 21 points from 2007; the number who rate their local infrastructure positively has more than doubled since first measured in 2005. While access to medical care remains a problem, half report new or rebuilt health clinics, up 13 points from 2007. And, in a largely rural nation with heavy reliance on subsistence farming, positive ratings of support for agriculture – availability of seed, fertilizer and equipment – is up by 9 points in the past year, albeit just to 45 percent.

On the economy, while affordability of food and fuel remain significant problems, 45 percent of Afghans rate the national economy positively, up 12 points from a year ago. Fewer, 39 percent, rate their own financial situation positively, but that too is up, by 7 points. The availability of jobs and economic opportunities is still a challenge, rated positively by just four in 10, but that’s up by 11 points in the past year.

Part of the improvement in economic attitudes may reflect aspirations; the Karzai government has announced a plan to raise teachers’ salaries, encouraging some speculation that other public sector raises – army, police – may follow. Again, if they don’t, positive views could be at risk.

In one sign of consumer advances – small in the grand scheme, but potentially powerful in its personal impact – the number of Afghans who report having a cell phone in their household has essentially doubled since 2005, from 31 percent then to 60 percent now.

There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views. But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.