SHAPING AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO IMPLEMENT PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW STRATEGY

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Executive Summary

President Obama has announced a new strategy for Afghanistan whose success is dependent upon beginning the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan national security forces (ANSF) in mid-2011. This is a far more difficult challenge than many realize. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made significant advances during the last few years, but their development had low to moderate priority for nearly half a decade. It was not until 2006-2007 that the ANSF began to have meaningful force goals, and to have adequate NATO/ISAF and US aid in developing its “force quantity.”

The present ANSF goals are probably still only about half the level that will eventually be needed to work with NATO/ISAF forces; implement the ISAF/Afghan strategy of shape, clear, hold, and build, and defeat the insurgency. Critical problems still exist in “force quality” because of a long-standing lack of mentors and partners, equipment, and a lack of the financial support the ANSF needs to grow and become effective.

The following key shortcomings still cripple the ANSF, and must now be corrected:

- NATO/ISAF efforts that lacked unity of command, and the ability to flexibly apportion both ANSF and ISAF forces across the battlespace;
- Failure to make the ANSF a full partner with the ISAF and to lay the ground work for transfer of lead security responsibility; and
- Lack of effective coordination among the elements of the ANSF.
- Unwillingness among various elements of NATO/ISAF and member countries to directly confront problems with corruption, powerbrokers, criminal elements, and insurgent influence within the Afghan government, and within the leadership of various elements of the ANSF.
- Setting inadequate force goals and force expansion plans that led to lack of sufficient capacity and capability of all types of ANSF, across the theater;
- Lack of clear near-term priorities and timelines for developing the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF required for the current fight extend beyond the ‘near-term’ of 12-24 months;
- Lack of longer term plans to expand and fund/sustain the ANSF for the length of the entire campaign, and help Afghanistan achieve lasting security and stability.
- Sustained mismatch between the force goals that were set and the resources necessary to implement the, including both funding and the provision of adequate trainers, mentors, and partners. Ongoing problems growing out of past failures to set the proper goals for ANSF expansion provide adequate numbers of mentors and partners, and to fund the level of effort required
- Failure to understand, and properly audit and survey, the motivation of ANSF forces by force element to understand recruiting, performance, motivation, and retention problems; and to properly assess the levels of pay, privileges, leave, medical benefits, death and disability benefits, facilities and equipment necessary to create effective forces on a sustained basis and compete with the Taliban and other insurgents and the pressure from power brokers, narco-traffickers, and other sources of corruption.
- Series of major shifts in the training effort for the ANP involving repeated changes of mission and policing concepts coupled to a failure to prepare police for the reality of counterinsurgency and the Taliban threat, and to tie police development to the creation of a practical approach to the rule of law that could provide a functioning mix of formal, informal, and prompt justice.
- A focus on creating large numbers of battalion-sized Kandaks in the ANA with emphasis on quantity over quality, and formal training without effective mentoring and partnering of newly created units; failure to understand that newly formed units require extended training at the whole unit level, and that extended mentoring and partnering of deployed units is critical, or formal training fails to achieve its goals.

The US Cripples ANSF Development Through FY2007-CY2009 Through Massive Failures to Properly Resource the Force Development Effort

The US bears a large share of the responsibility for many of these failures. The US took more than half a decade to fund ANSF development seriously and then funded it erratically and failed to provide the proper numbers of trainers, mentors, and partners.

One of the most critical problems was chronic underresourcing. Critics of today’s ANSF and the training effort should look carefully at the data in Figure One. The US failed to make creating effective Afghan forces a serious goal until FY2007, and this funding must be put in the context that funding can take 12-18 months to have an impact in the field – which meant it only began to have a fully impact in mid to late CY2008.

The US then failed to fund the level of post-2007 effort necessary to sustain a major force expansion. According to the Department of Defense, (FY) 2008 funding levels totaled $2.75 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA, $964 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. It then dropped to $2 billion in FY2009, although the ANA force goal was being raised to 134,000.

It is only since that time that the US has found itself making massive expenditures it might well have avoided if it had ever taken ANSF development seriously in the first place. As is noted by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR),

Since FY 2005, almost $18.67 billion has been made available to the ASFF. This accounts for approximately 47.5% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. This amount includes the nearly $3.61 billion provided in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act signed by the U.S. President on June 24, 2009. As of September 30, 2009, over $17.30 billion has been obligated, with nearly $16.58 billion of that amount disbursed...

As of September 30, 2009, a total of $16.58 billion has been disbursed. Of this amount, $10.75 billion (64.85%) was disbursed for the ANA, $5.76 billion (34.73%) for the ANP, and the remaining $0.07 billion (0.42%) focused on related activities—the majority of funds for the ANA have been disbursed for Equipment and Transportation ($4.43 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts ($2.81 billion). The majority of funds for the ANP have been disbursed for Infrastructure ($1.59 billion), followed by sustainment efforts ($1.55 billion)...

A comparison of Figure One and Figure Two shows that the US and its allies failed to tie ANSF force levels and force goals to funding through early CY2009 – although the following analysis shows that significant improvements took place after early CY2008. Figure Three shows that these mistakes were coupled to similar delays in deploying adequate trainers and mentors through early CY2009. As a Department of Defense report noted at the beginning of 2009:

As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP through Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.
The U.S. is actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. For example, Illinois Army National Guardsmen support a Polish battle group, a Latvian OMLT will deploy with 11 members from the Michigan Army National Guard, and Ohio Army National Guardsmen are deploying with a Hungarian OMLT.

... The eventual ANP training and mentoring objective is to send a PMT to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. Currently, the broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to meet this objective. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, 5 regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned (37 percent fill). The shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring.
Figure One: No Real Funding Until FY2007

Congressional Research Service Estimate

Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror


Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 2009 p. 44.
Figure Two: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANASF Force Level, Goals, and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008
Figure Three: Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement Through Early 2009:

Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors:
Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:


These fundamental failures to properly resource ANSF development for more than half a decade, and to provide proper numbers of trainers and mentors, were compounded further mistakes that still haunt ANSF force development:

- **A failure to try to seriously create Afghan forces that could be real partners to the US and NATO/ISAF, and eventually replace the US and NATO/ISAF in an extended insurgency that would require strong national security forces for a decade or more.** The US waited some six years to take the force development effort seriously, and then focused on rushing newly created small combat units – Kandaks of battalion size – into the field. It was not until the summer of 2009 that the US seriously addressed what partnering really meant, began to set goals for creating the kind of higher level joint headquarters and operations that could truly make Afghan military and police forces real partners, and lay the ground work for the eventual transfer of most military and paramilitary functions to Afghan forces.

- **Lack of entire unit training:** These problems have been compounded by a failure to provide adequate training for the entire newly formed Kandak or unit. The trained parts are assembled without adequate training of the entire force element – a direct contrast to the key lessons of the importance of full unit training – even for mature forces – in places like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin.

- **Failure to see that mentoring and partnering was the critical phase.** It has only been in the course of 2009 that the US has focused on the fact that newly created, entire units, get their primary training and combat capability after they leave the formal training center and go into the field. The tacit assumption – or at least de facto experience – has been that the Afghans are already “fighters” and that newly formed units can be treated as something close to mature, functioning units, rather than units that require at least a year of embedded mentoring and close partnering to develop the proven leadership and core competence needed. This approach often proved to under resource mentoring and partnering, create major problems for new units, and encourage serious and rapid attrition.

- **A failure to understand the linkage between police development and the combined needs of a society dependent on an informal justice system capable of promptly resolving civil disputes and preventing local and tribal violence, and the need for police forces that had sufficient paramilitary capability to survive in an insurgency.** The police and rule of law efforts remained largely decoupled through early CY2009.

- **The US did not take the police training effort seriously for at least five critical years during the rise of the insurgency.** It attempted to export responsibility. The training effort was turned over to an underresourced and terribly managed German effort that focused on training European-style police officers for a country that had very different needs and resources. When the US finally did react, the program was effectively transferred to an underresourced, US-run, State Department system that was over-dependent on contract support and also sought to create conventional police that could not survive in the emerging insurgency. It was not until 2007 that that police began to get effective paramilitary training from the US military, and the training effort remained underresourced and secondary to the Afghan Army effort through early 2009.

- **The US continued to treat ANSF development as if the key goal was the tactical defeat of the insurgency rather than securing population centers, and denying the enemy control and influence over the Afghan population.** Even today, American commanders and strategists talk about “clear, hold, build, and transfer” without a real definition of what this means, much less any public and credible plan for shaping ANSF development to perform the necessary civil-military functions in the “hold” and “build” phases.

- **Unrealistic emphasis on border security efforts.** As was the case in Iraq, far too much emphasis was placed on trying to create border and port of entry forces that could not credibly cover the areas required, did not have the firepower and mobility required, and were subject to constant Taliban and hostile threats and pressure, and vulnerable to bribes and corruption. These problems were further compounded by the fact that Pakistan was often treated as if it would be a reliable partner in such efforts when US experts clearly knew this was not, and would not, be the case.

- **The US never effectively exercised its de facto leadership role in the alliance to develop a coordinated NATO/ISAF/PRT effort.** In practice, much of the ANSF development and deployment effort has put Afghan military and police forces in the field under conditions where each leading country uses Afghan forces somewhat differently, and where the lack of any standard for the operation of national NATO/ISAF
forces – coupled to a lack of any standard for coordination of such forces with related PRTs – has left deployed ANSF forces without an effective NATO/ISAF partner.

- **Failure to ensure proper continuity and management of the partnering effort.** These problems were compounded in the field at every level by the rapid rotation of US and ISAF forces and aid workers, a lack of continuity of effort, a failure to prepare and rate commanders properly on partnering, and erratic handoff or transfer of this function during the rotation of field commanders and combat units.

- **Having trainers rate their own success, and inadequate and inaccurate rating systems.** The US should have learned from the battle of Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith, that trainers should not be allowed to rate those they train without independent verification. Unit readiness and performance need to independently validated. More broadly, however, the US has developed a statistically-based rating system in both Iraq and Afghanistan that is useful in providing some key indicators, but not in measuring actual levels of combat performance, loyalty, quality of leadership, and the impact of key problems like attrition. This had led to the sharp over rating of army units as being truly “in the lead.”

- **Failing to deal with the reality of corruption and power brokering:** The US was extremely slow to make serious efforts to deal with the complex impact of corruption and power brokering that affects ANSF development, operations, and force allocation at many levels – particularly the police. It often complained, but rarely acted decisively. It did not set a clear and predictable set of ground rules and behavior as to outing the incompetent and corrupt, dealing with powerbroker interference, and making anti-corruption efforts effective. It was only in the summer of 2009 that the US really began to address these issues, and how to allocate resources in ways that reward honest and effective performance and deny aid, contracts, and US support to the ineffective and corrupt. It is still unclear this will lead to effective and sustained US action that will support ANSF development.

- **Delays in realistic assessment of manning, quality of facilities, adequacy of pay and privileges, and other key factors affecting attrition and combat performance.** The US has been remarkably slow to act on past lessons and constantly evaluate the reasons for attrition, actual levels of Afghan morale and motivation, and the real world adequacy of key factors like pay, privileges, facilities, medical care, leave, retirement, and death and disability benefits. Efforts to establish effective systems are still a work in progress.

- **Uncertain selection and career paths for US trainers and mentors:** The US was slow to properly train the trainers, mentors, and partners; and it is still not clear whether playing this role will put the US officers involved on the kind of competitive career track they deserve.

**Facing the US Threat to the ANSF**

These problems do not mean that the Afghan’s do not have equal of greater responsibility for their current problems, or that they can be excused from taking full responsibility for ANSF development over time. They do mean that the US must now take responsibility for years in which it failed to act as if Afghanistan faced a serious and growing insurgency; and for its past underresourcing every aspect of the war in ways that allowed the insurgents to take the initiative. Far too many of the failures in today’s ANSF are the product of a critical half-decade in which the White House, OMB, and OSD cut back on requests from US commanders and ambassadors, and essentially had no meaningful strategy for Afghanistan.

It is not enough for President Obama to announce a new strategy, and call for transfer of security responsibilities to the ANSF. The US will lose the war in Afghanistan unless it makes far more effective efforts to correct these problems, and fully resources an effort accelerate reaching current force goals. Such action is only a part of the strategy needed to win in Afghanistan, but no other effort towards victory will matter if the Afghan people cannot be given enough security and stability to allow successful governance, the opportunity for development, and an established civil society and rule of law that meets Afghan needs and expectations.

The US and other NATO/ISAF nations do need to act immediately begin to correct the remaining problems and resource shortfalls in the training, mentoring, and partnering effort. At a minimum, they must be ready be the start of 2010 to support and resource NTM-A/ CSTC-A
plans to accelerate current ANSF force expansion plans. At the same time, they need to establish the groundwork for further major expansions of the ANA and ANP by 2014-2016. Recent planning efforts indicate that such an effort might need to double the ANA and ANP, although early success could make full implementation of such plans unnecessary. Making a fully resourced start will ensure that adequate ANSF forces will be available over time, and greatly ease the strain of maintaining and increasing NATO/ISAF forces. Funding such expansion to the ANSF will also be far cheaper than maintaining or increasing NATO/ISAF forces.

At the same time, such force expansion efforts must not race beyond either Afghan or US/NATO/ISAF capabilities. Quality will often be far more important than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important than generating large initial force strengths. US/NATO/ISAF expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable units in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the US/NATO/ISAF can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and sustainability.

The beginning of US withdrawals in mid-2011 is a goal that must be earned, not a deadline to be imposed regardless of actual progress. The US and NATO/ISAF cannot afford to ignore the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real world “friction” that affects force development. Slogans and rhetoric about ideological goals, leadership, and morale cannot be allowed to lead the force development effort to ignore Afghan material realities: problems in pay, corruption, problems in promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor medical care, overstretching or over committing force elements, problems in supporting families, vulnerability to insurgent infiltration and threats, and a lack of meaning compensation for death and disability. The US military and NATO/ISAF have systematically ignored such problems in the past, and understated or lied about their impact.

One needs to be equally careful about how much the US and its allies can saving by moving too fast. It may be conceptually attractive to compare the price of creating Afghan forces to those of deploying US and NATO/ISAF forces. It is certainly clear that the US and NATO/ISAF cannot or will not deploy and sustain the forces necessary to compensate for any failure to expand Afghan forces. It will be a disaster, however, if the real world problems in creating truly effective ANSF partners are not fully addressed and equal attention is not given to correcting these problems. Each problem is a way to lose, and force expansion that fails to solve them cannot be a way to win.

Improvements in the training base are needed that emphasize training at the Kandak and integrated and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of the ANSF can simply be trained and thrust into operations. Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.

Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers take time and require careful attention to continuity at the embedded training/mentoring effort. Partnering and the creation of effective units in the field is an exercise in sustained human relationships, and short tours and rapid changes in US and NATO/ISAF
trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.

Further shifts will be needed in the structure of training and partnering as ANSF forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations.

At this point in time, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and NATO/ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

Worse, both the President and his advisors have claimed that the US is not involved in “nation building” in Afghanistan. This is true only in the sense that the US has not made a commitment to the impossible goals set in ambitious concepts and plans like the Afghan National compact and Afghan Development Plans. The fact is that counterinsurgency must involve armed nation building and the ANSF must play a critical role in the civil and rule of law aspects of “hold” and “build” and in providing enduring security and stability once “transfer” takes place. This will require enduring US and outside aid that funds most ANSF development and operations as long as a major threat remains, as well as similar US aid in developing Afghan governance and enough economic activity and growth to bring suitable levels of employment and economic security. This is “nation building” and efforts to deny are exercises in the semantics of obfuscation and dishonesty.

Furthermore, the ANDSF cannot function as an effective institution unless the US and its allies help develop the capacity of the Afghan government at the central, provincial, district and local levels to use the ANSF effectively, and tie the police development effort to the creation of a function mix of formal and informal justice systems. The US must help the Afghan government both develop the necessary capabilities to plan and manage security within the Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministries. It must help the leadership of every element of the ANSF deal with the problems of corruption, powerbrokers, narco-traffickers, and Taliban infiltration – as well as with the problems of ethnic and sectarian pressures and tensions, and tribalism. No ANSF effort can succeed that does not address the problem of nation building within the Afghan security structure.

The US and NATO/ISAF need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers, and in far too much media reporting, fully seriously. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field. 

**The Afghan National Army (ANA)**

The fact there are problems in Afghan force development should not minimize the impact of recent successes. The training effort is far better funded, manned, and structure than it was up to
the fall of 2007, and partnering has improved – particularly with the Afghan National Army. The ANA has already proven its value in combat. In the near-term, the ANA will play a key role in the shape and clear missions, as well as in the hold mission because the ANP is not yet strong and capable enough to perform the task. The ANA needs to be expanded and fully resourced for its de facto role in the current fight, even while more concerted efforts are made to build an effective ANP for the longer term.

NATO/ISAF and the US must focus in the near-term on building up the ANA to carry out critical counterinsurgency tasks and to *hold* in threatened population areas. At the same time, they must improve the ANP and ANCOP forces so they can provide *hold* capabilities where there is a less serious threat but when, and only when, this is clearly within their current capacity. This effort can only succeed if adequate resources are provided, if adequate time is taken to provide force quality as well as force quantity, and if NATO/ISAF and the US are willing to support the resulting force not only during critical periods of combat, but in phasing it down to a post conflict size that the GIRoA can fund and sustain.

CSTC-A has already begun active efforts to expand ANA forces from an assigned strength of roughly 91,000 to 134,000, and from 117 fielded Kandaks to 179. It is procuring improved equipment and raising the number of Commando Kandaks from 6 to 8. A total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are already capable of leading operations.

A successful US strategy to win the war in Afghanistan – and to create a true host country partner – does, however, require the full – and ruthlessly self-honest and objective – implementation of three additional decisions about the future of the ANA.

**The first decision is to accelerate training and improvements in partnering and force development to ensure the ANA can actually reach nominal effective strength of 134,000 men in 2010, while creating the base that can make future major expansions in the ANSF by 2014. This will mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and in mentors or partner units. Resources to do this well should be identified and committed concurrently. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such as expansion is now needed. If NATO/ISAF is more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to be done both at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.**

**The second decision is to end the shortfall in NATO and ETT mentors, and resources.** There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but CSTC-A reports that the ANA had a need for a minimum of 67 OMLTs plus US trainers in July 2009. However, it had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. American ETTs were also under resourced in the past, though ETTs are being replaced by the “two BCT” concept of providing mentors. The requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of CY2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25. Expert analysis is needed, but it may take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team (changing the two-BCT approach to a three-BCT one) to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new “enablers” like artillery, engineering, C2, medical services, as well as logistics and sustainability.

**The third decision is to create a full operational partnership, focused around the development of the ANA and key elements of the ANP, so that Afghans are a true partner in all NATO/ANSF and US operations and take the lead in joint operations as soon as possible.** It is not enough for NATO/ISAF units to partner with the ANSF. The ANSF must be made a full partner at the command level as well. Afghans should see Afghans taking the lead in the field as soon as practical, and as playing a critical role in shaping all plans and operations as well as in implementing hold and build. This often cannot be done immediately; it must be done as soon as possible. This can be accomplished by embedding a brigade combat team, brigade, or similar force into each echelon of each ANA Corps (which cover the same areas as the ANP regional
commands) to provide the expertise and enablers to carry out joint planning, intelligence, command and control capabilities, fire support, logistic expertise, and other capabilities that the ANA now lacks and can acquire through partnership and joint operations with the US.

There is a fourth critical decision that the US, NATO/ISAF, the Afghan government, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense need to make. It is all very well to use a slogan like “clear, hold, and transferred.” It is quite another to systematically implement it as part of a population centric strategy. No matter how much effort is made to improve the integrity, size, and capability of the various elements of the Afghan police, improve governance at the local level, and create an effective structure for prompt justice – there will be 3 to 5 years in which the ANA must play a critical role in various clear and hold efforts, and in securing build problems by local, aid, and government workers. No effort to make a population centric strategy work – or that relies on hope and rhetoric to make “shape, clear, hold, and build” work without explicit plans that reflect this reality can succeed.

The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC)

The Afghan National Army Air Corps will take time to form as an effective force, although it already is contributing to the COIN fight, and further contributions – particularly lift and medevac – would relieve ISAF of some key requirements. ANAAC development plans must be tailored to Afghan needs and capabilities. There is a clear case for giving the ANSF at least the currently planned mix of air lift, battlefield, mobility, RW attack, IS&R, and multi-role capability. This would expand the ANAAC from a total of 36 aircraft and 2,500 airmen today to 139 aircraft by CY 2016.

The mistakes the US and NATO/ISAF have made in using airpower over the last eight years have shown, however, that there is a broader and more urgent role that the ANAAC can perform. It can develop the skills to support NATO in targeting and managing air operations, and take on responsibility for vetting air strikes and air operations. Such a partnership would do much to assure Afghans that Afghan forces were true partners in all air operations and played the proper role in reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Such a “red card” role presents obvious difficulties, but it will be applied to all NATO/ISAF operations, including ground operations, in time. Working to make it effective now as well as a key partner and part Afghan and NATO/ISAF strategic communications could have major benefits.

The Afghan National Police (ANP)

Improving the various elements of the ANP, while less time critical in terms of direct combat operations, is equally urgent due to the ANP’s central role in performing the hold function in population centers, without which COIN will not succeed. Such improvement, however, presents different challenges than improving the ANA.

The ANP currently suffers from critical problems in capability, leadership, corruption, supporting governance, and the district and local levels of courts, legal services, and detention facilities necessary to implement prompt justice and a rule of law. Most of the ANP also lacks the ability to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. In July 2009, the Afghan Uniformed Police had an authorized strength of 47,000 and 51,000 assigned – although no one had reliable statistics on its actually level of day-t-day strength or levels of attrition.
Strength and capability are also only part of the problem. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

As a result, NATO/ISAF plans raise serious questions as to whether the hold function can be performed with the NATO/ISAF and ANSF resources available, and without a major expansion of and improvement in the ANP. Time is critical because the initial phase of the hold function will require a transition to proving regular policing activity and supporting the prompt administration of justice, and ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the build phase cannot be properly implemented unless the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

There are several areas where NATO/ISAF and the US need to work with the Afghan government at the central, provincial, and local level to shape the future of the ANP:

- **First, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, hold, and build.** NATO/ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

  The Focused District Development (FDD) program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

  No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- **Second, major efforts need to be made to increase the size and quality of the ANP over time.** Current plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is needed to improve the quality of its leadership and facilities. The ANP’s most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for is adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NMA-A, and not under civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP’s main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

  Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in partnering and training than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added PMTs as well. However, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of the police was raised to 160,000 by the end of CY2014.
Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP. These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions. These could build on ANCOP and police cmdno commando cadres. The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the NDS and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.

Fourth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice. The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice -- unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan's informal justice system. The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as much less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

The Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 authorized and 12,800 assigned. Afghanistan will require a competent and sufficient border police function in the future. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create and make effective under counterinsurgency conditions. Afghanistan’s geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement even more difficult than usual, and NATO/ISAF and the ANSF have more urgent priorities.

Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance, reduce corruption, and increase government revenues. These efforts should be complemented by specific technologies, including biometrics and ISR, to the extent feasible.

Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for NATO/ISAF action or additional forces and capabilities. A tightly focused effort could help the Afghan government get substantial revenues from commercial vehicle traffic across the border than are now being lost through corruption. There is no prospect, however, that the ABP can seal the borders or do more in the near-term than harass the insurgency while becoming a source of casualties and more corruption. This is particularly true as long as elements of the Pakistan government and ISI covertly support key elements of the Taliban.

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3)

Tribal and local security forces can play a useful role under carefully selected conditions. The AP3 is a tribal force designed to provide the equivalent of security guards for district-sized areas. (In Afghanistan, there are 364 districts, excluding major urban areas). This force is still in development, and Afghanistan’s tribal and regional differences mean that it may not work in every area and needs to be carefully tailored to local conditions.
The best approach is to use the AP3 model only where it is clear that local Afghan commanders and officials, and local NATO/ISAF commanders, feel this can work. Ensure that the expansion of the AP3 is fully coordinated with Afghan provincial and district officials, local ANSF commanders, and NATO/ISAF regional and task force commanders to limit loyalty problems and tribal friction.

Making NATO/ISAF A Real Partner

NATO/ISAF and the US must follow several “iron laws” for force development in carrying out all these efforts. First, they must pay as much attention to ANSF force quality as to increasing force quantity. They must not create units where there are inadequate mentors, partner units, facilities, equipment, and training capacity. Pay close attention to performance in the field versus formal training and quantified readiness measures. Second, they must properly equip and support ANSF forces or not put them into harm’s way.

Every increase in ANSF force quantity must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of NATO/ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.

NATO/ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

Third, NATO/ISAF and the US must act to give to “partnership” real meaning. All the elements of NATO/ISAF must begin to work together with all of the elements of the ANSF to create equivalent forces that can conduct combined operations together. This will take time, resources, and patience. NATO/ISAF regional command Task force commanders must understand, however, that partnering with ANSF forces does not mean simply using them as they are, but making them effective, and treating operations as key real world aspects of training.

The Need for an Integrated Civil-Military Partnership

The Obama Administration has rejected open-ended nation building, but it will also lose the war if it does not accept the reality that it is involved in armed nation building over a period that may easily last for a decade or more after the US begins nominal force cuts in mid-2011, and that the development of the ANSF must pay as much attention to the civil-military aspects “hold and build” as to clear and transfer.”

It is meaningless to talk about a partnership that does not go beyond simply fighting the insurgency. NATO/ISAF and the ANSF will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective NATO/ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. A mix of NATO/ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, but if this is all that is accomplished they will still lose the war to an opponent that can win a battle of political attrition against an Afghan
government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant, failing to provide basic services, and which is seen as corrupt as well as supporting power brokers rather than the people.

NATO/ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the *hold* and *build* missions. A transition should take place to leadership civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level, but NATO/ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.

They must realize that national elections and democracy do not bring any form of political legitimacy or loyalty without tangible actions, only actions count. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government is too corrupt and incapable to take these necessary actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside civil aid efforts are far too narrow, far too security conscious, and far too oriented towards talk and planning to serve Afghan needs in the field. The ideal is an integrated civil-military effort.

It is also far easier to talk about building the capacity of the civil side of the Afghan government, and reducing corruption and the role of powerbrokers, than to take effective action. If such an effort can be successful, it will probably only begin to have full impact in 2014-2016, In the interim some combination of NATO/ISAF and the ANSF must provide at least enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and takes at least initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. They must provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

The mix and phasing of such efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas. In far too many cases, however, this will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows what aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, actually do win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards true “build” phase.

At the same time, this does not mean that the ANSF can ever be an effective substitute for Afghan civil governance. There must be a parallel effort to reduce the national caveats and restrictions on aid. Corrupt and incapable US and NATO/ISAF aid organizations and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted as well as their Afghan counterparts. Projects that cannot be scaled up to have a meaningful impact, ephemeral good works, fund raising without accountability or validated requirements, and supporting national “branding” rather than meeting Afghan needs, all need to be put to an end. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will win the people.

One key step in this process will again be for the US to look in the mirror rather than simply make complaints about the Afghans and its allies. The US has so far failed dismally to create the kind of truly integrated civil-military plan its needs to implement President Obama’s new strategy. Stovepipes and turf fights, and internal bickering – particularly by elements within the State Department, -- have crippled the effort necessary to create a plan with the depth, detail, and content needed. The Obama Administration needs to force real unity of effort – not simply talk about a whole of government approach – and do so at every level.
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I. Creating the Afghan Forces Needed to Win

President Obama made the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) one of three critical parts of the new strategy he announced on December 1, 2009:

... huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.

... as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

... this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America's war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.

The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

...taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We'll support
Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation -- by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand -- America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

...Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I’ve heard, and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we’re better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.
Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort -- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who -- in discussing our national security -- said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

**Implementing the President’s Strategy**

Like all of the elements of the President’s strategy, creating an ANSF with the necessary capabilities presents major challenges and major risks. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made significant advances during the last few years, but their development had low to moderate priority for nearly half a decade. It was not until 2006-2007 that the ANSF began to have meaningful force goals, and to have adequate NATO/ISAF and US aid in developing its “force quantity.”

The ANSF probably cannot achieve even its current force goals with the required quality by the end of 2010. Critical problems still exist in “force quality” because of a long-standing lack of mentors and partners, equipment, and a lack of the financial support the ANSF needs to grow and become effective. At the same time, these present are probably only about half the level the will eventually by needed to work with NATO/ISAF forces; implement the ISAF/Afghan strategy of “clear, hold, and build, and transfer,” and largely replace US and NATO/ISAF forces by 2014-2016.

The US and its allies also need to be far more realistic about what “transfer” really means. At this point in time, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and NATO/ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

**Yes, It is Armed Nation Building**

President Obama and his advisors have not help by claiming that the US is not involved in “nation building” in Afghanistan. This is true only in the sense that the US has not made a commitment to the impossible goals set in ambitious concepts and plans like the Afghan National compact and Afghan Development Plans. The fact is that counterinsurgency must involve armed nation building and the ANSF must play a critical role in the civil and rule of law aspects of “hold” and “build” and in providing enduring security and stability once “transfer” takes place. This will require enduring US and outside aid that funds most ANSF development and operations as long as a major threat remains, as well as similar US aid in developing Afghan
governance and enough economic activity and growth to bring suitable levels of employment and economic security. This is “nation building” and efforts to deny are exercises in the semantics of obfuscation and dishonesty.

Furthermore, the ANDSF cannot function as an effective institution unless the US and its allies help develop the capacity of the Afghan government at the central, provincial, district and local levels to use the ANSF effectively, and tie the police development effort to the creation of a function mix of formal and informal justice systems. The US must help the Afghan government both develop the necessary capabilities to plan and manage security within the Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministries. It must help the leadership of every element of the ANSF deal with the problems of corruption, powerbrokers, narco-traffickers, and Taliban infiltration – as well as with the problems of ethnic and sectarian pressures and tensions, and tribalism. No ANSF effort can succeed that does not address the problem of nation building within the Afghan security structure.

The US and NATO/ISAF need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers, and in far too much media reporting, fully seriously. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field.\(^7\)

**No Chance of a Second Try: Key Short Comings That Must Be Overcome**

There is no time to waste and there will be no political support for a second try. The insurgency has steadily gained ground for the last half decade, and the war has reached the point of crisis. The Afghan government, NATO/ISAF, and the US cannot win – even in the limited sense of giving Afghanistan reasonable stability and security and ensuring it is not a haven for international terrorist movements – unless this situation changes radically and immediately. An effective ANSF is only one of the elements of any meaningful kind of victory, but it is a critical one. It also involves significant lead times, and placing ANSF development on the right track requires immediate decisions and resources.

The following key shortcomings still cripple the ANSF, and must now be corrected:

- NATO/ISAF efforts that lacked unity of command, and the ability to flexibly apportion both ANSF and ISAF forces across the battlespace;
- Failure to make the ANSF a full partner with the ISAF and to lay the ground work for transfer of lead security responsibility; and
- Lack of effective coordination among the elements of the ANSF.
- Unwillingness among various elements of NATO/ISAF and member countries to directly confront problems with corruption, powerbrokers, criminal elements, and insurgent influence within the Afghan government, and within the leadership of various elements of the ANSF.
- Setting inadequate force goals and force expansion plans that led to lack of sufficient capacity and capability of all types of ANSF, across the theater;
• Lack of clear near-term priorities and timelines for developing the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF required for the current fight extend beyond the ‘near-term’ of 12-24 months;

• Lack of longer term plans to expand and fund/sustain the ANSF for the length of the entire campaign, and help Afghanistan achieve lasting security and stability.

• Sustained mismatch between the force goals that were set and the resources necessary to implement the, including both funding and the provision of adequate trainers, mentors, and partners. Ongoing problems growing out of past failures to set the proper goals for ANSF expansion provide adequate numbers of mentors and partners, and to fund the level of effort required.

• Failure to understand, and properly audit and survey, the motivation of ANSF forces by force element to understand recruiting, performance, motivation, and retention problems; and to properly assess the levels of pay, privileges, leave, medical benefits, death and disability benefits, facilities and equipment necessary to create effective forces on a sustained basis and compete with the Taliban and other insurgents and the pressure from power brokers, narco-traffickers, and other sources of corruption.

• Series of major shifts in the training effort for the ANP involving repeated changes of mission and policing concepts coupled to a failure to prepare police for the reality of counterinsurgency and the Taliban threat, and to tie police development to the creation of a practical approach to the rule of law that could provide a functioning mix of formal, informal, and prompt justice.

• A focus on creating large numbers of battalion sized Kandaks in the ANA with emphasis on quantity over quality, and formal training without effective mentoring and partnering of newly created units; failure to understand that newly formed units require extended training at the whole unit level, and that extended mentoring and partnering of deployed units is critical, or formal training fails to achieve its goals.


The US bears a large share of the responsibility for many of these failures. The US took more than half a decade to fund ANSF development seriously and then funded it erratically and failed to provide the proper numbers of trainers, mentors, and partners.

One of the most critical problems was chronic underresourcing. Critics of today’s ANSF and the training effort should look carefully at the data in Figure I.1. The US failed to make creating effective Afghan forces a serious goal until FY2007, and this funding must be put in the context that funding can take 12-18 months to have an impact in the field – which meant it only began to have a fully impact in mid to late CY2008.

As Figure I.1 shows, the US then failed to fund the level of post-2007 effort necessary to sustain a major force expansion. According to the Department of Defense, (FY) 2008 funding levels totaled $2.75 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA, $964 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. It then dropped to $2 billion in FY2009, although the ANA force goal was being raised to 134,000.vi

It is only since FY2007 that the US has found itself making massive expenditures it might well have avoided if it had ever taken ANSF development seriously in the first place. As is noted by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction,vii

Since FY 2005, almost $18.67 billion has been made available to the ASFF.13 This accounts for approximately 47.5% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. This amount includes the nearly $3.61 billion provided in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act signed by the U.S.
President on June 24, 2009. As of September 30, 2009, over $17.30 billion has been obligated, with nearly $16.58 billion of that amount disbursed...

As of September 30, 2009, a total of $16.58 billion has been disbursed. Of this amount, $10.75 billion (64.85%) was disbursed for the ANA, $5.76 billion (34.73%) for the ANP, and the remaining $0.07 billion (0.42%) focused on related activities... the majority of funds for the ANA have been disbursed for Equipment and Transportation ($4.43 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts ($2.81 billion). The majority of funds for the ANP have been disbursed for Infrastructure ($1.59 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts ($1.55 billion).

A comparison of Figure I.1 and Figure I.2 shows that the US and its allies failed to tie ANSF force levels and force goals to funding through early CY2009 – although the following analysis shows that significant improvements took place after early CY2008. Figure I.3 shows that these mistakes were coupled to similar delays in deploying adequate trainers and mentors through early CY2009. As a Department of Defense report noted at the beginning of 2009:

As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.

The U.S. is actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. For example, Illinois Army National Guardsmen support a Polish battle group, a Latvian OMLT will deploy with 11 members from the Michigan Army National Guard, and Ohio Army National Guardsmen are deploying with a Hungarian OMLT.

... The eventual ANP training and mentoring objective is to send a PMT to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. Currently, the broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to meet this objective. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, 5 regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned (37 percent fill). The shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring.

As the following chapters show, this has improved during the course of 2009, but the problems involved still need to be corrected more than eight years after the beginning of the conflict.

It is also important to understand the human cost of these developments, and how the lack of adequate pay and privileges, medical and disability benefits, death benefits, facilities and equipment, has impacted on Afghan forces. There are no public data on surveys of the attitudes of given elements of the ANSF, the impact of pay problems that left them less well-paid than the Taliban and were only recognized in later 2009, or the scale of retention problems that have crippled much of the force development and made some NASTO/ISAF readiness ratings little more than statistical nonsense.

These issues emerge all too clearly in media reporting, however, and in private mails from forces serving in the field. They also are all too clear when one examines the patterns in casualties over time. Figure I.4 shows the rise in attacks on the ANSF during 200-7-2009. Figure I.5 shows the patterns in casualties that resulted from underresourcing, undertraining, underequipping and underpartnering Afghan forces.
It is no coincidence that casualties were highest in the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the force that had the least resources and where the following chapters show the US and NATO/ISAF made critical mistakes in virtually every aspect of ANP force development. In fairness, no one attempt to create an ANSF that would be so vulnerable. Nevertheless, that was the end result. As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said in an interview of December 8, 2009, “Attrition is higher in the areas where combat is heavier. The reason is that there aren’t enough of them. And they basically fight until they die, or the go AWOL.” When he was asked if it wasn’t late in the game to learn these facts about the ANSF, Gates replied that, “There’s a lot of this that is late in the game, frankly.”
Figure I.1: No Real Funding Until FY2007 – Part One

Congressional Research Service Estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09 Bridge</th>
<th>Cum FY01-FY09</th>
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<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>5.54</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>*6.99</td>
<td>*4.92</td>
<td>*12.95</td>
<td>*5.75</td>
<td>*3</td>
<td>*38.95</td>
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Figure I.1: No Real Funding Until FY2007 – Part Two

SIGAR Estimates


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Governance/Development</th>
<th>Counter-Narcotics</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Oversight and Operations</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>$1.01</td>
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<td>$3.50</td>
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<td>$3.50</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>$3.50</td>
<td>$10.08</td>
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<td>$3.50</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$1.03</td>
<td>$1.01</td>
<td>$2.60</td>
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<td>$2.60</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
<td>$10.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. SIGAR funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Figure I.2: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANASF Force Level, Goals, and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008

Figure I.3: Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement Through Early 2009:

Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors:

Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:

Figure 1.4 The Rise in Attacks on the ANSF Sharply Outpaced the Force Development Effort

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, June 2009 pp. 55,
Figure I.5: Killing the Underresourced and Underprepared: Comparative Patterns in ISAF and Afghan Casualties

Casualty Patterns 2007-2009:

- Comparing Jan-May ‘09 to the same time period in 2008:
  - Total military deaths were up 37%
  - ANSF deaths were up 33%
  - ISAF deaths were up 62%

Coalition, ANP, and ANA Killed in Action: October 2008-May 2009

Source: NATO-JOISS Database

These failures to resource ANSF development and force goals, and to provide the proper numbers of trainers and mentors, were compounded further mistakes that still haunt ANSF force development, and for which the US must bear primary responsibility:

- **Failure to try to seriously create Afghan forces that could be real partners to the US and NATO/ISAF, and eventually replace the US and NATO/ISAF in an extended insurgency that would require strong national security forces for a decade or more.** The US waited six years to take the force development effort seriously, and then focused on rushing newly created small combat units – Kandaks of battalion size – into the field. It was not until the summer of 2009 that the US seriously addressed what partnering really meant, began to set goals for creating the kind of higher level joint headquarters and operations that could truly make Afghan military and police forces real partners, and lay the ground work for the eventual transfer of most military and paramilitary functions to Afghan forces.

- **False training standards:** Afghan and contractor rated training often granted virtually all those in training a passing grade regardless of actual competence and performance.

- **Promotion and positions were often sold, the result of political influence, or the result of sect and ethnic group without active and systematic resistance by the US and NATO/ISAF officers.** These problems were compounded by a failure to systematically resist corruption, the influence of power brokers, ties to narco-traffickers and criminals, and links to insurgents at political and higher command levels; and by an inadequate effort to improve the capacity and integrity of key Ministries like the Ministry of Interior, and Afghan officials at the provincial, district, and urban levels.

- **Lack of entire unit training:** These problems have been compounded by a failure to provide adequate training for the entire newly formed Kandak or unit. The trained parts are assembled without adequate training of the entire force element -- a direct contrast to the key lessons of the importance of full unit training – even for mature forces – in places like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin.

- **Failure to see that mentoring and partnering was the critical phase.** It has only been in the course of 2009 that the US has focused on the fact that newly created, entire units, get their primary training and combat capability after they leave the formal training center and go into the field. The tacit assumption – or at least de facto experience – has been that the Afghans are already “fighters” and that newly formed units can be treated as something close to mature, functioning units, rather than units that require at least a year of embedded mentoring and close partnering to develop the proven leadership and core competence needed. This approach often proved to under resource mentoring and partnering, create major problems for new units, and encourage serious and rapid attrition.

- **Lack of honest assessment of readiness in the field – and of the impact of overdeployment, erratic leave policies, and inadequate pay and support – on real world readiness.** Key problems developed in leadership, motivation, and retention that were understated or ignored through late 2009. It was only in the summer of 2009 that a systematic effort began to look beyond vague concepts like motivation and morale to examine Afghan perceptions of the problems shaping Afghan force readiness and critical retention problems. It took years to raise ANP salaries to levels that could make anything approaching an honesty police force possible, and more than half a decade top introduce pay systems that help ensure that those serving were actually paid and that reduced abuses like “ghost” soldiers that were not actually present. It was only in December 2009 that the US announced that it had found that the ANSF was sharply underpaid relative to the Taliban and other insurgents. An effort under Lt. General William B. Caldwell found that ANP soldiers were then being paid $180 per month versus $250-$300 a month.5

- **Failure to understand the linkage between police development and the combined needs of a society dependent on an informal justice system capable of promptly resolving civil disputes and preventing local and tribal violence, and the need for police forces that had sufficient paramilitary capability to survive in an insurgency.** The police and rule of law efforts remained large decoupled through early CY2009.

- **US did not take the police training effort seriously for at least five critical years during the rise of the insurgency.** It attempted to export responsibility. The training effort was turned over to an underresourced and terribly managed German effort that focused on training European-style police officers for a country that had very different needs and resources. When the US finally did react, the program was
effectively transferred to an underresourced, US-run, State Department system that was over-dependent on contract support and also sought to create conventional police that could not survive in the emerging insurgency. It was not until 2007 that that police began to get effective paramilitary training from the US military, and the training effort remained underresourced and secondary to the Afghan Army effort through early 2009.

- **US continued to treat ANSF development as if the key goal was the tactical defeat of the insurgency rather than securing population centers, and denying the enemy control and influence over the Afghan population.** Even today, American commanders and strategists talk about “clear, hold, build, and transfer” without a real definition of what this means, much less any public and credible plan for shaping ANSF development to perform the necessary civil-military functions in the “hold” and “build” phases.

- **Unrealistic emphasis on border security efforts.** As was the case in Iraq, far too much emphasis was placed on trying to create border and port of entry forces that could not credibly cover the areas required, did not have the firepower and mobility required, and were subject to constant Taliban and hostile threats and pressure, and vulnerable to bribes and corruption. These problems were further compounded by the fact that Pakistan was often treated as if it would be a reliable partner in such efforts when US experts clearly knew this was not, and would not, be the case.

- **US never effectively exercised its de facto leadership role in the alliance to develop a coordinated NATO/ISAF/PRT effort.** In practice, much of the ANSF development and deployment effort has put Afghan military and police forces in the field under conditions where each leading country uses Afghan forces somewhat differently, and where the lack of any standard for the operation of national NATO/ISAF forces – coupled to a lack of any standard for coordination of such forces with related PRTs – has left deployed ANSF forces without an effective NATO/ISAF partner.

- **Failure to ensure proper continuity and management of the partnering effort.** These problems were compounded in the field at every level by the rapid rotation of US and ISAF forces and aid workers, a lack of continuity of effort, a failure to prepare and rate commanders properly on partnering, and erratic handoff or transfer of this function during the rotation of field commanders and combat units.

- **Having trainers rate their own success, and inadequate and inaccurate rating systems.** The US should have learned from the battle of Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith, that trainers should not be allowed to rate those they train without independent verification. Unit readiness and performance need to independently validated. More broadly, however, the US has developed a statistically-based rating system in both Iraq and Afghanistan that is useful in providing some key indicators, but not in measuring actual levels of combat performance, loyalty, quality of leadership, and the impact of key problems like attrition. This had led to the sharp over rating of army units as being truly “in the lead.”

- **Unwillingness to deal with the reality of corruption and power brokering:** The US was extremely slow to make serious efforts to deal with the complex impact of corruption and power brokering that affects ANSF development, operations, and force allocation at many levels – particularly the police. It often complained, but rarely acted decisively. It did not set a clear and predictable set of ground rules and behavior as to outing the incompetent and corrupt, dealing with powerbroker interference, and making anti-corruption efforts effective. It was only in the summer of 2009 that that police began to address these issues, and how to allocate resources in ways that reward honest and effective performance and deny aid, contracts, and US support to the ineffective and corrupt. It is still unclear this will lead to effective and sustained US action that will support ANSF development.

- **Delays in realistic assessment of manning, quality of facilities, adequacy of pay and privileges, and other key factors affecting attrition and combat performance.** The US has been remarkably slow to act on past lessons and constantly evaluate the reasons for attrition, actual levels of Afghan morale and motivation, and the real world adequacy of key factors like pay, privileges, facilities, medical care, leave, retirement, and death and disability benefits. Efforts to establish effective systems are still a work in progress.

- **Uncertain selection and career paths for US trainers and mentors:** The US was slow to properly train the trainers, mentors, and partners; and it is still not clear whether playing this role will put the US officers involved on the kind of competitive career track they deserve.

**Facing the US Threat to the ANSF**

These US mistakes do not mean that the Afghan’s do not have equal of greater responsibility for their problems, or that Afghan leaders and commanders can be excused from taking full
responsibility for ANSF development over time. They do mean that future US efforts must take responsibility for years in which the US failed to act as if Afghanistan faces a serious and growing insurgency; under resourcing every aspect of the war in ways that allowed the insurgents to take the initiative. In the case of the US, many of the failures in today’s ANSF are the product of a critical half-decade in which the White House, OMB, and OSD cut back on requests from US commanders and ambassadors, and essentially had no meaningful strategy for Afghanistan.
II. Current ANSF Force Goals: Improving Both Quality and Quantity

President Obama did not announce any changes in the force goals for the ANSF described in Figure II.1, and which the Department of defense described as follows in the spring of 2009:\textsuperscript{xii}

The ANA will reach its objective of 134,000 personnel by the end of 2011 if required resources are provided. The 134,000-man force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as a commensurate increase in institutional support.

The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of at least 86,800 personnel. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. Development of existing ANP forces continues at a slow pace because of the shortage of Police Mentor Teams.

The MoI is instituting the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) as a pilot initiative in Wardak province. As of March 2009, the AP3 comprises 243 candidates and empowers and encourages local community leaders and communities to take responsibility for their own security.

It is virtually certain, however, that major change will be needed before 2011 and during the years that follow. It is equally certain that the pattern of Afghan deployments shown in Figure II.2 will have to be changed to put far more Afghan forces into the areas where they will face serious threats and fighting. This means resources need to be committed quickly both to solve key problems in quality and to lay the groundwork for a larger expansion of the ANSF after 2010. If the US and other NATO/ISAF forces are to make even token withdrawals beginning in mid 2011, time is critical in making the ANSF ready for large-scale transfers of responsibility.
**Figure II.1 Size and Current Force Goals for the ANSF**

**Force Levels and Goals in June 2009 (DoD)**

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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Date Complete</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Forces</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD/GS</td>
<td>3,246</td>
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<td>Sep 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustaining Institutions</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>Jun 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>15,484</td>
<td>15,048</td>
<td>Jun 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainee Operations</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Infantry Kandak</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Combat Forces</td>
<td>66,406</td>
<td>53,417</td>
<td>Jun 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Air Corps</td>
<td>3,412</td>
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<td>Jun 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL MoD</td>
<td>103,475</td>
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<td>Ministry of Interior Forces</td>
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<td>MoI Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs Police</td>
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<td>Uniformed Police</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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**Force Goals in September 2009 (SIGIR)**

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<tr>
<th>ANDS Security Pillar</th>
<th>ANDS Target</th>
<th>Updated Target (by September 2010)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>ANDS Completion Date</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>80,000 troops (plus 6,000 in training)</td>
<td>134,000 troops</td>
<td>93,000 troops</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>82,180 professional policemen</td>
<td>109,000 professional policemen (by September 2010)</td>
<td>81,000 professional policemen</td>
<td>End of 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups: All illegal armed groups disbanded in all provinces; 84 of 119 targeted districts declared disabled. March 20, 2011.
- Removing Unexploded Ordnance: Land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance reduced by 70%. 90% of all known mine- or explosive remnants of war (ERW)-contaminated area destroyed. All mines and personal mines disposed. ANDS Update: 25% of target area cleared. DoD: 1.79 billion square meters cleared; 690 million square meters remain. 2012 and 2013.
- Counter Narcotics: Areas under poppy cultivation reduced by half compared with 2007 levels. Areas under poppy cultivation reduced by 36% compared with 2007 levels. 2013.

Figure II.2: Afghan Force Deployments
Building the Force

Given the lead times involved, this means planning must begin now to create larger Afghan forces even if most of 2010 must be spent on solving the problems in meeting existing force goals. Discussions with the US-led advisory team in CSTC-A, and NATO/ISAF advisors, show that key elements of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) need to be accelerated and better resourced to carry out the currently planned expansion at the new pace required.

Equally important, the current ANSF expansion plans are simply not adequate to meet these challenges of the COIN fight. No one can visit Afghanistan without learning that NATO/ISAF commanders at every level express agree on the need for such action: there are too few ANSF forces in their areas to accomplish the mission; and the proposed timelines for fielding additional ANSF to their areas are too slow.

They also agree, however, that this involves more than numbers. The Ministries of Defense and Ministries of Interior are not able to manage the level of force development required. There are critical leadership and attrition problems. The capabilities of current ANSF forces, particularly the ANP and ABP, are inadequate. And, some of the ANSF, particularly the ANP and ABP, are riddled with corruption which leads to popular alienation as well as ineffectiveness.

This means that both larger and higher quality Afghan forces will be needed if any “population-centric” strategy is to work – particularly if NATO/ISAF and US allied forces are to decline after mid-2001. As ISAF and ANSF forces clear key population centers, Afghan forces must assume the task of keeping these centers cleared (hold) and to performing the mix of COIN and regular policing activity necessary for hold and build. It is the ANSF, working with local Afghan officials, that will ultimately give the critical hold and build phases of NATO/ISAF strategy effectiveness and win popular support.

“Zero-Basing” ANSF Funding Profiles

One key step will be to carry out a “zero-based” review of both the best ways to increasing force quantity and force quality, and of the funding need to both create the proper ANSF forces, and then to sustain them as long as Afghanistan must fight a major insurgency. There is no near to mid-term prospect that Afghanistan can support the ANSF it needs to deal with the present threat, and any effort to do so would cripple the expansion of government services and efforts to make the present economy function.

As Chapter I has shown, the ANSF force development is now receiving better funding for the ANSF, although the force development’s budgeting and accounting capabilities remain understaffed and somewhat uncertain. Figure II.3 shows that ANSF will receive some $5.6 billion in FY2009 and $7.4 billion in FY2010, as summarized below, and the recent disbursement patterns have made significant improvements. Funding even the present ANSF, however, still presents serious problems. DoD reported in its report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan in June 2009 that,\textsuperscript{xi}
$4.0 million for the Related Activities. An additional $3.6 billion has been requested in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriation. ANSF development efforts are conditions-based; therefore it is not possible to provide a reliable estimate of a long-term ANSF budget.

Until the beginning of 2009, the NATO ANA Trust Fund was used only for ANSF development costs, which included fielding, equipping, and shipping of donated equipment. In March 2009 NATO approved the expansion of the ANA trust fund to cover ANA sustainment costs to allow non-NATO countries to contribute. The expectation is that the expansion of the trust fund will encourage increased international contributions for ANSF sustainment; however, as of April 2009, contributions have been limited.

…The ANA will reach its current objective of 134,000 forces by December 2011. The United States will take the lead in supporting the expansion by providing funds for the initial training and equipping of new ANA units. CSTC-A has requested $589 million in supplemental funds in order to build the first eight kandaks of the new force structure in FY 2009. Because of the limited amount of equipment immediately available for accelerated fielding, these kandaks will initially receive only 40 percent of the standard infantry kandak transport capabilities. The new kandaks will be used to provide security along the Ring Road. The long-term final end-strength for the ANA is conditions-based and may increase in the future.

No Current Estimate of Force Quantity, Its Costs, or the Cost of Fixing Force Quality

There has been only limited public reporting of the future force goals for the ANSF, or the cost of giving them the right size and quality since the President’s speech. Senior officials have said that these goals, and the exact costs of the changes necessary to implement the strategy the President announced on December 2nd are still being examined. They have also said that the goals for each element of the ANSF are now to be regularly reexamined and adjusted on the basis of progress over time.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, followed up the President’s address with the following comments in an interview on December 2, 2009,

So we train the Afghan security forces to take the lead and take responsibility for their own security and achieving a stable country. That’s not going to happen overnight. We know that, And, it isn’t going to happen instantly al across the country. That’s the main focus. We move from a lead to a, if you will, side-by-side. And then, they will take the lead tactically, and then we go into an overwatch kind of situation, not unlike we are in Iraq right now. An then we are able to have those combat forces depart.

...we had focus on developing Afghan forces for some time. But not unlike the combat forces, it just had not been resourced. This resources that effort...So we had a few months ago, the first full brigade – the fourth and the 82nd – go into exclusively conduct a training missions. We’ve got another brigade in this 30,000 that is focused exclusively on that. So we recognize we have to accelerate it. This is a high risk part of the strategy, we know that....And its a much higher risk with the police, as it was in Iraq, than it is with the army

...One of the questions I got today on the Hill is, ‘How do you know this is going to work? What lessons have we learned?’ ...we need good leaders in the Afghan security forces. That it really doesn’t turn until we have leadership at the non-commissioned officer level in the police as well as the army. And, that we need leaders at the mid-grade and senior officer level. That’s probably the long pole in the tent. They got to be equipped.

The armies – they are good fighters. They want to get this right. The challenge – probably the greatest challenge – we have is in the police and in the corruption that has existed there. Now we’ve got a minister – a government and a minister very dedicated to rooting out this corruption. We also know that this is going to take some time.

...In addition, General McChrystal will focus on raising up...security in local villages. Now, there’s a very delicate balance here, because we’re not to go back to the warlord years. But that’s a very – historically that’s a very strong part of Afghan security...
It is clear that they will not be cheap. It is also clear that both the appropriation of future funds, and actual disbursements, cannot be allowed to lag behind the demands imposed by a steadily intensifying conflict. If doubling the force does become an objective, this means massive increases in cost, although the size of these increases will depend heavily on the exact rate of force expansion, standards for force quality, and a host of other factors that will be shaped by how successful the ANSF development effort proves to be in the future, as well as by the need to begin transferring more responsibility to the ANSF beginning in July 2011.

As a guesstimate, the range could be an increase from the present $5.6 billion to some $9 billion to $13 billion a year – but this is truly a guesstimate, and was only in December 2009 – after President Obama’s speech -- that a honest discussion of the issue even began. President Karzai warned on December 8, 2009 that Afghanistan would not be able to pay for its own security until at least 2024 in a joint press conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Karzai noted that, “Afghanistan is looking forward to taking on our own responsibilities in terms of paying for its forces with its own resources, but...For another 15 to 20 years, Afghanistan will not be able to sustain a force of that nature and capability with its own resources.”

Gates responded by stating that the US had a tentative goal to increase the Afghan army to 134,000 soldiers at the end of 2010, with an ultimate size of 240,000, and that, “there is realism on our part that it will be some time” (before Afghan security forces can stand on their own.). He also described the development and resourcing of the ANSF in an interview that day in ways that made it clear that the US now was planning ANSF development on a step-by-step basis and had no clear way to predict is size or future cost,

There are a couple of problems that need to be addressed. One is we have found that they—the army and the police in Afghanistan are actually more poorly paid than the Taliban they're fighting, of all things. And so one thing we can address almost immediately is increasing the pay of the police and the army. One of the problems that we've had and that they've had is that, particularly those that are sent in to areas where there's a lot of combat, there aren't enough of them to rotate. And so they basically are sent there to fight until they either desert or are killed or wounded.

There is a couple of problems that need to be addressed. One is we have found that they—the army and the police in Afghanistan are actually more poorly paid than the Taliban they're fighting, of all things. And so one thing we can address almost immediately is increasing the pay of the police and the army. One of the problems that we've had and that they've had is that, particularly those that are sent in to areas where there's a lot of combat, there aren't enough of them to rotate. And so they basically are sent there to fight until they either desert or are killed or wounded.

LAUER: But is that 400,000 number realistic? Can you accomplish that in two years?

GATES: Well, I think what the president has said--you know, maybe that's an aspirational goal, but what we need are annual goals. So the goal for the army is to go from about 96,000 right now to 134,000 at the end of 2010. So let's get to 134,000 instead of looking immediately to the 240,000 ultimate size of the army or that people have talked about and General McChrystal has talked about. Let's talk about getting to 134,000 first.

... In terms of lighting a fire under the Afghan government to get them to start getting the size forces they need and getting them trained and getting them into the field, I don't know a better way to do that than what we have. By the same token, in terms of an assertion, of providing confidence of our commitment, I think that the conditions-based way of approaching the drawdowns after July 2011 is also exactly the right way.

Lt. General David Petraeus provided a rough estimate of $10 billion a year or more for Afghan force development in testimony the next day to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and made it clear that it would be years before the ANSF “can handle the bulk of the security tasks and allow the bulk of our troopers to redeploy,” and that they would, “require substantial international funding for years to come in a host of different areas, not the least of which is their security forces.”
What is clear is that the Afghan government has no near to mid-term capability to pay these costs, they will need to be sustained for some five to ten years, and allied contributions will be limited at best. It is also clear that Afghan economic development is not likely to increase government revenues to the point where Afghanistan can pay for the forces it needs as long as they must be large enough to deal with a serious threat, either in the form of an active insurgency or a potential return of Taliban forces from across the Pakistani border. As a result, the US will probably have to pay most of the costs for the ANSF through at least 2020.
Figure II.3: Recent Disbursements for the ANSF

**Current Funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2009</th>
<th>FY 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>$4,023.9M</td>
<td>$4,702.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>$1,513.6M</td>
<td>$2,752.9M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
<td>$69.3M</td>
<td>$7.4M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,606.8M</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,462.7M</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recent Disbursements**

**ASFF Disbursements for the ANA**

By Sub-Activity Group, FY 2005–September 2009 ($ billions)

![Pie chart for ANA disbursements]

**ASFF Disbursements for the ANP**

By Sub-Activity Group, FY 2005–September 2009 ($ billions)

![Pie chart for ANP disbursements]

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. Numbers are as of September 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/9/2009.

Dealing With the Problems of Afghan Corruption and Power Brokering

Getting the proper support from the US and NATO/ISAF countries is only part of the challenge. The problems in the ANSF have been -- and are -- compounded by failures in the Afghan government, although there are many competent Afghan officials and officers. Corruption and the lack of capacity in the GIRoA have created critical problems in developing and employing the ANSF, particularly the ANP and ABP.

Corruption in the ANSF is widespread. The DoD Inspector General’s office described the scale of the problem in September 2009:

“Lack of accountability for funds, equipment, and personal actions remains problematic throughout the ANSF. Inspectors General and Internal Affairs personnel ranging from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, to ANA Corps and ANP Regional commands reported what they described as substantiated cases of corruption that resulted in little, if any, disciplinary action. Equipment has been consistently damaged, lost or diverted to other uses through noncombat actions without any systematic process to hold ANSF personnel accountable, when appropriate. Processes and procedures were generally not established to be able to determine individual accountability for equipment. Those accountability processes and procedures in place were generally ineffective or not followed.”

It is not enough to create Afghan forces that are effective in combat. NATO/ISAF and the US will have to build capacity and integrity in the GIRoA, and especially in the Ministry of Defense, ministry of the Interior, and justice system. Afghan people must perceive the ANSF as legitimate and trustworthy if it is to be effective in the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ missions. Corruption and the perception of corruption in both the Afghan government and the ANSF -- particularly in the ANP -- has shaken popular confidence and affected the Afghan people’s decisions about their ability to trust Afghan forces. Worse, the broader corruption and influence peddling in the Afghan government, partly the central government, has reached the point where it often interferes in the leadership, deployment, and use of Afghan forces in ways that sharply undermine their effectiveness and discredit them from the outside.

Fortunately, the Ministry of defense has emerged as relatively honest and effective, the Ministry of Interior has improved with time, and there are many honest and competent Afghan officers and officials at every level. NATO/ISAF and US must work with them directly to ensure that corruption and power brokers cease to present major problems in shaping the ANSF and in its operations. Failed and corrupt officials and officers need to be removed, bypassed, isolated, and deprived of all NATO/ISAF and US funds and support. In contrast, NATO/ISAF and the US need to work closely with honest officials and officers in ways that are transparent and that the Afghan people see provide lasting security, create a climate that helps provide prompt justice, and creates civil-military programs to meet their economic needs -- rather than simply uses the ANSF as a fighting force.

True Partnership: The Need for a Moral and Ethical Approach to Afghan Force Development

NATO/ISAF and the US face equally serious challenges in shaping the ways Afghan forces are used. The expansion of Afghan forces will involve experiments in training cycles, force expansion, and partnering as substitutes for military experience that are high risk efforts and will need to be constantly evaluated and recalibrated.

Such efforts have a moral and ethical dimension as well as a military one. Afghan forces must not be rushed into the field in ways where NATO/ISAF and the US sacrifice Afghan soldiers and
policemen in the interest of victory, or ask them to take unreasonable risks that NATO/ISAF and US forces will not take. It is one thing to push the development of Afghan forces in the face of a military crisis. It is another to overstretch them, rush them into service, and use them up.

Current optempos for the ANSF, -- including developing and fielding a force while simultaneously fighting an insurgency -- has left little room for forces, particularly the ANA, to maintain a balanced cycle of combat, training and leave time. They need to be put on such a cycle even as some aspects of the training process are accelerated. If continued without respite, that optempo is likely to exhaust the force; to have a deleterious impact on retention; and to allow no room for the critical additional training required.
III. Creating a Strategic Partnership

NATO/ISAF and the US cannot succeed in developing the ANSF in the ways required unless they meet two tests.

- First, every aspect of force development must be tied to clear demands that the ANSF serve the nation and the Afghan people in ways that minimize corruption, power brokering, the interests of given national and regional leaders, and tie the aid and force development efforts to commanders and the use of the ANSF to valid military requirements. It must be clear to Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers at every level that they will be pushed out of their positions, bypassed, or blacklisted when they serve their own interests and not those of the nation.

  It will be particularly critical to expand every element of ANSF forces at an Afghan pace that will produce adequate numbers of properly trained officers and NCOs, to ensure that those who prove competent are promoted and put in key command positions, and to remove those who are not competent, corrupt, or that respond to informal power brokers and political favoritism.

- Second, the standard for force development must be that NATO/ISAF and the US accelerate force development with adequate funds, mentors, and partners, in ways that limit casualties and the strain on Afghans to levels approaching those that allied forces face. Short term tactical expediency is not a substitute for real and lasting partnership, or using up Afghans as a substitute for coalition forces.

  As has been mentioned earlier, NATO/ISAF and the US must also look beyond the short-term needs of force expansion and the shape and clear phase of the fight. It must develop plans to make the ANSF a force that can independently defend the nation, and to deal with probable force cuts once the insurgency is defeated.

Both of these requirements seem to be fully understood by NATO/ISAF and US officials, commanders, and advisors in Afghanistan. It is far less clear that capitols have the same understanding of these priorities or are presently prepared to act and set the proper standards for action. Everyone involved in the ANSF development effort must understand that more resources and more realistic force goals will not be enough unless the ANSF is made a true partner in every NATO/ISAF and US operation.

Far too often, the ANSF has been an auxiliary rather been a true partner. One Canadian OMLT member observed that,

  “as soon as one of your Coalition colleagues started talking about “putting an Afghan face on the operation,” you knew that meant that rather than engage in the frustrating process of ANA skills development involved in mounting a joint operation . . . they were going to grab a couple ANP officers from somewhere at the last minute and throw them on the helicopter to meet the ISAF Conop requirements. The gap in understanding between Afghans and Coalition was seen as simply too wide to rely on them in battle. And mentors, forced to fall back on personal diplomacy in the absence of any other leverage, were unable to bridge the gaps.”

Mentors for ANA units are clearly necessary for the ANA development mission. Yet they are not sufficient. ANA units need to be partnered with ISAF units and need to truly work with them on operations. Too often, the attitude among ISAF officers is that the ANA are the mentor’s ‘problem,’ and mentors are used as an excuse to avoid contact with the relatively unreliable ANA. General McChrystal appeared to be well aware of this problem, making one of the pillars of his strategy to “Improve effectiveness through greater partnering with ANSF. We will increase the size and accelerate the growth of the ANSF, with a radically improved partnership at every level, to improve effectiveness and prepare them to take the lead in security operations.”
Correcting Key Shortfalls in the NATO/ISAF and US Effort

More resources and reforms in the NATO/ISAF and US approach to ANSF force development will only be effective, however, if they result in key changes in the way ANSF force development is supported. This requires a far more integrated effort. It requires one that clearly separates the training mission that provides training for Afghan officers, NCOs, and enlisted men from the mentoring and partnering effort necessary to make them an effective fighting unit in the field. It requires all of the coalition countries involved to actually develop and resource a coordinated effort.

An effective force development effort requires transparency and honesty. There is a tendency among US and ISAF/Coalition personnel to over-estimate the capabilities of their soldiers. This tendency was also observed among US officers training the Iraqi Army, and is likely due to a number of factors, from loyalty to those being mentored, to a desire to demonstrate progress. For instance, reports indicate that some ANA units rated Capability Milestone 1 (CM1) had not received field training as a full unit. Units rated CM1 are supposed to be able to conduct independent operations with only liaison and air support or other support elements from ISAF forces. While this practice appears to have stopped, giving a unit the highest capability rating before it has ever been trained together as a full unit is clearly inaccurate.

Even when a unit is given a chance to operate in the field before receiving its CM rating, its capabilities may still be ‘spun’ to a higher rating than it deserves. One Canadian OMLT member observed a number of serious shortcomings in the ANA brigade he was mentoring, only to have it declared CM1, the highest rating possible. These observations make a sharp contrast with the official requirements for a CM1 rating in Figure III.4.
Figure III.4: CM1 rating requirements versus observations from OMLT member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM 1 Criteria</th>
<th>S2 Mentor’s Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop humint sources and fuse humint into operations</td>
<td>Limited (personal sources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide situational understanding of the enemy to higher, lower, own HQs</td>
<td>Limited (no plotting/analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide reasonably accurate understanding of enemy capabilities</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track historical and background information on threats within their sector</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine threat patterns and trends</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ and manage the brigade recce company effectively</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide intelligence to enable ops through IPB</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop enemy COAs as part of planning</td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct intelligence gathering from detainees</td>
<td>Not effective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Fully Staffing the Training and Mentoring Base**

Fully staff the training and mentoring base with qualified and motivated personnel will be critical. NATO/ISAF cannot afford to embark on force expansions that are not properly supported by qualified trainers and mentors, as well as adequate facilities. While current reporting is lacking, and no plans to expand Afghan forces have yet been announced, report as of June 2009 showed that NATO/ISAF and US mentors and partners still feel far short of meeting even current existing requirements.

**Shortfalls in ANA Trainers**

As of June 2009, only 2,928 of CSTC-A’s total combined ETT/PMT/OMLT requirement of 5,668 (51%) personnel was filled. CSTC-A provided the following summary of shortages in the mentoring effort of Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams or OMLTs in June 2009:

According to NATO requirements, 67 OMLTs are currently required
- 56 OMLTs on the ground, 46 validated
- Confirmed offers –13
- Unofficial offers -5

Projected Status –End of CY 2009
- NATO requirement –75
- CSTC-A projection –62 OMLTs on the ground
- Deficit will be 13

Projected Status –End of CY 2010
- NATO requirement –91
- CSTC-A projection –66 OMLTs on the ground
- Deficit will be 25

Shortfalls in ANP Trainers
There were even more serious problems in providing adequate trainers and mentors for the Afghan police. CSTC-A provided the following summary of shortages in the mentoring effort of Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams or POMLTs in June 2009:

CSTC-A is requesting that NATO provide 38 POMLTs by end of CY 2009
- 14 POMLTs on the ground
- Confirmed offers -10
- Unofficial offers -8

Projected Requirements –End of CY 2010
- 98 additional POMLTs

Projected Requirements –End of CY 2011
- 46 additional POMLTs

CSTC-A is requesting that NATO provide 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY 2011

The Impact of Such Shortfalls
Any continuation of such personnel shortages will be crippling to the CSTC-A mission and affects virtually every aspect of ANSF development. The DoD IG found numerous examples of personnel shortages affecting the training and mentoring mission:

ARSIC-S reported that its operations have been stressed by the lack of personnel resources. For example, the minimum force protection requirement for movement off of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) by an ETT to conduct an outreach operation is nine personnel. However, some teams are comprised of as few as four soldiers.

Because of this, some ANA units in outlying FOBs in ARSIC-S have not received the ETT mentoring support required. Those FOBs were visited whenever possible, but the ETTs could not provide the overwatch actually needed.

In ARSIC-E, ETTs are at less than 50 percent strength, staffed with four to six personnel, far short of the required 16. ARSIC-C reported that ETTs have an average of only four of 16 personnel required and are forced to “borrow” the necessary support and security personnel from nearby U.S. combat units.

Staff from the Regional Corps Advisory Command (RCAC) in ARSIC-E stated that replacement individual augmentees were rarely assigned by CSTC-A to the billet against which they were requisitioned, apparently due to a combination of combat and noncombat losses, as well as the changing situation on the ground. And, in many instances, personnel who were trained at Ft. Riley did not know whether they would be assigned as ETTs or PMTs until arrival in-country.

CSTC-A staff assigned to the CFC noted that ETTs accompanying Afghan infantry battalions (kandaks) were invariably under-strength.
Many of the ARSICs reported that MOS skills and specialties required of the ETTs/OMLTs and PMTs/POMLTs are not always analogous with the functions they are mentoring; personnel did not have the skill sets required for their positions.

Fixing such problems requires far more than simply providing NATO/ISAF warm bodies to serve in a mentoring and partner role. In some instances CSTC-A needs more than just military and police trainers. For example, DoD IG found that CSTC-A exerted “insufficient contract oversight” due to a lack of trained contracting officers and contracting officer representatives in country.\textsuperscript{xiii}

The personnel involved must be motivated and competent – something lacking in many of those who have been arbitrarily assigned to such roles in the past. These positions must be treated as what they are: At least as important to victory as command roles in NATO/ISAF forces.

Every increase in ANSF force quantity must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of NATO/ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.

NATO/ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple the ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

\textit{Giving Partnership Real Meaning}

NATO/ISAF ‘mentors’ must support and coach ANSF units through training and advice, including ‘observer/controller-like’ functions. Both functions will be critical, whether provided by the same or discrete coalition ISAF units. Minister Wardak and many ISAF commanders have stressed the impact top-flight partners have on raising the capabilities of ANSF units.

Effective partnership also requires forces that can fight and survive. This is particularly true of the effort to develop the ANP. The ANA has at least been trained for the right mission. The ANP has not and NATO/ISAF must take direct responsibility for many of the casualties that the ANP have suffered. The ANP do not take the bulk of the casualties in the fighting because they are leading the fight. They take them because NATO/ISAF has not been trained and equipped them to survive in a counterinsurgency environment.

For far too long, the ANP has been treated as if their mission was to act as conventional police that could operate in climate of security, while serving in a broader structure of a civil rule of law. These conditions simply do not exist, and cannot exist until the shape and clear phases are complete and hold and build have reached a level of stability and security where police can concentrate on crime, a criminal justice process and courts actually exist, and when there are normal jails. In the interim, the ANP and all other elements of the ANSF must be trained and equipped to be part of the fight.

In this context, the Canadian approach to PMTs may be more beneficial than the American approach. In Kandahar province, Canadian PMTs were embedded in police stations 24 hours a day, and had strengthened their stations to western standards of force protection. American
PMTs would sleep on American bases, driving out to ANP stations each morning. While the American approach may provide more flexibility, and more force protection for Americans, it was also unsuitable to the hostile climate of Afghanistan. According to a member of a Canadian OMLT in Kandahar in 2009, Afghan police stations were incredibly vulnerable. The Taliban was able to destroy these with “impunity,” and only stations protected by embedded mentors “could be counted on to still be there the next morning.”

Reforming the Command Structure

NATO/ISAF and the US already have important reforms underway. The overall command structure of NASTO/ISAF and US forces affecting the development of the ANSF is shown in III.1. NATO/ISAF and US force development efforts are now being combined under one commander and into a NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). This is creating the structure shown in Figure III.2, and is a critical step towards fully integrating the NATO/ISAF and US training efforts:

- SHAPE guidance signed on 25 June 09 provided implementation instructions for creating NTM-A
- The guidance directs:
  - Sixteen tasks for NTM-A to be implemented as and when resources are available.
  - Cdr, CSTC-A is being dual-hatted as COM, NTM-A report directly to the COM ISAF.
- NTM-A was established in concept by the NAC Summit in April 09.
- NLT 15 Sept 09.
- Key tasks will remain within CSTC-A’s current Generate the Force and Develop the Force Lines of Operation. NTM-A will not execute MoD and MoI Ministerial Development.

Other, more detailed, improvements are taking place within the command and control (C2) structure of the training and command process and are shown in Figure III.3. These steps could do much to correct the past problems in what has been a poorly coordinated and inefficient effort.

It is also important to note, however, that the new three-star HQ and when NTM-A only began operations in late October, 2009. It seems likely that this will enable CSTC-A and NTM-A to focus more effectively on improvements in force development. The establishment of NTM-A, including the dual-hatting arrangement with CSTC-A, has the potential to help solve several major challenges that the ISAF has faced.

- First, the arrangement may help synchronize ISAF and U.S. approaches toward the ANSF mission. One caveat is that the transfer of TF Phoenix to the three-star HQ will require close integration among the dual-hatted NTM-A/CSTC-A, and the three-star HQ, on the ANSF mission, to ensure top to bottom integration from the ministerial to the ground level.
- Second, NTMA provides a readily available alternative for those TCNs that are ready to contribute but prefer not to provide combat forces.
Figure III.1: The Overall NATO/ISAF and US Command Structure Affecting Afghan Force Development
Figure III.2: The Creation of the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
Figure III.3: Planned Changes to Integrate Command and Control of the Training and Partnering Efforts

Current Training Team Command and Control Structure

Future Command and Control Structure
Moving Towards Joint Command

The role of joint NATO/ISAF and ANSF commands needs to be developed and expanded as quickly as possible as ANSF forces grow more capable and are able to take the lead in a growing number of operations. NATO/ISAF, the ANA, the ANP, and other elements of the ANSF need to have joint headquarters and carry out joint operations at every level from the regional command on down.

The provision of adequate numbers of mentors, partners, and enablers like combat support units and intelligence needs to be tied to joint planning, intelligence, and operations that move the ANSF steady from a role where NATO/ISAF is effectively in the lead to the point where they are in the lead and then replace NATO/ISAF forces. Both those serving in the ANSF and the Afghan people must see that NATO/ISAF plans to leave as soon as Afghan forces are ready, that NATO/ISAF respects Afghan sovereignty the moment Afghan governance is capable and honest, and furthermore that Afghans steadily increase their role in deciding where military force should be used and how best to protect Afghan civilians.

Some experts have suggested that this can be accomplished at the regional level by imbedding elements or all of a brigade or brigade combat team with the regional command center and forces of the ANA and ANP. This is a decision for the NATO/ISAF command, but it is clear that any workable solution means expanding partnership at each major echelon of operations and not simply the top. It is equally clear that such efforts must be supported at every level by active NATO/ISAF enablers and partner units until the ANSF is ready to fully take over all aspects of the mission.

The need to coordinate a wide range of ANA, ANP, and NDS operations is a further reason for bringing the new OCC system – which is now being set up -- to full operational capability. It is a reason for strengthening its coordination functions, for providing the OCCs with better communications and display systems, and for providing mentors and partners. Giving the OCCs and added command and control function and could make them a key tool in ensuring that Afghan forces can take the lead when they are ready, and shift from the remaining areas where NATO/ISAF is in the lead to operations centers where the ANSF is in the lead and NATO/ISAF is in support.

Changing the Culture of NATO/ISAF and US Operations

These steps require a change in the NATO/ISAF military culture as well as efforts to create effective ANSF units. NATO/ISAF commanders and troops must uniformly treat the ANSF units they work with as real partners, and see their development as having equal or greater priority than day-to-day kinetic operations against the insurgents.

There must be a feedback loop to CSTC-A and the NM-A to constantly improve the training process, and to Afghan Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and NATRO/ISAF top command to keep altering the equipment mix and supply system for each type of ANSF force so that it can both fight effectively beside NATO/ISAF units and develop a force structure that is tailored to Afghan needs and the eventual creation of independent ANSF units that Afghanistan can afford and can sustain.

This will sometimes mean that NATO/ISAF and the US must move at an Afghan pace and respect Afghan priorities and values. ANSF force development cannot be managed on the basis of NATO/ISAF priorities and standards of efficiency. Issues like leave and optempo need to take
account of the need Afghans have to deal with their families and to avoid breaking units by overusing them. Efforts to create Afghan officers and NCOs that mirror image Western military systems have to be tempered with the understanding that there are limits to how quickly Afghan concepts of military training and operations can be changed – if at all. The task is to help the Afghans become more efficient in doing it their way; not to try to transform them.

Finally, there will be a need for effective, comprehensive ministerial advisory support, a mission currently led by CSTC-A. While such efforts sometimes have less visible impact than building combat power, building key systems at the Ministry and service level – personnel management, logistics accounting – are essential to ensuring that the ANSF can eventually stand on their own. This mission also requires appropriate resourcing, including sufficiently senior-level advisors who have actually helped run ministries in their own countries.

**Providing Proper Equipment and Funding**

ANSF forces must acquire the necessary enablers and equipment, in as timely a manner as possible. The DoD Inspector General found that the ANSF has shortages of a number of essential unit equipment, including howitzers, mortars, communications, and engineer.\textsuperscript{xxv} Work by CSTC-A shows that it will be particularly critical to provide the equipment needed for ANSF units to be interoperable with NATO/ISAF forces and weapons, and to ensure that such weapons are delivered as soon as ANSF forces are ready to absorb them. This does not mean that all equipment has to come from the West. There are systems like the Mi-17, D-30, SPG-9, and RPG-7 that are cheap and meet Afghan needs. A partner force, however, must be able to draw on NATO/ISAF support and sustainment and work directly with NATO/ISAF forces. It also cannot wait on time-consuming delays in the US FMS process or financial rules that block force development.

More flexibility is needed to rapidly provide existing funds to meet immediate needs. Equipment procurement and delivery needs to be made more rapid. ANA trust money should not be rigidly limited to the ANA when helping the ANP is critical. CSTC-A has identified the following immediate priorities:

- Timely receipt of funding
- Support for an FY 10 Supplemental if necessary to fund ANSF growth
- Realignment of function with Bureau of INL --Police development, mentor contracts
- International financial support to ANSF growth and sustainment
- Waivers for continued procurement of Mi-17s

Equally important, ANSF force development is far cheaper than providing equivalent NATO/ISAF forces. According to the DoD IG, “CSTC-A estimates the cost (in 2010 dollars) to generate ANA forces to be $1B/10,000 personnel, and the cost to generate ANP forces to be $35B/10,000 personnel. They also estimated that the annual sustainment costs for the ANA would be $210M/10,000 personnel; and the ANP would be $182M/10,000 personnel. By contrast, the Congressional Research Service in 2005 estimated that the annual cost to field and sustain U.S. forces in Afghanistan was $267,000 per soldier, which amounts to $2.67B/10,000 soldiers.”\textsuperscript{xxvi}

Yet funding for the ANSF development effort cannot be allowed swing from year-to-year on a feast and famine basis that makes effective management of the effort impossible. While much attention has been paid to the stability of funding to the ANSF development effort, delays in providing funds continue: the FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation was not made available to CSTC-
A until the second quarter of FY 2009. NATO/ISAF members need to carefully review their own near- and longer-term commitment to the ANSF. This includes ensuring that ANSF development and operations are funded by alliance nations on a sustained basis until the war is won and Afghanistan has moved solidly towards security, stability, and development.

**Developing a Sufficient Afghan Logistics Capability**

CSTC-A has not placed a strong past emphasis on developing ANSF logistics capabilities, and has had to focus on the quick development of combat capabilities. The ISAF logistics system has thus had to step in to provide the ANSF with needed materials. While this arrangement may work adequately in the short term, if the ANSF is ever to take the lead or takeover security in Afghanistan, it clearly needs an independent logistics capability.

Both the ANA and ANP logistics systems are far too small and inefficient to supply ANSF personnel. The DoD Inspector General’s office found major problems with ANSF logistics:

The Afghan National Security Forces’ logistics1 systems that support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), respectively, remained institutionally immature and insufficiently effective. Army and Police personnel have not become proficient in applying the established logistical model and did not demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the logistics system’s capacity to perform as designed. To ensure the supply system worked somewhat effectively, the ANA and ANP often depended upon U.S. mentors and trainers to “push” them needed equipment and supplies by mobilizing the support of U.S. counterparts in the ANSF supply chain.

This occurred because the ANA and ANP logistics functions were still in an early stage of development, with the ANP significantly lagging the ANA. Neither the ANA nor the ANP had enough trained and experienced logistics personnel to make their logistics processes and procedures function properly. Moreover, trained logistics personnel and units had been periodically diverted to “front line” security roles, which has been the ANSF and Coalition forces’ priority.

In addition, CSTC-A did not have an overarching strategic plan with corresponding operational implementation plans for developing logistics capability within the ANSF, and has not, until recently, sufficiently emphasized the importance of developing a sustainable ANSF logistics function appropriate to its growing operational capability. In addition, CSTC-A did not have enough mentoring personnel to address effectively both security forces expansion and logistical development issues.

Finally, establishing modern military and police logistical systems will require overcoming the still strong legacy among ANSF leaders of the former Soviet-style, highly centralized, logistical mindset, as well as the cultural tendency to hoard, resulting from the country’s prolonged experience with poverty. Corruption, which has been endemic in the ANSF supply system and continues to be problematic, undermines the potential effectiveness of the Army and Police logistical systems.

As a result, the ANSF systems were unable to reliably meet army and police logistical needs. Moreover, a widening gap has developed between the logistical and operational capabilities of the ANSF. This has limited the capacity of the ANSF to support its current force size, which could lead to a growing logistical gap, prolonged ANSF dependence on the U.S and ISAF/Coalition, and delayed building of a logistically sustainable Afghan security force.

CSTC-A has had an critical shortage of logistics mentors, greatly retarding the growth of Afghan logistics capabilities. Before 2007, logistics mentoring was provided only at the senior levels of the MoD and MoI, with some logistician in the ETTs providing limited assistance at the Corps and Kandak level. Logistics mentoring below the MoI level was never provided before 2008 due to personnel shortages. CSTC-A has begun to improve this situation, yet “It was not until 2008 that CSTC-A began to organizationally coordinate and synchronize its logistics mentoring resources, with the objective of establishing a logistics mentoring organization capable of
integrating and focusing logistics training for the ANA and ANP. The continuing shortage of logistics mentors – particularly for the ANP – has limited the impact of this effort.

As seen in Figure III.5, the official logistics processes for the MoI and MoD are complex, even when they function correctly. Yet these systems rarely function correctly. These systems are based upon Western models and may not be appropriate for Afghanistan. CSTC-A advisors reported that, “because there was little transparency in ANSF supply distribution, each step in the requisition and distribution process was vulnerable to significant inefficiency, as well as outright blockage of supplies due to corruption from bribes or from pilferage.

This has led to chronic supply delays or failure to receive ordered supplies. U.S. mentors to the ANA and ANP chains of command have sometimes been able to determine the cause of a supply problem and address the issue. But, because supplies were often not delivered to ANSF units in a timely fashion, if at all, CSTC-A and ANSF personnel reported widespread frustration with the supply requisition and issuance process and a lack of confidence in using it as designed.”

These problems are all compounded by a lack of Afghan personnel with logistics training.
Figure III.5: The MoD and MoI Logistics System

Taking Account of National Directorate of Security (NDS)

The NDS does not fall under MoD or MOI command, but it cooperates closely with ANSF at every level. There are no indications that the present role and capabilities of the NDS need to be changed. It is clear, however, that NDS activities do need to be fully integrated with those of the ANSF and NATO/ISAF, and there have been coordination problems in the past.

Both the Afghan government and the ANSF will need an integrated approach to both internal security and to HUMINT that mixes effective counterinsurgency with careful steps not to alienate key elements of the population. Afghan intelligence can play a critical role in supplementing NATO/ISAF and US collection and analysis capabilities, particularly at the local level where HUMINT is critical. It can be equally critical in ensuring that counterinsurgency operations have the kind of Afghan face, planning, and execution that avoids civilian casualties and collateral damage.

At the same time, any combination of intelligence and internal security efforts all too often lead to excesses and popular alienation. Finding the right balance will be difficult at best, particularly as long as many elements of the population have little practical reason to trust the Afghan government, are unsure it will win a lasting victory, and/or do not have a local rule of law that offers both swift justice and relative freedom from corruption. It will take a systematic NATO/ISAF effort to help the ANSF and NDS find the best achievable and practical balance in any given area, as well as to ensure that the end result is to steadily build up the credibility and capacity of local governance. This will be particularly important in executing amnesty programs, handling detainees, and attempting to bring moderate elements of the Taliban and insurgency back into the government and the mainstream of Afghan society.

Integrated Civil-Military Partnership

More broadly, this partnership must go beyond simply fighting the insurgency. NATO/ISAF and the ANSF will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective NMATO/ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. A mix of NATO/ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, but if this is all that is accomplished they will still lose to the war to an opponent that can win a battle of political attrition against an Afghan government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant and failing to provide basic services, while furthermore being viewed as corrupt and as supporting power brokers rather than the people.

NATO/ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the hold and build missions. A transition should take place to leadership civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level, but NATO/ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.

They must react to the reality that national elections and democracy do not bring any form of political legitimacy and loyalty by themselves; only actions count. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government is too incapable and corrupt to take such actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside civil aid efforts are far too narrow, far
too security conscious, and far too oriented towards talk and planning to serve Afghan needs in the field. The ideal is an integrated civil-military effort.

The reality must become a consistent operational demand for effective civilian and formal Afghan government action. This will take time, however, and in the interim some combination of NATO/ISAF and ANSF must act immediately to provide at least enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and takes at least initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. They must provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

The mix and phasing of such efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas. In far too many cases, however, this will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows what aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, do actually win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards the true “build” phase.

In the process, a significant number of national caveats and restrictions on aid will have to be lifted. Corrupt aid officials and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted. Exercises in symbolism, ephemeral good works, fund raising and “branding” will need to be put to an end. Above all, the military must act immediately when civilians are incapable and these efforts will need ANSF support and leadership where the Afghan civil government cannot act. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will lose the peace.
IV. The Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA has already proven its value in combat, and will be the most essential element of the ANSF for the current fight because of the need to give clear and hold priority. The ANA already partners with ISAF and OEF forces in shape and clear operations; and while the ANP is arguably the appropriate eventual lead for holding as well as building, the ANP currently lacks the capacity and capabilities needed to play that role comprehensively.

At the same time, the ANP is not yet strong and capable enough to carry out the tasks it now faces or to accept the transfer of responsibility from NATO/ISAF forces. Any study of future requirements for the ANA must depend on further clarification of the new strategy that President Obama announced on December 1, 2009, and then focus on the remaining problems and challenges in the ANA. At the same time, there is good news at many levels. In spite of a past lack of resources, the Afghan National Army is the most respected institution in the Afghan government.

**Current ANA Expansion Plans**

The force goal for the ANA was still only 60,000 as late as in February 2006. It was then raised to 80,000 in February 2007, and then to 134,000 in September 2008. This goal 134,000 was originally set for 2013, but is now the aim for 2011. Some experts even believe it can be accelerated to late 2010, but this is questionable if the ANA is to maintain and improve its force quality.

US officials have mentioned a longer-term goal of 240,000 since President Obama’s speech on December 2, 2009, but have been careful to state that there are no firm plans as yet to achieve such a goal for either then ANA or ANP, and that future goals will depend on the rate of Afghan progress in both force quality and force quantity. Lt. General William B. Caldwell, who is now in charge of the overall US and NATO/ISAF force development effort, stated in an interview on December 1, 2009 that the current force goal was still 134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP by October 31, 2010. He did state that the groundwork was being laid for expansion of the ANA beyond the goal of 134,000, but that no higher goal had been set and that an eventual goal of 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police was still purely notional.

In contrast, Minister of Defense Wardak has made it clear he feels the 134,000 level cannot defend the country and that additional plans are needed to give the Afghan Army the kind of heavy weapons and equipment it needs to defend against foreign enemies, and not simply perform the counterinsurgency mission. General Sher Mohammad Karimi, the operational commander of the Afghan MoD has also stated that the Afghan Army falls far short of what is needed.

In his interview with the New York Times on December 1, 2009, Minister of Defense Wardak stated: “The 134,000 army, which has been approved so far, is not enough for our country. We have requested to increase that number to at least 240,000. Even during the 1970s, under the reign of King Mohammed Zahir, the army did not fall below 200,000 – and the target was 250,000 troops...Then, everywhere was peace. There was no fighting with the Taliban militants and international terrorists...we need even more troops than during the king’s time.”

The current structure of the Afghan Army is shown in Figure IV.1, and the history of efforts to expand the ANA are traced in Figure IV.2. A total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are already rate as capable of leading operations (although this rating system sometimes grossly exaggerates the
capability of given kandaks), and plans call for growing from the current 117 fielded ANA kandaks to 179. Six of eight planned commando kandaks have already been fielded.

While growing the ANA may be desirable in terms of meeting the increasing threat from the Taliban, caution must be used in order to prevent a tradeoff of quantity over quality. This tradeoff is already happening to some extent. According to a Canadian OMLT member, “Increasingly the rapid growth of the organization [the ANA] nation-wide was working against efforts to improve quality, diluting those officers and men with potential in a bigger and bigger pool, and elevating mediocrities for lack of any better alternative. ISAF’s focus on quantity over quality, which continues today, had already resulted in a significant reduction in the ANA's ability to contribute to the kinetic fight in our province by late 2008.”\footnote{xxxv}
Figure IV.1: The Size and Readiness of the Afghan National Army
Figure IV.2: Growth of the ANA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Force Numbers</th>
<th>As of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>September 29, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>January 22, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>February 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,300 + 2,500 in-training</td>
<td>April 30, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,360</td>
<td>June 29, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>August 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,350 + 3,000 in-training</td>
<td>September 13, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,800 + 3,400 in-training</td>
<td>January 10, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,900</td>
<td>September 16, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>January 31, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46,177</td>
<td>January 10-22, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>October 18, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>December 28, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>August 8, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>November 2, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>March 10, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91,911</td>
<td>June 30, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Trends, Training, and Readiness**

Figure IV.3 shows key trends in the size and readiness of the Afghan Army, and they reflect some important improvements over the situation in January 2009. It must be stressed, however, that unclassified reporting on the Afghan forces is dated, and President Obama did not announce any details of new plans for the development of any element of the ANSF. Accordingly, the best available unclassified description of the progress and problems in the ANA is still the Department of Defense account in its June 2009 report on *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*:

- The ANA is subordinate to the MoD and is divided into five regional corps (aligned with the ISAF regional commands) and an air corps. Each corps is divided into brigades comprised of three infantry kandaks, one combat support kandak, and one combat service support kandak. The commando kandaks are under the tactical control of the regional corps. ANA force generation remains on schedule in accordance with the accelerated program to increase the ANA end-strength to 134,000 soldiers by December 2011. Development of existing ANA forces continues to progress; as of May 2009, 29 kandaks had achieved Capability Milestone (CM) 1.

- Each ANA combat unit is accompanied by either a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT), or an ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT). ETTs and OMLTs provide ANA unit leadership with advisory support on all unit functions and direct access to U.S. and ISAF resources that enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively. ETTs, OMLTs, and U.S. Special Forces Units assess ANA units, helping the units identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.

- As of May 2009, the total requirement for U.S. ETT personnel for ANA training is 3,313 military personnel. ANA Units at the Corps level and below require 2,663 U.S. training personnel. The current U.S. contribution is 1,175 personnel, with 1,204 of those military personnel training ANA units at the Corps-level and below. The international community contribution of 55 OMLTs fills an additional 831 requirements. The low U.S. fill-rate is due to the concurrent mission to train the ANP. As stated above, a
significant portion of the planned 2009 U.S. force increases will be dedicated to the ANSF training mission.

- NATO has committed to providing 103 OMLTs by the time the ANA reaches 134,000 personnel in 2011. As of April 2009, there were a total of 53 OMLTs out of the current requirement of 65 OMLTs.

- As of January 2009, the ANA has recruited 28,292 soldiers. We expect to recruit in excess of 34,000 by March 2009. The recruiting process remains unchanged from the previous report. The year-to-date re-enlistment average in the fielded ANA is 57 percent for soldiers and 63 percent for NCOs. This is an increase of seven percent for both soldiers and NCOs from the previous year. To encourage re-enlistment, the ANA approved an incentive pay package, a $20 per month pay increase, and the option for soldiers to sign one-year contracts.

- The current annual ANA absent AWOL rate is nine percent. With the exception of the 203rd Corps, AWOL rates are highest in units with high operational tempos. Other factors that contribute to high AWOL rates include poor leadership, difficulty returning from leave, and difficulty in supporting their families while deployed.

- The overall assessment of the ANA officer corps effectiveness from the kandak- to corps-level is unchanged from the previous report; trends are positive and ANA officers continue to work to improve their professionalism. In January 2009, the first 84 lieutenants graduated from the internationally-accredited National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) and received their commissions. The academy will provide an annual influx of professionally-trained young officers for the Army and Air Corps.

- ANA communications capability continues to improve. As of March 2009, the ANA is in the process of completing a planning annex to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). In March 2009 the planning annex attained initial operating capability. This new capability is already greatly improving planning coordination between the ANA and coalition forces and enhancing development of ANA planning staff.

- The capability of the ANAAC continues to improve. Several milestones were reached in 2008. The first large fixed-wing movements of ANCOP occurred in July and August, moving 230 policemen from Herat to Kabul. A new ANAAC record for passengers transported in a single month was set in October 2008, with 9,337 personnel moved. The Air Corps moved an average of 54,000 kilograms (kg) of cargo and 9,100 passengers per month from between October and December of 2008, with an average of 810 sorties per month. Airlift numbers during January and February 2009 were lower due to poor weather conditions.

SIGAR has, however, reported some more current data on ANA readiness, and on the rising intensity of ANSF operations and the ANA casualties that result. These data are summarized in Figure IV.4.

**Current Force Developments**

CSTC-A provided the following additional summary of ANA force developments at the end of June 2009:

- Growing
  -- Already above 90,000.
  -- Acceleration to 134,000 end-strength by Dec 2011; possible acceleration to achieve goal in 2010.
  -- Expanding Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability; growing to 72 fixed wing aircraft and 67 helicopters by 2016
  -- Building coordination with the ANP and NDS through five Operations Coordination Centers Regional and 29 Provincial
  -- Increasing ANA infrastructure, completed 187 projects with 82 projects on-going and another 61 projects planned
Fielding

- 117 of 179 units fielded, 91,911 assigned of the 134,000 end-strength
- NATO weapons and up-armored HMMWV fielding on-going: fielded 32,768 M16s and M4s, 1,760 M203s, 2,199 M249s, 1,138 M240Bs, 100 M2s, and 1,912 UAHs
- 8 accelerated Infantry Kandaks for Hwy 1 security fielded between May – Dec 2009
- 6 of 8 Commando Kandaks fielded, 7th kandak fielded Jan 2010

Fighting

- 76 of 117 units capable of leading operations
- ANA has led 56% of the deliberate combat operations in the last 90 days
- ANAAC currently executes over 90% of air movement requests for fixed wing aircraft
- SOF mentoring 5 conventional Infantry Kandaks, and partnering with 14 other units
Figure IV.3: Current Trends in the ANA

Table 5 - ANA unit CM levels, May 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Unit</th>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kandak</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade HQ</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps HQ</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure IV.4: SIGAR Reporting on ANA Developments in 2009

ANA Readiness Improvements: May-September 2009

ANA Unit CM Ratings, Period-to-Period Comparison

Rise in ANSAF Operations:

ANA Casualties: July 1-September 20, 2009

Major Ongoing Problems

While there are clearly bright spots in ANA development, major problems remain. This will require a sustained effort at every level from building the capacity of the Ministry of Defense to the individual Kandak.

Corruption and Accountability

In spite of the Army’s high reputation, and the relatively high integrity of the Ministry of Defense, corruption is still a serious challenge. This is evident at every level of the ANA, and in all regions of the country. The DoD Inspector General’s Office found a number of examples of persistent lack of accountability and corruption in visits to the regional commands:

ARSIC-Central ETTs:

Some corrupt ANA leaders appear to be getting around the Electronic Pay System (EPS) process in order to continue extorting soldiers’ pay. For example, there are reports of officers and NCOs devising methods to “get around the EPS system” to extort part of a soldier’s pay. This would occur, for example, when the soldier is required to give up his military ID card to the officer or NCO to obtain permission to go downtown to the bank. On his return, the soldier is required to pay to get the ID card back.

ARSIC-South, J3 Staff:

There is a problem in the 205th Corps with accountability and responsibility, not only for weapons and equipment, but also for personal behavior. There is no system in place for soldiers to be held accountable for their weapons, uniforms, assigned vehicles, or other equipment. There should be a functioning process and procedure for discipline at the Corps-level.

ARSIC-East, RCAC Mentors:

There is little accountability (e.g., clothing/inventory records), poor quality assurance and control, and virtually no consequences for loss or damage to equipment.

ARSIC-East, HQ Personnel:

For every 100 units of supply ordered by an ANA unit, on average, only about 80 or 90 will make it to the company. Additionally, 300 percent of the necessary cold weather ear had to be fielded to the 1st brigade, with no explanation for the duplication and no consequences to anyone for the loss and/or theft of the gear. And with no inventory records to document what has been issued to each soldier, the situation will not prove. ISAF/Coalition forces need to emphasize mentoring the concept of personal responsibility and accountability.

ARSIC-South, OMLT Mentors (Canada):

Very rarely is anyone punished for corruption or for losing equipment or uniforms, and if someone is reprimanded, it is usually quickly forgotten. A kandak commander from 205th Corps was caught stealing items from the unit’s mosque. When confronted, he blamed the interpreter, despite the fact that the items in question were found in the commander’s quarters. Although he was verbally reprimanded by the Corps Commander, supposedly court-martialed, and relieved of his command, the kandak commander went back to his unit and is still in command. Reportedly, a Corps Commander does not have the authority to relieve a kandak commander. That authority is held at the MoD. In another case, a kandak was issued 25 new vehicles, but while transporting them from the depot to the unit location, 21 of the vehicles were damaged or destroyed. No one was held accountable.

Corruption in the ANA also cannot be separated from the much more serious problems in the ANP – which directly affect ANA operations and the relative ability of each force to carry out any given part of the “clear, hold, build, and transfer” mission. Paying for police commander positions is another manifestation of the wider corruption issue. Wealthy Afghans pay enormous sums ($200,000 – 400,000) to be installed as commanders. These sums seem outrageous, yet a police commander in the south can earn more than $600,000 a year extorting and collecting taxes on the drug trade. Unfortunately, most police commanders are appointed directly from Kabul,
rather than from the provinces in which they operate, complicating efforts to combat this practice.

While efforts to combat this corruption are ongoing, they have been hampered by a lack of enforcement of rules and regulations in both the ANP and ANA. Inspector General programs in the MoI and MoD are under-staffed, under-resourced, and under-mentored. According to an OMLT member, “They had no functioning military law or administrative punishment systems so even if they wanted to sanction someone it would have been impossible.” xxxvi

Related to the corruption issue is the problem of personnel accountability. ANA and ANP recruits are still not properly vetted. Personnel use this lack of vetting to abuse the system in various ways. For instance, a common practice among ANA soldiers stationed in the south is to go AWOL or leave after their first 3 years are finished and then head north to join the ANA again under a different name. xxxvii

Training, Motivation, and Retention

Serious challenges remain in training, in the motivation and quality of officer corps, and in force retention. The recent trends in training are summarized in Figure IV.5.

These trends indicate that recruitment and training now track with the general distribution of the ethnic structure of the population, and significant numbers of skilled trainees are now entering the ANA. Ethnic and religious discrimination in promotion is an issue, and recruiting of Southern Pashtuns is poor. Moreover, Tajiks make up some 41% of officers, but only 27% of the population. xxxviii

There are, serious problems in ANA, ANP, and all aspects of ANSF training because virtually all Afghans pass training courses, regardless of performance. Unfortunately, it is far from clear that trainers can be trusted to rate the impact of their own training, and while the Afghan Army has considerably more integrity in its training effort than the Afghan police, it still has strong internal pressures to pass virtually all of those who enter training out as successes, regardless of actual performance.

Motivation and morale vary by unit, and many ANA units have fought fiercely, and taken casualties. But, reports of unmotivated ANA officers and enlisted men are common. One OMLT member observed, upon visiting an ANA brigade headquarters “His [brigade commander Gen. Bashir] cell phone is their primary communications link. The G2 is off somewhere playing chess with a source, the G3 is driving around the city by himself looking for troops to jack up and the G4 is taking a nap. Most of the rest of the headquarters are off playing cards or chess or watching Bollywood videos on a cell phone.” xxxix This brigade was rated capability milestone 1(CM1), the highest possible rating for an ANA unit.

Retention of personnel is broad problem in the ANSF. ANA units have been pushed beyond their limit by overdeployment for periods outside their home areas for over three years, often in areas without adequate facilities, equipment stocks and maintenance, and leave policies. The situation has been even worse for the Afghan Uniformed Police, (AUP), who lose substantially numbers of a month.

These problems has been compounded by problems in pay, although the situation is getting better as ANA and ANP become paid directly, rather than through their commanders. is caused by a number of factors. Pay to both ANA and ANP personnel has often been
irregular, and was frequently stolen – at least in part -- by superior officers, despite the CSTC-A’s efforts to prevent this. Direct pay reduces these problems, although officers can still charge for positions and promotions, tax their troops part of their pay, and use less open forms of extortion.

Pay itself has also been a major problem. NATO/ISAF and CSTA-A did not properly survey either the ANA or ANP to determine the reasons for growing recruiting and retention problems until late 2009. As a result, the ANP suffered for some years from being so underpaid that it virtually became corrupt out of sheer necessity – a problem compounded by far more erratic pay than in the ANA, worse training and leadership, worse facilities and equipment, and much higher casualty levels. This problem was eventually fixed by raising ANP salaries to the level of the ANA, but it did not address the fact that at least the starting salary of both forces was notably lower than the pay given to Taliban and insurgent fighters.

This led to a crisis in recruitment that the US and NATO/ISAF conspicuously failed to make public – or properly reflect in its combat readiness assessments – until late 2009. It was only in December 2009 that the NATO advisory team announced that it had found that this disparity in pay was a major problem in recruiting, and that the Taliban was averaging $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120-$180 a month. ANA and ANP salaries were then raised to levels closer to $240 a month. This raised ANA recruiting from average lows far below the required level – and only 830 in September 2009 – to 2,659 in the first week of September 2009 – roughly half of the entire monthly quota level.

Paid leave is irregular in both the ANA and ANP. This is a major problem when soldiers and police frequently have to travel far through Afghanistan’s poor transport systems to reach their families and deliver the money they have earned. Many ANSF go on leave and are forces to stay on leave until their family gets enough cash together to buy the service member a ticket back to their unit.

Another factor that negatively affects retention rates in the ANA is unit rotation. There are essentially no regular unit rotations in Afghanistan. That means that ANA units stationed in the south or east, where fighting is constantly intense, never get a break. Meanwhile forces in the north rarely see real combat. Not surprisingly, this results in the units in constant combat having much higher attrition rates. Even during training, before units deploy to the south, desertions can be high. According to Lt. Col Daniel J. Walczyk “As soon as they find out we are sending them to the south, we start losing them.”

It should be noted that many of these latter problems are directly related to the underresourcing of the ANSF development program, rushing forces into combat without adequate or competent mentors and partners, and overdeployment of forces outside their home area and without proper leave policies. There also has been a failure to properly survey Afghans as to why retention and desertion problems are so great, and to look at how Afghans perceive issues like pay and privileges, leave policies, promotion and assignments, medical services, death and disability, equipment, and facilities. US and ISAF reporting often criticizes Afghan leadership and morale without demonstrating that mentors and partners have been asked to systematically gather data on Afghan perceptions and to look beyond motivation and morale.
Figure IV.5: Recent Trends in ANA Training

Ethnic Representation: ANA Graduates vs. General Population (Percent)*

ANA Training Graduates by Specialty: July 1 to September 30, 2009

ANA Training Graduates by Program: July 1 to September 30, 2009

Literacy and Manpower Quality

Illiteracy remains a major challenge to the development of the ANSF. Only 28% of Afghans are literate – 13% of females and 43% of males. About 70% of recruits to the ANSF are functionally illiterate. Some sources place the illiteracy rate of new recruits at 90%.

The ability to read is necessary in a number of positions in the ANSF, most prominently NCOs and mechanics/logistics technicians.

While the problem of illiteracy was foreseeable and is clearly solvable, CSTC-A’s literacy programs only recently became priority, and have thus far been marginally effective. The ANP and ANA literacy programs have run into many of the same problems affecting the rest of force development – a shortage of qualified teachers, a lack of PMTs and ETTs, the difficulty of reaching personnel in remote locations, poor oversight, and the demands of the security situation. As with many other problems, illiteracy was worse among the ANP than the ANA. Unfortunately, CSTC-A “has not yet published a literacy development plan, with metrics to measure performance, nor issued clear guidance to its trainers and mentors on program oversight responsibilities.” While CSTC-A has recently begun to make literacy training a priority, it remains to be seen whether it will be effective at raising literacy rates in the ANSF.

Equipment Issues

Figure IV.6 shows that ANA equipment deliveries are increasing and the equipment is getting better, but problems remain and requirement will change if the ANA is to increase and be configured as a balanced force that can both be a true partner and accept a responsible transfer of responsibility. The Department of Defense stated in its June 2009 report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan that,

M16 assault rifle fielding continues in the 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps and Capital Division. NATO weapons fielding will be complete by spring 2010. Commando kandaks are currently equipped with U.S. and NATO weapons systems that include the M4 carbine and 81mm mortars. As of March 2009, the CSTC-A program to refurbish existing artillery (122mm, D30) is funded and awaiting award of contract. CSTC-A is attempting to acquire additional D30 artillery systems to expedite artillery fielding. In addition to artillery, CSTC-A is currently in the process of fielding more than 4,100 high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to the ANA, with expected completion by mid-2010.

Similarly, SIGAR reported in September 2009 that,

ANA personnel are equipped with M16 A2 rifles and M24 sniper rifles; M203A2 grenade launchers; and M2, M240, and M249 machine guns. For transportation, the ANA uses light and medium tactical vehicles (LTVs and MTVs), armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), and ambulances. For communication, the ANA uses base-station, portable, vehicle-mounted, and handheld radios. Between July 1 and September 30, 2009, the ANA fielded 2,040 weapons, 927 vehicles, and 2,147 radios.

The fact remains, however, that this equipment is very light by US and NATO/ISAF standards, and no current plans exist to give the ANA more than very light armor, and significant artillery. This means the ANA as yet has no procurement plan that would equip it to accept a large-scale transfer of responsibility after mid-2011.

ANA Corps commanders report that their soldiers have old and unreliable equipment left over from the mujahedin DDR process, and their ammunition is of lower quality and reliability than
that of the insurgent. CSTC notes that not every unit will be given new Western equipment, but that five corps now have M-16s or reconditioned AK-47s, uparmored HUMVEEs, new uniforms and body armor, and the other equipment they need. It reports that the other Corps will get such equipment by the end of 2009. Accelerating the growth of the ANA may require new units to be formed with full combat support, but not combat service support, and older – though functional and reconditioned types of equipment.

Under equipping Afghan forces is both morally reprehensible, and fiscally irresponsible. A trained Afghan soldier is far more expensive to replace than is his weapons and ammunition, should he become a casualty or fail to reenlist due to substandard equipment that puts him at undue risk. If partner troops who rely on NATO for support (ANA) are committed to combat, they should have modern equipment that is at least a match for insurgents, and reliable ammunition.

NATO/ISAF also needs to be sensitive to Afghan concerns that the ANA and its Air Corps eventually acquire the heavier weapons needed to defend the country without NATO/ISAF support. It is easy to forget that Afghan forces once operated some 15 divisions with 1,300 tanks, over 1,000 armored fighting vehicles, large numbers of artillery and 120 jet combat aircraft plus armed helicopters. There is a clear need to concentrate on the insurgency, but NATO/ISAF must not forget that Afghanistan’s neighbors are scarcely pacifists and issues like Afghan honor and prestige remain significant.

**Figure IV.6: Afghan Major Equipment Deliveries: July 1-September 20, 2009**

![Figure IV.6: Afghan Major Equipment Deliveries: July 1-September 20, 2009](source)


**ANA Intelligence**

ANA military intelligence also appears to have major problems. Intelligence issues are inherently difficult to discern from an unclassified perspective. However, it is clear that ANA intelligence capabilities are severely lacking. According to one Canadian intelligence office in a OMLT,

“The ANA intelligence section responsible for this area comprised five personnel. The two officers had received some training in their responsibilities; the NCOs had received only OJT. At the kandak level, the intelligence section was between 1 and 3 personnel. There is supposed to be one reconnaissance company per brigade, but throughout Afghanistan these are being used as regular infantry to hold fixed locations.
That meant the combat intelligence teams had no information to evaluate other than the remarkably useless intreps they would receive from Corps. All the officers had their personal and confidential network of contacts, but that information would never be written down or passed on. With nothing coming in, at battalion, brigade, even corps levels, there was no collation system, no battle map to update, no analysis to conduct, no briefings to give.”

**Detainee Operations**

Detainee operations pose a special problem for both the ANA and ANP. While ISAF forces have recently revised their detainee procedures to better separate hard-core insurgents from more reconcilable ones, ANA detainee operations remain troubling.

A Canadian OMLT member described typical Afghan treatment of detainees:

“...The army handed over detainees as soon as possible to the NDS, who tended to immediately release them. At the time, all detainee cases had to be resolved within 72 hours. No questioning was conducted, and any statements of identity taken at face value: to do otherwise was considered rude. In most cases the detainee would soon be released upon payment of a surety: only the friendless went to Sarpoza [the Kandahar detention facility]. We’d run into some of them again, and it’s fair to say every high level insurgent in the province had been through the mill at least once. More problematic to me was the disposition of detainees while in custody, either left to sit around in the intelligence office, or sometimes next to the brigade commander for extended periods. It’s fair to say that any bona fide insurgent in ANA custody probably learned more from the experience than the other way around.”

**Creating the ANA Needed to Win**

The US and NATO/ISAF need to work with the Afghan MoD and ANA immediately to set clear goals for both correcting the qualitative problems in the ANA, and creating the base for a level of force expansion that may eventually have to double the present force goals for the ANA, although the actual goal such be regularly recalibrated – depending on the actual level of Afghan progress and the course of the fighting.

To succeed, NATO/ISAF and the US must also carry out the following additional tasks to improve and expand the ANA:

- Focus on improving the quality of its effort to partner, mentor, and train ANA units in the field and to continuously monitor the success of its efforts to create truly effective forces. NATO/ISAF commanders at every level must make partnering and training key real-world parts of their operations and ensure that ANA units achieve true operational readiness.
- Identify and commit the resources needed to rapidly execute this expansion. These resources should include a third U.S. BCT on the model of the two new partner/mentor BCTs.
- Properly equipping and supplying ANA soldiers for combat must be a high priority.
- Alter the present CM rating system to rate actual combat performance; to gauge capability to conduct truly independent operations without enablers; and to track the success of partnering and mentoring.
- Ensure that ANA forces have proper NATO/ISAF support and enablers. This should not be a secondary role, when the ANA can be made a key part of operations. This reliance on NATO/ISAF should be reduced steadily with time, but it should not limit the development of the ANA, and the quality of partnership, in the interim.
- Constantly re-evaluate the deployment of the ANA and other ANSF forces to reflect the overall needs of the campaign and not the demands of Afghan politics and power brokers. Some ISAF and ANSF commanders in the field proposed to the Team that ANA forces be reapportioned across Afghanistan – typically, with a net increase in their own respective battles paces. In practice, there does not seem to be much room for implementing unit rotation policies to relieve units now engaged in combat, since no region
currently has a surplus of ANA forces, and since far more ANA forces are already deployed in relatively ‘hot’ areas, including the south and east, than in the north and west. MoD’s fielding plans call for prioritizing the south, but NATO/ISAF needs to press the GIRoA to ensure that newly formed units are allocated where they are most needed, and not for political purposes.

The core element of a successful strategy will consist of a NATO/ISAF decision that the only cost-effective way to achieve an adequate overall mix of NATO/ISAF and ANA force levels is to fund a substantial further expansion of the ANSF. This means sustained financing of the ANA by the international community, probably first of all the United States Government, as well as other states and NATO as a whole. It means making it a matter of highest priority to meet growing requirements for mentors and partners. It means that ANA training centers must be expanded to include more regional centers and more capacity. Given the lead times, this decision should be taken no later than early 2010.

**Key Strategic Decisions About ANA Force Development**

A successful US strategy to win the war in Afghanistan – and to create a true host country partner – will, however, require the full – and ruthlessly self-honest and objective – implementation of several additional decisions about the future of the ANA.

- *The first decision is to accelerate training and current force expansion goals, and to set a new goal for expansion of the ANA that will increase it from a goal of 134,000 men to a clearly defined goal that will support the strategy of beginning US and NATO/ISAF withdrawals in mid-2011. This will mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and in mentors or partner units. Resources to do this well should be identified and committed concurrently. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such as expansion is now needed. If NATO/ISAF is more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to be done both at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.*

- *The second decision is to end the shortfall in NATO and ETT mentors, and resources. There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but CSTC-A reports that the ANA had a need for a minimum of 67 OMLTs plus US trainers in July 2009. However, it had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. American ETTs were also under resourced in the past, though ETTs are being replaced by the “two BCT” concept of providing mentors. The requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of CY2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25. Expert analysis is needed, but it may take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team (changing the two-BCT approach to a three-BCT one) to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new “enablers” like artillery, engineering, C2, medical services, as well as logistics and sustainability.*

- *The third decision is to create a full operational partnership, focused around the development of the ANA and key elements of the ANP, so that Afghans are a true partner in all NATO/ANSF and US operations and take the lead in joint operations as soon as possible. It is not enough for NATO/ISAF units to partner with the ANSF. The ANSF must be made a full partner at the command level as well. Afghans should see Afghans taking the lead in the field as soon as practical, and as playing a critical role in shaping all plans and operations as well as in implementing hold and build. This often cannot be done immediately; it must be done as soon as possible. This can be accomplished by embedding a brigade combat team, brigade, or similar force into each echelon of each ANA Corps (which cover the same areas as the ANP regional commands) to provide the expertise and enablers to carry out joint planning, intelligence, command and control capabilities, fire support, logistic expertise, and other capabilities that the ANA now lacks and can acquire through partnership and joint operations with the US.*

There is a fourth critical decision that the US, NATO/ISAF, the Afghan government, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense need to make. It is all very well to use a slogan like “clear, hold, build, and transfer.” It is quite another to systematically implement it as part of a population
centric strategy. No matter how much effort is made to improve the integrity, size, and capability of the various elements of the Afghan police, improve governance at the local level, and create an effective structure for prompt justice – there will be 3 to 5 years in which the ANA must play a critical role in various clear and hold efforts, and in securing build problems by local, aid, and government workers. No effort to make a population centric strategy work – or that relies on hope and rhetoric to make “shape, clear, hold, and build” work without explicit plans that reflect this reality can succeed.
V. The ANA Air Corps (ANAAC)

The Afghan Army National Air Corps is still very much a work in progress, as is shown in Figure V.1. The Afghan National Army Air Corps got a late start and lags behind the development of other ANSF. The ANAAC is already contributing to the COIN fight, and further contributions – particularly lift and medevac – would be very welcome, and could relieve ISAF of some key requirements. Current ANAAC development plans are tailored to Afghan needs and capabilities. is, however, a clear case for giving the ANSF at least the currently planned mix of air lift, battlefield, mobility, RW attack, IS&R, and multi-role capability. This would expand the ANAAC from a total of 36 aircraft and 2,500 airmen today to 139 aircraft by CY 2016.

The mistakes the US and NATO/ISAF have made in using airpower over the last eight years have shown, however, that there is a broader and more urgent role that the ANAAC can perform. It can develop the skills to support NATO in targeting and managing air operations, and take on responsibility for vetting air strikes and air operations. Such a partnership would do much to assure Afghans that Afghan forces were true partners in all air operations and played the proper role in reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage. Such a “red card” role presents obvious difficulties, but it will be applied to all NATO/ISAF operations, including ground operations, in time. Working to make it effective now as well as a key partner and part Afghan and NATO/ISAF strategic communications could have major benefits.
Figure V.1: The Afghan National Army Air Corps

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<td>C-27</td>
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<td><strong>Pres Airlift</strong></td>
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<td>C-27</td>
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VI. The Afghan National Police (ANP)

The deployment of the Afghan National Police is shown in Figure VI.1. Like the ANA, the Afghan National Police have already expanded significantly in recent years. This expansion has, however, been less effective than that of the ANA, reflecting both resource problems and just how late NATO/ISAF and member countries were in realizing that conventional police could not survive in a growing insurgency.

The force goal for the ANP was still only 60,000 in February 2006 -- for a country of some 33.6 million – a far larger population than in Iraq with a larger territory, a far more dispersed population, and with far worse lines of communication and ease of movement at every level. It only rose to 82,000 in May 2007, and then to 86,800 in April 2009 and 96,800 in June. As is the case with the ANA, there is not current mid to long-term goal for the future expansion of the police. However, Lt. General William B. Caldwell, who is now in charge of the overall US and NATO/ISAF force development effort, stated in an interview on December 1, 2009 that the current force goal was still 96,800 ANP by October 31, 2010. He did state that the groundwork was being laid for expansion of the ANP beyond the goal of 96,000, but that no higher goal had been set and that an eventual goal of 160,000 police was purely notional.

Force quality problems have been equally severe. NATO/ISAF also did not realize that how difficult it would be for the ANP to function as a civil police force in country without a functioning criminal and civil justice system in most areas; without courts and jails; and where the formal justice system is far more corrupt, ineffective, and harder to access for some 95% of the population than the informal local justice system.

Worse, it took years to develop anything approaching a meaningful approach to police training and organization, and to reflect the reality that a Afghanistan was still at war and faced a steadily growing insurgency. Germany was given the lead responsibility for police training in February 2002, and this resulted in an almost surrealistic mix of incompetence. Training for Western style police missions, underresourcing, and failure to react to the insurgent threat through 2005.

It was only in June 2005 – after the police had become heavily tied to warlord militia forces – that a serious police training effort began. This effort began as a joint US and German effort, and continued to fail until a further reorganization effort in 2008. It then remained divided between a CSTC-I effort and an EU-formed European Policy Mission (EUPOL) effort that continues to repeat at least some of the German failures to prepare the ANP effectively for the counterinsurgency mission, coupled to questionable contractor support and performance standards.

One expert summarized this situation as follows:

The central importance of police in contributing to stability in conflict and post conflict situations is probably obvious to this audience. But, unfortunately, it is not always so to policy makers and the military who usually drive policy making on the ground in Afghanistan. Far too often, the policing side of the equation (international and domestic) is an afterthought. And as a result it is often poorly thought out and poorly resourced.
Initially in Afghanistan, responsibilities for sectors was divided up between key international donors. The Germans were given responsibility for police, and Americans for the army, Italians for the justice system and the British for counter-narcotics. This almost inevitably resulted in a lack of coordination between these key elements of the security sector as well as a large differences in resources, with the vast majority of the money going to the Afghan National Army, the one institution to receive comprehensive, top to bottom reform.

There were big philosophical differences in approach by the Germans (and now the Europeans) and Americans. German training was primarily focused on a civilian law and order force with little acknowledgement of the security environment. The US squarely focused on producing an auxiliary security force to supplement their own troops.

These different philosophies also played out in the approach taken to training. Germans focused on producing a highly professional officer corps – three year training course for officers and one year for non-commissioned officers. This was laudable, but of course meant that only some 870 officers were trained in the first three years, and some 2,600 NCOs. Even more dangerously it meant that in the interim local commanders and militia leaders were able to embed themselves in the Ministry of Interior and in senior local police positions with their own men as the “beat police”. This greatly increasing resistance to meaningful reform in future years.

Frustrated by the slow pace in the police sector, the US entered the game in the lead up to the 2004 elections. Americans realized much greater efforts were needed to train the lower ranks, and ramped up rapid training course, churning out police in 8 weeks if literate, and just 5 weeks if illiterate – and only some 30 per cent or so of recruits were literate.

Meanwhile, while all of this was going on, far too little was happening in terms of real reform at the Ministry of Interior, long regarded as a deeply corrupt institution. The justice sector also continued to lag, with too little in the way of agreed strategic approaches to reform, including how the different institutions would work together. There is of course little point in having a police force if you don’t have functioning judges, courts or prisons and a working relationship between the different bodies. Building Afghan institutions is the ultimate exit strategy and the only way to ensure sustainability.

In 2006 in response to the growing insurgency even these minimal standards were dropped, with the creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police. This program was supposed to see 11,000 men hired in the most violent areas and given a gun and a uniform after ten days training. As it rolled out Crisis Group warned that this was a dangerous distraction from building a professional police force. As predicted after millions of dollars and two years of efforts this program was widely admitted to be a failure with a few thousand of these men switched to the regular police, but thousands more disappearing never to be seen again with their weapons and uniforms. Yet more were simply let go, again with their weapons and uniforms but now unpaid and presumably unhappy about it.

Imagine if this time and effort had been put into training quality professional NCOs, who are essential field leaders in a largely illiterate country. Instead their training too has been slashed from one year to some three months.
How quickly lessons are forgotten amidst the speedy rotations in Afghanistan. Almost identical rhetoric to that about the ANAP in 2006 is now being used by the Americans to promote the APPF, the Afghan Public Protection Force. Admittedly a far more closely monitored project – although it is only in the trial stages in Wardak province – it aims to provide local recruits with three weeks of training, and a gun. Given the current doubts about the effectiveness and accountability of the Afghan police force, we are sceptical that having a less trained “police” force, with local allegiances, will contribute to providing greater security and building public confidence.

There are some glimmers of hope. A new Interior Minister, with a far more strategic approach, took the helm at the end of 2008. The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) has been streamlined and is co-operating, particularly at a working level, far more productively than previously. There was also great pride in Kabul at the quick reaction of the security forces to the February 2009 assault on three ministries in the capital, and that effective response provided an important psychological boost. These small achievements need to be built upon.

... There must be effective coordination between donors – at both planning and implementation stages. There must be a clear vision of the mission objectives, shared by all the of the major donors in partnership with Afghan institutions. And there must be a chain of command with clear division of work.

This should be self evident, but apparently the lessons of the past have not been internalized. In Afghanistan there has been a failure to coordinate at all levels. The Germans and Americans and Italians did not coordinate over their vision of the security and rule of law sectors. The Americans and Germans did not coordinate their training of officers and police. Currently, the EU has the nominal lead for police training, even though the US contributes the vast bulk of the resources. And they both have a different philosophy of policing – be it counter-insurgency or community focused. The new minister of interior is far more effective in knocking heads together amongst the international community but efforts are still too often run outside Afghan institutions, and short term in focus.

Effective coordination also extends to donors’ internal organization to assist with police reform. In the United States there is no single agency responsible for police training abroad. The departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the Agency for International Development, all have police programs that operate independently and often without communicating effectively. The decision to give a leading role in police programs in Afghanistan to the Department of Defense has further blurred the distinction between the military and police.

Few international efforts have been as dismal failures as the ANP development program was through 2007. The situation has since improved, but -- as past chapters have shown -- the ANP still lack the trainers, mentors, and partners they need. They have remained underpaid, subject to corruption and political influence, and have not been given the facilities and equipment they need to survive and operate in the face of an insurgent threat.

The Current Status of the ANP Development Plans

The current size and readiness of the Afghan National Police are shown in Figures VI.2 and VI.3. The Afghan National Police (ANP) now includes several distinct forces: the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), responsible for general policing; the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force that provides quick reaction forces; the Afghan Border Police (ABP), which provides law enforcement at Afghanistan’s borders and entry points; and
the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), which provides law enforcement support for reducing narcotics production and distribution.

Detailed tables and graphics describing the size and readiness of the ANP are included in Annex A to this report. The Department of Defense described the progress and problems in the ANP as follows in its June 2009 report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan:

- The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of at least 86,800 personnel. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism, and customs. Development of existing ANP forces continues at a slow pace because of the shortage of Police Mentor Teams.

- The MoI is instituting the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) as a pilot initiative in Wardak province. As of March 2009, the AP3 comprises 243 candidates and empowers and encourages local community leaders and communities to take responsibility for their own security.

- The target for the ANP is 432 units, including district AUP units and specialized police units, rated at CM1. The number of CM1-rated ANP units increased from 17 in October 2008 to 24 in May 2009. The number of units at CM2 more than doubled, going from 13 units to 28.

- Challenges with personnel accountability may lead to inaccuracy in MoI-reported force levels. The MoI has deployed 34 provincial teams to establish personnel and equipment accountability throughout the country. As of March 2009 the MoI had completed work in 341 of 365 districts.

- Between March 2008 and February 2009, nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs was 17,191 (2,737 ABP, 3,562 ANCOP, and 9,468 AUP and specialty police). It is important to note that the MoI has not had any problems achieving any of their recruiting goals. Positive polling data on popular support for the police and the propensity to serve as well as recent experiences with FDD suggest that this trend can continue.

- The MoI will transition from locally-based recruiting to a national recruiting system in 2009. The MoI is currently developing its own senior-level vetting system to ensure merit based promotions and to validate the quality of his current leaders. Rank reform was largely completed in 2008 with the total number of officers going from 15,001 to 6,820. At the highest ranks there are now 120 Generals down from 319; 235 Colonels from a high of 2,447, and 305 Lieutenant Colonels from 1,824. Officers took a written test as part of the reform process.

- Those that did not pass the test were provided a second opportunity to demonstrate their skills. The individuals who failed both tests were reduced to NCOs or patrolmen. Many candidate officers do not complete the vetting and training process. ANP ranks are further decreased by high casualty rates and the failure of ANP officers to report for duty.

- As of March 2009, the ANP is paid at parity with the ANA and all thirty-four provinces are using Electronic Funds Transfer to pay police. Electronic Funds Transfer is intended to eliminate the hand-to-hand method of payment that provides many opportunities for corruption. However, such opportunities persist. It is still possible for ANP commanders to demand a portion of their officers’ salaries after disbursement from the electronic system.

- Police Mentor Teams (PMTs) are composed of both military and civilian personnel and train and mentor ANP units. More than 500 civilian police trainers and mentors are deployed with PMTs in the field and at training centers. The objective is to provide a PMT to every ANP unit. However, limited resources and the broad geographic scope of the ANP will necessitate additional training capacity and equipment if this objective is to be met.

- CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Assuming that one-third of AUP districts will have PMTs assigned at a given time, minimum PMT manning needs to be 2,375 personnel. As of January 2009, 922 personnel were assigned to PMTs and six
districts had PMTs provided by the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF).

- U.S. maneuver forces that deploy to Afghanistan beginning in the spring of 2009 will have the additional mission of providing police mentors in districts where they are operating. The request for forces (RFF 920) that outlines this program projects that these U.S. maneuver forces will be able to provide 1,278 police mentors for the PMT mission.

- AUP districts will continue to undergo reform through the FDD program. Unit PMTs will participate in the district assessment, police training, and mentorship following the training to ensure that the teams are fully integrated into the FDD process.

- The remainder of the police mentor requirements beyond the RFF 920 sourcing was identified in RFF 937, which provides the full requirement for both ANA and ANP mentor teams over time. RFF 937 outlines the requirement for 1,097 police mentors and 3,349 Army mentors for FY 2009. The Joint Staff is currently planning to source RFF 937 with two brigade combat teams (BCTs). If this sourcing solution is approved, the BCTs will be terrain-oriented with one BCT responsible for the CSTC-A training team mission (ETTs and PMTs) in the west and south, and the other BCT responsible for the training mission in the north and east.

- To date, EUPOL ANP training and mentoring has only been executed at the regional and provincial levels. This restriction enhances the importance of NATO and other international ANP development programs that provide trainers and mentors down to the district police level.

SIGAR partially updated this information in its October 2009 report:

The target end strength for ANP personnel is 109,000 by September 2010, according to CSTC-A....The ANP stood at 81,509 personnel as of May 2009, according to DoD...The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, and additional specialized police with responsibilities that include criminal investigation, counter-terrorism operations, and customs enforcement.

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), a civilian police program, was initiated in March 2009 as a pilot program to contribute to security efforts in Wardak. The AP3 is part of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and is controlled by the district chief of police. Afghans are chosen for AP3 by village shuras and then undergo a three-week training session. Once trained, they provide security on roads and at schools and public buildings, and serve other functions like those of a “neighborhood watch.” As of August 20, 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reports that 548 AP3 personnel have been trained and positioned in communities. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) is currently reviewing the program and will decide whether to replicate it in other areas.
Figure VI.1: The Size and Capability of the Afghan National Police
Figure VI.2: DoD Reporting on Trends in the ANP: 2008-2009

Figure VI.3: SIGAR Reporting on APA Developments in 2009

ANA Readiness Improvements: May-September 2009

![Capability Milestone (CM)]

- **CM1**: capable of operating independently
- **CM2**: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
- **CM3**: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
- **CM4**: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions

Notes: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%


APA Casualties: July 1–September 20, 2009

![By Month]

- **Total Wounded in Action**: 350
- **Total Killed in Action**: 184

Notes: CM1 = All criteria adequately met, quantitative measures >85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role >85%.
CM2 = Most criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 70–85%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 70–85%.
CM3 = Few criteria adequately met, quantitative measures 50–70%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role 50–70%.
CM4 = No criteria adequately met, quantitative measures <50%, qualitative assessment of functionality in role <50%

**CSTC-A Force Development Goals in June 2009**

CSTC-A provided the following summary of the development goals for the ANP at the end of June 2009:

- **Growing**
  - Acceleration of 4.8K ANP for Kabul by Aug 2009
  - Expanding by 10K ANP in 14 key provinces by Aug 2009
  - Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) --16 of 20 battalions fielded
  - Increasing ANP infrastructure, completed 102 projects with 331 projects on-going and another 351 projects planned

- **Reforming**
  - Reinforce good policing where it exists
  - Accountability Reforms
  - Rank Reform (100%), Electronic Pay (98%), Electronic Funds Transfer (70%), and Bio-metrics (21%)
    - Ministerial Reform Initiatives
    - Financial Disclosure and Merit Based Appointments

- **Developing**
  - Focused Border Development (FBD)
  - Cycle 1 -3 complete; Cycle 4 and 5 on-going
  - Focused District Development (FDD)
  - 64 Districts and 12 Provincial reserve companies in FDD Cycles 1-8
  - Ministerial Development

CSTC-A reported the following goals for near term growth:

- **Phase I: 4.8K Growth for Kabul**
  - The 4.8K ANP growth approved by Washington D.C. and the JCMB
  - Recruited, Vetted, Trained, and Fielded by elections
  - Two Phase training program
  - CSTC-A will have the resources to fund this entire requirement

- **Phase II: 10K Growth –Key Provinces**
  - Approved in principle by JCMB in April 09; plan approved by IPCB in June 09, subject to the availability of funds
  - The 10K will be deployed in 14 high threat provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimroz, Paktika, Khost, Pakia, Ghazni, Nooristan, Badghis, Farah, Konduz, and Baghlan
  - Two Phase training program
  - The total cost of the 10K growth estimated at $260M; coordinating with the International Community for funding
Afghan Priorities for Development of the ANP

The Afghan Ministry of Interior has its own near-term priorities for the development of the ANP and these may be summarized as follows:

- **Accelerate FDD & Other Programs**
  1. International PMTs
  2. Survivability (MEDEVAC/IED/Force Protection)
  3. FDD/FBD/ANCOP

- **Eliminate Corruption**
  1. Ministerial Reform
     (Merit Based Appointment/Investigations)
  3. Inspection/International Audit Teams
  4. Logistical/Financial Accountability

- **Improve Police Intelligence**
  1. Anti-Crime Reorganization
  2. Neighborhood Watch/Community Engagement
  3. Technology (intercept/analyses/Kabul Camera)
  4. Expand Expertise (Mentors/LEP/Forensics)
  5. Enhance Counter Narcotics Operations

- **Increase Tashkil**
  1. Kabul Increase now to 4,800
  2. 10K Increases by Election
  3. Increase to enable COIN “Hold”

- **Secure Key Cities & Highways**
  1. Eliminate illegal Tolls
  2. Expand APPF
  3. Expand Partnering with SOF

- **Secure Elections**
  1. OCCR/P Activation
  2. Security and Protection of Candidates
  3. Election Security Planning as of 15 Jun 09

**Force Development Challenges and the Need For Force Integrity**

Some elements of the ANP have already achieved considerable capability and ANP forces have taken serious casualties and sometimes fought with great courage. Afghan police forces are at the forefront of the COIN fight, and this is reflected in their casualty rate: the ANP suffers casualties at three to four times the rate of the ANA.\(^{lii}\)

The fact remains, however, that the Ministry of the Interior has not achieved the level of capability and integrity of the Ministry of Defense, and the international community has
significantly under-resourced the building, training, equipping, and mentoring of the ANP. As Figures VI.1 to VI.3 have shown that ANP readiness remains low – even when judged by CM readiness standards. SIGAR does a uncertain rise in readiness in 2009, As of September 13, 2009, CSTC-A reported CM1 ratings for 11 ANP units, which represents approximately 12% of the units rated for this quarter. As reported last quarter, approximately 4% of units were rated CM1 as of May 23. The majority of units rated this quarter were given CM2 or CM3 rating.

**Manning**

It is still not clear that any aspect of the manpower data on any element of the ANSF is fully trustworthy. Reporting still seems to fail to report actual vs. authorized and absentee levels accurately, and these problems are considerably worse for the ANP than the ANA. Other reporting has also tended to sharply understake the level of real-world problems in the ANP. For example, the Department of Defense reported in June 2009 that, between March 2008 and February 2009, nationwide recruiting numbers for all police programs was 17,191 (2,737 ABP, 3,562 ANCOP, and 9,468 AUP and specialty police). It is important to note that the MoI has not had any problems achieving any of their recruiting goals. Positive polling data on popular support for the police and the propensity to serve as well as recent experiences with FDD suggest that this trend can continue. The MoI will transition from locally-based recruiting to a national recruiting system in 2009.

The MoI is currently developing its own senior-level vetting system to ensure merit based promotions and to validate the quality of his current leaders. Rank reform was largely completed in 2008 with the total number of officers going from 15,001 to 6,820. At the highest ranks there are now 120 Generals down from 319; 235 Colonels from a high of 2,447, and 305 Lieutenant Colonels from 1,824. Officers took a written test as part of the reform process. Those that did not pass the test were provided a second opportunity to demonstrate their skills.

The individuals who failed both tests were reduced to NCOs or patrolmen. All Afghan National Police recruits (AUP, ABP, ANCOP, etc.) undergo the same vetting process established four years ago by the MoI Recruiting Department and now fully implemented. The recruits are screened by the MoI Medical, Intelligence, and Criminal Investigative Departments. Recruits must have either a national identification card (tashkira) or two letters of recommendation from community elders.

Upon arrival at an RTC for FDD training, all AUP officers are vetted for a second time by a regional police recruiter. They also undergo health screening, biometrics data collection, enrollment in the electronic payroll system, issue of Identification Cards, enrollment in electronic funds transfer where available, and drug testing. Recruits who test positive for hashish or marijuana remain in the program and receive counseling concerning ANP drug policies and prevention. During the course of the eight-week FDD training, U.S. civilian police mentors monitor all trainees and identify those that need to be removed. Police officers that fail to graduate from the FDD course are removed from the force.

As of March 2009, the ANP is paid at parity with the ANA and all thirty-four provinces are using Electronic Funds Transfer to pay police. Electronic Funds Transfer is intended to eliminate the hand-to-hand method of payment that provides many opportunities for corruption. However, such opportunities persist. It is still possible for ANP commanders to demand a portion of their officers’ salaries after disbursement from the electronic system. The MoI will extend Electronic Funds Transfer as the banking system extends throughout the country. The MoI is also testing a program to electronically pay police officers using cellular telephone technology.

These comments understated or buried the scale of serious problems in every area. For example, the statement that, “These numbers do not reflect actual increases in total ANP strength for this time period. Many candidate officers do not complete the vetting and
training process. ANP ranks are further decreased by high casualty rates and the failure of ANP officers to report for duty” was made a footnote. Serious remaining problems in vetting were largely ignored, as were chronic problems in training performance—compounded by critical problems with illiteracy.

As has been noted earlier, ANP pay remained a major problem. The ANP suffered for some years from being so underpaid that it virtually became corrupt out of sheer necessity—a problem compounded by far more erratic pay than in the ANA, worse training and leadership, worse facilities and equipment, and much higher casualty levels. This problem was eventually fixed by raising ANP salaries to the level of the ANA, but it did not address the fact that at least the starting salary of both forces was notably lower that the pay given to Taliban and insurgent fighters.

It was only in December 2009 that the NATO advisory team announced that it had found that this disparity in pay was a major problem in recruiting, and that the Taliban was averaging $250-$300 a month while the average ANA soldier got $120-$180 a month. ANA and ANP salaries were then raised to levels closer to $240 a month. This still leaves the problem for the police, however, that the Taliban’s pay is only part of the problem. Buying positions and promotion remains a critical problem. So does extortion or “taxing” of pay and allowances by superior officers, and the ANP are far more vulnerable to bribes and corruption at every level of operation than the ANA because they come into far more direct contact with criminals and power brokers and have far more opportunity to extort money from the civil population.

Paid leave is irregular in the ANP. This is a major problem when soldiers and police frequently have to travel far through Afghanistan’s poor transport systems to reach their families and deliver the money they have earned. Many ANP go on leave and are forces to stay on leave until their family gets enough cash together to buy the service member a ticket back to their unit. Others simply leave the service.

**Training**

As the previous chapters have shown, police training has been crippled by poor vetting and recruiting policies and enforcement, shifts in control and goals of the training structure and mission, and lack of trainers and mentors. As Figure VI.4 shows, training is improving in volume, but training standards are mixed at best, and Afghans often come out of the training system who have not really met training standards or even shown they can handle the minimal literacy burdens involved.

SIGAR reporting in October 2009 provides a relatively recent summary of the training effort, but one that understates the qualitative problems that still remain:

...8,270 personnel graduated from ANP training organizations between July 1 and September 30, 2009. The program with the most graduates was the Kabul Security Acceleration Uplift/10k Growth program. This program provides Basic 8 training, which is an eight-week program taught by ANP instructors with contractor oversight. Trainees learn first-responder responsibilities, tactical training, IED awareness, surveillance and intelligence gathering, field training, civil disturbance, and shooting techniques. The ANP is also trained through several other programs.

The Focused District Development program consists of Advanced 8 training, Leadership and Management Development training, and an Officer and Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) Basic course. Advanced 8 training is an eight-week course that introduces advanced police tactics and night operations, and gives an overview of terrorist tactical operations. The Leadership and Management Development
program teaches problem solving, planning, goal setting, and incident management skills. It also develops leadership capabilities and teaches how to best handle operational and personal issues that police leaders may encounter. The Officer and NCO course teaches police station defense, firearms and marksmanship, leadership, and anti-terrorism tactics.

The ANP Academy Officer Training program is a three-year program taught at the Afghan National Police Academy, where officers earn a bachelor’s degree. The ANP Academy Noncommissioned Officer Training program, which runs four and a half months, is also taught at the Academy.

The Afghan Civil Order Police program consists of eight weeks of patrolman instruction and eight weeks of advanced training. This program is taught by ANP instructors with contractor oversight.

The Focused Border Development program is a six-week, contractor-led border training instruction, with two weeks dedicated to mentoring in the field. Training is focused on survival and interdiction skills. Instruction is given in marksmanship and advanced shooting skills as well as small-unit tactics and vehicle operations.

... 2,611 ANP graduates were assigned to 11 provincial police headquarters between July 1 and September 30, 2009. The majority of graduates were assigned to the southern region. The largest group was fielded to the Kandahar Police Headquarters...

Several challenges to training exist. The U.S. Agency for International Development reported that 50% of Afghan men over age 15 are illiterate. This means that roughly half of men fit for military service cannot read or write. According to trainers from the U.S. Marine Corps, other challenges to training include the language barrier between trainers and trainees and the limited education of Afghan trainees.

Figure VI.4: Recent Trends in APA Training

![Figure VI.4: Recent Trends in APA Training](image)

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2009, pp. 63-64.

**Equipment and Infrastructure**

Figure VI.5 shows that equipment deliveries are improving. Even so, the ANP is significantly less well equipped than the ANA, although some ANCOP units are better
equipped for the COIN mission. SIGAR provided the following summary of ANP equipment in the fall of 2009,\textsuperscript{lvii}

the ANP classifies equipment as critical weapons, vehicles, and tactical communication equipment required to support growth to the ANP’s targeted strength of 109,000 personnel by September 2010. From July 1 to September 30, 2009, CSTC-A reported that the ANP fielded 6,437 new individual and crew-assigned weapons.\textsuperscript{123} CSTC-A supplies the ANP with weapons and equipment through the same process as it uses for supplying the ANA. Donations and U.S.-funded purchases of Warsaw Pact weapons contribute to the ANP weapon supply. ANP personnel are equipped with 9mm pistols; AK-47, PKM, and machine guns; and RPG-7, GP-25, and GP-30 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) weapons.

From July 1 to September 30, the ANP fielded 476 Ford Ranger trucks, referred to as LTVs, and four International Harvesters, referred to as MTVs, according to CSTC-A. The ANP also uses all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) but did not field any vehicles of this type during this period. As of September 30, the ANP is planning for 574 additional vehicles in the future. The ANP is expected to be supplied with armored HMMWVs in the late fall of 2009, according to CSTC-A. The Afghan Civil Order Police and Afghan Border Police units also want to acquire ambulances.

During this quarter, the ANP fielded 2,450 radios, according to CSTC-A. The ANP procured 4,162 radios during this period. As of September 30, the ANP is not planning for any additional radios.

...In another communications effort, CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol–based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the Afghan MoI, according to DoD. These networks will connect the five regional commands and units in all 34 provinces, and as many districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will link the MoI’s National Police Command Center and the Ministry of Defense’s National Military Command Center. CSTC-A plans to complete the radio networks by 2012.

This equipment is too light to meet ANP needs as long as it must perform part of the “hold” mission and is vulnerable to attack by Taliban forces in the field.

These problems are compounded by inadequate facilities that are often very vulnerable, and – as Figure VI.6 shows, by the fact a number of infrastructure projects have not been completed because the threat was too great. CSTC-A reported in the spring of 2009 that it had, “cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled $33.53 million and these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.”\textsuperscript{lviii}

This situation is, however, slowly improving.\textsuperscript{lix}

According to CSTC-A, ANP infrastructure is defined as the buildings and permanent equipment necessary for support, redeployment, and operations of police personnel. It includes such buildings as barracks, headquarters, training buildings and ranges, administrative spaces, warehouses and storage buildings, and maintenance facilities. Infrastructure contracts active from July 1 to September 30, 2009, were for such projects as battalion headquarters, district headquarters, and provincial headquarters.

CSTC-A reported 269 active ANP infrastructure contracts as of September 30, 2009. Of those, 32 contracts, with a collective value of $58.83 million, were scheduled to be completed between July 1 and September 30. During the same period, 14 infrastructure projects, collectively valued at $55.40 million, were awarded. The greatest number of active infrastructure projects with expected completion dates during this period was in Badakhshan. The highest collective value of projects with expected completion dates during this period was in Samangan. Eleven contracts with a collective value of $23.10 million were terminated.\textsuperscript{121}
Figure VI.5: Recent Trends in ANP Equipment

Figure VI.6: ANP Infrastructure Projects Cancelled Due to Threat


Capacity, Capability, and Corruption

The overall ANP force is lacking in capacity and capability. This is already mission-critical, and has greatly increased ANP casualties. The ANP should play the lead role in “holding” any area that has been cleared, and in providing security during “building”. These clear/hold/build/transfer activities are not be thought of as sequential in any given battlespace, let alone across the theater, which makes a competent ANP all the more essential.

ANP performance is further crippled by elements that suffer from serious corruption, manifested most powerfully to the Afghan population by frequent street-level ‘shake-downs’ by the police. There are no disciplinary units at the provincial level to control police forces. These problems are enabled by both corruption at higher levels of command within the MoI and in other local governance structures. Senior officials lack control of their personnel, and do not regularly monitor performance. They are compounded by political interference, and by the lack of a robust justice sector.

NATO/ISAF programs cannot succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure that it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and desire to try to control and influence the ANP, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.
The Focused District Development Program

One possible answer to part of these problems is the Focused District development (FDD) program, which is described in Figures VI.7 to VI.9. The FDD program is still being refined and evaluated, but it may prove to be a key to dealing with these issues. It is necessarily slow, however, because it is limited by the availability of formal trainers, coalition units to partner with the re-trained AUP units, and ANCOP units to backfill for the AUP during training. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide a quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

The Focused District Development program operates by taking the police off-line in entire districts, putting in replacement units, and putting the offline force through an eight-week training course. All the police from that district are then withdrawn simultaneously, sent to a regional training center together for 8 weeks to receive training appropriate to position and prior training and literacy levels, and re-equipped with all authorized equipment. Police who fail to graduate, or cannot be vetted, are removed from the police force. During training, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) cover the police district, and are withdrawn when the ANP return. Following their return, the police are monitored and provided with follow-on training, and police officers are trained further in specific topics to become trainers organic to the district.

As of February 2009, 52 districts had undergone FDD, as well as 25 city precincts. CSTC-A estimates that 2012 would be the earliest that FDD could be completed in all of Afghanistan’s 365 districts. Accelerating the FDD program does not appear to be possible under current resource constraints, due to a lack of sufficient training capacity, a shortage of PMTs, and a shortage of ANCOP personnel to relieve the ANP while in FDD.

As with many aspects of ANSF development, the problems of the FDD program are exacerbated by a shortage of US and ISAF/Coalition training personnel. The shortage of PMTs is the most critical factor hindering the FDD program, according to CSTC-A. The total PMT requirement is for approximately 2,375 personnel. Only 39% of that requirement had been met as of May 2009. Of the 635 required PMTs, CSTC-A fielded only 90, and these were understrength. The decision to send an additional BCT to train the ANSF will significantly reduce this shortfall, but it will not eliminate it.

Additionally, while the ANCOP seems to have enough personnel to meet the current demands of backfilling police districts while they undergo FDD, the force is stretched thin. Efforts to conduct FDD without backfilling the force while it is away for training have proved unsuccessful. Any acceleration of the FDD program will require more ANCOP personnel to be trained, or an alternative force to backfill the districts in FDD must be found.

The Department of Defense described the program as follows in its June 2009 report on Afghanistan,

The Focused District Development (FDD) is a comprehensive program divided into six phases for assessing, training, and validating district AUP units. The program began in late 2007. Each phase includes units between seven and 11 AUP units. Fifty-two police districts out of a total of 365 districts in Afghanistan are currently enrolled in the Focused District Development (FDD) program.

To date, selection of FDD districts has focused on districts in the south and east, near the Ring Road. For the first seven cycles of FDD there were no formalized procedures for collaborating with international partners to select which districts would go through the FDD program. FDD cycle eight will incorporate a more
collaborative approach to district selection. CSTC-A, through USFOR-A, approached ISAF to propose developing a more formal and integrated approach to district selection. CSTC-A, USFOR-A, ISAF, UNAMA, the ICMAG, and the MoI worked together to produce a prioritized list of FDD districts coordinated closely with the COIN strategy. This collaborative approach to district selection will be continued for future FDD cycles.

The first six cycles of FDD included only district-level AUP. However, cycle seven will consist of eight provincial police companies and four district units mentored by international PMTs (IPMTs) from Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The inclusion of provincial ANP in the FDD is the result of the lack of PMTs. The fact that provincial police have assigned mentors has eased the PMT constraint and facilitated their inclusion in FDD. It is also of significant value to the provincial police chiefs and governors to provide a trained police resource for quick response to crises and to provide flexibility within the province. At full manning levels, the FDD program would take three years to complete. As mentioned above, there are significant shortages in PMTs and overall ANP training personnel.

… AUP districts will continue to undergo reform through the FDD program. Unit PMTs will participate in the district assessment, police training, and mentorship following the training to ensure that the teams are fully integrated into the FDD process.

An effort has been made to focus the training cycles on regions with high levels of insurgent activity, primarily in the East and South of Afghanistan However, due to problems in threat assessment, and a lack of intelligence advisors, the selection of districts may not be linked to the priorities that would emerge from an integrated concept of operations based on better intelligence and planning. There are some indications that districts have been picked on the basis of districts in need of help, but not the districts that need the most help.

Districts that have undergone FDD do seem to have experienced significantly lower civilian casualties after completion of the program. However, one of the consistent curses of the lack of credible transparency and reporting on virtually every aspect of U.S., allied, UN and Afghan government operations is that public and unclassified reports on the real-world result of plans and concepts have been “spun” into claims of success before they have had had a real or lasting impact on actual performance.

Senior U.S. officers, advisors, and intelligence personnel raise serious questions about the extent to which the problems with corruption and power brokers in the ANP reassert themselves over time, although most agree that the program does produce at least some lasting benefits and improves popular Afghan perceptions of the police.

What is more serious is that they also question whether the FDD program, or any police reform program, can work without changing the basic environment in which the ANP now operates. The police cannot exist in a vacuum. If governance is excessively corrupt and subject to power brokers at the national, provincial, and local levels, the police inevitably will follow. If the police operate in an environment where they have to deal with the insurgency and organized crime to survive, they will do so. If there is no functioning rule of law with formal or informal courts and adequate jails, or prosecutors and judges are corrupt or vulnerable to political pressure, the police will become a law unto themselves.
Figure VI.7: The ANP Focused District Development Program in March 2009

Figure VI.8: The Focused District Development Program in July 2009
Figure VI.9: Typical FDD time Phases

Developing the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)

The Afghan Uniformed Police falls far short of the numbers required in the field, and it seems likely that a zero-based review will conclude that major efforts need to be made to nearly double the size and quality of the AUP. Recent decisions to add 4,800 police to Kabul, and 10,000 more in 14 provinces (including folding in some existing but non-tashkil police officers), are steps in the right direction, but only a first step.

Once again, however, NATO/ISAF and the US will need to pay as much attention to force quality as force quantity and to making the ANP a true partner. The ANP now lacks the equipment to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. Many current AUP lack adequate equipment and facilities – and such gaps urgently need to be addressed.

Too Light to Survive, Too Light to Win

The Department of Defense states in its June 2009 report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan that progress is being made, but this progress will still leave the ANP far too vulnerable for service in the hold and build phases of the conflict and to protect itself in high threat areas,

The ANP is equipped with light weapons, including AK-47s and 9mm pistols. Most police elements also have light machine guns. The ABP will be provided heavy machine guns later in 2009 in recognition of the increased threat and capabilities of enemy forces operating in the border regions. ANCOP units will also be provided heavy machine guns. Former Warsaw Pact weapons are provided through donations or through U.S.-funded purchases. Specialty organizations, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism police receive equipment consistent with their mission.

The ANP is provided Ford Rangers as light tactical vehicles (LTVs) and International Harvesters as Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTVs). The ANCOP is currently fielded with LTVs and MTVs, but these will be replaced with armored HMMWVs in late fall 2009. Ambulances are scheduled to be provided in March 2009 to ANCOP and ABP elements. CSTC-A is building an Internet Protocol-based network and a wireless radio network for the ANP and the MoI. The networks will connect the five regional commands, all 34 provinces, and as many of the districts as possible. CSTC-A is also installing network and radio systems in Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centers that will be linked to the MoI National Police Command Center (NPCC) and the MoD NMCC. Based on current fielding plans, the networks will be completed by 2012.

Mentors and Trainers

At present, however, the most urgent need seems to be trainers and mentors. The AUP faces even more severe shortfalls in partnering and training than the ANA, and any end-strength increases, though very welcome, will only exacerbate the gap. According to CSTC-A, the ANP needs a minimum of 38 POMLTs by the end of CY 2009. It now has 14 POMLTs on the ground. The deployment of a third U.S. BCT would help meet the most urgent of these needs, but the goal of 38 POMLTs represents the impact of past under resourcing of the ANSF, and is roughly half the real requirement.

Even if no decision is taken to double the ANP, past plans indicate that the CSTC-A will need at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011, and there will be a need for added PMTs as well.. These requirements will, however,
be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of all elements of the police is raised to 160,000 by the end of CY 2014.

**Developing the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP)**

The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide higher-end police capabilities – specifically, to maintain civil order in urban areas, and to provide a police presence in less secure remote areas. The current ANCOP authorized strength is over 4,000 men. Its assigned strength is 3,345, in four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. Current plans call for growing the ANCOP to 20 battalions by the end of the year; if an increase in ANP target end-strength is approved, that growth would include corresponding increases in the ANCOP.

**The Afghan Border Police (ABP)**

The Afghan Border Police currently have limited effectiveness and significant problems with corruption where they are deployed in areas that involve significant commercial traffic across the border. The Focused Border Development Effort may help this situation, but its effectiveness is more uncertain that that of the FDD. The Program is summarized in Figure VI.10, and the Department of Defense described it as follows in June 2009:

Focused Border Development (FBD) is a program designed to enhance the effectiveness of Afghan Border Police (ABP) line companies in the RC-East area of operations. CSTC-A and CJTF-101 have partnered to accelerate the fielding of ABP companies in these areas. FBD will man, train, and equip 52 companies. Following the training and equipping stage, the ABP companies will establish partnering relationships with CJTF-101 units. The program is in the process of expanding to six companies in RC-South and eight companies in RC-North. Initial reports from partner units indicate positive progress, with ABP companies returning from training with increased capability to conduct operations. Eighteen companies have completed the training as of March 2009, which amounts to 1,677 border police trained. Additionally, 784 ABP are currently in training. ABP companies are provided with vehicles, weapons, and communication assets as they complete their training cycle.

The FBD program is different, and less effective, than the FDD program in a number of ways. ABP units do not come off-line to attend training as a unit. Instead, groups of 30-40 personnel at a time are selected by the Kandak commander to undergo training. This is done because there is no ANCOP equivalent to backfill for an entire ABP unit. Additionally, there are no assigned military training teams to carry out FBD. Instead, local Coalition battle commanders assign mentoring teams. Finally, two different contractors (DynCorp and Blackwater) have contracts to carry out FBD in different areas. Each contractor until had a different training program, depriving the ABP of a homogenously trained force. CSTC-A has recently adopted a single standardized FBD program.

In the future, Afghanistan will require a competent and sufficient border police function. The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 and 12,800 assigned. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create, Afghanistan’s geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement all the more difficult, and NATO/ISAF and the ANSF have more urgent priorities.

Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance and reduce corruption. As is the case with the ANP, these efforts should be complemented by specific technologies including biometrics and ISR, to the extent feasible. Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for NATO/ISAF action or additional forces and capabilities.
Figure VI.10: The Focused Border Development Program

- FBD Update
  - FBD Cycle 1-3:
    - RC East: ~23 Companies
    - RC North: ~9 Companies
    - RC South: ~3 Companies
  - Total Trained: 3,517
- Current - FBD Cycle 4 – 5: May – Jul 09:
  - RC East: ~5 Companies
  - RC North: ~3 Companies
  - RC South: ~2 Companies
- Future - FBD:
  - Complete all 52 Companies in RC-E by AUG 09
  - Complete all 122 Companies in RC-N (19 companies), RG-S (36 companies), and RC-W (19 companies) by AUG 2010
**The Rule of Law/Prompt Justice Gap**

The ANP must also deal with civil issues the ANA does not face. The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice -- unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. Unfortunately, a gap exists between the ANP and the justice system. The DoD IG found that “The professional connection and cooperation between the ANP and the criminal justice/Rule of Law (ROL) system at the district level in Afghanistan was tenuous at best.”

One major reason for this gap is the lack of justice personnel. Some districts simply have too few no judges and prosecutors, and many have none at all. The DoD IG found that “Regional Command-West PMTs reported in their monthly Capability Evaluation that in one district there was no prosecutor or judge available locally and, therefore, the police were unable (or unwilling) to arrest any suspect because a prosecutor’s guidance was required. Another report on a district in Regional Command-Central simply stated that its district AUP had no coordination with the prosecutors, and therefore conducted no investigations and no arrests. As a consequence, the AUP does not develop the effectiveness intended or the credibility with the population.”

The police-justice system gap is exacerbated by cultural and bureaucratic factors as well. According to representatives of the ROL Office at Embassy Kabul “prior to 2005, the police were not treated as part of the justice system in Afghanistan.” This problem was compounded because “the police have been primarily trained as a military force, not a police force.” The relationship between justice personnel and the ANP has never been close, with MoJ officials describing the police as “thugs and non-professionals.”

The FDD program has done little to erase this gap. According to the DoD IG, “A review of the basic eight-week ANP Program of Instruction revealed that of the total 263 hours allotted, only 28 hours were collectively devoted to topics such as ethics, the Constitution, penal code, criminal procedures, and human rights. The preponderance of instruction was directed at safety/survival instruction, terrorist tactics, counterterrorism, defense, and weapons qualification. Training in criminal investigations during basic police training received little attention.

The Regional Training Centers (RTCs), where the FDD training for the police is being accomplished, were also used to train Ministry of Justice personnel (prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) through the State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program. Despite using common facilities, there had been no overlapping training between Justice Ministry students and ANP students. While at the RTC, in effect the two groups did not formally interact through receiving any joint training on how to professionally cooperate to assist one another in their respective functions to achieve common goals. This compartmentalized operational and training philosophy has repeatedly been identified as a potential problem by PMTs, PRTs, and Justice Training Teams.”

Improving the Rule of Law will require strengthening of the informal justice system while trying to create links that tie it in some ways to the formal justice system that is too weak, too limited in coverage, and too corrupt to meet the needs of some 90% of Afghanistan’s population. Military security is not security, and there is no time to wait the decade or so it will take to create an effective formal justice system – if, indeed, the Afghan people want or will ever trust the systems
Western nations are now trying to implement. There must be some form of function civil and criminal justice, and one that is administered locally, promptly, and in ways ordinary Afghans can access.

The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is mission critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation. If this effort is not made a key part of the hold and build phase, the problems that have done so much to empower the Taliban in so many areas – and demonstrate that the Afghan government lacks practical legitimacy regardless of how it is chosen -- will continue. Like the other key failures in civil-military operations that have been warned about earlier, a failure in this area risks losing the war.

Dealing with this practical crisis in the implementation of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” requires NATO/ISAF, the US, and aid workers to work together to ensure that corrupt and incompetent ANP officials and officers are bypassed, excluded from NATO/ISAF support, publicly identified, and pushed out of office. It also means, however, using the same combination of incentives and disincentives to give the ANP protection from corrupt and incompetent Afghan officials and power brokers when this threatens the integrity of the force and its ability to perform its mission.

To date, NATO/ISAF, and the US and other countries, have often been part of the problem. They have tolerated too much or put too little pressure on at the top to support commanders and officials in the field. Empowering failure may be politic, but it is also a way to lose. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and to power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

Reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan in SCHB. NATO/ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can support the governance aspects of the hold mission by showing that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

Creating an Afghan National Police (ANP) that Can Clear, Hold, and Build

As is the case with the ANA, key decisions are required about Afghan force development. Improving the various elements of the ANP, while less time critical in terms of direct combat operations, is critical if the ANP is to play its key role in performing the hold function in population centers and securing the build activities that are essential to the success of a population centric strategy.

Current NATO/ISAF plans raise serious questions as to whether the hold function can be performed with the NATO/ISAF and ANSF resources available, and without a major expansion of and improvement in the ANP. Time is critical because the initial phase of the hold function will require a transition to proving regular policing activity and supporting the prompt
administration of justice, and ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the build phase cannot be properly implemented unless the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

Both force quantity and force quality present critical problems. The ANP currently suffers from critical problems in capability, leadership, corruption, supporting governance, and the district and local levels of courts, legal services, and detention facilities necessary to implement prompt justice and a rule of law. Most of the ANP also lacks the ability to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

As a result, there are several areas where NATO/ISAF and the US need to work with the Afghan government at the central, provincial, and local level to shape the future of the ANP:

- **First, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, hold, and build. NATO/ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.**

  The Focused District Development (FDD) program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

  No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- **Second, major efforts need to be made to increase the size and quality of the ANP. NATO/ISAF should begin to expand the ANP and the other elements of the Afghan police. In Kabul alone, for example, the current goal for the ANP is 4,800 and commanders feel some 7,200 are needed. Current plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is needed to improve the quality of its leadership and facilities.**

  The ANP’s most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for is adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NMA-A, and not under civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP’s main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

  Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in partnering and training than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional POMLTs plus added US PMT trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and BMTs by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added PMTs as well. However, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of the police was raised to 160,000 by the end of CY 2014.
Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP. These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions. These could build on ANCOP and police commando cadres. The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the NDS and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.

Fourth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice. The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people -- the need for prompt justice – unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as much less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

This, however, is only part of the story. NATO/ISAF must carry out additional tasks to support the ANP and meet the needs of the Afghan people:

- ISAF Regional and task force commanders need to work with mentors to integrate partnering, mentoring, and training ANP units in the field in ways that will help create effective forces. It also is not enough to use the current rating system; NATO/ISAF commanders at every level must make partnering and training key real-world parts of their operations and ensure that ANP units achieve true operational readiness and it must be clear where such activity is adequate and where it is not.

- Partnering means ensuring that ANP forces have proper support when they come under attack from threat forces. This means strengthening NATO/ISAF and ANA quick reaction forces, but it may also mean strengthening the ANP’s ANCOP forces, and providing armored vehicles. Furthermore, it is a further reason for fully supporting the ANA Air Corps development plan to provide mobility and air support.

- As long as ANP forces are so limited, NATO/ISAF needs to press the GIRoA to ensure that ANP forces that have been re-blued, and are judged competent, are allocated where they are actually needed, and not for political purposes.

- NATO/ISAF provide the basic equipment necessary for ANP forces to survive engagement with limited numbers of insurgent forces and mobility necessary to perform their mission.

- NATO/ISAF should adjust its readiness rating system for the ANP that explicitly assess the degree of corruption in individual units and areas. There should be public pressure for performance and reform, and to show NATO/ISAF is making real efforts to aid the Afghan people.

- NATO/ISAF efforts to expand the role of regional training centers to relieve the burden on existing centers needs to be accelerated, and putting this training under CSTC could improve its quality and focus.

- Finally, NATO nations need to commit the fiscal and human resources to making ANP development work. This may involve approaches with which some countries are uncomfortable, such as using non-governmental hiring practices to get sufficient numbers of qualified police mentors. This includes not only police trainers, but police managers who can help the ANP and the MOI improve the structure and performance of Afghan law enforcement systems.
VII. The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) and Other Local Security Forces

The Department of Defense describes the AP3 program as follows in its June 2009 report on Afghanistan:

The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is a current MoI initiative. The AP3 is an Afghan-initiated and Afghan-led program that relies on increased community responsibility for security. The AP3’s mission is to enhance security and stability, strengthen community development, and extend the legitimate governance of the GIRoA to designated districts in key provinces through community-based security forces. The AP3 comprises security forces under MoI authority, closely coordinated with the ANA, ANP, and international forces. The AP3 leverages the same community elder groups that the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) has worked with through the Afghan Social Outreach Program (see below). These community elder groups select members of the security forces. The AP3 pilot began in Wardak province in RC-East in March 2009. Wardak province was selected to facilitate partnering and monitoring by U.S. forces. Once the program has been validated it will be expanded to other areas.

In practice, the AP3 program is focused on securing areas roughly the size of a district (note that traditional structures, such as shuras, may not line up with district boundaries, so they may not exactly mirror districts). The goal of the program is to involve the people in keeping their neighborhoods clear of insurgents once they have been cleared and while they are being held. The program can best be described as a contract among three primary groups:

- Coalition Forces (both battle space owners and special forces, who train the guardians);
- The GIRoA, to include the Governor, MOI and the ANP;
- The people of a district

The coalition forces’ role is to ensure that the district is secure enough so that the APPF will not be overmatched by organized insurgent forces. The GIRoA’s job is to provide both proper administration and oversight of the effort through the MOI and ANP, respectively, and to develop consensus among the key local leaders so that they will not only support the program, but also provide reliable manpower for it. The people’s role is, through community and district councils as well as informal structures, to nominate military aged men (25-45) to serve in the guardian force and to provide popular support to it.

All three sets of players, as well as the NDS, help in vetting recruits. Special forces ODAs train and mentor them to ensure they continue to improve and do not become militias. The ANP commander for a province oversees the program, and the MOI pays the soldiers through direct deposit.

The underlying premise of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is that neither ISAF nor the ANSF have sufficient strength to provide security for local communities, and that members of local communities – if properly selected, trained, and overseen – are capable of providing some first-layer security. AP3 may also free up some AUP from providing fixed site security, or manning local check-points, thus allowing them to focus on policing tasks. That premise – especially in the absence of sufficient ANSF during the 12-24 month near term – is tantalizing enough to make AP3 worth exploring further. At the same time, failed past experiments with community-based forces – most notably the Afghan Auxiliary Police – underscore that the GIRoA and ISAF must exercise caution in several distinct ways.
First, it is imperative to comprehensively assess the successes – and challenges – of the AP3 test pilot in Wardak province. By most reports (the Assessment Team is writing before visiting the province), the training of the initial AP3 class proceeded smoothly, and the group was well-received back in their home community, but subsequent classes may have encountered glitches.

The pilot program suggests some broad lessons:

- First, community-based security forces need to be fully supported and vetted by local community leaders; they should be overseen in some form by the ANSF; for the foreseeable future ISAF needs to play a strong advisory and oversight role; and like many other security efforts, success may be catalyzed by linkage to locally-based development initiatives.

- Second, ISAF commanders and Afghan officials at all levels caution against a blanket application of a single AP3 model in all geographic areas. Community-based security forces will only work if they enjoy full legitimacy from their home communities, and their shape and nature may need to vary by area. Furthermore, in some areas, the basic premise of a community-based force linked to official GIRoA structures may founder as a result on the community’s current strong antipathy toward Kabul.

- Third, it is essential that Kabul-based GIRoA retain approval authority over the formation of community-based security forces, on the fundamental Weberian principle that the state exercises the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its territory. Though little known outside theater, there is already a small proliferation of ‘home-grown’ forces, including not only AP3, but also the KAU in Uruzgan, and the Helmandi Scouts…and possibly more.

Regional and task force commanders across the theater are actively – and sometimes skeptically – considering the application of AP3 to their battle spaces. ISAF HQ ICW the ANSF and security ministries should take a hard look, now, at options and opportunities to expand AP3. That hard look needs to include, for any given geographic area, a clear definition of the requirement for a local force; and clearly assigned training and oversight roles to ANSF and coalition forces respectively.

In Wardak province, U.S. SOF are playing two key roles – training the ANP trainers, and providing embedded oversight of trained AP3 units, and links to US enablers and fire support. However, U.S. SOF is a precious and limited commodity, and likely cannot play that role for all AP3 should the program expand significantly. The next pilot, scheduled for Kunduz province, seems not yet to have met these prerequisites – and seems to have taken the RC Commander by surprise.

The creation and use of AP3 forces must also be based on a coordinated approach developed by regional and local NATO/ISAF, ANA, and ANP commanders -- working closely with the provincial and district governor where this is possible. AP3 forces should not be imposed, and must be tailored to support all local conditions in ways that do not compete with other elements of the GIRoA, the ANSF, and NATO/ISAF forces.

ISAF should also work closely with the ANSF and security ministries, now, to plan the ‘way forward’ for the AP3, including transition into service in the ANSF, or vocational training and transition into civilian jobs.
VIII. Counternarcotics

There is no question that narcotics are a major source of corruption and problems for the Afghan government – as well as a source of suffering for the Afghan people and nations throughout the world. The solution, however, lies in providing substitute crops and the markets and food processing that will give Afghan farmers a living, and not in eradication per se. This is a long term solution that can only come with security in many areas, and sometimes after substantial aid and development. Efforts to combine eradication with alternative crops must be combined and carefully phased so as to not alienate the Afghan people and thus empower insurgents in contested areas.

This does not mean, however, that counternarcotics are not an important part of security operations. Narcotraffickers both help fund the insurgency and are a key source of excessive corruption and the abuses by various power brokers. They undermine support for the Afghan government and undermine the effectiveness of the ANP and ANB. Accordingly, NATO/ISAF should focus on helping the Afghan security forces arrest the traffickers and related criminal networks and officials, and on making it clear which officials and informal power brokers are tied to drugs as a public way of pressuring them to change their behavior.

This does not mean that NATO/ISAF should not work to eradicate drugs in areas where they clearly help finance the Taliban. Such action, however, must be carefully targeted, and should not interfere with shape, clear, hold, and build operations which require popular support. In these cases eradication should only take place where there are immediate and credible options to provide alternative crops.
IX. Conclusions: Fully Addressing the Challenges of Force Development

It is not enough to announce a new strategy for the Afghan War. The US must now work with its NATO/ISAF allies and the Afghan government to take the detailed steps necessary to give the ANSF the capacity and capabilities to implement that strategy. Major new efforts are necessary to ensure that the ANSF becomes strong enough to work with NATO/ISAF to collectively, win the fight, and to accelerate the timeline for a responsible transfer of security activity to the ANSF and an eventual drawdown of NATO/ISAF forces.

This will involve increases in ANSF end strength as soon as these are practical. But, all involved must recognize that success is unlikely to come before 2014, and that any approach to ANSF force development requires efforts that are both innovative and necessarily experimental. Many aspects of NATO/ISAF’s shape, clear, hold, and build strategy involve major uncertainties, and that there is no precise way at this point to determine what kind of combined NATO/ISAF and ANSF troop to task ratio will succeed. It is far easier, however, to scale back an ANSF expansion program than to cope with one that does not meet the need. It also is clear that investments in the ANSF, CSTC-A, and added mentors will be far cheaper than any practical alternative.

**Quality Before Quantity – On Afghan Terms**

Moreover, force expansion efforts must not race beyond either Afghan or US/NATO/ISAF capabilities. Quality will often be far more important than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important than generating large initial force strengths. US/NATO/ISAF expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable units in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the US/NATO/ISAF can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and sustainability.

US/NATO/ISAF expediency cannot afford to ignore the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real world “friction” that affects force development. Slogans and rhetoric about ideological goals, leadership, and morale cannot be allowed to lead the force development effort to ignore Afghan material realities: problems in pay, corruption, problems in promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor medical care, overstretching or over committing force elements, problems in supporting families, vulnerability to insurgent infiltration and threats, and a lack of meaning compensation for death and disability. The US military and NATO/ISAF have systematically ignored such problems in the past, and understated or lied about their impact.

This means that the integrity and reputation of the ANSF will be an essential part of force development. No US efforts in strategic communications or aid can substitute for a host government’s ability to both communicate with its own people and win legitimacy in ideological, religious, and secular terms. Key aspects of operations – winning popular support, obtaining human intelligence, minimizing civil casualties and collateral damage, and transitioning from military operations to a civil rule of law – will all depend on both the quality and quantity of Afghan forces.

**Creating Real Partnering for “Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer”**

Mid-2011 may not be a magic deadline, but the US and NATO/ISAF must do far more than build small units if a successful transfer is to take place. The emphasis must be on creating forces...
that are fully mission effective, and which become the kind of partners that can really take the lead and then replace US and NATO/ISAF forces.

At a tactical level, improvements in the training base are needed to emphasize training at the Kandak and integrated entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of the ANSF can simply be trained and thrust into operations. Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.

Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers take time and require careful attention to continuity at the embedded training/mentoring effort. Partnering and the creation of effective units in the field is an exercise in sustained human relationships, and short tours and rapid changes in US and NATO/ISAF trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.

Much broader shifts are needed in the structure of training and partnering as ANSF forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “shape, clear, hold, and build” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations. At this point in time, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and NATO/ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

The US and NATO/ISAF military need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers, and in far too much media reporting, fully seriously. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field.

**Yes, It Is “Armed Nation Building”**

Whether or not the Obama Administration likes the term “nation building,” NATO/ISAF and the Afghan government will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. The US, its NATO/ISAF allies, and the Afghan government must look beyond force development, and make armed nation building as a critical element of hybrid warfare. This will requires an integrated civil-military effort in which providing lasting security for the population, and economic and political stability, will often be far more important than success in tactical engagements with enemy forces. It also requires the US to understand that important as its traditional allies are, the key ally will be the host country and not simply its government but its population.
It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective NATO/ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. Even once a mix of NATO/ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, they will still lose the war if they cannot build. Military action alone cannot defeat an opponent that fight a sustained battle of political attrition against an Afghan government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant, failing to provide basic services, and which is seen as corrupt as well as supporting power brokers rather than the people.

This means NATO/ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the hold and build missions. A transition should take place to leadership civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level, but NATO/ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.

In doing so, they must face the reality that national elections and democracy do not bring political legitimacy or loyalty without tangible actions that benefit the Afghan people. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government has been too corrupt and incapable in the past to take the necessary actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside NATO/ISAF and other aid efforts have been too narrow, too security conscious, and too oriented towards mid and long-term efforts to serve Afghan needs in the field.

Every effort must still be made to develop effective civilian and formal Afghan government action. This will take time, however, and some combination of NATO/ISAF and ANSF must act in the interim to provide enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and take initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. The end result must be to provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.

The mix and phasing of such civil-military efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas. It also will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows what aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, actually do win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards true “build” phase.

**Obeying the “Iron Laws of Force Development**

It is easy to lose a war through the wrong kind of force development efforts – as Appendix A makes all too clear. To succeed, NATO/ISAF and the US must follow several “iron laws” for force development in carrying out all these efforts. First, they must pay as much attention to ANSF force quality as to increasing force quantity. They must not create units where there are inadequate mentors, partner units, facilities, equipment, and training capacity. Pay close attention to performance in the field versus formal training and quantified readiness measures. Second, they must properly equip and support ANSF forces or not put them into harm’s way.

Every increase in ANSF force quantity must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of NATO/ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about...
command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.

NATO/ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.

Third, NATO/ISAF and the US must act to give to “partnership” real meaning. All the elements of NATO/ISAF must begin to work together with all of the elements of the ANSF to create equivalent forces that can conduct combined operations together. This will take time, resources, and patience. NATO/ISAF regional command Task force commanders must understand, however, that partnering with ANSF forces does not mean simply using them as they are, but making them effective, and treating operations as key real world aspects of training.

In the process, a significant number of national caveats and restrictions on aid will have to be lifted. Corrupt aid officials and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted. Exercises in symbolism, ephemeral good works, fund raising and “branding” will need to be put to an end. Above all, the military must act immediately when civilians are incapable and these efforts will need ANSF support and leadership where the Afghan civil government cannot act. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will lose the peace.

One key step in this process is for the US And NATO/ISAF countries to look beyond complaints about the Afghans and to look in the mirror. This may be particularly true in the case of the US. So far, for example, the US country team has failed to create the kind of truly integrated civil-military plan the US needs to have for its own ends. To lead NATO/ISAF by example, and to meet the needs of the Afghan people. Stovepipes and turf fights, and internal bickering – particularly by elements within the State Department, crippled the effort necessary to create a plan with the depth, detail, and content needed. The resulting compromise has not created the kind of plan or effort required. Petty interagency bickering continues in Washington, and the Obama Administrations needs to force real unity of effort at every level.
ANNEX A:

Doing It Wrong: Host Country Force Development Lessons from Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq
Developing host country forces requires a wide range of military expertise at every level, and no one should discount the progress the US military has made in these areas. At the same time, however, this progress should not lead US force development efforts to ignore the practical problems it has encountered from failing to look beyond the purely military aspects of force development in past wars, and that have damaged or crippled past efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Armed nation building is very different from aiding an ally with effective governance and an established force structure. An effective force development effort cannot tacitly assume that the ally is a host country capable of creating effective forces with a relatively strong central government or authority and with considerable unity of effort within its armed forces. It must address all key aspects of what happens when force development must take place under nation building conditions, in fractured or divided states, where alignments with the US are uncertain, and civil military operations are both difficult and critical.

These problems may not be critical to US advisory and training efforts in the many less demanding cases in the world, but they are the problems that have characterized all of the critical cases the US has had to deal with over the last half century, and where the US has had to relearn the same lessons again and again.

**Critical Shortfalls in US Force Development Efforts**

The US needs to look beyond the cases where the force development task is to respond to host country governments that have a high degree of unity and common objectives, and where the need to provide a politically sensitive advisory effort, linked to something approaching nation building, and caught up in complex irregular or asymmetric wars is minimal.

Virtually every major US military intervention since World War II has shown that US force development efforts must address a checklist of critical problems that repeatedly occur in fractured or weak host countries. Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan all serve as a warning that US force development efforts must make much better efforts to address several critical problems:

1. **Fractured states and divided states require a different approach**: Host country force development efforts often involved divided and competing security forces. There may be large elements within the host country leadership, political structure, and forces the US cannot trust. The force may have strong anti-US or anti-regime elements. The finance ministry, or its equivalent may not function, and individual combat elements may be under rival sectarian, ethnic, tribal, or factional control -- some involving serious loyalty problems. The advisory team may have to bridge over critical ethnic, sectarian, and tribal differences. The basic structure for force management, procurement, and budgeting may be weak, lacking, and/or corrupt.

   The US needs to find the best way to address these conditions in a functional way. It must find better ways to analyze a country’s capability or problems, and work around a failed or formative system. It must make conducting a network analysis to map out the “good” and “bad” guys a key aspect of force development and find better ways to deal with rival and competing groups.
2. **Host country force development must become an integrated part of civil-military operations, stability operations, and nation building.** The most challenging cases exist when the nation state is fractured, divided, or formative. This means the US must find much better ways to build Ministries, develop forces that can work in a counterinsurgency environment or deeply divided state, train forces to work with civil authorities, and determine how force development can create forces that can perform all of the relevant tasks in the “hold” and “build” phases of “shape, clear, hold, and build.” The problems in dealing with dealing with corruption, power brokers, political interference in promotion and retention, and the lack of civil capacity and the civil instruments of a rule of law need to be addressed far more explicitly.

3. **Zero-Based Force Building:** Creating new forces virtually from scratch is very different from improving or expanding an effective force structure in being and has post crucial problems that the US has had to relearn how to deal with every time they have arisen. They affect a key host country force development task: Deciding what force structure is needed within the elements of a nation’s security forces, and how to build forces from a very limited or zero base.

Consider Iraq and Afghanistan: The US failed to determine the proper size of the forces needed, the speed of build up required, and the proper mix of elements within the armed forces, security forces, and police. It found that the formal training effort was only part of the force development task, and that mentoring, partnering, and enabling were critical once forces were supposedly trained and equipped. The size of the army required constant increases, often at a rate and in ways that created chronic leadership issues, promotion and retention problems, and issues with corruption in terms of pay and the creation of phantom forces.

The US had to find ways to create battalions from scratch in ways the manual does not touch upon, phase in higher headquarters and formations, deal with issues in creating sustainability, and slowly find replacements for US enablers – where the need for such outside support was a critical part of the force development task where no clear system existed for deciding how to address the tasks. The various planning and coordinating groups lack experience and instruction and took years to function with moderate effectiveness – when they did.

4. **Every new effort to create a police and security force in a fractured country and under the conditions of armed nation building has failed, or repeated the same initial mistakes, over the last 50 years.** These previous problems have been even more severe in dealing with the security services, intelligence, branches, and various forms of police. Each case has led to efforts to create a civil police and formal rule of law that cannot function or survive in a counterinsurgency environment. It has repeated the same in initial mistakes in deciding how to structure such forces, the problems between DoD and State in creating forces that can survive in divided states and in a counterinsurgency environment; and the failures of allies like Germany in Afghanistan. It has understated or ignored the need for specialized or paramilitary police and other security elements, and the hard choices to be made as to what kind of training and vetting can really be provided for local police. It has also led to the many of the same initial problems in creating border police, specialized anti-terrorism units, and dealing with issues like narcotics.
The effort to create civil police that could not operate in a counterinsurgency environment has been a disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan. The failure to deal with the real world need for paramilitary police and for creating a force in a climate where the state is corrupt and/or the rule of law was tenuous to failed has been a problem and again. The manual does not highlight these real world problems and issues.

This, however, is only part of the story. The US has found itself dealing with countries that do not have a well-structured rule of law in the field. This effort to create police without the rest of the justice system has often coincided with an ongoing insurgency or civil conflict. The police have to be paramilitary to survive and are not supported by effective civil courts, jails, lawyers, etc. Moreover, force development efforts need to be structure from the start to prepare for the problems created corrupt officials, power brokers, and the use of the police as players in civil conflicts.

5. **Dealing with a corrupt, divided, and/or disloyal military.** Divided nations, a lack of capacity, poor pay and corruption, and sectarian/ethnic/tribal issues have other impacts. The misuse of promotion and military pay, phantom soldiers, equipment and weapons theft and sales, promotion by faction or personal loyalty, bypassing of training standards, false ratings of unit effectiveness and readiness, are endemic in the developing world. The risks of such problems and how to work around them are never realistically addressed, but any review of SIGIR, GAO, and DoD IG reports on past SFA efforts would make it clear that these are critical tasks.

6. **Dealing with a corrupt, divided, and disloyal mix of host country governance and politics:** The US must make clear and hard decisions regarding the ways in which its force development efforts fit into the broader US country team, outside alliance, and US command and intelligence problems in dealing with state building for either regular armed forces or police. How many times have we had to fix or bypass key officials and ministries in such countries? Deal with ministries lacking in capacity, caught up in political struggles, interference from outside power brokers, problems with Prime Ministries and finance ministries? What guidance does an SFA team need?

7. **Problems with contractors:** Afghanistan and Iraq made contracting a critical problem in US force development efforts and in operating where US military efforts have limited control in a resource limited environment. It is far from clear that the US military has yet developed anything like adequate tools to manage, audit, and control contract support. Both DoD and SIGIR have documented critical problems and failures in Iraq.

8. **Shortfalls in trainers and mentors:** Far too often, US training and partnering efforts have glossed over shortfalls in the quality of trainers and mentors; their lack of motivation and experience; and the tendency to use, rather than partner, host country forces. In Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF still faced the problem in late 2008 that it had only about one-third the police trainers and 50% of the required army trainers as the force development effort scaled up. The US was not prepared to deal with either its own shortfalls or the problems that occurred when allies did not deliver as planned.

9. **Addressing the “training” – “partnering” gap:** They also need to realize that improvements in the training base are need to emphasize training at the Kandak and integrated and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the
training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of a host country force can simply be trained and thrust into operations.

Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.

10. **Continuity of effort, and dealing with the need for sustained human relationships at the partnering and mentoring level:** Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers takes time and continuity of at least the embedded training/mentoring effort. It is an exercise in sustained human relationships and short tours and rapid changes in US trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.

11. **Understanding the emerging importance of civil military relationships and training:** Further shifts will be needed as forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “shape, clear, hold, and build” tasks. Every aspect of **clear, hold, and build** requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations.

At this point in time, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military can really define how to implement **clear, hold,** and **build** in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and choose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.

**Other Issues That Need to Be Addressed**

There are a wide range of other areas that have been important in recent US force development experience. They too form a checklist that effective force development efforts must explicitly address:

1. **Case studies:** Where does the user go to find the lessons from recent US efforts? How do trainers and partners determine what experience may be most relevant?

2. **Continuity of Effort:** Shifts in command, particularly at the partnering and mentor level, often lead to a lack of proper continuity of effort, a breakdown or gaps in critical US-host country relationships, and a mutual lack of trust. Repeated rotations have help US officers reduce these problems, but they still need far more attention.

3. **Partnering:** The US military must now find the best way to actually implement create a partnering structure of the kind General McChrystal has put forward in his new strategy for Afghanistan. It must move from talk about empowering Host country commanders and making them more independent; and shaping the use of embedded mentors and partner units in a practical way. It must address the need to develop steadily higher levels of real world host country C2 capabilities, help host country elements move into the lead;
and truly partner – not use – host country forces needs more attention and case examples. So does the complex transition from being in the lead to the advisory role.

4. **Mentoring, Embeds, and Enablers:** Like partnering, finding the right mix of mentors, embeds, and enablers is critical; particularly in helping new units adjust to the realities of combat and allowing effective leaders to emerge. The complex tasking and organization required in such efforts has repeatedly been underestimated, and in the interface with partnering and enabling US and allied combat units supporting a host country force has not been realistically addressed.

5. **C4I/IS&R:** Modern force development requires far more sophisticated and technically advanced C4I/IS&R capabilities. These have been critical problems in shaping host country capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The practical problems encountered are not addressed, nor are the solutions worked out over time.

6. **Sustainability:** Few areas in force development have presented more recent problems in both operations and force generation. Progress has occurred in this area, but it still poses major challenges at every level.

7. **CM and Readiness Ratings:** Developing meaningful ratings of how ready a unit actually presented problems in Vietnam that help lose the war. It has presented major problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan – raising serious questions about whether the SFA team can develop objective independent ratings that can be trusted, and whether quantitative metrics are a substitute for narratives on how units are actually led and behave in combat. The issue of who rates the raters is not addressed, nor is the problem of rating units once they actually enter combat.

New metrics are needed that show the impact of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions. A system needs to be put in place that provides practical help and experience to the actual force development effort in the field, and helps it find the right metrics for a given case and determine how to get reliable and useful data.

8. **Retention, unit manning, and unit leadership:** These have all been interrelated and critical problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Retention is often country, culture, and subgroup related and requires careful assessment of local practices, values, and methods. The problems in leave/family ties/local ties and other factors affecting in unit manning and the problems created by ghost manning needed much more attentions. So does the fact that formal training in new units can rarely provide a reliable picture of officer and NCO quality in combat, and there is a need to identify and remove weak and incapable leaders as soon as possible and help the inexperienced develop in other cases. The manual tended to assume that the SFA task is building elements in a relatively mature force when this often will not be the case.

9. **The NCO Problem:** It is far easier to try to introduce this aspect of US practice in different cultures and developing states than to make it actually work. This issue needs explicit attention in current and future US force development efforts.

10. **Donors from multiple states:** The US needs for focus far more on creating “alliances of the effective” and much less on getting as many different allied efforts and resources as
possible. NATO/ISAF have made progress, but proper coordination and the development of effective allied efforts remains a problem.

11. Developing pay, promotion, facility, medical, disability, death benefit, and family contact systems and ratings. The US had often stressed leadership and morale in fits force development efforts and ignored the realities of what actually drives human behavior and capability – particularly in forces that have a high element of politicization, corruption, and weak capacity. Any effective SFA effort and system must address all of these issues as key potential problem areas.

12. Counterterrorism and irregular warfare: US force development efforts have often focused far too much on formal combat training, and too little on counterterrorism and irregular warfare. Talking about hybrid warfare is not enough. The US must find better ways to make it part of the force development effort.

13. Military mission: The US has experienced constant problems where it sought to develop forces for its view of the mission when this differed from key elements in a divided host country military and political structure. A force development effort that pretends there is agreement on the mission within a host country, or between the US and all key elements of the host country, has repeatedly create a climate of illusions that has presented serious problems in creating effective host country forces and operations in the field.


ix


xvi Matt Lauer, Interview with Secretary Gates, NBC, December 8, 2009.


Rolston, Capt. G.B. “Military Intelligence Mentorship in Kandahar Province: Limitations of the ‘Afghan Face’ Approach.” Speech to the Conference of Defence Studies Institute, Ottawa, ON, Canada, on 7 Oct 2009. Pg 8

Rolston, Capt. G.B. “Military Intelligence Mentorship in Kandahar Province: Limitations of the ‘Afghan Face’ Approach.” Speech to the Conference of Defence Studies Institute, Ottawa, ON, Canada, on 7 Oct 2009. Pg 12


